LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CASES

SECTION 5

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts: Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675
with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the
petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion
of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to
250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Ruling: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of
constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." As to
Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act
of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress. Article VI Sec 5 (4)
was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the
legislative district. In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
VETERANS vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation
of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.

On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the
filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%)
percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.

ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a
policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in
order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in

the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order
to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
“additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

Note: Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.” We thus
translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district
representatives ———————————- x .20 = No. of party-list

.80 representative This formulation means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase
in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats
would be 52, computed as follows: 208 ——– x .20 = 52

.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up
all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.
BAGONG BAYANI v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the
pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to
the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent
to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-
list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” . It is
however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
“marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the
party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in
the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution,
to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the
Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.
BANAT VS COMELEC

Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELEC‘s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:

(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

(2) Is the 2% threshold and ―qualifier‖ votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Held:

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House
of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.

(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation
of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
twopercent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The two percentthreshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5
(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of ―the-broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.‖
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided tocontinue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
BENIGNO AQUINO VS COMELEC

De Jure vs De Facto Government

Facts:

On January 21, 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some
Presidential Decrees. The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that Marcos
does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935
Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned
proclamations, decrees and orders. This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the
office of the Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the
appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the courts. Only
the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a
quo warranto petition. The petitioners, however, do not claim such right to the office and not one
of them is the incumbent Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.

HELD:

First of, petitioners do not have the personality to file suit. On the issue at bar, the SC affirmed
the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by President
Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the
1935 Constitution; that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated;
that the question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by
Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. Under the (1973) Constitution, the
President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973. While his term of office under
the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the general
referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in
office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17,
1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and
as aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom ―sovereignty resides . . . and
all government authority emanates . . .,‖ it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. The
logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
RAI SEMA VS COMELEC

Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population

Requirement

Facts: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM‘s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of
the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the
purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made
of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should
be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabato‘s status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative
district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival
Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly
LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in
order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema‘s contention is untenable. On
the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating
a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.
COMELEC en banc vs.AKB

Facts: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-
list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to

include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they
are ideologically marginalized.
SECTION 6

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949.
She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul‘s College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban.
She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand
Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter.
When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a ―Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa
in said months. ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner‘s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda‘s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband‘s domicile because the term ―residence‖ in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose
a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother‘s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
AQUINO vs. COMELEC

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for
disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition
on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with
the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence. Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue: 1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to

warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. 2. WON it is
proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense
of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held: 1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile”
not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.

Mr. Nolledo: I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
elections. What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. Davide: This is in the
district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile. Mrs. Braid: On
section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times
as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. Mr. De los Reyes So we have to stick to
the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of
domicile. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with
the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election lawrequirements, this defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.

Which brings us to the second issue. 2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in
the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should
prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The Constitution requires
a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in
which he seeks election to Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992)
election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac
for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his
birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his
domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception,
Tarlac. Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole
purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but
only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino’s
assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a newone and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on
Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district. Decision Instant petition
dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the
next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City
made permanent. Dicta:

I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:

A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving

congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the
house of representatives electional tribunal

B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral
Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be
judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction

D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against
the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.

E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which
were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the
case of petitioner’s district in Makati.

F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a
second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot
be proclaimed as substitute winner.

II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine
residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.

III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
Co VS. HRET

FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent alleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar.

2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers.

HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only
to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At
that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could
not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship
in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was
no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The same issue
of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a
natural born citizen by both bodies.