REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

DIGEST COMPILATION

Submitted to:

Atty. Vera Shayne G. Salcedo

Submitted by:

JD 4402

March 15, 2019

Table of Contents
PRELIMINARIES ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1
Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006 ................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
Samson v. Daway, G.R. 160054-55, 21 July 2004....................................................................................................... 3
People v. Bello, 29 August 2012 ...................................................................................................................................... 26

RULE 110........................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Panaguiton v. DOJ, G.R. 167571, 25 November 2008 .............................................................................................. 9
Jadewell Parking System v. Lidua, 7 October 2013 ............................................................................................... 12
Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. 168380, 8 February 2007 ........................................................................................ 14
Francisco v. People, 18 February 2009 ...................................................................................................................... 17
Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 17 March 2000 ...................................................................................................... 20
Heirs of Burgos v. CA, 8 February 2010................................................................................................................... 24
Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, 13 January 2014 ........................................................................................... 26
People v. Duca, 30 October 2009 .................................................................................................................................. 27
Senador v. People, 6 March 2013 ................................................................................................................................. 29
People v. Pangilinan, 14 November 2011 ................................................................................................................ 32
Sombilon v. People, 30 September 2009................................................................................................................... 35
People v. Valdez, 13 February 2013............................................................................................................................ 37
Zapanta v. People, 20 March 2013............................................................................................................................... 41
Ocampo v. Abando, 11 February 2014 ..................................................................................................................... 44
Bonifacio v. RTC, 5 May 2010 ........................................................................................................................................ 47
Union Bank v. People, 28 February 2012 ................................................................................................................. 49
Spouses Dacudao v. SOJ, 8 January 2013 ................................................................................................................ 51
Lee v. Lee, 7 Augusr 2013 ................................................................................................................................................ 54

RULE 111........................................................................................................................................................................................ 56
Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. 173807, 16 April 2009 ....................................................................................................... 56
Chieng v. Santos, 531 SCAR 730 .................................................................................................................................. 58
 Co v. Munoz, 4 December 2013 .................................................................................................................................... 61
Teves v. People, 24 August 2011 .................................................................................................................................. 64
Pimentel v. Pimentel, 13 September 2010 ............................................................................................................... 67
Reyes v. Rossi, 18 February 2013 ................................................................................................................................. 69
Jose-Consing v. People, 15 July 2013 ......................................................................................................................... 72
Gaditano v. San Miguel Corp., 24 July 2013 .......................................................................................................... 75
San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, 4 September 2013 ................................................................................. 77
Chua v. Executive Judge, 2 October 2013 ............................................................................................................... 79

RULE 112........................................................................................................................................................................................ 81
People v. Romualdez, G.R. 166510, 29 April 2009 ............................................................................................ 81
Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 1 June 2007........................................................................................ 83
Tolentino v. Paqueo, 7 June 2007 ................................................................................................................................. 88
People v. Dela-Torre-Yadao, 13 November 2012 ................................................................................................ 90
People v. Gabo, 3 August 2010...................................................................................................................................... 92

RULE 113........................................................................................................................................................................................ 95
People v. Racho, 3 August 2010 .................................................................................................................................... 95
Luz v. People, 29 February 2012................................................................................................................................... 98
People v. Villareal, 18 March 2013 ............................................................................................................................ 102

RULE 114..................................................................................................................................................................................... 105

Leviste v. CA, 17 March 2010 ....................................................................................................................................... 105

RULE 115..................................................................................................................................................................................... 107

Visbal v. Judge Vanilla, 7 April 2009 ...................................................................................................................... 107
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 15 July 2013 ...................................................................................................... 110

RULE 117..................................................................................................................................................................................... 114

People v. Dumlao, 2 March 2009 .............................................................................................................................. 114
Heirs of Honrales v. Honrales, 25 August 2010 ............................................................................................... 116
Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 17 November 2010 .............................................................................................. 120
PNB v. Soriano, 3 October 2012 ................................................................................................................................. 122
 Braza v. Sandiganbayan, 20 February 2013 ........................................................................................................ 125
People v. Lagos, 6 March 2013 ................................................................................................................................... 129
Digital Telecommunications Philippines v. Cantos, 25 November 2013 ........................................... 132
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 18 February 2014 ................................................................................................ 134
Los Banos v. Pedro, G.R. 173588, 22 April 2009 ............................................................................................... 137

RULE 118..................................................................................................................................................................................... 138

Garayblas v. Ong, 3 August 2011 ............................................................................................................................. 138

RULE 119..................................................................................................................................................................................... 140

Mari v. Gonzales, 12 September 2011 .................................................................................................................... 140
Go v. People, 18 July 2012 ............................................................................................................................................. 143
People v. Anabe, 6 September 2010 ......................................................................................................................... 147
Neri v. Sandiganbayan, 7 August 2013 ................................................................................................................. 151
Cabador v. People, G.R. 186001, 2 October 2009 ............................................................................................. 156
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 12 February 2007 ............................................................................. 159
Alferez v. People, 31 January 2011 .......................................................................................................................... 161
Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, 5 September 2012 ....................................................................................................... 164

RULE 120..................................................................................................................................................................................... 166

People v. Manansala, 3 April 2013 ........................................................................................................................... 166
Colinares v. People, 13 December 2011 ................................................................................................................. 170

RULE 121..................................................................................................................................................................................... 172

Tadeja v. People, 20 February 2013 ......................................................................................................................... 172

RULE 122..................................................................................................................................................................................... 176

Tan v. People, 381 SCRA 75 ......................................................................................................................................... 176
Yalong v. People, 28 August 2013 ............................................................................................................................ 178
Quilesete v. People, 18 February 2009 ................................................................................................................... 180
Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. 170979, 9 February 2011 ....................................................................................... 182
Rodriguez v. People, 24 October 2012 ................................................................................................................... 184
People v. Webb, 14 December 2010 ......................................................................................................................... 186
 People v. Valdez, 13 February 2013 ........................................................................................................................ 191
Worldwide Web Corp. v. People, 13 January 2014 ........................................................................................ 192

RULE 126..................................................................................................................................................................................... 195

United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, 28 June 2005 ............................................................ 195
Sec v. Mendoza, 23 April 2012 ................................................................................................................................... 197
HPS Software v. PLDT, 10 December 2012 ......................................................................................................... 201
 PRELIMINARIES

Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006

by Miguel, Maria Therese Louise C.

Doctrine

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over

the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Facts:

On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later
identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2
Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The
RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC
acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the
petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal
complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant
of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to

reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent
motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

Issues:

Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Page 1 of 208
 Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.

Held:

No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of
the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
defendant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.

Page 2 of 208
 JURISDICTION

MANOLO P. SAMSON vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC.
G.R. Nos. 160054-55. July 21, 2004.
By: VARGAS, Rose Shahanna G.

DOCTRINE:

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer arraignment.

FACTS:

Two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section
170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293) were filed against petitioner
Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes for his alleged illegal distribution, selling
and/or offering for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags,
accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and the use of its trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would
cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and
prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner thereof.

Petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the
existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair
competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding
probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. However, the trial court denied the
motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.

Petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for reconsideration of
the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over
the offense charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of
imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691. The trial court
denied petitioners twin motions. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.

Page 3 of 208
 Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to suspend the
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a)
the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition. - NO.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a
prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which
sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of
said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a
prejudicial question. Hence, no prejudicial question has been substantiated to warrant the
suspension of Petitioner‘s arraignment and other proceedings.

Anent the pending Petition for Review, Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in the following cases
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension
shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer arraignment.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his
discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the
Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.
Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to

Page 4 of 208
the petition. Hence, he failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a
suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule
116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not
established that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.

Page 5 of 208
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO
G.R. Nos. 166948-59 August 29, 2012
Digested by: Salto, Dianne D.

DOCTRINE:

What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the offense
described in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in relation to
the office being held.

FACTS:

In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged
anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring
lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed
of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a
discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while
the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale
in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to
enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay
lesser taxes.

The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General

Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of sale
covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification
of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171,
paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019.

Acting on the Committee‘s recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the
acquisition of lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
against the respondents for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of
falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.

Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004 the
Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the records to the proper courts,
hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges
such order.

Page 6 of 208
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over
offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of government-owned and controlled
corporations.

RULING:

YES. In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or
non-stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and controlled
corporation. Consequently, respondent AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under
Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.2 On motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its position and
ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-owned and controlled corporation, having been
created by special law to perform a public function.

Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since
Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime
charged, did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that section. Notably, in
its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word "manager" used above as
one who has charge of a corporation and control of its businesses or of its branch establishments,
and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.

The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes "divisions,
or departments," which are corporate units headed by managers. The United States case of
Braniff v. McPherren5 also referred to "divisions" and "departments" in relation to the position
of "manager." Under this definition, respondent Bello would fit into the term "manager," he
having charge of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department when the questioned transactions took place.
But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in Section
4(a)(1) should be understood to refer to a range of positions within a government corporation. By
the variety of the functions they perform, the "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers"
cannot be taken to refer only to those who exercise "overall" control and supervision of such
corporations.

The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not, for

example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board, the
directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement. Since
"managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as
presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above,

Page 7 of 208
has charge of a corporation‘s "divisions or departments." This brings Bello‘s position within the
definition.

Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise jurisdiction over
him because his rank at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of Police
Superintendent in the Philippine National Police. But the criminal information does not charge
him for offenses relating to the regular police work of a police officer of his rank. He is rather
charged for offenses he committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a "manager" of the
Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, a government-owned and controlled corporation.

What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the offense
described in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in relation
to the office being held.7 Here, the OMB charged Bello of using his office as Legal Department
Head to manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land acquisitions to the prejudice of the
government.

Page 8 of 208
 RULE 110

Panaguiton v. DOJ, GR No. 167571

By: Quising, Josiah

Doctrine:

Any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately
lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

FACTS:

Cawili borrowed P1,979,459 from Panaguiton in 1992. He issued 3 check payments in

1993 bearing the signatures of both Cawili and his business associate – Tongson. All 3 checks
were dishonored. Petitioner made demands to no avail so he filed a BP 22 case against Cawili
and Tongson on August 24, 1995.

Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he
had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an
officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact,
he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said
checks had been falsified.

In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to
co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño
directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Page 9 of 208
 On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on
the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the
complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings.
Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed
to him had already prescribed.

DOJ and CA agreed and dismissed the case. CA dismissed the case because the petitioner
failed to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner filed an
MR with an amended verification and certification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to attach a proper verification and certification will dismiss the
case
Whether or not the action for BP22 has prescribed

HELD:

1. Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correct--the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served, as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with
the verification requirement.

Page 10 of 208
2. We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P.
Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than
one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four
(4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-
up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Tongson filed his case well-within the 4 year period and filed his appeals and MR within
the deadline. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. It was not his fault. Thus, the offense has not yet prescribed.

Page 11 of 208
JADEWELL V. LIDUA G.R. No. 169588 (2013)
Topic: Rule 110, Prosecution of Criminal Offenses
Gabriel, Roselle A.

Facts:

Jadewell is a private parking operator duly authorised to operate and manage parking
spaces in Baguio City and render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if
the vehicle is illegally parked, by virtue of a City Ordinance.

Jadewell filed cases for robbery against private respondents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 arising from their acts of removing wheel clamps on the wheels of
the cars rendered immobile and failure to pay the prescribed fines and penalties for violation of
a City Ordinance. The Resolution finding probable cause on the said acts was issued on July 25,
2003. The criminal information dated July 25, 2003 were filed on October 2, 2003 with the
MTC.

The private respondents filed a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation on the ground of
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription.

Jadewell argued that under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations were filed only on October 2, 2003, the complaint, however, was filed on May 23,
2003.

Issue: Whether the criminal liability on the violation of the ordinance has already prescribed

Ruling: Yes.

The Rules on Summary Procedure provides that only the filing of an Information in the
Court tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.

Section 1 of Rule 110, on the other hand, provides:

(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the
prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of
the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.

Page 12 of 208
 For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time,
from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.

It is without question that the period of prescription is 2 months for the offense charged
under the City Ordinance. And as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only
the filing of an Information toll the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance.

If there is a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the
petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period
was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file
the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of
Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period
within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only
had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within
which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Page 13 of 208
Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. 168380, 8 February 2007
TOPIC: Rule 110 - Prosecution of Offenses
Digested by: DE VERA, QUEENIE, S.

DOCTRINE:
1. Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that all
criminal actions, commenced by either a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of a public prosecutor.

2. A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute.
Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of
said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

FACTS: Manuel Baviera, petitioner, was the former head of the HR Service Delivery and
Industrial Relations of Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of herein respondents.
SCB is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other
fiduciary business in the Philippines. Pursuant to a Resolution of the Monetary Board of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the conduct of SCB‘s business in this jurisdiction is subject
to the certain conditions.

Apparently, SCB did not comply with the conditions. Instead, it acted as a stock broker,
soliciting from local residents foreign securities. These securities were not registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

The Investment Capital Association of the Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint
alleging that SCB violated the Revised Securities Act, particularly the provision prohibiting the
selling of securities without prior registration with the SEC; and that its actions are potentially
damaging to the local mutual fund industry. SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB,
holding that its services violated Sections 4(a) and 19 of the Revised Securities Act.

However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP directive, SCB continued to offer and
sell securities in this country. This prompted petitioner to enter into an Investment Trust
Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased US$8,000.00 worth of securities upon the bank‘s
promise of 40% return on his investment and a guarantee that his money is safe. The trend in the
securities market, however, was bearish and the worth of petitioner‘s investment wend down to
only US$3,000.00. Petitioner learned from Marivel Gonzales, head of the SCB Legal and
Compliance Department, that the latter had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF

Page 14 of 208
securities.

Petitioner filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint charging private respondents
with syndicated estafa and violation of Securities Regulation Code.

DOJ, in its Joint Resolution, dismissed petitioner‘s complaint for syndicated estafa and violation
of Securities Regulation Code. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
He alleged that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa and violation of Securities
Regulation Code. CA dismissed the petition. MR is also denied.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner‘s complaint for violation of Securities Regulation
Code and his complaint for syndicated estafa.

HELD: No. Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides
that all criminal actions, commenced by either a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. This mandate is founded on the theory that
a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very
sovereignty of the State. It follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the
prosecution of the offense.

Concomitant with his authority and power to control the prosecution of criminal offenses, the
public prosecutor is vested with the discretionary power to determine whether a prima facie case
exists or not. This is done through a preliminary investigation designed to secure the respondent
from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is essentially an
inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is probable
cause that the accused is guilty thereof.

In determining whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion, it is expedient to know if
the findings of fact of herein public prosecutors were reached in an arbitrary or despotic manner.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner‘s evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause
for syndicated estafa. There is no showing from the record that private respondents herein did
induce petitioner by false representations to invest in securities. Nor did they act as a syndicate to
misappropriate his money for their own benefit. Rather, they invested it in accordance with his
written instructions. That he lost his investment is not their fault since it was highly speculative.

Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for review
against private respondents and in concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of

Page 15 of 208
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On petitioner‘s complaint for violation of the Securities Regulation Code, suffice it to state that,
as aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC, not the DOJ.
Again, there is no indication here that in dismissing petitioner‘s complaint, the DOJ acted
capriciously or arbitrarily.

Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:

―53. 1. x x x That all criminal complaints for violations of this Code and the implementing rules
and regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred to the Department
of Justice for preliminary investigation and prosecution before the proper court x x x‖

The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of
any law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission
finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed
to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing his complaint.

A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence,
it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities
Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all
complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be
filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the
complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1
earlier quoted.

Page 16 of 208
Francisco v. People, G.R No. 177720, Feb. 18, 2009
Topic: Rule 110 - Sec. 3
Digested by: Morales, Carol Ann S.

Doctrine: A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be
filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense
subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

FACTS: An amended information was filed with the RTC of of Pasig, petitioner was charged
with Estafa. On arraignment, petitioner Francisco pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. Petitioner
Francisco was an employee of Bankard at the time the alleged crime occurred. He was
knowledgeable in computer programming, and held the position of Acquiring Chargeback
Supervisor.

Bankard engaged the services of Equitable Computer Services, Inc. (Equicom) to encode and
post credit card transactions and submit reports on those services. Procedurally, Bankard
transmits to Equicom the invoices, instructions for debiting, credit advances and other documents
relevant to encoding and posting. Equicom then transmits through electronic mail the reports on
the transactions to Bankard. Petitioner Francisco was tasked to convert the Equicom reports sent
through electronic mail from its original ARJ Text Format to the Amipro Format used by
Bankard. Petitioner Francisco was the only one assigned to perform this task.

Sometime in August 1999, Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed to
Bankard that there were four questionable transactions reflected in Solidbank Mastercard
Account No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 under the name of petitioner Francisco. An amount of
₱663,144.56 was allegedly credited to said account of petitioner Francisco, the credit apparently
being a reversal of charges from four establishments. The amount of ₱18,430.21 was also
credited to petitioner Francisco‘s AIG Visa Card based on another supposed credit advance.

Bankard conducted an investigation. Upon comparison of the original reports of Equicom with
those converted by petitioner Francisco, it was found that based on Equicom‘s original Daily
Transaction Prooflist, there was a reversal of charges from Bankard Travel Services in the
amount of $5,989.60 which was credited to the credit card under the name of petitioner
Francisco, with a conversion date of 10 August 1999.

Petitioner Francisco was the person who received the transmittals from Equicom of documents
including any purported cash advice at the time the credit transactions were made in favor of his
credit card accounts.lavvphi1

Page 17 of 208
As a result of the fraudulent crediting of the amount of ₱663,144.56 to petitioner Francisco‘s
Solidbank credit card account, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of
the settlement of transactions between the issuing banks from the time of the crediting of the
amount to petitioner Francisco‘s credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged
back to Solidbank on 27 August 1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not the information was sufficiently filed, despite the contention that
Solidbank is not the proper party to file the case.

HELD: YES.

The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the third one under Article 315(a) of
the Revised Penal Code in the following list provided by this Court in several cases:

(1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other
similar deceits;

(2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;

(3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means,
that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and

(4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Petitioner Francisco further argues that Bankard had no personality to file the complaint, since
the credit card companies were the ones which really suffered damage in the case at bar. Thus,
argued petitioner Francisco, the third element of estafa under Article 315(a) was lacking:

Stated otherwise, this element speaks of an offended party which undoubtedly may only refer to
Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa simply because it was these two credit card companies that
extended credit facilities to herein petitioner when the latter used his credit cards.

Despite this factual setup however, not even one of these credit card companies appeared as
private complainant in the instant case. BANKARD Inc., the former employer of herein
petitioner is the one who lodged the criminal complaint after the latter filed an illegal dismissal

Page 18 of 208
case against it before the National Labor Relations Commission. Worse, the assailed Decision of
the Honorable Court of Appeals even awarded civil liabilities in favor of BANKARD Inc.
corresponding to the accumulated credit balances of petitioner with Mastercard and Visa, when
in truth and in fact, Mastercard and Visa continues even up to the present to exert collection
effort against petitioner by sending him corresponding demand letters.

Firstly, as discussed above, it was duly proven that Bankard also suffered damages by reason of
fraudulent acts committed by petitioner Francisco.

Secondly, even assuming for the sake of argument that Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa were
the proper offended parties in this case, petitioner Francisco is mistaken in his assertion that it
was essential for either Solidbank Mastercard or AIG Visa to have filed the complaint for estafa.

Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, namely adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness, a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary for
the institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court
is sufficient.

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of
crimes, except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the
prosecutor need not be filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person,
unless the offense subject thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

Page 19 of 208
Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz (G.R. No. 134504; March 17, 2000)
Topic: Rule 110
By: MANGUERA, TRICCIE COLEEN A.

DOCTRINE: While the rule is, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings
pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, there are recognized exceptions, if the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a
more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.

FACTS: After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-
Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City
recommended and thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

- Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutor‘s resolution [before] the DOJ
which was however denied. Hence, he moved for reconsideration, but was still denied by the
DOJ. He thereafter filed in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus Motion for
Reinvestigation and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest". It was granted and the case was set for
reinvestigation by another prosecutor.

- Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for reinvestigation,
found no reason to disturb the findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the remand
of the case to the court for arraignment and trial.

- The accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito
Narciso to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted
on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00.

- The private prosecutor representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister
of accused‘s deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post
Bail. The accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a Motion to Expunge 1)
Notice of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail".

- Private complainant through counsel filed her opposition to the motion to expunge [filed by]
accused. She moved for the postponement of the trials and the subsequent hearings thereon
pending the resolution of their Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail.

Page 20 of 208
- The court cancelled the hearing upon motion of the public prosecutor because no prosecution
witness was available. Again, the private prosecutor moved for postponement because of the
pendency of his Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail. On the same date, the trial
court issued the second assailed order which cancelled the trial and reset, and granted the
petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of
his guilt.

Court of Appeals: Granted private respondents Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this recourse to
us via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Order of the
Regional Trial Court which granted bail to the petitioner is substantially and procedurally infirm
notwithstanding the absence of any opposition from the public prosecutor.

(2) Whether or not the private respondent has the legal personality to intervene in the present
criminal case.

HELD:

(1) YES. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required."

- Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

- The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no
hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion
by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence.

- Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the

Page 21 of 208
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the
application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

- Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required

hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of
bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what
he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before
whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."

- Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several cases that emphasized the mandatory character
of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of
the trial judge in such petition:

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,
supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

- The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for
doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

- Additionally, the court‗s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the

Page 22 of 208
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial
of the application for bail. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with
grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.

(2) YES. While the petitioner attacks respondent‘s legal standing to file the Petition for
Certiorari before the appellate court, maintaining that only the public prosecutor or the solicitor
general may challenge the assailed Order, People v. Calo, provided an exception to the above
doctrine:

"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring
or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or
the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals
(Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just,
speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended
party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance
against Judge Adaos order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private
petitioners) father.
- The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate court‘s ruling on
this point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

- The petitioner maintains that only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the accused
himself and his minor child, may file the instant action. The SC disagrees. It should be
remembered that the crime charged against the private respondent is parricide; hence, the
accused cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a contradiction in terms and an
absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Hence, we
rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper
party-litigant who is akin to the "offended party," she being a close relative of the deceased.

Page 23 of 208
Heirs of Burgos vs. Court of Appeals, Johnny Co y Yu,
G.R. No. 169711, February 8, 2010
by: Ma. Corazon M. Cristobal

DOCTRINE:
Actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor
General are as a rule summarily dismissed.

FACTS:
Ø A number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Burgos . 4 months after
the incident, Aman and Martin who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the
attack. They pointed to two others and to respondent CO who allegedly masterminded the whole
thing.
Ø After 10 years, respondent CO surrendered to the NBI. The prosecution charged him
with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Co, pleaded NOT GUILTY to
the charges.
Ø Respondent CO filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing, the RTC granted
bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent CO was NOT strong.
Ø Petitioners heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration, but the RTC now presided over
by another judge, denied the same. This prompted the victims heirs to file a special civil action
of certiorari before the CA.
Ø The CA dismissed the petition, however, for having been filed without involving the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence and the law.
Ø Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsidenation but the CA denied it for lack of
merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which
questioned the RTCs grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the
offended parties and without the OSGs intervention.

RULING:
YES.
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the
Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in
legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which
may be gathered from the term shall x x x.
x x x x/

Page 24 of 208
 The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law,
there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than that
it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.

Actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor
General , are, as a rule, summarily dismissed.
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action,
preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its
denial has NO IMPACT on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final
judgment. Here, respondent CO has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for
civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
The court affirms the CA‘s decision.

Page 25 of 208
Worldwide Web Corp. vs. People
GR No. 161106, January 13, 2014
Sanchez, Precious Loren L.

Doctrine: The conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party
moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

Facts: The police chief inspector of the PNP filed applications for warrants, to search the office
premises of petitioner Worldwide Web. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting
illegal toll bypass operations, which amount to theft and violation of PD No. 401 to the damage
and prejudice of PLDT.

The RTC granted the applications for search warrants.

Petitioners filed their motions to quash the search warrants.

The RTC granted the motions to quash.

PLDT moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get
the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Issue: WON PLDT has personality to question the quashal of the search warrants?

Ruling: YES.

Section 5 of Rule 110 states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control
of the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information. However, a
search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of
an application therefor.

Therefore, the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party
moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

Page 26 of 208
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARTURO F. DUCA
G.R. No.171175, October 30, 2009
NICHOLE JOHN USON

DOCTRINE: The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

FACTS: Respondent Arturo Duca is charged of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Pedro Calanayan (private complainant) filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia
F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca with the MCTC of San Fabian-San
Jacinto, Pangasinan. The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. The money judgment was
satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca.

Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages. She
alleged that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin
Duca. She presented Property Index having a sworn statement with the signature affixed on top
of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that
the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Cecilia and
Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff
Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property
in question.

MCTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt

RTC: affirmed
CA: reversed, it held that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly
authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondents
appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the
pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment?

RULING:

Yes, the prosecution was denied due process.

Page 27 of 208
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme
Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Likewise, in City Fiscal of
Tacloban v. Espina, the Court made the following pronouncement:

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents
the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional
trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or this
Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal.
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to
be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor
General to file his Comment on Ducas petition. A copy of the CA Resolution dated May 26,
2004 which required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for
Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge
Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy
of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment
deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.

The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given
the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may
be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General
the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to
refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is,
therefore, a nullity.

Page 28 of 208
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA
JAIME
G.R. NO. 201620 : March 6, 2013
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE: “The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is
immaterial and did not violate accused constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her.”
BY: BALDONADO, Maria Guila

FACTS:
Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a
jewelry business. Sometime in the first week of September 2000, Senador went to see Rita at her
house in Cebu City, expressing her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling.
Rita's daughter-in-law and business partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of
jewelry worth seven hundred five thousand six hundred eighty five pesos (PhP 705,685).
Senador, the undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and,
thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen
(15) days from the delivery. However, as events turned out, Senador failed to turn over the
proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within the given period.
Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold
jewelry or the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand
fell on deaf ears prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against Senador.
Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code. During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel the
amount of PhP 705,685 as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless, the check was later
dishonored as it was drawn against a closed account.
Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not the
same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the private
complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the
private complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as
witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al.(Uba) and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog
(Lahoylahoy), Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right
to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated.
RTC found Senador guilty. On appeal, CA upheld the decision of RTC. Further, the CA finding
that Uba is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime against property and not
oral defamation, as in Uba ruled.

Page 29 of 208
ISSUE:
WON an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party violates the
accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.

HELD:
NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the
information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to
an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere
formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the
appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of the
person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an
erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case,
Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as
indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information.
Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule
110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If
there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the
offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause
such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x
x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the
erroneous designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter
of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other
generic property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds
of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently
fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Senador and presented during
trial, which enumerates these "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP
705,685," (Presents tabular form of name, type, weight and description of property.)

Page 30 of 208
Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the present
case, not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The error in the designation of the offended party in
the information is immaterial and did not violate Senador's constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

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People v. Pangilinan
G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011
Rule 110- Prosecution of Offenses
By: MORALES, Edilyn

Doctrine

The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused cannot be
waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information
filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully
state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed.

Facts

The prosecution filed two separate Informations charging appellant of the crimes of Rape under
Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and Child Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7160, respectively.

The Information reads as follows:

That on or about 1995 up to about June 2001 at Barangay Apsayan, Municipality of Gerona,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally commit
acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor subjected to sexual abuse.

That accused is the stepfather of AAA who was born on January 29, 1988.

Contrary to law.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. This decision
was affirmed by the CA.

The CA ruled that the precise time of the commission of the offense need not be alleged in the
complaint or information unless time is an essential element of the crime charged which is not so
in the crime of acts of lasciviousness; and that since appellant did not move for a bill of
particulars or quashal of the Information, he could no longer question on appeal the alleged
defect in the Information.

As to appellant‘s claims that there was no evidence showing that he had carnal knowledge of
AAA on July 27, 2001, the CA found that AAA was only 14 years old and had been subjected to

Page 32 of 208
abuse by appellant since she was seven years old; thus, she could not remember the details and
the dates when she was abused; however, it was established that she was raped which happened
before the Information was filed. The findings of Dr. Mascarina that there was no hymenal
laceration did not categorically discount the commission of rape and full penetration was not
required to convict appellant for rape. The CA found no reason for AAA to fabricate lies as she
considered appellant her father who treated her like his own daughter.

Issue

Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness despite the failure of the prosecution to allege and establish with particularity the
date of the commission of the offense

Held

Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it provides:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

A reading of the allegations in the Information would show the insufficiency of the averments of
the acts alleged to have been committed by appellant. It does not contain the essential facts
constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law.

In People v Dela Cruz, the Court dismissed the case after finding the Information to be void and
made the following ratiocinations:

It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The
information does not cite which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610
has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions
constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as
required under the rules of criminal procedure.

The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required
under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts.

Page 33 of 208
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused cannot be
waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information
filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully
state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. Thus, appellant cannot
be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information.

However, the Court found that the prosecution was able to prove that accused-appellant was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC. Appellant may
be convicted for rape in the light of AAA's testimony. For in rape cases, the date of the
commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its occurrence.
As in the present case, appellant can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be
convicted therefor. The prosecution's evidence established that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA through force and intimidation by threatening her with a samurai. Thus, rape was
established. Considering that in the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he resolved
the filing of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for which appellant was
convicted by both the RTC and the CA, therefore, we merely affirm the conviction.

While the Information for rape mentioned AAA's minority, as well as the fact that she was a
stepdaughter of appellant, it was only AAA's minority which was proven by a copy of a birth
certificate issued by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Angeles City.

Page 34 of 208
Sombilon v. People
G.R. No. 175528, 30 September 2009
By LAQUI, Xela Leona D.

Doctrine: It is a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be

expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.

Facts: AAA, a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was investigated by PO3 Benito Sombilon at the
Calinan Police Station, Davao City in connection with a complaint for Theft filed by a certain
Aileen Dagoc.
AAA alleged that Sombilon, in conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked
it. She testified that the room had no window but had a cot, a table, and a clothesline where some
clothes were hanged. She claimed that Sombilon pointed a gun at her, with the end of the barrel
touching her forehead and pushed her with it, causing her head to violently bang against the wall,
and asked her: Did you steal the necklace? She answered that she did not. Sombilon then took an
electric wire from a drawer and inserted its male plug to a socket. She was ordered to place her
two hands on top of the table where her fingers were electrocuted with the end of the wire. She
was again asked the same question, which she kept answering in the negative. Subsequently, she
was asked: Dalaga ka na ba? (Are you a woman now?), and was told: I am single too.
Simultaneously, she was touched all over her body including her breasts, her belly, and her
private parts. She was also kissed on her cheek. She struggled to resist the sexual advances but
Sombilon prevailed. She claimed that they were inside the room for more than one (1) hour.
Thereafter, they went out of the room where Sombilon announced to P03 Danilo Mendez and
Aileen Dagoc that she had already admitted having stolen the necklace. Pale, AAA was
trembling and crying; her hair disheveled, her dress wet. She also had bruises on her forehead.
The police officers allowed AAA and her mother to go home on the condition that they would
pay the value of the necklace. Because of AAAs condition, AAAs mother brought her daughter
to the Medical Clinic of St. Luke where AAA was examined by Dr. Manuel Garcia, Sr. Dr.
Garcia gave AAA a tranquilizer to calm down the latter who was trembling and incoherent. At
first, AAA could not answer the doctor when she was asked what happened to her. Later, upon
regaining her composure, she revealed that she was electrocuted and sexually molested by
Sombilon.
In an Information, Sombilon was charged with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. Upon
arraignment, Sombilon pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Sombilon guilty of acts of lasciviousness.The CA rendered
a decision affirming with modification the RTCs judgment of conviction.

Page 35 of 208
Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
APPRECIATION OF THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF HIS PUBLIC POSITION FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE IN THE INFORMATION?

Ruling: YES, THE COURT ERRED, Aggravating Circumstance must be alleged in the
information.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provide: Sec. 8.
Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial. A
reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating circumstance.
Here, the crime was committed in 1998, the generic aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of public position was not alleged in the information. As such, it cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the penalty imposed must be
modified.

Page 36 of 208
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013
By: Marianne M. Jalotjot

Doctrine: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble
of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.

Facts: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged,
prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts and
circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai
alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then
busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to
come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises;
Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired
several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at
the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin
shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third
victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger
machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently fired from short distances.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification on the
award of damages.

The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed
a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming
Edwin‘s appeal closed and terminated.

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez,
finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder.

Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self-explanatory letterdated March 12,
2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18,
2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.

Page 37 of 208
Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012, the Solicitor General interposed no opposition
to the plea for the reduction of Edwin‘s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of Court
and pertinent jurisprudence.

Issue:
1.Whether the information was sufficient in alleging the attendance of treachery - NO
2. Whether a co accused who did not file an appeal may benefit the judgment rendered on appeal
filed by his/her co-accused - YES

Ruling:
1. No. It is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance
of treachery.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from
the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information.

Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials
of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is
to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting
[them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and immediate cause of their
deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery
attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a
person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime
was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim
might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there
are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations.

Page 38 of 208
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This
requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is
always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being
charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of
which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense
and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

2. YES. Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the
crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for
three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes
committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the
benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this
Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the
victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin‘s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly
provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more
of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this
provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:

As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing‘s
acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch
as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be
applicable only to those who did not appeal.

Page 39 of 208
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not
give justice to the purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason,
i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the
appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the
foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so
long as the judgment was favorable to him.

In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez‘s co-accused to him despite
the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the
evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is
that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by the parties.The records show that Rodriguez had
withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both
appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellant‘s acquittal, which is favorable
and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given
that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Court's finding in its
Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject
advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with
actual malice."

Page 40 of 208
ZAPANTA VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 170863, March 20, 2013
By: Bustamante, Anne Murphy N.

RULE 110

DOCTRINE: When the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need
not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense
was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.

Facts: An Information filed with the RTC charging the petitioner, together with Concordia O.
Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows: sometime in the month of
October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being
then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken
then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction
and General Services (AMCGS), with the duty to manage and implement the fabrication and
erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the receipt, audit
and checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site – a position of full trust and
confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of
ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of
confidence and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City, wide
flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value of ₱2,269,731.69 without the knowledge
and consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA
MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of
₱2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency.

Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Loyao remains at-
large.

In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that
AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr.
Marigondon‘s motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials.

RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. On appeal, the petitioner assailed the
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses‘ statements, and reiterated his status as an AMCGS
employee. CA brushed aside the petitioner‘s arguments and affirmed the RTC‘s decision
convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the prosecution witnesses‘ testimonies
deserve full credence in the absence of any improper motive to testify falsely against the

Page 41 of 208
petitioner. It noted that the petitioner admitted his status as Anmar‘s employee and his receipt of
salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner‘s defense of denial for being self-
serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral damages to Engr. Marigondon for lack of
justification.

The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in
the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e.,
November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC‘s decision
convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.

HELD: No.

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of
the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission.

Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of
the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations
and before the commencement of the action.

Page 42 of 208
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the
information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words
"sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of
the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as
well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to
prepare his defense.

We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material
element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Clearly, the month of
November is the month right after October.

Page 43 of 208
Ocampo v. Abando G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014
By: Buenaventura, Marie Melanie O.

Topic:Section 14 Rule 110; Amendment or Substitution

Doctrine: If during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed
committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the
remedy.
Facts:
- The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang
Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered from the grave site were 67
severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD.
- The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD.
All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again. They also expressed belief that their
relatives‘ remains were among those discovered at the mass grave site.
- On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena
requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their
witnesses.
- Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis and Ladlad) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was
then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati). Putting forward the
political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder
in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
Issue: Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion charge
against him in the RTC.
Held:
Yes.
Under the political offense doctrine, ―common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as ―common‖ offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus,
when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must
be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

Page 44 of 208
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents
with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched principle
in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what to
charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor. But when the political
offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrate.
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can
be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-
conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged
by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.
The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if
during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
―If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused
shall not be placed in double jeopardy.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion,
the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple
rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Based on the law, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has
been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a
valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized
under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06 -944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the
DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack
of impartiality and independence.

Page 45 of 208
When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental
petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually ordered the
dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch
32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-
262163.

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Bonifacio v. RTC (G.R. No. 184800; 5 May 2010)
Topic: Rule 110
Digest by: Ferreras, Marjorie

Doctrine: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.

Facts: Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed, on behalf of the Yuchengco
family and of the Malayan Insurance Co. a criminal complaint before the RTC of Makati for 13
counts of libel under Art 355 in relation to 353 of the RPC against herein petitioners who are
officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc (PEPCI). Pepci is a large group of disgruntled
planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) – a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life
Assurance Corp, also owned by Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) – who had previously
purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon due to
liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments
before the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPI‘s refusal to honor its obligations under the educational plans, PEPCI sought to
provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their loss under the policies by
maintaining a website with the address of www.pepcoalition.com. Gimenez alleged that the same
website is easily accessible to the public. He further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated
website in Makati on various dates, he was appealed to read numerous articles which maliciously
and recklessly caused to be published by PEPCI containing highly derogatory statements and
false accusations against the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and Malayan.

By resolution, the Makati Prosecutor‘s Office filed 13 counts of libel after finding probable
cause to indict the accused. Several of the accused appealed the Prosecutor‘s resolution to the
Secretary of Justice which reversed the finding of probable cause and directed the withdrawal of
the information on the ground that internet libel, as a crime, is inexistent.

Petitioner then filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Quash the information on the ground
that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Citing Macasaet v people, petitioners
maintained that the information failed to allege a particular place within the trial court‘s
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended party
resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
The RTC of Makati, despite finding probable cause, quashed the information, but upon motion
for reconsideration, allowed the prosecution to amend the information and the latter moved to
have the amended information admitted. Petitioners once more moved to have the amended

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information quashed on the same ground but the RTC ruled that the information was sufficient in
form.

Issue: WON the RTC of Makati acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended
information despite the failure to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published
by the accused in Makati.

Ruling: Yes. The venue of the action seeks to prevent undue harassment on the part of the
publisher by the complainant who, if the amended information would be allowed, can file in all
other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. It
is clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to
only two places. 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense, and 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The
amended information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. RA
4363 amended Art 360 of the RPC which sets the venue for the filing of an information for a
libel case. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel in any jurisdiction where the
libellous article was published or circulated. Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the
amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant,
isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. To credit Gimenez‘s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioner‘s website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Art 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent.

For the Court to hold that the amended information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates
to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.

Page 48 of 208
Union Bank v. People,
G.R. no. 192565, 28 February 2012
Ponente: Corona C.J
Topic: Rule 110

By: Aricheta, Paula Joy D.

DOCTRINE: Section 10 and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place

FACTS: Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed
before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on
March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.

In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum
Shopping.She was then8 charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by
falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint
that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used
in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and
that the facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the
Pasay City Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction
over the case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.

When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the
ruling of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that
"venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented".

The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where
any of its essential ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme

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Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy.

ISSUE:Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification was presented to
the trial court?

RULING: The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper
venue for the criminal action.

The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Art. 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction
and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an
affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an
affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.'

The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The
Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under
Art. 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.

If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither

criminal nor civil, a written swor statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where
the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination
of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

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Sps. Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales, G.R. 188056,
January 8, 2013
Topic: Rule 110; Prosecution of Offenses; Preliminary Investigation

By: Norhaisah A. Calbe

Doctrine: In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation
does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor
rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

FACTS:

Herein spouses were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates
in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy
Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After
their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number
of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 182 (DO No. 182),
directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward
all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special
Panel in Manila for appropriate action except that of cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is
covered by another DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 (March 2 Memorandum). Pursuant
to DO No. 182, the complaints of the spouses were forwarded by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse
of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due
process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of

Page 51 of 208
cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule
against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and the March 2 Memorandum. Hence, it posits that the
petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No.
182?

RULING: NO

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely
alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the
petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial
or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure
his subordinates‘ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all
the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or
administrative.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a
quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, stating:

x x x [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or

innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of

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 discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While
the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it
is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.11

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor‘s power
to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is
true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly ends
there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a
legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of
law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person
properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor‘s orders or resolutions.

DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had
promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to ―administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof‖ as expressed in Republic Act
No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1,
Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

Page 53 of 208
Lee vs Lee, August 17, 2013 G.R. No.181658
By: Bautista, Cecille Loie G.
Topic: Rule 110
Doctrine: whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to
consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right
must be respected.
Facts:
Lee Pue Liong aka Paul Lee is the President of Centillion Holdings Inc. (CHI), a company
affiliated with CKC Group of Companies. CKC Group is in a subject of a intra corporate dispute
between the petitioner and his siblings including the respondent herein Chua Pue CHin Lee, a
majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
While the Petitioner and his siblings including the respondent was involved in a pending criminal
case, Petitioner instituted, on behalf of CHI, a petition for the Issuance of a TCT involving a
property owned by CHI. In his Affidavit of Loss, he stated that said TCT was inadvertently lost
or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999 but it had not been found
and is beyond recovery. The RTC granted such petition. Then, the Respondent with his brother
Nixon Lee, filed a petition from the same RTC for it to set aside the said ruling claiming the Paul
Lee knew fully well that CHua Lee (Resp) was in possession of the of the said TCT as she was
the Corporate Treasurer at the time and that the Petitioner merely needs another TCT as he was
planning to mortgage the same to Planters Devt. Bank. Thus, RTC recalled and set aside its
order.
Then, CHua Lee filed a complaint-affidavit stating among others that, Paul Lee made a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, testimony, and affidavit as he
perfectly know that she was in the possession of the said TCT. Then she filed a supplemental
affidavit clarifying that she is accusing the Petitioner of perjury.
At the trial, Atty. Macam appeared as counsel for the private Resp as private prosecutor with the
consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The Petitioner moved to
exclude the Resp and her lawyer contending that perjury is a public offense, thus there is no
private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this
case. Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime against public interest as provided under Section 2,
Chapter 2, Title IV, Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the offended party is
the State alone. Petitioner posited that there being no allegation of damage to private interests, a
private prosecutor is not needed.
MTC denied motion. CA affirmed.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF
PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

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Ruling:
SC held that petitionhas no merit. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty
or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of.
Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is
sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT covering CHI‘s property
and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to
respondent‘s personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties
and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner‘s duplicate
of TCT was only averted by respondent‘s timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the
RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the
MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by both MeTC and
CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to
consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right
must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for
the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.

Page 55 of 208
 RULE 111

G.R. No. 173807, JAIME U. GOSIACO vs. LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA (April
16, 2009) -Reyes, Samantha

Topic: Institution of criminal action; Corporation; BP Blg. 22

Doctrine: Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the
juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation
of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22,
including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.

Facts: On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco invested P8 million with ASB Holdings,
Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with interest
at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000. In exchange, ASB through Ching (Manager), issued
DBS checks for P8 million and P112,000. The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against
DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch. Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the
DBS Bank San Juan Branch to deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the
checks were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for
insufficiency of funds. Despite demand, ASB still failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal
complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC. Meanwhile, petitioner moved that ASB
and its president, Luke Roxas, be impleaded as party defendants. However, this was denied at it
had already been submitted for final decision. MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it
did not absolve her from civil liability. Petitioner still appeals the denial of impleading ASB in
the criminal case. He contends that Rule 111, Sec. 1 precludes him to file a separate civil case
against the corporation if he is not allowed to implead ASB. (Rule 111, Sec. 1(b): The criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.)

Issue: Does Rule 111, Section 1(b) preclude a separate filing of a BP22 case against the
corporation?

Held: No. Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the
juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation
of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including
such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.
● Prior to the amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was
permissible to pursue the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the
corporation itself for the civil liability. However, under the amended rules that the civil

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 and criminal liability attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous
option to directly pursue the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil
obligation the corporation itself is no longer that clear.
● There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be
pursued even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains existing. First, the
possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that
should not be permitted. Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the
amount of the check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend with that
possibility through this case. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best we refer the
matter to the Committee on Rules for the formulation of proper guidelines to prevent that
possibility.
● The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the
civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress if the
plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based on the amount of the check in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and the civil action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option
to file two separate cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the
corporation could evidently be pursued through the civil action alone. Nonetheless, in
petitioners particular case, considering the previous legal confusion on whether he is
authorized to file the civil case against ASB, he should, as a matter of equity, be
exempted from paying the filing fees based on the amount of the checks should he pursue
the civil action against ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason, we likewise find
that petitioner should not be barred by prescription should he file the civil action as the
period should not run from the date the checks were issued but from the date this decision
attains finality. The courts should not be bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
● WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Jaime
U. Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the
amount of the subject checks, in accordance with the terms of this decision. No
pronouncements as to costs. Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the
Committee on Revision of the Rules for the formulation of the formal rules of procedure
to govern the civil action for the recovery of the amount covered by the check against the
juridical person which issued it.

Page 57 of 208
CHIENG VS. SANTOS, GR NO. 169647, AUGUST 31, 2007
TOPIC: Rule 111

By: Charise Villaranda

Doctrine: Upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111
of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure

Facts:

On 17 August 1989, petitioner Antonio Chieng extended a loan in favor of respondent spouses
Eulogio and Teresita Santos. As security for such loan, the respondents executed in favor of
petitioner a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a piece of land situated at West Bajac-Bajac,
Olongapo City.On even date, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Olongapo City.

Eulogio issued several checks in favor of petitioner as payment for the loan. Some of these
checks were dishonored, prompting the petitioner to file a criminal case against respondent
Eulogio for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. During the pre-trial conference of these cases,
petitioner and respondent Eulogio entered into a compromise agreement. However, respondent
Eulogio failed to comply with his obligation in the compromise agreement.

An action for foreclosure of mortgage constituted on respondents‘ real property. Petitioner

alleged that he extended a loan of ₱600,000.00 in favor of respondents for which respondents
executed the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. Despite his repeated demands, respondents failed to
pay the loan.

RTC: ordered the respondents to pay petitioner the amount of P377, 000.00 with interest, plus
attorney‘s fees and costs.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Unsatisfied, respondents filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals/

CA: reversed the decision of the Olongapo City RTC and dismissed the civil case. Citing Bank
of America v. American Realty Corporation, it held that

• a mortgagor-creditor has two choices of action he may either file an ordinary action to
recover the indebtedness or foreclose the mortgage. In short, once a collection suit is filed, the
action to foreclose the mortgage is barred.

Page 58 of 208
• Although Criminal Cases No. 612-90 to No. 615-90 for Violation of BP Blg. 22 before
the RTC were not strictly in the nature of ordinary actions for collection/payment of debts or
loans, the resulting compromise agreement in the said cases between petitioner and respondent
Eulogio, on the matter of payment of the loan, had the effect of settling respondents indebtedness
to petitioner. This is pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted in the
criminal actions. Having been impliedly instituted in the criminal cases, any separate civil action
for the collection or payment of the loan, like the action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage,
can no longer be availed of by petitioner.

Thus, it pronounced that the issue of the payment of the loan, having been the subject of the
Order dated 15 July 1991 of the Olongapo City RTC, Branch 72, in Criminal Cases No. 612-90
to No. 615-90, cannot be re-litigated and that the proper course of action for petitioner was to
seek the execution of the said order

Issue: Whether petitioner, by filing Criminal Cases No. 612-90 to No. 615-90 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent Eulogio, was already barred or precluded from
availing himself of the other civil remedy of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

Ruling: Yes

When petitioner filed the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
respondent Eulogio, petitioners civil action for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
checks was impliedly instituted therein pursuant to Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure.

In the case of Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,
the Court ruled that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for
the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The
reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

(a) x x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Page 59 of 208
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that
the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved.

The impliedly instituted civil action in Criminal Cases No. 612-90 to No. 615-90 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was, in effect, a collection suit or suit for the recovery of the mortgage-
debt since the dishonored checks involved in the said criminal cases were issued by respondent
Eulogio to petitioner for the payment of the same loan secured by the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage.

Consequently, when petitioner filed Criminal Cases No. 612-90 to No. 615-90, he was deemed to
have already availed himself of the remedy of collection suit. Following the rule on the
alternative remedies of a mortgage-creditor, petitioner is barred from subsequently resorting to
an action for foreclosure.

(Note however that the Court in this case rule in favor of the Petitioner for reasons of justice and
equity.)

Page 60 of 208
Co vs Munoz (G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013, Brion)
By Julo, Ria

Doctrine:
The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC) applies to civil actions to
claim civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or
filed separately from the criminal action; hence, its title ‗When separate civil action is
suspended.‖ Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil
liability ex delicto. This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that, that ―every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.‖ Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities:
one criminal and one civil.

The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil
action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action.

Facts:
Munoz (respondent) was charged and arrested for perjury. Co (petitioner) did not waive, institute
or reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz‘s libellous acts.

RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA
which subsequently reversed the decision of RTC.

Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect of the libel suits because that
would violate Muñoz‘ right against double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis
of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. He avers that this principle applies
in general whether the civil action is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. He
also claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of acquittal.

Muñoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC because, as its title
suggests, the provision presupposes the filing of a civil action separately from the criminal
action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the right to separately institute the civil action
arising from the offense, the extinction of the criminal action extinguishes the civil action.

Issue:
The parties‘ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:

(1) Won Co may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the accused‘s
civil liability - Yes
(2) Won Munoz is liable for damages arising from the libelous despite his acquittal. – No.

Page 61 of 208
Held:
(1) Yes. - The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to
enforce the accused’s civil liability.

As a general rule, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action except when the civil action based on delict which shall be deemed extinguished if there is
a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.

The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil
liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if the action is instituted with or filed
separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs
situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal
action; hence, its title "When separate civil action is suspended." Despite this wording, the last
paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto.

This is based on Article 100 of the RPC which states that that "every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable." Each criminal act gives rise to two liabilities: one criminal and one
civil. Reflecting this policy, our procedural rules provide for two modes by which civil liability
ex delicto may be enforced:

(1) through a civil action that is deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action;
(2) through a civil action that is filed separately, either before the criminal action or after, upon
reservation of the right to file it separately in the criminal action.

The offended party may also choose to waive the civil action.

This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does not affect its nature, as may be
apparent from a reading of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC, which
states:

Section 2. Contents of the judgment. – x x x In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

The Rules precisely require the judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the accused
civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended party may avail of the proper remedies to
enforce his claim for civil liability ex delicto.

Page 62 of 208
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA, the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a party –
whether the accused or the offended party – may avail with respect to the judgment:

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect
of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.

To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of
the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused‘s acquittal, the
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto:

(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused is acquitted.

(2) Munoz is not civilly liable because no libel was committed. The CA has acquitted
Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the existence of
malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The SC in another case (Borjal and
Guingguing) shows that privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption
of malice or malice in law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of
malice in fact.

Page 63 of 208
Cenon Teves v. People of the Philippines and Danilo R. Bongalon
G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
Topic: Rule 111
By: Kristine Joyce Alegre

DOCTRINE
The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of previous marriage of the accused
cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.—Settled is the rule that
criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing
of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining
prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he
contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the
bigamous marriage.

(NOTE - The pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question in a prosecution for concubinage or bigamy. (Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis,
336 SCRA 747 [2000])

FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) were married.
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines for
vacations.

In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita
Calderon. Thelma then went to the NSO and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 in
Bulacan.

In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy.
Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006.

Page 64 of 208
However, during the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City,
rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the case for bigamy was decided)
declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma
is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to
Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by a Certification of Finality issued on 27
June 2006.

On August 15, 2007, the RTC found Petitioner Teves guilty for the crime of Bigamy.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. He claims that his criminal liability should be extinguished since
his previous marriage was declared null and void, ―there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus,
there is no bigamy to speak of.‖

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his
case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration
of nullity of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had
already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be held guilty for BIGAMY despite the judicial declaration that his
previous marriage with Thema is null and void? YES

HELD:
YES. The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. CA was correct in affirming
petitioner‘s conviction. Teves‘ contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is wrong.

The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before
the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage

Page 65 of 208
while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of
Nullity of the First marriage AT THE TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

Additionally, here, the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was
only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. If Petitioner‘s argument is allowed, then such would allow the offender to escape
liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the
Information in court. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability of
the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court.

It is also settled that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only
for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December
2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact
to the date of the bigamous marriage.

Page 66 of 208
Joselito R. Pimentel vs. Maria Chrysantine L. Pimentel and People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 172060, September 13, 2010
Topic: Rule 111, Prejudicial Question

Doctrine:
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be pre-emptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
Section 7, Rule 111 however is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action. Here, the civil case was instituted Nov. 5, 2004 but the criminal
case for parricide was instituted August 30, 2004 and raffled to the Quezon City RTC on October
25, 2004. Clearly the civil case was filed later and so is not a prejudicial question.

Facts:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the
RTC Quezon City.
RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 holding that the pendency of the
case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal
case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the
crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue
in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Petitioner filed a petition for
review before this Court.

Page 67 of 208
Issue:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

Ruling: Petition has no merit.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004.
It was raffled to
RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The
RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February
2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.
Respondent‘s petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant
the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be pre-emptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
The issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-
7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage.

Page 68 of 208
TEODORO A. REYES v. ETTORE ROSSI
G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013
Topic: Rule 111
By: Morales, Inah

DOCTRINE: A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must
first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is
to avoid conflicting decisions.

FACTS: On October 31, 1997, petitioner and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems
Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent
executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a
Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes
would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as down payment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00
through four post-dated checks.

Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the
deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks that
would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the
obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31,
1998.

Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes‘ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes
issued and delivered the following nine post-dated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00
drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank.

Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks on their maturity dates in Advanced Foundation‘s
bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment ostensibly
upon Reyes‘ instructions to stop their payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. Rossi likewise deposited two more checks in Advanced Foundation‘s
account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account
Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the
assumption that they would be similarly dishonored.

In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and
damages in RTC QC.

Page 69 of 208
On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the
dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125.

Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802.

Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the criminal
charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as well as
argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because
of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial
question as to the criminal proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial question
that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg.22.?

RULING: No, a prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be
determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions.

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question
are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal
actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to

Page 70 of 208
stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without
funds upon presentment.

On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the
fulfilment of Advanced Foundation‘s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale.
If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have
committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not
necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the
dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the
violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale
was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make
arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of
extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission.

Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the
offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the
conditional sale.

Page 71 of 208
Jose Consing v. People, 15 July 2013
G.R. No. 161075
Topic: Rule 111, prejudicial question
Digest by: Abueg, Raponcel

Doctrine: A civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question
that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.

Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Facts:
Note: This case consists of numerous/simultaneous cases filed against Consing and his mother
(RTC Pasig-1 civil case, RTC Makati-1 criminal case estafa, RTC Makati-1 civil case for
damages, RTC Manila-1 civil case for damages, RTC Cavite-1 criminal case estafa).

Petitioner Rafael Jose Consing Jr. obtained for himself and his mother Cecilia Dela Cruz, various
loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. The loans were secured by a real estate
mortgage (REM) over a parcel of land covered by TCT T-687599 registered under the name of
Dela Cruz.

The REM includes an option to purchase the mortgaged property. So, Unicapital purchased one-
half of the property while the other half was purchased by Plus Builders, a joint venture partner
of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that
the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito
Tan Teng. So they demanded the return of the purchase money from Jose Consing but their
demands were unheeded.

Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig RTC for injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of money, on the ground that he had
acted as a mere agent of his mother.

Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document
against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor‘s Office, which was filed by the
prosecutor as Criminal Case No. 00-120.

Page 72 of 208
Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages.

Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence
of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. So the Makati
RTC suspended its proceedings of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question.

The State filed an MR but was denied. It appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari and upholding the RTC‘s questioned orders.

Later on, Plus Builders filed a civil suit for damages against Consing in Manila RTC.
Another criminal case for estafa was filed against Consing and his mother in Cavite RTC.
Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment in Cavite RTC on the ground of the existence of
a prejudicial question (i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases). This time, the RTC
Cavite handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing‘s motion. It also denied the MR.

Consing filed a petition for certiorari to the CA assailing the Cavite RTC decision. The CA
permanently enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig
and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.

Hence, the State elevated this CA‘s decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed
the CA. The Supreme Court ruled that there exists no prejudicial question in the Cavite criminal
case vis-a-vis the Pasig and Manila civil cases.

Going back to the Makati criminal case, the State sought to apply the same decision by the
Supreme Court.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a prejudicial question exists in the herein civil cases as to suspend the
proceedings in the estafa cases.

Ruling:
NO.
A perusal of Unicapital‘s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud.

It can be seen from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de
la Cruz had acted in a ―wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as

Page 73 of 208
security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a
spurious title.‖

As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, proceed
independently of each other.

Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Page 74 of 208
Gaditano v. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No. 188767, 24 July 2013
Topic: Prejudicial Question
Digest by: Umangay, Karen Abigail P.

Doctrine:The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

Facts: Spouses Argovan Gaditano and Florida Gaditano, who were engaged in the business of
buying and selling beer and softdrink products, purchased beer products from San Miguel
Corporation. They paid through a check which was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite 3 written demands, petitioners failed to make good of the check.
Hence, SMC filed a criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.

Petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank,
Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully
garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished
by payment.

In their Counter-affidavit, the spouses maintained Petitioners assert that the issues they have
raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.

The OPP recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil
Case. The DOJ dismissed the petition for review filed by SMC. CA granted the petition for
certiorari filed by SMC. The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the civil case which is
an action for specific performance and damages involving petitionersÊ joint savings account, and
the criminal case which is an action for estafa/violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involving Argovan's current account.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceedings

Ruling: None.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is

Page 75 of 208
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary
for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished
the P378,000.00 from petitioners' savings account. The subject of the civil case is the
garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioners' savings account.

The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being
conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of
another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to
its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners' savings account. The source of the funds
of petitioners' savings account is no longer SMC's concern. The matter is between petitioners and
AsiaTrust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is whether
petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer products.

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San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez
G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
By: Ruelo, Patricia Ann G.

Topic: Prejudicial Question

Doctrine:
The law provides that prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents
that an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a
civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of
the administrative proceedings.
Facts:
Petitioner San Miguel Properties, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes,
then represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver residential lots
situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque. The transactions were embodied in three
separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were
fully delivered to San Miguel Properties. However, the 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of
land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in
April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not
delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO
Network Management, Inc.
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor. On October 10, 2000,
San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, citing the
pendency of BF Homes‘ receivership case in the SEC.
Issue:
WON the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a
reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question
Held:
Yes. The law provides that prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions
only. However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the
respondents that an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the
resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after
termination of the administrative proceedings. In this case, the court dismissed San Miguel
Properties‘ criminal complaint for violation of PD 957 on the ground that no action could be
filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the

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implementation of the provisions of PD 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the
HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal
action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the
SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been
made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual
signatories in the three deeds of sale. Hence, the public respondent did not act with grave abuse
of discretion when he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings
considering that the issue on the validity of the sale transactions by Orendain in behalf of BF
Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private
respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles
of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioner‘s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not
determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse
an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the
subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal
case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not
under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place.

Page 78 of 208
CHUA vs EXECUTIVE JUDGE GR NO. 20290 October 2, 2013
By Miguel, Maria Therese Louise C.

DOCTRINE: Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory
pleading filed.

FACTS
Petitioner Richard Chua tiled before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a
complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(BP Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. After conducting preliminary investigation, the OCP
found probable cause and, on 22 March 2012, filed forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22
before the MeTC. Consequently, the MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a total of
₱540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. Finding the
said amount to be beyond his means, petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask
whether he could pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total
filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once. The MeTC clerk of court opined that petitioner
could not. Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing fees. Due to non-payment of the required
filing fees, the MeTC designated the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 as undocketed
cases. petitioner filed before the Executive Judge of the MeTC an urgent motion to allow private
complainant to pay filing fee on a per case basis. In it, petitioner reiterated his request that he be
allowed to pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total amount of
filing fees in its entirety. Executive Judge issued an Order denying petitioner‘s Urgent Motion. In
rebuffing petitioner‘s Urgent Motion, the Executive Judge of the MeTC ratiocinated that
granting petitioner‘s plea would constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees that, in turn,
contravenes Section 1(b) of the Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Whether the Executive Judge of the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion, in light of the
facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in refusing petitioner‘s request of paying filing fees on
a per case basis

HELD
YES.
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or
deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22
filed before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is
incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its entirety.
Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the
filing fees of which he is capable of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current
financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases.

Page 79 of 208
We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner‘s request.
The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire₱540,668.00 as one indivisible
obligation, when that figure was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count
of violation of BP Blg.22 filed before the MeTC. Granting petitioner‘s request would not
constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full the
filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.

Page 80 of 208
 RULE 112

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN "KOKOY" ROMUALDEZ, and

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 166510. April 29, 2009.
By: VARGAS, Rose Shahanna G.

DOCTRINE:
The running of prescriptive period to conduct a preliminary investigation will not be
tolled if it is not filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office.

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Information provided that ―the accused Kokoy, being then the elected Provincial
Governor of Leyte, without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-
in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as
Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well
that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the
Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province
of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of
Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte in the amount US $276,911.56 or its
equivalent amount of P5,806,709.50 and P293,348.86 to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.‖

Romualdez moved to quash the information on the ground that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished by prescription. To support his prescription argument, Romualdez
posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the
preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period
from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the
Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. The time span that elapsed
from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond
the said 15 year prescriptive period.

He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because
the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) were null and void. He likewise argued that the Revised Penal Code

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provision that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should
not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code;
the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326)
does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the preliminary investigation by the PCGG tolled the running of the prescriptive
period. - NO.

RULING:
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the 15-year prescriptive
period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise
initiates its investigation. The only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is
that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office, i.e.
Office of the Ombudsman, not the PCGG, as in this case.

The Supreme Court ruled that the initial filing of the complaint or the preliminary
investigation by the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the 15-year prescription
period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power
of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the
President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption cases involving the Marcos
cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing
of the first information is void ab initio for want of authority, and thus could not be considered as
having tolled the 15-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule that the
commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab
initio proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded
any legal effect by this Court.

Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or
resurrected by mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and
evidence had again to be adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be
that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original
complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus
incurable by amendment.

Page 82 of 208
VICENTE P. LADLAD VS. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
Digested by: Salto, Dianne D.

DOCTRINE:

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee
and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.

FACTS:

Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.

On the Beltran Case:

Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the
crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest for
Inciting to Sedition based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally on the occasion of
the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed
the corresponding Information.

The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where he was subjected to a second
inquest, this time for Rebellion. Beltran and some other petitioners were implicated as "leaders
and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The DOJ panel of
prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information.

On the Maza Case:

Based on some letters received, the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear
at the DOJ Office "to get copies of the complaint and its attachment." During the preliminary
investigation, the counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man, named Fuentes, who claimed
to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent

Page 83 of 208
prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present
during the proceedings.

The panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46
others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding Information charging petitioners
and their co-accused as "principals, masterminds, [or] heads" of a Rebellion.

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of
impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated.

The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners‘ motion. Petitioners sought reconsideration and
additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases but to no avail.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid.
2. Whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion
3. Whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution of
the Rebellion case against Maza and the others.
RULING:

On the Beltran Petition, the Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is not Valid.

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances
when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
xxxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Page 84 of 208
The joint affidavit of Beltran‘s arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without
a warrant for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only
have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void.
None of Beltran‘s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had
just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed
Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard
Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest
officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made "in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If the arrest was not properly
effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was
not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee
and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest void.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion.

The allegations in the affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in
an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that
Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he

Page 85 of 208
was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed
specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of
27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran‘s
alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a
rebellion.

ON THE LADLAD AND MAZA PETITIONS:

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted With Irregularities.

Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the
complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence
or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters
of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the affidavits attached
to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing
that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of
Rule 112.

Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the
complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is
none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here,
after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to
petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the
complaints and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the
CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor
Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes‘ affidavit not to petitioners or their
counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors
then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later,
on 17 March 2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG
letters.

On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality

Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the panel of
prosecutors, stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation,
that, "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause, then it‘s up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x."
Petitioners raised this issue in their petition, but respondents never disputed the veracity of this

Page 86 of 208
statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the
absence of probable cause.

Page 87 of 208
Tolentino v. Paqueo, 7 June 2007 GR 150606
By: Josiah David F. Quising

DOCTRINE:
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve
the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by
petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to
quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
FACTS:
Tecklo was charged with the violation of RA 8282, Sec. 22(a) in relation to Sec.28 (e ) for
failing to remit premiums due for his employee to the SSS despite demand.
Tecklo filed for a Motion to Quash arguing that State Prosecutor Tolentino, not being a City or
Provincial Prosecutor, has no authority to commence prosecutor, and opposed by Prosec.
Tolentino. RTC agreed with Tecklo and held that under R.112 no complaint or information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the Provincial or City Prosecutor or Chief State Prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy. The designation given to Prosecutor Tolentino came from the Regional Chief State
Prosecutor [who] is not one of those mentioned exclusively by the Rules to approve in writing
the filing or the dismissal of an information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject
Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor
HELD:
No.

While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that [no] complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal of chief state prosecutor, the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure states that [n]o complaint or information may be filed or dismissed
by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the provision is
couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is
mandatory.

Page 88 of 208
An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 1275 showed that they do not include that of approving the Information filed or
dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.
It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to
approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information
filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a
ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Page 89 of 208
PEOPLE V. DELA TORRE-YADAO
G.R. No. 162144-54 (2012)
Topic: Rule 112, Preliminary Investigation
Gabriel, Roselle A.

Facts: On May 1995, the PNP killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. The police officers involved in the killing were
charged with Murder before the Sandiganbayan which were later transferred to the RTC. The
cases, however, were provisionally dismissed for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for
trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the
private complainants.
Two years later, the PNP Director sought to revive the cases against the respondents by
requesting the DOJ to conduct another preliminary investigation on the strength of affidavits of 2
police officers. The panel of prosecutors found probable cause to hold the accused police officers
liable for murder, resting in the filing of information against them before the RTC.

The private respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC
Order which allowed the renewed preliminary investigation. They also filed with the RTC a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause which was granted and the the cases were
dismissed since the affidavits of the prosecution witness were inconsistent with those they
submitted in the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the Order dismissing the cases but was later
denied by the RTC.

The prosecution claims that the RTC Judge gravely abused her discretion when she set the
motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of
arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses
that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the duty of the RTC Judge was to
determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the
investigating prosecutor's resolution as well as the informations and their supporting documents.
And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order
the investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of probable
cause within five days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, the RTC Judge dug up and adopted the
Ombudsman‘s findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of
robbery in 1996. The RTC Judge gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier
preliminary investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the
cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of the 2 police officers reasonably explained the
prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.

Page 90 of 208
Issues:

1. Whether the RTC Judge erred in conducting a hearing in the determination of probable
cause
2. Whether the RTC Judge erred in dismissing the criminal action outright and not ordering
the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Sec. 6 Rule 112

Ruling:

1) NO. The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs
to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if
it is supported by substantial evidence.

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new
affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, it was not unreasonable for the RTC Judge, for the purpose of determining
probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent
statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the
records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents.

2) NO. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause.

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The
court‘s first option under the above is for it to „immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. That is the situation here: the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

It is only in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause that the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case
here. Discounting the affidavits presented by the prosecution, nothing is left in the record that
presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP Director
Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years after it happened. It would
have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the
five days required of the prosecution by the rules.

Page 91 of 208
PEOPLE V. GABO, G.R. NO. 161083, 3 AUGUST 2010
TOPIC: Preliminary Investigation
Digested by: DE VERA, QUEENIE, S.

DOCTRINE: It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry,
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary
investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is
made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged – is the function of the
investigating prosecutor.
Based on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an
Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of
arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court
within thirty days from the filing of the information.

FACTS:
A fire broke out inside the Plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing
Corporation in Bocaue, Bulacan. Investigations were conducted by the CIDG and the Inter
Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) of the DILG. Pursuant to the letter of CIDG Regional
Director Laxa to the Secretary of Justice, IATF‘s Indorsement and the Letter of BFP Chief
Remedio to the Prosecutor of the DOJ, the following were the accused of destructive arson
before the Office of the Chief State prosecutor, namely: Samson Cua Ting, alias Ding Jian Zhi,
External Vice-President; Wilson Cua Ting, Plant Manager; Edward Ngo Yao (Yao), President of
New Marketing Corporation; Willy So Tan, alias Chen Yi Ming, Vice-President for Operations;
Carol Fernan Ortega, Assistant to the External Vice-President; and John Doe and Peter Doe.
In their defense, respondents submitted a Counter-Affidavit to refute the allegations made
against them.
After Preliminary Investigation, the State prosecutor recommended that the information
for destructive arson be filed against Wilson Ting, Yao, Tan and Ortega. However, the case
against Samson Ting be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to indict him under the charge
and as to the charge of accessories against 3 fire officers, it was remanded to TF-IATF for further
investigation.
An Information for Arson was filed against Wilson Ting, Yao, Tan, Ortega, John Doe
and Peter Doe. Prior to arraignment of the respondents and before warrants of arrest could be
issued, respondents filed a Motion to conducts Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of Probable Cause.

Page 92 of 208
 The RTC issued an Order DISMISSING THE CASE for lack of probable cause as
ordained under Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The RTC applied
the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its observation that the sworn statements
submitted by petitioner and respondents contained contradictory positions. Petitioner filed MR
which was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the CA denied
the said petition and affirmed the RTC Orders in toto. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case on lack of probable
cause as the same is sanctioned under Sec. 6, R112.

RULING:

YES.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the preliminary
investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made
by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.
Sec. 6, R112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC 6. When warrant of arrest may issue·
xxxx
(a) By the Regional Trial Court.·Within (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.He may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order of the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by
the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
As enunciated in Baltazar vs. People, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is
filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as

Page 93 of 208
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those
falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.The
conclusions of the RTC which led to the dismissal of the information against respondents cannot,
in any sense, be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or
capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly debatable, and
may even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave
abuse of discretion.
Based on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an
Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest;
and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within
thirty days from the filing of the information.
The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. To this Court‘s mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of
personally evaluating the supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of
dismissing the case against respondents.
Based on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it dismissed the case
on lack of probable cause as the same is sanctioned under Sec. 6, R112.

Page 94 of 208
 RULE 113

People v. Racho, G.R No. 186529, August 3, 2010

Topic: Rule 113 - Sec. 5
Digested by: Morales, Carol Ann S.

Doctrine: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established
doctrine.

Facts: A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend
the appellant.The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description.
He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would
arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00
p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from
the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his
final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and
invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied
the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen
was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and
with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165,
for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.

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At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his
brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were
false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained
that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to
alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him
to the police station for investigation.

In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the
validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated
sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the arrest is valid.

HELD: NO.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial

question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught
in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the
apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.
Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the
lawful arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the
search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make
the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to
determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable
cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.

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The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

Page 97 of 208
Luz v. People (G. R. No. 197788; February 29, 2012)
Topic: Rule 113
By: MANGUERA, TRICCIE COLEEN A.

DOCTRINE: A warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for
an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense.

FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00
oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle.
- That he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he
told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it.
- The accused was obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was
a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container,
he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the
contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2)
of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
- Arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not guilty to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated, after which, trial ensued.
- During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting
of evidence and extortion.
RTC: Convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution
evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later
found to contain shabu.
CA: Affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were valid.

Page 98 of 208
* Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not
even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there
was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

HELD: NO. First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

- Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.

- Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers
license of the latter. Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides
the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints.

- At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In
fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the
police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence,
it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.

- It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner,
the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under
the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.

- This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the
latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,

Page 99 of 208
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.

- This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

- If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a
traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him
to be arrested for a second time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was
already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search
of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

- It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was
not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.

- Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given
and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner
acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to take out the
contents of his pocket.

- Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)
whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants

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belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily
given.

- In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in
the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against
a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

- Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.

- The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

- The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

Page 101 of 208

People vs. Villareal
G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013
by: Ma. Corazon M. Cristobal

FACTS:
Ø PO3 Renato De Leon was driving a motorcycle on his way home, he saw appellant
from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of
shabu. Thus, PO3 De leon alighted in his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom
recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.
Ø Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165 of dangerus drugs in an Information.
Ø When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
Ø The RTC convicted the appellant as charged upon finding that all the elements of the
crime of illegal poissession of dangerous drugs have been established and gave full faith and
credit to PO3 De Leon‘s testimony.
Ø The CA sustained appellant‘s conviction, finding a clear case of in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC‘s Decision convicting appellant of the
offense charged.

RULING:
YES.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the

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presence or within the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section
5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant
had committed it.20
In both instances, the officer‘s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under
paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been
no lawful warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon‘s testimony on direct examination in
court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th
Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?
PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma‘am.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his
hand, Ma‘am.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma‘am.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Ma‘am.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma‘am.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma‘am.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was a
shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu, Ma‘am. 21
(Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even
with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a
distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and
minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by
appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient
to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant‘s hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be
properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he
(appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per
se of walking along the street and examining something in one‘s hands cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or
at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3
de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Page 103 of 208

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de
Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter‘s previous charge for
the same offense.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from
appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

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 RULE 114

Leviste vs. CA
GR No. 189122, March 17, 2010
Sanchez, Precious Loren L.

Doctrine: Bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion
to grant or deny bail. The appellate court‘s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Leviste was convicted for the
lesser crime of homicide. He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The CA denied petitioner‘s application for bail.

Petitioner now argues that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner‘s
application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
Section 5, Rule 114 was present.

Issue: WON, in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial
court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, the discretionary nature of the grant
of bail pending appeal means that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114?

Ruling: NO.

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios. First scenario, the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph namely, recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration, previous escape from
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification, commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon,
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail, undue risk of committing
another crime during the pendency of the appeal, or other similar circumstances. Second scenario
contemplates the existence of atleast one of the said circumstances.

Bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or

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deny bail. The appellate court‘s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second scenario, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that
are governed by Section 5, Rule 114.

Page 106 of 208

 RULE 115

PROSECUTOR ROBERT M. VISBAL v. JUDGE WENCESLAO B. VANILLA

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651, April 7, 2009
NICHOLE JOHN USON

DOCTRINE: Judge cannot archive case if accused had been arraigned. Trial in absentia should
be conducted.

FACTS:
Respondent Judge Vanilla was charged with grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for
ordering Criminal Case People of the Philippines v. Rodelio Abayon y Benter archived.

The complainant alleged that at the time the respondent judge ordered the criminal case archived,
the witnesses for the Prosecution were able, ready, and willing to testify, with due notice to the
accused after he had been arraigned. The first witness, the complainant himself, had already
testified.

The respondent explained that: in an order dated June 23, 2003, the court reset the hearing to
August 27, 2003 on motion of the public prosecutor because of the absence of the second witness
and of the accused himself; at the hearing on August 27, 2003, the return of the subpoena served
on the accused showed that he had not been properly notified; the prosecution did not present
another witness or inform the court of its desire to summon other witnesses; upon motion of the
prosecution, the case was reset to October 9, 2003 and another subpoena was sent to the accused;
at the hearing on October 9, 2003, the return of the subpoena indicated that the accused changed
address without informing the court; this time the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the
accused for his failure to appear; thus, "there was no setting of the hearing in the meantime, for it
was not known when the accused would be arrested and, for practical purposes, he ordered that
the case be archived to be revived upon the arrest of the accused."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge erred in archiving the case?

RULING:

Yes, respondent's order archiving the case is patently erroneous. Administrative Circular No. 7-
A-92 provides that a criminal case can be archived if after the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
the accused remains at large for six (6) months from delivery of the warrant to the proper peace
officer. However, the court may motu propio or upon motion of any party, archive a criminal

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case when proceedings therein are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because of the
following reasons:

a. the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or to
undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a mental hospital;
b. a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the criminal
case unless the civil and criminal cases are consolidated;

c. an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to and is pending

resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a temporary
restraining or a writ of preliminary injunction; and

d. when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by his
bondsman.

The Order of October 9, 2003 directing the case to be archived was issued on the same day
respondent ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest in violation of the 6-month period
required under the Circular. Neither does the case fall under the circumstances where the court
may archive the case motu propio.

Respondent should have proceeded with the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14 (2) of the
Constitution which authorizes trials in absentia provided the following requisites are present: (a)
that accused has been arraigned; (b) that he has been notified; and (c)that his failure to appear is
unjustified.

All the requisites are present in the case. Accused was arraigned on January 28, 2003. He is
deemed to have received notice of the hearings considering that he has not notified the court of a
change in address. The inability of the court to notify him did not prevent it from continuing with
the trial because accused has waived his right to present evidence and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses who testify against him.

We agree with the OCA's findings that respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law
when he archived Criminal Case No. 2000-08-00-01 immediately after the warrant of arrest was
issued against the accused. He violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, which allows the
archiving of a criminal case if, after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at
large for six (6) months from delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer. Everyone,
especially a judge, is presumed to know the law; when the law is sufficiently basic or
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. However, for full
liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge

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in the performance of official duties must not only found to be erroneous; more importantly, it
must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
motive.

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RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, vs. SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINESR.
GR No. 191411 G.R. No. 191871 July 15, 2013
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

BY: BALDONADO
DOCTRINE: “Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the
aforesaid constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes
within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader
protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more
embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after
the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and
administrative cases.”

FACTS:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for three full terms
which ended on June 30 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects
Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales‘ subordinate and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.On
November 9, 2001, a letter- complaint from People‘s Graftwatch was received by the Office of
the Ombudsman,requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and
agricultural equipment for theprovince in the amount of P 20,000,000.00. After the Case
Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conductedits investigation, a Final Evaluation
Report dated April 16, 2002 upgraded the complaint into a criminal case againstpetitioners.A
Resolution dated March 27, 2003, was prepared by Graft Investigation Officer Butch Cañares,
finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as ―Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act.‖ The Information prepared and
signed by Cañares was submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo Miro who
recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003.

However, the finalapproval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro came only on May
21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Informationwas filed before the Sandiganbayan.Coscolluela

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filed a Motion to Quash on July 9, 2009, arguing that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of caseswas violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after
almost eight (8) years since the complaintwas instituted. Nacionales, Malvas and Amugod later
adopted Coscolluela‘s motion. An Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 27, 2009, was
filed by the respondents on the ground that the Information has to go throughcareful review and
revision before its final approval.The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners‘ Motion to Quash in a
Resolution dated October 6, 2009 for lack of merit. Itheld that the period of delay cannot be
deemed as inordinate and petitioners‘ constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was not
violated. On November 6 and 9, 2009, petitioners filed their respective Motions
forReconsideration, which were later denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
February 10, 2010, for lack ofmerit.Hence, these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners‘ right
to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
HELD:
YES. The Court holds that petitioners‘ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case
had been violated due to the following grounds:First, it is observed that the preliminary
investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete; Second, the delay in the
Ombudsman resolution of the case largely remains unjustified;Third, the Court deems that
petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of
cases; and Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the
lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is

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 also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility.
His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or
extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that
such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As
held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused
despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice
beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more
delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.
For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to
intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice
him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State.
As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the entire
proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in Corpuz should
equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional
provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the

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right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the
periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article
VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The present
constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman‘s
resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused,
it is undeniable that petitioners‘ constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of
cases had been violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the
Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order to ensure that cases
before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible
for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.
Corollarily, for the SB‘s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence
surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal
case against petitioners be dismissed.

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 RULE 117

People v. Dumlao
G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009
RULE 117- Motion to Quash
By: MORALES, Edilyn

Doctrine

Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of

evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.

Facts

Before the Sandiganbayan, an information was filed charging Dumlao, Lao and others with
violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA No. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

It was alleged in the said information that the respondents, who were members of the GSIS
Board of Trustees, entered into a contract of lease-purchase with respondent Lao, a private
person. The said contract provided the concurrence of GSIS to sell Lao a property it had
acquired, consisting of land and building known as the Government Counsel Center for P2
million on an installment with annual interest and amortization. Lao was also authorized to sub-
lease the ground floor of the said building during the lease period, from which he collected
yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization, causing huge disadvantage to the government.

Considering the foregoing, Dumlao filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts alleged
did not constitute an offense. He averred that the prosecution‘s main thrust against him was the
alleged approval by the GSIS Board of the said contract. He contended that it was never
approved as the signatures of his fellow respondents did not appear in the minutes of meeting
therefor, proving their non-participation therein. Additionally, there was no board quorum during
that time to push through with the approval thereof. Hence, since the evidence of the prosecution
was insufficient, he should be deemed innocent.

The Sandiganbayan ruled in Dumlao‘s favor, based on the said insufficiency of evidence.

Issue

Whether the insufficiency of evidence is a ground for motion to quash.

Held

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No. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. The grounds, as
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its
case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.

In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for
insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its
evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecution‘s right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused‘s culpability.
It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not
only did it not consider the ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on
a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus without basis
and untimely.

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Heirs of Honrales v. Honrales
G.R. No. 182651, 25 August 2010
By LAQUI, Xela Leona D.

Doctrine: The court ruled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information
is filed, it is there retained.

Facts:Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales. Bernardino
R. Camba, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an information for
parricide against respondent. An Information was filed against respondent with the RTC of
Manila. Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, ordered respondents arrest.
Respondent moved to reconsider the Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Camba which
recommended the filing of parricide charges. Respondent later also filed a supplement to his
motion. In view of respondents motion for reconsideration, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Alfredo E. Ednave moved that the RTC defer proceedings. Respondent in turn filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest, which the public prosecutor opposed.
The RTC issued an Order deferring proceedings in view of the pendency of respondents
motion for reconsideration. It, however, denied the motion to recall the arrest warrant since
deferment of proceedings does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the
same defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the offense as would
constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court further held that considering the
evidence submitted, it finds probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrant.
The 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Laura D. Biglang-Awa filed a Motion for Leave to
Conduct Reinvestigation with the RTC in light of the affidavit of one (1) Michelle C. Luna,
which respondent, in his motion/supplemental motion for reconsideration, argues will belie the
statement of witness for the complainant, John James Honrales that the shooting of the victim
was intentional.
The RTC issued an Order granting leave to conduct the reinvestigation and authorizing
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to reinvestigate the case.
The heirs of the victim (petitioner heirs) moved before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila for the inhibition of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa from conducting the
reinvestigation and praying that the case be remanded to the court for trial.
City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia issued Office Order reassigning the case to Assistant
City Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay. Both parties appeared but petitioner heirs manifested that
they earlier moved to reconsider Office Order. Respondent moved that he be given up to October
22, 2003 to file an opposition.
Respondent filed his opposition. Counsel for petitioner heirs then manifested that they be
given until November 5, 2003 to submit a reply thereto.
Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order denying petitioners motion to
reconsider Office Order.

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 Petitioner heirs moved that the hearing be suspended on the ground that they have filed a
petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assail the Order. Respondents
counsel objected in view of the presence of their witness Michelle Luna. Thus, the hearing
proceeded. After the hearing, petitioner heirs moved for the cancellation of the December 10,
2003 hearing and filed a formal motion to that effect.
Respondent filed a Motion and Manifestation praying that the case be submitted for
resolution or, in the alternative, that it be set for final clarificatory hearing.
Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order denying the prayers for suspension
and submission of the case for resolution and instead set the hearing on December 22, 2003.
Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a Resolution setting aside the October 28, 2002
Resolution and recommending the withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of
an information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. City Prosecutor Garcia
approved the Resolution. Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay filed with the RTC a motion to
withdraw the information for parricide.
While the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information for
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila.
Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition
for review with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense. They likewise filed an
Opposition to Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC arguing that there was no final
resolution yet downgrading the charge against respondent that would justify withdrawal of the
Information for parricide.
Petitioner heirs filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Proceedings with the RTC to
give time to the DOJ Secretary to resolve their petition for review.
The DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, dismissed the petitions for
review assailing (1) the Order dated November 17, 2003 of Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay
denying the urgent motion to reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and (2) the Resolution dated
December 19, 2003 finding probable cause against respondent for reckless imprudence resulting
in parricide, instead of intentional parricide as charged.Petitioner heirs moved to reconsider the
Resolution, and the RTC of Manila issued an Order on April 14, 2004, holding in abeyance the
resolution of the pending incidents in the parricide case in view of the said motion for
reconsideration.The DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Zuo, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Thus, Judge Soriaso of the RTC of Manila issued an Order on May 28, 2004
considering the motion to withdraw the Information submitted for resolution.
Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, however, petitioners again
filed a petition for review with the DOJ on June 14, 2004, assailing said denial. Said petition,
however, was dismissed with finality by the DOJ in a Resolution.
Contending that the petition for review before the DOJ questioning the downgrading of
the offense was no longer an impediment to the resolution of the pending Motion to Withdraw

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Information, respondent promptly filed with the RTC a Manifestation with Reiteration to
Resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information.
On August 5, 2004, petitioner heirs appealed the dismissal of their petitions to the Office
of the President (OP). Thus, on August 6, 2004, Judge Soriaso reiterated her previous ruling to
hold in abeyance the resolution of the motion to withdraw in deference to the appeal taking its
course before the OP.
In the meantime, respondent was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to the
charge of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide.Respondent filed with the RTC a motion
seeking to dismiss the parricide charges against him. He cited his arraignment and conviction by
the MeTC as grounds for the dismissal of the case against him.
Petitioner heirs filed with the MeTC a motion to nullify the proceedings held on October
11, 2004. They claimed that they were denied procedural due process since October 11, 2004
was not the agreed date for respondents arraignment but October 18, 2004. They also argued that
the Information before the MeTC was invalid. The OP dismissed petitioner heirs appeal of the
DOJ Resolution. Petitioner heirs promptly moved to reconsider the OPs dismissal of their appeal,
but their motion was denied.
Respondent moved for Judge Soriasos inhibition alleging bias in favor of the prosecution
as shown by her continued inaction on his motion to withdraw Information.

Issue: Whether the case may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right
against double jeopardy?

Ruling: YES, The case may be remanded to the RTC without violating the right against double
jeopardy.
It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the withdrawal of
the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest without making an independent
assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the case
may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right against double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded
to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or

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frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information. x x x x
Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC.
In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr.,The court ruled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which
the Information is filed, it is there retained.
Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge
for intentional parricide pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the
criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the
exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is therefore absent.

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JASON IVLER vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
By: Marianne Jalotjot

Doctrine: Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution

for the Same Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts.

Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce‘s husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce‘s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. After unsuccessfully
seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the (RTC), in a petition for certiorari,
which affirmed the decision of the MeTC.

Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Issues: Whether petitioner‘s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

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Ruling: YES. SC hold that the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts.

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony.

The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

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PNB vs SORIANO
G.R. No. 164051, October 3, 2012
By: Bustamante, Anne Murphy N.

RULE 117

DOCTRINE: Requisites for double jeopardy to set in: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before
a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when
the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

Facts: PNB extended a credit facility in the form of a Floor Stock Line (FSL) in the increased
amount of Thirty Million Pesos (₱30 Million) to Lisam Enterprises, Inc. [LISAM], a family-
owned and controlled corporation that maintains Current Account No. 445830099-8 with
petitioner PNB.

Soriano is the chairman and president of LISAM, she is also the authorized signatory in all
LISAM‘s Transactions with [PNB].

On various dates, LISAM made several availments of the FSL in the total amount of
₱29,645,944.55, the proceeds of which were credited to its current account with PNB. For each
availment, LISAM through Soriano, executed 52 Trust Receipts (TRs). In addition to the
promissory notes, showing its receipt of the items in trust with the duty to turn-over the proceeds
of the sale thereof to [PNB].

PNB‘s authorized personnel conducted an actual physical inventory of LISAM‘s motor vehicles
and motorcycles and found that only 4 units covered by the TRs remained unsold. LISAM
should have remitted to PNB. Despite several formal demands, respondent Soriano failed and
refused to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicles to the prejudice of PNB.

PNB, filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City charging
Soriano with fifty two (52) counts of violation of the Trust Receipts Law, in relation to Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

City Prosecutor of Naga City finds prima facie evidence that respondent LILIAN SORIANO is
probably guilty of violation of the Trust Receipt Law, in relation to Article 315 par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, let therefore 52 counts of ESTAFA be filed against the respondent.

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Consequently, the same office filed Informations against Soriano for fifty two (52) counts of
Estafa (violation of the Trust Receipts Law).

Meanwhile, PNB filed a petition for review of the Naga City Prosecutor‘s Resolution before the
Secretary of the DOJ.

RTC ordered the dismissal of one of the criminal cases against Soriano.

On the other litigation front, the DOJ, reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the Naga
City Prosecutor. PNB filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Appellate court
did not find grave abuse of discretion in the questioned resolution of the DOJ, and dismissed
PNB‘s petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the reinstatement of Criminal Cases violate the constitutional provision against
double jeopardy.

HELD: No. The reinstatement of the criminal cases against Soriano will not violate her
constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Section 7,17 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for double jeopardy to set
in: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the present case, the withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a categorical dismissal
thereof by the RTC. Double jeopardy had not set in because Soriano was not acquitted nor was
there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the fifty one (51) cases against her. It stands to
reason therefore that the fifth requisite which requires conviction or acquittal of the accused, or
the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met.

On both issues, the recent case of Cerezo v. People, is enlightening. In Cerezo, the trial court
simply followed the prosecution‘s lead on how to proceed with the libel case against the three
accused. The prosecution twice changed their mind on whether there was probable cause to
indict the accused for libel. On both occasions, the trial court granted the prosecutor‘s motions.
Ultimately, the DOJ Secretary directed the prosecutor to re-file the Information against the
accused which the trial court forthwith reinstated. Ruling on the same issues raised by PNB in
this case, we emphasized, thus:

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x x x. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court
should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice. It is the court‘s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. x x x.

In this case, it is obvious from the order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC
judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to
hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the
prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to
Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain,
undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.

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Braza v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 195032 February 20, 2013
By: Buenaventura, Marie Melanie O.

Topic: Rule 117; Double Jeopardy

Doctrine: For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass or
include those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibit refers to identity of
elements in the two offenses.
Facts:
- The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006.
- Four (4) out of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK
Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK).
- After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and
Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman.Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN
Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza being the president of FABMIK,
was impleaded as one of the respondents.
- On March 23, 2007, the fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Repor recommending the
filing of charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the DPWH officials and
employees in Region VII and the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu, and private
contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and Development, Inc.
- This report was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas) for
the conduct of a preliminary investigation and was docketed therein as OMB-V-C-07-
124-C, entitled PACPO-OMB-Visayas v. Lala, et al.
- After the preliminary investigation, the OMB Visayas issued its Resolution, dated
January 24, 2008, finding probable cause to indict the concerned respondents for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
- Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials of DPWH Region VII, the
officials of the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private contractors, FABMIK
President Braza and GAMPIK Board Chairman Gerardo S. Surla.
- On June 6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel
abroad. He entered a plea of ―not guilty.‖
- On November 13, 2008, Braza filed a manifestation9 to make of record that he was
maintaining his previous plea of ―not guilty‖ without any condition.
- During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its
August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the case.

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- According to the anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect that no independent canvass
was conducted and that the charge of overpricing was based on falsified documents were
serious reasons enough to merit a reinvestigation of the case.
- Braza filed his Manifestation , dated February 2, 2009, informing the Sandiganbayan of
his intention to abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the
prosecution would merely use the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a
second unbridled fishing expedition to cure the lack of probable cause.
- On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion in support of the abandonment of
reinvestigation with a plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further reinvestigation
of the case would only afford the prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation
which would be vexatious, oppressive warranting its dismissal with prejudice.
- After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution,
dated May 4, 2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the finding of probable
cause but modified the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 301914 to violation
of Sec. 3(e) of the same law.
- Accordingly, the prosecution filed its Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information16 on May 8, 2009.
- Braza averred that he could not be arraigned under the second information without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
- The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution admitting the Amended
Information, dated May 4, 2009, (second Information) and denying Braza‘s plea for
dismissal of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed
in double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second information because
his previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was regularly
arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second information charged
an offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the
original offense charged.
- Braza posits that double jeopardy has already set in on the basis of his ―not guilty‖ plea in
the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the second
Information. He claims that his arraignment was unconditional because the conditions in
the plea were ineffective for not being unmistakable and categorical. He theorizes that the
waiver of his constitutional guarantee against double jeoardy was not absolute as the
same was qualified by the phrase ―as a result of the pending incidents.‖ He argues that
even granting that his arraignment was indeed conditional, the same had become simple
and regular when he validated and confirmed his plea of ―not guilty‖ by means of a
written manifestation which removed any further condition attached to his previous plea.
- The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) retorts that the withdrawal of the first
information and the subsequent filing of the second information did not place Braza in
double jeopardy or violate his right to speedy disposition of the case. The OSP reasons
that Braza waived his right to invoke double jeopardy when he agreed to be conditionally

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 arraigned. It further argues that even granting that the arraignment was unconditional,
still double jeopardy would not lie because the charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 in the second information is a different offense with different elements from that of
the charge of violation of Sec. 3(g) in the first Information.
Issue: whether or not there is double jeopardy.
Held:
No.
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting ―provisional‖ or
―conditional‖ arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the Revised Internal
Rules of the Procedure of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Procedure, this Court
had tangentially recognized such practice in People v. Espinosa provided that the alleged
conditions attached to the arraignment should be ―unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened.
A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the arraignment of Braza
under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere accommodation in his favor
to enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in
absentia in case he would abscond.
The Sandiganbayan‘s June 6, 2008 Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions for
Braza‘s arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information would be
amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy and shall
allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information without losing his right to question the
same.
It appeared that these conditions were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer by the anti-graft
court. He was afforded time to confer and consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily
submitted himself to such conditional arraignment and entered a plea of ―not guilty‖ to the
offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly laid out.
Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to conveniently
avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second information.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza cannot
plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the second
information because the offense charged therein is different and not included in the offense
charged under the first information.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution.
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 11728 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double jeop ardy, the
accused has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy must have

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attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.
Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if the first information
charged an offense different from that charged in the second information since both charges
arose from the same transaction or set of facts.
Braza claims that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses
made out from a single act. It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether
aware, of the ruling in Suero v. People where it was held that the same criminal act may give rise
to two or more separate and distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as
there is variance between the elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine of double
jeopardy is a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused from the risk of being
prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another and
different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act
is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the same transaction.
A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and those of violation
of Sec. 3(e) of the same law, however, will disclose that there is neither identity nor exclusive
inclusion between the two offenses.
Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law
share a common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not inclusive of the
former.
For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally encompass or include
those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the
two offenses.
In this case, there‘s no double Jeopardy.

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People v. Lagos (G.R. No. 184658; 6 March 2013)
Topic: Rule 117
Digest by: Ferreras, Marjorie

Doctrine: It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to
the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

Facts: A confidential informant (CI) appeared before the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the PNP. The CI relayed that AIDSOTF, assembled and briefed the
team that would conduct the buy-bust operation. PO 2 Frando was assigned to act as the poseur-
buyer and PO2 Cubian as back-up, while the rest of the team members were to serve as perimeter
security. The CI then called respondent Estacio, informing him that a prospective buyer wished
to purchase 30 tablets of ecstasy with a total value of ₱50,000.

At 11:00 p.m. of the same day, PO2 Frando, accompanied by the CI, approached Estacio. Estacio
opened the doors of the vehicle and introduced his two companions, Carlo and Jonathan (later
identified as herein respondents Jonathan Dy and Carlo Castro), to PO2 Frando and the CI.
Respondent Castro handed PO2 Frando one sealed plastic sachet containing several pink pills.
The latter gave the "boodle" money to respondent Dy and immediately removed his baseball cap,
which is the prearranged signal.

PO2 Frando introduced himself as a police officer and frisked respondent Dy and was able to
recover the buy-bust money. Respondents were then escorted to the AIDSOTF office in Camp
Crame, where they identified themselves as Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino, Carlo Castro y
Cando, and Jonathan Dy y Rubic. As officer in charge of the inventory of the evidence seized,
PO2 Cubian turned over the plastic sachet to PO3 Jose Rey Serrona, who was in charge of the
investigation. The 30 pink pills were found positive for ecstasy.

An Information was filed against respondents for the sale of dangerous drugs, in violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr.
of the Quezon City RTC. Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial
ensued, and the prosecution presented its evidence, including the testimonies of four witnesses:
PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, Police Senior Inspector Manaog, and PO3 Serrona. After the
prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, respondents filed a Motion for leave of
court to file their demurrer, as well as a Motion to resolve their Petition for Bail. Judge Sagum
issued a Resolution denying both the Petition for Bail and the Motion for leave of court to file a
demurrer. Respondent Estacio then sought the inhibition of Judge Sagum. Presiding Judge

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Sagum inhibited himself from the case. The case was re-raffled to public respondent Judge
Lagos.

Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order granting respondents‘ Petition for Bail and allowing
them to file their demurrer. He issued the second assailed Order, acquitting all the accused. On
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the People, he issued the third assailed Order denying the
above motion and granting the Motion to Withdraw Cash Bonds filed by the accused. In granting
the demurrer filed by the accused, respondent judge surmised that it was the CI who had initiated
the negotiation of the sale and should have thus been presented at trial.

Private respondents counter that the Petition is dismissible on the ground of double jeopardy and
is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Issue: WON Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite clear proof of the elements of the illegal sale, the
existence of the corpus delicti, and the arrest in flagrante delicto.

Ruling: Yes. The grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is

entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule,
however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of
judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65. The Supreme Court
is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical
or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event,
the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.

Here, the accused were caught in flagrante delicto and AIDSOTF police officers witnessed the
actual sale. The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is
proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the seller‘s receipt of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. Unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were
not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit.

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Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who had personal knowledge of the identity
of the seller, the initial offer to purchase the ecstasy pills, and the subsequent acceptance of the
offer. It is clear from the testimonies of PO2 Frando and the other arresting officers that they
conducted the buy-bust operation based on the information from the CI. However, the arrest was
made, not on the basis of that information, but of the actual buy-bust operation, in which
respondents were caught in flagrante delicto engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Requiring the CI to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary to jurisprudential doctrine,
since the Court has long established that the presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the
prosecution of drug cases. The testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it would be merely
corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and
who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.

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Digital Telecommunications Philippines v. Cantos, G.R. 180200, 25 November 2013
Ponente: Del Castillo J.
Topic: Rule 117

By: Aricheta, Paula Joy D.

Facts:By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 7678, petitioner was granted a legislative franchise to
install, operate and maintain telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines. Upon
seeking the renewal of its Mayor‘s Permit to operate and provide telecommunications service in
Balayan, Batangas, petitioner was informed by then Mayor Martinez, Jr. that its business
operation would be restrained should it fail to pay the assessed real property taxes. And as
petitioner failed to pay, the Chief of the Permit and License Division of Balayan, Batangas, Mr.
Martinez, issued a Cease and Desist Order enjoining petitioner from further operating its
business.

Petitioner thus promptly filed a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order before the
RTC of Balayan, Batangas against the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared that the issuance of the Cease and Desist
Order was without legal basis. The RTC also ruled that petitioner is only liable to pay real
property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise.

The mayor then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it wasdismissed outright.In June
2002, respondent, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas,issued
seven Warrants of Levy certifying that several real properties of petitioner situated in
theMunicipalities of Ibaan, San Juan, Sto. Tomas, Cuenca, Nasugbu, Balayan, and Lemery, all in
theProvince of Batangas, are delinquent in the payment of real property taxes.
Hence, the properties would be advertised and sold at public auction within 30 days from
petitioner‘s receipt of the warrants.Digital sought the lifting of warrants of levy and invoked the
foregoing final decision in the Civil Case. Digital claimed that said decision in the Civil Case
was binding on the Provincial Treasurer. But since the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner
filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order

Rtc - (indirect contempt case) dismissing petitioner‘s Petition for Indirect Contempt and
Prohibition against respondent (Civil Case No. 4051), it ruled that since respondent was not a
party in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no duty to render obedience to the Decision therein.
Furthermore, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 3514 and Civil
Case No. 4051, the former being an action in personam, the Decision in said case binds only the
parties impleaded therein and their successors in interest, which do not include the respondent.
Hence, the petitioner appealed to ca via certiorari but was dismissed also stating that First, it

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noted that the dismissal of the case for indirect contempt by the RTC amounted to an acquittal
from which an appeal is not allowed. In any case, respondent‘s act of issuing the warrants of levy
did not constitute indirect contempt in Civil Case No. 3514 since the final Decision issued in said
case was not directed against him but to the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License
Division of Balayan, Batangas.

The respondent reiterated the CA‘s ruling that the RTC Decision amounts to an acquittal, hence,
an appeal does not lie.Arguing against it, petitioner contends that the rule on double jeopardy
will not bar it from pursuing its appeal because this is not a criminal case and respondent is not
tried as an accused.,

Issue: Whether or not a dismissal for contempt barsbars a second prosecution?

Ruling: yes but… respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.

The Court states that Contempt is not a criminal offense. However, a charge for contempt of
court partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly
apply to a prosecution for contempt. In fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of theRules of Court provides
that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as incriminal cases.
The Court has held that an alleged contemnor should be accorded the same rightsas that of an
accused. Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondentamounts to an
acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution.

Be that as it may, respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court isdefined as a
disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies
not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court‘s order, but such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or
dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation.

In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public
auction sale of petitioner‘s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of
the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a
ministerial function which he is bound to perform

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DISINI, JR., ET. AL. VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET. AL., GR NO. 203335 11
FEBRUARY 2014

Topic: Rule 117

By: Norhaisah A. Calbe

DOCTRINE:

Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175
and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.

Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy, and, in respect to these,
is void and unconstitutional.

FACTS:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a
boon to the need of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication.
But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who
would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter
by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations.

The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet.

For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent

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these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime
Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the
Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on
October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime
law until further orders.

ISSUE: Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA
10175 constitutional?

HELD:

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single
set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and
the Revised Penal Code. When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act
10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy;

There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is
again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the

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same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims
that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy.

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription,
and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.

Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009‘s (ACPA) scope
so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. ACPA‘s definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means."

Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

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Los Banos vs Pedro, April 22, 2009 G.R. No. 173588
By: Bautista, Cecille Loie G.
Topic: 117
Doctrine:
Facts:
Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the
COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for
Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117,
Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case
saying that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually
consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to
object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed
upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set
Pedro‘s arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC‘s mandated
reopening.
The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for
Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the
CA's decision was reversed.
Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.

Issue: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

Ruling:
No, Sec 8, RUle 117 is not applicable. The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional
Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself
has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not
follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117
applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground
that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of
a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands,
on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.

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 RULE 118

G.R. Nos. 174507-30, ATTY. EMELITA H. GARAYBLAS vs. THE HON. GREGORY
ONG (August 3, 2011) - Reyes, Samantha

Topic: Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference

Doctrine: Pursuant to Rule 118, Sec. 3, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the
accused if the following concur: (1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND (2)
counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse.

Facts: Petitioner Atty. Emelita H. Garayblas was the principal legal counsel and Atty. Renato
Dela Cruz was collaborating counsel in this case. Accused Gen. Ramiscal was arraigned and the
Sandiganbayan 4th Division set the pre-trial for April 6, 2006 in Davao City. However, SB reset
the schedule and moved it to April 27. Garayblas opposed this but the SB denied it stating that
they should adjust their schedules instead. Garayblas failed to attend due to health reasons
(severe headache, body weakness and sluggishness due to diabetes and high blood pressure),
while Dela Cruz failed to attend because he was in another pre-trial involving the same accused
with the SB 2nd Division. Pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 118, they were ordered to pay P10,000 each
and to pay the travel expenses of the court personnel to travel to Davao City.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan 4th Division acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing
such penalties.

Held: Yes. Pursuant to Rule 118, Sec. 3, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the
accused if the following concur: (1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference AND (2)
counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse. There is no cavil that petitioners failed to appear at
the pre-trial conference in Davao City on April 27, 2006. The crux of the matter in this case then
is, did petitioners present an acceptable or valid excuse for said non-appearance? YES.
● ATTY. GARAYBLAS –The Court can understand that a person suffering from
confusion, difficulty in concentrating, blurred vision, fatigue, and others, would be hard
put to attend a hearing, much less have the clarity of mind to think or worry about finding
another lawyer to substitute for her. Indeed, it would not be reasonable to expect her to
have been able to make the necessary arrangements for another lawyer to attend in her
stead. Consider, further, the importance of having counsel who is the most well-versed on
the facts of the case, to be the one attending a pre-trial conference. This is because ―Pre-
trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. x x x during
pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues
of the trial would be. This being so, it is not quite prudent to send in a new lawyer, who

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 has not had ample time to fully familiarize himself or herself with the facts and issues
involved in the case, to attend a pre-trial conference. Sending to the pre-trial conference a
new lawyer who is not very knowledgeable about the case would most probably lead to
such careless preparation which the Court abhors. Moreover, respondents do not refute
Atty. Garayblas' claim that before the pre-trial conference, she had never been absent for
a hearing before the SB 4th Division. This circumstance should be taken in her favor, as
it shows that she is not in the habit of feigning illness to deliberately delay the
proceedings.
● ATTY. DELA CRUZ – His non-appearance at the pre-trial conference was also
excusable. There were hearings for their client's case in two separate divisions of the
Sandiganbayan on the very same date in two distant locations. To ensure representation
for their client at the hearings in both divisions of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners agreed
that Atty. De la Cruz would attend the one before the Second division, while Atty.
Garayblas would attend the one before the SB 4th Division in Davao City. It appears that
Atty. De la Cruz was not fully apprised of the fact that his co-counsel would not be able
to attend the pre-trial conference. It is understandable why Atty. De la Cruz could not
have abandoned the hearing before the Second Division so he could attend the pre-trial in
Davao City. It was already too late in the day for Atty. De la Cruz to change plans and to
notify the Second Division that he would be absent so he could attend the pre-trial in
Davao City instead of the hearing at the Second Division.
● Petitioner Atty. De la Cruz has presented a valid and acceptable excuse, for which he
should not be found liable under Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On the other hand, petitioner Atty. Garayblas showed some lapse in judgment,
not to mention discourteous behavior, in not informing the SB 4th Division at the earliest
possible time of her illness and inability to attend said pre-trial conference.
● WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan 4th
Division's Order dated June 14, 2006 and its Resolution dated August 10, 2006 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25122, 25125-29, 25133, 25135, 25137-38, are hereby MODIFIED
by DELETING the fine and the order for both petitioners to pay part of the traveling
expenses of the court. Instead, petitioner Atty. Garayblas is hereby given a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

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 RULE 119

53. MARI v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 187728, 12 September 2011

Topic: Rule 119

By: Charise Villaranda

DOCTRINE: The only delay that may be excluded from the time limit within which trial must
commence are those resulting from the proceedings concerning the accused. The change of
venue proceeding can only be excluded if the accused was the one who filed for it, contrary to
what happened in this case.

FACTS: On 11 June 2008, an Information for Rape was filed in RTC Sogod stating that
petitioner AAA was raped by respondent on 10 October 2004 at her boarding house in Sogod,
Leyte. On 27 June 2008, respondent was committed to detention through voluntary surrender. On
30 June 2008, the RTC set the arraignment to 31 July 2008, but was cancelled and reset to 20
August 2008. On that date, nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC reset the
arraignment to 31 October 2008 with an order that the case will be dismissed if public prosecutor
or is assistant fails to prosecute on that date. On 28 October 2008, petitioner moved for
cancellation of hearing manifesting that a private prosecutor had been granted authority to
prosecute by Provincial Prosecutor, and praying that the arraignment be cancelled due to the
pendency of petitioner‘s petition for transfer of venue in SC.

The private prosecutor did not appear on said hearing date. The 31 October 2008, the hearing
proceeded and respondent was arraigned in the presence of Provincial Prosecutor designated by
the RTC. Pre-trial was set to 24 November 2008. On that date, private prosecutor moved for
cancellation of hearing on the ground of the pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. Thus,
respondent moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute, but was denied. On said date,
the RTC terminated pre-trial and set the trial to 12 December 2008. On that date, no one
appeared for the prosecution. Thus, the hearing was reset to 16 January 2009. Again, on that
date, private prosecutor urgently moved for cancellation of hearing stating that it was only on 14
January 2009 that he was notified of the 16 January 2009 hearing. Thus, the RTC on 16 January
2009 dismissed the case for failure of prosecution to prosecute. Petitioners moved to reconsider
but was denied on 16 March 2009. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON The accused right to speedy trial is violated - YES

HELD:

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Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge dismissed the case too hastily. According to S10 of
Speedy Trial Act, now embodied in S3 R119:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:

x x x x

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases
or transfer from other courts.

Court disagrees, a reading of the rule would show that the rule shows that the only delay that
may be excluded from the time limit are those resulting from the proceedings concerning the
accused. The change of venue proceeding can only be excluded if the accused was the one who
filed for it, contrary to what happened in this case.

Further, records show that the 30-day limit in R119 S1 had already been breached. SC agrees
with the RTC in observing that the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying the
proceedings by failing to appear on the hearings set by the court, filing a motion for cancellation
of hearing on the day of the hearing itself, or not even bothering to appear on the date they set for
hearing on their motion.

Petitioners are also mistaken that the mere pendency of their petition for change of venue would
interrupt the proceedings before the trial court. It is the same as when a petition for certiorari is
filed; it does not interrupt the proceedings before the trial court unless a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order is given.

Further, in recent jurisprudence, in determining w/n the accused is deprived of the right to
speedy trial, the following factors are to be considered:

a. Duration of the delay

b. Reason for such delay
c. Assertion of the right (to speedy trial) or failure to assert it
d. Prejudice caused by such delay

In determining the right to a speedy trial, the courts are required to do more than a mathematical
equation.

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In this case, the accused was already deprived of liberty for 4 months when he was first
incarcerated by the MCTC, and again for 6 months after the Information was filed before the
RTC following the Adm. Order. Verily, the accused was already deprived of liberty and it is
vexatious to delay the proceedings by a mere motion for change of venue, especially so if there‘s
no WPI or TRO. Petition is DISMISSED.

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Go vs People (G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE)
By: Julo

Doctrine:
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to
preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It
cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a
prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused
of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.

To take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court
where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution
witness‘ deportment and properly assess his credibility.

The right of confrontation is held to apply specifically to criminal proceeding and to have a two-
fold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-
examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.

Facts:
Go was charged before MeTC for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC. It was alleged
that Go wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Upon arraignment,
petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion
to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping (representative of Highdone Co. Ltd.), alleging that he
was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos and that upon
doctor's advice he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. MeTC
granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical
Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Go sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting
Go to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The prosecution
elevated the case to the CA. The CA held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon
the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because
no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in
any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining

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witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through
counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.

Issue:
Won the CA erred and committed a grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the taking of oral
deposition of Li Luen Ping abroad.

Held:
Yes – CA committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered

Under Section 15, Rule 119.

The pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than
the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the
motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia.

RTC's ratiocination in this wise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the
provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially
provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor

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and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, the
Court finds no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."

In the case of People v. Estenzo, the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness
testifying in open court, thus:

"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to
secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to
an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot
be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers."
There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables the judge as
trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the
witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the
physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory,
and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be
observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x"

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose:
(1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-
examination, and
(2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.

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The Court explained in People v. Seneris that the constitutional requirement "insures that the
witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it
forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood
and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and
assess his credibility."

As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as
facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination," it is properly viewed as
a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials.

Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the
initial trial proceedings before the MeTC. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile
constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with
zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for
the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first
instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines
anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness
to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the
testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other party.

Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the MeTC prior
to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own
failure by pleading for a liberal application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized
that while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of
witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the
accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is
to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against
him face to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution
witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and
deposition.

Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking
the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order
allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than
the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.

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People of the Philippines v. Feliciano Anabe y Capillan
G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010
Topic: Rule 119 [see: Sec. 17 - Discharge of accused to be state witness]
By: Kristine Joyce Alegre

Doctrine:
● The testimony of a state witness must be received with great caution and carefully
scrutinized. The rule is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-
conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and
without corroboration, be regarded as proof of a moral certainty that the latter committed
the crime. It must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable
testimony and strong circumstances, and must be to such an extent that its
trustworthiness becomes manifest.
● The state witness cannot simply allege everything left unproved and automatically
produce a conviction of the crime charged against the remaining accused. Corroboration
of the account of the state witness is key. It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the
testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in its material points.

Facts

Feliciano Anabe (ANABE) and Felicita Generalao (FELICITA) in conspiracy with ―another
person,‖ were charged with robbery with homicide and destructive arson. Both pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment.

Felicita was the helper of CHAN, the brother in law of the victim, Lam Tiong Uy (Uy). Uy
stayed in the Chan Family‘s house in QC while the family was on vacation abroad. It was here
where the crime happened.

Felicita turned state witness. She narrated that she was asked by Anabe to repair a TV in the
house. After an hour, she entered the dining room and this is where she saw Anabe holding

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a knife. She also claimed that she saw the body of the Uy on the floor covered with a mat, along
with a bloodstained knife on the table.

Further, she said that Anabe admitted to killing UY and that during that event she was
subsequently ordered by Anabe, together with another helper, Conrada, to leave the house,
otherwise they would be suspected of killing Uy. Anabe then hailed a taxi which the three of
them boarded after he had gone back to the house to set it on fire. They departed the house for
Masbate and after, she was brought by the appellant to Butuan. While there, she narrated the
evrnts to her family and she was then brought to Bombo Radyo where she surrendered. Other
witnesses claimed that the Tag Heuer watch of victim Uy was worn by Anabe and that the ring
and bracelet of Uy‘s daughter, was worn by Felicita at the police station after their arrest.

As Felicita turned state witness, the RTC convicted Anabe of the crime of robbery with homicide
and destructive arson and ordered him to pay civil indemnity and moral damages.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Upon appeal to the SC, Anabe claims that Felicita was merely motivated by her desire to
exculpate herself. He argues that there was no corroborative evidence to substantiate Felicita‘s
testimony on material points.

Issue:
1. WON Anabe was guilty of the crimes of Robbery with Homicide and Destructive
Arson? NO. Crime modified to qualified theft.
2. WON Felicita‘s testimony on appellant‘s confession, being uncorroborated, can be given
full credence? NO. Must have been corroborated as stated under Sec 17. Rule 119

Held:
1. No. The crime was modified to qualified theft. Not all elements of robbery with homicide
were proven. Further, Felicita’s account on appellant’s authorship of destructive arson does not
suffice to convict him.

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2. No. Felicita’s testimony on Anabe’s alleged confession is treated as circumstantial
evidence and hence, corroboration is required. (Does not fall under exception since she was not
an eyewitness)

This case does not fall under the exception to the rule as Felicita is not an eyewitness. It is a
requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in its material
points.

The state witness cannot simply allege everything left unproved and automatically produce a
conviction of the crime charged against the remaining accused. Corroboration of the account
of the state witness is key.

―Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.—When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the
court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall
be inadmissible in evidence.‖ (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

❖ EXCEPTION WHEN AN UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF STATE

WITNESS IS DEEMED SUFFICIENT = WHEN THE STATE WITNESS IS AN
EYEWITNESS

The uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere
in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details
which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. This exception,

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however, applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony would then be
direct evidence. The above-quoted Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of
the accused sought to be discharged as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that
he or she is an eyewitness) in that it requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the
testimony of the said accused.

Where, as here, the state witness is not an eyewitness, the testimony partakes of the nature of
circumstantial evidence. The rule on circumstantial evidence thus applies. If the testimony is
uncorroborated, it does not suffice. It cannot merit full credence. Again, the rule on
circumstantial evidence requires that, among other things, there is more than one circumstance
and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused of the crime
charged only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.

The uncorroborated testimony of Felicita does not suffice to establish that appellant committed
violence (element of robbery) on Uy. Neither does appellant‘s flight. Further, being
uncorroborated, Felicita‘s account on appellant‘s authorship of destructive arson does not suffice
to convict him.

SC: Appeal dismissed. Crime modified. Monetary Awards and damages deleted.

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Romulo L. Neri vs. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
202243, August 7, 2013
Topic: Rule 119, Consolidation

Doctrine:
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases
in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously
while providing justice to the parties. But it should be denied if it subverts any of the aims of
consolidation.

Facts:
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
In connection with what had been played up as the botched Philippine-ZTE National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), on May 28, 2010,
filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) criminal Informations, the first against Benjamin Abalos,
for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as SB-10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), and
eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of that court.
The second Information against Neri, also for violation of Sec. 3(h), RA 3019, in relation
to Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, was docketed as SB-10-CRM-0099 (People v.
Neri) and raffled to the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. Vis-à-vis the same project, the
Ombudsman would also later file an information against Macapagal-Arroyo and another
information against her and several others docketed as SB-11-CRM-0467 and SB-11-CRM-0468
to 0469, respectively, all of which ended up, like SB-10-CRM-0098, in the anti-graft court‘s 4th
Division.
On January 3, 2012, in SB-10-CRM-0099, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
OMB, citing Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan
Revised Internal Rules, moved for its consolidation with SB-10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos),
SB-11-CRM- 0467 (People v. Arroyo, et al.) and SB-11-0468 to 469 (People v. Arroyo). The
stated reason proffered:
to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy of cases
involving the same business transaction. And in this regard, the prosecution would later manifest
that it would be presenting Yu Yong and Fan Yang, then president and finance officer,
respectively, of ZTE, as witnesses all in said cases which would entail a substantive expense on
the part of government if their testimonies are given separately.
Neri opposed and argued against consolidation, and, as he would later reiterate,
contended, among other things that: (a) SB-10-CRM- 0099, on one hand, and the other cases, on
the other, involve different issues and facts; (b) the desired consolidation is oppressive and

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violates his rights as an accused; (c) consolidation would unduly put him at risk as he does not
actually belong to the Abalos group which had been negotiating with the ZTE officials about the
NBN Project; (d) he is the principal witness and, in fact, already finished testifying, in the
Abalos case; (e) the trial in the Neri and Abalos cases are both in the advanced stages already;
and (f) the motion is but a ploy to further delay the prosecution of SB-10-CRM-0099,
considering the prosecution‘s failure to present any more witnesses during the last two (2)
scheduled hearings.
To the opposition, the prosecution interposed a reply basically advancing the same
practical and economic reasons why a consolidation order should issue.
By Resolution dated February 3, 2012, the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, agreeing with
the position thus taken by the OSP, granted the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-
CRM-0098.
According to the Fifth Division, citing Domdom v. Sandiganbayan consolidation is
proper inasmuch as the subject matter of the charges in both the Abalos and Neri cases revolved
around the same ZTE-NBN Project. And following the movant‘s line, the anti-graft court stated
that consolidation would allow the government to save unnecessary expenses, avoid multiplicity
of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court without
violating the parties‘ rights.
Neri filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not consolidation is proper.

Ruling: Petition is Meritorious. Consolidation in this case is improper.

The petition is meritorious, owing for one on the occurrence of a supervening event in the
Sandiganbayan itself. As may be recalled, the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan Fifth
Division ordering the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 (the Neri case) with SB-10- CRM-
0098 (the Abalos case) pending with the Fourth Division, was subject to the ―conformity of the
said (4th) Division.‖ On October 19, 2012, the Fourth Division, on the premise that consolidation
is addressed to the sound discretion of both the transferring and receiving courts, but more
importantly the latter as the same transferred case would be an added workload, issued a
Resolution refusing to accept the Neri case, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Fourth Division
RESPECTFULLY DECLINES to accept SB-10-CRM-0099 (Neri case) for consolidation with
SB-10-CRM-00998 (Abalos case) pending before it.
While it could very well write finis to this case on the ground of mootness, the actual
justiciable controversy requirement for judicial review having ceased to exist with the
supervening action of the Fourth Division, the Court has nonetheless opted to address the issue
with its constitutional law component tendered in this recourse.

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 The interrelated assignment of errors converged on the propriety, under the premises, of
the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10-CRM-0098. Consolidation is a procedural
device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties.
Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court‘s docket or
consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules the term ―consolidation‖ is
used in three (3) different senses or concepts, thus:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (quasi consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become
a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set
out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not
merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other.
(consolidation for trial)
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court is entitled ―Consolidation or Severance.‖ And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:
Section 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court stating:
Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses.—Charges for offenses founded on the
same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the
discretion of the court.
as complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which
states:
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases.—Cases arising from the same incident or series of
incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to
which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.
Whether as a procedural tool to aid the court in dispatching its official business in
criminal or civil cases, the rule allowing consolidation — in whatsoever sense it is taken, be it as
a merger of several causes of actions/cases, in the sense of actual consolidation, or merely joint
trial — is designed, among other reasons, to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the litigants.

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 While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it
approved, there is nothing in the records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the
Fifth Division approved went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation
partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.
Given the above perspective, petitioner should now disabuse himself of the unfounded
notion that what the Fifth Division intended was a fusion into one criminal proceedings of the
Abalos and Neri cases, where one is unidentifiable from the other, or worse, where he will be
tried as co-accused in the Abalos case.
As held in Caños v. Peralta, joint trial is permissible ―where the actions arise from the
same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be
consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties.
In terms of its effects on the prompt disposition of cases, consolidation could cut both
ways. It may expedite trial or it could cause delays. Cognizant of this dichotomy, the Court, in
Dacanay v. People, stated the dictum that ―the resulting inconvenience and expense on the part
of the government cannot not be given preference over the right to a speedy trial and the
protection of a person‘s life, liberty or property.‖ Indeed, the right to a speedy resolution of cases
can also be affected by consolidation.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, a case involving the denial by the anti-graft court of the
prosecution‘s motion to consolidate a criminal case for indirect bribery with another case for
plunder, consolidation should be refused if it will unduly expose a party, private respondent in
that instance, to totally unrelated testimonies, delay the resolution of the indirect bribery case,
muddle the issues, and expose him to the inconveniences of a lengthy and complicated legal
battle in the plunder case. Consolidation, the Court added, has also been rendered inadvisable by
supervening events –– in particular, if the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial
had already been heard in the earlier case. So it must be here.
In the list of charges for both cases, it can be gleaned that the particulars and specifications for
each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in connection with the
negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the
prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-trial order in the Neri case are also different from the list
of the people‘s witnesses lined up to testify in the Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both
the pre-trial orders.
The names thus listed in the pre-trial order in the Abalos case do not yet include, as aptly
observed by the Fourth Division in its adverted October 19, 2012 Resolution, additional names
allowed under a subsequent resolution. In all, a total of at least 66 warm bodies were lined up to
testify for the prosecution.
Veritably the same mischief sought to be avoided in People v. Sandiganbayan which
justified the non-consolidation of the cases involved therein, would virtually be present should

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the assailed consolidation be upheld. A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would
expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case against him
and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case.
Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos,
however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be
resolved –– a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him.
What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented
in the two cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that
in Abalos. Awaiting the completion in due course of the presentation of the witnesses in Abalos
would doubtless stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as there are more or less thirty-
five (35) prosecution witnesses listed in People v. Abalos who are not so listed in People v. Neri.
In the concrete, this means, in the minimum, awaiting the completion of the testimonies of thirty-
five (35) additional witnesses, whose testimonies are unrelated to the charges against him, before
the case against petitioner may finally be disposed of, one way or another. Also, petitioner will
be exposed to an extra thirty-five (35) irrelevant testimonies which even exceed those relating to
his case, since the prosecution only has roughly about twenty-six (26) witnesses for his case.
Further still, any delay in the presentation of any of the witnesses in People v. Abalos would
certainly affect the speedy disposition of the case against petitioner.
At the end of the day, the assailed consolidation, instead of contributing to the swift
dispensation of justice and affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
their cases, would achieve the exact opposite. In Dacanay, we held that the rights of an accused
take precedence over minimizing the cost incidental to the resolution of the controversies in
question. Clearly then, consolidation, assuming it to be proper owing to the existence of the
element of commonality of the lineage of the offenses charged contemplated in Sec. 22 of Rule
119, should be ordered to achieve all the objects and purposes underlying the rule on
consolidation, foremost of which, to stress, is the swift dispensation of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties. It should, however, be denied if it subverts any of the aims
of consolidation. And Dacanay and People v. Sandiganbayan are one in saying, albeit implicitly,
that ordering consolidation — likely to delay the resolution of one of the cases, expose a pmiy to
the rigors of a lengthy litigation and in the process undermine the accused‘s right to speedy
disposition of cases ,—constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

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ANTONIO CABADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186001, October 2, 2009
Topic: Rule 119
By: Morales, Inah

DOCTRINE: A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads: Demurrer to evidence.
After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.

FACTS: On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the
RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with others,
Atty. Jun N. Valerio. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years
of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of evidence and
required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15
days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of which
was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-
paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a
speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any
evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution
witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.

Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution
asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually
made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.

RTC - issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared
him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case
submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned.

Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on February 19,
2007.
CA – affirmed RTC
ISSUE: WON petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer
to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to
present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned?

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RULING: No, when the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for
judgment.
On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the accused
files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence.
Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Electionsthat, to determine whether the pleading
filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations
in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary
objective of the party filing it.

In this case, the gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of
the prosecutors absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions
repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such
time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the
CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion as
a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in paragraphs 11 (sic) and 12
regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused right
to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays
without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the
trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador‘s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this
up for a ruling by the trial court.

Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs 11 (sic) and 12,
saying that the trial court has no evidence to consider, the charge has no leg to stand on, and that
the witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused
in the incident. But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had
accomplished.

The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He
did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects
such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called demurrer did not
touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed,
he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of
exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss.To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to
evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and
exclaiming that he had touched a wall.

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Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads: Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day
Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to
object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only
after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed
his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecutions formal offer, before the trial
court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said
that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.

In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to
evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.

Therefore, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must,
however, be exercised in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to
present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the
penalty involved.

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Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi
G.R. No. 165496. February 12, 2007.
Topic: Rule 119, Demurrer
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J
Digest by: Abueg, Raponcel D.

Doctrine: When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is
submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence.

Facts:
Respondent Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Upon
arraignment, respondent pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief. After the prosecution rested its case,
respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached
his Demurrer.

He asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the
presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.

Later, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati granted the Demurrer and dismissed the
case. The prosecution‘s MR was denied.

Petitioner Hun Hyung Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Makati RTC, contending
that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

Makati RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent‘s
criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It granted the appeal of
petitioner and ordered respondent to pay petitioner the amount of ₱1,875,000 with legal interest.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Consequently, the RTC set aside its decision and
ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that respondent may
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent may still adduce evidence.

Ruling:
YES.

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When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case
including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action
has been waived or reserved.

In case of acquittal in the criminal case, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to
the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of
evidence in criminal and civil aspects of the case.

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

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ALFEREZ vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182301, 31 January 2011
Digest by: Umangay, Karen Abigail P.

DOCTRINE: Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of
dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
This is so even if petitioner did not present his evidence to rebut the documentary
evidence of the prosecution as he had waived his right to present evidence for having filed a
demurrer to evidence without leave of court. The Court must emphasize that the prosecution has
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or
fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the
defense.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alferez purchased construction materials from Cebu ABC Sales Commercial.
As payment for the goods, he issued 3 checks. However, the checks were dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account. Petitioner was thus charged with 3 counts of violation of
BP 22 before the MTCC. During the trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness, private
complainant Pingping Co. thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the documentary
evidence.
Instead of presenting evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence approximately 10
months after the prosecution rested its case. Petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to show
that he received the notice of dishonor or demand letter.
MTCC issued a resolution denying petitioner‘s Demurrer to Evidence, and rendering
judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC rendered Judgment affirming in
toto the MTCC decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order. In
the same Order, the RTC modified the MTCC resolution by sentencing petitioner to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for 6 months for each count of violation of BP 22 instead of fine as
originally imposed.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via petition for review under R42. In the assailed
Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. As to petitioner‘s contention that he
was denied his right to present evidence after the denial of his demurrer to evidence, the CA held
that there was no such denial since it was merely the consequence of the filing of demurrer
without leave of court.

ISSUE:

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 Whether the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner‘s conviction for
violation og BP 22.

RULING:
YES. The SC has held that the elements of the crime are: 1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply o account or for value; 2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3) the subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payments.
In this case, the 1stand 3rdelements have been adequately established. The prosecution,
however, failed to prove the 2ndelement. Because this element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to establish.
In Suarez vs. People, which is on all fours with the instant case, two Informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner therein. After the prosecution presented its
evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court on the ground that no
notice of dishonor had been sent to and received by him. When the case reached the SC, it
acquitted petitioner on reasonable doubt as there was insufficient proof that he received notice of
dishonor.
In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with
the registry receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no
attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. Receipts for
registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. To be
sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the
required proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for
the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The
prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for
in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The
burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance
of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. 22 cases, there should be clear proof
of notice. Moreover, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee
or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that
petitioner or his authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot
replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives
the accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient proof that
petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of
insufficiency of funds cannot arise.

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 This is so even if petitioner did not present his evidence to rebut the documentary
evidence of the prosecution as he had waived his right to present evidence for having filed a
demurrer to evidence without leave of court. The Court must emphasize that the prosecution has
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or
fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the
defense. The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of the requisite notice of
dishonor and that he was given at least five (5) banking days within which to settle his account
constitutes sufficient ground for his acquittal.
Finally, in answer to petitioner‘s insistence that he should have been allowed by the trial
court to present his evidence on the civil aspect of the case, suffice it to state that when petitioner
filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, the whole case was submitted for judgment
on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case
including its civil aspect.

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Reyes v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148607, September 5, 2012
By: Ruelo, Patricia Ann G.

Topic: Demurrer to Evidence

Doctrine
A motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and
shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case.
This period runs, according to Cabador v. People, only after the court shall have ruled on the
prosecution‘s formal offer for that is when it can be deemed to have rested its case.
Facts:
The Instructional Materials Corporation (IMC), a government-owned and controlled corporation
allegedly made investments to Associated Bank which were the subject of an investigation. The
investigation conducted by DECS disclosed that there was a questionable investment of ₱231.56
million in a private bank of advances that IMC received from the government. Pending recovery
of the unaccounted government securities worth ₱116 million mentioned above, the government
filed criminal charges of violation of Section 3(e)5 of Republic Act (R.A.) 30196 before the
Sandiganbayan against petitioners Miranda and Mendoza, General Manager and Finance
Division Chief of IMC, respectively.
The government also indicted petitioner Reyes, Eurotrust‘s president, for investing IMC funds by
buying government securities or BF Homes Assets Privatization Certifications from Associated
Bank. These certificates were then sold to IMC for a profit of ₱ 571,028.19. IMC also failed to
collect from Reyes a balance of ₱ 116 million from investment instruments that matured.
After the prosecution ended the presentation of its evidence and filed a formal offer of its
documentary exhibits, Reyes objected on the ground that witness Adelino‘s testimony covering
the audit report was hearsay since she joined the audit team as a replacement member only in
January 1991. She also objected to the offer of documentary evidence that were not marked or
made known to the parties during pre-trial. In a Resolution dated February 21, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan set aside Reyes‘ objection and admitted the prosecution's evidence. It denied her
motion for reconsideration on April 6, 2001, prompting her to file a motion for leave to file a
demurrer. But the court denied this, too, for having been filed out of time since the 5-day period
within which to file such leave was to be counted from Reyes‘ receipt of the February 21, 2001
Resolution.
In her motion for reconsideration, Reyes claimed that the 5-day period should rather be counted
from her receipt of the denial of her motion for reconsideration of the Order admitting the
prosecution‘s evidence. But the Sandiganbayan rejected this view, prompting Reyes to file a
petition for certiorari before this Court in G.R. 148607 for alleged grave abuse of discretion.
Meanwhile, trial in the case proceeded.
Issue:
WON the denial of petitioner‘s demurrer to evidence was proper

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Held:
Yes. According Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure a motion for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. This period runs,
according to Cabador v. People, only after the court shall have ruled on the prosecution‘s formal
offer for that is when it can be deemed to have rested its case. In this case, Reyes filed a timely
motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan‘s ruling on the prosecution‘s formal offer,
which is allowed, thus preventing the prosecution from resting its case. When the Sandiganbayan
denied Reyes‘ motion for reconsideration, she filed with it, within the required five days of her
receipt of the order of denial, her motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.
Still, the Sandiganbayan‘s error in not allowing Reyes to ask for leave to file a demurrer to the
evidence cannot be regarded as capricious and whimsical as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Courts have wide latitude for denying the filing of demurrers to evidence. Indeed, an
order denying a motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself is
not subject to appeal or certiorari action before judgment. The remedy is to assign the order of
denial as an error on appeal after judgment.
At any rate, the Court has in fact dealt with the issue concerning the timeliness of Reyes‘ motion
for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, finding that it had been filed on time. But the
Sandiganbayan‘s error in that regard did not amount to a denial of her right to be heard on her
defense. She just had to bear with not knowing sooner if the evidence the prosecution adduced
against her thus far was insufficient to prove her guilt. She later had the chance to question the
sufficiency of that evidence. But the Court, evaluating the same, agrees with the majority in the
Sandiganbayan that the evidence is sufficient.

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 RULE 120

PEOPLE vs MANANSALA GR No. 175939 April 3, 2013

By: Miguel, Therese

DOCTRINE: The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged
FACTS
On October 18, 1994 the PNP-Olongapo City conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala,
a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for
and obtained a search warrant from the RTC-Olongapo City to authorize the search for and
seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala‘s residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension,
Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. SPO4 Bolina and other elements of the PNP,
accompanied by the Barangay Chairman conducted the
search of Manansala‘s house at around 5:30 a.m. the next day. The search yielded the 750 grams
of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered from a
wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of PhP 655.00 that included the
two marked PhP50.00 bills used during the test buy.
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that
effect, along with his father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. The certification
listed the following seized articles:
1) one kilo, more or less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves;
2) rolling paper;
3) money amounting to PhP 655.00

SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they
turned over the seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of
October 20, 1994, the seized articles were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga for qualitative examination. The PNP Crime Laboratory later
issued Technical Report with findings on qualitative examination that the specimen gave
POSITIVE result for marijuana. Manansala pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, First Asst. City
Prosecutor Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an amended information, ostensibly
to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of R.A. No.
6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. But the RTC did
not act on the motion. Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the
matters earlier summarized. In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been
the victim of a frame-up stating that military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and
arrested him without any

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warrant, and brought him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on
Magsaysay Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and then detained
him when he refused to admit the sale and possession of marijuana. They turned down his
request to be brought to a hospital for the treatment of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the
time of his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his captors and whoever had
maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter testified at the
trial.
The RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of
R.A. 6425, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The crime charged in the information was a
violation of Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him
guilty of the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8 of the
same law.
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof. On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors
committed by the RTC that the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of
prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana in violation of Section 4.
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing, falling
under the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly
knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently
proven. The member of the team who is alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal
stuff from the accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the testimony of SPO4 Bolina, to
the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to the application of the search warrant, a
member of the team acting as poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot
be given weight, being hearsay.
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find
marijuana leaves in the custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the
enforcement of the search warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the
weakest defense, the trial court was convinced that accused is guilty instead of violating Section

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8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily included in the
crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. In light of these
circumstances, the RTC has no option that to find accused guilty and liable for the crime proved.
Since the date of the commission of the crime as proved is October 19, 1994, the provisions of
R.A. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will find application. On intermediate
appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction and affirmed with modification the decision of the lower
court. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425
necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof under Section 8 of the same law
HELD
Yes.
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The
element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In this case,
the trial court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that
accused was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that
he was found in possession of the same. While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited
drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of
marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further
apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included
in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this
case, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused
were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, we find that the
court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting the accused appellant of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section
4 of R.A. 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the
records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at the
house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the
PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of the positive testimony of the prosecution witness
and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is indubitable that a crime had in fact been
committed and that accused-appellant was the author of the same. It is as prevailing doctrine that
the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the seller was
also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not
included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some
future dealings or use by the accused.
The elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, are as follows:

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(1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and
(2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. Although not expressly
stated, delivery is given stress, which implies prior possession of the prohibited drugs. Sale of a
prohibited drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug,
affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant‘s culpability under
Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows:
(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
The involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal
possession as the crime proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in
the information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support
the conviction of the accused for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is either
deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal sale. On the other hand,
any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of
the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging illegal
possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly violated.
The illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug
pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated simply because
the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing
more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given
notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. The crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of
illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession.
The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court, the rule
then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. The Court AFFIRMED the decision

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ARNEL COLINARES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 182748. DECEMBER 13, 2011.
By: VARGAS, Rose Shahanna G.

DOCTRINE:
Under the probation law, the accused who appeals from the judgment of conviction is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation, unless the said judgment is
erroneous and meted out by another judgment partaking the nature as the original judgment
unto the accused.

FACTS:
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel)
with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur for
striking Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum
probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.

On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC‘s decision. Petitioner
then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable,
which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no
application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the
judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of
attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court. -
YES.

RULING:
Under the probation law, the accused who appeals from the judgment of conviction is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments
of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions‘ hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court‘s annulled judgment against him. He will not be

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entitled to probation because of the severe penalty imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court‘s
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial court‘s judgment even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also
be made to pay for the trial court‘s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply
for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao
gets the whip). Where is justice there?

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court allowed Arnel to apply for probation. The Court found
that he did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Court‘s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have
the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty
imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law
would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Court‘s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him
guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused.

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 RULE 121

REYNANTE TADEJA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145336 : February 20, 2013
Digested by: Salto, Dianne D.

DOCTRINE:
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the
court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time
before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction
already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 – the date on which the Decision of this
Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of
a new trial may no longer be entertained.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered."

FACTS:

The incident happened while prosecution witnesses Maria Elena Bernardo Almaria (Elena) and
Jacinta del Fierro (Jacinta) were watching a public dance around midnight on 3 May 1994,
during the celebration of the annual .fiesta of Barangay Talabaan, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. It was then that they witnessed Ruben Bernardo (Elena's brother and Jacinta's uncle)
being hacked to death by the brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand (petitioners), and
petitioners‘ first cousin Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja. They also testified that Plaridel
accidentally hit Reynante while trying to hack Ruben; hence, Reynante's injuries. According to
them, they stayed at the scene of the incident until Ruben was brought to the hospital.

On the other hand, petitioners alleged that Ruben and his sons, Russell and Robenson Bernardo,
went to thebarangay plaza shortly after Rusell had been twice prevented by barangay tanods
from entering the dance hall due to his drunken state and inappropriate attire (no upper garment).
Ruben was brandishing a knife and cursing at the crowd. The Bernardos challenged Reynante,
who was then waiting for his children and sisters still inside the dance hall. Reynante's brothers

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(Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand) testified that they were together at their mother's house at the
time.

Reynante was able to evade the first knife attack by Ruben. Barangay Chairperson Lolito
Tapales tried to intervene, but he was threatened by Ruben as well. The latter then turned his
attention back to Reynante, who tried to run away, and gave chase. Russell and Robenson
blocked the path of Reynante, causing him to lose his balance and fall to the ground. The
Bernardos then took turns in attacking him. Ruben got hold of Reynante's right hand and shouted
to his two sons to run away. He then stabbed Reynante on the right part of the chest and the left
side of the body before running away.

Reynante struggled back to the plaza. From there, he was taken to the hospital by Eddie Eraso
(Eddie) and two others, using a jeep. Upon boarding the jeep and turning on its lights and engine,
they all saw Ruben about 15 meters away, still holding a knife. Thereafter, Eddie reported the
incident to the police. In response, Police Officer 3 Ronaldo Flores went to the hospital to
question Reynante. The latter narrated how he was stabbed by the Bernardos. The inquiry was
interrupted when Ruben arrived at the emergency room of the hospital in serious condition. He
later died of "hypovolemic shock secondary to acute blood loss" due to multiple stab wounds and
a hacking wound.

The next day, 4 May 1994, Senior Police Officer 3 Rogelio Tomayosa went to the hospital to
continue questioning Reynante. Based on the latter‘s account, an Official Signal Dispatch was
sent to the Philippine National Police Provincial Headquarters in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
stating: "VICTIM REYNANTE TADEJA ARRIVED TO FETCH HIS CHILDREN BUT WAS
CHASED BY RUBEN BERNARDO AND STABBED [BY] HIM WHEN HE LOST
BALANCE."

On 15 July 1994, an Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed against Reynante,
Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel. Thus, Criminal Case No. Z-814 was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC).

Meanwhile, Reynante filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Russell and Robenson,
later docketed as Criminal Case No. Z-815 before the RTC. Criminal Case Nos. Z-814 and Z-
815 were tried jointly.

On 15 July 1997, the RTC issued a Decision in Criminal Case No. Z-814 finding Reynante,
Ferdinand, Plaridel, Ricardo and Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. In Criminal
Case No. Z-815, the RTC acquitted Russell and Robenson of frustrated homicide in its 14 July
1997 Decision.

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Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA).

On 8 March 2000, the CA issued a Decision affirming the findings and Decision of the RTC in
Criminal Case No. Z-814.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that nothing in the transcripts
provided would affect the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elena and Jacinta.
Petitioners then filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the CA Decision and Resolution.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, alleging that this Court had failed to reconcile the
testimonies of witnesses Elena and Jacinta on the one hand and Regina on the other. On 23
October 2006, we denied the motion with finality.

On 2 November 2010, petitioners filed a letter manifesting the hope that their last motion would
be favorably acted upon by this Court and reiterating their request for the reopening of the case
to receive newly discovered evidence. Petitioners also filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Set
Aside Conviction and Remand the Case to the Trial Court for Reception of Newly Discovered
Evidence.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not there should be reopening of the homicide case against the accused on the ground
of newly discovered evidence.

RULING:

NO. We resolve to DENY petitioners‘ motion to reopen the case for reception of further
evidence in the trial court.

Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time
fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.

Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the
court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time
before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners‘ judgment of conviction
already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 – the date on which the Decision of this
Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the Book of

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Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of
a new trial may no longer be entertained.

Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession
of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave
testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial
court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained
during trial does not hold water.

It is also noteworthy that Plaridel‘s confession does not jibe with Reynante‘s narration of what
happened during the incident. According to Reynante, Ruben stabbed him in his right chest and
the left side of his body. Upon seeing him bleeding profusely, Ruben ran away. This narration
contradicted the confession of Plaridel that when he saw the stabbing incident, he approached
and grabbed the knife from Ruben and immediately stabbed the latter with it.

Furthermore, Plaridel stated in his confession that as he stabbed Ruben, Reynante was being
transported to the hospital. Plaridel then left Ruben on the road and followed Reynante. If this
version is true, then in no way can the story of Reynante be plausible, considering that he
allegedly still saw Ruben about 15 meters away holding the knife while the former was being
transported to the hospital.

Clearly, the cousins chose not to tell the truth during trial. Whatever their reasons were, the
inevitable conclusion is that Plaridel‘s version in his extrajudicial confession is not newly
discovered evidence that can be a ground for a new trial within the contemplation of the rules.

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 RULE 122

Tan v. People, GR No. 148194

By: Josiah David F. Quising

DOCTRINE:
According to Rule 122, Sec. 3 , the remedy of ordinary appeal by notice of appeal, although not
necessarily preclusive of other remedies provided for by the rules, is open and available to
petitioner.
FACTS:
Tan was found guilty of bigamy by the RTC on Dec. 12, 1996. On 23 December 1996, petitioner
applied for probation. On 8 January 1997, the application was granted by the trial court, but the
release order was withheld in view of the filing by the prosecution, on 21 January 1997, of a
motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out that the penalty for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was prision mayor and the imposable penalty,
absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, should be the medium period of prision
mayor, or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the prosecution argued,
petitioner was not eligible for probation.
The trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having been filed out of time since the
decision sought to be modified had already attained finality. Indeed, petitioner had meanwhile
applied for probation. Upon motion of the prosecution, however, the trial court reconsidered its
order and rendered an amended decision, promulgated on 10 July 1998

CA dismissed the appeal because it raised a pure question of law so is should have been brought
up by a petition for review on certiorari not by merely filing a notice of appeal before the trial
court.

ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals gravely erred in applying section 2, rule 50 on dismissal of
improper appeal to the court of appeals as the said section refers to an appeal under rule 41 in
ordinary civil action but not to an appeal in criminal cases which is governed by rule 122 of the
revised rules on criminal procedure.
HELD:

Yes. CA erred.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed
by law. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be
a violation of due process, itself a right guaranteed by the Constitution.

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As per Rule 122, Sec. 3 - The remedy of ordinary appeal by notice of appeal, although not
necessarily preclusive of other remedies provided for by the rules, is open and available to
petitioner.
The notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on 13 July 1998, three days after the
questioned decision was promulgated. It was a remedy that the law allowed him to avail himself
of, and it threw the whole case effectively open for review on both questions of law and of fact
whether or not raised by the parties.
Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court the power to hear cases on appeal in which only an error of law is involved. Indeed, the
Court of Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is authorized to
determine errors of fact, of law, or both. These rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in
criminal cases, and they do not thereby divest the Supreme Court of its ultimate jurisdiction over
such questions.
Anent the argument that petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it
might be pointed out that this remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appeal, being a remedy still
available to petitioner, a petition for certiorari would have been premature.

In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial
court.

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YALONG V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 187174 (2013)
Topic: Rule 122, Appeal
Gabriel, Roselle A.

Facts: Stemming from a complaint filed by Ylagan, an information for violation of BP 22 was
filed against Yalong before the MTCC which found the latter guilty. Yalong filed a
Supplemental MR which the MTCC treated as an original motion. It was denied in an Order.
Yalong then filed a Notice of Appeal which was also denied in an Order. Dissatisfied, Yalong
filed a Petition for Relief from the Denial of Order of Denial of Appeal but was also dismissed.
Yalong moved for reconsideration which was however denied. He then filed for Petition for
Certiorari before the RTC; denied. He filled for a MR; denied. He filed for a Petition for Review
before the CA; denied on the ground that the Order of the RTC was issued in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction- where appeal ( by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC)- and not a petition
fore review is the proper remedy. He filed MR; denied.

Issue: Whether the CA properly dismissed the subject petition for review on the ground of
improper appeal

Ruling:
YES.
The Rules provides that appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court.

In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC and that
the latter court rendered a Resolution dismissing the same. It is fundamental that a petition for
certiorari is an original action and, as such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance
of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, based on
the above-cited rule, Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a
petition for review with the CA. As a consequence of Yalong‘s failure to file a notice of appeal
with the RTC within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality
which thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.

Yalong‘s contention that a petition for review may be treated as a notice of appeal since the
contents of the former already include the required contents of the latter cannot be given
credence since these modes of appeal clearly remain distinct procedures which cannot, absent
any compelling reason therefor, be loosely interchanged with one another. For one, a notice of
appeal is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final
order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is required when
the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,

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while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalong‘s filing of the subject petition for review
cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.

Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is considered
fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.

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QUILESETE V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 180334, 18 FEBRUARY 2009
TOPIC: Rule 122 - APPEAL
Digested by: DE VERA, QUEENIE, S.

DOCTRINE: A case involving malversation of public funds, punishable under Article 217 of the
RPC, committed by a low-ranking public officer with salary grade below SG 27 must be filed
with, and tried by, the RTC, the court that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Upon
conviction by the RTC, the remedy should be an appeal to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to PD
No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, specifically Section 4 thereof.

FACTS:
Quilesete was charged with Malversation in an Information filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao. During the arraignment, he pleaded ―NOT GUILTY.‖ Quileste is a
low-ranking public officer with salary grade below SG 27.
After the pre-trial and trial, the RTC found Quileste guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Malversation.
Aggrieved, Quileste appealed to the CA. however, in its Resolution (June 2007), the CA
dismissed outright the appeal because Quileste failed to furnish the OSG a copy of his Motion
for Extension to File Appellant‘s Brief and Appellant‘s Brief. Quileste moved to reconsider the
said Resolution. It was denied by the CA in its Resolution(September 2007) on the finding that
despite the allegation that a copy of the motion was served upon the OSG via registered mail, the
registry receipt was not attached to the motion. Neither was there an explanation why registered
mail was resorted to in the service of the Appellant‘s Brief upon the OSG.

ISSUE:
Whether Quileste correctly filed his Appeal to the Court of Appeals.

RULING:
NO. It may be recalled that this case involves malversation of public funds, punishable
under Article 217 of the RPC, committed by a low-ranking public officer (with salary grade
below SG 27). Thus, the case was correctly filed with, and tried by, the RTC, the court that has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Upon Quileste‘s conviction by the RTC, his remedy
should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to PD No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, specifically Section 4 thereof, viz.:
Section 4. Jurisdiction.·x x x
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade ―27‖ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal

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 Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether
in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.

This is complemented by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, Part III, Rule XI,
Sec. 1, which reads –
―Section 1. Ordinary Appeal. – Appeal to the Sandiganbayan from a decision
rendered by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be by ordinary appeal under Rules 41 and 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure or Rule 122 and 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, as the case may be.‖

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a
statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law. In this case,
Quileste should have appealed the RTC Decision of conviction to the Sandiganbayan within 15
days from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. By
lodging his appeal with the CA which, in turn, erred in taking cognizance of the same, although
it dismissed the appeal on technical grounds, the period within which to appeal to the proper
court – the Sandiganbayan – lapsed. Thus, Quileste lost his right to appeal. Consequently, he
cannot come before this Court to question the dismissal of his appeal, the RTC Decision having
become final and executory upon the expiration of the period to appeal.

Page 181 of 208

Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R No. 170979, February 9, 2011
Topic: Rule 122 - Sec. 6
Digested by: Morales, Carol Ann S.

Doctrine: While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement
of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Facts:
An information for estafa against the petitioner (Judith Yu) was filed with the RTC which
convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial
with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her
of the crime for which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion
for new trial for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a fresh period of 15 days
from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, within which to file a notice of appeal.
The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal fore being belatedly filed and a Motion for
execution of the decision.

Issue:
Does the fresh period rule apply to appeals in criminal cases?

Held: YES.

This "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

The raison dire for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus,
the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.

Page 182 of 208

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh
period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Were we to strictly interpret the fresh period rule in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case
a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced.

The Court agrees with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.

Hence, the appeal was filed on time.

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Rodriguez v. People (G.R. No. 192799; October 24, 2012)
Topic: Rule 122
By: MANGUERA, Triccie Coleen A.

DOCTRINE: If a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial

justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused
in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused
is at stake. It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases.

FACTS: After promulgation of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 02-206499 convicting
petitioner for unfair competition, he filed a motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the
15th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal.

- 14 days after receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed
his Notice of Appeal. Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed
out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

- Before the RTC, the CA and now here, petitioner was unwavering in his assertion of the
applicability of the "fresh period rule" as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

The rationale of the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow
a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.

- A scrutiny of the said rules, however, reveals that the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes
need NOT apply to Rules 42, 43 and 45 as there is no interruption in the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal. It is explicit in Rules 42, 43 and 45 that the appellant or petitioner is accorded a
fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision, award, judgment, final order or resolution
or of the denial of petitioner‘s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed.

Page 184 of 208

ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" is applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal
cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122.

HELD: YES. While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the "fresh period rule" to criminal
cases, the issue was squarely addressed in Yu v. Tatad, which expanded the scope of the doctrine
in Neypes to criminal cases in appeals of conviction under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

- Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to
the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal
casea situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced.

- This must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason.
Thus, we agree with the OSG‘s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.

- It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant
case, where the accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or
reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period
counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.

- If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases under the spirit and rationale in Neypes greater
leeway in filing an appeal through the "fresh period rule," with more reason that it should equally
grant the same to criminal cases which involve the accuseds "sacrosanct right to liberty, which is
protected by the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."

- Consequently, in light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner seasonably filed his notice of
appeal on February 2, 2009, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from January 19, 2009,
the date of receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.

Page 185 of 208

People vs. Hubert Webb
G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999
by: Ma. Corazon M. Cristobal

FACTS:
Ø Hubert Webb is one of the accused in Criminal case for rape with homicide. During
the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed a Motion to Take Testimony By
Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the persons, to wit:
1.] Steven Bucher
Acting Chief, Records Services Branch
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20536
U.S.A.
2.] Debora Farmer
Records Operations, Office of Records
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.
3.] Jaci Alston
Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
4.] Ami Smalley
Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
5.] John Pavlisin
210 South Glasell, City of Orange
California, 92666
U.S.A.
before the general consul, consul, and vice consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of
presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that said persons are all residents of the United
States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no
jurisdiction over them.
Ø The respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the
aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly material and indispensable to

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establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that:
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the
province and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing,
or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application and
notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party
may introduce any other parts. (italics supplied).
Ø The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that
1. Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of
respondent-accused, has not application in criminal cases;
2. Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a
mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused before trial not during trial;
3. Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure dos not
sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside
Philippine jurisdiction.
Ø The trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not
allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Page 187 of 208

 Ø Respondents elevated the cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certitorari. Respondents argued that:
1. The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal
proceedings;
2. Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a
consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and
3. Webb has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his
defense and the denial of such right will violate his constitutional right to due process.
Ø The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment granting respondent‘s
motion. It is hereby ordered that the deposition of the abovementioned witnesses be taken before
the proper consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California.
Ø Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in
its ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial judge erred in denying Webb‘s request to take depositions of 5 citizens
and residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in
Washington D.C. and California?

RULING:
NO.
A deposition is -
"The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open
court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by a court, or under a general
law or court rule on the subject, and reduced to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to
be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery
device by which one party (through his or her attorney) asks oral questions of the other party or
of a witness for the other party. The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The
deposition is conducted under oath outside of the court room, usually in one of the lawyers
offices. A transcript - word for word account - is made of the deposition.Testimony of [a]
witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to
questions or interrogatories x x x.

The purpose of taking depositions are to:

1. Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and
preventing perjury;
2.] Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and
defenses;

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 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise
could not be proved except with great difficulty;
4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses
thereby encouraging settlements;
5.]Expedite litigation;
6.] Safeguard against surprise;
7.] Prevent delay;
8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and
9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.

A deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not
during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice - particularly on the defense of alibi, which is
respondents main defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the court below - states that
when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for the taking of the
deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign
witnesses is to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility
of Defense Exhibits 218 and 219. This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and
academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial court in its
order dated July 10, 1998.

In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through
the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of
Exhibits 218 and 219 readily shows that these are of the same species of documents which have
been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court in its order dated July
18, 1997.
Indeed, a comparison of Exhibits has been made and it discloses that its contents are the same
with other documents previously introduced as evidence.

It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only serves to underscore
the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses
would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondents motion to
take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous
exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness
of the evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is

Page 189 of 208

 already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to
be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. (emphasis
and italics supplied.)

The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four
hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be
produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain
the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that the
evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly add anything
substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American
public officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very
person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that
they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the respondent-
accused who was actually present in the United States and not in the Philippines on the specified
dates.

The Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside CA‘s decision.

Page 190 of 208

People vs. Valdez
GR No. 175602, February 13, 2013
Sanchez, Precious Loren L.

Doctrine: An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter.

Facts: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder. After trial, the RTC convicted
them as charged, the CA upheld the RTC‘s decision. The two accused then came to the Court on
final appeal but Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal which the Court granted.

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez,
finding him guilty of three counts of homicide instead of three counts of murder.

Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self-explanatory letter where he pleaded
for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that
the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.

Issue: WON the plea for reduction of Edwin‘s sentence should be granted?

Ruling: YES.

Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes
committed despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal
of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him.

Edwin‘s plea is granted based on Section 11 (a), Rule 122 which states that ―an appeal taken by
one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.‖

Page 191 of 208

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014
NICHOLE JOHN USON

DOCTRINE: An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas filed applications for warrants before the RTC of
Quezon City to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) as
well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet). The
applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which
amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or
Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT).

RTC granted the application for search warrants. The warrants were implemented on the same
day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.Planet Internet notes that even
personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission
of international calls, such as the President‘s Office and the Information Desk, were searched.
Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners WWC
and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internetfiled their respective motions to quash the search warrants,
citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause,
since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was
not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant
thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."

RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.

CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid
and effective.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the quashal orders are proper subjects of an appeal or a petition for certiorari?

Page 192 of 208

RULING:
APPEAL, an order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing
of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it
cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65
petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The
Court held therein as follows:

But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to
return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz
vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:

Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of
restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by
the US District Court, of defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant
is such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion,
the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character
because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of
the guilt of the accused therein.

Petitioners‘ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether the
criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial
court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a
motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in
Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more
to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."

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In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet
to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the
grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for
search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal
actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was
nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final
orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

Page 194 of 208

 RULE 126

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.
BY: BALDONADO

DOCTRINE: “However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as
plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply
are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an
initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order;
(b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure”

FACTS:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing

fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs
where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help
of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of
Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to
seize ―finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.‖ No
fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened
contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau
of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then
filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items
are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Page 195 of 208

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin
syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

HELD:
YES. It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view
doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view.
The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion
or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer
must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on
plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents.
However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was
enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes
and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the
enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof
were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the
petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

Page 196 of 208

SEC v. Mendoza
G.R. No. 170425, April 23, 2012
RULE 126- Search and Seizure
By: MORALES, Edilyn

Doctrine

[A] search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a
prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to
get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and
made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly
known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a
criminal action, it does not make it such an action.

A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by
the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process,
restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the
police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the
Philippines.

A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil
rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from
the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the
furtherance of public prosecution.

Facts

NBI applied with the RTC of Makati City for the issuance of a search warrant covering
documents and articles found at the offices of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Valero
Street Makati City. The NBI alleged that these documents and articles were being used to a)
violate Republic Act 8799, also known as the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), and b) commit
estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The court granted the application.

The NBI and SEC agents searched the offices mentioned and seized the described documents
and articles from them. Shortly after, the SEC filed a criminal complaint with the DOJ against
respondents Mendoza, et. al. for violation of Sections 24.1 (b) (iii), 26, and 28 of the SRC.
Mendoza, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against the NBI and the SEC before the RTC
of Muntinlupa. They alleged that, three months after the search and seizure, the NBI and the SEC
had not turned over the seized articles to the Makati RTC that issued the search warrant.

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This omission, they said, violated Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
required the officers who conducted the seizure to immediately turn over the seized items to the
issuing court.

Opposing the petition, the SEC, the NBI, and the DOJ (the three agencies) averred that
injunction may not be issued to protect contingent rights or enjoin criminal prosecution. They
pointed out that Mendoza, et al. should have exhausted administrative remedies available to
them at the DOJ. Further, the three agencies maintained that Mendoza, et al.s petition for
prohibition should have been lodged with the CA.

Simultaneous with the action before the Muntinlupa RTC, two of the respondents who did not
join that action, Pastrana and Abad, filed with the Makati RTC a motion to quash the subject
search warrant for having been issued in connection with several offenses when the Rules of
Criminal Procedure require its issuance for only one specific offense.

The Muntinlupa RTC issued a TRO against the three agencies, enjoining them from using the
seized articles in proceeding against Mendoza, et al. Later, the Muntinlupa RTC replaced the
TRO it issued with a writ of preliminary injunction subject to the final outcome of the
proceedings before the Makati RTC. The three agencies moved for reconsideration but was
denied. This prompted the said agencies to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
CA.

During the pendency of the case before the CA, however, the Makati RTC rendered a decision
nullifying the search warrant it issued and declaring the documents and articles seized under it
inadmissible in evidence. The Makati RTC also directed the SEC and the NBI to return the
seized items to respondents Pastrana and Abad.

For some reason, the CA did not mention the Makati RTC order and did not dismiss the petition
before it on ground of mootness. It rendered judgment, denied the three agencies petition, and
affirmed the orders of the Muntinlupa RTC. The CA ruled, among other things, that Mendoza, et
al.s action before the Muntinlupa RTC was proper and distinct from that which respondents
Pastrana and Abad filed with the Makati RTC.

Issue

The issues raised in this petition have essentially been rendered moot and academic by the
Makati RTC’s decision, which quashed the search warrant it issued and declared the items
seized under it inadmissible in evidence. Still, one issue whether or not the CA erred in holding

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that the Muntinlupa RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.s injunction action needs to
be resolved in the interest of setting the matter aright and providing a lesson for the future.

Held

Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance of the search warrant
and 2) the suppression of evidence seized under it are matters that can be raised only with the
issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal action has in the meantime been filed in court.
Thus:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A
motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the
court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion
and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by
the latter court.

Although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza,et al. filed with the
Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which is to prohibit the three agencies from using the items
seized under the search warrant, is actually an action to suppress their use as evidence.
Consequently, Mendoza, et al. should have filed it with the Makati RTC that issued such
warrant.

It might be pointed out of course that since Mendoza, et al. were not parties to the issuance of the
search warrant, they had no standing to question the same or seek the suppression of evidence
taken under it. Consequently, since they had reasons for questioning government use of the
seized items against them, they had the right to bring the injunction action before the Muntinlupa
RTC where they resided.

But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant proceeding for
them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not correct to say that only the parties to the
application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized
under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an action where
a party complains of a violation of his right by another.

Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or offices of
Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to file with the Makati RTC a motion to suppress the use of
the seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and the NBI to immediately turn

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these over to the issuing court. The issuing court is the right forum for such motion given that no
criminal action had as yet been filed against Mendoza, et al. in some other court.
Parenthetically, it appears from its investigation report that the SEC kept the seized documents
and articles for months rather than immediately turn them over to the Makati RTC. Justifying its
action, the SEC said that it still needed to study the seized items. Evidently, it wanted to use
them to build up a case against the respondents, unmindful of its duty to first turn them over to
the court. Clearly, SEC‘s arbitrary action compromised the integrity of the seized documents and
articles.

74

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HPS Software v. PLDT
G.R. No. 170217
10 December 2012
By LAQUI, Xela Leona D.

Doctrine: Evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from
proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.

Facts:
The complainant PAOCTF filed two applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation
of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of
P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipments following the
complaint of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company or PLDT that they were able to
monitor the use of the respondents in their premises of Mabuhay card and equipments capable of
receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without these calls passing
through the facilities of PLDT.
Complainant‘s witnesses Richard Dira and Reuben Hinagdanan testified that they found out that
respondents are engaged in the business of International Simple Resale on September 13, 2000
when they conducted a test call using Mabuhay Card. They followed the dialing instructions
found at the back of the card and dialed "00" and the access code number 18008595845 of the
said Mabuhay Card. They were then prompted by a voice to enter the PIN code to validate and
after entering the PIN code number 332 1479224, they were again prompted to dial the country
code of the Philippines 011-6332 and then dialed telephone number 2563066. Although the test
calls were incoming international calls from the United States, they discovered in the course of
their test calls that PLDT telephone lines/numbers were identified as the calling party,
specifically 032-3449294 and 032-3449280.
They testified that the test calls passing through the Mabuhay Card were being reflected as local
calls only and not overseas calls. Upon verification, they discovered that the lines were
subscribed by Philip Yap whose address is HPS Software Communication Corporation at
Plaridel St., Alang-alang, Mandaue City. They also testified that the lines subscribed by Philip
Yap were transferred to HPS Software and Communications Corporation of the same address.
They further testified that the respondents committed these crimes by installing
telecommunication equipments like multiplexers, lines, cables, computers and other switching
equipments in the HPS Building and connected these equipments with PLDT telephone lines
which coursed the calls through international privatized lines where the call is unmonitored and
coursed through the switch equipments in Cebu particularly in Philip Yap‘s line and distributed
to the subscribers in Cebu.
The trial court issued two search warrants for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
(Theft of Telephone Services) and for violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Unauthorized

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Installation of Telephone Connections) which both contained identical orders directing that
several items are to be seized from the premises of HPS Corporation and from the persons of
Hyman Yap, et al.
Subsequently, a preliminary investigation was conducted by Assistant City Prosecutor who
thereafter issued a Resolution which found probable cause that all the crimes charged were
committed and that Philip Yap, Hyman Yap, Stanley Yap, Elaine Joy Yap, Julie Y. Sy, as well as
Gene Frederick Boniel, Michael Vincent Pozon, John Doe and Jane Doe were probably guilty
thereof and filed in court Informations.
Philip Yap and Hyman Yap filed a Motion to Quash and/or Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.
HPS Corporation filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return of the Things Seized. Both
pleadings sought to quash the search warrants at issue on the grounds that the same did not refer
to a specific offense; that there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general
warrants and were wrongly implemented. In response, PLDT formally opposed the
aforementioned pleadings through the filing of a Consolidated Opposition.

Issue: Whether the two search warrants issued is valid?

Ruling: YES.
The Court has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon
the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized.
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means
taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agree that no probable cause
existed to justify the issuance of the subject search warrants. However, The Supreme Court do
not agree.
The pieces of evidence are more than sufficient to support a finding that test calls were indeed
made by PLDT‘s witnesses using Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332 1479224 and, more
importantly, that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that HPS Corporation, et al. had
probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal ISR activities exists. To reiterate,
evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof
beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.
With regard to the issue of whether or not the subject search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants, PLDT argues that, contrary to the ruling of the former Eighteenth Division of the Court

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of Appeals in its assailed Decision dated April 8, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75838, the subject
search warrants cannot be considered as such because the contents of both stated, with sufficient
particularity, the place to be searched and the objects to be seized, in conformity with the
constitutional and jurisprudential requirements in the issuance of search warrants. On the other
hand, HPS Corporation, et al. echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that the language
used in the subject search warrants are so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records and
equipment of HPS Corporation regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. A search warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in
order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by
both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.

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