Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
ii
Table of contents
iii
Acknowledgements
This report on cross‐cutting issues is drawn from the findings of six sector functional reviews that were
undertaken by the World Bank between March and October 2010 on behalf of the Government of
Romania. The six sectors – Agriculture and Rural Development, Transport, Pre‐university Education, Public
Finance, Center of Government, and Competition ‐‐ represent the first of two phases of functional reviews
agreed between the European Commission and the Government of Romania as reflected in their June 2009
Memorandum of Understanding. The second phase of functional reviews began in November 2010 and
will continue through the end of April 2011; those findings are not included in this report.
The Romania functional reviews were coordinated by the Government through the Public Policy
Directorate (PPD) of the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG). The team is especially grateful for
the support of the General Secretary of the Government, Daniela Nicoleta Andreescu, the Director of the
Public Policy Department, Mihaela Toader, and Advisor to the Public Policy Department, RaduIacob.
The Bank team coordinating the functional reviews was lead by Bernard Myers (Task Team Leader for the
Functional Review). Sector team leaders included HolgerKray (Agriculture and Rural Development),
Mohammed Essakali (Transport), Mariana Moarcas (Pre‐University Education), Sebastian Eckhardt (Public
Finance), Bernard Myers (Center of Government), and Donato de Rosa (Competition). The team worked
under the overall guidance of Mr. William Dorotinsky (Sector Manager, Public Sector and Institutional
Reform, Europe and Central Asia Region) and Mr. François Rantura (Country Manager, Romania).
iv
Executive Summary
Romanian governments have navigated the country through significant economic and social changes
over the past two decades. After the fiscal and debt crisis of the late 1990s, Romania embarked upon a
full‐fledged transition to a market economy, including liberalization of markets, restructuring and
privatization of State companies, legal and institutional reforms, and macroeconomic stabilization.
Major transformations took place in economic sectors such as energy, mining, steel, railways, the
financial sector, but also in social sectors such health and higher education. This sustained effort
culminated in the beginning of EU accession negotiations in 1999. EU accession brought further reforms
in the economic and institutional structure of Romania and a period of rapid economic growth from
2004‐2008. In response to the global fiscal crisis that began in 2009, the Government has taken tough
decisions to restore fiscal balance and to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in education, financial
sector, social assistance and pensions, and public finance management.
Despite the progress over twenty years, fundamental changes in the structure and management of
the public sector are still needed if Romania is to achieve its aspirations for higher standards of living
and higher incomes. Although the EU accession process facilitated political consensus on the direction
and pace of reforms, now Romania’s political leadership need to forge a new commitment to reform
that is all their own, driven by Romania’s national interest. The unsustainable level of economic activity
of the last decade enabled successive Romanian governments to pass over longstanding problems in the
structure and management of the public administration. Dysfunction in the public administration,
uncertainty in the business climate, and poor quality of public services all loom as permanent threats
that may progressively restrict the pace of economic recovery and prevent Romania from reaching its
potential. As more and more Romanian youth look outside the country for their future, it is vital that
Romanian leaders accelerate the country’s break with some of the management systems and culture it
inherited.
As a whole the functional reviews undertaken by the World Bank paint a picture of a public
administration characterized by (a) focus on compliance with detailed norms and regulations rather
than performance, (b) budget resources spread thinly across policy areas without prioritization, (c) a
lack of public transparency on performance, and (d) out‐dated control systems for managing people
and budgets. Taken together these present a heavy yoke that will prevent ministries from performing
even when the economic crisis ends. The low level of EU‐funds absorption across the sectors reflects
the fact that weak operational capacity – and not money – is the primary obstacle to Romania’s long‐
term economic growth. When benchmarked against the EU27, Romania generally shows up as having
levels of spending roughly comparable to other member states (as percentage of GDP) but levels of
performance that tend to be lower (e.g., in agriculture and rural development).
While institutional strengthening is a long‐term process, the Government could commit itself in the
short‐term by agreeing on set progress indicators or milestones and establishing accountability for
monitoring the reforms.Public administration reform requires substantial political will in any country,
and the political context in Romania offers specific challenges, not least because of the tight inter‐
linkages between the political parties and the State apparatus. A realistic agenda for reform needs
1
torise above the partisan political gains and losses so that Romania can align itself with European
traditions of public sector governance. A crisis is often needed in a country for bold actions to be taken.
Romania may need to assure that the current economic crisis does not come and go without the critical
steps taken to build a foundation for future growth and opportunity.
The first phase of functional reviews conducted by the World Bank has provided a rich source of
information on the challenges and opportunities in six sectors.1 The Ministries have responded by
preparing draft action plans which they have submitted to the EC in December 2010 as an outline of
their future ambitions to strengthen their ministries and their sectors. In most cases, Ministers did not
wait until the conclusion of the Bank’s analysis to begin implementing some of the Bank’s
recommendations. The commitment of Ministers during the project was demonstrated by their
accessibility to the Bank teams, and the high level of collaboration from Ministry officials at all levels.
While a determined, multi‐year program of public administration reform is critical, Romania can learn
from agencies which already are piloting important reforms and exemplifying a different management
culture. They are implementing modern IT systems, developing personnel evaluation systems,
flattening hierarchical organization structures, and monitoring results of their work. The Romanian
Competition Council is one example where close interaction with EU counterparts has facilitated a more
performance‐oriented culture. From this example it is clear that value for money and providing good
services to taxpayers are not foreign concepts to Romanian institutions—they just need to be replicated
on a priority basis across the public administration so that Romania may successfully compete in the
global economy.
A. Recommendations on Managing the Reform Process
Romania has had a long experience with plans not followed with implementation. The sustainability of
public administration reforms requires both commitment and institutional capacity – e.g., to
coordinateacross sectors, to communicate effectively to stakeholders, and to monitor and assess interim
results. Therefore, the Government should consider as a priority the following:
• Accountability: Designate an individual or group withclear accountability and political authority
for coordinating public administration reform across the public sector
• Capacity: Build institutional capacity to support the reform process. This could include
establishment of a Department of Public Administration and Modernization – under the
direction of the Prime Minister –for coordination of strategic human resource policies and
coordination and monitoring of all public administration reform initiatives that support
performance
• Leadership: Enhance staff support to the Office of the Prime Minister to assure a strategic focus
and effective follow‐up on priority areas
1
The six “sectors” were Agriculture and Rural Development, Transport, Pre‐university Education, Public Finance,
Center of Government, and Competition. The six sectors were agreed between the EC and the Government of
Romania. The second phase of the functional review began in late November 2010 and will conclude in June 2011.
2
•
Reporting: Agree on a small set of high‐level indicators for reporting onreform progress across
sectors
• Budgeting: Refine the budget calendar for 2012 to introduce a top‐down priority setting
process to align sector commitments with overall fiscal strategies
• People: Enhance the incentives for attracting and motivating high‐skilled people to work on
priority reforms
B. Recommendations on Cross‐Cutting Issues of Public Administration
While each of the individual sector functional reviews led to the development of detailed action plans,
there were some cross‐cutting management challenges that emerged as well. Recommendations to
address them are discussed in more detail in the body of this report and summarized briefly below:
Policy Planning and Coordination
• Strengthen institutional capacity in the Center of Government2 to coordinate policy and
resource commitments across sectors so that medium‐term budgets and strategies are better
aligned and more achievable
• Strengthen the rules of procedures for Government meetings to enhance capacity for strategic
decision making and to require policy documents (rather than legal drafts) that focus decision‐
making on the policy trade‐offs and potential impacts over the medium term for major policies
• Develop a detailed Annual Government Work Program to coordinate planning of major policies
and legal acts, with quarterly reporting against agreed milestones to facilitate accountability
Budgeting and Strategic Management
• Expand the institutional mandate and capacities of Ministry of Public Finance from primarily
fiscal and budgetary control to include assessment of value‐for‐money of public spending
programs
• Modernize budget execution processes to facilitate timely and accurate monitoring of program
performance by line ministries, and progressively incorporate more performance information
into the budget preparation calendar
• Rationalize the detailed regulations in financial management that have lead to duplicative and
unnecessary controls that weaken accountability for performance.
2
By “Center of Government” we mean primarily the General Secretariat of the Government and the Office of the
Prime Minister. Some other state functions such as human resource management should also be coordinated
within the Center, but do not presently reside within either the GSG or the PM’s Office.
3
Human Resources Management
• Significantlyreduce the politicization of the public administration and create a layer of high‐
skilled, professional senior management that assumes responsibility for most operational
decisions and reduces the bottlenecks of decision‐making that occur at political levels. Raise
competency standards for entry into senior positions and substantially reduce use of temporary
appointments.
• Assign responsibility forstrategic management of human resources across the public
administration, including an approach to recruitment and remuneration that is built around job
responsibilities and skill competences and align staffing composition to current business needs.
Examine the incentives beyond pay that are needed for attracting and keeping key skills within
the public sector.
• Integrate lessons from well‐performing agencies and authorities, where they have adopted
modern management techniques and fostered higher levels of staff performance
Sector governance and structure
• Reduce the fragmentation of sector responsibilities that have lead to diffuse accountability and
poor inter‐sectoral coordination. Ministries should provide strategic direction and assure that
subordinated agencies and state companies achieve agreed performance objectives, without
becoming involved in day‐to‐day operational management.
• Establish professional boards for state companies (e.g., in Transport) and assure an appropriate
arms‐length relationship between the ministries and the companies, including transparent
accounting and auditing of state owned enterprises’ (SOE) performance
Knowledge Management and Communication
• Reduce the reliance upon manual, paper‐based procedures by using modern information
technologies (such as electronic signature) to streamline administrative processes and speed the
capacity to respond
• Improve communication with external stakeholders in the development of policy measures and
drawing upon expertise that is available outside the public sector.
4
Policy Planning and Coordination
Evidence‐based policy advice is critical for governments to develop well‐designed programs and to
avoid the tendency toward ad‐hoc decision‐making. Romania’s public administration in contrast has
been plagued by over‐reliance upon “emergency ordinances” and a surprising lack of policy documents
with which to inform debate about policy trade‐offs. Sample data showed that emergency ordinances
were used 228 and 111 times in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Although procedures were introduced in
2005 to use public policy documents as an initial starting point in the adoption of new laws, the process
had tepid political support and was non‐existent by 2009 once the fiscal crisis began to surface. The
government has therefore reverted back to practices where normative acts are prepared and discussed
with limited policy substantiation offered. Instead civil servants who should be focusing on “policy” are
instead focusing on legal conformity. A political and administrative culture has developed where
ministers initiate policy without the benefit of having a firm analytical foundation on which to
substantiate or defend it before colleagues or opponents.
Governmentsmust have an effective institutional mechanism by which to set strategic direction,
facilitate collaboration across state functions, and prioritize among an otherwise limitless list of sector
needs. While the Romanian Constitution sets the broad parameters for the functioning of Government,
within those boundaries one needs a strong Center of Government to balance the interests of
competing ministries and to assure that Government objectives are pursued collectively. There is no
single best model from which to draw globally; however, it works best when there is a close working
relationship between the head of the government and the minister of finance. Moreover, the PM’s
office needs its own strong, permanent institutional apparatus on which to draw for policy support.
Since the dissolution of the Chancellery, this is now embodied in the General Secretariat of the
Government. The critical issue for Romania is whether the GSG is structured and staffed to help the PM
exercise a stronger executive coordination function. The conclusion of the functional review is that it is
not.
Strengthening the Center of Government is essential for Romania to break a cycle of policy overload,
conflicting policy mandates, and weak policy implementation. Stagnant sector performance was a
persistent issue before the economic crisis, while the growing budgetary arrears are a more recent
indicator that the policy‐setting process at the Center has not functioned well. Although line ministers
may see themselves as losing something to a strong Center, policy prioritization needs to take place by
looking across sectors and “challenging” individual sectors to do more with the existing resources.
Neither the Minister of Finance nor the PM is adequately equipped to play this role solely by
themselves. The newly implemented Fiscal Responsibility Law implicitly demands a strong role for the
Center, but it is in the self‐interest of future governments to get better alignment between their policy
priorities and the “machinery of government” that is supposed to implement them. In this way,
ministers can be more confident that the policy commitments that make are likely to be implemented.
The functional review emphasizes that a strong Center of Government will require reform efforts in
several areas:
5
1. Improve Processes for Policy Planning & Monitoring
Development of a detailed annual government work program, with quarterly progress
reports, would be a useful starting point for bringing greater discipline into Government’s
policy coordination processes. This new process would require ministries to identify in advance
all significant policy, financial and legal documents to be submitted for Government approval
over the coming year. Two components of the annual government work plan (AGWP) are
important: deadlines for submitting the priority policy and legal proposals (building on the
legislative program already prepared by the Department for Parliamentary Relations) and key
milestones for implementing major policy and financial commitments. The AGWP would be a
key instrument to help the GSG and PM monitor compliance by line ministries in preparation
and implementation of major policies. 3
Romania officials need to integrate the processes for national and European policy and
planning processes. Normative acts related to EU policies are considered by officials under a
separate process than that used for national policies. Without closer integration into the
national budget processes, however, neither the national nor European planning processes are
likely to result in more than a wish list of well meaning policy ideas.
2. Build Policy Expertise in the Center
Policy analysis skills within government will need to be developed over time, and will need to
be appropriately valued in the job grading hierarchy. Position descriptions in the Public Policy
Directorate (PPD) will need to reflect the high level skills needed and responsibility given to the
department; and the mix of positions should be oriented toward high‐level policy analysis.
Although the total number of staff appears comparable or even higher than in similar
organizations in the region, many staff are involved in activities unrelated to policy and
planning. On‐the‐job training is an important part of building the capacity, and the Government
may need to have appropriate compensation systems that enable it to retain the staff who have
developed these skills. Improving the linkages to the Prime Minister’s Advisors will also be
important to building capacity and relevance of PPD’s analysis. Over the medium term, the
Government could consider supplementing internal expertise, with advisory services from
outside consultants.
3. Mainstream Policy Analysis in the Line Ministries
Strategic planning and policy analysis have to be integrated into the core activities of the line
ministries, and not left as a mere support function. Although initially conceived to support
3
The European Commission, for example, produces an annual Commission Work Plan which translates the
President’s political guidelines into concrete public policy and legal measures. The work programs are generally
designed to ensure that the Commission’s policy priorities are advanced. Deadlines are set and monitored
throughout the year by the General Secretariat.
6
sectoral policy planning and inter‐sectoral coordination, the policy planning units (PPUs) in line
ministries have been under‐utilized. Staffed with public managers and others with substantial
qualifications, the PPUs have not been able to overcome the fact that budget planning and
strategic planning in ministries tend to be separate processes, and neither is well‐connected to
the day‐to‐day operational decisions taken by the ministry. The current focus of many PPUs is
around managing EU‐financed projects and not performing policy analysis, strategic planning, or
policy monitoring and evaluation. Demand for good policy analysis has to start with the
Minister, and then be reinforced by the PM and the MOPF as part of the broader annual
budgeting process.
4. Enhance Strategic Decision Making in Government Meetings
Governments meetings cannot effectively fulfill their role in policy coordination and priority‐
setting without reforming the way they are managed. The amount of time between the
preparation of the government meeting and the actual meeting (less than two full days) is far
too short to enable informed discussion among ministers. Ministers are too often reading
important briefs only at the meeting itself. Substantiation notes that accompany the normative
acts are not an adequate basis for decision‐making on some important policy issues, and staff
who review the acts have an overwhelming focus on legal conformity rather than policy impact,
justification, and policy trade‐offs. The functional review found that the quality of
substantiation notes was often viewed as deficient. Greater discipline is needed to limit the
number of supplementary items that make it to the Government meeting agenda without
consideration at the preparatory meeting.4 And fiscal impact analysis needs to evolve in both
quality and importance for decision‐making. The preparatory meeting should be strengthened
and administrative items need to be shifted out of the government meeting (as much as legally
possible) so that time is devoted to strategic issues.
5. Align Institutional Structures for Strategic Planning and Monitoring
The CoG should devolve itself of many of the disparate agencies/commissions reporting to the
Prime Minister and/or the GSG. Many of the authorities and agencies under the Prime Minister
and GSG do not belong there and should report either to a line ministry or the Parliament
depending on the particular mandate. The reporting relationship to the PM does not necessarily
give them a higher profile in government, but they could be a distraction from the core
functions of the Center since there is no technical expertise with which to monitor their
activities. Some of the agencies/commissions could stay with the CoG, but Government should
develop a set of criteria to limit these as much as possible. (A potential set of principles with
which to evaluate the agencies/commissions is found in the CoG report.)
4
The preparatory meeting, which occurs 2 days prior to the government meeting, provides the venue where
ministries can announce and review upcoming initiatives.
7
The internal apparatus of the GSG should also be restructured to emphasize the policy
coordination and policy prioritization functions, streamline the responsibilities of the General
Secretary, and improve the linkages to the Prime Minister’s Advisors. With 18 direct reports,
the General Secretary position of the GSG is not structured to enable it to play a genuine
leadership role in policy planning and coordination; the span of control could be reduced to five
or six. The diversity of functions in the GSG is quite broad, and one should examine which
directorates and departments are important to the core policy and legal coordination mandate
of the GSG; the others should be shifted elsewhere. The Public Policy Directorate (PPD) has an
especially important role to play, but should be structured around six core divisions – four policy
sectors, one central planning and monitoring unit, and one project management unit to absorb
the various time‐limited projects that currently distract key staff. PPD’s effectiveness would also
be enhanced with formal linkages to the Prime Minister’s Advisors and protocols to regulate the
ongoing working relationship.
Budgeting and Strategic Management
While the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) could bring important improvements over time to Romania’s
public finance management system, the functional reviews revealed problems that appear to go
beyond the immediate mandate of the FRL to address. The FRL is clearly targeted at problems in
aggregate fiscal discipline that have manifested themselves in recent years. Weak linkages between
planning and budgeting, and the inability of Ministry of Public Finance to adequately control aggregate
expenditures, are at the heart of the rationale behind the FRL. Yet, ministries also face problems with
the predictability of budget inflows, managing multi‐year expenditure commitments such as investment
projects, transparency of information about budget execution, and cumbersome regulations for
executing the budget.
The Ministry of Public Finance has primary responsibility for management of public spending, but
some important sub‐functions are under‐performing relative to what one would see in other EU
countries. Qualified and experienced staff are at work in the ministry, but the functions are not
necessarily organized in a way that promotes performance. National strategic planning fails to work
effectively and the MOPF is not structured or staffed to provide substantial policy support; but rather it
is focused on expenditure management. Information on expenditures and commitments is improving,
but is still not well‐mastered by the Treasury in order to have a timely assessment of cash positions.
Revenue collection as a share of GDP has been weaker than in other countries that have lower tax rates.
Procedures for executing the budget reflect high levels of controlling regulations, though not all add
benefit (e.g., the cumbersome monthly credit opening procedures and the tight controls on
reallocations by second‐tier spending units). Some important functions, like oversight of SOEs, are
generally missing altogether.
Political leaders in Romania will have difficulty delivering on their policy objectives without
substantial reforms in both the process and the institutional arrangements for managing budgets.
Budget management is the most effective instrument available to governments in setting strategic
priorities and managing accountability. Better service delivery in line ministries will come through
8
changes in financial management processes and rules. However, institutional changes are needed
within MOPF to transform it from being primarily an accounting body to a policy management
organization and also to help Romania realize its potential for revenue mobilization. Unlike ministries of
finance in more advanced countries, Romania’s MOPF lacks both the capacity and the mandate to
challenge ministries on the value‐for‐money in public programs.
Three issues should be highlighted among the areas for reform:
1. strategic planning and budgetingmust be more closely integrated institutionally to manage
policy trade‐offs and assure policy compliance
2. information on budget execution needs to be improved to facilitate management in line
ministries,
3. control mechanisms need to be evaluated for their effectiveness and streamlined when
necessary
1. Align Strategic Planning and Budget Processes for Effective Policy Implementation
Budgeting and strategic management must be integrated for political leaders to have adequate tools
to direct the bureaucracy and to hold it accountable for performance. Strategic planning is a vital
process for the government to engage in, and technical assistance over the past several years was aimed
at developing techniques for strategic planning by line ministries. However, as long as strategic planning
is disconnected from the budget process it will be a time consuming and marginally useful process. In
Romania the responsibilities for strategic planning and budget planning have been persistently split and
poorly coordinated between the GSG and the MOPF. This assures that neither process will work as well
as it should.
Romania needs an institutional structure that enables discussion of policy priorities and trade‐offs in
greater depth than can be expected in the weekly meeting of the Government. The arbitrage among
sectors can only be done in the Center of Government with support from the MOPF. However, the
current institutional arrangements suggest that neither the Prime Minister’s Office, nor the GSG have
adequate capacity to play this role. That capacity could be built up intensively by attracting some of the
best and brightest staff to work in a new policy department located either in the GSG or under the PM.
The mandate for them to play this role must be worked out through new rules of procedure between
the PM’s Office and the GSG and through a new budget preparation calendar that better integrates
budgeting and planning.
The FRL and the new European Council decisions on budgeting in the Member States will make
integration of strategic planning and budgeting by the Center an imperative. Fiscal impact
assessments will be at the heart of the new process. New policy initiatives should not be considered
without having a realistic method for financing the activity over the medium term. Skills to conduct
medium term impact assessments need to be progressively developed over time. Although such
analysis is done already, its impact on policy has not always been strong.
9
Strategies developed by line ministries have to be linked to a realistic resource envelope for them to
have any credibility – in some sectors this may lead to substantial consolidation of their activities.
Major ministries such as Education, Transport, and Agriculture all have some documents that could be
presented as strategies, but the link to the medium term budget forecasts was universally missing.
Strategic planning documents tend to reflect broad visions for sector development and not what can be
realistically financed – evidence of that is especially strong in the Transport sector, where funding
requirements for the existing portfolio of investment projects far exceed available resources. Since
many sectors have persistent and legitimate development needs, this will necessarily mean
consolidation or contraction in the scope of services that can be provided. The defacto reality is that
funding is spread thinly across more activities and programs than can be adequately funded. As a result
programs can still be administered but they do not necessarily perform.
Requiring alignment of the strategic plans with the medium term expenditure framework should be a
first step for the Government towards a more performance‐oriented management culture. Since
most ministries have needs that outstrip budgets, the Government needs to use the budget process to
encourage ministries to right‐size their policy commitments with the available resource envelope. Only
when operational programs reflect realistic funding, can the ministries be held accountable for their
performance. By identifying and cutting back on low‐priority activities, the Government would also
create fiscal space for new initiatives that better reflect their goals. Over time, the Government could
introduce performance indicators that reflect the desired outcomes and/or intermediate outcomes that
the public should expect. Program evaluations focused on efficiency and effectiveness could be an
additional tool for periodically restructuring poorly performing or poorly targeted programs.
2. StrengthenBudget execution
The Agriculture and Rural Development review highlights the concern of many managers that
theyneed more useful information on budget execution for effective management and accountability.
Although the current budget structure complies with the requirements of the finance law and provides
an adequate basis for accounting purposes, the structure does not make it useful for strategic and
performance management. Managers expressed a need to be able see expenditures on a departmental
and program basis so that they can give feedback on how program implementation is proceeding.5
Although there have been some attempts coordinated by GSG and MOPF to develop program budgets,
these are disconnected from the actual day‐to‐day management of the budget, and therefore, come
across as a one‐off exercise.
Uncertainty around the quarterly spending levels can undermine effective program management in
line ministries. Quarterly spending ceilings do not always take into account the cyclicality of a ministry’s
funding needs. For example, in agriculture an especially high level of disbursements needs to occur in
the second quarter of the year to avoid penalties from the EC, and therefore, allocations that are
weighted toward the 4th quarter have less usefulness. Frequent changes in the approved budget, also
5
A survey carried out during the functional review revealed that only 30 percent of MARD staff know how much
budget is available for the activities they work on.
10
create havoc for effective management by program managers, although it is expected that
implementation of the FRL may help to reduce the need for budget rectifications.
3. Streamline the control environment for greater effectiveness
While financial controls are necessary to assure appropriate use of funds, they need to be applied
wisely so that they facilitate good management rather than undermine it. Many managers expressed
frustration that the financial management processes are overly complex and rely on too many manual
processes. For example, the process of “credit opening” was cited as problematic in both Agriculture
and Education sectors because substantial delays result from the large number of checks and
verifications. The Agriculture report cites an example where over 40 signatures are required for
subsidies to a single farmer, with work done on the basis of hardcopies that have to be re‐typed. The
transmission of payment order to Treasury is also manual. The Law on Public Finance (500/2002)
requires spending authorities to bring paper payment orders (ordonantare) to the Treasury branch
offices. The process is cumbersome and time consuming, involving significant paperwork and many
signatures. The process could be automated, but problems related to the granting of legal authorization
for electronic signature are preventing the automation. Other managers felt that more flexibility should
be given to shifting budgets among chapters, sub‐chapters or titles between quarters, as long as
expenditures remain within their respective annual appropriation (otherwise, budget rectification
should continue to be required).
Although Romania’s public procurement framework is generally sound, the actual procedures
implemented in ministries tend to be cumbersome and risk‐averse. The ARD sector provided the most
in‐depth look at public procurement procedures among the six sectors. It revealed that MARDand its
subsidiary organizations had very clear internal procedures, but with too many steps, internal
documents, and clearances that did not add value. Each contract is signed by representatives of the
legal department, procurement department, financial department, preventive control unit (internal and
external), and the Minister. While the extensive internal procedures may give a perception of
transparency and openness, they do not lead to efficiency or cost‐effectiveness in public procurement.
The external public audit institution was not included in the Functional Reviews, but the role of the
Court of Accounts and the climate of control that exists in Romania should be part of a future
assessment. There was a common perceptionin ministries that some of the control measures that are in
place are intended to avoid problems with the Court of Accounts. Procedures are made more detailed
in order to avoid deviations from the established procedures. Since inputs are easier to control than
outputs, the focus is very much on managing inputs. Multiple clearances, reflected for example, in the
number of signatures required to process a financial transaction –may not provide value‐added in terms
of financial control.
Some areas that have the biggest scope for financial and economic losses – such as state‐owned
enterprises – largely escape an effective control environment. The Ministry of Finance, for example,
exercises no oversight of state‐owned companies and does not establish a financial performance
framework for such enterprises – though some create quasi‐fiscal deficits by operating at a loss. What is
11
more, there is neither an audit requirement on these companies, nor an obligation for those which
operate in competitive markets (e.g., energy) to sell competitively for improved profitability. The
Transport review highlights how one of these companies (railways) generates arrears that manifest
themselves in other parts of the public and private sectors, including the social security budget.
Human Resource Management
Human resource management stands out as one of the most important challenges to performance
across the six sectors’ functional reviews. Senior managers consistently point to the difficulties in being
able to accomplish their objectives because of the rigidities in human resource management, the
relative scarcity of high skilled professionals, and the difficulty in motivating and retaining those who do
perform well. Public sector compensation remains the most high‐profile issue, but the doubling of
salaries from 2004‐2008 showed that pay alone is not sufficient to address the substantial weaknesses in
human resource management. Recent efforts to rationalize the pay system are worthwhile, but they
should not be mistaken as sufficient to address the core performance challenges. Although Romania has
benefited from substantial funding for public administration reform over the past decade, some policies
and practices stilldistinguish it from more advanced EU member states.
Though the public administration contains many dedicated and professional staff, the system cannot
function effectively with the existing human resource policies and institutional framework in place.
Human resource needs to be looked at comprehensively, because it comprises a broad set of policies
and practices that have becomebarriers to performance for many ministries. Romania has put in place
the legal and regulatory framework for a modern civil service, but the actual implementation falls short
of the objectives. Indeed, one of the key challenges to reform in HRM is the lack of a clear institutional
champion, with primary responsibility to modernize human resource management across the public
sector. The second major concern is the high level of political influence over senior civil service
positions.
The political leadership of Romania should develop a common vision for the public administration
that encompasses five broad categories of reform related to HRM:
1. Professionalization of the senior civil service
2. Strengthening recruitment and promotion to focus on merit and performance
3. Updating organizational structures and staffing structures to support business needs
4. Rationalizing the pay system and level of employment,
5. Building institutional accountability for strategic HRM across the public sector
12
1. Professionalize Senior Management functions
In a modern democratic state overall responsibility for policy, strategy and outcomes rests at the
political level; however, authority and responsibility for executive and administrative decision‐
makingnormally rests with professional civil servants and managers. This is to ensure continuity and
to prevent political interference in day to day technocratic or administrative decision making. The
administrative independence and integrity of the Civil Service is seen not only as important for efficiency
and effectiveness but also as an essential safeguard against corruption. Romania Civil Service
Legislation (Law 188/1999 as amended by Law 252/2006) aimed to establish a classical unitary
Civil Service led by a corps of professional, stable and politically neutral managers and administrators.
This was intended to change the relationship between political and administrative functions. The reality
in Romania however is that the CivilService/Public Service falls short of the model of a professional,
stable Civil Service based on competition and merit.
Staff and public perceptions are that appointments to senior positions depends more on political
patronage than on merit or ability. High levels of turnover in senior posts (up to 17%), the doubling of
temporary appointments at the time of elections, and the large number of displaced or redundant
‘Higher’ civil servants occupying posts in the corps of government inspectors suggest the validity of this
perception. Due to frequent political changes this results in high turnover, disruption and a loss of
continuity, knowledge and experience in senior posts. The problem of high turnover exists in many
areas of the Public Sector including SOE’s. A small sample of SOE’s indicated a change of General
Director every year for 6 years. Political involvement in the selection process is facilitated by the low
level of experience (5 years) required for entry to senior level positions and by the failure to specify and
rigorously test for relevant management/technical skills and competencies for entry.
Administrative overload and delay result from the fact that decision making in Ministries and
Agencies remains concentrated at the ‘political’ level. Ad hoc decision making predominates (as
reflected by the high number of emergency ordinances and amendments to legislation). Centralized
decision making is due both to the reluctance of politicians to delegate tasks and responsibilities and to
the reluctance of staff to take responsibility. The role of senior civil servants and their decision making
powers is ambiguous, and at least in some ministries, they are outnumbered by political appointees who
duplicate their functions.6The Government’s recent reduction in the number of State Secretary posts
improves the situation only marginally, and a much more detailed review of the number and role of
political appointees (Ministers, State Secretaries, Advisors and Cabinets) needs to be carried out.
Romania’s administrative system lacks a high level non‐political management structure overseeing
operational management. While there is a Secretary General position in each line ministry, its role and
responsibility is often marginalized – i.e., focused on administrative support functions ‐ because it
6
In MARD for example, there were 25 political appointees, counting Minister, state secretaries, political advisors,
and cabinet staff.
13
lacks line management functions and oversight over operational units. The politically appointed State
Secretaries often appear to perform fully operational line management functions. Organizational charts
show Director/Director Generals reporting directly to State Secretaries and even to Ministers. Less than
30% of ministerial policy units are reporting directly to the General Secretaries of the ministry, while for
the EU Affairs units the percentage is even lower.7Moreover, because the organizational structure of the
ministries can be quite fragmented (see the FR report on MOPF), State Secretaries are effectively
encouraged to play a larger coordination role than they should. The relatively low level of professional –
as opposed to political – engagement in operational decisions is not unique to ministries though. Even
SOE’s which should be expected to have a considerable measure of operational independence are
largely micromanaged at the political level; there is limited delegation to professional staff or
management autonomy provided to the General Director.
Management culture and the control environment may contribute to the limited delegation and
bottlenecks in decision‐making. Top managers do not necessarily trust the managers below them and
their staff, nor do they have time to develop their staff so that they can trust them. Lower level
managers on the other hand are reluctant to take responsibility, lest they be penalized for mistakes. This
situation has two consequences. The first is that there are long delays in action; the second, perhaps
even more importantly, is that high‐level managers, who should focus most of the time on strategic
issues and communication, focus most of the time on operational issues ‐‐ leaders have little time to
think, to strategize and to lead. Lack of accountability and fear of being blamed for mistakes create an
overall atmosphere in which responsibility and decision making at lower levels in the hierarchy are
avoided, procedures are lengthened (e.g. large number signatures being required for fairly basic and
simple actions) and where staff and lower level manager shy away from problematic issues rather than
engage in joint attempts to find solutions.
Though development a professional cadre of senior civil service managers will require a long‐term
perspective, there are some immediate actions that the Government can take to begin the process:
a. Setting the framework for clearly distinguishing management/administrative
roles,responsibilities, and functions, with the aim of pushing greater accountability to the
senior civil service and enabling ministers to focus more on strategic direction and
communication. This would be initiated through revised Management Manuals and Procedures
(ROFs).
b. Increasing the technical requirements for entry into Director level and above positions, based
around a set of job‐related competencies, skills, and relevant experience that must be met. The
auditing/monitoring of the appointment process should be extended to these positions to
assure compliance, and future turnover should be analyzed.Political involvement in selection
should be limited to ‘High Ranking’ civil servants as envisaged by Article 12 Act No. 188/1999.
c. Limiting the use of “Temporary Appointments” to prevent the bypassing of entry restrictions
7
Only 28 percent of public policy units reported to the General Secretary, compared with 36 percent of
Economic/Budget units and 14 percent of European Affairs Units.
14
d. Reducing the number of political appointees in ministriesand strengthening the role of the
General Secretary. The General Secretary should be provided with greater decision making
powers and should also be expected to delegate decision making to subordinates. All Director
Generals/Directors should report directly to the Secretary General. The number of political
appointees should be reduced ‐ not more than 1 or maximum 2 state secretaries for each
ministry, acting essentially as deputy‐minister. Consideration should be given to removing all
political appointees from Agencies/Institutions which have primarily an executive,
administrative, or service delivery role and establishing effective accountability and monitoring
mechanisms.
2. Enhance Merit‐based Recruitment and Promotion of Staff
Recruitment and selection within the public administration is problematic, due to a focus on legalistic
compliance with regulations and procedures, and insufficient attention to assuring that the necessary
skills and competences are linked to the institutions’ mandate and functions. The functional review
reports mention that job descriptions for publicly announced positions are poorly developed – which is
likely to impact negatively on highly qualified people applying for vacant positions matching their skills
and expertise. The announcements include insufficient specifics on the required technical and
management competences, and the tasks to be fulfilled. The request for professional expertise is limited
to the number of years of general experience in profession. No specification is given of required skills in
modern public governance (e.g., strategic planning, policy analysis and design, project management,
financial analysis).
Although there has been an attempt to introduce performance management principles in the Civil
Service through the introduction of job descriptions and annual performance appraisal, the lack of
clear strategic objectives at the organisation level has inhibited its development. Job descriptions and
Performance Appraisal documents have tended to be descriptive and fail to focus on key measurable
results and relevant skills and competencies. Although training and development needs are identified as
part of the appraisal process the lack of resources prevents follow up action. The processes are largely
seen by management and staff as a time consuming task that adds little value.
Individual performance assessment based on job descriptions is only partially practiced. Performance
assessment is not so much job‐ and task oriented but generic. The National Agency for Civil Servants
(NACS) provides standardized templates for carrying out the assessment against the activities described
in the job descriptions. Since these lack clarity in terms of objectives, tasks, associated activities and
timelines, the appraisal can provide only limited information on the performance output and therefore,
is of little use to management. The ministry annual appraisal system is therefore seen more as an
administrative burden than a tool to assess output and thus, improve job performance. Though results
are stored, they are barely used for providing feedback to the staff involved or to management, and
thus rarely lead to action being taken to improve performance. The fact that retrenching unproductive
staff is extremely difficult may contribute to the lack of interest among managers in more targeted job
performance assessment. The inadequacy of current performance assessment procedures also means
15
that when personnel cuts have to be made, there are few or no criteria to retrench staff on the basis of
their job performance.
The prospect of ‘promotion’ is normally an important feature of any career system , as it serves to
motivate staff for higher performance and helps the institution identify those ready for greater
responsibility.The current processes appear to work reasonably well for appointments to junior posts –
assuring that they are largely based on merit. However, political involvement in senior appointments
is perceived to diminish the career prospects of those who do not have political connections.
To make recruitment and promotion of staff more closely linked to specific job experience and
competencies, there are several actions that the government could take in the short to medium term:
a. Upgrade the mandate and capacity within NACS to shift focus from legal compliance to
supporting ministries in the advancement of two core HRM objectives:
i. Attracting and retaining required skills,
ii. Ensuring meritocratic, depoliticized HRM practices (e.g., in recruitment/selection,
promotion, and dismissals), and
b. Roll out a plan for revising job descriptions starting with senior posts
c. Revise the performance appraisal system to take into account job specific priorities and to
improve linkage to pay system
d. Reduce the number of senior civil service posts filled by people recruited from outside the civil
service.
3. Realign organizational structures and staffing
The implementation of Government Ordinance 22/2009 and Law 161/2003 – which set universal
management‐staff ratios8 – hasresulted in dysfunctional structures in ministries.Ministries have
become very fragmented, overly hierarchical, less effective in coordination, and sometimes duplicative
in some support functions. Ministries need to adopt organizational structures that fit their business
needs rather than be forced to create departments and units to comply with rigid norms on span of
control. International experience and management theory shows there are no management‐staff norms
that can be universally applied. The key factors in determining ‘span of control’ are the competencies of
managers and staff, the similarity or dissimilarity of the work being supervised, the levels of problems,
the existence of clear operating standards and rules, the complexity of the task etc. Although the
imposition of ceilings may have been a successful cost control measure to prevent upward grade drift, it
creates inefficient and ineffective structures.
Government should remove rigid management‐staff ratios and enable ministries to restructure
according to business needs. The government should develop guidance/criteria for ministries on
restricting that would make it feasible to create flatter, less hierarchical organizational structures. To
8
According to the regulation 5 staff required for an office, 7 for a service, 15 for a Directorate, and 25 for a General
Directorate.
16
guard against potential abuses, the staffing levels and organization structures should be submitted at
least annually to MOPF (for financial consistency) and to the institution responsible for overseeing public
administration modernization for their review and clearance.
Non‐political management of ministries is highly fragmented because of the multiplication of first tier
operational units. In the MOPF there are a total of 35 first‐tier operational units below the secretary
level. Policy coordination and prioritization can only be effectively carried out therefore by one of the
State Secretaries. While policy prioritization that encompasses all the policy functions of the ministry
can only be made by the Minister himself. With this level of fragmentation it is virtually impossible for
the non‐political management of the ministry to play a significant role in the decision‐making and
prioritization for the sector as a whole.
Ministries need to be able to adjust the composition of positions to fit business needs and to value
technical non‐managerial posts within the organization. Ministries generally have enough staff overall,
but they do not necessarily have the right staff in the right positions. The public administration will
increasingly need people with unique, highly marketable technical skills to perform jobs. Career paths
need to exist within the public administration for those individuals to be recruited and rewarded fairly as
technical staff. Creating managerial positions should not be the only way forministries to employ such
individuals . Moreover, ministries need to have flexibility to adapt their staffing structures as business
needs change. For example, the Ministry of Public Finance’s long‐term transformation into a more
policy‐oriented and less compliance‐oriented institution, should involve needing fewer entry level
clerical staff for transactions, and many more mid‐level professional staff with higher‐value added
responsibilities. Policy units may need several people who are paid rates that are comparable to senior
managers, but without the administrative responsibilities of a manager.
4. Rationalize the pay system and level of employment
Ministries consistently see the competitiveness of public sector pay as one of the challenges to
recruiting and retaining quality public sector employees. Although a Unitary Pay Law (UPL) has been
approved by the Government to reform the public sector pay system, implementation of the proposed
new salary levels could take several years depending on the evolution of Government finances.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the proposed new salaries would be sufficient to enable the public
sector to recruit and retain those whose skills are the most marketable to the private sector because
there is no effective benchmarking done to the wider labor market. Generous payments for seniority
are one of the historical practices that is retained (with only slight modification) even though they are at
odds with a more performance‐oriented public administration.
Internal equity remains a key concern of ministry staff and a barrier to performance. Many of the
bonuses and allowances have been consolidated into base pay in the past two years, but the 75 per cent
top‐up for management of EU funds is still cited as one of the larger distortions, and it is cited as a
barrier to cooperation across departments. In addition, the pay system continues to pay generous
benefits based on number of years experience – regardless of whether that experience is related to the
job or has any bearing on their current job performance. Job titles continue to be used as the primary
17
instrument for setting pay without taking into account the specific content of each job and how the
weight of responsibility may differ across institutions.
External competitiveness of pay maybe difficult to address in the long term unless government can
either significantly increase the revenue levels or decrease public employment. Blind implementation
of cross‐the‐board the cuts in employment are rarely productive. Instead the government should
consider what areas are either are less efficiently managed or that are lower policy priorities and target
those with larger average cuts. Some pockets of the public administration may need additional people.
Greater yields in revenue collection are possible with application of more modern business processes by
the tax authorities.
5. Strengthen Institutional Leadership over HRM
HRM should be a strategic priority of the Government, but the institutional mechanisms for the
development and co‐ordination of HR policy across the Public Service are inadequate. Responsibility
for the formulation of Human Resource policy is fragmented across various ministries and institutions
(MAI, NACS, MLFSP, MOPF, MERYS and MoH) and implementation is through different legal
instruments. Although the functions, responsibilities and powers of the respective institutions are clear
in legal terms, in practice problems are caused by overlapping and conflicting responsibilities. This has
resulted in inconsistency, policy confusion, and delays in decision making. Some of the institutions lack
the authority and status to achieve results whilst others lack capacity and resources. There are also
gapsin responsibility for key areas. Responsible Ministers are also understandably distracted by the
other major policy issues (e.g. Public Order and Security) within their mandate9. The fragmentation of
the HR policy role and supporting legal instruments together with absence of a political champion with
the dedicated responsibility of taking forward pay reform and other key HR issues in the Government
meeting, helps to explain the limited success achieved in some areas over the last 18 years and the gaps
and shortcomings that exist.
Overall responsibility for the formulation and co‐ordination of HR policy across the Public Service
should rest with a single state institution to ensure consistency and common standards. This is the
model adopted by the majority of EU 15 members and has proved particularly successful in Asia and in
countries going through a period oftransition.The Central Unit should have overall responsibility for the
formulation of HR policy proposals and the dissemination of best practice. Areas of policy responsibility
should include pay and grading, recruitment, selection, career development, training and redeployment
and the efficient and effective use of resources. This does not require the micro management of all
staffing and personnel issues by the Central Unit. Existing institutions (e.g. Health and Education) would
remain responsible for formulating their own HR strategies and would continue to submit HR policy
proposals. The latter would however need to be endorsed by the central Unit prior to submission for
government approval. The role of MOPF would remain unchanged in that all policy proposals would
also need to be endorsed with regard to ‘affordability’. MOPF and the central Unit should have joint
responsibility for the development of IT based personnel and payroll systems.
9
The National Agency for Civil Service reports to the Ministry of Administration and Interior.
18
Strong central co‐ordination and monitoring arrangements are needed in respect of the broader
modernisation agenda. Both cut across institutional and sectoral boundaries. Action is therefore
needed to ensure strategies and policies are coherent and complement rather than contradict each
other, to ensure harmonisation and proper sequencing, to determine priorities and monitor progress
and to provide the mechanisms for consultation and co‐operation across government.
A Department of Public Administration and Modernization – under the direction of the Prime Minister
‐‐ could be established with responsibility for both HRM and the co‐ordination and monitoring of all
major initiatives being pursued under the program for ‘Modernizing’ Public Administration. The
responsibilities and staffing of other Ministries and institutions (e.g. MLFSP, MAI, NACS, CUPAR) should
be adjusted accordingly. This could be headed by a State Secretary, similar to the Department for
European Affairs, with dedicated responsibility for HRM and Administrative Reform/Modernization
issues. The proposal would involve limited additional cost since existing staff in NACS, MLPSP and
CUPAR could be used. Detailed action plans would need to be drawn up with respect to the
Modernization Program.
Sector Governance and Structure
Ministries are not providing the strategic leadership and accountability for sector performance that
they should be. In part this is due to lack of clear separation between the roles of purchaser of services
and provider of services. In both Education and Transport sectors, much of the delivery of services is
conducted by subordinated institutions. Yet, the ministries remain involved in operational decisions to
such an extent that it blurs the clear chain of accountability that must be established. The involvement
in operational matters also becomes a distraction from managing sector performance information and
developing strategic management.
In areas where intra‐sectoral responsibilities are overlapping amongst institutions, there needs to be a
more robust framework for coordination. For example, in the ARDsector some policy areas fall entirely
outside the scope of the MARD portfolio (e.g., cadastre), while othes are shared between MARD and
various other line ministries (e.g., forestry, water management and land reclamation). The split of daily
tasks and responsibilities between MARDand most other agencies is generally clear, but strategic and
operational coordination is weak or missing. In the same vein, clear strategic coordination is needed
between MADR and the MOPF in the taxation of farmers and agro‐processors.
The relationship between the Ministry and the subordinated entities needs to be redefined in the
Transport sector. There is a particularly pressing need to establish an arms‐length relationship between
the Ministry of Transport and the operating companies. The companies are legally structured to operate
on a commercial basis and their management needs to be protected from the potential political
interference. Accountability of the companies would in turn be enhanced through the establishment of
professional boards of directors, and more transparent standards for reporting.
19
Policy outcomes in the Agriculture and Transport sectors would benefit from a well‐developed and
comprehensive strategy for the sector that reflects the opportunities and challenges facing each
sector within a medium term budget envelope. Without a consistent strategic framework with which
to guide policy choices within the sector, ministriescan become over‐extended, beyond their ability to
deliver. A similar risk lies in Education, where a “strategy” exists but without the benefit of a costing
exercise that would enable it to be translated into an operational program. Across the three sectors,
strategic plans tend to be vague and disconnected from the operational planning. Uncertainties around
medium term budget allocations have played a part in discouraging policy rationalization. Moreover, a
performance divide clearly exists between the agencies and the ministries that are to report to them –
with the latter generally have weaker human resource capacity to draw upon.
Fragmentation of the public administration is reflected in the quantity of local administrative
structures that are used. These add unnecessary overhead costs to the public administration and
often impede effective service delivery because of the challenges to coordination they present. An
extensive network of regional office structures in Agriculture could be consolidated to provide for more
effective implementation of policy and services to beneficiaries. In public finance there is an extensive
network of local offices for Treasury and for Revenue Administration. These continue to be needed by
the Ministry because of the heavy reliance on manual processes and the lack of centrally automated
systems. In the Education sector, resources go into preserving an extensive network of schools despite
steadily declining school age populations. By keeping open little used schools, resources are diverted
from other pressing needs within the sector that might have a higher impact on educational
achievement.
Knowledge Management and Communication
Critical information needed for policy planning and decision‐making are often unavailable, and some
information is not used effectively. Although information technology was not a primary focus of the
functional review, the absence of good systems with which to capture and analyze information was a
persistent frustration for managers. At a strategic level, most ministries lack the kind of data needed to
evaluate performance and to understand the potential causes of poor performance. In Agriculture the
ministry’s leadership recognized that it lacks the information needed to see which programs and
regional offices are working better, and which ones call for corrective action. In the Education sector as
well, the Ministry does not take advantage of data on national testing to assess regularly what schools
are performing well and what factors might contribute to it. Important financial information is
sometimes lacking and becomes an impediment to better management. The Treasury’s cash
management responsibilities would be strengthened if more routine, transactional procedures could be
automated, and if the Treasury were to adopt an integrated financial management information system
that could consolidate data that currently resides in separate systems.
Yet, the key challenge in Romania is not to build bigger databases; it is that the demand for program
information or analysis is weak. As the report on Education pointed out, information is at best seen as
an administrative or technical asset, but it is not seen as a strategic instrument of policy development or
communication. In the Education sector, information is there in the National Data Base of Education
20
(NDBE) but it has not received resources for updates or maintenance since 2007 and is being serviced
free of charge by a private sector agency. High‐level decision‐makers and managers in the sector are
rarely asking for information unless they have requests for information from Parliament, NGOs, or the
press. Some directorates have chosen to develop their own small data bases, further perpetuating a
fragmentation of information.
An orientation toward “clients” of services and communication with them on the quality of services is
missing from much of the public administration. Public consultation on new laws tends to be done
formally, but without a genuine commitment to integrate such feedback. The laws are posted for 30
days on a website for comment, but genuine consultation with the affected stakeholders is rarely done
prior to the government decision. The national budget process is primarily focused on the allocation of
inputs, with virtually no reporting made on the impact of the activities. Even within the ministries,
reporting on performance is rarely required by Ministers unless it is in the context of an EU‐financed
project or a Parliamentary request. Ministries do not have the culture of conducting user surveys to
evaluate how beneficiaries view their services.
21
Annex: Sector Specific Reform Recommendations
In addition to reforms that have a cross‐cutting impact on public administration, there are also actions
that can be taken at the sector level with direct implications for sector performance. The individual
sector reports provide a detailed assessment of the challenges and opportunities to improve
performance. These reflect a combination of short and medium term actions that should be
undertaken. Prioritization of the actions according to their feasibility and potential impact is primarily a
responsibility of the Ministry concerned. However, the Bank has offered its own prioritization of actions
that are the most critical for impacting performance. This is only a subset of the action plans that were
presented to ministries for their consideration. The key areas are presented below.
Transport
Objective/Issue Sequenced Actions Implemen‐ Responsi‐ Target/Outcome
tation bility
Period
1.1 Strategy & 1.1.1 Prepare and publish a brief < 6 months MOT Stable sector planning
Policy but realistic medium‐term national framework.
transport strategy covering Enhanced
strategic objectives, policies and accountability for
proposed programs for the next 5 sector results.
years Transparent costing of
sector policies.
1.2 Main State 1.2.1 Privatize CFR Marfă as soon < 18 months MOT / Economically viable and
Institutions for as possible in a way that will allow Government profitable freight
transport delivery it the opportunity to successfully railway industry.
compete on equal terms in the
freight transport industry
1.5 1.5.2 Reorganize the MOT into < 6 months MOT Consistency in the
Administrative more substantial and multi‐modal MOT’s strategy and
apparatus General Directorates that will help policies.
reduce gaps and overlaps in Elimination of gaps and
functions overlaps in functions
within the MOT.
2.1 Shareholdings 2.1.1 Delegate stewardship of a < 6 months Government Better achievement of
majority of the companies’ shares (with the State’s
to another ministry proposals shareholding
from MOT) objectives, as opposed
to the current MOT
shareholding rights
dominated by day‐to‐
day political
consequences of the
decisions made by
Boards.
2.3 Chief 2.3.2 Require that CEOs be selected < 6 months MOT Higher professionalism
22
Executive Officers by a merit‐based process with and performance of
defined Board involvement Management.
Limited political
patronage.
3.3 Company 3.3.2 Make a decision on a smaller < 18 months Government Railway infrastructure
Management CFR network of higher average traffic (with costs contained and
SA density that will protect core proposals railway infrastructure
passenger and freight markets, but from MOT, funding is efficiently
give Romania a railway network CFR SA) utilized.
more commensurate with its traffic
flows
4.1 Public 4.1.1 Rationalize MOT’s public < 6 months MOT / Better rationalization of
investment investment program, discard some Government investments.
management projects and defer others to future Refocus on EU funded
years, therefore creating fiscal investments.
space for Romanian counterpart Free budgetary
funding of EU funded transport commitments from
projects, which should be given programs that are not
priority economically justified
in a time of fiscal crisis.
4.1.4 Prohibit further pledging of < 6 months MOT and Adequate funding for
Rovignette revenues RNCMNR road maintenance and
management.
Eliminate discretionary
decision on the use of
Rovignette outside the
normal budgetary
channels.
Education
Objective/Issue Sequenced Actions Implemen‐ Responsi‐ Target/Outcome
tation bility
Period
23
utilization of capacity to manage and implement (a), (b) and implementation and
available current projects and absorb future (d)]; greater absorption of
European project project funds: (a) Shift project Central future project funds
funds management to a project Government
implementation unit (keeping + EC [for (c)]
matters of substance in the hands
of units in Ministry where the
projects belong functionally), (b)
increase number of staff in this
unit,(c) use external contract staff,
and (d) train staff in project
management, procurement and
disbursement
4.1Optimize the 4.1. Identify schools that need to < 6 months Ministry, (a) Increase in average
number of be closed and schools that will together class and school size;
schools and absorb students from them with
adjust the size of 4.1.2Rehabilitate, repair, expand 18‐36 (b) Growth rate in
regional
the teaching force the absorbing schools months expenditure per
to better fit the inspectors
4.1.3 Provide buses for the 18‐36 student is reduced;
size and transportation of children and months
dispersion of close identified schools (c) school closures do
school population 4.1.4 Put in place a list of < 6 months not impair access to
“protected schools” whose
education
closures would impair access to
education (because no nearby
(d) education
school exists)
4.1.5 Identify catchment areas and < 6 months environment of, and
schools that need to be put quality of instruction
together in consortia received by, students
4.1.6 Increase the number of < 18 months from closed schools
school consortia and provide improves
support to improve their
effectiveness
4.1.7 Assess the effectiveness of < 18 months
school consortia
4.1.8Continue implementation of < 18 months Ministry,
per student financing including the together
creation of a funding formula for with MOPF
non‐capital financing of schools
and giving principals spending
flexibility.
24
Agriculture
Objective/Issue Sequenced Actions Implemen‐ Responsi‐ Target/Outcome
tation bility
Period
Public Finance
Objective/Issue Sequenced Actions Implemen‐ Responsi‐ Target/Outcome
tation bility
Period
25
contestability by increased
transparency and independent
review of Macro Fiscal Framework
by Fiscal Council (as mandated by
FRL). Enhance independence and
status of the MOPF Macro‐Fiscal
Unit by subordinating it directly to
the Minister of Finance.
Publish Fiscal Risk Statement,
including sensitivity analysis.
1.2 Preserve the MOPF’s right to <6 Months MOPF Expenditure growth
Institutionalize unilaterally adjust spending conforms to 3 percent
Top Down requests of Line Ministries if Deficit Target
Budgeting submissions exceed ceilings. Allow
Line Ministries to allocate
resources within the ceiling.
Institutionalize a Cabinet level <18 Months MOPF/GSG/
Ministerial Finance Committee Cabinet
Process as part of the budget
process to create collectively
binding commitments to ceilings
aligned with Government priorities.
Integrate the Budget Policy
Strategy (FRL requirement) with
the budget process and ensure
consistent fiscal targets.
3.2 Improve Prepare Specifications for <18 Months MOPF Improved timeliness
Financial Computerized General Treasury and reliability of
Reporting Ledger. financial reporting,
Capability Initiate Integration of accounting <18 Months MOPF including on
and reporting system with the commitments
Treasury payment system.
Build interface to transfer
approved budget to the treasury
data base. Record commitments in
the central treasury data base.
Further develop computerized 18‐36 MOPF
treasury general ledger TG/L Months
module that accounts for all
financial transactions related to
budget, commitments, and cash.
Automate Reporting Function from
TG/L
26
Center of Government
Objective/Issue Sequenced Actions Implemen‐ Responsi‐ Target/Outcome
tation bility
Period
27
Competition
Objective/Issue Sequenced Actions Implemen‐ Responsi‐ Target/Outcome
tation bility
Period
28
directly connected with operations
with which they are involved
3.8.2 Establishing through < 6 months RCC Better controls in place
legislation or internal regulation, when recruiting new
prohibitions on the hiring of close staff and introduced a
relatives and severely limit the higher level of pre‐
future hiring of relatives of current employment screening,
staff, managers, and Board including checking close
members relatives record
declarations.
29
Project title: Functional Review of the Central Public Administration in Romania - I
Project co-financed by European Social Fund
This report does not necessarily represent the position of the European Union and the
Romanian Government.