TORTS & DAMAGES person suffers injury.
Here, the level cross bar is
NAGUIAT v. NLRC GR 116123
GARCIA v. SALVADOR 168512
BARREDO v. GARCIA GR L-48006
PICART v. SMITH
FACTS
Plaintiff Picart is riding a pony along a bridge. While
driving his automobile, defendant Smith blew his horn
to give warning of his approach but quickly turned his
car to the right hitting Picart, as the horse fell and died
and it’s rider was thrown. Picart filed suit for damages
before RTC which dismissed the same and ruled in
favor of Smith. Undaunted, Plaintiff elevate the matter
to SC.
ISSUE
W/N Defendant in maneuvering his car was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage done.
RULING
Yes, Defendant is negligent and liable for the damage
incurred. This is so because the control of the situation
had then passed entirely to the defendant Smith.
Instead of avoiding the horse and it’s rider, he ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse and
hitting the same. The law considers what would be
reckless, blame worthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that. However, Picart is guilty also of
contributory negligence because he heard the horn but
goes to the right instead of going to the left. This could
only result to reduction of damages and not a bar for
his claim. Hence, Smith was guilty of negligence in
maneuvering his car such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done to Picart.
CUSI v. PNR
FACTS
On their way home from a party, Plaintiff Victorino
Cusi is driving his vauxhall car. When he proceeded in
the national highway and upon traversing the railroad,
a train hit them causing a mishap. It was owned by
Manila Railroad Co. Now Philippine National Railway
(PNR). The collision resulted to the possible
miscarriage of his wife Mrs. Pilar Cusi who is a music
and piano teacher. Mr. Cusi suffered brain injuries who
is a successful businessman. Then, Plaintiff filed suit
for damages before RTC which ruled in his favor.
Unsatisfied, PNR elevate the controversy to SC.
ISSUE
W/N Defendant PNR is liable for gross negligence.
RULING
Yes, Defendant is liable for gross negligence. Judge
Cooley defined negligence as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstance justly demand, whereby such other
raised. There is no flashing red light and no whistle
could be heard from the incoming train. There is also
no security guards on duty at the time of the incident.
The circumstances only goes to show the negligence on
the part of the Defendant PNR. Therefore, PNR is
grossly negligent and must answer the damages
caused thereof.
JARKO MKTG v. CA
FACTS
Respondent Criselda Aguilar is shopping together with
her 6 years old daughter in Syvels Dept. Store owned
by Petitioner Jarko Marketing Corp. Criselda were at
the second floor and while signing her credit card in
the counter she felt a gust of wind. She then beheld her
daughter Zhieneth on the floor crying for help, shocked
she asked assistance. Thereafter, the child lost her
speech at the Makati Medical Center and died 14 days
after the accident. Criselda filed suit for damages
before RTC which dismissed the same and ruled in
favor of Jarko due to lack of evidence. She appealed to
CA which reversed the trial court’s ruling. Undaunted,
Plaintiff Jarko appeal the case to SC.
ISSUE
W/N Petitioner is negligent for maintaining a defective
counter which is the proximate cause of the death of
Criselda’s daughter Zhieneth.
RULING
Yes, Jarko is liable for its negligence for maintaining a
defective counter. Accident and negligence are
intrinsically contradictory, one cannot exist with the
other. Accident is a fortuitous event happening without
human intervention. Negligence is the omission to do
something a reasonable man would do; or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. The negligence on the part of Jarko is obvious in
this case. One is the defective counter. Children below
9 years old are incapable of contributory negligence.
The child is not capable of contributory negligence as
she did not climb the counter. The act of Criselda in
letting go the hands of the child at that precise moment
of time while signing the credit card and slip is usual
and reasonable. Elsewise put, the gift-wrapping
counter is so defective. The letter L-shape is
dangerous. The top is heavy. It was shaky and not
nailed. In fact, they never nailed the counter, only after
the accident happened.
Therefore, Jarko is liable on the damage incurred by its
negligence.
CHILD LEARNING v. TAGORIO
FACTS
Respondent Timothy Tagorio is a grade IV pupil in
Mary Mount School operated and maintained by (CLC)
Child Learning Center Inc. By call of nature, Timothy
went to the comfort room in the third floor. He was
locked. Then he panicked. He went through the
window and fell down down three stories high. He
suffered injuries thereof. Then, Respondent through
his parents filed suit for damages before RTC which
ruled in his favor. It was affirmed by CA. Unsatisfied,
CLC elevate the controversy to SC.
ISSUE
W/N Petitioner CLC is negligent under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor.
RULING
Yes, CLC is liable for its negligence under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor. Art. 2176 NCC provides Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict. Here, CLC failed to install iron grill in the
window of the CR. It also failed to have a functioning
lock set doorknob. For this reason, it failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence to rebut the presumption of
the law regarding negligence. Therefore, Petitioner
CLC is liable for its negligence under the doctrine that
the thing speaks for itself.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
ILAO-ORETA v. RONQUILLO
FACTS
Petitioner Ilao-Oreta is an OB-gyne working on St.
Lukes Medical Center. By reason of infertility,
Respondents Sps. Ronquillo engaged Doctor Ilao-Oreta
and Eva agreed to undergo laparascopic procedure and
scheduled it on April 05, 1999. The doctor went to a
honeymoon in hawaii and she estimated that she
would arrive in Manila in the early morning of the
scheduled operation. However, she failed to consider
the time difference between Hawaii and Philippines.
So, she failed to conduct the said operation that day. By
such, the Spouses filed suit for damages before RTC
which ruled in their favor. It was affirmed by CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/N Petitioner is guilty of gross negligence.
RULING
No, Petitioner Dr. Ilao-Oreta is not guilty of gross
negligence. Gross negligence implies a want or absence
of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. Here, Petitioner left an admitting
order with her secretary and instructed the hospital
staff to perform pre-operative treatments. This reflects
an earnest effort and intention to perform the
procedure on that day. Besides, the situation did not
present clear injury, for the only purpose of which is to
determine the real cause of infertility and not to treat a
life threatening disease. Furthermore, the honeymoon
justifies the excitement which attend and affect her
performance. Wherefore, Petitioner is not guilty of
gross negligence because of her due diligent efforts.
AMEDO v. RIO INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Amedo is the mother of Filomeno
Manguit. Filomeno is a seaman of Merchant Ship
owned by Respondent Rio Inc.. In an incident,
Filomeno jumped into the water to recover a 2 peso
bill belonging to him, as a result he was drowned.
Petitioner then filed suit for damages before Regional
Trial Court which ruled in favor of Respondent.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Elena
Amedo elevate the controversy before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Company should be held liable for
the death of Filomeno.
RULING:
No, Respondent Company should not be held liable for
the death of Filomeno. This is so because the death of
Petitioner’s son was caused by Filomeno himself by his
notorious negligence of jumping into the sea. Gross
negligence is meant such entire want of care as to raise
a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the
probable consequences of carelessness, and is
indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or
property of others.In the case at bar, the act of jumping
into the sea is a negligent act attributable only to
Filomeno because the danger which entails being clear,
patent and obvious. Hence, Respondent Rio Inc. should
not be held liable for the death of Filomeno.
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
PICART v. SMITH [supra]
SICAM v. JORGE
FACTS
Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with
Agencia de R. C. Sicam to secure a loan. On October 19,
1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took
away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the
pawnshop vault. Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her
of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in
the pawnshop on the same date. Respondent Lulu then
wrote back expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam
to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on
November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint
against Sicam with the RTC of Makati seeking
indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry
amounting to P272, 000.00, and attorney’ fees (AF) of
P27, 200.00. The RTC rendered its decision dismissing
respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’
counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision
to the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the
appellees to pay appellants the actual value of the lost
jewelry and AF. Petitioners denied, hence the instant
petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners liable for the loss of the
pawned articles in their possession?
HELD
Yes. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Article 1174
of the Civil Code provides: Except in cases expressly
specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared
by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not
enough that the event should not have been foreseen
or anticipated, but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
Petitioners failed to show that they were free from any
negligence to the loss of the pawned jewelry. In order
for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
necessary that one has committed no negligence or
misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. The
very measures which petitioners had allegedly
adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery
was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and
anticipated.
In connection to Article 1173 of the Civil Code further
provides: The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contract does not
state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of
a family shall be required. The records show that the
petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation. Sicam’s testimony revealed
that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. It was
also established that there is no sufficient precaution
and vigilance that were adopted by petitioners to
protect the pawnshop from the robbery because Sicam
admits that the vault was open at the time of robbery.
Hence, Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the
operation of their pawnshop business
CORINTHIAN GARDENS v. TANJUANGCOS
FACTS
Tanjuangcos owned joined lots in Corinthian Gardens.
Spouse Cuasos, on the other hand, own a lot adjacent
to the former’s. Before the Cuasos constructed their
house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty (surveyor) as
per recommendation of the petitioner association.
Later on, the petitioner approved the plans made by
CB Paras Construction (builder). Corinthian conducted
periodic ocular inspections in order to determine
compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the
Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC).
Unfortunately, after construction, the perimeter fence
of the Cuasos’ encroached upon the Tanjuangcos’ lot.
ISSUE
Whether or not Corinthian was negligent under the
circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence
contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjuangcos?
HELD
Corinthian is negligent. Its approval of the plan is
tainted with negligence. Petitioner is found negligent
under the TEST. The MRRC provides that no new
constructions can be started without the approval of
the petitioner association. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in
the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of
periodic inspections of on-going construction projects
within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring
compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the
construction of perimeter walls. Corinthian’s failure to
prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter
wall into Tanjuangcos’ property – despite the
inspection conducted – constitutes negligence and, at
the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the
Tanjuangcos.
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
HEIRS OF COMPLETO v. ALBAYADA
FACTS
At around 1:45 in the afternoon of August 27, 1997, a
Toyota Corolla Taxi being driven by Redentor
Completo, owned and operated by co-petitioner
Elpidio Abiad and a bicycle rode by the herein
respondent, Amando Albayda Jr., figured in a mishap
along the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets, Villamor
Air Base leaving a deep indentation on the rear right of
the taxicab and causing serious physical injuries on the
part of the respondent. Albayda was brought to the
Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside
VAB. However, he was immediately transferred to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center
(AFPMC) on V. Luna Road, Quezon City, because there
was a fracture on his left knee and there was no
orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH. From August 21,
1997 until February 11, 1998, he was confined therein.
He was again hospitalized at PAFGH from February 23,
1998 until March 22, 1998. The respondent filed a
complaint for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Completo before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City, where Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil action
for damages against petitioners Completo and Abiad.
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision,
the judgment if which favoured the herein plaintiff
[Albayda] and against the defendants [Completo and
Abiad].
ISSUES
1. Whether or not CA erred in finding that Completo
was the one who caused the collision.
2. Whether or not Abiad failed to prove that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a family.
3. Whether or not the award of moral and temperate
damages and attorney’s fees to Albayda had no basis.
HELD
1. No. As stated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which
provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In
this regard, the question of the motorist’s negligence is
a question of fact. It was proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in driving the taxicab because due to
overspeeding. Such negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the serious physical injuries
sustained by Albayda
2. Yes. Under article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their employees,
but the employer’s responsibility shall cease upon
proof that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of
their employees.
3. No. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less
than compensatory damages, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty. Moral damages are
awarded in qausi-delicts causing physical injuries. The
permanent deformity and the scar left by the wounds
suffered by Albayda will forever be a reminder of the
pain and suffering that he had endured and continues
to endure because of petitioner’s negligence.
PACIS v. MORALES
FACTS
Alfred Dennis Pacis, 17 years old, died due to a gunshot
wound in the head which he sustained while he was at
the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store. The gun
store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome
Jovanne Morales. The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis
Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of
the gun store for repair. The gun was left by defendant
Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun
store. Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His
employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular
caretaker of the gun store, was also not around. He left
earlier and requested sales agents Matibag and
Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and
defendant Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted to
Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the
gun store which included the key to the drawer where
the fatal gun was kept. Matibag and Herbolario later
brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on
top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the
young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun.
The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It
went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the
head.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. It
held that respondent is civilly liable for the death of
Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. The trial court held that the accidental
shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partly
due to the negligence of respondent’s employee
Aristedes Matibag. Respondent appealed to the CA. It
reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. The CA ruled that there is no negligence
on the part of the respondent and the death of Alfred
Pacis was an accident.
ISSUE
Whether or not the death of Alfred Pacis an accident?
HELD
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm
inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled
the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition
must maintain basic security and safety requirements
of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate
Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a
higher degree of care is required of someone who has
in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character,
such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby.
Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which
involve little or no risk, a business dealing with
dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to
avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the
guns in his store are not loaded. Respondent was
clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair
and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first
that it was not loaded. Furthermore, it was not shown
in this case whether respondent had a License to
Repair which authorizes him to repair defective
firearms to restore its original composition or enhance
or upgrade firearms. Clearly, respondent did not
exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of care
required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons,
as would exempt him from liability in this case.
CHILDREN
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD
FACTS
Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty
fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite
scattered in the premises behind its power plant.
Fifteen year old David Taylor is a son of a mechanical
engineer.
Two years before the incident David spent four months
at sea, as a cabin boy on an interisland transports.
Later he took up work in his father's office, learning
mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It
appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and
physically than most boys his age.
David, along with Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the
premises of the defendant without permission. While
playing, the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked
some pieces and brought them home. In the presence
of Jessie, a 9 year old girl , The two boys made a series
of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of
the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no
result. Next, they tried to break the cap with a stone
and failed. They then opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the
cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the
boys and to Jesse. This action was brought by the
plaintiff, through his father, to recover damages for the
injuries which he suffered.
ISSUE
Whether or not the company was liable for the injury
sustained by plaintiff?
HELD
The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances,
the negligence of the defendant of leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
of the injury. When the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own acts, he
cannot recover damages for the injury. The immediate
cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiff’s
injury, was his own act in putting a match to the
contents of the cap. True, David Taylor may not have
known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the
ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did
not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred,
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had
sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of
the danger to which he exposed himself when he put
the match to the contents of the cap; that his age and
his experience qualified him to understand the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless
act, so that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the negligence of
the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
JARCO MKTG v. CA [supra]
EXPERTS
CULION ICE v. PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORP.
FACTS
Cranston decided to have the engine on Gwendoline
changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil
burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost
of running the boat. He made inquiries from the
Philippine Motors Corporation and conferred with C.E.
Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job. Upon
preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the
conclusion that the principal thing necessary to
accomplish the end in view was to install a new
carburetor. In the course of the preliminary work upon
the carburetor and its connections, it was observed
that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline,
or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part
of the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to
Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of
the matter and said that, when the engine had gotten
to running well, the flooding would disappear. The
boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run, the
engine stopped a few times and connection again had
to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start.
After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer,
switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture.
A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the
carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent
parts were covered with a mass of flames, the
Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk. The salvage
from the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of
P150. The value of the boat, before the accident
occurred, as the court found, was P10,000.00.
ISSUE
Whether or not the loss of the boat was chargeable to
the negligence and lack of skill of Quest?
HELD
YES. The loss of the boat was chargeable to the
negligence and lack of skill of Quest. Ordinarily a back
fire from an engine would not be followed by any
disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line
and the flooding of the carburetor had created a
dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed
in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions
to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the
fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel
improperly mixed. In this connection it must be
remembered that when a person holds himself out as
being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. Quest did not
use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on
boats.
There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible
harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of
the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from
accident, but this accident was in no sense an
unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but
for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of
liability is not whether the jury was accidental in a
sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. We
therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this
accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in
effecting the changes which Quest undertook to
accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to
the exact manner in which the accident occurred might
appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin
of the fire is not so inscrutable as to enable us to say
that it was casus fortuitus.
NEGLIGENCE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE
 DEFINITION
VDA. DE BATACLAN v. MEDINA
FACTS
The passenger bus of Medina Transportation, owned
by respondent Mariano Medina, turned turtle on its
way to Pasay. The gasoline from the bus leaked. People
from the vicinity came to the rescue of the passengers.
One of the rescuers carried a torch as the accident area
is dark. As the rescuer approached the bus, it ignited
the bus from the leaked gasoline which caused the
death of four people including Bataclan.
ISSUE
Whether or not the overturning of the bus is the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.
RULING
Yes. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is
set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen
after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend
that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response
to the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30
in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what
was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected
and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call
for outside help.
Proximate Cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC
FACTS
Private respondent Dionisio was on his way home
from a cocktail party on the night of the accident.
According to him, the headlights of his car suddenly
turned off and when it turned back on, he was already
near the askewed parked dump truck owned by
Phoenix Construction. As a result, the car of Dionisio
hit the dump truck causing injuries to private
respondent Dionisio.
ISSUE
Whether or not the parked dump truck is the
proximate cause of the accident which resulted in the
injuries of Dionisio.
RULING
Yes. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and
of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other
words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship between
petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and
the accident and respondent's injuries on the other
hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner,
the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to
distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and
the existing "conditions" upon which that cause
operated. If the defendant has created only a passive
static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact
of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are
the result of other active forces which have gone
before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the
premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as
much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since
that is the very risk which the defendant has created,
the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect
liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who fans into it a month
afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional
mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces
set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in
a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is
important but the nature of the risk and the character of
the intervening cause.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence
far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision between the dump truck and the private
respondent's car would in an probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our
view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore
closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as
an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable
consequent manner which the truck driver had parked
the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and
others similarly situated not to impose upon them the
very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and
overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more
from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause
is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably
to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason
to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the
defendant may be negligence among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant
may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who
sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary,
usual and customary wind arising later wig spread it
beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to
take precautions to prevent that event. The person
who leaves the combustible or explosive material
exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire
from some independent source. ... In all of these cases
there is an intervening cause combining with the
defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each
case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to
protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
FERNANDO v. CA
FACTS
There was a bidding for the re-emptying of the public
market septic tank. One of the bidding party together
with four other companions, without clearance from
the city engineering office, entered the septic tank. As a
result, the five men were found dead. The autopsy
report stated that they died of Asphyxia caused by
diminution of oxygen supply.
ISSUE
Whether or not the City of Davao is liable to the death
of the five men.
RULING
No. It would appear that an accident such as toxic gas
leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen
unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case
at bar occurred because the victims on their own and
without authority from the public respondent opened
the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of
emptying a septic tank especially one which has not
been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person
should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident.
Thus, the appellate court was correct to observe that:
. . . Could the victims have died if they did not open the
septic tank which they were not in the first place
authorized to open? Who between the passive object
(septic tank) and the active subject (the victims
herein) who, having no authority therefore, arrogated
unto themselves, the task of opening the septic tank
which caused their own deaths should be responsible
for such deaths. How could the septic tank which has
been in existence since the 1950's be the proximate
cause of an accident that occurred only on November
22, 1975? The stubborn fact remains that since 1956
up to occurrence of the accident in 1975 no injury nor
death was caused by the septic tank. The only
reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the
above is that the victims' death was caused by their
own negligence in opening the septic tank.
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. CA
FACTS
Jose Bernardo was an owner of a stall in the public
market of Baguio. He sells pork and beef meat. On that
unfortunate day, he was about to receive the meat
delivery on the parked jeepney when he was
electrocuted, as he was about to board the jeepney,
which caused his death. It turned out that the antenna
of the jeepney is entangled with an open electric wire
at the top of the meat stall.
ISSUE
Whether or not BENECO is liable for the death of the
victim.
RULING
Yes. There is no question that as an electric
cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in
supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet
province, its primordial concern is not only to
distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to
ensure the safety of the public by the proper
maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. It is clear to us
then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving
unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point
between the service drop line and the service entrance
conductor, which connection was only eight (8) feet
from the ground level, in violation of the Philippine
Electrical Code. BENECO's contention that the accident
happened only on January 14, 1985, around seven (7)
years after the open wire was found existing in 1978,
far from mitigating its culpability, betrays its gross
neglect in performing its duty to the public.[4] By
leaving an open live wire unattended for years,
BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the
safety of the public.Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was
an accident that was bound to happen in view of the
gross negligence of BENECO.
BENECO theorizes in its defense that the death of Jose
Bernardo could be attributed to the negligence of
Canave, Jr., in parking his jeepney so close to the
market stall which was neither a parking area nor a
loading area, with his antenna so high as to get
entangled with an open wire above the Dimasupil
store.[5] But this line of defense must be
discarded. Canave's act of parking in an area not
customarily used for that purpose was by no means
the independent negligent act adverted to by BENECO
in citing Manila Electric Co. v. Ronquillo.[6] Canave was
well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area
where there was no showing that any municipal law or
ordinance was violated nor that there was any
foreseeable danger posed by his act. One thing
however is sure, no accident would have happened had
BENECO installed the connections in accordance with
the prescribed vertical clearance of fifteen (15) feet.
THE “CAUSE”
PROXIMATE
MERCURY DRUG v. BAKING
FACTS
Mr. Baking went to the Doctor for a checkup. He was
given prescription by the doctor for his blood sugar.
Mr. baking went to the Drug store to buy the
prescribed medicines. It turned out that the saleslady
misread the prescription to be Dormicum, a potent
sleeping pill, instead of Diamicron. Unaware of the
wrong dispensing of the drug, Mr. Baking took one pill
in the morning going to work. While driving, Mr.
Baking fell asleep causing his car to collide with
another car and resulted to his injuries.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mercury Drug’s wrongful dispensing of
drug is the proximate cause of Mr. Baking’s injuries.
RULING
Yes. It is generally recognized that the drugstore
business is imbued with public interest. The health and
safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if
drugstore employees will not exercise the highest
degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of
fact, we defer to the findings of the trial court affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent
in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the
prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake
could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient,
the said employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. She should have verified
whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed
the one prescribed by his physician. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and
the skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a
combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident
could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee
been careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without
the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it
was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while
driving his car, resulting in a collision.
PILIPINAS BANK v. CA
FACTS
Private respondent issued post-dated to cover the
purchases he made. To cover these checks, he
instructed Roberto Santos to make the deposits to his
current account with petitioner Bank. In order to effect
the transfer of funds from his savings to his current
account, Santos inquired from the bank teller the
current account number of private respondent
Florencio Reyes. The deposits then went to another
account in the name of Florencio Amador, instead of
Florencio Reyes. As a result, the checks drawn by
Reyes bounced.
ISSUE
Whether or not the bank’s negligence is the proximate
cause of the incident which tarnished the name of
private respondent.
RULING
Yes. First. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it
must be established that private respondent's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well
defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have
occurred and from which it ought to have been forseen
or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case
that the injury complained of or some similar injury,
would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence." In the case at bench, the proximate
cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's
employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of
private respondent in the name of another depositor
who had a similar first name.
As held by the trial court:
…applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis,
deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care
required in the performance of his duties. As earlier
stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in
the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption
that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger
without, however, going through the full name, is the
same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should
have continuously gone beyond mere assumption,
which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded
with clear certainty, considering the amount involved
and the repercussions it would create on the totality of
the person notable of which is the credit standing of
the person involved should a mistake happen. The
checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his
business were dishonored by the bank because the
ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance
insufficient to cover the face value of checks.
CONCURRENT
FAR EASTERN v. CA
FACTS
M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR,
owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC) arrived at the port of Manila from
Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o’clock in
the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority
(PPA) to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Gavino
was tasked by Manila Pilot’s Association (MPA) to
conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel. Gavino boarded the vessel and stationed
himself in the bridge. After briefing Gavino of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel, lifted
anchor. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for
docking maneuvers that time. However when the
vessel reached the landmark, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped and the anchor be drop. The left
anchor were dropped however, the anchor did not take
hold as expected resulting the bow of the vessel
rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel as well
sustained damage too.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT GAVINO AND MPA ARE SOLELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RESULTING DAMAGES
SUSTAINED BY THE PIER
HELD
The well-established rule is that pilot associations are
immune to vicarious liability for the tort of their
members. They are not the employer of their members
and exercises no control over them once they take the
helm of the vessel. They are also not partnerships
because the members do not function as agents for the
association or for each other. Pilot’s associations are
also not liable for negligently assuring the competence
of their members because as professional associations
they made no guarantee of the professional conduct of
their members to the general public. Article 1207 of
the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states or when
the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
REMOTE
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. REMOQUILLO
FACTS
Efren Magno went to his stepbrother’s 3-story house to
fix a leaking ‘media agua” (downspout). He climbed up
to the media agua which was just beow the 3rd floor
window and stood on it to receive a galvanized iron
sheet through the said window. After grabbing hold of
the sheet, he turned around and a portion of the iron
sheet he was holding came into contact with an
electric wire of Manila electric Company strung 2.5 ft.
parallel to the edge of the media agua, electrocuting
him and killing him. His widow and children filed a suit
to recover damages from the company and the court
rendered judgment in their favor. The company
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment then later appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner company is liable to the
death of Magno.
HELD
No. It merely provided the condition from which the
cause arose (it set the stage for the cause of the injury
to occur). A prior and remote cause (which furnishes
the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which an
injury ws made possible) cannot be the basis of an
action if a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury intervenes between such prior and
remote cause and the injury. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation and circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. We
fail to see how the company could be held guilty of
negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To us it is
clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act
of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire
to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter’s length of 6 feet.
The real cause of the accident or death was the
reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he
was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua
just below the third story window, it is to be presumed
that due to his age and experience he was qualified to
do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had
training and experience for the job. So, he could not
have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the
danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the
instant case, his training and experience failed him,
and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-ft
iron sheet with both hands and at arm’s length,
evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence
and discretion to the winds, he turned around
swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby
causing his own electrocution.
INTERVENING
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC [supra]
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
PLDT v. CA
FACTS
The jeep of spouses Esteban is running along the inside
lane of the street when it had ran over a mound of
earth and fell into an open trench. It was an excavation
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. Accordingly, spouses
Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left
uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the
lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of which,
the spouses met an accident and sustained injuries.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY
SPOUSES ESTEBAN WERE THE RESULT OF THEIR
OWN NEGLIGENCE
HELD
The accident which befall private respondents was due
to the lack of diligence of respondent Esteban and was
not imputable to negligent omission on the part of
PLDT. The negligent of Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but
goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident
and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
The perils of the road were known to, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, Esteban could have
avoided the injurious consequences of his act.
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
AFRICA v. CALTEX
FACTS
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station. It started
while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread and burned house including
personal properties. Certain reports on fire were
prepared by the Manila Police Department and Fire
Department and Capt. Tinio of AFP. Capt. Tinio’s report
was an information given by certain Benito Morales
and what the chief of fire department had told him on
the same subject.
The Trial Court and Court of Appeals found that
petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondents had exercised due care. The foregoing
reports were ruled out as double hearsay by the Court
of Appeals hence inadmissible. Thus this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply to presume negligence on the part of
resppndents.
HELD
For the doctrine Res Ipsa Loquitur to apply, the
requisites were a) the accident is of a kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of one’s
negligence; b) it is caused by an instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant; and c) the
possibility of contributing conduct that would make
the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the instant
case, the gasoline station with all its appliances were
under the control of respondent. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were
respondents and their employees. It is fair and
reasonable that the incident happened because of want
of care. The negligence of the employees was the
proximate cause of the fire, which is the ordinary
course of thing, did not happen. Therefore, the
petitioners are entitled to the award of damages.
F.F CRUZ v. CA
FACTS
The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner is
situated adjacent to the residence of Mable. Mable first
approached the plant manager of petitioner, to request
that a firewall be constructed between the shop and
Mable’s residence. The request was repeated several
times. Then fire broke out in petitioner’s shop. The fire
spread to Mable’s house. Both the shop and the house
were razed to the ground.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE INJURY COMPLAINED OF IS
CAUSED BY THE PETITIONER
HELD
When the thing which caused the injury complained of
is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant that the accident arose
from want of care. The facts of the case call for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor,
considering that in the normal course of operations of
a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible materials
such as wood chips, paint, varnish and fuel may be
found.
D.M CONSUNJI v. CA
FACTS
On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, Jr., a construction
worker of D.M. Consunji fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower City to his death. Based on the
police report, it is thus manifest that Jose Juego was
crushed to de rath when the platform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. The falling of the
platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting
points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock. On may 9, 1991, Maria Juego, filed in the
RTC. a complaint for damages against the deceased
employer. The employer’ss defense was the arrailment
of the widow of the benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. the RTC ruled in faaavor of the widow. Maria
Juego. On appeal by herein petitioner, the court of
appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding
that the doctrine of res epsa loquitor is applicable to
prove negligence on the part of the petitioner.
RULING
No. the effect of the doctrine is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
elevator was as a result of the person having charge of
the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule, the
doctrine is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognize that prima facie negligence maybe
established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. While
negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and
while the mere happening of an accident or inquiry
will not generally give rise to an inference or
presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor, which literally mean, the thing or transaction
speak for itself, the facts or circumstances
accompanying an injury maybe such as to raise a
presumption or at least permit an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant or some other
person who is charged with negligence. The CA held
that all requisites res ipsa loquitor are present in the
case at bar petitioner does not cite any other evidence
to reout the inference or presumption of negligence
arising from the application of res ipsa loquitor, or to
established any defense any defense relating to the
incident.
CAPILI v. CARDANA
FACTS
On February 1, 1993. Jasmin Cardana was walking
along the perimeter fence of San Roque Elementary
School when a branch of a caimito tree located within
the school premises fell on her, causing her
instantaneous death. Thus her parents – herein
respondents –filed a case for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
alleging that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of
foresight caused the death of their daughter. Petitoner
denied the accusation that she know that the tree was
dead and rotting. On February 5, 1996. the trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents
to established negligence on the part of petitioner.
However.this decision was reversed by the court of
appeals. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence. this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is negligent and liable for
the death of Jasmin Cardana.
RULING
Yes. petitioner is negligent and shall be held liable for
death of Jasmin Cardana. A negligent act is an
inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from
a lack of ordinary prudence and maybe one which
creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to
another because of the expectable action of the other, a
third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A
negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent
person in the actors position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk
of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or
to do it in a more careful manner.
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting
tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger
that is foreseeable as the school principal, petitioner
was task to see to the maintenance of the school
grounds and safety of the children within the school
and its premises that she was unaware of the rotten
state of a tree whose falling branch had cause the
death of the child speaks in of her discharge of the
responsibility of her position. The fact that
respondents daughter died as a result of the dead and
rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that
the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone
passing by and calls for application of the principle of
res ipsa loquitur. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that
the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting
tree which cause the death of respondent’s daughter
was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge
of the school.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
CASTILLEX v. VASQUEZ
FACTS
On August 28, 1988, Romeo Vasquez was driving a
Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmena Rotonda. On
the other hand, Benjamin Abad, manager of petitioner,
driving a Toyota Hilux, drove a company car, instead of
going around the Osmena Rotonda made a shortcut
against the flow of the traffic. The two collided with
each other causing the death of Vasquez. A criminal
case was file against Abad but was dismissed for
failure o prosecute, so the present action for damages
was filed by private respondents,, parents of the
deceased against petitioner. The trial court ruled in
favor of respondents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
ruled affirming the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not an employer may be held vicariously
liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company
issued vehicle.
RULING
No. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment. It has been held that an
employee who uses his employer’s vehicle in going
from his work to a place were he intends to eat or in
returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting
within the scope of his employment in the absence of
evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer.
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of
work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of
the employee and not a part of his services to
employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere
performance of his services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within
the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employer’s vehicle. An employer who loans his motor
vehicle to an employee for the latter’s personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable
for the employee’s negligence operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use, even where the
employer contemplates that a regularly assigned
motor vehicle may be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is
some incidental benefit to employer. In the case at bar,
it is undisputed that Abad did some overtime work at
the petitioner’s office, which was located in
Cabangcalan, Mandaue City.
To the mind of the court, Abad was engaged in affairs
of his own not in line with his duties.
VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC RULES
US v. CRANE
FACTS
On February 10, 1914. Mariano Crame was driving a
motor vehicle along calle heran when he collided with
and running over the body of George B. Coomos. a
private in the United States Army. who was then
crossing Calle Heran. The accident caused injuries.
wounds and bruses that have deranged the mental
facilities cosmos. The trial court convicted the accused
of the crime of producing serious physical injuries by
imprudence teneraria. Hence. this petitions.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mariano Crame shall be held liable.
RULING
Yes. Mariano Crame is liable. As establisheb by
evidence. it is clear that the accused was driving on the
right hand side of the street when the accident
happened. According to the law of the road and the
custom of the country he should have been n the left
hand side of the street. According to the evidence there
was abundant room for him to drive upon what may
properly be called the left- hand side of the street and
still be free from danger of risk. We regard it clear
from the record that the accused was driving much
faster than he claims he was or else he was negligence
in not watching the street for foot passengers or in the
handing of hid automobile. It is a matter of common
knowledge that an automobile being driven at 10-
miles an hour can be stopped if necessity requires it.
BLTB v. IAC
FACTS
On August 11, 1978. a collision between Bus No. 1046
of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus company. driven
by Armando Pon and Bus no. 404 of Superlines
Transportation Company driven by Ruben Dasco took
place at the highway traversing Isabong, Tayabas.
Quezon which resulted to the death of Anecito Rosales,
Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several
injuries to Nena Rosales and Bylon Sales. Evidence
shows that the BLTB Bus NO. W46 was negotiating the
bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera
car just as Bus no. 404 was coming from the opposite
direction. Armando Pon made a belated attempt to
slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his
proper lane but was unsuccessful. Separate cases were
filed in the CFI of Marinduque against BLTB and
superlines together with their drivers praying for
damages. etc. the lower court exonerated Superlines
and its driver from liability and attributed sole
responsibility to dependants BLTB and its driver. The
decision was affirmed by the appellate court.
ISSUE
Whether or not herein petitioners shall be held liable.
RULING
Yes the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence of the driver of BLTB bus, who recklessly
operated and drove said bus by overtaking a Ford
Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend of
the highway which was divided into two lanes by a
continous yellow strip. It is well settled that a driver
abandoning his proper Lane for the porpuse of
overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has
the duty to see that the road is clear and not to proceed
if he cannot do it safely.
Armando Pon should have remembered that when a
motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there
is a special necessity for keeping to the right side of the
road and the driver has not the right to drive on the
left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the
right if a car is approaching from the opposite
direction comes into view. Unless there is proof to the
contrary. it is presumed that aperson driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic violation. In failing to
observe these simple precautions, BLTB’S driver
undoubtedly failed to act with the diligence demanded
by circumstances.
GUILLANG v. BEDANIA
FACTS
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon,
petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his
brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction
sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo
Highway (highway) in Cavite. At the other side of the
highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania)
was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck with plate
no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. The truck
was owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva).
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard
Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the
truck entered the opposite lane of the highway,
Genaros car hit the right portion of the truck. The truck
dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of
the road. As a consequence, all the passengers of the
car were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical
Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of
severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to the
Philippine General Hospital.
However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the
injuries he sustained from the collision. The car was a
total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.
On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo,
Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero[5] instituted a
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
respondents Bedania and de Silva. On 5 December
2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioners. The trial court found Bedania grossly
negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by
making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due
regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists.
On 3 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision in favor of respondents, for lack of merit.
ISSUE
Whether or not Bedania was grossly negligent for
recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden
U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic
rules and the safety of other motorists.
RULING
Yes, there is a presumption that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.In this
case, the trial court found that the traffic Accident
Investigation Report showed that the truck committed
a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal
lights. The trial court added that Bedania violated
another traffic rule when he abandoned the victim
after the collision. Bedania was grossly negligent in his
driving and held liable for damages.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause
of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and
injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which,
in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred.[40] The cause of the collision is traceable to
the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was
executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all
probability would not have happened. The sudden U-
turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious
risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent
or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn
triggered a series of events that led to the collision and,
ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of
petitioners.
POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS WEAPONS &
SUBSTANCES [ART. 2188]
DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE
PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE IS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE
BERNARDO v. LEGASPI
FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of Court of First
Instance, Manila dismissing the complaint on the
merits filed in an action to recover damages for
injuries. Due to the collision between the respective
automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, Bernardo filed
an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
his car which he alleged that Legaspi’s negligence is
the cause of said collision. Legaspi, on the other hand,
filed a cross-claim alleging it was Bernardo’s fault and
also ask for damages. The Lower Court found upon
evidence that both petitioner and defendant were
negligent in handling their automobiles and that said
negligence prevent them from recovering.
ISSUE
Whether or not the parties may recover damages.
RULING
No. The court ruled that where two automobiles, going
in opposite side/directions, collide on turning a street
corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found
by the Trial Court that the drivers were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the occurrence of
the collision, neither of the parties can recover
damages.
PLDT v. CA [supra]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. REMOQUILLO
[supra]
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE [ART. 2179]
RAKES v. ATLANTIC GULF GR L-1719
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD [supra]
CADIENTE v. MACAS GR 161946
LIMITATIONS ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
PICART v. SMITH [supra]
LAPANDA v. ANGALA 525 SCRA 229
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
HIDALGO v. BALANDAN 91 PHIL 488
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD [supra]
RES IPSA LIQUITOR
CAPILI v. CARDANA [supra]
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AFIALDA v. HISOLE
FACTS
Loreto Afialda was employed by the Basilio Hisole and
Francisco Hisole as caretaker of their carabaos at a
fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while tending
the animals, without any fault from Afialda or any force
majeure, he was gored by one of them and later died as
a consequence of his injuries.Plaintiff herein, who is
the sister of the deceased, filed an action a civil action
for damages from injury caused by the animal.Plaintiff
seeks to hold defendants liable under Article 1905 of
the Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage
should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who may have suffered it.
(Art. 2182 of the New Civil Code) The lower court
ruled that in Art. 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of
an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker
of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had
been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the
same code.(Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code).
ISSUE
Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when
damage is caused to its caretaker?
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that Art. 1905 of the Civil
Code names the possessor or user of the animal as the
person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this
for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has
the custody and control of the animal and is therefore
the one in a position to prevent it from causing
damage. In the present case, the animal was in custody
and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid
for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's
business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation
which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
PICART v. SMITH [supra]
ONG v. MWD
FACTS
Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers
went to the swimming pool operated by Metropolitan
Water District (MWD). The swimming pools of MWD
are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line,
oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The
bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as
to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools. MWD
employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had
taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on
schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such
a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look
after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse
and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with
oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards
who are available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be
going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke. No
one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed
someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the
lifeguard in attendant (Abaño), who immediately dove
into the water. The body was later identified as
Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived multiple
times but of no avail. The parents of Ong sued MWD
averring that MWD was negligent in selecting its
employees. During trial, the elder brother of Ong and
one other testified that Abaño was reading a magazine
and was chatting with a security guard when the
incident happened and that he was called a third time
before he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even
assuming that there was no negligence on the part of
MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of “Last Clear
Chance” for having the last opportunity to save the
Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
ISSUE
Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of
Dominador Ong.
HELD
No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent
in selecting its employees as all of them were duly
certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the
pools as there were proper safety measures and
precautions/regulations that were placed all over the
pools. Hence, due diligence is appreciated as a
complete and proper defense in this case. Further, the
testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other
witness was belied by the statements they have given
to the investigators when they said that the lifeguard
immediately dove into the water when he was called
about the boy at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no
application here. It was not established as to how
Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to
the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned not
until his body was retrieved from the bottom of the big
pool. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act
instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going
to the big pool if he did not see him go there), and if the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury.
GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. IAC
FACTS
Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos
were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated
Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it
approached from the South Lizada Bridge going
towards the direction of Davao City. At about that time,
the cargo truck driven by defendant Paul Zacarias,
coming from the opposite direction had just crossed
said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the
bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a
consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias
was unhurt. The trial court dismissed the case for
damages for insufficiency of evidence. However, the
Court of Appeals revesed the decision. It found
Zacarias to be negligent and his negliegence gave rise
to the presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer, and their liability is both primary and
solidary.

ISSUE
Whether or not Zacarias should be held liable because
of his negligence.
RULING
No, Zacarias should not be held liable. The truck was
inside its own lane when the accident occurred,
Zacharias had no duty to swerve out of the jeep’s way.
Moreover, there was no actionable responsibility for
the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had a full
view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one
hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a
speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The
private respondents have admitted that the truck was
already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And
they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners'
imputation that they also admitted the truck had been
brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters
away.27 From these facts the logical conclusion
emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance
to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of
thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which
he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of
only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity
of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to
expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck
to swerve and leave him a clear path.
PANTRANCO v. BAESA
FACTS
Spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children,
together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with
their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were
aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at
Malalam River. The group rode in the passenger
jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the
registered owner thereof. While they were proceeding
towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus
encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a
curve, and collided with it. As a result of the accident
David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa
and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa,
died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries.
Private respondents filed separate actions for damages
arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. The
trial court rendered judgement against PANTRANCO.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision reducing
the damages. PANTRANCO files a motion for
reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit, hence
this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an
error for not applying the doctrine of last clear chance.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error. The
doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it appears that
the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine
of last clear chance finds no application in this case.
For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it. In this case, there is
nothing to show that David Ico knew of the impending
danger. When he saw at a distance that the
approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did
not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that
the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite
direction.
Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco
bus was speeding towards Manila. By the time David
Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning
to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the
jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed
at which the approaching bus was running prevented
David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right
shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision.
Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived
the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he
had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that
the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered."
PRESCRIPTION
FERRER v. ERICTA
FACTS
Mr. And Mrs. Franis Pfleider were the owners or
operators of a Ford pick-up car. At about 5pm of
December 31, 1970, their son, defendant Dennis, who
was only 16 at the time, without proper official
authority, drove the ford, without due regard to traffic
rules and regulations, and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent injury to persons or
damage to property. The pick-up car was overturned,
causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer,
who was then a passenger, which injuries paralyzed
her and require medical treatment an confinement at
different hospitals for more than two year. As a result
of the physical injuries sustained by P, she suffered
unimaginable physical pain, mental anguish, and her
parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock, and
spent a considerable sum of money for her treatment.
Complaint was only filed on January 5, 1975 Pretrial
(May 12, 1975), only Ferrer and counsel were present.
As such, the Pfleiders were declared in default and the
court rendered judgment against them. Upon filing a
motion for reconsideration, respondent Judge, without
setting aside the order of default, issued an order
absolving defendants from any liability on the grounds
that: Complaint states no cause of action because it
does not allege that Dennis Pfleider was living with his
parents at the time of the vehicular accident.
Considering that under 2180, the father, and in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, is only responsible
for the damages caused by their minor children who
live in their company
ISSUE
WON the defense of prescription had been waived by
the defendants’ failure to allege the same in their
answer.
RULING
While it is true that, as a rule, prescription can only be
considered if the same is invoked in the answer of the
defense, the rule cannot be invoked when the evidence
shows that the action has already been barred by the
statute of limitations.
KRAMER v. CA
FACTS
The record of the case discloses that in the early
morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing
boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and
Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon
Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision
with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines
owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping
Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B
Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. After the
mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their
respective marine protests with the Board of Marine
Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board
conducted an investigation for the purpose of
determining the proximate cause of the maritime...
collision. On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a
Complaint for damages against the private respondent
before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay
City.
ISSUES
The principal issue in this Petition for Review is
whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by
the petitioners against the private respondent arising
from a marine collision is barred by the statute of
limitations.
RULING
For one, while it is true that the findings and
recommendation of the Board and the decision of the
Commandant may be helpful to the court in
ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the
former (court) is not bound by said findings and
decision. Indeed, the same findings and decision could
be entirely or partially admitted, modified,... amended,
or disregarded by the court according to its lights and
judicial discretion. For another, if the accrual of a cause
of action will be made to depend on the action to be
taken by certain government agencies, then
necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive... period
would hinge upon the discretion of such agencies. Said
alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught with
hazards. Their investigations might be delayed and lag,
and then witnesses in the meantime might not be
available or disappear, or... certain documents may no
longer be available or might be mislaid. The petition is
devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code,
an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins
from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan V.
Sarabia,[16] this Court ruled that in an action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks,
the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4)
year prescriptive period... must be counted from the
day of the collision. From the foregoing ruling, it is
clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the
time of the commission of an act or omission violative
of the right of the plaintiff, which is... the time when the
cause of action arises.
Principles
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages
arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4)
year prescriptive period must be counted from the day
of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an... administrative body like a Board
of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the
fault or negligence of the other party before he can file
an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not
apply in this... case. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by
alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents
or personnel of the other vessel.
FORTUITOUS EVENT
HERNANDEZ v. CA GR 71871
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE v. CA GR L-87584
EXERCISE OF DILIGENCE [ART. 2180]
MISTAKE AND WAIVER
GATCHALIAN v. CA
FACTS
Petitioner boarded the bus owned by Private
Respondent. The bus met an accident and Petitioner
sustained physical injuries and was hospitalized.
Privates respondent’s wife paid for his hospitalization
and medical expenses. She also gave P12.00 for
petitioner’s transportation expenses in going home
and let petitioner sign a prepared joint affidavit which
stated among other things:
…That we are no longer interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of
said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
Notwithstanding this document, Petitioner filed an
action extra contractu to recover compensatory and
moral dames.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not private respondent has successfully
proved that he had exercised extraordinary diligence
to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus.
2. Whether of not Petitioner is entitled for damages
being claimed.
RULING
Private respondent did not show that he exercised the
extraordinary diligence required by law for common
carriers. It is not considered as force majeure or
fortuitous event under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
The waiver signed by Petitioner is not valid and
effective. A waiver to be valid must be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. It must not be contrary to law,
morals, public policy or good.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
“Damage without injury.”
NAPOCOR v. CA
FACTS
Respondents were residents near Angat Dam. During
the height of typhoon “Kading”, a massive flood
covered the towns near Angat Dam particularly the
place of the respondents. Private respondents blamed
the sudden rush of water to the reckless and
imprudent opening of all the three floodgates of the
Angat Dam spillway, without prior warning to the
people living nearby or within the vicinity of the dam.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the damage caused to private
respondents is caused by force majeure.
2. Whether or not petitioner is liable even without any
contractual relationship with the private respondents.
3. Whether or not damage suffered by private
respondents was damnum absque injuria.
RULING
1. Although the typhoon “Kading” was an act of God,
petitioners cannot escape liability because their
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage. Their act of opening the spillways without
prior notice and during unholy hours where the people
were asleep were gross negligence.
2. Petitioner is still liable under the law on quasi-delict.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
“whoever by act or omissions causes damage to
another there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for damage done.”
3. There is no question that petitioners have the right,
duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve
the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot
be countenanced, however noble their intention may
be. The end does not justify tha means, particulary
because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent.
WHEREFORE: Private respondents are entitled for
damages, interest, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
EMERGENCY RULE
MCKEE v. IAC
FACTS
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8
January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur
Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an
International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No.
RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76
driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths
of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of
the Ford Escort.Jose Koh was the father of petitioner
Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George,
Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the
other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year
old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on
the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front
passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two
(2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck,
which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of
rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort,
on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from
San Fernando. When the northbound car was about
(10) meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right
side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to
cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose
Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so,
his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred
in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane,
on the said bridge. As a result of the vehicular accident
which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee
and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, 2 civil cases for damages
based on quasi-delict were filed before the CFI of
Pampanga against the owners of the truck. An
Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property" was filed with the trial court. Respondents
alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having
approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben
Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going towards
Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic
rules and regulations applicable under the
circumstances then prevailing.
In the criminal case filed, Ruben Galang was found
guilty. The civil cases were dismissed and the
respondents were awarded moral damages, exemplary
damages and Attorney’s fees. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed and set aside the decision
of the lower court and held ordered the respondents to
pay damages. The decision is anchored principally on
the respondent Court’s findings that it was Ruben
Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which
caused the accident. The appellate Court further said
that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection
and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted
that these defendants did not allege in their Answers
the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee. A motion for reconsideration alleging
improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently
filed by private respondents on the basis of which the
respondent Court, reconsidered and set aside its
earlier decision and affirmed in toto the trial court’s
the trial courts.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT JOSE KOH IS NEGLIGENT
RULING
NO. Jose Koh’s entry into the lane of the truck was
necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at
the time, a greater peril- death or injury to the two(2)
boys. No negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving
the car away from where they were even if this would
mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane
would be several meters away and could very well
slow down, move to the side of the road and give way
to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known
as the Emergency Rule.”One who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys
into the lane of the car. We find that Jose Koh adopted
the best means possible in the given situation to avoid
hitting them.Applying the above test, therefore, it is
clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
“No wrong is done to him who consents.”
INELCO v. CA
FACTS
On June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name
"Gening" passed through the province of Ilocos Norte.
After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased
Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out
of the house and proceeded northward towards the
direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she
was the owner and proprietress, to look after the
merchandise that might have been damaged. Wading
in waist-deep flood, the deceased was followed by two
of her employees. Suddenly, the deceased screamed
"Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls
attempted to help, but failed because they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but
at four meters away from her he turned back shouting
that the water was grounded. When Antonio was
informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been
electrocuted, they requested the police to ask the
people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or
INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was
recovered about two meters from an electric post.
Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr.
Castro examined the body .The skin was grayish or, in
medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by
electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an
"electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn.
About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a
burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr.
Castro stated the cause of' death as ,”circulatory shock
electrocution". In defense and exculpation, defendant
presented the testimonies of its officers and employees
and sought to prove that on and even before the day of
Isabel Lao Juan’s death ,the electric service system of
the INELCO in the whole franchise area, did not suffer
from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life
and property. The service lines, devices and other
INELCO equipment had been newly-installed prior to
the date in question. As a public service operator and
in line with its business of supplying electric current to
the public, defendant had installed safety devices to
prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others. An action for damages in the
aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the
heirs of the deceased with the CFI. INELCO however
theorizes that the deceased could have died simply
either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself. It was pointed
out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by
connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate
and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter
with electric current whenever the switch is on. This
might have causes the electrocution. The CFI ruled in
favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint but
awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and
attorney's fees of P45,000. The CA set aside the
decision of CFI and ordered INELCO to pay actual
damages of Php30,229.45, compensatory damages of
Php50,000 exemplary damages of Php10,000,
attorney’s fees of Php3000, plus the cost of the suit.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the
deceased's death
HELD
Yes. INELCO was liable. The cause of the death of the
decedent was the failure of the Company to repair the
damage brought by the typhoon. When a storm occurs
that is liable to prostate the wires, due care requires
prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines. No
assumption of risk attributable to Isabel since she was
responding to an emergency to protect her property.
The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the
argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability
since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While
it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts
of God for which no person may be held responsible, it
was not said eventuality which directly caused the
victim’s death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner’s negligence that death took place.
A person who voluntarily assents to a known danger
must abide by the consequences. As for the defense on
assumption of risk, the same was not tenable. The
Doctrine of “Volenti non fit injuria” means that
someone voluntarily assents to a known danger then
he must abide by the consequences. These are the
exceptions : (1) when there is an emergency; (2)
protection of one’s life and property ; and (3)
protection of life and property of another. Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased’s property, a
source of her livelihood was faced with an impending
loss. Furthermore, the deceased , at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right
to be without regard to petitioner’s consent as she was
on her way to protect her merchandise. Present where
petitioner’s duty to exercise extraordinary diligence
was not observe. “ When a storm occurs that is liable to
prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts
to discover and repair broken lines” The fact is that
when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power
Corporation set out in the early morning on June
29,1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground
but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the
streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows
that petitioner’s duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence under the circumstance was not observed,
confirming the negligence of petitioner.
In considering the liability of petitioner, the
respondent CA awarded the following in private
respondent’s favor: Php30,229.45 in actual
damages,Php50,000 in compensatory damages,
computed in accordance with the formula set in the
Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of
Php15,000 as average annual income of the deceased;
Php10,000 in exemplary damages; Php3,000
attorney’s fees; and costs of suit. Except for the award
of Php12,000 as compensation for the victim’s
death,we affirm the respondent CA’s award for
damages and attorney’s fees. Pursuant to recent
jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196;
People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the said
award of Php12,000 to Php30,000, thus, increasing the
total actual damages to Php48,229.45. The exclusion of
moral damages and attorney’s fees awarded by the
lower court was properly made by the respondent CA,
the charge of malice and bad faith on the part of
respondents in instituting his case being a mere
product of wishful thinking and speculation. Award of
damages and attorney’s fees is unwarranted where the
action was files in good faith; there should be no
penalty on the right to litigate. If damage results form a
person’s exercising his legal rights.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
PARENTS & GUARDIANS
EXCONDE v. CAPUNO
FACTS
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of
double homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March
31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
(Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for
damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno
was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal,
the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno
was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed a
separate civil action against Delfin Capuno and his son
Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate
amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro
Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if anyone
should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina,
he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at
the time of the accident, the former was not under the
control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This
defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a
consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the
damages claimed in the complaint. Plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on
the ground that the appeal only involves questions of
law. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is
liable for the damages in question jointly and severally
with his son Dante because at the time the latter
committed the negligent act which resulted in the
death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living
with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not
disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And
so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving
the father from liability. Thus, the petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable,
jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages
resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by
the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Dante is civilly,
jointly and severally liable with his Son Dante. It held
that under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code,
paragraph 1 and 5 provides:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next
preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom another is responsible.The father, and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with
them. x x x x x x x x x Finally, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is
necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents
the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil
Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph,
Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove.
ELCANO v. HILL
FACTS
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-
8102, Pedro Elcano et al. V. Reginald Hill et al.
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin
Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack
of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
ISSUE
Whether or not Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs)
of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of
the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Article 2180 applies
to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. While it is true that parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant
to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor
is not really full or absolute.Furthermore, under Article
2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him
at the time of the occurrence in question. Therefore,
Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual. According to
Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under
Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons.
BAHIA v. LITONJUA
FACTS
This is an appeal by the defendant Leynes from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
against him for the sum of P1,000, with costs; and by
the plaintiff from Fausta Litonjua. This is an action to
recover damages from the defendants for the death of
plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of defendant's servant in driving an
automobile over the child and causing her death. It
appears from the evidence that one Ramon Ramirez
was the owner and manager of a garage in the city of
Manila known as the International Garage. His mother,
the defendant Fausta Litonjua, sometime before the
accident from which this action springs, purchased an
automobile and turned it over to the garage to assist
her son in the business in which he was engaged. On
the 14th of May, 1911, Ramirez rented the automobile
so purchased and donated by his mother to the
defendant Mariano Leynes, together with a chauffeur
and a machinist, to be used by him for a short time
between Balayan and Tuy, Province of Batangas, to
carry persons living in Balayan to and from the fiesta
which was about to take place in Tuy. According to the
arrangement between them, Ramires was to furnish
the automobile, chauffeur, and machinist, and the
defendant Leynes was to pay him therefor P20 a day.
On the 16th of May, 1911, while passing from Balayan
to Tuy, the automobile, by reason of a defect in the
steering gear, refused to obey the direction of the
driver in turning a corner in the streets of Balayan,
and, as a consequence, ran across the street and into
the wall of a house against which the daughter of
plaintiff was leaning at the time. The font of the
machine struck the child in the center of the body and
crushed her to death. The action was brought against
the mother of Ramirez, who bought the automobile,
and Leynes, under whose direction and control the
automobile was being operated at the time of the
accident. Ramirez was not made a party. The court
dismissed the action filed. Thus, the petition
ISSUE
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the action
filed against Fausta Litonjua, and Leynes.
RULING
No. As to Fausta Litonjua, the Supreme Court held that
the action was properly dismissed. It is a fact proved in
the action and undisputed that, although the mother
purchased the automobile, she turned it over to the
garage of her son for use therein. The establishment
belonged to the son, Ramon Ramirez, and he had the
full management and control of it and received all the
profits therefrom. So far as appears, the contract with
Leynes was made without her knowledge or consent
by Ramirez as the owner and manager of the
International Garage. While she may have been in one
sense the owner of the machine, that fact does not,
under the other facts of the case, make her responsible
for the results of the accident. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court also ruled that the judgment against
Leynes must be reversed and the complaint dismissed
as to him. While it may be said that, at the time of the
accident, the chauffeur who was driving the machine
was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits
derived from the trips of the automobile belonged to
him and the automobile was operated under his
direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in
making him responsible for the negligence of the
chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself. Article
1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in
cases of negligence, but also provides when that
liability shall cease. It says: The liability referred to in
this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damages.
In this case the death of the child caused by a defect in
the steering gear of the automobile immediately raised
the presumption that Leynes was negligent in selecting
a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain it in
good condition after selection, and the burden of proof
was on him to show that he had exercised the care of a
good father of a family. As to selection, the defendant
has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly
licensed by the Government in their particular calling,
and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine
had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the
defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive,
of the defective condition of the steering gear. From
the commencement of the use of the machine until the
accident occurred sufficient time had not elapsed to
require an examination of the machine by the
defendant as a part of his duty of inspection and
supervision. While it does not appear that the
defendant formulated rules and regulations for the
guidance of the drivers and gave them proper
instructions, designed for the protection of the public
and the passengers, the evidence shows, as we have
seen, that the death of the child was not caused by a
failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was
caused by a defect in the machine as to which the
defendant has shown himself free from responsibility.
TAMARGO v. CA
FACTS
Petitioner Macario Tamargo is Jennifer’s Adopting
Parents. Respondent Sps. Bundoc are Adelberto’s
Natural Parents. While playing, Adelberto Bundoc, a 10
year old boy shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death. By that,
Petitioner filed a suit for damages against Sps. Bundoc
before RTC which dismissed the same on the ground
that Sps. Bundoc are not the indispensable parties.
This is because prior to the incident a case for adoption
of Adelberto is pending and a decree of adoption had
shifted the parental authority to the adopting parents
Sps. Rapisura. The appellate court ruled that Petitioner
had lost their appeal. Hence, the latter seeks relief
before Supreme Court.
ISSUE
W/N the Respondent natural parents are the
indispensable parties for the quasi-delict incurred by
their son Adelberto.
RULING
Yes, Respondent Sps. Bundoc are vicariously liable
because of the doctrine of imputed negligence. Art.
2180 NCC provides that the obligation imposed by Art.
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own act or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
This responsibility can be rebutted by evident showing
of extraordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the said
responsibility cannot be considered ceased as Sps.
Bundoc failed to prove the same. The decree of
adoption is not a bar for the claim for damages because
Adelberto was living with his natural parents Sps.
Bundoc at the time the incident transpired. Therefore,
Sps. Bundoc are vicariously liable because the law
presumes negligence on those of persons responsible
for the acts or omissions of a child.
LIBI v. IAC
FACTS
Petitioner Sps. Libi had a son Wendell Libi. Respondent
Sps. Gotiong had a daughter Julie Ann Gotiong. Wendell
and Julie were lovers who died on a single bullet from
a gun owned by former’s father Cresencio Libi. By
reason of the tragic incident, Sps. Gotiong filed a suit of
civil damages for vicarious liability of the Petitioners
before the RTC which dismissed the same for lack of
merit and insufficiency of evidence. CA reverse the trial
court’s ruling and interpreted Art. 2180 of NCC.
Aggrived, Petitioner elevate the matter before the SC.
ISSUE
W/N Sps. Libi is vicariously liable for the death of
Respondent’s daughter as caused by the Petitioner’s
son.
RULING
Yes, Sps. Libi is vicariously liable for the damage
caused by their son. Art. 2180 NCC provides that the
obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own act or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. Petitioner is
primary liable for the civil liability arising from the
crime committed by the minor son under their legal
authority and control and who lives in their company
when the incident happened. Furthermore, Petitioners
also failed to exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
familias. This is because Petitioners gun was freely
accessible to Wendell for they have not regularly
checked whether said gun was still under locked. Ergo,
Petitioner is primary liable for their negligence.
OWNERS & MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS
CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD
FACTS
Cangco is an employee of Manila Railroad Company
working as a clerk who was issued a PASS by the
company. The PASS entitled him to ride upon
company’s trains free of charge. During one of his
commutes as he makes his exit from the coach his feet
slipped and he fell violently on the platform. His body
was drawn under the moving car where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. Cangco admitted that
he failed to see the sacks of melon placed by another
employee on the platform where he alighted because
during that time the area was dimly-lighted. Cangco
instituted a suit at CFI City of Manila where CFI Manila
concluded that although negligence was attributable to
the defendant by reason of the sacks of melons placed
as to obstruct passengers nevertheless the plaintiff
himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from
the coach and was therefore precluded from
recovering.
ISSUE
Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is liable for
damages?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Cangco and
reversed the decision of the Lower Court. In arriving at
the said ruling the Supreme Court noted that the
contract of Manila Railroad to transport plaintiff
carried with it the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains.
That duty, being contractual, was direct and
immediate, and its non-performance could not be
excused by the proof that the fault was morally
imputable to the defendant’s servants. The Supreme
Court also ruled that considering the age, sex and
familiarity of the petitioner with regards to his conduct
in alighting while the train is still moving and about to
stop cannot be considered as negligence on his part so
as to use it to exempt the company from liability due to
the negligence of its servant.
PHIL. RABBIT v. AMERICAN FORWARDERS
FACTS
Pineda, a driver of Phil-American Forwarders, was
driving recklessly when he bumped the bus driven by
Felix Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines. The bus was damaged and
Pangalangan suffered injuries. Complaint for damages
was filed against Phil-American Forwarders, Pineda
and Balingit as manager of the company. CFI Tarlac
dismissed the complaint against Balingit on the ground
that he is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. On
appeal to the Supreme Court plaintiffs urged that the
veil of corporate fiction be pierced. They alleged that
out of the capital stock of P41,200, Balingit and his
wife had subscribed P40,000.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal is proper and whether or
not the veil of corporate fiction be pierced?
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
affirmed the dismissal of complaint against Balingit.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code the term
“manager” is used in the sense of “employer” and does
not embrace a “manager” who himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his
employer. The court also ruled that piercing the veil of
corporate fiction cannot be raised to the SC since it was
not raised in the Lower Court.
FIL BROADCASTING v. AMEC
FACTS
Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (“FBNI”), owned
“Exposé” a radio documentary program hosted by
Carmelo ‘Mel’ Rima (“Rima”) and Hermogenes ‘Jun’
Alegre (“Alegre”). Exposé is aired every morning over
DZRC-AM which was heard over Legazpi City, the
Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. In the
morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and
Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from
students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical
and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (“AMEC”) and its administrators. Claiming
that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and
Angelita Ago (“Ago”), as Dean of AMEC’s College of
Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI,
Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990.
AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the
supposed exposés, FBNI, Rima and Alegre “transmitted
malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed
plaintiffs’ (AMEC and Ago) reputation.” AMEC and Ago
included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. On 18
June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil
Lozares, filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts
against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and
Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a
sense of public duty to report the “goings-on in AMEC,
[which is] an institution imbued with public interest.”
Thereafter, trial ensued. During the presentation of the
evidence for the defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea,
collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on FBNI’s behalf. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.
Consequently, FBNI filed a separate Answer claiming
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that
before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1)
file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo
an apprenticeship and training program after passing
the interview. FBNI likewise claimed that it always
reminds its broadcasters to “observe truth, fairness
and objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from
using libelous and indecent language.” Moreover, FBNI
requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (“KBP”) accreditation test and
to secure a KBP permit. On 14 December 1992, the
trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre
liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the
broadcasts are libelous per se. The trial court rejected
the broadcasters’ claim that their utterances were the
result of straight reporting because it had no factual
basis. The broadcasters did not even verify their
reports before airing them to show good faith. In
holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that
FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from
the charge, the trial court ruled that Rima’s only
participation was when he agreed with Alegre’s
exposé. The trial court found Rima’s statement within
the “bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of
the press.” Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and
Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other,
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment
with modification. The appellate court made Rima
solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate
court denied Ago’s claim for damages and attorney’s
fees because the broadcasts were directed against
AMEC, and not against her. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed
a motion for reconsideration which the Court of
Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution.
Hence, FBNI filed the petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
RULING
As a juridical person, generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike to natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the award of moral
damages. However, the Court’s statement in Mambulao
that “a corporation may have a good reputation which,
if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of
moral damages” is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless,
AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of
libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article
2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for
libel or any other form of defamation and claim for
moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is
libelous per se, as an owner (FBNI) did not exercise
due diligence of a good father in the selection of Rima
and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their
qualifications." However, no clear and convincing
evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent
FBNI's "regimented process" of application.
Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had
deficiencies in their KBP accreditation,56 which is one
of FBNI's requirements before it hires a broadcaster.
Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, the
Court found the award of P300,000 moral damages
unreasonable. The record shows that even though the
broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered
any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, the Court reduced the award of moral
damages from P300,000 to P150,000.
MERCURY DRUG v. HUANG
FACTS
Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the
registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi
Truck with plate number PRE 641 (truck). It has in its
employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver.
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are
the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the
red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with plate number
PTT 775 (car).These two vehicles figured in a road
accident within the municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the
car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del Rosario
was driving the truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were
traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from
the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City.
The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck
was on the next lane to its right, when the truck
suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the
front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car
over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around
and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a
lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and
finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church. At the
time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a
Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His driver's license had
been confiscated because he had been previously
apprehended for reckless driving. Respondent filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioner. The trial
court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004, found
petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court decision with
modification. Hence, petitioner appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury
Drug) is jointly and severally held liable for payment of
damages.
RULING
Yes, the court mentioned that the liability of the
employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse
against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and
solidary with the employee. To be relieved of liability,
petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its
prospective employees, the employer is required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. With respect to the supervision of
its employees, the employer should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
their breach. To establish compliance with these
requirements, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence. Petitioner Mercury
Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due
diligence on the supervision and discipline over its
employees. In fact, on the day of the accident,
petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license.
He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified
that he reported the incident to his superior, but
nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or
reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was
taken against petitioner Del Rosario, the court
therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury
Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that
it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario and
therefore affirmed jointly and severally liable with Del
Rosario for payment of damages.
STATE
MERRITT v. GOVERNMENT
FACTS
Plaintiff E. Merritt, while riding on a motorcycle at a
speed of not more than 12 miles per hour along Padre
Faura and while crossing Taft Avenue, was struck by a
General Hospital ambulance due to the latter’s sudden
and unexpected turn resulting to serious physical
injury and subsequent unconsciousness of plaintiff.
ISSUE
As the negligence which caused the injury is a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the
government, the issue is whether or not liability shall
extend to the State through the acts of its agents.
RULING
Under paragraph 05 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, in
a damage case, the responsibility of the State is limited
to that which contracts through a special agent duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts of omissions imputable to a
public office charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of
civil responsibility. It is therefore evident that the State
is only liable for acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents. In the case
at hand, the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent and therefore the State
cannot be made liable.
ROSETE v. THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS
The case in hand is about a claim of petitioner
Inocencio Rosete, among others, against the
government for damages caused to buildings
belonging the Rosete the cause of which was fire that
originated from the warehouse of the Emergency
Control Administration (ECA), an office or agent of the
government, due to the negligence of Jose Frayno in
igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five-
gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained,
and of the officers of said ECA in storing gasoline in
said warehouse contrary to the Ordinances of the City
of Manila. Respondent Auditor General in this case did
not find the State liable for the acts mentioned above.
Hence, the case is then elevated to the Supreme Court
for determination.
ISSUE
Whether or not liability of the officers or agents of the
government caused by negligence may be extended to
the latter.
RULING
Under paragraph 05 of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the State is only liable in the sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed.
The Supreme Court then cited a ruling of its
counterpart in Spain:
“The obligation to indemnify for damages
which a third person causes to another by his
fault or negligence is based on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes
part in the act or omission of the third part
who caused the damage. It follows therefrom
that the State is not responsible for the damage
suffered by private individuals in consequence
of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor negligence can
be presumed on the part of the State in the
organization of branches of the public service
and the appointment of its agents.”
“That the responsibility of the State is limited
by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts
through a special agent so that in
representation of the State and being bound to
act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. Under paragraph 05 of article
1903 of the Civil Code, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the State is limited to that
which contracts through a special agent duly
empowered by a definite order or commission
to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts of
omissions imputable to a public office charged
with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in
the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.”
There being no showing that the negligence imputed
by the ECA or its officers was done by a special agent,
the government cannot be held responsible for the
damages caused from said negligence.
FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN GR 55963
NIA v. FONTANILLA 179 SCRA 685
TEACHERS & HEADS OF ACADEMIC
ESTABLISHMENTS
AMADORA v. CA
FACTS
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was
looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the presence
of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April
16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would
intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit
Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
The victim was only seventeen years old.
ISSUE
Whether or not the school, being an academic school,
be held liable in the death of the victim following Art.
2180 of the Civil Code.
RULING
Yes. After an exhaustive examination of the problem,
the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision
in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be
held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall
be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of
arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
PALISOC v. BRILLANTES
FACTS
A 16-year old student of Manila Technical Institute
died due to fists blows from a fellow student, causing
him to lose balance and fell on an engine block, and
eventually resulted to his death. The incident
happened in one of the school’s laboratories.
ISSUE
Whether or not the school officials, teachers and heads
of schools liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, for
damages caused by their pupils and students against
fellow students on the school premises.
RULING
Yes. The Court holds that under the cited codal article,
defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical
Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue,
respectively) are liable jointly and severally for
damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the
latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at
the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to
defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's
board of directors. The school itself cannot be held
similarly liable, since it has not been properly
impleaded as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought
to so implead it, by impleading improperly defendant
Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court
found that it had been incorporated since August 2,
1962, and therefore the school itself, as thus
incorporated, should have been brought in as party
defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding
that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to
plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly
manifested and made of record that "defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head
of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a
corporation and is not owned by any individual
person.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils
and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles
349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law of torts,
the governing principle is that the protective custody
of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards
that would reasonably be anticipated, including
injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow
students.
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his
dissenting opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is
some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.
are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority" and "where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter,
and not the parent, should be the one answerable for
the torts committed while under his custody, for the
very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the
child is under instruction." The school itself, likewise,
has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school
head and teachers under the same cited article.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving
defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only
if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school."
As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article —
"so long as (the students) remain in their custody"
means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There
is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability
to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied,
must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision.
ST MARY’S ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS
FACTS
It was an accident that resulted in the death of a
student; (the son of the Carpitanos) who had joined a
campaign to solicit enrollment. The Carpitanos
claiming for damages, impleaded St Mary’s and the
owner of the subject vehicle liable. The RTC ruled in
favor of the Carpinanos. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the school and the vehicle owner are
liable.
RULING
The court went on to quote the provisions which
anchored the CA’s decision in Art. 218 FC enumerating
those persons who have special parental authority
whenever an emancipated child is in their custody;
these are the school, its administrators, teachers or
individuals engaged in child care. Art. 219 of the same
Code stating the liability of those persons stated above
in case of injury. However, in order that the provision
above stated to apply there must be a showing that the
act or mission attributable to the injury is the
proximate cause of the same. Quoting the meaning of
the PROXIMATE CAUSE – is the cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
From the record it appeared that the subject vehicle
was driven recklessly by a 15 yr old boy, a student of
the same school. It was ruled that it is the detachment
of the steering wheel that caused the accident. Being
so, the registered owner of the vehicle is held primarily
liable. St Mary’s was absolved from their liability as
negligence on supervising their employees and
procuring their responsibilities was not established.
ST. FRANCIS v. CA
FACTS
Another case of a student losing his life while in school
connected activities. The son of the Castillos, though
not permitted to go out for swimming with the school
activity, was permitted to bring only food for the
teachers and directed to get back immediately after
bringing the same. While in the beach, a woman
teacher was apparently drowning and in the squabbles
with everybody’s attempt to rescue, it was Castillo Jr.’s
attempt to rescue the teacher that caused his own
drowning and subsequent death. The Castillos
thereafter filed a case against the school and its
teachers for damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the school and teachers are liable.
RULING
The SC ruled that the CA erred in applying Article 2180
of the Civil Code in rendering the school and teachers
liable.
Article 2180 – loco parentis:
THE OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY ARTICLE 2176
IS DEMANDABLE NOT ONLY FOR ONE’S OWN
ACT OR OMISSIONS, BUT ALSO FOR THOSE
PERSONS FOR WHOM IS RESPONSIBLE.
EMPLOYERS SHALL BE LIABLE FOR THE
DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR EMPLOYEES
AND HOUSE HOLD HELPERS ACTING WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS, EVEN
THOUGH THE FORMER ARE NOT ENGAGED IN
ANY BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY.
From these provisions and the records of the case, the
Court absolved the school from liability as the said
activity was not sanctioned by their administrator and
the incident did not happen inside the school’s
premises. As to the teachers, negligence on their part
was not established as they even brought PE teachers
who are experienced in first aid matter, thus, they are
not liable.
PSBA v. CA
FACTS
It was a stabbing incident in the school’s premises that
resulted to the untimely death of a student of PSBA.
The assailant was an element from outside of the
school. Parents of the victim claimed for damages on
the ground of quasi-delicts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the school may be held liable under
quasi-delicts.
RULING
The Court said no because the circumstances of the
case evince a contractual relation between the school
and the deceased student, hence, the rules on quasi-
delicts do not govern. Though a bilateral contract
between the school and the deceased student exists, as
the school being the provider of conducive learning
atmosphere and education, and the student to abide
with its rules, these however do not take the case
under the rule of quasi-delicts as the breach of contract
thru negligence by the school in providing adequate
security was not yet established.
Articles 2180 and 2176 rule in loco parentis – the
damage should have been caused by the student of the
school sought to be held liable, which is not the case.
 PRIMARY/STRICT LIABILITY
POSSESSORS & OWNERS OF ANIMALS [ART. 2183]
VESTIL v. IAC
FACTS
Little Theness Tan Uy is a three year old child. One day
while she was playing with the child of the petitioner,
Theness was bitten by a dog owned by the father of the
petitioner who was then already deceased. The
incident happened at the house of the father of Vestil.
Theness was immediately rushed to the hospital where
she was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead. She was then administered with an anti-
rabies vaccine. Theness was discharged after 9 days of
being confined but was readmitted 1 week later due to
vomiting of saliva. The following day, Theness died.
Months later, the parents of Theness sued the
petitioner alleging that they were liable since the dog
that bit and eventually killed to their daughter was
owned by them. However the petitioner rejected the
charge insisting that the dog belonged to their
deceased father.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THENESS WAS
THE RESULT OF THE DOG BITES
HELD
Article 2183 provides that the possessor of an animal
or whoever may make use of the same is responsible
for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or lost. While it is true that petitioner is not
really the owner of the dog, there is no doubt that the
petitioner is the possessor of the dog at the time the
incident happened hence, they are liable for the death
of the three-year old child.
AFIALDA v. HISOLE [supra]
OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES [ART. 2184]
CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI
FACTS
This is a suit for damages from the defendants due to a
vehicular accident. Petitioner was driving hid Mercury
on his way from his home to the airport. With him are
his wife and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the Cadillac of the respondent
with Bernardo as the driver.
Ahead of the Cadillac was a caratella that was towing
another horse. Bernardo attested that the caratella was
only 8 meters away. But instead of slowing down,
Bernardo swerved to the left side in spite of the
presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane.
Photographs were taken in the crime scene and it
shows that Caedo tried avoiding the incident. The right
wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the
road. There is no doubt that the collision was directly
traceable to Rafael Bernardo’s negligence and that he
must be held liable for the damages suffered by the
plaintiffs.
ISSUE
Whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac,
is solidarily liable with Bernardo.
HELD
If the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the
owner of the vehicle would be held liable if he could
have prevented the mshap by the exercise if due
diligence. Article 2184 of the New Civil Code provides
that “In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed
that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty
of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.” In
the instant case, the car was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide open and
devoid of traffic since it is morning. There is no reason
for the car owner to be in any special state of alert.
Thus, Yu Khe Thai is free from liability.
CARTICIANO v. NUVAL
FACTS
Plaintiff was driving his father’s car traversing the
coastal road of Bacoor Cavite. On the opposite
direction was the defendant’s owner-type jeep driven
by one Darwin. Darwin veered his vehicle to his left
going to the center island of the highway, which later
on collided head-on with plaintiff Zacarias. The
plaintiff suffered injuries. Defendant Nuval offered
P100,000 as compensation but plaintiff refused to
accept. Plaintiffs filed criminal and civil case against
the defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that it was Darwin’s
negligence that caused the accident and defendant
Nuval as owner is also liable. Defendant Nuval claimed
that Darwin was not his employee. Court of Appeals
then held that Nuval is not liable for the tort
committed by Darwin.
ISSUE
Whether or not Nuval as employer of Darwin if the
latter will be found negligent.
HELD
No evidence was shown by Nuval that Darwin was not
his employee thus Nuval is liable for the tort
committed by Darwin. Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code
provides that “The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
ommisions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.”
Thus, plaintiffs are entitle to moral and actual damages
to be paid solidarily by Nuval and Darwin.
MALLARI v. CA
FACTS
This is a case about the collision of a passenger jeepney
and delivery van of Manila Bulletin. The sketch of
collision showed that it occurred after petitioner
Mallari Jr. overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the
right lane. The impact caused the jeepney to turn
around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to
its passengers and one among them died. Widow of
Reyes, the one who died, filed a complaint for damages
against herein petitioner and herein respondent. RTC
found that the proximate cause was the negligence of
Angeles, driver of Manila Bulletin van. Hence, RTC
ordered Angeles and Manila Bulletin to pay jointly the
widow of Reyes. On appeal, CA found no negligence on
the part of Angeles and Bulletin but on the negligence
of petitioner Mallari Jr.
ISSUE
Whether or not Manila Bulletin is liable for damages.
HELD
CA is correct that the collision occurred was thru the
negligence of petitioner Mallari Jr. in violation of
Section 41 of RA 4136. Thus, binding Mallari Sr., owner
of passenger jeepney, to the negligence and
recklessness of petitioner Mallari Jr. Under Art 1755 of
Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide using utmost diligence. The petition is
denied and petitioners are ordered to pay Reyes jointly
and severally.
MANUFACTURERS & PROCESSORS [ART. 2187]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [ART. 2189; SEC. 24,
RA 7160]
GUILATCO v. CITY OF DAGUPAN
FACTS
Plaintiff is a court interpreter. When he was about to
board a tricycle, she accidentally fell into an open
manhole on the sidewalk at Perez Boulevard (a
National Road), thereby causing fracture in her right
leg. As a result thereof, she was hospitalized at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for 16 days. Because of
the continuing pain and difficulty in locomotion she
was brought at Makati Medical City. She was also
unable to report for duty even after consuming her
accrued leaves, so she lost her monthly income. She
had lost several pounds and no longer in her former
jovial self as a result of the accident. She filed an action
for damages against the City of Dagupan. The City of
Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the
manhole was located on the national road, which was
not under the control and supervision of the City of
Dagupan.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant is liable for damages.
HELD
Yes. The liability of public corporations for damages
arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of road is expressed in Art. 2189 in
the Civil Code: Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision. It is not necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city or municipality
for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street. In this case, this control or
supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan
and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose
duties include the care and custody of the public
system of waterworks and sewers. The same Charter
of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues,
alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof,
maybe legislated by the municipal board. Thus, the
charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has
supervision and control over the sidewalk where the
open drainage hole is located.
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO
FACTS
At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent
Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and
unloading zone, waiting for a jeepney when one came
along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney and took a few steps, he fell inside
an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused
Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses
and the broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.
Respondent was then brought to PGH to be treated of
his injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various
parts of his body and allergic eruptions caused by the
anti-tetanus injections administered to him required
further medical treatment and payment of these
charges. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the
damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for damages.
HELD
Yes. Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by any person by reason” — specifically
— “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under their
control or supervision.” In other words, Article 2189
governs liability due to “defective streets,” in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189
is decisive thereon. In its answer to the amended
complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in
good condition and regularly inspected and the storm
drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned” who “have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them
by law.” Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either
“control or supervision” over said street or road.
JIMENEZ v. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS
The plaintiff and his neighbour went to the Sta. Ana
public market to buy bagoong. That at the time when
the public market was flooded with ankle deep
rainwater. After purchasing, he turn around to return
home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which
could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater
causing a 4 inch nail stuck inside the uncovered
opening to pierce the left leg of the petitioner. Thus he
suffers injury. Petitioner sued for damages against the
City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
under whose administration of the public market. The
lower court rendered in favour of the defendants and
against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint for lack
of evidence. The Intermediate Appellate Court held
Asiatic liable but not City of Manila. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling
that respondent City of Manila should be jointly liable
and severally liable with Asiatic for the injuries
suffered by the petitioner.
RULING
The petition is with merit. There is no doubt that the
plaintiff suffered injuries when he fell into a drainage
opening without any cover in Sta. Ana public market.
Asiatic claimed that it was only a small puncture and
that as war veteran, plaintiff hospitalization was free.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be
held liable because under the Management Operating
Contract, Asiatic Integrated assumed all responsibility
for damages which may be suffered attributable to it.
They insist Article 1, Sect. 4 of RA No. 409 which states
that “the city shall not be liable for the damages
suffered by persons arising from the failure of the
Mayor, other officers xxxx.”
However, the court based its ruling on Art. 2189 which
provides that provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of or injuries
suffered by any person, by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public building
under their control of supervision. In the case at bar,
Sta. Ana public market, despite the contract,
respondent city remained under the control of the
market. It is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise
reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably
safe for people frequenting the place for their
marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have
been taken during good weather to minimize the
danger to life and limb under those difficult
circumstances.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA
FACTS
Under the contract for Water Service Connection
entered into by and between the Metropolitan WSS
and KC Group, to install water service connections. KC
was given a job order on the excavation at the Corner
of M. Paterno and Santolan Road. The digging
operations started with a hole 1 meter wide and 1.5
meter deep. After which they refilled the excavated
portion of the road with the same gravel and stone
excavated from the area.
Meanwhile, between 10-11 in the evening, Priscilla
Chan was driving her car at speed of 30km/hr, with
her on the right side was Asst. Prosecutor Lara Biglang
Awa. The road was flooded, thus the left front wheel of
the car fell on the manhole. As a result, prosecutor was
fractured. She filed to RTC for complaint of damages
against MWSS, Municipality of San Juan and a number
of municipal officials. RTC rendered MWSS and San
Juan liable for damages. Both petitioner and
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA
affirmed but modified the decision of RTC. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Municipality of San Juan is liable
for damages.
RULING
Yes. In denying liability, petitioner cites Section 149 of
LGC, that is to provide for the construction,
improvement, repairs and maintenance only of
municipal streets, avenues Since Santolan municipal
road is a national road, it cannot be held liable. An
under Sec. 8 ordinance no. 82-01, it states that the
excavator shall assume fully all liabilities for such
damages or injuries arising therefrom. Under art.
2189, ownership of the roads, streets is not a
controlling factor, rather it is sufficient that a province,
city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.
Also, the other provision of Sec. 149 states the power
and duties of the SB, which include to regulate the
drilling and excavation and adopt measures to ensure
public safety against open canals, manholes. Clearly,
the municipality of San Juan can regulate the drilling
and excavation of the road.
BUILDING PROPRIETORS
DE ROY v CA 157 SCRA 757
DINGCONG v. CANAAN 72 PHIL 14
ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS [ART. 2192; ART. 1723]
KINDRED TORTS/MEDICAL PRACTICE
BATIQUIN v. CA
FACTS
In September 21, 1988, Dr. Batiquin performed a
simple cesarean section to Mrs. Villegas and after 45
minutes, the latter delivered her first child. Mrs.
Villegas stayed at the hospital until September 27,
1988. Soon after leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas
began to suffer abdominal pains and complained to be
feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin who prescribed her certain
medicines. However, the abdominal pains and fever
kept on recurring and bothered her. When the pain
became unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight,
she consulted Dr. Kho. A blood count showed that Mrs.
Villegas had an infection inside her abdominal cavity,
this impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas
should submit to another surgery, to which the latter
agreed. On the surgery, it was found out that there is a
whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on
each left and right ovaries and a piece of rubber
material on the right side of the uterus embedded on
the cyst. This piece of rubber material looked like a
piece of rubber glove. A complaint was filed against Dr.
Batiquin and the trial court ruled in favor of Dr.
Batiquin. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of
herein petitioner.
HELD
Yes. Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the
instant case, all its requisites are present. First, the
entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under
the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the
private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as
to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign
object finding its way into private respondent Villegas’
body which, needless to say, does not occure unless
though the intervention of negligence. Second, since
aside from the cesarean section, private respondent
Villegas underwent no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in
her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the cesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. Therefore, she is liable for
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas’ abdomen and for all the adverse
effect thereof.
As a final word, the Court reiterates its recognition of
the vital role the medical profession plays in the lives
of the people, and State's compelling interest to enact
measures to protect the public from "the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds
for disease or trauma." Indeed, a physician is bound to
serve the interest of his patients "with the greatest of
solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill."
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of
her profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention
of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the
general, and members of the medical profession, in
particular.
RAMOS v. CA
FACTS
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos sought professional advice
because of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by
the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of the
stone. The operation was set on June 17, 1985.
Dr.Hosaka decided that she should undergo a
“cholecystectomy” operation. On the day of her
scheduled operation, she was given injections. At
around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Guttierez the anesthesiologist,
informed Herminda, the sister-in-law of Dr. Erlinda
that there will be a delay on the arrival of Dr. Hosaka.
At around 12:10 PM, Dr. Hosaka arrived. At around
12:15 Pm, Dr. Hosaka arrived at the operating room.
Herminda saw Dr. Guttierez intubating the hapless
patient. She then notice the bluish discoloration of the
nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda. She
then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to
call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. Dr.
Calderon tried to intubate Erlinda. The patient’s
nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a
trendelenburg position. Dr. Calderon was then able to
intubate the patient.
Two days thereafter, Dr. Hosaka informed Rogelio that
something went wrong during the intubation. The
doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm.
Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month. About four
months thereafter, the patient was released from the
hospital. Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with
the RTC against respondents alleging negligence in the
management and care of Erlinda. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor f petitioners. The defendants were
held guilty of negligence. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents are liable for their
negligence.
HELD
Yes. With respect to Dr. Guttierrez, the court find her
negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia
phase. She failed to properly intubate the patient. She
also admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on
the day of the operation itself, no prior consultations
with or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda. Dr.
Guttierrez’ act of seeing her patient for the first time
only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure
was an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical
procedure is a clear indicia of her negligence. As to Dr.
Hosaka’s liability, as the head of the surgical team, as
the so-called “captain of the ship”, it is the surgeon’s
responsibility to see to it that those under him perform
their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr.
Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to
exercise the proper authority in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols.
In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that
respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dr.
Guttierez properly intubated the patient. This indicates
that he was remiss in his professional duties toward
his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the
events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a
general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to
adduce evidence with regard to the degree of
supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In
neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar
nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge
its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is
consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians
for Erlinda's condition. Our courts face unique
difficulty in adjudicating medical negligence cases
because physicians are not insurers of life and, they
rarely set out to intentionally cause injury or death to
their patients. However, intent is immaterial in
negligence cases because where negligence exists and
is proven, the same automatically gives the injured a
right to reparation for the damage caused. Established
medical procedures and practices, though in constant
flux are devised for the purpose of preventing
complications. A physician's experience with his
patients would sometimes tempt him to deviate from
established community practices, and he may end a
distinguished career using unorthodox methods
without incident. However, when failure to follow
established procedure results in the evil precisely
sought to be averted by observance of the procedure
and a nexus is made between the deviation and the
injury or damage, the physician would necessarily be
called to account for it. In the case at bar, the failure to
observe pre-operative assessment protocol which
would have influenced the intubation in a salutary way
was fatal to private respondents' case.
RAMOS v. CA [MR]
FACTS
This is motion for reconsideration of the decision,
dated December 29, 1999 holding private respondents
civilly liable for petitioner Erlinda’s comatose
condition. The Supreme Court denied the motions for
reconsideration. They then filed their respective
second motion for reconsideration. The Philippine
College of Surgeons filed its petition-in-intervention
contending that SC erred in holding private respondent
Dr. Hosaka liable under the captain of the ship
doctrine. According to them, the doctrine has long
been abandoned in US in recognition of the
developments in modern medical and hospital
practice.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court erred in holding private
respondents liable.
HELD
No. while the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and
Dr. Guttierez were secured primarily for their
performance of acts within their respective fileds of
expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and
that one does not exercise control over the other, they
were certainly not completely independent of each
other so as to absolve one from the negligent acts of
the other physician. It is quite apparent that they hav
ea common responsibility to treat the patient, which
responsibility necessitates that they call each other’s
attention to the condition of the patient while the other
physician is performing the necessary medical
procedure. Also, Dr. Hosaka’s irresponsible conduct of
arriving very late for the scheduled operation of
petitioner Erlinda is violative, not only of his duty as a
physician to serve the interest of his patients with the
greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent
and skill, but also Article 19 of the Civil Code which
requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to
act with justice and give everyone his due.
As to Dr. Gutierrez, she omitted to perform a thorough
preoperative evaluation on Erlinda. As she herself
admitted, she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day
of the operation itself, one hour before the scheduled
operation. She auscultated[14] the patient’s heart and
lungs and checked the latter’s blood pressure to
determine if Erlinda was indeed fit for operation.[15]
However, she did not proceed to examine the patients
airway. Had she been able to check petitioner Erlindas
airway prior to the operation, Dr. Gutierrez would
most probably not have experienced difficulty in
intubating the former, and thus the resultant injury
could have been avoided. As to the liability of DLSMC,
there is no employer-employee relationship between
DLSMC and Drs. Guttierez and Hoska which would
hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by
petitioner Erlinda under Art.2180 of the Civil Code.
REYES v. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL
FACTS
Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the
deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five days before the
latter’s death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring
fever with chills. Since typhoid fever was common at
that time, the doctors confirmed through the Widal
test that Jorge has typhoid fever. However, he did not
respond to the treatment and died. The cause of his
death was “Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to
Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.” Consequently,
petitioner filed the instant case for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which dismissed the
case and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever.
Instead, his death was due to the wrongful
administration of chloromycetin. They contended that
had respondent doctors exercised due care and
diligence, they would not have recommended and
rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily
concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever,
and administered chloromycetin without first
conducting sufficient tests on the patient’s
compatibility with said drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sisters of Mercy Hospital is liable for
the death of Jorge Reyes.
RULING
No. Sisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for the death
of Jorge Reyes. There is no showing that the attending
physician in this case deviated from the usual course of
treatment with respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was
given antibiotic choloromycetin and some dose of
triglobe after compatibility test was made by the
doctor and found that no adverse reactions manifested
which would necessitate replacement of the medicines.
Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is
actually the average merit among all known
practitioners from the best to the worst and from the
most to the least experienced, but the reasonable
average merit among the ordinarily good physicians.
Here, the doctors did not depart from the reasonable
standard recommended by the experts as they in fact
observed the due care required under the
circumstances.
Policy in Medical Negligence cases, it is incumbent
upon the plaintiff to establish that the usual procedure
in treating the illness is not followed by the doctor.
Failure to prove this, the doctor is not liable.
Physicians are not insurers of the success of every
procedure undertaken and if the procedure was shown
to be properly done but did not work, they cannot be
faulted for such result.
NOGALES v. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
FACTS
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales, who
was then 37 y/o was under the exclusive prenatal care
of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month of
pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While
Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr.
Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and
development of leg edemas indicating preeclampsia
which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy.
Around midnight of May 26, 1976, Corazon started to
experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and
Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After
examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate
admission to Capitol Medical Center (CMC). Upon her
admission, an internal examination was conducted
upon her by a resident-physician. Based on the
doctor’s sheet, around 3am, Dr. Estrada advised for
10mg valium to be administered immediately by
intramuscular injection, he later ordered the start of
intravenous administration of syntociron admixed
with dextrose, 5% in lactated ringer’s solution, at the
rate of 8-10 micro-drops per minute. When asked if he
needed the services of anesthesiologist, he refused.
Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously and
her cervix was fully dilated and she experienced
convulsions. Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of 10g of
magnesium sulfate but his assisting Doctor, Dr.
Villaflor, only administered 2.5g. She also applied low
forceps to extract Corazon’s baby. In the process, a 10 x
2.5cm piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The
baby came out in an apric, cyanatic weak and injured
condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated
and resuscitated. Corazon had professed vaginal
bleeding where a blood typing was ordered and she
was supposed to undergo hysterectomy, however,
upon the arrival of the doctor, she was already
pronounced dead due to hemorrhage.
After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court
rendered judgment on 22 November 1993 finding Dr.
Estrada solely liable for damages. Petitioners appealed
the trial court’s decision. Petitioners claimed that aside
from Dr. Estrada, the remaining respondents should be
held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed
out the extent of each respondent’s alleged liability. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
ruling and applied the “borrowed servant doctrine” to
release the liability of other medical staff. This doctrine
provides that once the surgeon enters the operating
room and takes charge of the proceedings, the acts or
omissions of operating room personnel, and any
negligence associated with such acts or omissions, are
imputable to the surgeon. While the assisting
physicians and nurses may be employed by the
hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally
become the temporary servants or agents of the
surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress,
and liability may be imposed upon the surgeon for
their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
ISSUE
Whether or not in the conduct of child delivery, the
doctors and the respondent hospital is liable for
negligence.
RULING
Yes. In general, a hospital is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor-physician.
There is, however an exception to this principle. The
hospital may be liable if the physician is the ostensible
agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as
the doctrine of apparent authority.
Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can
be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of
whether the physician is an independent contractor,
unless the patient knows, or should have known, that
the physician is an independent contractor.
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of
apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
1. The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital;
2. Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of
authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the
hospital had knowledge of and acquired in them; and
3. The plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of
the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care
and prudence.
Borrowed servant doctrine provides that once a
surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge of
the acts or omissions of operating room personnel and
any negligence associated with each acts or omissions
are imputable to the surgeon, while the assisting
physicians and nurses may be employed by the
hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally
become the temporary servants or agents of the
surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress,
and liability may be imposed upon the surgeon for
their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
PSI. v. AGANA
FACTS
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the
Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of
bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a
series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil
diagnosed her to be suffering from Cancer of the
sigmoid. On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil assisted by the
medical staff of the Medical City Hospital performed an
Anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that
the malignancy on her sigmoid area had spread on her
left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain
portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of
Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan
Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr.
Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil
took over, completed the operation and closed the
incision after searching for the missing 2 gauzes as
indicated by the assisting nurses but failed to locate it.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pains in her anal region but Dr. Ampil said
it is a natural consequence of the operation/surgery
and recommended that she consult an oncologist to
examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed
during the operation. Natividad and her husband went
to the US to seek further treatment and she was
declared free from cancer. A piece of gauze portruding
from Natividad’s vagina was found by her daughter
which was then removed by hand by Dr. Ampil and
assured that the pains will vanished. However, it
didn’t. The pains intensified prompting Natividad to
seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
While confined there, Dr. Ramon Guttierez detected
the presence of another foreign object in her vagina – a
foul smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vagina. A recto-vaginal fistula
had forced stool to excrete through her vagina.
Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the
damage.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dr. Ampil and Fuentes are liable for
medical malpractice and the PSI for damages due to
the negligence of the said doctors.
RULING
Yes. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in
the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed and it is settled that the leaving of
sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after
the incision has been closed is at least prima facie
negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply,
such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as
to raise inference of negligence. There are even legions
of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence
per se. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or
more appropriately, medical negligence. To
successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must
only prove that a health care provider either failed to
do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he did something
that a reasonably prudent provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the
patient. Simply puts the elements are duty, breach,
injury, and proximate causation. Dr. Ampil, as the lead
surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects,
such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of
the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to
inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both
duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad,
necessitating her further examination by American
doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s
negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury
could be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending nurses
that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing. That they
were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s
negligence and the injury. And what further
aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment
of this missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad
and her family.
SPECIAL TORTS IN HUMAN RELATIONS
ABUSE OF RIGHTS [ART. 19]
CARPIO v. VALMONTE
FACTS
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra
engaged her services for their church weddinng on
October 10, 1996. At about 4:30 pm on that day,
Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel and when she
arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already
there including Soledad Carpio, the aunt of the bride.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite to go to the reception hall to give the meal
allowance to the band and to pay the suppliers. Upon
entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring
at her and it was at this juncture that Soledad Carpio
allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte:
“Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas
ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It turned out that after
Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties,
petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which
she placed ins i de the comfort room in a paper bag
were lost and these include diamond rings, earrings,
bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of
about 1M pesos. Valmonte was allegedly bodily
searched, interrogated and trailed by the police
officers, but the pe titioner kept on saying the words
“Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte’s car was
also searched but the search yielded nothing.
Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter
from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology
which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’
relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation
but the petitioner did not respond. Valmonte filed a
suit for damages. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and ruled that when sought investigation for
the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her
right and if damage results from a person exercising
his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added
that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that
petitioner acted maliciously and in bad fai th in
pointing to her as the culprit. The CA ruled out
differently and opined that Valmonte has clearly
established that she was singled out by the petitioner
as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry.
However, the court find no sufficient evidence to
justify the award of actual damages. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of
actual and moral damages
RULING
The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to
moral damages but not to actual damages. In the
sphere of our law on human relations, one of the
fundamental precepts is the principle known as “abuse
of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find
existence of an abuse of right, the following elements
must be present: 1) there is legal right or duty; 2)
which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or
prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person should
be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach
against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that
she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside
the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to
attack respondent with her innuendos which were not
merely inquisitve but outrightly accusatory. By openly
accusing respondent as the only person who went out
of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that
she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. Petitioner
had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner
which is contrary to morals and good customs.
Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of
Article 19 in relation to Article 20 for which she should
be held accountable.
SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC. v. CA
FACTS
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of
selling and distributing agricultural machinery,
products and equipment. On September 20, 1966,
SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement
whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer
in the City and Province of Iloilo. The agreement was
subsequently amended to include Capiz in the
territorial coverage and to make the dealership
agreement on a non-exclusive basis. In the course of
the business relationship arising from the dealership
agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of
P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM
brought action to recover said amount plus interest
and attorney’s fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and
interposing a counterclaim for damages representing
unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System
Development Corporation (FSDC) 21 units of
Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII
alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in
1977 24units of Mitsubishi power tillers to FSDC,
which fact JII allegedly made known to SEACOM, but
the latter taking advantage of said information and in
bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and
sold 21 units of said tractors with much lower prices,
thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of
P85,415.61.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
affirmatively; the act of SEACOM in dealing directly
with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent, and that
there was fraud in the transaction between FSDC and
SEACOM to the prejudice of JII. “SEACOM not satisfied
with the presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined
the competition even as against the latter, and thereby
changed the scenario of the competition thereby
rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they
entered into to the manifest prejudice of JII” On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was
no agency relationship between the parties but
SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages for having
acted in bad faith when it competed with its own
dealer in the sale of the farm machineries to FSDC.
Both courts invoke as basis for the award Article 19 of
the Civil Code which reads as follows: "Art. 19. Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.”
ISSUE
Whether or not SEACOM acted in bad faith when it
competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of
farm machineries to FSDC.
HELD
Yes. Even if the dealership agreement was amended to
make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may not
exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in
keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens
itself to liability under the abuse of right rule
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted.
This provision, together with the succeeding article on
human relation, was intended to embody certain basic
principles “that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.” What is sought to be
written into the law is the pervading principle of
equity and justice above strict legalism.
SC accordingly resolves to affirm the award for
unrealized profits. The Court of Appeals noted that the
trial court failed to specify to which the two appellees
the award for moral and exemplary damages is
granted. However, in view of the fact that moral
damages are not as a general rule granted to a
corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who
testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his
mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how
SEACOM “dealt with us behind (our) backs”, the award
should go to defendant Jamandre, President of JII.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages shall be
paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre.
Costs against appellant.
CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION v.
VILLANUEVA
FACTS
Isagani C. Villanueva opened a savings account and a
current account with Citytrust Banking Corporation
with an automatic transfer arrangement. Villanueva
requested a new checkbook from one of the bank’s
customer service representatives. He then filled up a
checkbook requisition slip but he could not remember
his current account number. He expressed his
predicament to a customer service representative who
in turn assured him that she could supply the
information from the bank’s records. Pia Rempillo,
another customer service representativ, saw
Villanueva’s checkbook requisition slip. She took it and
proceeded to check the bank’s checkbook register.
Upon seeing the name Isagani Villanueva -- Account
No. 33-00446-3 in the checkbook register, Rempillo
copied the aforesaid account number on the space
intended for it in VILLANUEVAs requisition slip. When
Villanueva received his checkbook, he signed and
issued a check amounting to P50,000 payable to Kingly
Commodities. However, Villanueva’s check was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and disparity
in the signature. He called the bank and was advice to
re-deposit the check for it shall be honoured after the
sufficiency of the funds was ascertained. But it was
again dishonored. In was found out that the reason for
the dishonor of the check was that the account number
assigned to his new checkbook was the account
number of another depositor also named Isagani
Villanueva but with a different middle intital. To
resolve the matter, Marilou Genuino, the bank’s branch
manager, promised to send to Kingly Commodities a
managers check for P50,000 before 5:30pm. She also
personally called Kingly Commodities and explained
the reason for the dishonour of the check.
ISSUE
Whether or not Villanueva is entitled to payment of
damages.
RULING
No, Villanueva is not entitled to any damages.
Villanueva might have suffered some form of
inconvenience and discomfort as a result of the
dishonor of his check. However, the same could not
have been so grave or intolerable. It is also clear from
the records that the bank was able to remedy the
caveat of Kingly Commodities to Villanueva. The bank
was able to issue a managers check in favor of Kingly
Commodities before the deadline. It was able to
likewise explain to Kingly Commodities the
circumstances surrounding the unfortunate situation.
Verily, the alleged embarrassment or inconvenience
caused to VILLANUEVA as a result of the incident was
timely and adequately contained, corrected, mitigated,
if not entirely eradicated. VILLANUEVA, thus, failed to
support his claim for moral damages.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN v. REYES
FACTS
The cause of action before the trial court was one for
damages brought under the human relations
provisions of the New Civil Code. Roberto Reyes, the
respondent, alleged that he was spotted by his friend
Dr. Violeta Filart at the lobby of Nikko Hotel. Mrs. Filart
invited and assured him that she will vouched for him
in the celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. When the buffet
dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined up at the buffet table
but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he
was stopped by petitioner Ruby Lim. In a loud voice
and within the presence and hearing of the other
guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka
nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, gumabaa ka na lang).
Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Mrs.
Filart, but the latter completely ignored him thus
adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after,
while he was still recovering from the traumatic
experience, a policeman approached and asked him to
step out of thee hotel.
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes filed a complaint. The
RTC dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to
the testimony of petitioner Lim that she was discreet
in asking Mr. Reyes. The Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes to leave the party where he was not
invited thereby becoming liable under human relations
provisions of the New Civil Code.
RULING
The Supreme Court finds the lower court’s findings of
fact to be more credible. Article 19, the principle of
abuse of rights, states that “every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which a wrongdoer must be responsible. When Article
19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Article 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, there was no proof of
motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame. Considering the
closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the
request for the latter to leave the party was made such
that they nearly kissed each other, the request was
meant to be heard by him only and there could have
been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment
to him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes
to leave was acceptable and humane under the
circumstances that is Mr. Lim did not abused her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, hence she cannot be made liable to pay for
damages. Neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be
held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee, Ms. Lim.
ACTS & OMISSIONS CONTRARY TO MORALS [ART.
20 & 21]
RUIZ v. SEC OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FACTS
It was a contract between Alied Corp. And the Republic
of the Phil. for the construction of the Veterans
Memorial Hospital in Manila. The said construction
was started in 1950, but terminated five years
thereafter. The root of the controversy was the 15% of
the contract price which retained by the Department of
National Defense. The architects of the construction
sought recovery for their unpaid compensation
resulted by the said retention. They prayed that they
must be recognized as the architects of the subject
construction, and that they will not only be deprived of
monetary claim, but that their professional prestige
and standing will seriously impaired.
They went on further to citing Art. 21 of the Civil Code:
Art21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the letter
for damages. They contended that the word “injury”
also refers not only to indeterminate right or property,
but also to honor or credit.
DOCTRINE
One cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the
failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. And
that Art. 21 also envisions a situation where a person
has a legal right, and such right is violated by another
in manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. It presupposes losses or injuries, material or
otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of such
violation.
Where the sole purpose of the appeal is only to secure
recognition that they were co-architects to enhance
their prestige, such judicial declaration is unnecessary,
because a brilliant professional enjoys the respect and
esteem of his fellow men, while an incompetent one
may summon all the tribunals of the world to proclaim
his genius in vain.
TENCHAVEZ v. ESCAÑO
FACTS
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February
1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where
she was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares,
in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair
and was duly registered with the local civil register.
The elopement did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes after the
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college.
Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she
had already married Pastor. The following morning,
the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he
believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint
of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration
did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name
he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly
coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing
an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez
and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her
father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house
of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued
living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job
in Manila. She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor but her letters became less
frequent as the days passed. As of June,1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta had gone
to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition. The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at
the hearing. On 24 June 1950, without informing her
husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was
to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that
she intended to return after two years. The application
was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the
County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. In 1951 Mamerto and
Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor. On
10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage. On 13 September 1954, Vicenta
married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada.
She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship
on 8 August 1958. But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had
initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31
May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through
its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid
divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced
their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages. The appealed judgment did not decree a legal
separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his
wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño
and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to
the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly
to this Court.
ISSUE
1.) Whether or not the court erred in not declaring
legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the
complaint; and
2.) Whether or not the court erred in not holding the
defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of
Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages.
RULING
On the first issue, the court held Yes. The Supreme
Court held that the preceding facts and considerations,
there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a
person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our
law, on the basis of adultery." On the second issue, the
court held No. The Supreme Court held that there is no
evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper
motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to
have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her
decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of
affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being
always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The
law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the
absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such
affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what
will justify interference. A parent is liable for alienation
of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct,
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts
maliciously, without justification and from unworthy
motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital
relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating his right and
liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous
for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his
conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of
the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment,
or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is
liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He
may in good faith take his child into his home and afford
him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently
been applied in the case of advice given to a married
daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face
of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions
are not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
PE v. PE 115 SCRA 186
WASSMER v. VELEZ 120 PHIL 1440
UNJUST ENRICHMENT [ART. 22 & 23]
PEREZ v. POMAR
FACTS
August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, asking for
the rate of compensation for the services he rendered
being an English interpreter between the defendant
and the military authorities at Tabacalera Company.
Ruled in his favor for such sum. The complaint also
asked that the defendant be condemned to the
payment of damages in the sum of $3,200, gold,
together with the costs of suit. Petitioner also asked
that Eugenio Pomar be condemned to pay damages.
According to the complaint it was alleged that Eugenio
Pomar, as general agent of the Compañia General de
Tabacos, verbally requested the plaintiff
last December, 8, 1901, to act as interpreter until May
31, 1902.
Perez services were ready whenever needed. Because
of that he abandoned his own soap company business,
Pomar assured him that Tabacalera Company always
generously repaid services. The defendant even gave
him flattering promises of employment with the
company, but Perez refused. his only proof as to the
same was Mr. Pomar’s word as a gentleman.
To answer the complaint, Pomar denied everything.
Instead, he said that Perez borrowed money from him
for his business, and that he delivered 36 arrobas of oil
worth $106, and three packages of resin for use in
coloring his soap. Respondent only accompanied him
in his trips because he wanted to extend his
business relations, and Pomar occasionally
accompanied him because of friendship, and especially
because of the free transportation given him. Because
of that Perez acted as interpreter in the conferences by
his own free will, without Pomar requesting him, so no
legal relation between him and the company existed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the
continued service rendered by the petitioner.
HELD
Yes, because from the testimonies at trial, it appears
that Perez indeed rendered services as interpreter of
English. He obtained passes and accompanied Pomar
in his journeys in Laguna. But, it doesn’t appear on
record whether Perez was at the disposal of Pomar for
6 months. No contract was filed or any
other innominate contract, but there was tacit and
mutual consent as to the rendition of services.
Pomar accepted the service, and Perez rendered it
expecting that the benefit would be reciprocal. An
obligation arises from this scenario. There was an
innominate contract facio ut des. No salary was fixed
for the services, so the court must determine its value,
to be determined by the custom and frequent use of
the place in which such services were rendered. The
court ruled to Perez. Pomar should pay 200 Mexican
pesos, less 50 pesos as to the costs of the suit.
PACIFIC MERCHANDISING v. CONSOLACION
INSURANCE
FACTS
An action for collection of sum of money was filed by
Pacific Merchandising Corporation (plaintiff-appellee)
against Consolacion Insurance & Surely Co., Inc.,
(defendant-appellee) who in turn filed a third-party
compliant against Gregorio V. Pajarillo (third-party
defendant-appellant). The third-party defendant
Gregorio V. Pajarillo appealed said decision. The
parties, through their respective counsel, submitted
the following Stipulation of Facts:
1. A Writ of Execution was issued by the LC in
the case Pacific Merchandising Corporation
vs. Leo Enterprises, Inc.,
2. That by the virtue of the aforesaid Writ of
Execution, the Sheriff of Manila levied and
attached the following:
a. Second Hand AUTOMATICKET
Machine; and
b. Cinema Projectors
That Atty. Greg V. Pajarillo was appointed as Receiver
in the case Gregorio V. Pajarillo vs. Leo Enterprises,
Inc.; That the sale at public auction of the
aforementioned items was postponed and was later
cancelled due to the representation of Atty. Greg V.
Pajarillo as Receiver of Paris Theater operated by Leo
Enterprises, Inc.; That the third-party defendant
Pajarillo approached Consolacion Insurance (third-
party plaintiff) and applied for a surety bond in the
amount of P 5,000.00 to be rated in favor of the above
named plaintiff in order to guarantee to said plaintiff
the payment of obligations in its favor by the Leo
Enterprises, Inc.; That to protect third party plaintiff
against damage and injury, the third party defendant
Pajarillo executed in favor of the former an
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. That plaintiff received from
Greg V. Pajarillo the sum of P2,000.00 leaving a
balance of P2,562.88 still unpaid aside from interest at
the rate 1% per month and to 25% of the amount due
as provided for in said undertaking (ANNEX ‘C’ to the
complaint); That on October 9, 1963, plaintiffs’ counsel
demanded from the said principal, Greg V. Pajarillo, the
payment of the installment corresponding to the
month of May, June, July, August and September, 1963,
which remain unpaid in spite of said demand, copy of
said letter being, attached as ANNEX ‘E’ to the
complaint; That the defendant was duly notified of the
demand name made of the principal, Greg V. Pajarillo
and in spite of said notice the defendant has failed and
refused to pay the unpaid obligation; That on
December 19, 1963, plaintiffs’ counsel demanded from
the defendant the payment of the unpaid obligation of
the principal, Greg V. Pajarillo but refused and failed to
the same in spite of said demand; On the basis of the
forgoing Stipulation of Facts, said court affirmed the
LC’s decision, from the forgoing judgement, third party
defendant Gregorio V. Pajarillo appealed to the CA. The
aforesaid Appellate Court, in turn certified the same to
this Court on the ground that there is no question of
fact involved, but only one of law.
ISSUE
Whether or not third party defendant-appellant
Gregorio V. Pajarillo is liable to plaintiff for the unpaid
amount claimed.
RULING
Upon the resolution of this issue will in turn depend
the liability of defendant-third-party plaintiff
Consolacion Insurance & surety Co., Inc. under the
Surety Bond, on the basis of which it was ordered by
the court a quo to pay the amount involved to plaintiff-
appellee. Thus, “a receiver, strictly speaking, has no
right or power to make any contract binding the
property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in
his hands without the authority or approval of the
court as explained by Justice Moran, speaking for the
custody of the receiver is the custody of the court. His
acts and possession are the acts and possession of the
court, and his contracts and liabilities are, in
contemplation of law, the contracts and liabilities of
the court. As a necessary consequence, receiver is
subject to the control and supervision of the court at
every step in his management of the property or funds
placed in his hands. He cannot operate independently
of the court and cannot enter into any contract without
its approval.
CIR v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY
FACTS
From January, 1952 to December, 1958, herein private
respondent Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
entered into various insurance contracts involving
casualty, fire and marine risks, for which the
corresponding insurance policies were issued. From
January, 1952 to 1956, documentary stamps were
bought and affixed to the monthly statements of
policies issues; and from 1957 to 1958 documentary
stamps were bought and affixed to the corresponding
pages of the policy register, instead of on the insurance
policies issued. On July 3, 1959, respondent company
discovered that its monthly statements of business and
policy register were lost and reported to the NBI and
CIR. The CIR through it’s examiner, after conducting an
investigation of said loss, ascertained that respondent
company failed to affix the required documentary
stamps to the insurance policies issued by it and failed
to preserve its accounting records within the
prescribed by Sec. 337 the Revenue Code by using
loose leaf forms as registers of documentary stamp
taxes for the years 1952 to 1958 in the total amount of
Php79,806.87 and plus compromise penalties of
PHP81,406.87.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CIR may impose and require the
payment of the subject stamp tax for the documents in
question
RULING
No. There is no justification for the government which
has already realized the revenue which is the object of
the imposition of subject stamp tax to require the
payment of the same tax for the same documents.
Enshrined in our basic legal principles is the time
honored doctrine that no person shall unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another. It goes without
saying that the government is not exempted from the
application of this doctrine.
While there appears to be no question that the purpose
of imposing documentary stamp taxes is to raise
revenue, however, the corresponding amount has
already been paid by respondent and has actually
become part of the revenue of the government. In the
same manner, evidence shown to prove that the
affixture of the stamps on documents not authorized
by law is not attended by bad faith as the practice was
adopted from the authority granted to one of
respondent’s general agents.
VELAYO v. SHELL
FACTS
On August 6,1948, the management of Commercial Air
Lines , Inc. (CALI) met with it’s creditors to informed
them that the corporation was in the state of
insolvency and had to stop operation. To ensure the
payment of their claims against CALI, the creditors
agreed that it would be advantageous not to present
suits against CALI but to strive for a fair pro-rata
division of its assets, although the management of the
CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the
creditors agreed on a pro-rata division of the assets, it
would file insolvency proceedings. Right after the
meeting, defendant Shell Philippines, one of CALI’s
creditors who was present in the meeting and who
agreed to the pro-rata division assigned it’s credit to its
sister Company, Shell USA. Shell USA then filed with a
California court an action for collection of the assigned
credit and applied for a writ of attachment against
CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane which was in California.
Prior to the meeting with creditors CALI had already
offered the plane to Shell Philippine but the offer was
rejected. Velayo as assignee of the other creditors of
CALI, filed this action for damages against defendant
Shell Philippine. He claims that the fraudulent
assignment of Shell USA prejudiced the other creditors
and was contrary to the agreed pro-rata division of
assets.
ISSUE
Whether or not Shell Philippines, taking advantage of
its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane in the
US, acted in bad faith in assigning its credit to its sister
company effectively defeating the agreed pro-rata
division of assets among the creditors of CALI
HELD
Provisions on Human Relations intended as catch-all
provisions for any wrong for which no specific remedy
is provided for by law Defendant schemed and effected
the transfer of its sister corporation in the United
States, where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and
unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said
insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the
assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity
to recover said plane. Art. 19. Any person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performances of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith”. Art. 21. Any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage”. "Another rule is expressed in Article 24
which compels the return of a thing acquired 'without
just or legal grounds'. This provision embodies the
doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another, which has been one of the
mainstays of every legal system for centuries. It is most
needful that these ancient principles be clearly and
specifically consecrated in the proposed Civil Code to
the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no
one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of
another. Article 23 of- the Civil Code goes as far as to
provide that: "Even if an act or event causing damage
to another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable
for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited:" with mere much more reason the
Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it
committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.
JUDICIAL VIGILANCE [ART. 24]
THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE [ART. 25]
RIGHT TO PRIVACY [ART. 26]
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP. v. CA
FACTS
The Arcadios were a newly member of a friendly
community known as Brookside Hills. Doctor Aramil
(Respondent herein) a neuropsychiatrist, live also in a
luxurious house in said subdivision. St. Louis Realty
Corp. (Petitioner herein), a publishing corporation,
wrongfully advertise in the Sunday Times,
misrepresented the house of Dr. Aramil belonged to
Arcadio S. Arcadio. Unaware thereof, Dr. Aramil upon
discovery wrote a letter then addressed to the
Corporation’s advertising Officer Mr. Magtoto.
Petitioner republished but no rectification nor apology
was made. Dr. Aramil filed suit for damages before RTC
which ruled on his favor. CA affirms the trial court’s
judgment. Undaunted, Petitioner Corporation elevate
the matter to SC.
ISSUE
W/N St. Louis Realty Corp. should be held liable under
Art.21 and Art.26 of NCC.
RULING
Yes, Petitioner Corporation is liable for acts contra
bonus mores or wilful acts contrary to morals, and
damages for disrespecting the privacy of Dr. Aramil.
Article 21 of Civil Code provides that any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 26 likewise
provide that every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbour
and other persons, shall produce a cause of action for
damages. In this case, Petitioner Corporation’s
employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the
Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated
publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose
it never made any written apology and explanation of
the mix-up. It just contended itself with a cavalier
rectification. Persons, who know the residence of Dr.
Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering
impression that he was renting from Arcadio or that
the latter leased it from him. Either way, his private life
was mistaken and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish. Hence,
Petitioner Corporation is liable under Art.21 and
Art.26 of NCC for disrespecting the privacy of Dr.
Aramil by the reckless publication.
CASTRO v. PEOPLE GR 180832
DERELICTION OF DUTY [ART. 27]
PILAR v. SANGGUNIANGBAYAN OF DASOL,
PANGASINAN
FACTS
Petitioner was elected Vice-Mayor of Dasol,
Pangasinan in 1980 and assumed office on March 1,
1980. On March 4,1980 the Sangguniang Bayan
adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaraies
of the Mayor and Municipal Treasurer in compliance
with Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 as implemented by
Circular 9-A of Joint Commission on Local Government.
The said resolution did not provide for an increase in
salary of the Vice-Mayor despite the fact that such
position is entitled to an increase. Petitioner
questioned the failure of the SB to appropriate the
amount for payment of his salary. The SB then enacted
a resolution appropriating the amount for the payment
of unpaid salaries however the Mayor vetoed the
resolution. The petitioner then filed for a writ of
mandamus. While the petition was filed the SB
enacted an appropriation ordinance which included
payment of salary differentials of the petitioner.
ISSUE
The issue is whether respondent Mayor is still liable
for damages the case becoming moot and academic
with the payment of salary differentials.
RULING
The Supreme Court held that although the case
becomes moot and academic Pilar is entitled to
damages and attorney’s fees. The amount shall be paid
by the Mayor from his private and personal funds. In
arriving at the decision the Supreme Court held that
the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing petitioner’s valid, just and demandable claim
for 3 years even with the certification from the
Municipal Treasurer of the availability of funds when
he vetoed the Resolution.
PHILIPPINE MATCH COMPANY v. CITY OF CEBU
FACTS
Cebu City enacted an ordinance imposing quarterly tax
on grosss sales of merchants, dealers, importers and
manufacturers of any commodity doing businessn in
CebuCity. It imposes a sales tax of 1% on the gross
sales, receipts or value of commodities sold exchanged,
bartered or manufactured. The company paid said
taxes on protest specifically questioning the legality of
the ordinance on its applicability to the following:
 Sales of matches booked and paid for in Cebu
City but shipped to customers outside the City;
 Transfer of matches to newsmen assigned to
different agencies outside of the City; and
 Shipments of matches to provincial customers
pursuant to salesmen’s instructions.
The Company also prayed that the City Treasurer
ordered to pay damages. The Trial Court invalidated
the tax on transfer of matches to salesmen assigned to
different agencies outside Cebu City and ordered the
City to refund Philippine Match Company. The City did
not appeal the decision. However the Company
appealed the portion of the decision dismissing its
claim for damages against the City Treasurer.
ISSUE
Whether or not the City Treasurer is liable for damages
in refusing to exempt the Company from payment said
taxes?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of respondent City
Treasurer. The Court noted that Article 27
presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public
official is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence. In this case, it cannot be said that the
Treasurer acted willfully or grossly in not exempting
the plaintiff from payment of taxes where he acted in
consonance with his bona-fide interpretation of the tax
ordinance.
UNFAIR COMPETITION [ART. 28]
US. v. MANUEL 7 PHIL 221
ARTICLE 29
SAPIERA v. CA
FACTS
Remedios Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, was issued
by Arturo de Guzman (4) checks as payment for
purchases he made at her store. She used said checks,
to pay for certain items she purchased from the
grocery store of Ramon Sua. These checks were signed
at the back by petitioner. When presented for
payment the checks were dishonored because the
drawer’s account was already closed. Sua informed
Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor
but both failed to pay the value of the checks. The trial
court acquitted the petitioner for the crime of estafa
and not held civilly liable. On appeal, the appellate
court held that petitioner is liable for the value of the
checks.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the value of
the checks he signed after the trial court had acquitted
her for criminal charges.
RULING
Petitioner is civilly liable in the instant case, as the
aggrieved party suffered damages. The court
mentioned, Article 29 of the prevailing Civil Code of
the Philippine “when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious. In a criminal case
where the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not
acquittal is due to that ground.”
In relation to negotiable instruments law, as she
(petitioner) signed the subject checks on the reverse
side without any indication as to how she should be
bound thereby, she is deemed to be an unqualified
indorser thereof. Every indorser who indorses
without qualification, warrants to all subsequent
holders in due course that, on due presentment, it shall
be accepted or paid or both, according to its tenor, and
that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings
on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount
thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser
who may be compelled to pay it.
SADIO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIQUE 201
SCRA 744
MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES, INC. v.
QUINTANO
FACTS
Quintano was an accredited agent of Machinery &
Engineering Supplies and is entitled to 5% commission
on all sales made by him. Quintano commenced an
action against Machinery & Engineering Supplies for
the recovery if his unpaid commisions. It was
dismissed for lack of merit. Machinery & Engineering
Supplies claimed that Quintano has retained collection
from its clients. This allegation was not denied by
Quintano. A criminal case of estafa was then filed by
Machinery & Engineering Supplies against Quintano,
but it was dismissed based on "reasonable doubt." A
civil case was also initiated by Machinery &
Engineering Supplies for the recovery of the retained
collection and for damages. However, it was likewise
dismissed because later on they ended up in an
amount beyond the jurisdiction of the lower court.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding the
doctrine of res adjudicata in herein case?
2. Whether or not the dismissal for Lack of jurisdiction
of the lower court bars the plaintiff to initiate the civil
action to a court that has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD
1. Yes. We agree that the court below erred in holding
that plaintiff's action herein was barred by res judicata
With regard to the judgment of acquittal in the
criminal case, No. 9991 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the decision (Exhibit "16")'clearly expresses
that the acquittal was for the reason that "the evidence
presented is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt." As can be seen, the decision of
acquittal does not negate the fact alleged in the present
complaint, that defendant, as agent of the plaintiff,
withheld part of the moneys that he received for his
principal.
It follows that the right of the principal to recover in a
civil action the moneys retained by the agent has not
been barred by the acquittal in the criminal case, since
the latter was acquitted upon reasonable doubt (New
Civil Code, Article 29)., and the judgment does not
declare that the basis of the civil action (retention by
the agent of the moneys belonging to the principal)
does not exist (Rule 107, section 1, paragraph. d)
Precisely, the existence of such basis for the civil action
was expressly recognized. 2. Yes. the action of the
plaintiff-appellant is not precluded by the 1949
judgment of the Municipal Court , for the reason that
the counterclaim filed by the appellant in said case was
to recover the sums allegedly retained by defendant
Quintano as its agent totalling P6,178.98 plus P8,500'
as damages . Award of that amount was clearly beyond
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court; hence, its
dismissal of the counterclaim was inoperative to bar a
subsequent suit to enforce the same. The want of
jurisdiction was not cured by the dismissal of plaintiff's
appeal by the Court of First Instance, since the latter
merely revived the appealed judgment of the
Municipal Court. The revival could not validate that
portion of the appealed judgment which was void for
want of jurisdiction.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and
defendant-appellee is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant the total of P5,733.53, with legal interest
from the time of the filing of the complaint up to full
payment. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SANTOS v. PIZARRO
FACTS
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M.
Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle
collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus
driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van,
which claimed the lives of the van’s driver and three
(3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby,
and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers. In a decision dated December 17, 1998,
the MTC convicted Sibayan. As petitioners expressly
made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil
action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan,
the MTC did not make any pronouncement as to the
latter’s civil liability.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, predicating their claim on the
judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a
separate civil action made in the criminal case.
Petitioners assert that by the institution of the
complaint, they seek to recover private respondent’s
civil liability arising from crime. Respondent Judge
NormandieB. Pizardo of RTC-Quezon City, dismissed
the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action
was based on quasi delict and should have been
brought within four (4) years from the time the cause
of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident. MR
was denied. Petition for certiorari with the CA was
dismissed for being improper remedy. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action for civil liability has
prescribed
HELD
No. A reading of the complaint reveals that the
allegations therein are consistent with petitioners’
claim that the action was brought to recover civil
liability arising from crime. Although there are
allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and
Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that
petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on
quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the
offended party has the choice between an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict
under the Civil Code. At the time of the filing of the
complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action
ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause
of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription
of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar
to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
In the case of Mendoza vs La Mallorca Bus Company, it
was held that the dismissal of the action based on
culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to
obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a
final judgment convicting the employee. Seen in this
light, the trial court should not have dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead
allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion
to dismissand motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover
civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action waives the other
civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the offender.
However, since the stale action for damages based on
quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no
more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against
double recovery for obvious reasons.
ARTICLE 31
REPUBLIC v. BELLO
FACTS
Private respondent Arceño, in his aforementioned
capacity, was charged in Criminal Case for
malversation of public funds in which he supposedly
failed to produce or to make proper accounting thereof
after repeated demands. After due trial, the respondent
court rendered a decision acquitting Arceño. After the
acquittal of Arceño, the Provincial Fiscal filed Civil Case
for the recovery of the total sum of P13,790.71 which
represented the accountability of Arceño due to his
failure to issue official receipts and to immediately
deposit said funds with the National Treasury, and
instead spent the said funds or disbursed them
without complying with the requirements applicable
to disbursements of public funds, with intent to
defraud the government. Arceño, through counsel, filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint in the said civil case
alleging, among others, that the petitioner, as plaintiff
therein, had no cause of action against him inasmuch
as "the cause of action had been decided in a prior
judgment."
ISSUE
Whether or not the acquittal of Arceño in the criminal
case bars the filing of the civil action against him.
RULING
No. It was admitted by Arceño that he did not post his
collections in his books of account nor deposited them
with the National Treasury as required by the rules
and regulations. Worse, he disbursed them without
prior approval of the Auditor. The decision did not
absolve Arceño or free him from responsibility insofar
as his accountability as Cashier and Disbursing Officer
is concerned. The acquittal, in the words of the trial
court, was because "The evidence of the prosecution is
not enough to establish the guilt of the accused as it
opens an avenue leading to a belief that the accused
might be innocent." Indeed, the dispositive portion of
the decision in the criminal case did not state that the
facts upon which his responsibility as an accountable
officer is based were non-existent. Instead it expressly
and categorically declares that his acquittal was upon
the finding that "the evidence of the prosecution was
not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt."
Even insofar as the amount of P6,619.34 which
constituted the subject-matter of the criminal charge of
malversation is concerned, the acquittal of the private
respondent in the criminal case would not constitute
an obstacle to the filing of the Civil Case. The finding by
the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in
the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery
School and not for his personal benefit is not a
declaration that the fact upon which the Civil Case is
based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a
declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense
charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. (Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed
against an accused who had been acquitted in the
criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on
factual or legal considerations other than the
commission of the offense charged. A person may be
acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar,
he could show that he did not misappropriate the
public funds in his possession, but he could be
rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to
make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the
same for purposes which are not authorized nor
intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable
rules and regulations.
TAYAG v. ALCANTARA 98 SCRA 723
VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
ABERCA v. VER
FACTS
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units
of the AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian
Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view
of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof,
the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants.
During these raids, certain members of the raiding
TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were
arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the
courts. For some period after their arrest, they were
arrested without denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel, through threats, torture and other forms of
violence in order to obtain incriminatory information
or confessions and in order to punish them.
ISSUE
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages
for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
under the constitution.
HELD
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus (PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional
rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and
cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by
adding the following text: However, when the action
(for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-
delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct
of any public officer involving the exercise of powers
or authority arising from martial law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same
must be brought within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC
suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot
suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their
private belongings, the violation of their right to
remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment. The question became moot and academic
since the suspension of the PWHC had been lifted with
the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of
Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP,
were merely responding to their duties, as they claim,
“to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion” in accordance with
Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the
lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive
strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But
this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving
commission untrammeled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights
and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and
protected by the Constitution. Article 32 of the Civil
Code, which renders any public officer or employees,
or any private individual, liable in damages for
violating the constitutional rights and liberties of
another, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code
or other penal statute.
This is not say that military authorities are
restrained from pursuing their assigned task or
carrying out their mission with vigor, to protect the
Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of
the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy
or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil
their very existence. What is meant is that in carrying
out their task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed; otherwise, the very
fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of
competing ideologies, the struggle of mind is just as
vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that
psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once
that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well
be abandoned. The doctrine of respondeat superior is
not applicable in this case. It has been generally
limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant relationships. No such relationship
exists superiors of the military and their subordinates.
However, the decisive factor in this case is the
language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an
officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly”
responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as
indirectly responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
NUISANCE
VELASCO v. MERALCO
FACTS
Petitioner owns three adjoining lots situated at corner
of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman Quezon City.
Petitoner sold two lots to Merlaco and retained the
third lot which is the farthest from the street corner.
Meralco constructed a sub-station with a distance of
10-20 meters from Velasco’s house. A sound
unceasingly emanates from the sub-station which,
according to Velasco, is a nuisance that caused the
disease of anxiety neurosis to the latter, among others.
The lower court ruled that the sound of sub-station
was unavoidable and did not constitute nuisance.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sound constitutes an actionable
nuisance.
HELD
Various American cases ruled that the test to
determine if the noise is nuisance or not does not only
rely on the volume/intensity but on the character of
the noise as to produce actual physical discomfort and
annoyance to a person or ordinary sensibilities.
Various tests on sound level were also conducted and
it showed that the sub-station’s transformers were
more than the normal. Thus this constitutes an
actionable nuisance for which the appellant is entitled
to relief. Thus, appellant is ordered to either transfer
its sub-station or take appropriate measure to reduce
its noise. The appellant is ordered to pay Velasco P20,
000 for damages and P5, 000 for Attorney’s fee.
MERALCO v. CA
FACTS
Pedro Velasco purchased 3 lots from People‘s
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) located at
the corner of South D and South 6 Streets of Quezon
City. The Deed of Sale provided that :
1. The properties sold shall be used exclusively
for residential purposes and no business shall
be allowed within the premises.
2. The vendor shall have the right to enter the
premises to install electric lines/ utilities for
the community.
3. Violation of the terms shall entitle vendor to
rescind the sale, seek cancellation of title,
repossess the property, and dispose of the
same as if there had been no previous sale.
4. Terms and conditions are binding upon the
heirs, executors, administrators, successors,
and assigns of the parties.
The terms and conditions were annotated, but
not word for word, on the title issued to Velasco.
Velasco sold 2 of the 3 lots to MERALCO, which
established a substation therein the following year. A
letter by Velasco to MERALCO dated Sept. 26, 1953
asked for technical assurance that the electric
substation is not dangerous to neighbors nor would it
be a nuisance. Velasco wrote a letter to MERALCO,
calling the attention of the latter on the effects of the
substation that the Velasco and his family tried to
tolerate for a while. This included the severe noise and
electrification of the ground and the artesian well,
which made life of the family unbearable and made the
residential district dangerous. Velasco filed a Nuisance
Case against MERALCO before the CFI of Rizal, praying
for the removal and abatement of the substation with
damages. CFI Rizal dismissed the complaint, but the SC
(on appeal) ordered MERALCO to either transfer the
substation or take appropriate measures to reduce the
noise between its property and the Velasco‘s to an
average of 40 to 50 decibels within 90 days from
finality of the decision. During the pendency of the
previous case, Velasco filed a second action, a
Cancellation Case, for rescission of the sale of the
property between Meralco and Velasco and to collect
rentals while the former is still in possession of the
same. CFI dismissed it for splitting of cause of action.
The CA reversed the decision, considering that
abatement of a nuisance was distinct and separate
from rescission of contract of sale.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Velasco has a cause of action
against Meralco.
2. Whether or not MERALCO‘s substation is a
commercial/ non-residential establishment.
 3. Whether or not the filing of the Cancellation
Case is barred by estoppel.
HELD
1. No cause of action. It is the original vendor,
not the vendee, who later sold the property to another,
who has right of cause of action against assignee of
vendee for alleged violation of condition that only
constructions exclusively for residential purposes shall
be built on the property. The requirement in the
PHHC-Velasco contract was binding on Velasco and
MERALCO as his assignee. That contract implies that it
is PHHC itself which has the right of action against the
assignee of Velasco. Cancellation of the title to the
property would be by virtue of the condition imposed
in the PHHC-Velasco contract, and not by virtue of the
contract between Velasco and MERALCO. If title to the
property is cancelled, and PHHC repossesses, no
damage will be suffered by Velasco who had already
sold and had received the value thereof. The damage
will be borne solely by MERALCO.
2. No, MERALCO’s substation is not a
commercial. From the PHHC or community point of
view, Construction of an electric substation by a local
electric public service company within the subdivision
is within the term ―residential purposes. Residences
are expected to be furnished with electrical
connection. Without such, because of the lack of a
substation, the residences within the entire
subdivision area could be valueless for residential
purposes. Also, while the property is in a residential
district, authorities of Quezon City granted a permit for
the construction of the substation, thereby conceding
that a substation is not necessarily nonresidential.
3. Yes. Where a party failed to object to the
construction of an electric substation within the
property but merely asked for assurance that the
substation would not be dangerous or be a nuisance,
he was guilty of contractual estoppel. What was
ultimately objected to by Velasco was the noise of the
substation, but there was no original and timely
objection to the establishment itself of the substation
as being not for residential purposes. If there had been
no noise whatsoever from the substation, no
controversy would have arisen. Acts done by the
parties to a contract in the course of its performance
are admissible in evidence upon the question of its
meaning as being their own contemporaneous
interpretation of its terms. Velasco should be held as
estopped from seeking cancellation of his sale of the
property to MERALCO because the substation, while it
was being built, was considered by Velasco as not
violative of the requirement for ―residential
purposes‖. There was no split of a single cause of
action. The principle applicable would be estoppel by
judgment or ―collateral estoppel by judgment‖. An
issue resolved in one cause of action cannot be
relitigated in a subsequent case filed on a different
cause of action to obviate multiplicity of suits.
BENGZON v. PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN
FACTS
This is an action for damages for maintaining a
nuisance continuously injurious to the plaintiff and his
family by reason of the maintenance and operation of a
stand pipe, pumping station and open reservoir for the
storage of water. Plaintiff and his family lived in a two-
story nipa and wooden house constructed on a lot also
owned by plaintiff. He had been living there for 27
years. Defendant constructed a reinforced concrete
stand pipe 28 meters high and 9 meters in diameter.
Within the base of the cylindrical tank were three
machines. In the side of the tank nearest the plaintiff’s
residence and at a distance of 3.4 meters was a
chimney which rose to about the height of gable of the
house. The tank itself was 3.8 meters from plaintiff’s
house. Plaintiff claimed that the plant emitted smoke
and a disagreeable odor; that the chimney emitted
sparks which, if carried by the wind, might cause his
house to catch fire; and that in case of an earthquake,
the tank might fall and crush his house and its
occupants. The lower court decided against the
plaintiff.
ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant is liable for damages for
maintaining a nuisance.
HELD
Yes. In Locating its pumping station within 3.8 meters
from the house of the plaintiff, the defendant should
reasonably have forseen that the noise, vibrations,
smoke, odor and sparks coming from the plant during
its operation, not only during the day but during the
night as well, would cause a constant annoyance,
discomfort and danger both to the property of the
plaintiff and the health and comfort of himself and his
family. The evidence as a whole leaves us with the
clear conviction that the construction and operation of
this pumping plant in such close proximity to the
plaintiff’s residence has rendere the same practically
uninhabitable without exposing to risk the comfort,
health and in case of fire, even the lives of the plaintiff
and his family.
We find from the preponderance of the evidence that
the fair present value of the appellant’s premises
involved in this suit is P3,000 and as under the
circumstances, the maintenance of the nuisance is
practically tantamount to an expropriation, we have
concluded that the defendant-appellee should be and it
is hereby required and adjudged to pay the plaintiff-
appellant the sum of P3,000 upon a tender by him to it
of a valid conveyance of the premises, free of liens and
incumbrances, reserving to the plaintiff-appellant the
right to remove his imrovements therefrom within
three months from the date of payment of the said
P3,000. The judgment appealed from is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with his decision. No special
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO v.
LOOD
FACTS
The metropolitan Waterworks and sewerage system,
successor in interest of National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority asserted ownership of a parcel of
land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and Halo Halo in San
Juan, Rizal. Said land declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Metropolitan Water District, are composed
of aqueducts and an underground reservoir. Portions
of the land were sold or leased by NAWASA. MWSS
desired the demolition and removal of the houses and
structures of the subject land.
The petitioners claimed the same land and moved to
reopen the cadastral proceedings on it. The CFI denied
the reopening. The same petitioners later filed a
special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with
the Supreme Court, which was dismissed.
Reconsideration was also denied. Lower Courts Ruling:
The CFI issued orders to demolish and remove the
houses and structures on the subject land. No further
justification exist to continue the stay order against the
removal and demolition of the constructions.
ISSUE
Whether the CFI exceeded its authority and
jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying the preliminary injunction sought to stay
demolition and removal of petitioners houses and
structures
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ruled in
favour of the CFI. Authority was not exceeded and
there was no grave abuse of discretion in the CFI’s
denial of petitioner’s motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction allegedly “ to maintain the status quo” and
stay demolition and removal of their illegal
constructions found to be public nuisances per se and
serious hazards to public health. Petitioners
construction have been duly found to be public
nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation
or disposal of waste matters and constructed without
building permits contiguously to and therefore liable
to pollute one of the main water pipelines which
supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may
be abated without judicial proceedings under our Civil
Code. As stated in Sitchon vs. Aquino, the police power
of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by
summary proceedings of public nuisances.
SOLIS v. PUJEDA
FACTS
Benedicta Pujeda is the owner of a strip of land, lying
along a stream known as the estero of Calibuyo. Prior
to the institution, the plaintiffs constructed a dam of
stone across the stream in order obtain water for
irrigation and one of the wings of the dam was made to
rest upon the bank which belongs to Benedicta. As a
result of this her land were flooded by the rise of
water. Thus she man an opening in the portion of dam.
Thus plaintiff instituted action restraining Benedicta
from interfering with the reparation of the dam.
Defendants answered that they be absolved and that
the plaintiffs in turn be required to remove the
aforesaid dam.
ISSUE
Whether or not the plaintiff have justified the invasion
of the rights of Benedicta.
RULING
No. It appears that when the work was undertaken
several years ago, the plaintiff expected to obtain the
approval of the Director of Lands for the project and at
the time they promised to indemnify Benedicta for
damage cause. However after its progress, the Director
of Land had ordered its removal but the plaintiff still
desired to continue thus they deposit a bond to Bureau
of Land to cover for the damage caused. Article 143 of
Law of Waters provides that an easement of buttress
can be imposed but in such case it is required that an
investigation of record shall be made before the
easement of buttress is decreed. And the Bureau of
Land is the proper repository of the administrative
authority.
In the case at bar, no investigation was made. Also no
legal warrant for the plaintiff to proceed with the
construction of the dam. Considering also that it is friar
lands, Sec 19 of Act No. 1120 gives the government
special authority to construct or to authorize another
to construct or improve. Thus their claim that they get
this license from Director of Lands afford no basis.
RAMCAR, INC. v. MILLAR
FACTS
Petitioner Ramcar, Inc. operates and maintains an auto
repair and body building shop while the seven private
respondents reside near or around the shop.
Respondents brought an action before the CFI of
Manila to abate the said establishment as a nuisance.
The CFI dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied with
the decision, the respondents appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s
decision, declaring that the operation and maintenance
of the establishment of the Ramcar is a public
nuisance. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not the abatement of petitioner’s business
is proper.
HELD
No. The business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per
se. it is only on account of its location that it is a public
nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the
appealed decision decrees, to remove all building an
structures built in the place where it is presently
located as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized for
pursuit that are not forbidden by law or ordinance.
TIMONER v. PEOPLE
FACTS
At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971,
petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte,
accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel
Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived
in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of
petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together
rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which
protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway.
Among the structures thus barricaded were the
barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-
Rebustillos. These establishments had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain
health and sanitation requirements. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-
Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their
stalls, alleged that these stalls constituted public
nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was
never able to reopen his barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen,
Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of
grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As
already noted, the said court exonerated the two
policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime
charged as principal by inducement. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the
trial court. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE
Whether or not Timoner committed Grave Coercion?
RULING
No. The petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged.
He did not commit Grave Coercon as the elements of
Grave Coercion required that he acted not under the
authority of the law. As the then Mayor of the City,
Timoner had the authority to act on behalf of the
recommendation and his constituents’ right to public
order and safety, and that such stalls along the
sidewalk affected the community and general public,
as it is in a public place, and was annoying to all who
come within its sphere. The Supreme Court did
contend that the barbershop did constitute a public
nuisance, as defined under Article 694 and 695 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Furthermore, it had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town,
merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of
the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good
faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner
incurred no criminal liability. Grave coercion is
committed when "a person who, without authority of
law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong."
1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any
person be prevented by another from doing something
not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something
against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the
prevention or compulsion be effected by violence,
either by material force or such display of it as would
produce intimidation and control the will of the
offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained
the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or,
in other words, that the restraint was not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
DAMAGES
ACTUAL/COMPENSATORY
HICKS v. MANILA HOTEL
FACTS
On the 9th of November 1912, plaintiff and defendant
entered into a written contract by which the defendant
ceded to the plaintiff the exclusive right to serve its
patrons with five-passenger automobiles for a period
of one year with certain rights with respect to a
renewal of the contract for a second year. Plaintiff
entered on the performance of his duties under the
contract and successfully discharged them during the
first yea. When about half of the first year had expired,
the defendant company, disregarding, as plaintiff
claims, the terms of its agreement with him, invited
proposals from various garages for its five-passenger
automobile privilege for the ensuing year, that is, from
November, 1913, to November, 1914, the time covered
by the second year of plaintiff's contract. Under these
proposals various garages competed for the privilege,
including that of George E. Brown, and, after certain
negotiations with the latter, his offer was accepted by
the defendant company and a written contract made
with him for the exclusive right to the privilege during
the year. This contract with Brown was executed some
months prior to the termination of the first year of
plaintiff's contract. Upon the termination of the first
year of the contract the defendant company having, as
we have seen, already entered into a contract with
Brown relative to the matter included in plaintiff's
contract for the period representing the second year
thereof, refused, over plaintiff's objections and
protests, to permit him to continue for the second year,
deprived him of the privilege which the contract
conferred, and evicted him from the hotel where,
under the terms of the contract, he was entitled to
have and did have an office. This action was brought to
recover damages for breach of contract.
ISSUE
Whether or not Hicks is entitled to the P10,800, basing
that the claim upon the profits which he would have
received if he had continued the business for the
second year?
RULING
Yes. There is more or less inaccuracy in every action
for damages for breach of contract but inn order to
justify a recovery in any case, assuming that a breach
has been committed, there are two necessary elements
to be considered: One that a damage has been done;
the other that such damage is the result of the breach.
The amount of the one should be computed with
reasonable accuracy. The fact of the other must be
determined with reasonable certainty. A less degree of
accuracy is required in the former than of certainty in
the latter, but neither is required to be absolute or
beyond conjectural possibilities. Where it reasonably
appears that a party has been damaged, and that such
damage is the direct result of the breach, then a
recovery is justified. The next step is to ascertain how
much will reasonably compensate the injured party.
This should be computed by the plainest, easiest, and
most accurate measure which will do justice in the
premises, and if from the conditions in the contract,
and the nature of the breach, it reasonably appears
that the extent or amount of damages may be more
readily, easily, correctly, and justly ascertained by
applying the loss of profits as a measure, if it is evident
that profits were lost and the amount thereof can be
calculated with reasonable accuracy, then such profits
are the true measure to be applied. In such cases,
however, it should appear evident that profits were
lost. The amount may be estimated with only
reasonable accuracy; but the fact that profits were lost
should require stricter proof. In the case before us
there seems to be as little speculation in determining
the profits which the plaintiff might have recovered as
is usual in cases where the time for which the profits
are to be recovered extends over a considerable period
of time. It is undisputed that the business was a very
profitable one the first year and that the second year
would have been more profitable than the first. While
the estimate of the amount of profits for the second
year is an estimate of necessity, it is one which is based
upon facts testified to by the plaintiff, which were
within his knowledge and which appear to the court to
sustain his contention. While the evidence is not as
conclusive as in cases where the damages are certain
and capable of accurate statement, we are satisfied
with its sufficiency, particularly in view of the fact that
all that courts may require of litigants is the
production of the best evidence of which the case is
susceptible. As to whether or not the plaintiff in an
action of this character may recover only that portion
of the profits which had accrued up to the time of
bringing the action, or whether he may sue for all the
damages resulting from the breach in a single action,
even though that action is begun long before the
period during which the profits will accrue has
expired, we may say that, in our judgment, the weight
of authority is to the effect that the plaintiff need bring
but one action and that he may recover the damages
sustained for the whole period even though it be by
anticipation.
MARIKINA AUTO LINE v. PP 486 SCRA 284
RCPI v. CA
FACTS
On January 24, 1983, private respondents-spouses
Minerva Timan and Flores Timan sent a telegram of
condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Midoranda
whrough petitioner RCPI, to convey their deepest
sympathy for the recent death of the mother-in-law of
Hilario Midoranda. The condolence telegram was
correctly transmitted. However, the condolence
message as communicated and delivered to the
addresses was typewritten on a “Happy Birthday” card
and placed inside a “Christmasgram” envelope. The
Spouses Timan demanded an explanation. Unsatisfied
with RCPI’s explanations, Timans filed a complaint for
damages. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the respondent Timans which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not RCPI shall be held liable for damages.
HELD
Yes. In the present case, it is self-evident that a
telegram of condolence is intended and meant to
convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. Precisely,
it is denominated “telegram of condolence” because it
tenders sympathy and offers to share another’s grief. It
seems out of this world, therefore, to place that
message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver
the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of
carelessness and incompetence not only to render
violence to good taste and common sense, they depict
a bizarre presentation of the sender’s feelings. They
ridicule the deceased’s loved ones and destroy the
atmosphere of grief and respect for the departed.
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram
company like RCPI can choose to send his message in
the ordinary form or in a social form. In the ordinary
form, the text of the message is typed on plain
newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram
is placed in a special form with the proper decorations
and embellishments to suit the occasion and the
message and delivered in an envelope matching the
purpose of the occasion and the words and intent of
the message. The sender pays a higher amount for the
social telegram than for one in the ordinary form. It is
clear, therefore, that when RCPI typed the private
respondents' message of condolence in a birthday card
and delivered the same in a colorful Christmasgram
envelope, it committed a breach of contract as well as
gross negligence. Its excuse that it had run out of social
condolence cards and envelopes is flimsy and
unacceptable. It could not have been faulted had it
delivered the message in the ordinary form and
reimbursed the difference in the cost to the private
respondents. But by transmitting it unfittingly—
through other special forms clearly, albeit outwardly,
portraying the opposite feelings of joy and happiness
and thanksgiving—RCPI only exacerbated the
sorrowful situation of the addressees and the senders.
It bears stress that this botchery exposed not only the
petitioner's gross negligence but also its callousness
and disregard for the sentiments of its clientele, which
tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must
be held liable for damages.
PP v. SANCHEZ 367 SCRA 520
CARIAGA v. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS
FACTS
Moncada was driving a bus of the Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company (LTB) and Cariaga was one of the
passengers. The bus is bound for Lilio, Laguna. As the
bus reached the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, where the
national highway crossed a railroad track, it bumped
against the engine of a train then passing by. The
impact was so strong that it caused the first six wheels
of the train to be derailed, while the engine and front
part of the body of the bus were wrecked. Moncada
died while Cariaga suffered major injuries. Cariaga was
unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident.
A portion of his brain was removed. According to the
doctors, due to this operation, Cariaga’s mentally has
been so reduced (50%) that can no longer finish his
studies as a medical student. LTB paid Cariaga’s
hospital, medical and miscellaneous expenses. Also,
LTB gave him P10.00 daily allowance from January
until April 1953. Complaint was filed against LTB and
MRR C. for recovery of damages.
 LTB argues that the accident was due to the
negligence of MRR for not providing a crossing bar at
the point where the national highway crossed the
railway track. That the driver of the train violated the
law in sounding the whistle only when the collision
was about to take place instead of at a distance of at
least 300 meters from the crossing and in not ringing
the locomotive bell at all. MRR argues that it was the
reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the
accident. RTC held that it was the negligence of the bus
driver that caused the accident. It ordered LTB to pay
Cariaga compensatory damages. Hence this appeal
where the Cariaga’s claim that the RTC should have
also awarded them moral and actual damages.
ISSUE
1.) Whether or not the bus driver was negligent.
2.) Whether or not the amount awarded by the RTC as
compensatory damages shall be increased.
RULING
1. Yes. Evidence shows that the train whistle had been
sounded several times before it reached the
crossing and the bus driver simply ignored the
warnings. Instead of slowing down, the bus driver
tried to make the bus pass the crossing before the train
by not stopping a few meters from the railway track
and in proceeding ahead. In fact, there was a bus which
arrived at the crossing ahead of the one driven by
Moncada. Said bus stopped before the crossing, hence
nothing happened to it.
2. Yes. In contracts, the obligor in good faith (common
carrier) is liable only for the natural and probable
consequences of the breach and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted. If in bad faith, fraud,
malice or wanton attitude, the obligor in breach is
liable for all damages reasonably attributed to the
breach. In the case at bar, LTB is liable not only for the
actual damages suffered for medical and hospital
expenses but also for the income which the passenger
would have earned had he finished medical school.
These are likewise considered as actual damages
because they could have been reasonably foreseen by
the parties at the time the passenger boarded the bus.
No moral damages could be awarded because it was
not shown that the breach of contract for which the
action is based was not tainted with fraud or bad faith.
The claim made by the spouses Cariaga for actual and
compensatory damages cannot be awarded due to the
fact that the present action is based upon a breach of
contract to carriage to which said spouses were not a
party, and neither can they premise their claim upon
the negligence or quasi delict of LTB because they
were not the ones injured in the accident.
UY CHACO v. ADMIRAL LINE
FACTS
The plaintiff, Mariano Uy Chaco Sons & Co., alleges as a
cause of action, that upon arrival of the S. S. Satsuma at
the port of Manila on June 22, 1920, there were short-
delivered one case of varnish and paint remover and
fifty bales of oakum, for the conversion of which,
defendant is liable. The defendant, the Admiral Line,
relies on the defense in its second amended answer
that the merchandise had been tendered and rejected.
Judgment was for plaintiff for the value of the case of
varnish and paint remover, P22.80, for the value of the
fifty bales of oakum, P700, for the freight, P195.50, and
for the insurance, P18, or a total of P936.30, with legal
interest and costs.
ISSUE
Whether or not Admiral Line should be held liable for
damages for its delayed delivery of the goods.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a delay of more than
two years in making delivery was conclusively
unreasonable. A delay in pressing a defense predicated
on tender, of more than two years counted from the
date when the complaint was filed, was likewise
defendant was sufficiently complete since it was
unable to turn the goods over to the plaintiff at any
time before the complaint was presented, and in fact,
could not do so until a long time thereafter. The
interval which elapsed between the date when the
merchandise should have been delivered and the
presentation of the complaint was approximately
eleven months. The delay which ensued between the
date when the merchandise should have been
delivered and the date when it was finally tendered
was close to two years and four months. The time
which passed between the date when the merchandise
should have been delivered and the date when the
defense of tender was set up, was over three years, and
this particular line of defense was not announced until
shortly before the trial. And these facts together, and
the reasons why the plaintiff can be permitted to
recover on its action are self-evident.
LEMOINE v. AKLAN
FACTS
On the 10th day of July, 1913, the plaintiff and
defendant signed a written contract whereby the
defendant hired the plaintiff, an expert automobile
mechanic, to perform services as such expert mechanic
in his automobile repair shop in the city of Manila for
the period of three years from the date of the contract
at a salary of P350 a month. Plaintiff started working
on the day on which the contract was executed and
continued therein until he was discharged by the
defendant the latter part of August of the same year,
plaintiff actually leaving on the 5th day of September.
On the 8th of the same month this action was begun, to
recover damages for breach of contract, the wages to
which he was entitled under the contract.
The defendant presents three defenses to the action.
The first is that plaintiff was incompetent and
insubordinate and that he unduly and without
permission absented himself from the repair shop
during the hours when, under the contract, he should
have been at work. The second is founded on the claim
that plaintiff, if he had used due diligence, would have
been able to obtain a like position in the city of Manila.
The defendant claims as his third defense that on the
6th of December, 1913, in a letter addressed to
plaintiff, he offered to take him back into his employ
under terms and conditions substantially the same as
those specified in the original contract of service and at
the same rate of wages; and that plaintiff, without
reason or justification, refused to accept the offer. The
court favored the defendant on his second defense but
allowed plaintiff wages for three months, which the
court considered a reasonable time which ought to be
conceded to him in which to obtain other employment.
Both parties appealed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitle to damages for
having been illegally discharged by his employer.
HELD
Yes. It has been held that, when a contract of
employment has once been broken by the employer by
a wrongful discharge of the employee and that status
has been recognized by both parties, the employee is
not obliged to do anything more under the original
contract; that, it having been broken voluntarily by the
employer, his employees is no longer under any
obligation to comply with the terms thereof. But,
notwithstanding this, we believe that, under such
circumstances, the employee should accept an offer
even under the old contract, as long as it does not
involve a renunciation of any right already accrued,
although it is doubtful if it can be said in the case at bar
that the offer was in reality one to return to
employment under the old contract but was, rather,
the creation of a new contract, the terms and
conditions of which were substantially those of the old.
The mere acceptance of the offer of defendant would
not constitute a waiver of his right to recover damages
for the time intervening from the date of the wrongful
discharge to the time when he returned to work under
the new offer, which would consist in the loss of wages
for that period, and any other damages which might
have been sustained and which plaintiff could prove.
Plaintiff proved no other damages than the loss of
wages. The damages in an action for wrongful
discharge are prima facie the amount of wages for the
full term. These are the damages and the only damages
which plaintiff proved. Plaintiff can recover in this
action only for the three months‘ period. The court
below allowed plaintiff his wages for the months of
September, October and November, but on a different
theory from that on which we have based his right;
but, whatever the theory, the amount is correct and the
judgment of the trial court is to that extent proper. The
judgment appealed from is affirmed.
JUNIO v. MANILA RAILROAD
FACTS
The plaintiffs with some other persons were traveling
in a PU-Car on the road between Calasiao and Santa
Barbara. When they arrived at the intersection of the
road and the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross
the track and collided with the engine of the night
express which was then passing over the crossing in
question at great speed. As a result of the collision, the
car was thrown some distance, plaintiff Junio's right
leg was amputated and her right arm fractured, and
Soloria received various injuries on her head. The
crossing is presumed to be dangerous due to the fact
that gates were required at that crossing. On the night
of the accident, the gates were not lowered and there
was no notice to the effect that they were not operated
at night or that they were temporarily out of order.
However, a notice to the effect that that was a railroad
crossing was there. The driver alleges that he slowed
down from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he was then
going, to 16 miles, and that he was on the lookout for
any approaching train. On the other hand, the engineer
insists that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle
before reaching the crossing. Both parties claim to be
free from guilt, and if the defendant company were
completely so, the plaintiffs would have no cause of
action against it.
ISSUE
Whether or not Manila Railroad Company is liable.
RULING
Yes, Manila Railroad Company is liable. From the
evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the
driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were
passengers were negligent, the former because, by
installing the gates at the place or crossing where the
accident occurred, it had voluntarily imposed upon
itself the obligation to operate them even at night and
to close them every time a train passed in order to
avoid causing injury to the public. It has been said that
the gates constitute an invitation to the public to pass
without fear of danger, and failure to operate them
conveniently constitutes negligence on the part of the
company. The driver was, likewise, negligent because
he did not comply with his duty to slacken the speed of
the car and to "look and listen" before crossing the
intersection and, above all, because he did not
maintain a reasonable speed so as to permit him to
stop any moment if it were necessary in order to avoid
an accident.
It is a well-settled principle of law that the negligence
of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory
negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who has
no control over him in the management of the vehicle
and with whom he sustains no relation of master and
servant. This rule is applied more strictly when, as in
the present case, hired cars or those engaged in public
service, are involved. Since the plaintiffs have not
incurred in any negligence imputable to them and
there is no reason why they should be made
responsible for the driver's negligence. The plaintiffs
are entitled to recover from the defendant damages
occasioned by the accident of which they were victims.
PP v. GUTIERREZ 302 SCRA 667
QUIRANTE v. IAC
FACTS
On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a
motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his
attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with
regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was
allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion
Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the
deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C.
Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said
agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as
follows:
a. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond,
the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty.
Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
b. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in
excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided
equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C.
Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation
despite an opposition thereto. In the petition for
review on certiorari, the respondent court (IAC) ruled
that the confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled of the
attorney’s fees.
HELD
NO. An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after
the main litigation has been decided and the subject of
recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue
over attorney's fee only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. Since
the main case from which the petitioner's claims for
their fees may arise has not yet become final, the
determination of the propriety of said fees and the
amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This
procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule
that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of only
when something is due to the client.
The orderly administration of justice dictates that such
issue be likewise determined by the court a quo
inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same
contingencies in determining the propriety and
assessing the extent of recovery of attorney’s fees. The
alleged confirmation to attorney’s fees should not
adversely affect the non-signatories in the petition,
since it is also premised on the eventual grant of
damages to the Casasola family.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the
decision of the respondent court subject of the present
recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.
ROYAL TRADERS EMPLOYEE UNION v. NLRC 269
SCRA 733
REFORMINA v. TOMOL
FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the
resolution of CFI Cebu Judge Tomol for an action for
Recovery of Damages for injury to Person and Loss of
Property. On June 7, 1972, judgment was rendered by
the CFI of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-11279 in favor of
the plaintiffs and third party defendants and against
the defendants and third party plaintiffs ordering to
pay jointly and severally the value of the boat with its
accessories, fishing gear and equipment minus the
value of the insurance recovered and the estimated
monthly loss suffered by them as a result of the fire
with legal interest, filing fee and attorney’s fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial court’s
judgment was modified in which the liability of the two
defendants for the awards is solidary. Petitioner’s
motion for the reconsideration of the questioned
Resolution having been denied, they now before this
Court through the instant petition praying for the
setting aside of the said Resolution and for a
declaration that the judgment in their favour should
bear legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 416
dated July 29, 1974.
ISSUE
Whether or not legal interest meant 6% as provided
for under Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
RULING
Article 2209 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case
at bar. It must be noted that the decision herein sought
to be executed is one rendered in an Action for
Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and
does not involve any loan, much less forbearances of
any money, goods or credits. As correctly argued by
the private respondents, the law applicable to the said
case is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code which states
that: “Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in
delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation,
the legal interest which is six percent per annum,”
The above provision remains untouched despite the
grant of authority to the Central Bank by Act No. 2655,
as amended. To make Central Bank Circular No, 416
applicable to any case other than those specifically
provided for by the Usury Law will make the same of
doubtful constitutionality since the Monetary Board
will be exercising legislative functions.
EASTERN SHIPPING v. CA 234 SCRA 78
PHIL. ACCIDENT INSURANCE v. FLORES 97 SCRA
811
HOLST v. PR BUILDERS 532 SCRA 74
OTHER KINDS
MORAL [ART. 2217 – 2220]
R&B SURETY v. IAC
FACTS
R&B Surety filed a case against Diaz, Santos and Uson
based on the surety bonds executed by Diaz, with
chattel mortgage as security, wherein Santos and Uson
were signatories. Santos filed an answer with
counterclaim. Uson also filed an answer with cross-
claim. Diaz did not file an answer. Santos admitted
signing the contract but interposed that he mistook
that he was only a witness thereto. Uson claimed that
her signatures therein were forged. The RTC rendered
judgment against Diazz and Santos, and dismissed the
case against Uson. The counterclaims and cross-claims
were also dismissed. Uson appealed the dismissal of
her counterclaim. The Appellate Court rendered
decision modifying the RTC judgment. R&B Surety was
ordered to pay moral damages to Uson.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of bad faith and
negligence in filing the complaint against respondent
Uson sufficiently to warrant an award of moral
damages.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ratiocinated that while
petitioner might have been negligent in not verifying
the authenticity of the signatures in the indemnity
agreement, still the same does not amount to bad faith
as to justify the award of damages and the conclusion
that the act of filing the complaint against respondent
Uson amounts to malicious prosecution In filing the
action, the petitioner was only protecting its business
interests by trying to recover the amount it had
already paid to the Philippine National Bank. In a long
line of cases, the Court have consistently ruled that in
the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud
or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and
that the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant;
they are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
reason of the defendants culpable action. In other
words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits of the possible of the
spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportionate
to the suffering inflicted. In the absence of a wrongful
act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, petitioner
cannot be adjudged to pay moral damages. The award
of exemplary damages and attorney's fees are likewise
untenable for they can only be given in case the
petitioner acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner and if the action
instituted by it was clearly unfounded and so
untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith.
GUITA v. CA 139 SCRA 756
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. RAMOS
FACTS
UCPB granted a loan to Zamboanga Development
Corporation (ZDC) with Venicio Ramos and the
Spouses Teofilo Ramos, Sr. and Amelita Ramos as
sureties. However, ZDC failed to pay its account to the
petitioner despite demands. The latter filed a
complaint with the RTC, Venicio Ramos and the
Spouses Teofilo Ramos, Sr. for the collection of the
corporations account. RTC rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner. Court ordered Deputy Sheriff to levy
and attach all the real and personal properties to
defendants. But there was mistake in attaching the
property of a certain “Teofilo C. Ramos married to
Rebecca Ramos.” When the corporation of this “Teofilo
C. Ramos” applied for a loan with UCPB, they were
shocked to learn that the property was under levy. He
then executed an affidavit declaring that he and Teofilo
Ramos, Sr. were not one and the same person.
Subsequently, the credit line application was
approved. However, as business did not go well,
“Ramos” found it difficult to pay the loan. When he
applied for a loan with another bank, he discovered
that the notice of levy annotated had not yet been
cancelled. His account therefore in UCPB remained
outstanding. When the respondent went to the
petitioner for the cancellation of the notice of levy
annotated on his title, the petitioners counsel
suggested to the respondent that he file a motion to
cancel the levy on execution to enable the court to
resolve the issue. The court granted the motion. The
Register of Deeds complied and cancelled the notice of
levy. Despite the cancellation, the respondent filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioner and
Sheriff before the RTC which rendered judgment in his
favor. The complaint against Sheriff was dismissed on
the ground that he was merely performing his duties.
CA affirmed RTC, ruling that the petitioner was
negligent in causing the annotation of notice of levy on
the title. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not UCPB was negligent when it caused the
levy on the subject property.
HELD
YES. In determining whether or not the petitioner
acted negligently, the constant test is: Did the
defendant in doing the negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Considering the testimonial and documentary
evidence on record, we are convinced that the
petitioner failed to act with the reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation. The petitioner has
access to more facilities in confirming the identity of
their judgment debtors. It should have acted more
cautiously, especially since some uncertainty had been
reported by the appraiser whom the petitioner had
tasked to make verifications. It appears that the
petitioner treated the uncertainty raised by appraiser
Reniva as a flimsy matter. It placed more importance
on the information regarding the marketability and
market value of the property, utterly disregarding the
identity of the registered owner thereof. In sum, we
find that the petitioner acted negligently in causing the
annotation of notice of levy in the title of the herein
respondent, and that its negligence was the proximate
cause of the damages sustained by the respondent.
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS v. CA 309 SCRA 141
PP v. FONTANILLA
FACTS
Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted and after trial, was
proved "guilty beyond reasonable doubt for qualified
seduction and accordingly sentenced to "an
indeterminate prison term from four (4) months of
arresto mayor as maximum to two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional and to pay the
costs." The accused was further ordered "to pay the
sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as moral
damages to the offended party or to her parents."
Fontanilla forthwith appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assailing errors on judgment on of which was the
ordering of the appellant to pay the sum of P500 in
moral damages to the offended party or to her parents.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in awarding
moral damages to the offended party or to her
parents?
HELD
No. The appellant finally contends that the lower court
erred in ordering him to pay P500 in moral damages to
the offended party or to her parents. Ironically, this
contention is correct in two respects. The first is that
the award of P500 in moral damages is inadequate. We
have heretofore stated that the complainant was a
virgin, there being no proof to the contrary, and that
she was deflowered by the appellant. The loss of her
virginity, at the hands of the appellant, together with
the attendant shame and scandal, entitles her, in the
view of this Court, to the sum of P2,500 in moral
damages. Her future as a woman is definitely impaired,
and the resultant prejudice against her engendered in
the male population of the barrio where she resides
cannot be blinked away. The second error of the lower
court is in making the award payable to the offended
party or to her parents, which award is, by the very
wording of the judgment, in the alternative. Article
2219 of the New Civil Code provides that moral
damages are recoverable by the offended party in the
cases of "seduction , abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts" and that the "parents of the female
seduced, abducted, raped, or abused . . . may also
recover moral damages." (emphasis supplied) The
conviction of the accused suffices as a basis to adjudge
him, in the same action, liable for an award of moral
damages, without independent proof thereof, to the
victim and her parents, because the law presumes that
not only the woman who was seduced, abducted,
raped or abused, but as well her parents, naturally
suffer besmirched reputation, social humiliation,
mental anguish, and wounded feelings. In the case at
bar, moral damages must be awarded to the offended
woman and her parents, not to either of them, as
ordered by the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with the modification that the appellant is
ordered to pay the sum of P2,500 in moral damages to
the offended party and her parents. Costs against the
appellant.
PP v. BANELA
FACTS
The Regional Trial Court in Daet, Camarines Norte,
found accused-appellant. Ricky Banela guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape which is defined
and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code (prior to its amendment by RA 7659) and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the offended party Marilou Alfonso, the
sum of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
Whether or not The new policy adopted by the Court in
the case of People vs. Senen Prades is applicable in the
case at bar?
HELD
No. We find it opportune to take note of the new policy
adopted by the Court in the case of People of the Phil.
vs. Senen Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998),
pertaining to the award of indemnity and damages.
The Court declared in the aforesaid case that the
indemnification for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed
or effectively qualified by any of the circumstance
under which the death penalty is authorized by the
applicable amendatory laws. However, in the case at
bar, the crime of rape was committed in 1993, or
before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, the
amendatory law restoring the death penalty. Hence,
the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party
shall remain to be P50,000.00. Likewise, as declared
in Prades, moral damages may additionally be
awarded to the victim without the need for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice, to wit: The fact that complainant has suffered
the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial of the victim, since the Court itself
even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her
part as a gauge of her credibility.
FIGUEROA v. PP 498 SCRA 298
EQUITABLE BANKING v. CA 133 SCRA 298
NOMINAL [ART. 2221 – 2223]
ALGARRA v. SANDEJAS
FACTS
Lucio Algarra (Plaintiff) received personal injuries as a
result of Sixto Sandejas (Defendant) negligent act and
was incapacitated for labor for two months. Plaintiff
sold the products of a distillery on a 10 per cent
commission and made an average of P50 per month.
He had about twenty regular customers who, it seems,
purchased in small quantities, necessitating regular
and frequent deliveries. Since the accident, his wife
had done something in a small way to keep up this
business but the total orders taken by her would not
net them over P15. He lost all his regular customers
but four, other agents filing their orders since his
accident. It took him about four years to build up the
business he had at the time of the accident, and he
could not say how long it would take him to get back
the business he had lost.. Upon these facts he should be
allowed fifty pesos per month for the actual time he
was incapacitated, his medical expenses, and for
diminution in profits of his business for one year,
during which he should be able to rebuild his business
to its former proportions. The lower court refused to
allow him anything for his injury on the ground that
the doctrine of Marcelo vs. Velasco is opposed to such
allowance and Viada which does not pertain to
personal injuries.
ISSUE
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to nominal
damage.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, under both the
Spanish Civil Code and American law of damages,
actual damages for a negligent act or omission are
confined to those which "were foreseen or might have
been foreseen," or those which were "the natural and
probable consequences" or "the direct and immediate
consequences" of the act or omission. The author of a
negligent act or omission which cause damage to
another is obliged to repair the damage done. This is
practically equivalent to compensatory or actual
damages. As provided for by the New Civil Code,
Article 2221 “ nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him
In relation to Article 2222 of the New Civil Code” the
court may award nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source mentioned in Article 1157, or
in any case where any property right has been invaded.
The plaintiff suffered loss to his business, in such case,
damages should be allowed for the diminution in
profits from the time of the interruption until the
business has resumed its normal proportions, based
upon the time it has taken or will take the owner to
rebuild it by the exercise of proper diligence.
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY v. MAGNO
FACTS
The San Miguel Brewery, Inc., a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
maintains a warehouse or branch office in the City of
Butuan and is engaged in the sale of beer and soft
drinks in said City. On December 14, 1950, the
Municipal Board of Butuan City passed Ordinance No.
11 amending Ordinance No. 7 of said City, imposing a
tax of two per cent (2%) on the gross sales or receipts
of those engaged in the sale, trading in, or disposal of
all alcoholic or malt beverages, wines and mixed or
fermented liquors, including tuba, basi and tapuy. On
June 6, 1960, the same Municipal Board passed
Ordinance No. 110 amending Ordinance No. 11, fixing
instead a tax on the sale of beer at the rate of P.25 per
case of twenty-four bottles, and on the sales of soft
drinks at the rate of P.10 per case of twenty-four
bottles of Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Tru- Orange, Seven-
Up, Bireley, Soda Water, and any other kind of soft
drinks or carbonated drinks. Although it appears that
the plaintiff has paid the required taxes under
Ordinance No. 11 promptly and religiously upon the
effectivity of the ordinance, the company stopped
paying the taxes thereafter and thereby incurred in
back taxes. Verbal demands were made by the City
Treasurer of Butuan on the representative of the San
Miguel Brewery, Inc. at Butuan City with warnings that
a warrant of distraint and levy will be issued against its
properties unless it settles its tax liability under the
ordinance aforesaid. Failure to comply with the
demands, the city of Butuan seized the delivery trucks
of the plaintiff. On January 12, 1961, the San Miguel
Brewery, Inc. instituted the present action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila, praying for an order
directing the defendant Francisco Magno to release the
delivery trucks seized and impounded by the City
Government of Butuan allegedly "without authority
and for reasons unknown to the company", and to
order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff damages in
the amount of P6,000.00 corresponding to the period
from January 9, 1961 to January 10, 1961, and
P3,000.00 for each day thereafter, that the trucks
remain impounded and unused by the plaintiff, plus
the costs of the suit. Parenthetically, the action was
brought against the defendant Francisco Magno in his
individual capacity, as disclosed in the allegations in
the complaint, and as expressly admitted in the
appellant’s brief, thus — "As a matter of fact, plaintiff
filed this action against Francisco Magno, not in his
official capacity, but in his individual capacity. In his
answer, defendant Francisco Magno interposed, among
others, the defense that in seizing the delivery trucks
of the San Miguel Brewery Inc., he was acting, and was
in the performance of his official duty, as Treasurer of
Butuan City, and can not be held liable to pay to the
company any damages. He set up a counterclaim of
P40,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively, allegedly sustained by him and
the members of his family on account of the shock,
fright, wounded feelings, mental anguish, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation they suffered by
reason of the filing of the case against him by the
plaintiff, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000.
ISSUE
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled for payment of
nominal damages.
RULING
Yes, In the case at bar, since there is no dispute that
appellee issued the warrant of distraint and levy
against the delivery trucks of appellant on January 9,
1961, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Butuan, and
as there is no disagreement that defendant-appellee
issued said warrant by virtue of Ordinance No. 26 of
the City of Butuan, and not having been sworn that
defendant, either as a private citizen or as City
Treasurer of Butuan, had acted in bad faith, there can
be no question that appellee, who was merely
performing a duty enjoined by law to be performed
when he issued the warrant of distraint and levy.
When as in this case, the defendant public officer was
sued in his private capacity for acts done in the
performance of official duty required by law and was
forced to employ the services of private counsel to
defend his rights, it is but proper that attorney’s fees
be charged against the plaintiff. Nominal damages may
also be adjudicated. Defendant as public officer
performing his official duties in the present case is
entitled to attorney’s fees and nominal damage in
accordance with Article 2222 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines.
SSS v. CA 120 SCRA 707
BUSINESS SERVICES OF THE FUTURE v. CA 480
SCRA 571
TEMPERATE/MODERATE [ART. 2224 – 2225]
GSIS v. LABUNG-DEANG
FACTS
Spouses Deang obtained a loan and deposited the
owner’s copy of a title of their property to GSIS. Eleven
months prior to its maturity the loan was settled by
the Spouses Deang and requested for the release of the
owner’s copy of the title. Spouses Deang intended to
secure a loan from a private lender and use the title as
collateral in securing the loan. However personnel of
GSIS were not able to release the owner’s duplicate of
the title as it could not find said copy despite diligent
search. Satisfied that the owner’s copy was really lost
GSIS commenced the reconstitution proceeding with
the CFI Pampanga for the issuance of a new owner’s
copy. GSIS then issued a certificate of release of
mortgage and subsequently released the reconstituted
copy of the owner’s duplicate. A month later Spouses
Deang filed with the CFI Angeles City a complaint
against GSIS for damages claiming that as a result of
the delay in releasing the duplicate copy of the title
they were unable to secure a loan from a private
lender. Spouses Deang alleged that the proceeds could
have been used in defraying the estimated cost of
renovation of their residential house and the
remaining amount could have been invested. The Trial
Court rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Deang.
The Trial court held that the loss of the owner’s copy in
the possession of GSIS without justifiable cause
constitutes negligence on the part of the employees of
GSIS making GSIS liable for damages. The CA affirmed
the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE
Whether GSIS, as a GOCC primarily performing
governmental functions is liable for a negligent act of
its employee within the scope of his assigned tasks?
RULING
Since GSIS defaulted in its obligation to return the
owner’s duplicate, as an obligor in good faith, GSIS is
liable for all the natural and probable consequence of
the breach of obligation. In awarding damages
however, moral damages are not awarded if the
defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or
with malice or bad faith. Likewise actual damages to be
compensable must be proven with clear evidence such
that in the instant case the Court cannot rely on mere
speculation. HOWEVER SPOUSES DEANG SUFFERED
FINANCIAL DAMAGE THUS TEMPERATE DAMAGES BE
GRANTED.
TANAY RECREATION CENTER v. FAUSTO
FACTS
Tanay Recreation Center and Development
Corporation is the lessee of a property owned by
Catalina Matienzo Fausto. The lease contract provided
that should Fausto decided to sell the property,
petitioner shall have the right to purchase the said
property. Petitioner informed Fausto of its intention to
renew the lease. However Fausto’s daughter
Pacunayen replied asking petitioner to remove the
improvements built on the property as she is now the
absolute owner of the property. It appeared that
Fausto sold the property to Pacunayen for the sum of
P10,000 and the title has already been transferred in
her name. Petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment
of Deed of Sale, specific performance with damages
and injunction. The RTC of Morong
Rizal Branch 78 extended the period of lease for
another seven years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and held that the
priority right to purchase as stipulated in the contract
is applicable only in case the property is sold to
strangers and not to Faustos relative.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of first refusal is applicable in
this case?
RULING
The Supreme Court held that when a contract contains
a right of first refusal the lessor is under a legal duty
not to sell to anybody at any price after he has made an
offer to sell to the lessee at a certain price and until the
lessee fails to accept it. Respondent in the instant case,
for not adhering with the term of the contract with
respect to the right of first refusal by the petitioner
was held liable to pay petitioner actual damages, plus
interest thereon, and to pay petitioner attorney’s fees
as well as to pay the costs of suit.
LBC EXPRESS v. ADO 468 SCRA 216
PP v. DUBAN 412 SCRA 131
LIQUIDATED [ART. 2226 – 2228]
MENCHAVEZ v. TEVES
FACTS
On February 1986, Petitoner Menchavez and
Respondent Teves, Jr. executed a contract of lease for a
period of five years. During the lease period, the Cebu
Regional Trial Court sheriffs demolished the fishpond
dikes constructed by respondent Teves. As a
consequence, Teves filed for damages. He alleged that
the lessors had violated their Contract of Lease, on the
grounds of the provision that they were not able to
have peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property
during the agreed lease period. Respondent further
asserted that the lessors had withheld from him the
findings of the trial court in Civil Case No. 510-T,
entitled “Eufracia Colongan and Paulino Pamplona v.
Juan Menchavez Sr. and Sevillana S. Menchavez.” In
that case involving the same property, subject of the
lease, the Menchavez spouses were orderd to remove
the dikes illegally constructed and to pay damages and
attorney’s fees.
ISSUE
Whether or not Menchavez is liable for Teves for the
Sheriff’s act of demolishing the constructed dikes
RULING
NO. A void contract is deemed legally non-existent. It
produces no civil effect. It does not create, modify or
extinguish a juridical relation. Parties to a void
agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts
leave them as they are, because they are deemed in
pari delicto or “in equal fault”.
JOE'S RADIO & ELECTRICAL SUPPLY v. ALTO
ELECTRONICS
FACTS
On May 23, 1953, the plaintiff and appellee and the
Bolinao Electronics Corporation entered into a
“dealership agreement”, (Exhibit “A”), whereby the
latter bound itself to sell and deliver to the former 500
television sets (RCA TV Model 21T-303, 21″ KERBY) at
the price of P1,134.00 each, in two shipments of 250
sets, the first shipment to be made within 90 days from
May 23, 1953, and the next shipment within 60 days
after the completion of the first shipment. On its part,
the appellee, Joe’s Radio & Electrical Supply, agreed to
deposit 1/3 of the total price of the first shipment,
minus a discount of 30 per cent, upon signing the
contract; 1/3 of the total price of the second shipment,
minus a discount of 30 per cent, immediately after its
receipt of the first shipment; and the balance of the
total price of each shipment (minus the discounts)
immediately after making the performance test of each
set in each shipment. To secure the true and faithful
compliance of the agreement by the Bolinao
Electronics Corporation, it agreed to put up a surety
bond, in an amount sufficient to cover the advance
payment to be made by appellee, and also that, should
the Bolinao Electronics Corporation fail to comply with
the terms of the agreement within the period specified,
it would return to appellee upon demand whatever
amount or amounts had been deposited by the latter,
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, plus
damages equivalent to 20 per cent of the total cost of
250 television sets.
The defendant and appellant Alto Electronics
Corporation was subrogated to the rights and
obligations of the Bolinao Electronics Corporation in
the “dealership agreement” on August 31, 1953; and
on the same date, the other defendant appellant Alto
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., issued in favor of appellee
a surety bond in the amount of P66,150 to guarantee
the full and faithful performance by the appellant Alto
Electronics Corporation under the agreement.
The first shipment of 250 television sets was totally
delivered, and totally paid for. Thereafter, appellee
deposited with appellant Alto Electronics Corporation
the sum of P66,150, the sum required under the
“dealership agreement” as advance partial payment for
the 250 sets of the second delivery. No delivery having
been made on this second batch, suit was commenced
against the defendants and appellants on January 30,
1954. During the pendency of the case, but before trial
was held, the appellee and the Alto Electronics
Corporation entered into another agreement, dated
July 2, 1954, wherein the latter admitted having
received from the former the sum of P66,150, as
advance partial payment. Under the terms of the
second instrument, the said appellant agreed to
liquidate this indebtedness by delivering to appellee
66 television sets of various models, delivery to
commence within five days after the signing of the
agreement and to be completed within 90 days
thereafter. With this agreement, the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. signed in conformity. However, only
13 were delivered leaving an unpaid balance of
P49,378.77. Besides these 13 television sets, said
appellant also delivered to appellee two other sets
with a total value of P2,928.24, which were accepted
by the latter as “deposit pending receipt of letter of
approval from the appellant surety company”
presumably (fearing a release of the surety bond
should said delivery be accepted without the surety
company’s consent), because delivery was made after
the lapse of the period provided in the second
agreement.
ISSUE
Whether or not the failure to object by the defendant
with the statement on the balance yet left is conclusive
as not to imply extinguishment of the obligation.
HELD
Yes. Certainly, the delivery of the two television sets in
question could not have been intended by either of the
parties to be the full and final settlement of appellee’s
claim.
Upon the other hand, it would seem that the general
principles on payment under the Civil Code sanctions
such kind of acceptance, as where the performance of
the obligation is incomplete or irregular. Observe that
the delivery of the two television sets was made after
the prescribed period fixed in the agreement of the
parties. Lest the appellee be misunderstood as having
granted an extension of the obligation that might
release the surety company from its undertaking
under the surety bond, it was not improper nor
unreasonable for it to subject its acceptance to the said
delivery upon the surety company’s consent. It should
be noted further that when appellee imposed such
condition, no objection was interposed by the
appellant Alto Electronics Corporation, thereby at least
implying its concurrence to it.
As regards the appellant Alto Electronics Corporation,
there is another reason why the first assigned error
could not be given merit, and that is, its admission
under paragraph 5 of its amended answer of
paragraph 11 of the amended and supplemental
complaint which in effect admitted the allegations
contained in the said paragraph of the complaint, “That
under the aforesaid agreement, defendant delivered to
plaintiff only 13 television sets with a total value of
P20,629.98 leaving an unpaid balance of P49,378.77”.
It is a familiar doctrine that an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that
all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the party or not.
The defendants ought to have known that they cannot
lease what does not belong to them for as a matter of
fact, they themselves are still applying for a lease of the
same property under litigation from the government.
On the other hand, Teves being fully aware that
petitioners were not yet the owners, had assumed the
risks and under the principle of VOLENTI NON FIT
INJURIA NEQUES DOLUS- He who voluntarily assumes
a risk, does not suffer damages thereby. As a
consequence, when Teves leased the fishpond area
from petitioners – who were mere holders or
possessors thereof, he took the risk that it may turn
out later that this application for lease may not be
approved. Unfortunately however, even granting that
the lease of petitioners and their application in 1972
were to be approved, still they could not sublease the
same. In view therefore of these, the parties must be
left in the same situation in which the court finds them
, under the principle IN PARI DELICTO NON ORITOR
ACTI, where both are at fault , no one can found a
claim.
LIRAG TEXTILE MILLS v. SSS
FACTS
That on September 4, 1961, the plaintiff [herein
respondent Social Security System] and the defendants
[herein petitioners] Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. and Basilio
Lirag entered into a Purchase Agreement under which
the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the said
defendant preferred shares of stock worth ONE
MILLION PESOS [P1,000,000.00] subject to the
conditions set forth in such agreement; For Petitioner
to repurchase the shares of stocks at a regular interval
of one year and to pay dividends. Failure to redeem
and pay the dividend, the entire obligation shall
become due and demandable and it shall be liable for
an amount equivalent to 12% of the amount then
outstanding as liquidated damages. Basilio Lirag
(Basilio) as President of Lirag Textile Mills signed the
Agreement as a surety to guarantee the redemption of
the stocks, the payment of dividends and other
obligations. Pursuant to the Agreement, Respondent
paid Petitioner P500,000 on two occasions and the
latter issued 5,000 preferred stocks with a par value of
P100 as evidenced by Stock Certificate Nos. 128 and
139. After sending Respondent sent demand letters,
Petitioner and Basilio still made no redemption nor
made dividend payments. Respondent (SSS) filed an
action for specific performance and damages against
Petitioner on CFI of Rizal, Quezon City. Petitioner
contends that there is no obligation on their part to
redeem the stock certificates since Respondent is still a
preferred stock holder of the company and such
redemption is dependent upon the financial ability of
the company. On the part of Basilio, he contends that
his liability only arises only if the company is liable and
does not perform its obligations under the Agreement.
ISSUE
1) Whether or not the Purchase Agreement entered
into by the Parties is a debt instrument?
2) Whether or not Lirag is liable for the interest as
liquidated damages?
HELD
1) YES, the Purchase Agreement is a debt instrument.
The terms and conditions of the Agreement
unmistakably show that parties intended the
repurchase of preferred shares on the respective
scheduled dates to be an absolute obligation, which
does not depend on the financial ability of the
corporation. This absolute obligation on the part of the
Petitioner corporation is made manifest by the fact
that a surety was required to see to it that the
obligation is fulfilled in the event the principal debtor’s
inability to do so. It cannot be said that SSS is a
preferred stockholder. The rights given by the
Purchase Agreement to SSS are not rights enjoyed by
ordinary stockholders. Since there was a condition that
failure to repurchase the stocks on the scheduled dates
renders the entire obligation due and demandable
with interest. These features clearly show that intent
of the parties to be bound therein as debtor and
creditor and not as a corporation and stockholder.
2) The award of the sum of Php146,400 in liquidated
damages represented by 12% of the amount then
outstanding is correct, considering that the petitioners
in the stipulation of facts admitted having failed to
fulfill their obligations under the Agreement. The grant
of liquidated damages is expressly provided for the
Purchase Agreement in case of contractual breach.
Since petitioners did not deny its failure to redeem the
preferred shares and the non-payment of dividends
which are overdue, they are bound to earn legal
interest from the time of demand, in this case, judicial
i.e. the time of filing the action.
EXEMPLARY/CORRECTIVE [ART. 2229 – 2235]
OCTOT v. YBANEZ
FACTS
Petitioner Diosdado Octot, a security guard in the
Regional Health Office of Cebu City, was summarily
dismissed from the service pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 6 and LOI Nos. 14 and 14-a directing heads
of departments of the government to weed out
undesirable employees, especially those who were
facing charges and were notoriously undesirable.
Petitioner, at that time, had a judgment of conviction
for libel pending appeal. Respondent Jose Ybanez as
the Regional Director of said office dismissed Octot in
the service. When his acquittal was obtained,
Petitioner sought reinstatement. His request was given
due course but despite notices to him to fill up the
necessary papers to support his new appointment, he
failed to appear but instead filed the instant action for
mandamus praying for reinstatement, payment of back
salaries, cost of living allowance, compensatory,
exemplary and moral damages, and to pay attorney’s
fees and the costs of the suit.
ISSUE
W/N Petitioner is entitled to his claim for exemplary
damages.
RULING
No, Octot cannot claim for exemplary damages in the
absence of proof that respondent Regional Director
acted in bad faith and with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner’s claim for exemplary damages is without
merit as the delay in his reinstatement was
attributable to his own fault and as the conditions
required for the award of exemplary damages were
not met. Exemplary damages are not generally
recoverable in a special civil action for mandamus
unless the defendant patently acted with vindictiveness
or wantonness and not in the exercise of honest
judgment. The claim for exemplary damages must
presuppose the existence of the circumstances
enumerated in Articles 2231 and 2232 of the Civil Code.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Such damages are required by public policy,
for wanton acts must be suppressed. They are an
antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run
through the body politic. Our jurisprudence sets certain
conditions when the same may be awarded, as follows:
(1) they may be imposed by way of example or corrected
only in addition, among others, to compensatory
damages, and cannot he recovered as a matter of right,
their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; (2) the claimant must first establish his fight
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages; (3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by
bad faith and the award would be allowed only if the
guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
In the case at bar, the record manifests that
respondents officials were not motivated by ill will or
personal malice in dismissing petitioner but only by
their desire to comply with the mandates of
Presidential Decree No. 6. Accordingly, when
petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Appeals, and
made a request for his reinstatement, respondents
readily showed their willingness to take him back and
recommended to the authorities concerned his
reinstatement. Moreover, the Office of the President of
the Philippines, in approving the reinstatement of
petitioner, specifically invited attention to the
provisions of LOI No. 647 which does not authorize
payment of backwages of reinstated employees.
Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in a
special civil action for mandamus unless the defendant
patently acted with vindictiveness or wantonness and
not in the exercise of honest judgment. The claim for
exemplary damages must presuppose the existence of
the circumstances enumerated in Articles 2231 and
2232 of the Civil Code. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Such
damages are required by public policy, for wanton acts
must be suppressed. They are an antidote so that the
poison of wickedness may not run through the body
politic.
DE LEON v. CA
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision * of
the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) in C.A., G.R. No.
40201-R promulgated on February 21, 1970 affirming
the judgment ** of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, with modification of the amount of moral and
exemplary damages from P100,000.00 to P60,000.00
and the amount of attorney's fees from P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00.
FACTS
The third-party defendants spouses Juan Briones and
Magdalena Bernardo were the former registered
owners of the fishpond situated at San Roque,
Paombong, Bulcacan, which was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 28296. This fishpond was the
subject of a deed of mortgage executed by the spouses
Briones on January 22, 1954, in favor of Hermogenes
Tantoco involving the consideration of P20,000.00,
which amount was later assigned by the mortgagee to
his father herein defendant and thirdparty plaintiff Dr.
Cornelio S. Tantoco.
Apart from this first mortgage, the spouses Briones
likewise executed a deed of second mortgage for
P68,824.00 with 10% interest per annum in favor of
Cornelio S. Tantoco dated May 26, 1959. Both
mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan and duly annotated at the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 of the
Briones.
While these two mortgages were still subsisting the
Briones spouses sold the fishpond, which is the subject
matter of said two mortgages, to plaintiff spouses
Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales de Leon in
the amount of P120,000.00. Of the amount of
P120,000.00, the Briones spouses actually received
only the amount of P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the
amount of P89,000.00 was withheld by the plaintiff de
Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage
indebtedness of the Briones to the Tantocos.
After the sale, plaintiffs de Leon satisfied the mortgage
loan of P20,000.00 including 10% interest per annum
to Hermogenes Tantoco who then accordingly
executed a deed of discharge of mortgage, but the
mortgage in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in the amount
of P68,824 was not satisfied. On February 5, 1962
plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the
defendant Cornelio Tantocos.
On May 8, 1962 the spouses Fortunato de Leon and
Juana F. de Leon, petitioners herein, filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against
defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco, respondent herein. On
May 16, 1967 the trial court rendered its decision on
the case (Record on Appeal, p. 74) the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering: the dismissal of
the complaint; payment by its plaintiffs to the
defendant Third-party plaintiff by way of counterclaim
the sum of P64,921.00 with interest thereon at 10%
per annum from February 5, 1962 until fully paid;
payment by plaintiff to defendant the sum of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and the
further sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; payment
of costs of plaintiff.
On appeal respondent Court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court with modification respecting the award
of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's
fees. Petitioner spouses filed on March 7, 1970 their
motion for reconsideration of the decision of
respondent court which motion was denied on April
20, 1970. On April 23, 1979 petitioners filed their
motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration. The respondent Court erred in
awarding in favor of respondent Cornelio S. Tantoco
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
P60,000.00 in the absence of supporting evidence and
reasons notwithstanding that no actual and
compensatory damages have been allegedly proved
and awarded in respondent's favor.
ISSUE
whether or not the award of P60,000.00 in the concept
of moral and exemplary damages is proper
HELD
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission.
On the other hand, jurisprudence sets certain
conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded,
to wit: (1) They may be imposed by way of example or
correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages and cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their determination depending upon
the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant; (2) the claimant must first
establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages; and (3) the wrongful act must
be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be
allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolant manner.
While the award of moral and exemplary damages in
an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of
awarding said damages there is no question of
respondent's entitlement to moral and exemplary
damage. The amount should be reduced, however, for
being excessive compared to the actual losses
sustained by the aggrieved party. Moral damages
though incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty of the wrongdoer. Time and again the Court
has ruled that "moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
defendants' culpable action"
In the case of Miranda Ribaya v. Bautista (95 SCRA 672
[1980]), this Court considered 25% of the principal
amount as reasonable. In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals found on February 21, 1970 that the
outstanding balance of the disputed loan was
P64,921.69. Twenty five percent thereof is P16,230.00
but considering the depreciation of the Philippine peso
today, it is believed that the award of moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is
reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but the aggregate award
of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to
P25,000.00.
PP v. CRISTOBAL
FACT
On March 31, 1986 at around 12:00noon to 1pm the
defendant Rogelio Cristobal, by means of force, threat
and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the will of the
latter. It was aggravated by the accused having
committed the crime in uninhabited place attended the
commission of the crime. The pain rape causes
becomes more excruciating when the victim carries
the life of an unborn within her womb. That tender and
innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation
in the mystery of life, is thereby placed in undue
danger. Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a married
woman. She was twenty-eight years old, with one child
and another on the way, when tragedy struck.
Fortunately, the life in her womb survived.
A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987.
Because it was returned unserved, an alias warrant of
arrest was issued on 1 February 1988, which was also
returned unserved. The trial court then ordered the
archival of the case and the arrest of the accused. It
was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio
Cristobal was arrested and detained at the provincial
jail. On 21 October 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor
filed a Manifestation for the revival of the case, which
the court favorably acted upon.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The appellee
prays that the assailed decision be affirmed with
modification of the award for moral damages, which
should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00
ISSUE
Whether or not the victim is entitled for exemplary
damage?
HELD:
Yes. For sexually assaulting a pregnant married
woman, the accused has shown moral corruption,
perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously
wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition
then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter
others from committing similar acts or for correction
for the public good is warranted. We hereby fix it at
P25,000.00. Pursuant to the current policy of this
Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court
should be increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the

decision of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604
convicting the accused ROGELIO CRISTOBAL of the
crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the foregoing
modifications. As modified, the award of moral
damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00,
and the accused is further ordered to pay exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.