DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE AND STARE DECISIS

G.R. No. 202047, June 08, 2016

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. NOEL B. PILI, et al. Respondents.
FACTS:

LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Executive Order (EO) No. 603 for
the "construction, operation, maintenance, and/or lease of light rail transit systems in the Philippines”. The LRTA
with Meralco Transit Organization, Inc. (MTOI) entered into a ten-year agreement about operations and
management from June 8, 1984 to April 7, 1994. MTOI, a corporation organized under the Corporation Code, hired
its own employees and thereafter entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the unions of its
employees. But on April 7, 1989, the Commission of Audit declared their agreement as void which led LRTA, on 9
June 1989, to purchase all the shares of stock of MTOI and renamed it to Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro)
and formally declared it as its wholly=owned subsidiary.

On 8 June 1994, the Agreement between the LRTA and Metro expired and was thereafter extended on a
month-to-month basis. On 25 July 2000, the union of rank-and-file employees of Metro staged a strike over a
bargaining deadlock which resulted in the paralysis in the operations of Metro. On 31 July 2000, the Agreement
expired when LRTA decided no longer to renew. On 30 September 2000, Metro ceased its operations.

The respondents of the case were employees of Metro who have been terminated upon the expiration of
the Agreement. On the other hand, the rest of the respondents filed cases involving purely monetary claims in the
form of separation pays, balances of separation pays, and other unpaid claims, respondent Noel B. Pili (Pili), in
addition to his monetary claims, alleged that he was illegally dismissed which was illegal and violative of his security
of tenure.

On 17 November 1997, LRTA approved the severance pay of the employees of Metro amounting to one
and a half months salary per year of service. They claim that this shows that the LRTA bound itself solidarity liable
with Metro.
On 28 July 2000, the Board of Directors of LRTA issued Resolution No. 00-44 where LRTA officially assumed
the obligation to ensure that the Metro Inc. Employees Retirement Fund is updated and that it fully covers all
retirement benefits payable to the employees of Metro. Based on the foregoing, the respondents - except Pili - argue
that the LRTA is liable for their monetary claims.

In the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, on 27 October 2005, Labor Arbiter Catalino R. Laderas rendered his
Decision in favor of Pili and the rest of the respondents. The Labor Arbiter found that Pili was illegally dismissed and
that LRTA was solidarity liable with Metro for the monetary claims.

On 5 December 2005, LRTA appealed to the NLRC. LRTA averred that the Labor Arbiter acted with grave
abuse of discretion in (1) taking cognizance of the case against LRTA despite the fact that it is a government-owned
and controlled corporation with an original charter; (2) holding LRTA guilty of illegal dismissal despite the lack of
employer-employee relationship between LRTA and Pili; and (3) awarding separation pay and other benefits to the
respondents despite the utter lack of factual and legal basis.

In the ruling of the NLRC, on 24 June 2008, the NLRC found that there was no illegal dismissal as Pili's
dismissal was valid on account of the termination of the Agreement between Metro and LRTA. The NLRC issued a
Resolution modifying in part the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On 10 November 2008, LRTA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The ruling of the
CA, In a Decision dated 1 June 2011, the CA set aside the Resolution of the NLRC and reinstated the 27 October 2005
decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. Such cause for termination of employment is not within the contemplation of
Article 283. Further, there is no indication that Metro was closing shop after the termination of its management
contract with petitioner LRTA. Much less, it was not proved that Metro was closing its business due to financial losses
or business reverses. Thus, the termination of Pili's employment by Metro cannot be justified and, therefore, illegal.
In a Resolution dated 23 May 2012, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by LRTA. Hence, the case
petition.
ISSUE:

w/o NLRC has jurisdiction over the LRTA.

w/o the LRTA is solidarity liable for the money claims of the respondents.

RULING:

The petition has no merit.

There is an error on the part of the NLRC taking cognizance of the cases against Metro and LRTA about the
monetary claims. All of the respondents allege that they were employed by Metro. Thus, there is no real issue as far
as the employer-employee relationship is concerned - the respondents themselves do not claim to be employed by
LRTA. But taking note, the NLRC acquired jurisdiction over LRTA not because of the employer-employee relationship
of the respondents and LRTA but rather because LRTA expressly assumed the monetary obligations of Metro to its
employees. In the Agreement, LRTA was obligated to reimburse Metro for the latter's Operating Expenses which
included the salaries, wages and fringe benefits of certain employees of Metro. Moreover, the Board of Directors of
LRTA issued Resolution No. 00-44 where again, LRTA assumed the monetary obligations of Metro more particularly
to update the Metro Inc. Employees Retirement Fund and to ensure that it fully covers all the retirement benefits
payable to the employees of Metro. It is clear, and it is also not denied by LRTA, that it has assumed the monetary
obligations of Metro to its employees. As such, the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over LRTA on the issue of the
monetary obligations.

In the case of LRTA v. Mendoza, the court found that LRTA is liable for the monetary claims of the employees
of Metro. The respondents in the said case were employees of Metro who, similar to the respondents in this case,
have been separated due to the expiration of the Agreement between LRTA and Metro. Held that: First, LRTA
obligated itself to fund METRO'S retirement fund to answer for the retirement or severance/resignation of METRO
employees as part of METRO'S "operating expenses”. Second, Even on the assumption that the LRTA did not obligate
itself to fully cover the separation benefits, it still cannot avoid liability for the respondents' claim. It is solidarity
liable as an indirect employer under the law for the respondents' separation pay. This liability arises from the O & M
agreement it had with METRO, which created a principal-job contractor relationship between them, an arrangement
it admitted when it argued before the CA that METRO was an independent job contractor who, it insinuated, should
be solely responsible for the respondents' claim.

However, as far as the claim of illegal dismissal is concerned, the court finds that NLRC cannot exercise
jurisdiction over LRTA. The NLRC and Labor Arbiter erred when it took cognizance of such matter. In Hugo v. LRTA,
in the said case, the employees of Metro filed an illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice complaint against Metro
and LRTA. The court held that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC did not have jurisdiction over LRTA.
In the present case, Pili admits that he was employed by Metro. However, he argues that the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil should be applied and LRTA should also be considered his employer. The court finds this
argument untenable. There is no sufficient evidence to support the application of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil and LRTA, even after it purchased all the shares of stock of Metro, maintained and continued to have
its separate juridical personality

The basic facts in this petition are the same as those in the case of LRTA v. Mendoza. Thus, the court finds
that LRTA is solidarity liable for the monetary claims of respondents, in light of this Court's findings in said case. It is
the duty of the Court to apply the previous ruling in LRTA v. Mendoza in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis.
Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present
case, should be decided in the same manner. The court finds no reversible error in the CA ruling, insofar as the
monetary claims are concerned.

RES JUDICATA

G.R. No. 173590 December 9, 2013

PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1988, Cristano De Guzman, a Postal Inspector at the Postal Services Office, was investigated by Regional
Postal Inspector Atty. Raul Buensalida in view of an anonymous complaint charging him of dishonesty and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As a result, Atty. Buensalida commended that De Guzman be
charged with twelve (12) counts of the same offenses and eventually be relieved from his post to protect the
employess and witnesses from harassment. The investigation report of Atty. Buensalida was forwarded to the
Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES) of the Department of Transportation and
Communication(DOTC) for further evaluation and approval. However, the ISLES, through a memorandum
recommended that De Guzman be exonerated from the charges against him due to lack of merit which was later
approved by DOTC Asec. Jardiniano dated May 15, 1990.

On February 6, 1992, Republic Act No. (RA)7354, otherwise known as the ― ”Postal Service Act of 1992,”
was passed. Pursuant to this law, the Postal Services Office under the DOTC was abolished, and all its powers, duties,
and rights were transferred to the PPC. Likewise, officials and employees of the Postal Services Office were absorbed
by the PPC.

On July 16, 1993, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief Postal Service Officer, was formally charged
by the PPC, through Postmaster General Eduardo P. Pilapil for the same acts of ―”dishonesty, gross violation of
regulations, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and the Anti-graft law, committed as
follows”. Investigation disclosed that while De Guzman was designated as Acting District Postal Inspector with
assignment at South Cotabato District, Postal Region XI, Davao City, he personally made unauthorized deductions
and/or cuttings from the ten (10%) percent salary differential and the like for his own personal gain and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of all the employees assigned at the aforementioned district.

In a Decision dated August 15, 1994, De Guzman was found guilty as charged and was dismissed from the
service. It appears, however, that the stated decision was not implemented until five (5) years later when Regional
Director Mama S. Lalanto issued a Memorandum dated August 17, 1999 for this purpose. De Guzman lost no time
in filing a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied pointing out that De Guzman failed to produce a
copy of the alleged recall order even if he had been directed to do so.

But, De Guzman filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was resolved on June 2, 2003 in his favor yet he
was found guilty of the charges against him and consequently dismissing him from the service. It was emphasized
therein that when De Guzman was formally charged on July 16, 1993, the complainant was the PPC, which had its
own charter and was no longer under the DOTC. Thus, the ISLES Memorandum dated February 26, 1990 prepared
by Dir. Reyes which endorsed the exoneration of De Guzman and the dismissal of the complaints against him was
merely recommendatory.

De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration was denied initially, but the motion was, at the same time,
considered as an appeal to the PPC Board of Directors. The Board, however, required PG Rama to rule on the motion.
Thus, in a Resolution dated May 10, 2005, PG Rama pointed out that, being the third motion for reconsideration
filed by De Guzman, the same was in gross violation of the rules of procedure recognized by the PPC, as well as of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which both allowed only one (1) such motion to be entertained. It was further
held that res judicata was unavailing as the decision exonerating De Guzman was ―”only a ruling after a fact-finding
investigation.” Hence, the same could not be considered as a dismissal on the merits but rather, a dismissal made
by an investigative body which was not clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial power.
Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution dated May 10, 2005, De Guzman elevated his case on
March 12, 2005 to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
On June 10, 2005, De Guzman appealed the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 before the PPC Board. Almost a year
later, the Board issued a Resolution dated May 25, 2006, denying the appeal and affirming with finality the decision
of his dismissal from the service. The motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by De Guzman was likewise
denied.

On April 4, 2006, the CA reversed the PPC Resolutions. It held that the revival of the case against De Guzman
constituted grave abuse of discretion considering the clear and unequivocal content of the Memorandum dated May
15, 1990 duly signed by Asec. Jardiniano that the complaint against De Guzman was already dismissed.
Aggrieved, PPC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated July 19, 2006, hence,
the instant petition.

Meanwhile, on July 26, 2006, De Guzman filed an appeal of the PPC Board’s Resolutions with the CSC which
was, however, dismissed. The CSC equally denied De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES, bars the filing of the subsequent
charges by PPC.

RULING:

De Guzman likewise failed to convince the Court of the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata for having
been charged of the same set of acts for which he had been exculpated by the ISLES of the DOTC whose
recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman was subsequently approved by then DOTC
Asec. Jardiniano.

The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and coordinates security, intelligence,
fact-finding, and investigatory functions for the Secretary, the Department, and Department-wide official
undertakings," was intended precisely for the purpose of determining whether or not a prima facie case against De
Guzman existed. Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no formal charge was filed against De Guzman and the
complaint against him was dismissed by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.

In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first
and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment
is rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal or merely technical point.Encinas v. Agustin, Jr., G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013.

In this case, there was no judgment on the merits, the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman in the
Memorandum of Asec. Jardiniano wasa result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of determining
whether a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses should be filed. This being the
case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined therein with finality.
 Hence, the Court holds that PPC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it revived the case against De
Guzman despite the previous dismissal thereof by Asec. Jardiniano. Since said dismissal was not a judgment on the
merits, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.

In fine, due to the errors of the CA as herein detailed, the Court hereby grants the present petition and
accordingly reverses and sets aside the farmer's dispositions. The Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January
6, 2005 of the PPC ordering De Guzman's dismissal from the service are thus reinstated.

The petition is granted.

 HEIRARCHY OF COURTS

February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 187094

LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AND RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners
vs.
HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, ANTONIO LL. LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN, and EDDIE C. GUTIERREZ, and RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, Respondents

FACTS:

Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for the death
of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe. His findings show that the named individuals conspired,
planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN), a rival of Bayan Muna
and Gabriela. Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy Peralta was
mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and that an Information for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals.

On February 2, 2007, Investigating Prosecutor Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr. issued a subpoena requiring petitioners
to testify at the hearing. On March 9, 2007, petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Quash
Complaint/Subpoena and to Expunge Supporting Affidavits. On July 13, 2007, the panel of investigating prosecutors,
denied petitioners' motion and ordered the submission of their counter-affidavits. Petitioners filed their respective
counter-affidavits. They also filed a (1) Motion to conduct Clarificatory Hearing and to Allow them to Submit Written
Memorandum, and a (2) Joint Supplemental Counter-Affidavit on Common Legal Grounds in Support of their Prayer
to Dismiss the Case, both dated August 21, 2007.

On October 23, 2007, the panel issued an Order again denying the motion. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by the panel. The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint
Resolution, the panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for
kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19 suspects. However, the panel
considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state witness. The panel recommended that the
corresponding information’s be filed against the remaining suspects. On the same day, two (2) Informations for
murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an
Information for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).

Petitioners filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case
Outright on the Guimba case. After the hearing on the motion and submission of the parties' memoranda, Judge
Napoleon R. Sta. Romana dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. On April 21, 2008, petitioners also filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright on the Palayan cases.
On April 25, 2008 and May 12, 2008, the motion was heard by the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City. Thereafter,
both parties submitted their respective memoranda.

On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an Order on the Palayan cases.
Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in the
Palayan cases". Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration of the July 18, 2008 Order, praying for the outright
dismissal of the Palayan cases against them for lack of probable cause. The Motion was denied by Judge Turla in an
Order.
 Hence, on March 27, 2009, petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Judge Evelyn A. Turla,
Prosecutors Floro F. Florendo, Antonio Ll. Lapus, Jr., Edison V. Rafanan, and Eddie C. Gutierrez, and Justice Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez (respondents).

On May 29, 2009, respondents filed their Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General which
includes the petition should be dismissed for violating the hierarchy of courts. Petitioners filed their Reply on
September 24, 2009. Aside from reiterating their allegations and arguments in the petition, they added that direct
invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction was allowed as their petition involved legal questions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing their petition directly before this
Court.

RULING:

The petition in the case is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

In the case of Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, this thoroughly explains the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. They are competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in
relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and
then into branches. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence
as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction,
which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, would be national in scope and there are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level
would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court
of Appeals.

The Supreme Court, which leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. The SC’s role to interpret the
Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated
by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As
correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed
at the most immediate time.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court
Fifth, . . . Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ

Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this
court. In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. At the
time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility of their arrest and
incarceration should the assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents in
Congress. Although the circumstances mentioned are no longer present, the merits of this case necessitate this
Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 218787, December 08, 2015

LEO Y. QUERUBIN, MARIA CORAZON M. AKOL, AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, et al Respondent.

Facts

On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC en banc released the bidding documents for the "Two-Stage Competitive
Bidding for the Lease of Election Management System (EMS) and Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or
Optical Scan (OP-SCAN) System." Specified in the published Invitation to Bid are the details for the lease with a
total Approved Budget for Contract to be used in the 2016 National and Local Elections. However, only Smartmatic
JV (Joint Venture) and Indra Sistemas, S.A. (Indra) responded to the call and submitted bid for the project on the
scheduled date.

On even date, Smartmatic JV and Indra participated in the end-to-end testing of their initial technical proposals for
the procurement project before the BAC. On March 26, 2015, finding that the joint venture satisfied the
requirements in the published Invitation to Bid, Smartmatic JV, was declared to have tendered a complete and
responsive Overall Summary of the Financial Proposal. The BAC required Smartmatic JV to submit additional
documents and a prototype sample of its OMR. After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, disqualified
Smartmatic JV on two grounds: first, failure to submit valid AOI; and second, he demo unit failed to meet the
technical requirement that the system shall be capable of writing all data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot
images simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.

The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for reconsideration. In denying the motion, the BAC, through declared
that Smartmatic JV complied with the requirements of Sec. 23.1(b) of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9184 (GPRA IRR), including the submission of a valid AOI, but was nevertheless disqualified as it
still failed to comply with the technical requirements of the project. 18

Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest, seeking permission to conduct another technical demonstration, the
OMR Smartmatic JV presented during the public bidding before the COMELEC en banc. Accordingly, on June 19,
2015, Smartmatic JV was allowed to prove compliance with the technical specifications for the second time, but
this time before the electoral tribunal's Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). This was followed, on June 23,
2015, by another technical demonstration before the Commission en banc at the Advanced Science and
Technology Institute (ASTI) at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. 22

Notwithstanding Smartmatic JV's compliance with the technical requirements in the TOR, Commissioner Luie Tito
F. Guia (Guia) would nonetheless dissent in part, questioning the sufficiency of the documents submitted by the
Smartmatic JV. Taking their cue from Commissioner Guia's dissent, the petitioners then challenged the decision of
the COMELEC arguing that it acted with grave abuse of dicretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its
decision. The respondent, through the OSG, then challenged the petition of the petitioners and said that they have
failed to observed the hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

whether or not under the circumstances, the rule on "hierarchy of courts" may be dispensed with.

RULING:

Yes, there exist ample compelling reasons to justify the direct resort to the Court as a departure from the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts

In the leading case of The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, the Court enumerated the specific instances when direct
resort to this Court is allowed, to wit:

1. When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
2. When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
3. Cases of first impression;
4. When the constitutional issues raised are best decided by this Court;
5. When the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored;
6. When the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
7. When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
8. When public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictates, or when demanded by the broader
interest of justice;
9. When the orders complained of are patent nullities; and
10. When appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
11. When appeal is considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.

The Court finds the second and fifth, and sixth grounds applicable in the case at bar. Much has already been said of
the "compelling significance and the transcending public importance" of the primordial issue underpinning petitions
that assail election automation contracts: the success and the far-reaching grim implications of the failure—of the
nationwide automation project.

As regards the fifth ground, the time element, it is sufficient to state that with the 2016 polls visible in the horizon.
It would be the height of absurdity to require petitioners to undergo scrutiny through the lens of the RTC first,
considering that the acquisition of 23,000 OMRs would, at the minimum, affect the clustering of precincts. Without
the finalized list of clustered precincts, the polling place for the registered voters could not yet be ascertained.
Needless to state, this would impede the preparations for the conduct of the polls and its unmitigated effects could
very well lead to mass disenfranchisement of voters.

Lastly, the sixth ground is indubitably applicable. The rulings of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body, can
immediately be reviewed by the Court on proper petition.
In sum, there exist ample compelling reasons to justify the direct resort to the Court as a departure from the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts not in relation to but under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on certiorari and prohibition, and to
brush aside the procedural issues in this case to focus on the substantive issues surrounding the procurement of the
23,000 additional OMRs for the 2016 elections.

PARTS OF LAW AND EQUITY

[G.R. No. 134241. August 11, 2003]

DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), petitioner, vs. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG and HARRISON
LUMBER, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of contract
and damages against the respondents. The complaint alleged that on 7 November 1994, Reyes as seller and Lim as
buyer entered into a contract to sell (Contract to Sell) a parcel of land (Property) located along F.B. Harrison Street,
Pasay City. Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as lessee with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of
January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would
hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint further
alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty
would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000. However, they denied that they
connived with Lim to defraud Reyes. Keng and Harrison Lumber alleged that Reyes approved their request for an
extension of time to vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business.
On 31 May 1995, Lim filed his Answer that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price
on or before 8 March 1995. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. On 9 March 1995, Reyes offered to return the P10
million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim
rejected Reyes offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had
already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation (Line One).
On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down payment
with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The trial court granted this motion. On 25 March 1997,
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order dated 6 March 1997 which the trial court denied Reyes motion in an
order citing Article 1385 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that an action for rescission could prosper only if the
party demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore should the court grant the rescission.
The trial court denied Reyes Motion for Reconsideration in its Order and in the same order, the trial court
directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October 1997.
On 8 December 1997, Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not

RULING:

The Court ruled that Reyes contentions are without merit. Reyes argues that a court cannot apply equity and
require deposit if the law already prescribes the specific provisional remedies which do not include deposit. Reyes
invokes the principle that equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or x x x judicial
rules of procedure.
 The instant case, however, is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left
alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. The hiatus may also imperil
restitution, which is a precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that Reyes himself seeks. This is a case of
silence or insufficiency of the law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates
the courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. This calls for the application of
equity, which fills the open spaces in the law.
Thus, the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit of the P10 million
down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment
and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
There is also no plausible or justifiable reason for Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10 million down
payment in court. The Contract to Sell can no longer be enforced because Reyes himself subsequently sold the
Property to Line One. Both Reyes and Lim are now seeking rescission of the Contract to Sell. Under Article 1385 of
the Civil Code, rescission creates the obligation to return the things that are the object of the contract. Rescission is
possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of
equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of
the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. Courts can extend
this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the pendency of the case, has no
other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the Rules of Court.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down
payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim.

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. Petitioner alleged in his petition that
he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth. His sex was registered as
"male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female"
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He consulted several doctors in the United States
and underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. On January 27, 2001 he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand which was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-
Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that the
petitioner had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision 8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is allowed the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of equity.

RULING:

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery which resulting to grant the Republic’s petition to set aside the decision of the trial court.

Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. The changes
sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that “no entry in the civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order.” This provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that “All other matters pertaining to the registration
of civil status shall be governed by special laws.” But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

This Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where
no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. the
petition is hereby DENIED.
 DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY, STABILITY AND NON- INTERFERENCE

G.R. No. 166859 June 26, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), et al, Respondents.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari against the respondent Sandiganbayan
challenging the denial by the Sandiganbayan, of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Solicitor General
alleges that its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must first be resolved, as a continuation of
the proceedings in the civil case by the Sandiganbayan might be rendered unnecessary in the event that its
petition before the Supreme Court is resolved in its favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of preliminary injuction can be granted during the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari
against the Sandiganbayan

HELD:

The mere elevation of an interlocutory matter to this Court through a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, like in the present case, does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before a public
respondent, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent.

The burden is on the petitioner in a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to show that there is a
meritorious ground for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction for the
purpose of suspending the proceedings before the public respondent. Essential for granting injunctive relief is the
existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage.The Court finds that petitioner has
failed to discharge the burden. The ground on which it bases its urgent motion is the alleged futility of proceeding
with the trial of the case. This assertion, however, is speculative, anchored on the mere supposition that the
petition would be decided in its favor. There is thus, in this case, a marked absence of any urgent necessity for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy" applies where "there is a strong probability that
the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court [or court of origin]".

The Supreme Court takes notice that in most cases where its interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court,
Sandiganbayan, suspends proceedings in the cases in which these assailed interlocutory orders are issued despite
the non-issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction and the absence
of a strong probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered moot by a continuation of
the proceedings before it