PURITA ALIPIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G.

JARING,
represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,
G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000.

Facts: Private respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond
in Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 1990. In
1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the
spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios
Manuel. The first installment was duly paid, but for the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation. Thus private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the
collection of the said amount before the trial court. In the alternative, he prayed
for
the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the
balance.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away and that the claim must be filed before
the estate of Placido.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
petitioner
was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded
in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her husband
merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. The Manuel spouses failed to file
their answer. For this reason, they were declared in default. Petitioner appealed
to
the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her motion
to dismiss. The CA denied her appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an
ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.

Ruling: No. Creditor Jaring cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an
ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the
conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the
settlement of estate of the decedent.

When Placido died, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved

and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate
proceedings in accordance with Rule 73 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.

The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator

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appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate
proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such
that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior
to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.

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 CIRILO LIM vs. BASILISA DIAZ-MILLAREZ,
G.R. No. L-17633, October 19, 1966.

Facts: Cirilo Lim filed a petition for his appointment as judicial administrator of
the estate of the late Jose Millarez, his uncle. The petition alleged that the
deceased
left no relatives such as descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except
collaterals. To the said petition, Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow
of
the late Jose Millarez, filed an opposition on two grounds: that the petitioner has
an
adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of the estate are the
subject
matter of a litigation between her as plaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant in a
pending civil case.

In the said civil case, where Basilisa is the plaintiff and Lim is the
defendant,
the issue is the ownership of the properties of the deceased. Basilisa alleges that
she is the legitimate widow of the deceased, while Lim contends that Basilisa was
not the legitimate spouse of the deceased. Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals,
it was established that Basilisa was indeed a legitimate spouse of the deceased for
23 years and that the subject property was conjugal.

In the hearing for the appointment of judicial administrator, both parties

manifested that there is an existing case between them over the question of
ownership of the property. Thus, the trial court dismissed the petition for
appointment. Lim filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals which certified the appeal to the Supreme Court
as there was no question of fact involved in the case.

Issue: Whether or not Lim can be appointed as judicial administrator of the estate
of Jose Millarez.

Held: No. Lim cannot be appointed as judicial administrator of the estate of Jose
Millarez on the ground that: (a) Lim, as a relative of the deceased, has some
interest adverse to that of Basilisa and (b) Lim have some liabilities to Basilisa
and
to the estate as a whole. As such, Lim cannot compatibly perform the duties of an
administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for
appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial

administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising
the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal
unless the said court is clearly in error.

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 THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL.vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-45460, February 25, 1938.

Facts: Petitioners, in behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,

claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by filing a petition for escheat in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna. Colegio de San Jose assailed the petition based
on the following grounds: (1) the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and
decide the case and (2) the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle
the
applicants to the remedy prayed for.

Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion asking for the dismissal or the
petition on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the same was
filed, is not applicable because it was not yet in force when the original owner of
the hacienda died.

The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the petition for escheat.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that Colegio De San Jose and
Young were interested parties in the petition.

2) Whether or not a demurrer to a petition is a prohibited pleading in escheat

proceedings.

3) Whether or not the Hacienda can be escheated in favour of the Municipality of

San Pedro.

Ruling:

1) No. Both Colegio De San Jose and Young were interested parties in the escheat
proceedings.

The jurisdictional facts which should be alleged in the petition for escheat
are: That a person has died intestate or without leaving any will; that he has left
real or personal property; that he was the owner thereof; that he has not left any
heir or person who is by law entitled to the property; and that the one who applies
for the escheat is the municipality where deceased had his last residence, or in
case
should have no residence in the country, the municipality where the property is
situated.

After the publication and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in
fact
the owner of real and personal property situated in the country and has not left
any
heirs or other person entitled thereto, it may order, after the payments of debts
and

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other legal expenses, the escheat, and in such case it shall adjudicate the
personal
property to the municipality where the deceased had his last place of residence and
the real property to the municipality or municipalities where they are situated.

Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a

deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving
any will or legal heirs. The proceeding, as provided by the rules, should be
commenced by petition and not by complaint.

In a special proceeding for escheat the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest
in
the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party
and
may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case the Colegio de
San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in
the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the former because it claims to be the
exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee
thereof under a contract legality entered with the former. In view of these
allegations it is erroneous to hold that the said parties are without right either
to
appear in case or to substantiate their respective alleged right.

2) No. A demurrer to a petition is a prohibited pleading in escheat proceedings.

The Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize the filing of a demurrer to
the petition are not applicable to special proceedings. However a motion to dismiss
using the grounds in a demurrer to a petition can be filed. In such case, the
motion
to dismiss plays the role of a demurrer and the court should resolve the legal
question raised therein.

3) No. The hacienda cannot be escheated in favor of the Municipality of San

Pedro.

According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their

right to
the escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society
of
Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order
of the King of Spain and passed from then on the Crown of Spain. As a result of
the war between Spain and the United States, the latter acquired by way of
transfer,
all the properties of the Crown of Spain in the Philippines, under the Treaty of
Peace entered into in Paris, and among which properties was included the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan. The said hacienda thereafter passed to the
Government of the Philippines Islands by virtue of the Act of the United States
Congress of July 1, 1992 (Philippine Bill), by mere administration for the benefit
of the inhabitant of the Philippines; and thereafter, under the Tydings-McDuffie

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law approved by the same Congress. In turn, the Untied States have ceded to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines all the properties and estate ceded by Spain,
among them being the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan.

If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan has already passed to the ownership
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot
claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer
the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs,
this being a condition required by the Code of Civil Procedure and without which a
petition for escheat should not lie. From the moment the hacienda was confiscated
by the Kingdom of Spain, it ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban
Rodriguez de Figueroa (the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father) and became
the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer
under the Treaty of Paris.