HALAGUEÑA v.

PAL

HALAGUEÑA v. PAL
G.R. No. 172013; October 2, 2009
Ponente: J. Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on
different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor organization certified as the sole and
exclusive certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants,
flight stewards and pursers of respondent.

On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter
referred to as PAL-FASAP CBA.

Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:

A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:

xxxx

3. Compulsory Retirement

Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall
be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x.

In a letter dated July 22, 2003, petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the
aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an
equal treatment with their male counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by petitioners'
counsel addressed to respondent demanding the removal of gender discrimination provisions in
the coming re-negotiations of the PAL-FASAP CBA.

On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP.

HELD:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the
application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the
constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.
In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer
and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of
their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under
Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship
which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreement.

Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor
relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction
over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations or
in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of
the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily
ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims
to these agencies disappears
AIRFRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO ( 18 SCRA 155 )

FACTS:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.

The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a ‘first
class’ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in ‘first
class’, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the ‘first class’ seat
that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a ‘white man’,
who, the Manager alleged, had a ‘better right’ to the seat. When asked to vacate his ‘first class’ seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Cuento, ‘many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the
manager, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man’ and plaintiff reluctantly gave his ‘first class’ seat in the plane.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of the petitioner airline, thus making petitioner liable for
damages in favor of respondent.

RULING:

That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-
Teheran leg; That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and that there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first
class accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred
to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent’s counsel placed petitioner on
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was
ousted by petitioner’s manager who gave his seat to a white man; and (b) evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award
for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of
the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule
or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.

CHU JAN VS LUCIO BERNAS (GR NO L-10010 AUG 1, 1916)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant
Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight.
Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First
Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and
regulations governing cockfights ,to pay P160 and return the other amount which s in
safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost
against plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On
plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal
Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu
Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions

ISSUE:

Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for
dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases
of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and duties
of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no
law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.

Held:

I g n o r a n c e o f t h e c o u r t o r l a c k o f k n o wl e d g e r e g a r d i n g l a w a p p l i c a b l e t o a
c a s e s u b mi t t e d t o h i m f o r d e c i s i o n a r e n o t r e a s o n s t h a t c a n s e r v e t o e x c u s e
t h e c o u r t f o r t e r mi n a t i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b y d i s mi s s i n g t h e m w i t h o u t
deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing
t h a t a c a s e ma y a r i s e t o wh i c h n o l a w wo u l d b e a p p l i c a b l e , t h e C i v i l C o d e
i n 2 n d p a r a g r a p h o f Ar t 6 , p r o v i d e s t h a t C u s t o ms o f t h e p l a c e s h a l l
be observed and in absence thereof, the general
p r i n c i p l e s o f l a w. Th e r e f o r e , t h e judgment and order appealed from are
reversed and to record of the proceedings shall r e ma n d e d t o c o u r t f r o m w h e n
t h e y c a me f o r d u e t r i a l a n d ju d g me n t a s p r o v i d e d b y l a w. N o s p e c i al
f i n d i n g i s ma d e w i t h r e g a r d t o c o s t .
SALVANA VS. GAELA ( 55 PHIL 680 )

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34115 February 21, 1931

FRANCISCO SALVAÑA and MODESTA SALIENDRA, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
LEOPOLDO GAELA, in his private capacity and as Justice of the Peace of Lucban, Tayabas,
respondent-appellee.

Aurelio Palileo for appellants.

Gregorio A. Sena, Braulio Devera and Baldomero Ortiz for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The instant appeal has been taken by the petitioners, Francisco Salvaña and Modesta Saliendra, from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

Let judgment be rendered dismissing the petition and denying the petitioners the custody of the
minor Felicisima Salvaña. A guardian shall be appointed as soon as possible, or upon the filing of the
petition announced at the hearing.

Let this case be placed on file as terminated. So ordered.

In support of their appeal the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court,
to wit:

1. The lower court erred in assuming the exclusive control of the trial when the return alleged private
authority.

2. The lower court erred in questioning and consulting the wishes of the child.

3. The lower court erred in pronouncing the petitioners who are legitimate parents of the minor as
unworthy of their trust as her natural guardians, without any hearing at all.

4. The lower court erred in the application of sections 551 and 553 of Act No. 190 to exercise the
judicial discretion in the matter of appointing a legal guardian in favor of the minor.

5. The trial court also erred in dismissing the application for the writ.

This appeal originated with a petition filed by the spouses Francisco Salvaña and Modesta Saliendra in the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas to recover the custody of their daughter Felicisima Salvaña, a 15-year old
single girl who is in the custody of the respondent and appellee, Leopoldo Gaela, justice of the peace of
Lucban, Tayabas.
Having been summoned upon the petition, the respondent filed an answer containing a general denial and a
special defense, the ninth paragraph of which reads as follows:

IX. That the herein respondent has never had the slightest intention of detaining said Felicisima
Salvaña and depriving her of her liberty, her stay in the undersigned's home being due not only to the
request of the petitioners herein, but also to that of Felicisima Salvaña, herself, who does not want to
live in her parents' home, because they maltreated he and wished her to marry a certain individual
named Andres Laguador, whom she does not care for.

At the hearing of the case before Judge Anastacio Teodoro of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
informal investigation was made — of which no notes were taken by the official stenographer of said court
— questioning the girl and her parents, with a view to obtaining their consent to her marriage to Ambrosio
Daza, with whom she had eloped, inasmuch as she was already six months pregnant by said young man.

As his Honor failed of his object, he denied the petition and ordered the appointment of a guardian as soon
as possible, or upon the filing of the petition announced at the hearing based upon the following
considerations:.

Whereas it has been shown that Felicisima Salvaña has chosen the home of respondent Leopoldo
Gaela, of her own free will because the latter had only daughters, and the minor Felicisima Salvaña
therefore found it convenient for her own interests to remain in said home; and whereas the court is
convinced that the petitioners seek by their acts to interfere with the personal liberty of their own
daughter by inducing her to make a cruel sacrifice, namely, to marry a man she does not care for, and
against her will;

Let judgment be rendered dismissing the petition and denying the petitioners the custody of the
minor Felicisima Salvaña. A guardian shall be appointed as soon as possible, or upon the filing of the
petition announced at the hearing.

The first question to decide in this appeal is whether habeas corpus will lie for the recovery of the custody of
an unemancipated minor daughter who is under the custody of a third person of her own free will.

Section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted.

Article 154 of the Civil Code provides that the father or, in his default, the mother may exercise parental power
over their unemancipated legitimate children; and article 155 imposes upon them the duty of keeping such
children in their company, educating and instructing them. Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure
recognized this parental power in providing that the parents are the natural guardians of their minor children
entitled to their custody and care for their education. (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, 30 Phil., 288; 246 U. S., 621.)

Since the petitioners-appellants are entitled to the custody of their minor daughter Felicisima Salvaña, they
are also entitled to recover her by habeas corpus, in accordance with the provision of section 525 of the Code
of Civil Procedure cited above.

Now then, is the fact that the respondent-appellee neither actually detains nor has any intention of detaining
the minor, but that she insists upon remaining in his power of her own free will, a hindrance to the issuance
of the writ?

In the case of Reyes vs. Alvarez (8 Phil., 723), the parents of a girl whom they had confided to the care of the
Beaterio de la Compañia de Jesus from the age of 21 ½ years, and who had lived there for thirteen years,
wanted to take her from there in order to have her in their company. The mother superior of that institution
stated that if the girl wished to leave and return to her parents, she would not prevent her. The girl said she
was there of her own free will and did not want to leave the college. This court granted the writ of habeas
corpus to enable the girl's parents to regain her custody.

In the case of In re Swall (Ann. Cas. 1915B, pp. 1015, 1016), decided on July 15, by the Supreme Court of
Nevada, the court said:

If the contention of counsel for petitioners is correct, that they are entitled to the custody of their minor
child by virtue of the mere fact that they are his natural parents and are not shown otherwise to be
improper persons to be instrusted with the custody of such minor, petitioners should prevail unless
there is something in the contention of respondents that they are not holding said minor under any
physical restraint. In this, as in probably most cases where a minor is abiding with persons who as to
him are in loco parentis, no physical restraint is necessary, for the natural inclination of the child does
away with any necessity of force. But where, as in this case, a right to the possession of the minor is
claimed, the right to retain such possession by such force as may be necessary may be assumed and
that, if necessary, it would be exercised. Proceedings in habeas corpus have so frequently been resorted
to determine the right to the possession of a minor that the question of physical restraint need be given
little or no consideration where a lawful right is asserted to retain possession of the child.

The fact, then, that a minor daughter is in the custody of a third person of her own free will, and without said
person's having the slightest intention of detaining her, is no hindrance to the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus to enable her parents to regain custody of her person.

The second question to decide is whether the mere fact that the parents of a minor daughter have sought to
compel her to marry a young man of their choice, whom she does not care for, and the mere fact that they
have refused to consent to her marriage to another young man whom she favors, and with whom she has
eloped and by whom she is pregnant, are sufficient reasons for depriving said parents of their parental power
and custody of said minor daughter.

Section 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while recognizing, as stated heretofore, the parental authority of
the parents over their unemancipated minor children, with the right to their custody and education, empowers
courts to appoint some suitable person as guardian of said minors, as the best interests of the latter may require.

Now then, to what extent and within what limits may courts exercise this discretional power to deprive parents
of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children?

In regulating the relations between parents and children in regard to the custody and education of
unemancipated children, the Civil Code, as well as the Code of Civil Procedure, has had in view the interests
and welfare of said children; for this is the basis of article 171 of the Civil Code, which authorizes courts to
deprive parents of patria potestas or to suspend its exercise, if they treat their children with excessive cruelty
or, by orders or advices given them or example set them, tend to corrupt them; and section 770 of the Code of
Civil Procedure grants the courts the same authority, "when the parent or parents of any minor child shall be
unable through vagrancy, negligence, or misconduct to support such child, or if able, shall neglect or refuse
to support such child, or when such parent or parents shall unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat
such child, or cause or allow it to engage in common begging. . . ."

Taking the provisions of the Civil Code and of the Code of Civil Procedure together, it appears that the
discretional power conferred upon courts by section 553 of the procedural law above cited is limited or
conditioned by the provisions of article 171 of said Civil Code and section 770 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
enumerating the cases when parents may be deprived of patria potestas and, consequently, of the custody of
their unemancipated minor children.

The Supreme Court of Porto Rico, construing like provisions in the Porto Rican Civil Code in the case of Le
Hardy vs. Acosta (18 P. R. R., 438), said:
 It is true that the well-being of the children should be carefully guarded by the courts; but they
should remember that the law has been enacted also with this end in view. (21 Cyc., 331, 332 and
333; In re Gates, 95 Cal., 461.) And, while the courts are in the line of duty in exercising the utmost
vigilance in protecting children in all their rights and from suffering any injury whatever, yet this
care should be exerted here in the manner pointed out by our Code; and it is the duty of the courts, in
this as in all other cases, to tract the law. As the trial court, with the very best intentions no doubt,
has failed to observe the requirements of the statutes in rendering the judgment appealed from, we
must not allow the decision thus made to stand. The father should have the absolute control and
custody of his minor children, unless some excellent legal reason to the contrary is alleged and
proved.

(See also Arbona vs. Torrens, 24 P. R. R., 423; and Rojas vs. Colon, 27 P. R. R., 805.)

Let us now see if the facts in the present case justify the deprivation of the herein petitioners-appellants of
the patria potestas and the custody of their minor daughter.

The concrete facts upon which the trial court relies to deprive the petitioners-appellants of the custody of
their minor daughter, denying their petition for habeas corpus are: That they have sought to compel their
aforesaid daughter to marry a young man against her will, and refuse to consent to her marriage with another
young man with whom she eloped and by whom she is to-day six months pregnant.

Neither the act compelling their unemancipated minor daughter to marry against her will, nor the act of
refusing to give their consent to her marriage, is included in the causes established by the laws we have cited
for depriving parents of patria potestas and the custody of their unemancipated minor children.

Although in the majority of cases when parents oblige their unemancipated minor children to marry against
their will they have at heart the welfare of those children, we disappove of such a practice, for while in time
and through fond and tender treatment, affection may follow and with it the happiness of the family, above
all should there be children, since marriage should be based upon mutual love and sympathy, there are not a
few cases where marriages not precluded by such sentiments have been unfortunate; and when the means
employed by parents to make their unemancipated minor children marry against their will is such as bring
about moral or physical sufferings, the intervention of the courts to deprive such parents of patria potestas
and the custody of said children will be justified.

In the present case, however, it does not appear that the parents of the minor Felicisima Salvaña insist upon
her marrying against her will, nor do we believe they will insist upon it on account of her present
physiological condition; the cruelty having ceased thereby, which would otherwise have justified depriving
them of parental authority, and if they now desire to keep her in their company, notwithstanding such
condition, it is because they love her.

It may be that by marrying the man by whom she is now pregnant, she would be happier than by living with
her own parents, but since the law does not authorize the deprivation of parental authority on the ground that
parents refuse to consent to the marriage of their unemancipated minor children, it would be a direct
violation of that law, depriving said parents of their parental authority. Unemancipated minor children, due
to the incomplete development of their mind and intellectual faculties, and to their lack of experience in the
world, need the counsel, care, and guidance of their progenitors in order to prevent the impulse of passion,
excited by worldly illusion which their undeveloped intellectual faculties are not strong enough to
overcome, from leading them to serious consequences.

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the writ of habeas corpus is
the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter, even though the latter
be in the custody of a third person of her own free will; and (2) that neither the fact that the parents of a
minor daughter sought to compel her to marry against her will, where it does not appear such a purpose has
continued, nor their refusal to consent to her marriage to another young man, by whom she is pregnant, is a
legal ground for depriving said parents of their parental authority and the custody of said daughter.
By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the writ of habeas corpus granted, and since
it does not appear from the record that any guardian has qualified or taken over the minor Felicisima
Salvaña, the respondent is hereby ordered to deliver the person of said minor to her father Francisco
Salvaña, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.

Other rulings:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be
issued if the restraint is voluntary, the Supreme Court held in Salvana v. Gaela (55 Phil. 680) that
the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. It may even be said that
in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not
the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas
corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
GO VS. ANTI-CHINESE LEAGUE ( 84 PHIL 468 )

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1563 August 30, 1949

In the matter of the petition for naturalization of JOSE GO (alias JOSEPH GOTIANUY), petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
ANTI-CHINESE LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINE and FELIPE FERNANDEZ, oppositors-appellees.

M. Jesus Cuenco and Regino Hermosisima for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Guiazon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.

OZAETA, J.:

From a decision of Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg of the Court of First Instance of Cebu denying his petition for
naturalization, Jose Go has appealed to this court.

Appellant was born of Chinese parents on December 5, 1914, in Cebu City, where he has continously resided
up to the present. He commenced his studies in the Cebu Chinese School, and after finishing the third grade
he had a Mrs. Shelton for tutor. Later he enrolled in the De la Salle College in Manila, where he finished the
intermediate course. Sometime in 1929 he left for Hongkong and enrolled for three years in the De la Salle
College of that city. Thence he proceeded to the United States and continued his studies in Armstrong College
in California, in the University of California, and in New York University. He returned to the Philippines in
August, 1940. He is married to Gim F. Lock, an American-born citizen of Chinese parents. He has no children.
He speaks and writes English and the Visayan-Cebuano dialect.

Since his return to the Philippines appellant has been engaged as insurance agent and inspector of the Visayan
Surety Company, from which occupation he averages an annual income of P2,500. He is also engaged in the
export of copra, with a capital of P120,000. He owns real property in Cebu City with an assessed value of
P7,800. In the words of the trial court: "He is not opposed to organized government nor is he affiliated with
any association or group of persons upholding doctrines opposed or antagonistic to organized government. He
does not believe in the necessity or in the wisdom and propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination
for the success or attainment of his ideas. He is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy.
He has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude and he is not suffering from any incurable
disease nor from mental alienation. He believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution."

The trial court's decision denying the petition was based on the proofs presented by the oppositors-Atty.
Vicente Sotto, in behalf of the so-called Anti—Chinese League of the Philippines, and Mr. Felipe Fernandez,
a Filipino citizen residing in Cebu City—consisting of the testimony of two political detainees named Pedro
Gerona and Pedro Labra. These witnesses testified in substance that in the month of November, 1943, the
appellant sold to the Japanese Navy one Fairbanks-Morse motor and two truck tires. Pedro Gerona also
testified that he saw the appellant on different occasions in the Normal School where the officers of the
Japanese Kempei-tai were located. Pedro Labra also testifies that appellant was a prominent member of the
Chinese Association of Cebu City, which according to him donated to the Japanese Navy P50,000 in cash and
some scrap iron, and that appellant frequently visited the offices of the Kempei-tai.

In rebuttal appellant vehemently denied the imputations of Gerona and Labra and swore that in August, 1942,
he evacuated to the barrio of Tupsan, municipality of Mambajao, Oriental, Misamis, where he stayed until
about September, 1944, when he came back to Cebu and after three days left with his father for the mountains.
He was corroborated by Francisco Vibares, of Tupsan, Mambajao, who testified that during the period
mentioned by appellant, that is to say, from August, 1942, to August or September, 1944, the appellant lived
in the barrio of Tupsan, Mambajao, Oriental Misamis, in the house of a cousin of the witness, and that he
came to know the appellant because he (witness) supplied appellant with goat's milk every day.

Appellant also presented Exhibit J, a clearance issued to him by the CIC on August 14, 1945.

The trial court declared that appellant lacked the qualification required by section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, in that he had not conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period
of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he was living. As additional reason for denying the petition the trial court invoked
paragraph (f) of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which disqualifies "persons who, during the period
of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos."

1. Neither the so-called Anti-Chinese of the Philippines nor Felipe Fernandez, a private individual, is a proper
party-oppositor in this case. These oppositors should have presented their opposition, and any proof they might
have in support thereof, to the Solicitor General, who, either personally or through his delegate or the
provincial fiscal, is the only officer or person authorized by law to appear on behalf of the Government and
oppose an application for naturalization. (Sec. 10, Revised Naturalization Law; Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines vs. Felix and Lim, 44 Off. Gaz., 1480.) Nevertheless, inasmuch as an assistant provincial fiscal
appeared at the trial of the case and made the oppositions of said oppositors his own, and the Solicitor General
appears to have approved his actuation, we consider the defect or irregularity complained of by the appellant
in his first assignment of error as having been cured or corrected.

2. The testimony of the two witnesses for the oppositors is of doubtful credibility. They were both under
prosecution for treason. One of them Pedro Labra, has been found guilty by this court and sentenced to life
imprisonment (see G. R. No. L-857, Oct. 19, 1948). Said testimony was, in our opinion, successfully rebutted
by appellant and his witness Francisco Vibares. Moreover, the trial judge apparently misconstrued said
testimony when he said in his decision that the sale by the appellant of a motor and two truck tires to the
Japanese Navy took place "sometime in the month of November, 1944," whereas according to said witnesses
it took place sometime in November, 1943, when the appellant was in Mambajao, Oriental Misamis.

But even assuming that the appellant did sell such merchandise to the Japanese Navy and that he was a member
of the Chinese Association of Cebu City, which allegedly donated P50,000 in cash and some scrap iron to the
Japanese Navy, such transaction would not, in our opinion, be a sufficient ground to reject appellant's petition,
specially if we take into consideration the clearance issued to him by the CIC. The trial court itself said that it
was not convinced that the appellant was a spy of the Japanese notwithstanding the efforts of the oppositors
to prove that he was.
3. We find no basis in the record for the finding that appellant had not mingled socially with the Filipinos or
had not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos. There
is no opposition to the petition on that score. At the trial the appellant testified without contradiction: "Since
my birth I have been a resident here and I have been with contact with Filipinos and all my friends are in Cebu
and our contact became to be more friendly. . . . I am more familiar with the customs and laws of the
Philippines and the United States. I was brought up here, also my schooling, for the last fifteen years, he has
been with the Philippines and the United States."

4. In reasoning out its decision, the trial court said: "It seems . . . that the law makes it mandatory on the part
of the court to grant Filipino citizenship if and when the applicant succeeds in proving that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law. This court believes that [the] law time has
come when a more rigid policy should be adopted in granting the Filipino citizenship. . . . This court would
even go farther by subscribing to a policy calculated to make it discretionary on the part of [the] courts to
grant or not grant Filipino citizenship even though the applicant shall have satisfactorily proven that he has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law. . . . .

We cannot subscribe to that proposition. It is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or
favor, to follow its mandate—not to tamper The court cannot adopt a policy different from that of the law.
What the law grants, the court cannot deny..

5. The Solicitor General contends that appellant has not satisfactorily proven that the laws of China grant to
Filipinos the right to become naturalize citizens or subjects thereof. The same contention was urged on us in
Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-1761, Aug. 24, 1949, wherein we said: "It suffices to
say that in previous cases a translation of the Chinese naturalization law, made and certified to be correct by
the Chinese Consulate General in Manila, was admitted and considered sufficient evidence to establish that
the laws of China permit Filipino to become citizens of that country."

The judgment appealed from is reversed and appellant's petition for naturalization is hereby granted. The
corresponding certificate of naturalization will accordingly be issued and registered in the proper civil registry
as required by law. No pronouncement as to costs.
PEOPLE VS. VENERACION ( 249 SCRA 247 ), OCT. 12, 1995

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION,

HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

FACTS:

The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the respondent judge with the crime of Rape with
Homicide of seven-year old girl. The accused on the incident also caused fatal injuries to the minor child by
slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the
direct cause of her immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of imposing the corresponding death
penalty, imposed rather the reclusion perpetua to each accused.

The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be modified that the penalty
be death instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still denied the motion citing religious convictions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he failed to attach the corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

HELD:

Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the attaching the proper corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide. The Supreme Court
mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by law
on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. Respondent-judge is duty bound to emphasize
that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the
law itself provides for the sentence of death as penalty in specific and well defined instances. The discomfort
faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but is a matter upon which judges
have no choice. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9, that no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case back to the respondent-judge for the imposition
of death penalty of the accused.

PE, ET AL VS. PE, ( 5 SCRA 200 )

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee

5 SCRA 200
May 30, 1962

Facts:
This is an appeal brought before the Court of Appeals upon the decision of the trial court dismissing
the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants, who are the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita, based on their claim
that defendant Alfonso––a married man who works as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory,
staying in Gasan, Marinduque, an adopted son of a Chinese named Pe Beco who is a collateral relative of
Lolita’s father––deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection, causing moral damages to
plaintiff.

Because of the frequency of his visits to Lolita’s family who has allowed free access because he
was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs both in Gasan, and Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home on April 14, 1957.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant caused moral damages to plaintiff, when as a married man, he pursued
his love affair with Lolita.
Held:

Yes. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent
of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs
against appellee.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. CA & MARILOU GONZALES, GR No. 97336 (FEB. 19, 1993)

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian
exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22
years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter,
which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house
of the respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage
did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.

The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However,
the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true,
and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom. The
decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:

Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good
moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered
a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the
petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal
desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already
looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages
were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against
the petitioner.

HERMOSSISIMA VS. CA, 109 PHIL 269 (1960)

FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., defendant
No.L-14628. September 30, 1960

FACTS:

The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent. The petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten years younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot.
Intimacy developed between them and thus sometime 1953 after coming from the movies, they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin. In February 1954, the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the
man promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June 1954 in a private clinic.
However, subsequently the man married one Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against
Francisco for acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner, as well as for support of said
child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter
of the defendant, ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual damages
and moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the assailed decision however increased the
amount for actual and moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in the instant case because it was the woman who
virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was overwhelmed
by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy.

TANJANCO VS. CA, 18 SCRA 994

FACTS:

Apolonio Tanjanco courted the plaintiff Araceli Santos BOTH BEING OF ADULT AGE: that the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
tender feelings: that in consideration of the defendant’s PROMISE OF MARRIAGE plaintiff consented and
acceded to defendant’s pleas for carnal knowledge(sexual intercourse) which later Araceli Santos conceived
a child. Apolonio REFUSED TO MARRY Araceli as promised and refrained from seeing the plaintiff which
led to her suffering from mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock and social
humiliation. The plaintiff asked that the defendant recognize the child she was bearing; to pay her not less
than P430 a month for her support plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary damages plus 10,000 attorney’s
fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages in court. Whether or not
seduction has been an element in the relationship between Apolonio and Arceli

RULING:
NO, case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction.
Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion: for had the appellant been deceived she would not have
again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.

Doctrine:
Seduction is more than a mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise of marriage, it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, entrapment, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the
woman has yield. Seduction falls under art 21 of the new civil code.