NEBOSH INTERNATIONAL

DIPLOMA - UNIT ‘C’

“INTERNATIONAL
WORKPLACE & WORK
EQUIPMENT SAFETY”
COURSE EXERCISES &
ASSIGNMENTS
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Table of Contents
Common Pitfalls .................................................................................................................................... 7
IC 01 GENERAL WORKPLACE ISSUES .............................................................................................. 9
Structural Damage – Following a Storm .......................................................................................... 9
Metal Fatigue – Factors and harictoristics of Electrolytic Corrosion .............................................. 10
Safe Systems of Working – Top of a Farm Grain Silo ................................................................... 11
Confined Space ............................................................................................................................. 12
Confined Space Working – Petrol Storage Tank ........................................................................... 13
Confined Space – Chemical Mixing Vessel – Use of BA & Rescue .............................................. 14
Confined Space – Collapsed Sewar – Risks to Those Entering ................................................... 15
Mixed Workforce – Welfare Conditions ......................................................................................... 16
Internal Transport & Workplace Design ......................................................................................... 17
Pipework Inspection – Preventing Major Leaks & Incidents .......................................................... 18
Mechanical Failures & Permits to Work ......................................................................................... 19
Inadequate Workplace Lighting ..................................................................................................... 20
IC 02 PRINCIPLES OF FIRE & EXPLOSION ...................................................................................... 21
Sources of Ignition – FLT & Protection to Minimise Risk of Explosion .......................................... 21
Effects of Fire on Structural Materials ............................................................................................ 22
Vapour Cloud Explosion ................................................................................................................ 23
Vapour Cloud Explosion ................................................................................................................ 24
Vapour Cloud Explosion – Petrol Tanker Filling - Hazards, Electrostatic Charge, ........................ 25
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) & Vapour Cloud Explosion – Principles &
Effects ............................................................................................................................................ 27
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) ................................................................... 28
Boiler Explosion – Safety Features and the Events Leading to Valve Closure ............................. 29
BLEVE – San Juanico - Disaster ................................................................................................... 32
Flammable Atmosphere – Use of Diesel Engine ........................................................................... 33
Dust Explosion – Corn Starch ........................................................................................................ 34
Dust Explosions ............................................................................................................................. 35
IC 03 WORKPLACE FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................ 37
Fire Safety Training........................................................................................................................ 37
Fire Drill Evacuation – Delayed Evacuation .................................................................................. 38
Fire Risk Assessment – Updating .................................................................................................. 39
Fire Risk Assessment – Upholstery Factory .................................................................................. 40
Building Design Features to Prevent Spread of Fire & Smoke...................................................... 41
Supermarket Restaurant – Automatic Fire Detection and Developing a Safe Means of Escape . 42

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 Heat & Smoke Detectors ............................................................................................................... 43
Sprinkler System – Design Factors ............................................................................................... 44
Fire Evacuation Procedures .......................................................................................................... 45
Fire Drill – Length of Time to Achieve Full Evacuation .................................................................. 46
Household Aerosol Canisters – Warehouse Storage and Fire Precautions .................................. 47
Compartmentation ......................................................................................................................... 48
IC 04 STORAGE, HANDLING & PROCESSING OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ........................ 49
Runaway Exothermic Reaction ...................................................................................................... 49
Chemical Reactions – Runaway – Design & Operational Features .............................................. 50
Runaway Redaction – Description, Conditions and Methods of Control ....................................... 51
Storage of HFL’s – Drum Storage ................................................................................................. 52
Water Treatment Plant – Receiving & Storing Strong Acid & Strong Alkali .................................. 53
Storage of Sulphuric Acid .............................................................................................................. 54
LPG – Properties & Safe Storage .................................................................................................. 56
LPG – Precaution When Storing in Cylinders ................................................................................ 58
Risks Associated With Spray Paining Using Highly Flammable Solvent Based Paint .................. 59
Paint and Thinners Store – Construction Considerations.............................................................. 60
IC 05 WORK EQUIPMENT ................................................................................................................... 61
Brittle & Ductile Failures................................................................................................................. 61
Fatigue Failure ............................................................................................................................... 62
Non-Destructive Testing Techniques –Advantages & Limitations ................................................. 63
Non-Destructive Testing – Purpose, Principles, Advantages & Disadvantages ........................... 64
LPG – Explosion – Pipework Corrosion & Protection .................................................................... 65
NDT – Principles, Benefits & Limitations – Dye Penetrant & Radiography ................................... 66
Purpose of Non-Destructive Testing (NT)...................................................................................... 67
CE Marking – Supply of Equipment ............................................................................................... 68
Thorough Examination – Lifting Equipment ................................................................................... 69
Agricultural Tractor Stability ........................................................................................................... 70
Pressure Systems .......................................................................................................................... 71
Pressure Systems .......................................................................................................................... 73
Lighting Audit of a Factory & Facilities ........................................................................................... 75
Maintenance of Plant – Reactive & Proactive ............................................................................... 76
Planned Preventative Maintenance – Compressed Air System .................................................... 77
IC 06 MACHINERY SAFETY................................................................................................................ 78
Fixed Guards & Their Design & Use .............................................................................................. 78
Features of a Fixed Guard ............................................................................................................. 79

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 Interlocked Sliding Gate – Construction Hoist ............................................................................... 80
Interlocked Machine Guard & Interlocking Devices ....................................................................... 81
Interlocked Guard – Construction Site Lift ..................................................................................... 82
Baggage Conveyor Acccident – Airport ......................................................................................... 84
Guarding of Conveyors .................................................................................................................. 85
Safety of Machinery – Light Curtain............................................................................................... 86
Safety of Machinery – Bench Mounted Circular Saw .................................................................... 87
ILO Convention 119 – Guarding .................................................................................................... 88
Safety Of Machinery – Guillotine Operation .................................................................................. 89
Safety of Machinery – Power Press ............................................................................................... 90
Computer Controlled Equipment – Reducing the Potential for Injury ............................................ 91
Lathe – Mechanical Hazards and Control Measures ..................................................................... 92
Robots – Mechanical Hazards ....................................................................................................... 93
IC 07 MECHANICAL HANDLING ........................................................................................................ 94
Mobile Crane – Erection of Mast on a Building - Minimising Risk to Employees & Others ........... 94
Mobile Crane – Instability .............................................................................................................. 95
Lifting Tackle – Selection & Suitability ........................................................................................... 96
MEWP – Hazards .......................................................................................................................... 97
Forklift Truck Instability & Operator Training ................................................................................. 98
Mobile Crane – Jib Failure ........................................................................................................... 100
Automated Guided Vehicles – Automated Order Picking Warehouse ........................................ 101
Workplace Traffic Movements ..................................................................................................... 102
Lifting Operations – Safe System of Work – Tandem Lift............................................................ 103
IC 08 ELECTRICAL SAFETY............................................................................................................. 104
Circuit Protection & Precautions When Maintaining Electrical Systems ..................................... 104
Electric Shock / RCD / Fuses / 110Volt / Electrical System Design ............................................ 106
Static Electricity............................................................................................................................ 108
Road Tanker – HFL & Static Also Safety Procedures ................................................................. 109
Electrical Systems – Corrosive Atmospheres .............................................................................. 110
Live Working ................................................................................................................................ 111
Direct Contact with Live Mains Voltage – Prevention Control Measures .................................... 112
Direct Contact With Live Parts – Control Measures to Limit the Effect ....................................... 113
Electric Shock – Physical Effects; Emergency Action and Precautions ...................................... 114
Intrinsically Safe Equipment – Purpose of Classification and Principles of Protection ............... 115
Electrical Risks – Intrinsically Safe & Flameproof Equipment ..................................................... 116
Portable Electrical Appliances – Testing Intervals ....................................................................... 117

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 Portable Electrical Appliances – Scheme of Examination ........................................................... 118
Electric Shock & Mains Protective Devices ................................................................................. 119
Electric Shock – Effects, Emergency Action & Precautions ........................................................ 120
IC 09 SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION & DEMOLITION ...................................................................... 121
ILO 175 – Sloping Roof Repair .................................................................................................... 121
Working In Close Proximity to Overhead Electrical Supply Lines ............................................... 122
Working Under a Live Overhead Power Line .............................................................................. 123
Safety in Construction – Working Close to Public Areas ............................................................. 124
Categories of Duty Holders Relating to Significant Construction Projects – (UK CDM Regs) .... 125
Role of the Designer .................................................................................................................... 126
Independent Scaffold – Safe to USe ........................................................................................... 127
Independent Tied Scaffold – Safety Criteria ................................................................................ 128
Tying Scaffold to a Building ......................................................................................................... 129
rd
Scaffolder Lowering Poles From 3 Flor Using Pulley ................................................................ 130
Civil Project – Welfare & First Aid & Contaminated Land ............................................................ 131
Electricity on Sites & Buried Services .......................................................................................... 132
Demolition – A Two House in a Street of Occupied Houses ....................................................... 133
Fall Protection .............................................................................................................................. 134
Fall Protection – Safety Harnesses & Suspension Trauma......................................................... 135
Installing Satelite dishes – Working at Height and Lone Working ............................................... 136
IC 10 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT ........................................... 137
Managing Environmental Risks – IPPS; BPEO; BAT .................................................................. 137
Controlled Waste & Duty of Care ................................................................................................. 138
Environmental Impact – Hazardous Sludge ................................................................................ 139
Waste Management Policy – Zoo ................................................................................................ 140
Pollution of the Atmosphere – Dust on Cars of Residents – May Be Process Related .............. 141
Emergency Planning – Major Industrial Accident ........................................................................ 142
Greenhouse Gas Emissions ........................................................................................................ 143

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Common Pitfalls
Below are comments taken from NEBOSH International Diploma Examiners Reports and all
our Delegates are reminded that these points are very important to understand and address
during the examination.
It is recognised that many candidates are well prepared for their assessments. However, recurrent
issues, as outlined below, continue to prevent some candidates reaching their full potential in the
assessment.
 Many candidates fail to apply the basic principles of examination technique and for some
candidates this means the difference between a pass and a referral.
 In some instances, candidates are failing because they do not attempt all the required questions
or are failing to provide complete answers.
Candidates are advised to always attempt an answer to a compulsory question, even when the
mind goes blank. Applying basic health and safety management principles can generate credit
worthy points.
 Some candidates fail to answer the question set and instead provide information that may be
relevant to the topic but is irrelevant to the question and cannot therefore be awarded marks.
 Many candidates fail to apply the command words (also known as action verbs, e.g. describe,
outline, etc).
Command words are the instructions that guide the candidate on the depth of answer required. If,
for instance, a question asks the candidate to ‘describe’ something, then few marks will be
awarded to an answer that is an outline.
 Some candidates fail to separate their answers into the different sub-sections of the questions.
These candidates could gain marks for the different sections if they clearly indicated which part of
the question they were answering (by using the numbering from the question in their answer, for
example).
Structuring their answers to address the different parts of the question can also help in logically
drawing out the points to be made in response.
 Candidates need to plan their time effectively.
Some candidates fail to make good use of their time and give excessive detail in some answers
leaving insufficient time to address all of the questions.
 Candidates should also be aware that Examiners cannot award marks if handwriting is illegible.
 The International Diploma in Health and Safety is taught and examined in English. Candidates are
therefore expected to have a good command of both written and spoken English including
technical and scientific vocabulary.
The recommended standard expected of candidates is equivalent to the International English
Language Testing System (IELTS) level 7 (very good user).
It is evident from a number of scripts that there are candidates attempting the examination without
the necessary English language skills.

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IC 01 GENERAL WORKPLACE ISSUES
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE – FOLLOWING A STORM

A rectangular warehouse building (40m x 100m ground area & 18m high) was constructed on a
structural steel framework, with a flat roof and coated steel walls.
During a storm, the warehouse suffered a catastrophic failure of one of its long walls which in turn
caused collapse of the roof and buckling of the other walls.
(a) Describe the possible mechanisms of structural failure that investigators would need to
consider as potential causes of the incident.
(b) Outline the health and safety issues to be considered when planning the subsequent demolition
of the damaged warehouse.
Possible mechanisms of structural failure that could have been described in answering part (a) of
this question included:
 Adverse weather conditions exceeding designed wind loadings;
 Overloading of the structure by excess weight on the roof caused by snow or rain water;
 Weakening of the steelwork by corrosion through roof leaks or the inoperation of rain water
drains;
 Alteration to structural members which had invalidated the original design calculations;
 Subsidence or nearby excavation or tunnelling operations creating instability and
 Vibration caused by the volume of passing traffic or wind variation which would result in
fatigue.
Part b)
This part of the question is usually answered badly with most candidates unable to relate to the
scenario and giving answers to what they considered to be a metal fatigue question.
Issues that should have been mentioned are
 The competence of the demolition contractor;
 The method to be used for demolishing the partially collapsed structure to prevent premature
collapse of the remainder;
 Precautions to be taken to prevent falls of people or material;
 The identification and isolation of buried services such as electricity water and gas;
 The inspection, examination and maintenance of plant and equipment to be used;
 Procedures for the removal of waste;
 The protection of adjoining property and
 The provision of appropriate personal protective equipment for the employees such as hard
hats, boots and eye protection.

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 METAL FATIGUE – FACTORS AND HARICTORISTICS OF ELECTROLYTIC
CORROSION

Materials can fail through various modes.

(a) Outline the meaning of ‘metal fatigue’.
(b) Identify TWO factors which can contribute to such a failure AND, for EACH factor, outline ONE
circumstance in which it may occur.
(c) Outline:
(i) The characteristics of electrolytic corrosion;
(ii) Factors which cause electrolytic corrosion.
Part a)
Metal fatigue occurs because the accumulating effects of fluctuating loads promote slow
changes in the crystalline structure of a metal. Cracks appear at the point of high stress and
extend until they reach a critical length.
There is little or no deformation prior to the failure which may be ductile or brittle. The failure
surface shows conchoidal marks which progress as narrow rings at low load but become
extended at full load.
Part b)
Factors which could give rise to fatigue failure in practice such as:
 Stress concentration particularly at sharp corners and holes;
 Surface and sub-surface defects such as flaws, cracks, occlusions and impurities;
 Design and fatigue strength issues; residual stresses imposed during manufacture or
assembly;
 The effects of factors such as corrosion or temperature.
Part c i)
The characteristics of electrolytic corrosion include the presence of corrosion products
consisting of metal oxides which affect the quality of the product. The corrosion forms pitting
round water droplets or condensate, is found especially on the underside of hot pipe work and
ultimately can have an effect on the flow of product within the pipework.
Part c ii)
The factors which cause electrolytic corrosion, this is an electro-chemical process where a
combination of moisture, oxygen and an electrolyte combine to promote the liberation,
transfer and consumption of electrons.
The relative reactivity of metals is also a factor and environmental contaminants such as
sulphur or nitrous oxides may accelerate the corrosion.
Reference should have been made to the parts played by the anode and cathode and
importantly to the need for an external source of electrical current.
The term ‘characteristics’ seemed to mislead many candidates who presented factors for part
(c)(i) which would have gained marks if they had included them in answer to part (c)(ii).

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 SAFE SYSTEMS OF WORKING – TOP OF A FARM GRAIN SILO

It has been found necessary to repair the explosion venting system at the top of a 15 metre high grain
silo on a farm.
Fixed external and internal access will be required for fitters / welders.
Prepare a summary of the essential precautions to be taken before and during the repair work.
Many candidates fail to apply their answers to the scenario.
In the past there appeared to be a wide misconception that the work requires the use of
intrinsically safe equipment with candidates failing to appreciate that welding is a source of
ignition. Some ignored the statement that fixed internal and external access will be required and
suggested use of a MEWP. Some confused responses treated the silo as a pressure vessel.
Much time was wasted by a number of candidates in discussing COM. Phrases such as 'safe
systems of work' without further explanation did not attract marks.
Better responses are those that are well structured and planned out.
These considered each issue in turn:
 Planning and organising the work,
o Considering that all work should be covered by a detailed method statement and
risk assessment;
o One person to be nominated in charge;
o All workers to be briefed on general and specific risks, etc);
 Then moved onto preparing the silo
o Emptying it;
o Ensuring the supply to the silo is isolated and locked off;
o Ensuring all residual grain is removed or dust-damped before hot work
commences;
 Consideration of specific issues relating to confined spaces
o Controlling entry to silo with permit-to-work;
o General ventilation and
o Suitable access and egress);
 Consideration of working at height:
o Use of platforms,
o Handrails,
o Toe-boards,
o Harnesses (if needed), and
o Protection of fragile sections of the silo top; and
 Protection of the working areas by:
o Excluding non-essential personnel,
o Erecting barriers and
o Use of appropriate warning signs.

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 CONFINED SPACE

(a) Describe what is meant by the term 'confined space'?

(b) Outline the issues that should be considered to ensure that emergency rescue
arrangements for confined space work are adequate.
Few candidates were able to provide a recognised definition of a confined space although a number
attempted to gain the available marks by giving examples of confined spaces.
Confined spaces are defined as ‘any place in which, by virtue of its enclosed nature, there
arises a reasonably foreseeable specified risk’ (i.e. of serious injury, drowning or
asphyxiation).
Confined spaces include:
 Chambers,
 Tanks (sealed and open-top),
 Vessels,
 Furnaces,
 Ducts,
 Sewers,
 Manholes,
 Pits,
 Flues,
 Excavations,
 Boilers,
 Reactors and
 Ovens.
In part b)
 Methods for raising the alarm with others outside the confined space e.g. Radio, personal
alarms etc.
 The equipment required e.g. life lines, breathing apparatus,
 Ensuring that there are persons present who are competent to undertake resuscitation
procedures,
 Emergency means of access / egress,
 Identification of plant which may need to be shut down during an emergency rescue and
 Training for emergency personnel.

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 CONFINED SPACE WORKING – PETROL STORAGE TANK

It is proposed to inspect, clean and repair the inside of a tank that is 6 metres in diameter and 10
metres high and which has previously been used for storing leaded petrol.
Outline the arrangements that should be considered in order to comply with the Confined Spaces
legislation
Weaker answers are those that refer to key terms in a generic way without providing the detail
needed to demonstrate application of the arrangements to the situation described. Conversely,
better answers are those that approach the proposed work in a logical and sequential way,
clearly explaining with examples what would be required at each stage in order to comply with
the relevant legislative requirements.
No person shall enter a confined space unless it is not reasonably practicable to achieve the
intended purpose without such entry.
Few candidates ask the question of whether the work, or any part of it, could be done without
entering the tank - for instance, by using remotely controlled cameras, robotic inspection
systems or a cleaning lance operated from outside the tank. Given the size of the tank, this might
not be entirely feasible but the question should nevertheless be raised.
If it were decided that entry cannot be avoided, then regulation a safe system of work in relation
to any relevant specified risks will be required.
The relevant specified risks in this case relate to fire and explosion, and loss of consciousness
due to asphyxiation or high temperatures.
In order to develop the systems of work, a full risk assessment would be required. This would
need to look at the likelihood of flammable atmospheres from the previous contents of the tank,
the possibility of air contamination from the cleaning or repair methods used and the build-up of
heat within the tank.
The risk assessment would also need to look at other (non-confined space) issues from the work
to be carried out, including work from height and the toxic effects of lead.
The arrangements that the risk assessment might find to be necessary relate to the possible need
to purge the tank with an inert gas, the use of forced ventilation, atmospheric testing before and
during entry, and the provision of PPE, possibly including air-fed breathing apparatus.
Attention would also need to be paid to the requirements for electrical equipment (e.g.
intrinsically safe, flameproof) and earthing arrangements.
If heat were to be a foreseeable problem, then consideration should be given to issues such as
job rotation and fluid intake.
The physical arrangements for working at height would need to be considered in terms of both
prevention of falls and, in relation to confined space working, access and egress in the event of
escape or rescue.
Procedural arrangements would centre on the establishment of well-defined systems of work,
the implementation of an entry permit system, limiting the number of people working in the tank,
communication with standby personnel and drawing up the emergency arrangements.
The emergency arrangements to be considered would include issues such as the provision and
maintenance of cutting equipment, hoists, fire-fighting equipment, PPE (e.g. breathing apparatus)
and first-aid facilities, and liaison with emergency services.
Arrangements should also be in place to ensure that all personnel involved in the operation have
received sufficient training in the work methods, the precautions needed and emergency
procedures.

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 CONFINED SPACE – CHEMICAL MIXING VESSEL – USE OF BA & RESCUE

The inside of a chemical mixing vessel is to undergo minor repairs by an operative entering the vessel
via an access hatch.
Outline the measures that should be in place to ensure that:
a) The vessel is safe to enter without the use of breathing apparatus
b) The operative can be rescued safely in an emergency
This question requires candidates to demonstrate that they understood and could apply the
control measures for confined space working to a defined scenario.
Part (a)
Measures such as:
 A permit to work,
 Isolation of the vessel by blanking off or disconnection,
 The removal of the contents and residues,
 Atmospheric testing before entry and thereafter continuously where this is deemed
necessary, and
 The provision of forced ventilation.
 Gas purging - this is highly relevant particularly where tests prove positive.
Part b)
 The formulation of a rescue plan and its communication to the employees concerned in the
operation;
 The provision of means of communication with the operator entering the vessel;
 The presence of a trained and competent stand by team;
 Providing emergency equipment such as breathing apparatus and resuscitation
equipment, and
 The means for removing the operator from the vessel such as a harness, ropes and a
tripod.

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 CONFINED SPACE – COLLAPSED SEWAR – RISKS TO THOSE ENTERING

A sewage drain has collapsed and it is necessary to inspect the damage prior to its repair. The
inspection requires entry into a confined space 10 metres deep.
Outline the possible risks to those entering the sewer.
The possible risks present include, but are not limited to:
 Those associated with the presence of gases and vapours either toxic and/or flammable;
 An atmosphere that was deficient in oxygen which could lead to asphyxiation and/or
suffocation;
 Working on slippery surfaces and the presence of pipes, cables or tools which could result
in falls;
 The possibility of the sudden ingress of water with the danger of drowning;
 The presence of chemical or biological contaminants either on the surface water or in the
sludge deposited in the sewer with the risk of contracting illnesses such as weil’s disease;
 Working in a restricted space with low headroom which might lead to musculoskeletal
injuries;
 Thermal issues such as heat exhaustion that might occur when working in high
temperatures;
 Coming into contact with sharps with the resultant needle stick injuries;
 The ever present risk of entrapment which could be caused by the collapse of the sewer.

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 MIXED WORKFORCE – WELFARE CONDITIONS

A vegetable packing plant employing 200 men and 60 women is about to open.
Outline the specific welfare arrangements that need to be provided before the plant opens.
The specific welfare arrangements that the company would have to provide include:
 A sufficient number of sanitary conveniences which should be separate for men and
women (or capable of being locked from the inside) and which should be adequately lit,
ventilated and kept clean;
 Washing facilities situated close to the sanitary conveniences and changing rooms,
provided with a supply of hot and cold or warm water, soap or other means of cleansing
and means of drying;
 A clearly marked supply of drinking water with cups;
 Clothing accommodation and changing facilities which should be separate for men and
women
 Contain means for drying wet clothing and for separate storage of contaminated clothing;
 Decontamination facilities with showers and a clear division between clean and dirty
areas;
 Rest/eating facilities including sufficient tables and seats, arrangements for preparing and
heating food and for boiling water,
 Facilities for nursing mothers
 Means or procedures for preventing contamination of the area where food and drink are
taken.

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 INTERNAL TRANSPORT & WORKPLACE DESIGN

Outline the main design features of a workplace designed to reduce the risk of injury associated with
internal transport.
A number candidate’s spend time discussing behavioural and vehicle issues, training and
maintenance when this was a straightforward question about design of a workplace.
Features are:
 Those that segregate vehicles and pedestrians, including separate pedestrian access and
egress;
 Inclusion of passing places;
 Protection of racking to reduce the likelihood of items falling;
 Lighting - general;
 Barriers and raised walkway;
 Convex mirrors on blind corners;
 Suitable road surfaces; edge protection on loading bays;
 Design of layout to avoid sharp bends and blind corners and to avoid the need to reverse;
 Designated crossing places for pedestrians;
 Lighting of transition areas between inside and outside to avoid glare and to
 Ensure the workplace is wide enough for foreseeable types of vehicle that will use the
area.

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 PIPEWORK INSPECTION – PREVENTING MAJOR LEAKS & INCIDENTS

Prevention of pipework failures is critical in preventing major leaks and incidents.

The construction of a new chemical plant is nearly complete and some parts are being prepared for
start-up.
(a) Outline an inspection strategy that could prevent pipework failures within this plant.
(b) Outline the items that could be included on a checklist when inspecting pipework after
construction.
Part a)
Any current inspection would need to be more thorough than those which may have been
carried out in the past.
The strategy would involve the use of NDT techniques such as dye penetrant for the detection
of surface faults and ultra-sonic’s or radiography to detect those that were more serious.
The techniques would involve the use of qualified personnel to interpret the results and
management should resist the temptation to use unqualified personnel for any type of pipe
work inspection.
Inspection should take place during and after construction has been completed and should be
on-going throughout the life of the plant.
Those carrying out the inspections should preferably include a member of the design team
who will be able to detect departures from the design intentions and also a member of the
start-up team who suffer most from the results of construction defects.
Part (b), Checklist items would include consideration such as that:
 The construction of the pipe work is from the grade of steel specified and the required
tests have been carried out;
 The pipes are not secured too tightly and are free to expand;
 The flanges on liquid lines are not located above cables;
 Temporary supports have been removed and permanent supports correctly installed;
 Springs and hangers are not fully compressed or extended;
 No sub-standard joints exist, no screwed joints have been used and all joints have been
leak tested;
 Temporary branches, nipples and plugs have been removed and replaced with welded
plugs;
 Pipes do not touch the ground, are not laid underground and do not pass through pits or
depressions containing water;
 Relief valve drain lines are not too close to the ground so that blocking and freezing is
avoided;
 Reinforcement pads are vented;
 Dead ends, dead legs and water traps have been avoided;
 Bellows are not distorted and support rings are not loose;
 Vibrating pipes have been avoided and all pipe work has received hydrostatic testing.

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 MECHANICAL FAILURES & PERMITS TO WORK

In 1988 a disaster occurred on the Piper Alpha platform in the United Kingdom.
(a) Identify mechanical failures that contributed to the initial explosion.
(b) Outline the systems failures associated with the permit-to-work system that contributed to the
initial explosion.
It is clear that candidates were expected to have an understanding of the situations that led to
the Piper Alpha disaster.
Part (a)
The removal of a safety pressure valve and its replacement with a blank flange assembly
which was incorrectly fitted and was not leak tight.
A running condensate pump tripped and a stand by pump, associated with the blanked flange
was operated.
Condensate and gas escaped from the blanked flange and the gas exploded.
For part (b)
The failures with the permit to work system which was in operation for the removal of the
pressure valve includs:
 A failure in communication at the end of the working day with the suspended permit
returned to the control room but not displayed and
 A failure to check that the blanked valve was leak tight at the time;
 A failure in communication at shift handover with the absence of any written procedures
for this event; the absence of formal training for those with the responsibility of issuing
permits;
 Inadequate written procedures for the permit to work in that there was:
o No reference to locking off or tagging valves to prevent inadvertent operation,
o No mention of the need to cross reference permits,
o No place on the permit for the issuer to declare that the work had been left in a safe
condition,
o No attention drawn to the potential dangers associated with the ‘suspension’ of
permits, and finally
o Inadequate monitoring and auditing by management of the permit to work procedure.
This question is normally poorly answered with most candidates unable to identify the
mechanical failures that led to the incident for part (a), and, for the second part, referring to a
lack of communication at shift change over but little else.

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 INADEQUATE WORKPLACE LIGHTING

(a) Outline the possible health and safety effects of inadequate workplace lighting.
(b) Outline the factors that should be considered to ensure that lighting in a workplace is adequate.
Part a)
The effects of inadequate lighting as those that impact health as well as safety issues.
Health effects may include headaches, visual fatigue or eye strain and blurred vision and the
effects of adopting a poor posture, such as neck and backache in order to have an adequate
view of the task being performed.
Safety implications include the likelihood of an increase in accidents due to trips, falls and
striking against objects because the hazards are not identified, because of the use of the
wrong type of lighting such as those producing a stroboscopic effect and through human
error in performing a task which may put others at risk.
Part b)
The factors to be considered in providing suitable and sufficient lighting includes amongst
others:
 The type of work to be undertaken and whether the tasks require general, local and/or
localised lighting;
 The workplace layout giving attention to the effects of screens, furniture or racking and the
shadows that might be cast;
 The levels of lighting in adjacent areas in order to avoid the effects of moving from a
strongly lit area to one which is dimly lit and vice versa;
 The different types and levels of lighting required for stairs, corridors and outside security
lights; the level of natural light available;
 The individual needs of the workers whether on account of age or disability;
 The possibility of glare on display screens and through reflection from other surfaces such
as wall surfaces;
 The colour and types of lighting fitted to prevent stroboscopic effects;
 The need for emergency lighting particularly for fire escape routes;
 The need for portable lighting when work has to be carried out in confined spaces
 The ease of maintenance whether replacing spent bulbs or cleaning the light fittings.

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IC 02 PRINCIPLES OF FIRE & EXPLOSION
SOURCES OF IGNITION – FLT & PROTECTION TO MINIMISE RISK OF EXPLOSION

(a) Identify the sources of ignition from a typical diesel-engine fork-lift truck.
(b) Outline the protection that should be provided on such a truck in order to minimise the risk of
explosion when it is required to work in a potentially flammable atmosphere.
Part a)
Possible sources of ignition from a typical diesel-engine fork lift truck.:
 Flames or sparks from the exhaust and inlet systems,
 Sparks arising from the truck's electrical system,
 As a result of the presence of static electricity or
 Through over speeding or
 Overloading of the engine.
Part (b) requires an outline of the protection that should be provided on the truck to
minimise the risk of explosion when it was required to work in a potentially flammable
atmosphere.
An initial protection measure would be the fitting of flame and spark arresters to prevent
flashback to atmosphere if vapour was drawn into the inlet system and to prevent any flames
from the exhaust system escaping into the air of the workplace.
The engine and exhaust system should be designed to ensure that their surface
temperatures were below the ignition temperature of the flammable substance and the use of
a water jacket on the exhaust system would provide additional protection.
Electrical equipment on the truck should be suitable for zones 1 and 2 and mechanical
alternatives (e.g. fuel gauge) should be fitted where possible.
The use of electrically conducting materials for parts such as tyres and drive belts would
reduce static build up while fitting speed limiters would help prevent over speeding or over
loading of the engine.
Usually there are only a small number of good answers provided for this question.
Most candidates seem to lack the depth of knowledge required and perhaps as a result
concentrated on procedural and human controls when the question was quite clearly about
hardware issues set in a specific scenario.

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 EFFECTS OF FIRE ON STRUCTURAL MATERIALS

a) Describe the effects of a fire in a workplace on the following structural materials:

i. Steel
ii. Concrete
iii. Wood.
b) Outline the precautions that could be taken to prevent failure of these materials in the event of fire.
This question is intended to give an opportunity to demonstrate knowledge of materials and, in
particular, their behaviour in a fire situation.

Most candidates are able to demonstrate some general knowledge but breadth and depth are
often limited. Overall, the question is not particularly well answered.

For part (a), almost without exception, candidates recognise that steel expands on heating.
Beyond this, answers became a little sketchier but many referred to a loss of strength and a
tendency of steel members to deform and buckle.
Similarly, most candidates correctly identified that concrete is a poor conductor of heat, exhibits
limited expansion and has a tendency to spall and crack, which can be exacerbated by the
expansion of steel reinforcement within the concrete.
Answers on wood are sometimes a little more confused. The key issues sought are that, while
thin sections will burn and promote fire, the charred surface of thicker structural members may
act as an insulator to protect the inner timber. However, burning wood generates smoke and
allows surface propagation of fire.
Better answers recognise that some varieties of timber are more resistant to fire than others.
Few candidates consider the eventual effect on the materials, in that steel will tend to regain
its strength on cooling - although some material properties may have changed - but that
concrete will suffer a loss of structural strength. The strength of wooden members will depend
on the original thickness and the proportion lost to fire.
Part (b) is concerned with the precautions to prevent failure of these materials and is, if
anything, slightly less well answered, with some candidates dwelling on general fire
precautions rather than those issues specific to the individual materials.
Examples of these include:
 The use of concrete or intumescent coatings to protect steel;
 The selection of thickness and timber type for wood, or impregnation with a fire retardant;
and,
 For concrete, the selection of the type of mix to improve fire resistance and increasing the
thickness of concrete between the external face and reinforcement bars.
Some general precautions, of course, are relevant. These might include the means of preventing
heat transfer through long steel members (compartmentalisation), automatic means of
applying water to structural members in the event of fire, and the use of fire-resistant surface
claddings.
Common weaknesses in answers relate normally to consideration of the materials in a non-
structural context (e.g. fire doors) and lengthy, sometimes misinformed, accounts of the fate of
the World Trade Centre to demonstrate a single point.

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 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION

With examples of actual incidents, describe the principles and effects of a vapour cloud explosion.
Most candidates fail to include in their description that a vapour cloud explosion can be
confined or unconfined.
A vapour cloud explosion may be confined in a tank, vessel or building etc., or unconfined
when released in large quantity in air.
An ignition source (spark, etc) is required with energy more than or equivalent to ignition
energy. Concentration must be within explosive limits.
The vapour cloud can travel large distances before an unconfined cloud vapour explosion
and cloud dispersal may bring the mixture below the lower exposure limit.
The vapour cloud may be produced by a rapid release of liquefied gas following vessel
rupture due to overpressure and subsequent vaporisation.
It may also be produced by an uncontrolled build-up of vapour above the lower explosion
limit inside a vessel.
The effects of a vapour cloud explosion include overpressure, fire, explosion and the fallout
of debris over a wide area.
Examples being
 Flixborough 1974,
 Beek NL 1975,
 Grangemouth 1987,
 Pasadena 1989 and
 Abbeystead 1984.
Sometimes candidates give a detailed analysis of Flixborough or Abbystead that was not a
requirement of this question.

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 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION

a) Outline the principles of a vapour cloud explosion AND give an example of a major incident
associated with a vapour cloud explosion.
b) Outline the effects of a vapour cloud explosion.
Part a)
A vapour cloud explosion may be confined for example in a tank or vessel or unconfined. Its
key principles include the presence of flammable vapour at a concentration between the upper
and lower explosive limits and an ignition source that exceeds the minimum ignition energy.
Unconfined vapour clouds may travel a considerable distance before igniting or they may be
dispersed to a concentration below the lower explosive limit depending on conditions.
The effects of vapour cloud explosions include overpressure, thermal effects and the emission
of debris.
In confined explosion cases, vessel or containment rupture may occur resulting in a rapid
release of liquefied gas.
In unconfined explosion cases, damage to people and property may be caused by the
pressure wave and thermal radiation.
Suitable examples could have included Flixborough 1974, Abbeystead 1984, Grangemouth
1987 and Buncefield 2005.
For part (b),
Better answers would need to outline the effects of heat radiation and toxic fume emissions.

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 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION – PETROL TANKER FILLING - HAZARDS,
ELECTROSTATIC CHARGE,

A road tanker is to be filled with petroleum (gasoline) at an installation.

(a) Identify FOUR hazards associated with this operation.
(b) Describe how a vapour cloud explosion could be generated in this situation.
(c) Outline practical ways of minimising the risk of an electrostatic charge.
(d) Outline control measures that could reduce risks with road tanker filling.
Part a)
Hazards could include the following:
1) Over-filling, over-loading or spillage;
2) The presence of incompatible or contaminated products;
3) The presence of fumes and/or vapour together with an ignition source such as static
electricity or smoking resulting in a fire or explosion;
4) A vehicle collision or a vehicle driven away while the hoses are still attached;
5) The risk of a fall from working at height.
Part b)
The explosion could be confined in a tank or vessel or be unconfined in the open air if large
quantities of vapour were present. It would be generated by the formation of a flammable
mixture in air within the upper and lower explosion limits, which would be ignited by a source
with energy in excess of the minimum required.
All three elements of the fire triangle would need to be present for the explosion to occur.
Part C)
Practical ways of minimising the risk of an electrostatic charge include:
 The use of tankers and pipe work with high conductivity;
 Reducing the velocity of the filling or draining operation by controlling the pump rate;
 Reducing constrictions by the use of smoother pipes unrestricted by strainers;
 Increasing the relaxation time by using longer pipe work;
 Earthing the pipe work and tanker and bonding to the same electrical potential;
 Using anti-static clothing and footwear and anti-static additives in liquids.
Continued….

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Part d)
Control Measures could include:
 The preparation of written procedures and instructions;
 The identification of specified entry and exit routes for tankers together with a high level of
communication and cooperation between the tanker driver and the site operator;
 The use of pumps, hoses and other equipment which are suitable for purpose, properly
installed and regularly maintained;
 Fitting devices such as a high level alarm to prevent overfilling;
 The erection of barriers or the use of bollards and warning cones to prevent a collision
between vehicles;
 Installing a system to prevent the tanker driving away if hoses are still connected to it;
 Ensuring tankers are positioned correctly with wheel chocks and hand brake applied;
 Ensuring hoses are coupled without submitting them to abnormal stress and valves
operated in accordance with the laid down procedures;
 Switching off electrical equipment which was not required for filling such as mobile
phones
 Bonding and equalising the potential between the tanker and the fixed installation;
 Using bottom loading tankers in preference to those which are top loaded but if this is not
possible, ensuring that the top loaded tankers have a fill pipe which touches the bottom of
the tanker and that hand rails or fall arrest equipment is provided to prevent falls;
 Preparing procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency and ensuring that all
workers are fully conversant with them.

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 BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE) & VAPOUR CLOUD
EXPLOSION – PRINCIPLES & EFFECTS

With examples of actual incidents, describe the principles and effects of:
a) A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion; and
b) A vapour cloud explosion.
In the case of a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE), key issues that needed
explanation include
 The presence of an external heat source,
 The expulsion (and ignition) of vapour via the relief valve,
 The rising temperature of the vapour space and vessel walls above the liquid surface,
 The development of overpressure
 A vessel rupturing with the emission of ignited boiling liquid and vapour resulting in a
fireball producing substantial thermal radiation.
 Relevant examples could have included the BLEVE at San Carlos de la Rapita in 1978 or the
Mexico City incident in 1984.
A vapour cloud explosion may be confined or unconfined.
Its key principles include
 The presence of flammable vapour at a concentration between the upper and lower explosive
limits
 An ignition source that exceeds the minimum ignition energy.
Unconfined vapour clouds may travel a considerable distance before igniting or they may be
dispersed to a concentration below the lower explosive limit depending on conditions.
The effects of vapour cloud explosions include
 Overpressure,
 Thermal effects and
 The emission of debris.
In confined explosion cases, vessel or containment rupture may occur resulting in a rapid release
of liquefied gas.
In unconfined explosion cases, damage to people and property may be caused by the pressure
wave and thermal radiation.
Suitable examples for the two types of vapour cloud explosion could have included:
 Flixborough 1974,
 Abbeystead 1984
 Grangemouth 1987 and
 Buncefield 2005.

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 BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE)

Describe the principles and the effects of a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE).
Give examples of actual incidents to illustrate your answer.
Examiners are normally surprised at the poor response to this question, considering that this is a
standard question.
Few candidates give a satisfactory outline of the physical principles with some even thinking that
boiling water is involved. Examiners were concerned that some answers included any large
scale incident as examples (including Buncefield and Ladbroke Grove). Although marks are not
deducted for incorrect examples, candidates using this approach waste valuable time and effort.
Key issues that needed explanation included
 The presence of an external heat source,
 The expulsion (and ignition) of vapour via the relief valve,
 The rising temperature of the vapour space and vessel walls above the liquid surface,
 The development of overpressure and
 Vessel rupture with the emission of ignited boiling liquid and vapour resulting in a fireball
producing substantial thermal radiation.
Relevant examples could have included,
 The BLEVE at San Carlos de la Rapita in 1978 or
 The Mexico City incident in 1984

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 BOILER EXPLOSION – SAFETY FEATURES AND THE EVENTS LEADING TO VALVE
CLOSURE

You have been asked to investigate a boiler explosion at one of your company's sites.
The maintenance manager has drawn you a sketch showing the position of the water column isolating
valves at the time of the explosion (see below).

(a) Ignoring the safety feature on the water column, identify FOUR other safety features that you
would expect to find on the boiler.
(b) Describe the chain of events that could have led to an explosion due to the water column valve
being closed
Part (a)
The safety features that could be found in addition to those stated in the question above,
include:
1. Pressure and temperature indicators,
2. A pressure relief valve,
3. A low water level alarm,
4. A bursting disc or fusible plug,
5. An automatic control system incorporating a fuel cut-off.
Continued….

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Part (b)
Reference the events that could have led to an explosion:
Since a valve on the water column was found to be closed, no water could enter the boiler and
the column would give a false reading.
The actual water level would fall as steam was drawn on demand, the crown would become
exposed, heat transfer in that area would be ineffective and a localised heat build up would
take place.
The crown would start to yield as a result of internal pressure and a ductile failure followed by
a rupture would occur.
There would be a loss of containment with an instantaneous change from water to steam and
an explosion as stored energy was released.
There was a great deal of misunderstanding of the possible sequence of events and of the
failure modes involved.
Candidates did not seem to appreciate the consequences of a reduced water level and there
were several unique suggestions put forward as to how the boiler might have exploded.

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 BLEVE – SAN JUANICO - DISASTER

In November 1984 the San Juanico gas storage facility near Mexico City exploded with catastrophic
consequences.
a) Outline the circumstances of the disaster.
b) Outline how a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosion (BLEVE) occurs with a gas
storage vessel constructed of metal.
c) Outline the immediate rescue and restoration measures that took place.
A major fire and a series of catastrophic explosions occurred at the San Juanico LPG terminal
near Mexico City. As a result of the incident, some 500-550 people died and the terminal
destroyed.
The terminal was supplied with LPG from three refineries on a daily basis. On the day of the
incident it was being supplied from a refinery some 400km away. Two large spheres and 48
cylindrical vessels (torpedoes) were filled to 90% capacity and four smaller spheres to 50%
capacity.
A drop in pressure was noticed in the control room but the operators were unable to identify
the cause of the pressure drop. An 8 inch pipe between a sphere and a series of cylinders had
ruptured. The gas accumulated around surrounding tanks and over an area measuring 150
metres by 200 metres.
The gas cloud drifted to a flare stack and exploded.
A number of ground fires from the original point of fracture were directed at adjacent
cylinders.
A series of BLEVEs occurred involving four of the six spheres and a number of the cylindrical
vessels. Injuries sustained were caused by radiated heat and burning droplets of LPG.
b), candidates should have outlined that gases such as butane and propane are stored under
pressure in metal storage vessels.
When the valve to the vessel is opened, the resulting drop in pressure restores the LPG to the
gaseous state. If, however, the vessel is involved in a fire, the liquefied gas boils and the
contents of the vessel will revert to the gaseous phase with a resulting increase in pressure
inside the vessel. The pressure relief valve opens and vaporised liquid escapes and the liquid
level drops.
As there is less and less liquid left to absorb the heat, the vessel above the liquid level
absorbs the heat and the metal starts to change and weaken and ultimately ruptures as a
result of ductile failure.
The remaining contents burst out and vaporise under atmospheric pressure sending debris
from the vessel into the surrounding area. The vapour cloud which includes gas droplets finds
an ignition source and explodes.
For part C - Following the explosion, some 4,000 emergency workers were drafted into the
terminal. The primary measures were concerned with the temporary evacuation and transport
of the injured.
Further measures were aimed at the prevention of an epidemic, the removal of debris and
identification of those who had been killed.
Fires were extinguished, temporary shelters provided and arrangements made for the mass
internment of those who had died.
This question is not popular and answered by only a few candidates. While many are able to
give a reasonable description of the mechanics of a BLEVE it is obvious that they have little
knowledge of the circumstances of the Mexico City incident.

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 FLAMMABLE ATMOSPHERE – USE OF DIESEL ENGINE

A diesel engine is being used to power a machine in a potentially flammable atmosphere.

(a) Identify the sources of ignition from the diesel engine.
(b) Outline the protection that should be applied to the engine to minimise the risk of an explosion.
Part a)
 Possible sources of ignition from a diesel engine.
 Flames or sparks from the exhaust and inlet systems,
 Sparks arising from the engine’s electrical system,
 Sparks caused by the presence of static electricity,
 Through over speeding or overloading of the engine
 From friction or the surface temperature.
Part (b)
The protection that should be applied to the engine to minimise the risk of explosion includes.:
 An initial protection measure would be the fitting of flame and spark arrestors to prevent
flashback to atmosphere if flammable vapour was drawn into the inlet system and to
prevent any flames from the exhaust system escaping into the air of the workplace.
 The engine and exhaust system should be designed to ensure that their surface
temperatures were below the ignition temperature of the flammable substance
 The fitting of a water jacket on the exhaust system together with thermal sensors and air
cooling for ‘hot spots’ would provide additional protection.
 Electrical equipment on the engine should be suitable for zones 1 and 2, mechanical
alternatives, as for example the fuel gauge, should be fitted where possible and electrical
starters wired to a plug and socket in a safe area.
 The use of electrically conducting materials for parts such as tyres and drive belts would
reduce static build up
 The fitting of speed limiters would help prevent over speeding or over loading of the
engine.
 It would also be advised to fit an air inlet shut-off valve to stop the engine if at any time
vapour ingestion does lead to over-speeding.

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 DUST EXPLOSION – CORN STARCH

The investigation of an accident at a food processor handling corn starch products concluded that the
explosion had taken place in two stages, a preliminary explosion followed by a more severe secondary
explosion.
a) Identify the principles underlying the control measures that may be needed to prevent or minimise the
effects of such an accident.
b) For each of principles identified, suggest control measures which are based upon the principle.
Examiners are sometimes not sure whether candidates who discussed BLEVEs and flash
points did not read the question properly or simply had no understanding of dust explosions.
Principles that were successfully identified were:
 Elimination of sources of ignition;
 Limitation of dust cloud generation and
 Minimising harm by controlling explosion.
For the second part of the question control measures that could have been suggested to
eliminate ignition sources are:
 To ensure electrically conducting safety footwear is worn;
 The use of non sparking tools and correctly rated ex electrical equipment;
 No smoking;
 Prevention of equipment hot spots;
 Magnetic extraction of rogue ferrous metals;
 Electrical bonding and earthing;
 Carrying out an assessment to meet the requirements of relevant legislation (e.g. DSEAR
of the UK) and

 Correct zoning of areas.

Dust cloud suppression could be achieved by:
 Damping down combined with the use of a pressure monitoring device;
 Having LEV at point of transfer;
 Use of an interlock to prevent overfilling of silo;
 Good housekeeping to prevent dust build up and

 Ensuring all ducting is dust tight.

Controlling explosion could be by use of:
 Equipment that is able to withstand explosion;
 Explosion relief venting and explosion panels;

 Ensuring building integrity.

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 DUST EXPLOSIONS

In relation to dust explosions:

a) Outline the conditions that must be present for a primary dust explosion to occur;
b) Outline the additional conditions necessary for secondary explosions to occur;
c) Identify FOUR factors that may affect the reliability of a nitrogen inerting system used in a
powdered aluminium process;
d) Identify the design features that would minimise the likelihood and effect of a dust explosion.
Part a)
In order for a primary dust explosion to occur, the dust must be combustible, must be capable
of becoming airborne and mixing with air and its particle size and distribution must be capable
of propagating flame.
Additionally the concentration of dust must fall within the explosive limits, an ignition source
of sufficient heat energy must come in contact with the dust and the atmosphere must contain
sufficient oxygen to sustain combustion.
A recall of the dust explosion pentagon would have assisted candidates in answering this part
of the question.
Part b)
Additional conditions necessary for secondary explosions to occur include the dislodgement
of accumulated dust from horizontal surfaces within the affected building by the pressure
wave and consequent air turbulence created by the primary explosion and the airborne
suspension of combustible dust throughout the affected area which is ignited by the original
primary explosion ignition source or by the combustion of products from the primary
explosion or by any other ignition source with sufficient heat energy within the affected area.
Part c)
Factors that might affect the reliability of a nitrogen inerting system:
1. The location and number of sampling points;
2. The type and calibration of the sensor;
3. The possibility of contaminants in the system interfering with the readings;
4. An inadequate supply of inserting gas; the number of locations where air might enter the
plant or process;
5. The safe means of shutdown if oxygen levels become too high; and
6. The reliability of the electronic control system.
Continued….

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Part d)
In identifying design features that would minimise the likelihood and effect of a dust
explosion, there would need to be reference to:
 The initial design of the ducting and equipment to withstand the effects of an explosion;
 The importance of ensuring the ducting was dust tight;
 Providing local exhaust ventilation at points of transfer;
 Installing explosion relief or suppression systems together with systems for suppressing
fire;
 Using screw conveyors instead of pneumatic systems for moving materials;
 Providing a magnetic extraction system for removing metal from product fed to the plant;
 Interlocking equipment to prevent overfilling of vessels and over-pressurisation;
 Using instrument systems with integral emergency shutdown;
 Using intrinsically safe electrical equipment and bonding all metal work to earth;
 Preventing dust build up in the plant by the use of sloping surfaces and
 Introducing a mechanised system for the humidification of the air.

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IC 03 WORKPLACE FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT
FIRE SAFETY TRAINING

Outline the issues that should be included in a fire safety training session for employees.
The issues to be covered in a fire safety training session for employees that would include:
 The principles of the fire triangle;
 The basic elements of fire prevention such as the storage of flammable materials, good
housekeeping and the need to prevent the accumulation of rubbish;
 The action to be taken on discovering a fire such as raising the alarm,
 The procedure for calling the fire service
 The action to be taken by personnel on hearing the alarm;
 The location and use of fire fighting equipment with practical training for selected
employees;
 The escape routes and exits from the premises together with the assembly points and the
roll calls that would have to be carried out;
 The arrangements for the evacuation of people with disabilities
 Assisting visitors and members of the public;
 The identity and role of fire wardens and marshals;
 The importance of fire evacuation practices and drills and
 Issues directly concerned with personal behaviour such as refraining from re-entering the
building after evacuation until instructed to do so
 FIRE DRILL EVACUATION – DELAYED EVACUATION

During a fire drill exercise at a large multi-storey office premises, the majority of the occupants
evacuated the building in less than three minutes.
However, all of the people based in one area of the building failed to leave the building until a further
four minutes had elapsed.
a) Outline factors that may have contributed to the delay in evacuation.
b) Outline reasons for conducting regular fire drills in workplaces.
Part a)
Here structuring the answer would have been useful under headings such as the fire alarm
design, the structural layout of the premises, the deficiencies in the existing procedures and
their execution and human factors and outline how each may have contributed to the delay in
evacuation.
In considering the alarm signal, it might have been too quiet and thus inaudible in some parts
of the premises because there were too few sounders with those that did exist set at too low a
volume. Additionally, even though the alarm could be heard, there was a possibility that it was
not distinctive enough and was similar to other alarm systems thus causing confusion.
As for the layout of the premises, escape routes might have been complex, lengthy and
inadequate. Some may have been blocked or locked with others lacking an adequate standard
of lighting.
The existing procedures might have been too complex and difficult to understand, with
insufficient instructions given to workers on what action to take when the alarm was sounded.
The number of fire marshals appointed would have to be questioned as would the adequacy of
the training they had been given.
During the actual exercise there were obviously workers who did not follow the procedures
and delayed their response to the alarm by finishing a particular item of work, or gathering
their belongings together or attempted to investigate the reason for the sounding of the alarm.
The alarm might have been caused by human factors such as hearing disabilities or apathy
with the assumption that it was only another fire drill or a false alarm.
Part b),
Regular practice of evacuation procedures allow for smooth and rapid evacuations when the
need arises and for workers to be familiar with the alarm signal, the evacuation procedure and
their own duties, to react to future alarms in a calm and orderly manner, and to be familiar with
the escape routes. It also provides a test of the integrity of the hardware systems such as the
alarms and emergency lighting and ensures compliance with legal and insurance
requirements.

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 FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT – UPDATING

A conference centre is planning to extend its existing building to incorporate childcare facilities on the
ground floor and additional conference rooms to hire out to local businesses on the upper floors.
Outline the range of factors that would need to be reviewed following completion of the planned
work to enable the company's fire risk assessment to be updated.
Following completion of the planned work the additional risk factors would include:
 Small children;
 Worried and possibly panicking parents if a fire was to occur;
 Persons under the influence of alcohol following events held in the conference facilities;
 The possible hazards of allowing smoking in the conference rooms and
 The potential number of extra people to be evacuated.
The above would call for additional precautions in terms of
 Escape routes,
 Holding fire drills for the children and delegates;
 An extension to the existing alarm system with additional call points;
 Additional equipment such as emergency lighting, fire fighting appliances and the
notices and signage
 Consider the appointment of additional fire marshals particularly with the likely presence
of a number of vulnerable people (children) and
 Train employees in the revised procedures.

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 FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT – UPHOLSTERY FACTORY

A factory manufactures upholstery using fabrics and plastic pellets. These raw materials are delivered
to a warehouse. The fabrics and plastic pellets are machined to form furniture coverings and
cushions.
The finished product is then stored in a despatch warehouse prior to distribution. The movement of
goods around the premises is carried out by Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) fuelled forklift trucks. The
company is located on the outskirts of a small town and employs 230 people.
Outline the range of factors that must be addressed to ensure an on-site fire risk assessment is made
for the premises.
There are a number of factors to be considered in carrying out a suitable and sufficient fire
risk assessment of the premises described in the scenario and they may be grouped under the
general headings of fuels, ignition sources, people issues, preventive actions, mitigating
actions, means of escape and management systems.
Factors connected with fuels which would have to be addressed include the LPG for the
forklift trucks, the flammable covers and untreated fillings and structural issues such as the
materials of construction of the premises themselves.
Ignition sources would include those connected with the use of electricity including the likely
presence of static, friction from machinery which may not be adequately maintained, illegal
smoking by personnel, the controls (or lack of them) introduced for maintenance which might
include hot work, and the possibility of arson.
As for people issues, attention would have to be given to the number of persons to be
evacuated in the event of a fire including visitors and contractors with the needs of disabled
workers being particularly addressed.
Preventive actions would include compartmentalisation for higher risk areas such as the
plastics and LPG stores with the latter being segregated, bunded an provided with a fixed
sprinkler system; fixed protection systems in warehouses and an adequate supply of water
and/or foam; the use of fire resistant cover materials; minimising the amount of stock kept on
the premises and ensuring a good standard of housekeeping with facilities provided for the
segregation of waste.
Mitigating actions would be concerned with the sufficiency and appropriate nature of the fire
fighting equipment together with its location, smoke venting of warehouses and the provision
of access for emergency services.
The assessment would need to give particular attention to the means of escape and there
would have to be assurance that these were continually maintained and that fire doors were
correctly specified. Attention would have to be given to travel distances including multi-storey
considerations, the provision of normal and emergency signage and emergency lighting
together with refuges for subsequent evacuation and the provision of assembly points in a
place of safety.
The assessment would have to consider the management systems introduced for the
maintenance and testing of fire precautions and mitigation equipment, the carrying out of fire
drills and the training given to workers both in evacuation procedures and the use of fire
fighting equipment.

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 BUILDING DESIGN FEATURES TO PREVENT SPREAD OF FIRE & SMOKE

Outline the design features of a building intended to control the spread of fire and smoke.
There is a wide range of building design features that are intended to afford protection
against the spread of fire and smoke.
Good answers included reference to:
 The materials to be used in the construction of the building - for example, the provision of
protection for structural steelwork,
 The treatment of timber with a fire retardant,
 The use of fire resistant materials in the construction of walls, floors and doors, and
 The provision of fire resisting closures to stairways and lift shafts.
 Compartmentation of large areas;
 Fitting doors with intumescent strips,
 Cold smoke seals and automatic self-closing mechanisms;
 The installation of fire resistant partitions in interconnected voids in roofs and ceilings,
 Fire dampers or breaks in ducting and
 The provision of automatic roof vents and sprinklers.

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 SUPERMARKET RESTAURANT – AUTOMATIC FIRE DETECTION AND DEVELOPING
A SAFE MEANS OF ESCAPE

For a large supermarket with restaurant facilities:

a) Outline the automatic fire protection systems that should be in place;
b) Outline the factors to be considered when developing a safe means of escape for the
supermarket.
Part a)
The automatic fire protection systems that should be in place, include:
 Fire detection for example fire and smoke detectors;
 Fire suppression systems such as automatic sprinkler systems or foam flooding systems
which would need to be subjected to regular testing;
 A fire alarm system with adequate call points located at strategic points in the store and
regularly tested before the store is opened to the public;
 A smoke control system comprising roof vents and automatic self-closing doors;
 An automatic fire service call out.
Candidates should also have indicated which of these systems were more suitable for the
supermarket and which for the restaurant.
Part b)
Factors which would need to be considered in developing a safe means of escape for the
supermarket include:
 The possible types and numbers of persons to be evacuated,
 The distance to fire escape routes
 The number of routes available;
 The arrangements for evacuating members of the public which would include the use of
the public address system
 the appointment of fire marshals who would need training in their responsibilities
including ensuring that all areas have been cleared;
 Ensuring that fire exit routes are kept free from obstruction and are clearly signed with the
routes from the supermarket and restaurant being sufficiently separated to avoid crowding
and confusion;
 The location of clearly marked assembly points which should be in a safe position away
from the building and positioned where they would not obstruct access for the emergency
services;
 The provision of emergency lighting in the event of failure of the main supply;
 Arrangements for liaison with the emergency services;
 The allocation of clear responsibilities to workers for giving assistance to customers and
particularly those who might be disabled;
 Arrangements for the disabling of lifts and for locking the tills to prevent the opportunities
for theft;
 The completion of regular fire drills at least at six monthly periods.

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HEAT & SMOKE DETECTORS

(a) In relation to automatic fire detection and alarm systems, outline the basic principles of
operation of:
(i) Heat detectors
(ii) Smoke detectors
(b) Identify the circumstances in which EACH type of detector would be inappropriate.
Answers to part (a) of this question tend to be polarised between those that demonstrated a
good understanding of the principles of the two types of detector and those that were
simplistic and stated little more than smoke and heat detectors detect smoke and heat
respectively, but without explaining how.
Reference to sprinkler heads gained no marks.
For heat detectors, there are two predominant types:
1. 'Fixed temperature' type that is designed, by means of a thermocouple or similar
arrangement, to detect when a set temperature is reached and the
2. 'Rate-of-rise' type that detects abnormally fast temperature rises, usually by means of
electronic resistors (or thermistors).
In practice, rate-of-rise heat detectors often incorporate a fixed temperature element.
Smoke detectors are of two main types: ionisation and optical (or photoelectric).
The ionisation type uses a small radioactive source to ionise a chamber into which smoke
may enter in the event of fire. The detector reacts to the change in electrical current caused by
the neutralisation of ions by the smoke particles.
The optical type of detector has a number of variants but chiefly responds either to the
obscuration of a focused light ray or to the scattering of light from an optical ray. It therefore
reacts either to a reduction in light at a receiver or, more commonly, to the sensing of light
by an optical sensor placed in the chamber where light would not normally be detected.
Most candidates are able, for part (b), to give examples of where each type of detector would be
inappropriate. For instance, nearly all candidates state that smoke detectors would be
inappropriate in situations where smoke, steam or vapour might normally be expected, such as
in kitchens or hotel bedrooms.
Heat detectors cause a little more confusion, with few candidates, having already ruled out
smoke detectors for kitchens, seemingly ruling out the use of heat detectors here as well (on the
grounds that kitchens can be hot places).
Some of the confusion is no doubt caused by the different applications of fixed temperature and
rate-of-rise heat detectors, where the inappropriateness of one type in a particular situation was
extended to heat detectors in general.
Whereas candidates were able to recognise that false alarms are a key criterion to
appropriateness, few considered speed of response.
For instance, a heat detector might be considered inappropriate where slow burning materials are
involved.

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 SPRINKLER SYSTEM – DESIGN FACTORS

The owners of a large distribution warehouse business have secured a contract from a stationery
manufacturer.
Their insurers have recommended that the proposed storage facility is sprinkler protected.
Outline the design factors to be considered in providing an adequate sprinkler system for the facility.
The design factors to be considered in the provision of an adequate sprinkler system would be:

 The capacity of water required,

 The existence of an adequate and assured water supply and

 The availability of an alternative if this was to fail for any reason.

 The design of the pumping system would also be important with a diesel back up if the
decision was taken to install electrically operated pumps.

 The means of activating the system (frangible bulbs or detector activated);

 The linkage of the system to alarms;

 The spray pattern required;

 The area to be covered and the presence of other combustibles apart from the stationery;

 The height of the storage racks and their distance from the sprinkler heads;

 The provision of fire stopping for sprinklers passing through compartmentalisation;

 The provision of fire water run off and

 The arrangements to be put in place for testing the equipment.

This question is generally poorly answered with many candidates proceeding no further than
stating that a water supply and a number of sprinkler heads were required. Many answers lack
technical depth and do not show an understanding of the particular issues raised in the wording of
the question.

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 FIRE EVACUATION PROCEDURES

Outline the issues that need to be addressed when planning a fire evacuation procedure for an office
building occupied by a number of different companies.

Your answer should include examples where appropriate.

An initial issue to be addressed would be the means of raising the alarm when a fire or other
emergency is discovered and the summoning of the emergency services.
In order to achieve the safe evacuation of both employees and members of the public (some of
whom may have sensory or physical disabilities), consideration would have to be given to physical
measures such as:
 Travel distances
 Alternative routes,
 Emergency lighting,
 Clear signage of exit routes,
 Refuges
 Evacuation equipment
 Procedural measures such as clarifying staff responsibilities,
 Training fire wardens,
 Accounting for personnel
 Providing door marshals to prevent entry or re-entry to the store.
 Security considerations such as minimising the opportunity for theft would also be an issue
here.
Liaison with the emergency services should form part of the planning process.
They can help with advice on issues such as
 Response times,
 Their access requirements and
 Appropriate locations of assembly areas.
There should also be liaison with neighbouring businesses that could be affected by an
emergency within the store.
The procedures, once drawn up, would need to be summarised on prominently displayed fire
notices and tested with regular fire drills.
This question is generally well answered with most candidates demonstrating an understanding
of the key issues that need to be addressed when planning an evacuation procedure in a fairly
complex situation.

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 FIRE DRILL – LENGTH OF TIME TO ACHIEVE FULL EVACUATION

During a fire drill exercise at a large multi-storey office premises, the majority of the occupants
evacuated the building in less than three minutes. However, all of the people based in one area of the
building, failed to leave the building until a further four minutes had elapsed.
a) Outline factors that may have contributed to the delay in evacuation)
b) Describe the advantages of undertaking regular fire drills in workplaces.
Candidates who provided lists rather than the required outline are unable to gain many marks.
Part a)
Factors include:
 Fire alarm design (e.g. Quiet/inaudible alarm signal);
 Deficiencies in procedure (e.g. Procedure difficult to understand);
 Execution of procedure (e.g. Delayed response to alarm signal, finishing phone call, shutting
down computer); and
 Human factors (e.g. Hearing disabilities).
In part b)
The regular practice of an evacuation procedure allowed compliance with legislation, smooth
and quick evacuations in future and allowed occupants to be familiar with:
 The procedure and their duties,
 Escape routes
 The use of panic bars / bolts, etc.
 Alarm signals and
 To react to future alarms in a calm and orderly manner.
Marks are also available for describing that it identifies problems with evacuation in a non-critical
scenario allowing:
 Targeted retraining or communication of the procedure;
 Investigation into the need for amending the procedure; and
 Investigation into the need for fire alarm redesign.

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 HOUSEHOLD AEROSOL CANISTERS – WAREHOUSE STORAGE AND FIRE
PRECAUTIONS

Many household aerosol canisters contain propellants that are a mixture of highly flammable
materials such as iso-propane and iso-butane. These canisters are used for multiple purposes
including cleaning products, furniture polishes, cosmetics, deodorants, etc.
a) Describe how a fire and explosion may occur when large quantities of these canisters are stored
in a commercial warehouse.
b) Outline the fire precautions that could be taken to limit the spread of any resulting fire and
explosion in such a warehouse.
Part a)
There are a number of factors which may cause fire and explosion where large quantities of
aerosol canisters containing highly flammable materials are stored in a warehouse.
The canisters may have suffered damage for example to the valve or body of the canister,
leading to loss of containment and the formation of flammable vapours which if between the
upper and lower flammable limits can be ignited by a heat source, perhaps a nearby fire or hot
work and even by direct sunlight.
The canisters may then be propelled from their original position as projectiles as the radiant
heat from the initial fire causes boiling of the contents of adjacent canisters.
This causes the release and ignition of additional vapour sources resulting in multiple
BLEVEs.
Part b)
Fire precautions that can be taken to limit the spread of any resulting fire and explosion in a
similar type of warehouse include:
 The segregation of the canisters from other flammable products;
 The separation of high flammability canisters by physical barriers; using
compartmentation within the warehouse with fire resistant partitions;
 The provision of containment cages to prevent projectiles;
 The installation of automatic fire detection and alarm systems;
 The use of automatic extinguishing systems and venting and explosion reliefs.

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 COMPARTMENTATION

Compartmentation in buildings consists of fire resisting doors, walls, floors, ceilings and windows.
Window frames are potentially a weak point in this fire resistance.
(a) Outline how window frames made with the following materials might behave in a fire:
(i) wood;
(ii) metal;
(iii) plastic.
(b) Identify which of these window frame materials gives the best overall fire resistance.
Part a i)
As far as wooden frames are concerned, some varieties of timber are more fire resistant than
others, for example, those which have been treated.
Thin sections promote fire, generating fumes and smoke although the charred surfaces may
act as an insulator providing protection for the inner timber.
Timber frames tend to maintain their shape and will have limited distortion with the smoke seal
and level of fire resistance being maintained.
Part a ii)
Metal window frames expand and distort leading to a reduction in fire resistance and the
escape of smoke with the possibility that the window unit as a whole will become unseated
and fall out.
The metal conducts heat, will regain strength on cooling but may remain permanently
deformed.
Part a iii)
Plastic window frames expand, distort and melt at relatively low temperatures producing toxic
fumes and smoke with molten plastic flaking off and falling to the area below the window.
The frame will suffer a complete loss of integrity leading to a reduction in fire resistance and
the escape of smoke with permanent deformation on cooling.
Part b)
Wooden frames provide the best overall fire resistance.

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IC 04 STORAGE, HANDLING & PROCESSING OF DANGEROUS
SUBSTANCES
RUNAWAY EXOTHERMIC REACTION

A hot liquid was accidentally and violently discharged from the feed port of a reactor vessel following the
addition of a chemical reagent during a chemical manufacturing process. The investigation suggested
that the cause was a runaway exothermic reaction.
a) Outline the factors that may have contributed to the event and explain the principles involved.
b) Describe the measures that could be taken to prevent a recurrence.
The aim of the question was to test candidates' knowledge and understanding of the principles of
a runaway exothermic reaction and the measures to prevent a recurrence.
The answer for part (a) requires an outline of the factors that may have contributed to the event
scenario and candidates are expected to outline the meaning of an 'exothermic reaction'.
Factors that could have contributed include:
 The system was based on wrong procedures or assumptions of the heat generated, its
dissipation and quantities of chemicals.
 Equipment failure, for example automatic feed breakdown or a failure in a component; and
 Incorrect operating procedures such as the speed of addition and mixing of an ingredient.
 The use of incorrect materials in the reaction vessel or incorrect materials being added;
 The possibility of contamination in the vessel and
 Human error.
In part (b) measures to prevent a recurrence include
 The appropriate feed control which may be manual or automatic, and speed of delivery, of
the chemical reagents;
 Design, testing and maintenance of engineering controls for the temperature, levels or
quantities fed into the process,
 Pressure changes and other warnings and alarms and
 Automatic process shutdown if the feed of the reagents or the reaction exceeds the pre-set
parameters.
Additionally, the control measures may have to include:
 Designed emergency neutralisation of the reactor vessel with the possibility of complete
discharge of the process reactants.
 Procedural control measures include quality control of feedstock purity from the supplier
against a proven specification, linked to the in-house monitoring of all supplied materials.
Allied to this would be the requirement for
 Adequate training, instruction and information for operators, supervision for normal
operation and emergency conditions.
 The use of laboratory or pilot plant trials and
 The use of hazard analysis techniques (HAZOP).

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 CHEMICAL REACTIONS – RUNAWAY – DESIGN & OPERATIONAL FEATURES

Unless appropriate precautions are taken, chemical reactions in a batch manufacturing process can
give rise to conditions which can lead to a 'runaway reaction'.
a) Explain what is meant by 'runaway reaction' and identify the conditions that may give rise to such
an event.
b) Describe the design and operational features of chemical processes necessary to prevent such
an event.
Examiners have in the past noted that few candidates appeared to understand the mechanism of a
'runaway reaction'.
Many answers include a whole range of points including elements of a BLEVE, or chain
reactions in the hope of scoring a few marks.
A 'runaway reaction':
 A reaction rate increasing exponentially to the point where auto-ignition explosion or
catastrophic over-pressure occurs; or as:
 Increases in pressure and temperature from reaction serve to accelerate the reaction in
accord with Le Chatelier's principal.
Candidates could also go on to identify conditions such as:
 Strongly exothermic reaction;
 Inadequate provision, or failure in cooling of the reaction, and
 Presence of contaminant catalysis.
Carrying out a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) on the reaction process would be
appropriate in this scenario; this may then have led to the inclusion of design features such as:
 High integrity temperature detection being linked to the cooling / reactant addition system;
 Pressure rise detection linked to cooling / venting / auto shut-down;
 Vessel protected by correctly sized bursting disc.
For additional marks candidates could include operational features such as ensuring that:
 Only high calibre of operator required for such processes were employed;
 Ensure that maintenance activities / raw material handling do not introduce potential
catalysts into the reaction.

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 RUNAWAY REDACTION – DESCRIPTION, CONDITIONS AND METHODS OF
CONTROL

Chemical reactions in a batch manufacturing process can lead to conditions which can cause a
‘runaway reaction’ unless appropriate precautions are taken.
a) Describe what is meant by ‘runaway reaction’ AND identify the conditions that may give rise to
such an event.
b) Outline methods of control of industrial chemical processes necessary to prevent or mitigate
runaway reactions.
Part a)
A “runaway reaction” is uncontrolled exothermic reaction where the heat produced exceeds
the heat removed. The surplus heat raises the temperature of the reaction mass and hence the
reaction rate resulting in a runaway reaction.
The reaction rate is exponential whereas the rate of heat removal is linear.
The conditions that may give rise to such an event include:
 The presence of a strongly exothermic reaction;
 Inadequate provision of, or failure in cooling of the reaction;
 The presence of contaminant catalysis; excessive quantities of reactants present in the
reactor;
 The lack of sensitive temperature detection and control;
 The insulation of the reaction vessel where solid residues have built up on the internal
walls of the vessel and
 Mixer failure with loss of agitation.
Part (b),
Some of the relevant control methods to be considered are:
 The installation of high integrity temperature detection linked to the cooling/reactant
addition system;
 Pressure rise detection linked to cooling, venting or auto shut-down;
 The protection of the vessel by correctly sized bursting discs; and
 The fitting of an agitation failure alarm.
Also consideration of operational features such as:
 Ensuring that: only a high calibre of operator was employed in such processes;
 That decision making requirements by operators in response to adverse operating
conditions were minimised;
 That maintenance and/or raw material handling do not introduce potential catalysts into
the reaction; and
 That the rate of addition of reactants was limited.

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 STORAGE OF HFL’S – DRUM STORAGE

As the Health, Safety and Environment Manager to a group of manufacturing companies, you have
recently discovered drums of a highly flammable solvent being stored on open land at the rear of one of
the group's factories.
a) Draft a memorandum to the Production Manager of the company concerned explaining why storage
in this manner is inappropriate.
b) Describe, with the aid of sketches, the main features of a storage facility that would be appropriate for
the storage of such drums.
This is a scenario-based question dealing with the storage of highly flammable liquids and the
fire, health and environmental risks associated with such storage.
Part (a)
Those matters that would constitute an imperative for changing the existing storage facilities:
 The risk of ignition, fire, theft and vandalism;
 The risk of spillage with consequent land or water contamination;
 Health risks and risks arising from manual or mechanical handling of the drums on open
land.
The company may face the risk of enforcement action, or prosecution, for breaches of the HS&E l
applicable legislation for the inappropriate storage facilities.
There is also the possibility of civil liability for nuisance or damage, the storage of the drums
may be a breach of the company insurance conditions and further costs could be incurred for
any clean-up.
Part (b) required the candidates to describe, with the aid of sketches the key features of a
suitable flammable liquid store.
The storage could have been either:
 In a safe open air compound (with suitable separation distance from buildings) or
 In a fire resistant building.
In the case of the storage building, candidates should have referred to design issues associated
with the materials of construction.
In either case, relevant issues were those relating to
 Security,
 Spill containment,
 Environmental protection,
 Ventilation,
 Prevention of ignition sources,
 Segregation of incompatible materials,
 Access and egress,
 Warning signs and
 Emergency facilities such as sprinklers

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 WATER TREATMENT PLANT – RECEIVING & STORING STRONG ACID & STRONG
ALKALI

As part of its water treatment system, a manufacturer is to install a plant suitable for the reception and
storage of a strong acid and a strong alkali, both of which will be delivered in bulk tankers.
Outline the safety provisions required for the design, operation and maintenance of the proposed plant.
Candidates who divide the question into its component parts, i.e. design, operation and
maintenance and dealt with the detail of these issues in turn achieve more success.
Under the design issues:
 The need for the storage tanks and pipe work to be constructed of suitable chemical
resistant material;
 The design and positioning of the delivery inlets to prevent connection being made to the
wrong tank;
 The positioning of the storage tanks in separate bunds with the bunds being capable of
holding the entire contents of the tanks plus 10%;
 The erection of hazard warning signs clearly identifying the contents of the tanks and the
colour coding of pipework;
 The fitting of level indicators and high level alarms to prevent overfilling;
 The provision of good vehicle access including a hard standing for tankers with facilities for
spill containment and
 The provision of a good standard of lighting.
Operational issues should have included
 The introduction of a safe system of work including emergency procedures to deal with
spillages
 The provision and maintenance of a contingency supply of neutralising and absorbent
materials and water;
 Providing training for the personnel involved including tanker drivers in the risks associated
with the operation and the control measures to be followed and
 The provision of personal protective equipment such as chemical suits, chemical resistant
gloves and full face protection.
The issues connected with maintenance are:
 The arrangements for the examination and testing of safety critical plant;
 The use of permit to work systems;
 The completion of the flushing out of tanks and pipe work and their isolation before the start
of maintenance work;
 Regular cleaning of the bunds and
 The provision of training to maintenance staff in emergency procedures.

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 STORAGE OF SULPHURIC ACID

As part of its water treatment system, a manufacturer is to install a plant suitable for the reception and
storage of sulphuric acid and caustic soda, both of which will be delivered in bulk tankers.
Both of these substances are highly corrosive and can react together violently.
Outline the safety provisions required for:
a) The design,
b) The operation and
c) The maintenance
Of the proposed storage facility.
This is a very popular question concerning the design, operation and maintenance of bulk
acid and alkali storage facilities.
It is usually reasonably well answered by the majorit y of candidates but those who divided
the question into its component parts (i.e. design, operation and maintenance) and tackle the
detail of each of those issues in turn, achieve more success.
Under design issues they would deal with
 The material to be used for the construction of storage tanks and pipe work; the layout
of the storage facility;
 The design and positioning of delivery inlets to prevent connection being made to the
wrong tank;
 Bunding of the tanks (to be a minimum of 110% of the largest tank within a bund facility;
 The fitting of level indicators and high-level alarms to prevent overfilling;
 Vehicle access;
 Lighting
 Labelling and
 Arrangements for spill containment.
Operational issues should include
 The introduction of a safe system of work including emergency procedures to deal with
spillages,
 Training the personnel involved including tanker drivers,
 Providing personal protective equipment such as
o Chemical suits,
o Chemical resistant gloves and
o Full face protection.
Continued….

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In outlining the provisions for maintenance, candidates should have referred to
 Arrangements for the examination and testing of safety-critical plant,
 Permit to work systems,
 Cleaning and isolation before maintenance work is started,
 Regular bund cleaning and
 The provision of training to maintenance staff in emergency procedures.
Many candidates miss marks because they resort to generalisations such as 'suitable
bunding' instead of indicating the relationship between bund size and tank volume.
In answering an "outline" question, candidates must provide additional detail to obtain the
marks available.
A number of candidates spend some time dealing with precautions for flammable liquids
which were not relevant to this scenario.

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 LPG – PROPERTIES & SAFE STORAGE

The physical and chemical properties of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) dictate a number of precautions
which should be taken in the storage of LPG in cylinders.
a) Select four of these properties and explain how one of the precautions is related to each property.
b) Give, with reasons, additional precautions for the safe storage of LPG in cylinders.
The properties include:
 LPG is a flammable gas at standard temp and pressure;
 It is denser than air;
 Escape clouds cool and therefore are not buoyant on thermal diffusion;
 Liquid releases float on water;
 The lower explosive limit (LEL) is reached with small concentrations of LPG;
 It is slightly anaesthetic and suffocating in high concentrations
Precautions for the safe storage of LPG in cylinders include:
 Preferably stored in the open air;
 Minimise quantity;
 Elimination of ignition sources:
o no smoking,
o intrinsically safe / flame proof electrical equipment);
 Only electrical apparatus for use in Zone 2 area should be allowed in storage area or within
separation distance;
 Provision of signage with 'extremely flammable' warnings;
 Dry powder extinguishers at storage location;
 Control of combustibles;
 Removal of vegetation around storage area (not sodium chlorate weed killers / other oxidising
agents);
 Floors should be concreted;
o Any slope away from stored materials;
 Empty cylinders stored separately from full with valves shut;
 Cylinders stored upright;
 Protective caps kept in place on valves;
 Segregated from oxygen cylinders (3m);
 Storage compound should be protected from vehicle impact;
Continued….

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 Storage situation greater than 3m from
o cellars,
o drains or excavations and
o protected from the elements;
 If more than 400 Kg store must have
o 2m high mesh fence,
o 2 exits, with
o Cylinders at least 1.5m from fence;
Any store room must be:
 Non combustible or fire resistant and
 ventilated with an explosimeter installed.
This is not a popular question, answers given to part (a) are generally poor, answers to part (b)
are better, although a number of responses discuss bulk storage, whereas the question refers to
cylinders.

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 LPG – PRECAUTION WHEN STORING IN CYLINDERS

Outline the precautions required when storing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in cylinders.
The precautions required when storing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in cylinders includes:
 The need for a store to be secured,
 Situated in a well-ventilated location and set apart from other buildings and traffic routes.
 The store itself should be of sufficient size,
 Constructed of suitable material to allow any leaks to disperse,
 Be equipped with suitable lighting,
 Provision of hazard warning signs and appropriate fire-fighting equipment.
On-going precautions would include
 Ensuring the area is kept free from combustible materials including vegetation,
 Controlling ignition sources,
 Storing cylinders upright,
 Segregating full and empty cylinders and
 Ensuring that oxygen cylinders or oxidising materials are stored in an area apart from the
LPG.
This question is reasonably well answered although some candidates' become more
concerned with risk assessment, training and emergency procedures rather than the physical
requirements for storage.

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 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SPRAY PAINING USING HIGHLY FLAMMABLE SOLVENT
BASED PAINT

Workers in a vehicle maintenance workshop spray-paint vehicles using a highly flammable solvent-
based paint.
Outline the measures needed to assess and control the risks associated with the spray-painting
activity.
One of the first measures to be taken in this situation would be to carry out an assessment of
the risks involved in carrying out the activity which would include:
 The hazardous properties of the paints and solvents used (normally by reference to safety
data sheets),
 The circumstances in which the work was carried out,
 Possible ignition sources and the likelihood that a fire or explosion would occur.
The control measures to be taken would be:
 Firstly to ensure that the workshop was constructed of fire resistant material, and then
 To give consideration to the possibility of replacing the paint in use with one that was less
flammable.
An external fire resistant storeroom would have to be provided for the paints and solvents with
the quantities present in the workshop reduced to a minimum and kept in non-spill containers
provided with lids.
Procedures would have to be put in place for the containment and clean up of spillages and
for the cleaning of the spray guns.
Local exhaust ventilation would have to be provided in the workshop with care taken to ensure
all electrical equipment was to the standard appropriate for the conditions that might prevail,
such as flameproof or intrinsically safe.
Fire fighting equipment would have to be provided together with adequate fire escape routes
Emergency procedures drawn up and communicated to the workforce who would also need
instruction and training on the risks involved in the operation and the precautions to be
observed.
Candidates are generally able to identify many of the control measures necessary.
Candidates normally have more difficulty in suggesting how the risks associated with the
process should be assessed.
Some loose marks because they produce lists rather than the outline required.

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 PAINT AND THINNERS STORE – CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS

Outline the factors to consider with respect to the design, construction and use of a storeroom that is
to be used for the storage of bulk stocks of palletised containers of highly flammable paints and
thinners.
Design and construction of the storeroom factors to be considered:
 The provision of adequate separation from occupied buildings and site boundaries;
 Segregation from traffic routes with the use of fire walls if separation was not possible;
 The construction of the store on an impermeable base with fire resistant materials with a
light weight roof or blast panels;
 The provision of high/low ventilation;
 The provision of bunding to retain any spilled liquid;
 Ensuring that electrical installations were suitable for a zoned area;
 The provision of fire/smoke detection systems and of sprinklers and/or fire extinguishers;
 Ensuring adequate spacing between racking to allow the movement of fork lift trucks;
 And the provision of separate access for pedestrians and the trucks.
Use of the storeroom would involve:
 The control of ignition sources such as the fork lift trucks and portable electric equipment;
 The storing of paints and thinners in fire resistant containers away from sources of heat
and sunlight;
 Procedures for decanting which should be carried out outdoors or in a separate area;
 Procedures for spillages where immediate cleaning up would be required using spill kits;
 Ensuring a high standard of housekeeping for the fork lift truck routes and pedestrian
walkways;
 Introducing procedures for the regular inspection and maintenance of the racking and
pallets;
 Arranging for the safe disposal of waste;
 Providing information and training to the workers on the necessary precautionary
measures to be taken
 Controlling access to the stores by limiting it to authorised personnel only.

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IC 05 WORK EQUIPMENT
BRITTLE & DUCTILE FAILURES

With the aid of labelled sketches, outline the characteristic features of, and factors that promote the
following types of materials failure:
a) Brittle failure;
b) Ductile failure.
For this question, candidates were expected to outline with the aid of labelled sketches, the
characteristic features of and factors that promote brittle and ductile fractures.

A brittle fracture generally occurs without warning or prior evidence of distress.

It is a crystalline structure failure with minimal plastic or elastic deformation.
There are generally characteristic "chevron" marks from the point of initiation and the failure is
sudden from rapid stress loading.
The factors promoting a brittle fracture are
 High tensile stresses,
 Residual or locked in stresses,
 Sudden loading which does not give the material time to deform plastically,
 Case hardening,
 Low temperatures and
 The degree of brittleness of the material.
A ductile fracture generally has a smooth fracture surface with plastic deformation of the material
before final fracture.
There is evidence of necking and the final fracture is often brittle because there is insufficient
material left to sustain a load.
This type of failure generally occurs as the result of a single stress overload though other
promoting factors including
 High temperatures,
 Cold work hardening and
 The plasticity of the material.
 FATIGUE FAILURE

A serious accident occurred when a threaded steel rod in the braking mechanism of a hoist broke.
An investigation revealed that the cause of the breakage was fatigue failure.
a) Describe the mechanism and characteristics of fatigue failure
b) List THREE factors which can contribute to such a failure and for each factor describe one
circumstance in which it may occur
c) Describe the measures that could have been taken to minimise the likelihood of such a failure
This question is designed to test candidates' understanding of the mechanisms and causative
factors of fatigue failure and the measures that could minimise the probability of such failure
occurring.
Part (a)
The mechanism and characteristics of fatigue failure:
 Crack propagation from points of stress concentration,
 Fluctuating stress environments and
 The characteristic conchoidal fracture pattern.
 The final failure may be ductile or brittle.
In part (b),
The factors which could give rise to fatigue failure in practice are:
 Sharp corners,
 Holes or surface occlusions,
 Design and fatigue strength issues,
 Residual stresses imposed during manufacture or assembly, and
 The effects of factors such as corrosion or temperature.
For part (c),
Measures to minimise the likelihood of fatigue failures includes
 Those connected with design, manufacture and installation involving the correct specification
of materials and components to match service conditions, correct assembly and quality
assurance;
 The maintenance, inspection and examination (with ndt) particularly of critical components
and their replacement at planned intervals; and
 Measures connected with use such as avoiding abuse and remaining within designed
operational limits, the provision of training and instruction for those involved in the use and
the keeping of service history records.
There is sometimes a lack of relevant technical knowledge with some confusing fatigue failure
with other types of failure such as ductile or brittle.

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 NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING TECHNIQUES –ADVANTAGES & LIMITATIONS

Describe the non-destructive testing techniques that could be used to test the integrity of welded
joints in a large pressure vessel, identifying the advantages and limitations of each technique.
A logical way to approach this question would be to take each technique in turn and describe its
principles and identify its particular advantages and limitations.

Of the various techniques, visual inspection is probably the cheapest and requires little
equipment (a torch and magnifying lens can enhance the surface), but it detects only surface flaws
such as cracks, grooves or weld globules, requires some expertise and is not very reliable.

The use of a dye penetrant method (with a suitable developer) is also relatively cheap and is a
simple operation, but again, does not detect sub-surface faults and interpretation of the
indications may be difficult (although enhancement can be achieved by using a fluorescent
penetrant with a UV source). Additionally, the penetrant used may present some health risks.

A third technique, magnetic particle inspection, involves magnetising the area concerned then
coating the joint to be tested with magnetic particles that may be in powder form or within a liquid.
It is a simple and quick operation that is very sensitive to surface cracks and, in certain
circumstances, can detect sub-surface defects. Its drawback is that the interpretation of results
may be difficult, particularly on the inside surface of a pressure vessel.

With radiography, x-rays or gamma rays are used to penetrate the welded joint to leave an
image on film. Any defects are shown up by the differences in the intensity of the radiation striking
the film. The benefits of this technique are that it detects internal defects and produces a
permanent record of the test. However, the operation is time consuming, expensive and
requires bulky equipment and skilled radiographers. Additionally, there is the danger of
radiation exposure.
Using an ultrasonic technique, pulses of high frequency ultrasound are used on welded joints,
with the reflected waves being detected and shown on an oscilloscope or digital display. This
technique detects both surface and subsurface defects, requires access to one side of the
joint only and takes little time with portable equipment that can be used in most environments.
The limitations of the technique are that it requires a high level of expertise and coupling the
equipment probe onto rough surfaces can be difficult.
Finally, eddy-current testing may also be used for the detection of surface flaws. It works by
detecting distortion in the magnetic field arising from eddy currents. It is relatively low cost and
can be used on all conducting materials, but requires some expertise.

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 NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING – PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES, ADVANTAGES &
DISADVANTAGES

a) Explain the purpose of non-destructive testing (NDT) on items of plant.

b) Other than visual inspection, outline the principles, advantages and disadvantages of TWO NDT
techniques.
This question is generally well answered but many candidates are unable to give a technical
explanation of the principles of how the various techniques work.
The purpose of non-destructive testing (NDT) is to check for faults (cracks etc) in
components before they develop into total failure without affecting the integrity of the
component.
The main NDT techniques required are:
 The use of a dye penetrant method makes cracks visible as dye penetrates into it. It is
relatively cheap and is a simple operation but it does not detect sub-surface faults, is not
totally reliable and interpretation of the indications may be difficult (although
enhancement can sometimes be achieved by using a fluorescent penetrant with a UV source).
Additionally, the penetrant used may have toxic properties.
 Impact or 'tap' testing involves detection of the change of pitch of reverberant sound after
striking. It is cheap as no specialist equipment is required but it gives no indication of where
the fault is and relies on individual sensitivity / skill.
 Magnetic particle method involves coating the surface of the item involved to be tested with
magnetic particles that may be in powder form or within a liquid. It is a simple and quick
operation that is very sensitive to surface cracks and, in certain circumstances, can detect
sub-surface defects, its drawback is that the interpretation of results may be difficult,
particularly on the inside surface of a pressure vessel.
 Use of Eddy currents (EC) involves high frequency alternating current in probe coil
which induces an EC field in the scanned test piece, when the probe scans across the defect
the EC field is distorted, causing indication on test instrument. It detects surface and
shallow sub-surface flaws and can be automated. Disadvantages are that this method can
suffer from spurious defect indications; it is no good on non-conductive test material; it
requires a skilled operator and relatively expensive equipment.
 With radiography, x-rays or gamma rays are used to penetrate the item to leave an image
on film. Any defects are shown up by the differences in the intensity of the radiation
striking the film. The benefits of this technique are that it detects internal defects and
produces a permanent record of the test. However, the operation is time- consuming,
expensive and requires bulky equipment and skilled radiographers.
Additionally, there is the danger of radiation exposure.
 Using an ultrasonic technique, short pulses of high frequency ultrasound are used, with the
reflected waves being detected and shown on an oscilloscope or digital display. This
technique detects both surface and sub-surface defects, requires access to one side of the
joint only and takes little time with portable equipment that can be used in most
environments.
The limitations of the technique are that it requires a high level of expertise and coupling the
equipment probe onto rough surfaces can be difficult.

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 LPG – EXPLOSION – PIPEWORK CORROSION & PROTECTION

In 2004 at ICL Plastics Glasgow nine people were killed and 45 seriously injured by an explosion in
the unventilated basement of a building.
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) had leaked from a crack in a corroded unprotected underground pipeline
that had been laid 35 years earlier. The LPG leak had migrated into the building.
a) Describe how corrosion occurs in buried LPG metal pipework. (6)
b) Outline how buried LPG metal pipework can be protected against corrosion. (4)
c) Excluding corrosion protection, outline additional factors to consider in preventing a recurrence of
an explosion in similar LPG pipework installations
Part a)
Corrosion occurs in buried LPG metal pipe work involves an electro-chemical process and the
need for the presence of a corrosion cell such as pitting of the metal pipe for example, and the
roles played by an anode, cathode and electrolyte, which in the scenario described was
moisture together with the possibility of contaminants in the soil, in the liberation and transfer
of electrons.
Candidates could also describe the effects of corrosion on different metals such as cast iron,
ductile iron and steel.
Part b),
Buried LPG metal pipe work can be protected against corrosion by:
 Wrapping with protective tape;
 Coating it with bitumen;
 Galvanising;
 Sleeving with a dry envelope; and
 Providing cathodic protection or a sacrificial anode.
Part c)
Additional factors to be considered in preventing a recurrence of an explosion in a similar LPG
installation would involve:
 Identifying and prioritising at risk installations such as those where hazardous features
arise from the design and layout of the building;
 Where there are inherent hazards in the layout or the condition of the installation and pipe
work such as the presence of unventilated voids;
 Those which are least well maintained or located in the most corrosive soils; and
 The older installations and the extent of their existing protection.
For inspection and maintenance of the systems, plans and drawings will be required together
with a record of previous maintenance.
Excavation may be required, though it must be acknowledged that disturbing the pipe work
may increase the risk of leaks.
There will also be a need for the introduction of a systematic programme of replacement of
metallic pipes with polypropylene and the condition of at risk systems will need to be
monitored pending the replacement.

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 NDT – PRINCIPLES, BENEFITS & LIMITATIONS – DYE PENETRANT &
RADIOGRAPHY

Outline the principles, benefits and limitations of the following NOT techniques:
a) Dye Penetrant Inspection
b) Radiography using x-rays or gamma rays.
Some candidates failed to mention the use of developer for dye penetrant, whilst others did
not mention the x-ray film for radiographic systems.
Candidates who structure their answer using the signposts of principles, benefits and
limitations for each of the techniques tend to gain higher marks.
Dye Penetrant inspection uses the principle of brightly coloured or fluorescent liquid applied
to the surface of the component, which penetrates into any surface cracks or cavities.
Developer is then applied which draws out the penetrant, so indicating cracks etc, that are
not normally detected visually.
The benefits of dye penetrant are that it detects surface faults, is quick and easy to use on
large surfaces, is cost effective, allows complex geometries to be inspected and is a portable
technique (e.g. spray aerosol cans of penetrant can be used).
The limitations of the technique are that
 Sub-surface faults are not detected,
 It is only suitable for non-porous materials,
 There must be direct access to the surface of the component,
 Surface finish and roughness can affect inspection sensitivity,
 It indicates the length of the defect but not the depth and
 There are health and safety considerations such as possible confined space and
flammability.
Radiography uses the transmission of x-rays or gamma rays through a material onto a film
placed on the opposite side.
The film records the intensity of the radiation received and as cracks and flaws are hollow a
greater intensity of rays pass onto the film.
The benefits of radiography is:
 That it can be used on most material (ferrous and non-ferrous),
 Internal (sub-surface) defects are indicated and
 A permanent visual image of the component under test is provided.
The limitations of the technique include:
 The space required for the equipment;
 It is a time consuming process;
 It is expensive;
 It requires skilled operators to use the equipment and interpret the results;
 There is a health and safety consideration due to the possibility of radiation exposure;
 The results show length but not the depth of defect; and

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  There is a limitation of the thickness of the material

PURPOSE OF NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING (NT)

Outline the purpose of non-destructive testing (NDT) on items of plant.

The purpose of non-destructive testing (NDT) is to check for faults such as cracks in
components before they develop into total failure without affecting the integrity of the
component.
Most candidates managedto provide a reasonable outline for this question.

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 CE MARKING – SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT

A new design of hydraulic press is intended for use within the European Economic Area.
Outline the 'essential health and safety requirements' that you would expect to have been addressed
in the technical file for the machine in order to demonstrate that it is in fact safe.
Few candidates show that they understood the concept of 'essential health and safety
requirements' (EHSRs) for a machine and many candidates, instead of addressing these, attempt
to describe the contents of a technical file (sometimes confused with an operating manual) and /
or the requirements for CE marking and declarations of conformity.
Anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of basic machinery safety issues should have been able
to make a reasonable attempt at this question since all it was really asking was what needs to be
considered in order to make a machine safe during installation, use, maintenance and
decommissioning.
Relating some of these issues to a hydraulic press would have gained even higher marks.
Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) are broadly divided into six areas:
1. General requirements (e.g. Safety integration principles, materials/products used or
created, lighting requirements and effects on lighting, handling/installation of machine)
2. Controls and control systems (e.g. Safety / reliability of controls, design of control devices,
means of starting and stopping (including emergency stops), mode selection, failure of
power supply, software design)
3. Protection against mechanical hazards (e.g. Stability, risk of break-up, falling / ejected
objects, safety of surfaces / edges, choice and characteristics of guards and protective
devices in relation to hazards / risks)
4. Protection against other hazards (e.g. Electricity and other energy sources, fitting
errors, extremes of temperature, fire, noise and vibration, emissions of dusts / gases /
liquids / etc.)
5. Maintenance (e.g. Remote adjustment/lubrication, means of access, means of
isolation, automatic cleaning)
6. Indicators (e.g. Information/warning devices, marking requirements, written
instructions).

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 THOROUGH EXAMINATION – LIFTING EQUIPMENT

Most national legislation specifies fixed intervals between thorough examinations of lifting equipment
and also includes an option for thorough examination to be carried out in accordance with an
'examination scheme'.
Outline the factors that a competent person would need to take into account when deciding whether
less frequent examinations might be justified, identifying the documents that would be needed for such
an exercise.
In answering this question, Examiners are looking to candidates to outline factors which the
competent person would need to take into account such as:
 The age of the equipment,
 Its history (including the extent of use, the loads lifted and the environments in which it
has been used) and
 Its likely future use
 The standards and specifications to which the equipment had been designed and
manufactured;
 The manufacturers' recommendations on testing, inspection and maintenance and
whether they have been adhered to (by reference to records);
 The equipment's accident, breakdown and repair history;
 Records of modifications
 The fitting of replacement parts;
 The results of previous examinations; and
 The typical performance history of similar items of equipment.
 AGRICULTURAL TRACTOR STABILITY

Outline:
a) The factors affecting the likelihood of an agricultural tractor overturning;
b) The measures that may be necessary to minimise the risk, or limit the effects, of a tractor
overturning.
Part a)
Factors affecting the possibility of overturning such as:
 The angle of slope and direction of travel on gradients;
 Uneven or soft ground;
 Speed on cornering;
 Wheel width;
 The condition and pressure of tyres;
 The effects of trailers and other attachments including power take-off seizure and
 The level of competence of the driver.
Part (b)
The measures that may be necessary to minimise the risk, or limit the effects, of a tractor
overturning include:
 Seat restraints and roll-over protection to mitigate the effects of an overturn.
 Restricting the use of tractors on steep gradients;
 Fitting counterbalance weights;
 Fitting wider tyres and maintaining them on a regular basis;
 Fitting a power take-off torque limiter such as shear pins and
 Providing training for drivers.

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 PRESSURE SYSTEMS

a) Explain what is meant by a 'pressure system'.

b) Describe common causes of structural failure in pressure systems.
c) Outline the technical and procedural measures to minimize the likelihood of failures in pressure
systems.
Part a)
A "pressure system" is:
 A system comprising one or more pressure vessels of rigid construction,
 Any associated pipework and protective devices;
 The pipework with its protective devices to which a transportable pressure receptacle is, or
is intended to be, connected; or
 A pipeline and its protective devices which contain or are liable to contain a relevant fluid, but
do not include a transportable pressure receptacle.
Better responses include examples of a 'relevant fluid', such as:
 Steam;
 A fluid or mixture of fluids which is at a pressure greater than 0.5 bar above atmospheric
pressure,
 The fluid being either a gas, or a liquid which would have a vapour pressure greater than 0.5
bar above atmospheric pressure when in equilibrium with its vapour at either the actual
temperature of the liquid or at 17.5 degrees Celsius; or
 A gas dissolved under pressure in solvent contained in a porous substance at ambient
temp and which could be released from the solvent without the application of heat.
Part b)
Possible modes of failure:
 Excessive stress,
 Abnormal external loading,
 Overpressure,
 Mechanical damage or ductile failure;
 Overheating;
 Mechanical fatigue; thermal fatigue;
 Brittle fracture;
 Creep;
 Hydrogen embrittlement at welding repairs;
 Corrosion;
 Water / steam hammer and caustic embrittlement.
In some cases candidates dealt with only one or two possible failure modes and thus restricted
the number of marks that could be awarded.
Continued…..

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Part c)
The third part of the question required candidates to look at the design, operation, inspection,
test and maintenance requirements that would be needed to minimise the risk of structural
failure.
This is generally well answered.
Reference was needed to:
 The design specification being correct (fit for purpose, CE marking etc);
 Specific safety features (pressure relief valves, level sensors, etc), quality control during
the manufacture, inspection and maintenance arrangements (including statutory
examination and the scheme of examination being prepared by a competent person);
 The role of non-destructive testing;
 Ensuring that the vessel operates within its performance envelope,
 In the case of boilers, the filtering and treatment of water; and the
 Training of personnel.

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 PRESSURE SYSTEMS

Failure of pressure systems can result in accidents.

(a) Identify FIVE examples of pressure systems AND give a workplace example in EACH case.
(b) Outline a typical written scheme of examination for pressure systems.
(c) Outline other control measures that could reduce the risk of pressure system failures.
Part a)
Examples of pressure systems:
1. Pressurised process plant and pipe work connected with chemical processes;
2. Fixed or portable compressed air systems as used for painting or tyre inflation;
3. Pressure cookers normally present in industrial kitchens;
4. Heat exchangers providing heating or cooling in industry;
5. Refrigeration plant found in a food storage building;
6. Boiler or steam heating systems providing general heating in workplaces; and
7. Autoclaves or equipment sterilisers used in cleaning laboratory glass ware.
Part b)
A typical written scheme of examination for pressure systems would cover all protective
devices and would include all pressure vessels and pipe work that could give rise to danger if
they failed.
The type of examination would be specified such as, for example, as a result of a statutory
requirement, as would also the frequency with which the examination should be carried out.
The scheme would stipulate the special measures needed in preparing the plant for
examination and in the case of a fired or heated pressure systems, the need for them to be
examined when cold and also when in operation with a final requirement that the examination
should be carried out by a competent person.
Part c)
Other control measures that might reduce the risk of pressure system failures:
Under equipment, it would be imperative to ensure that installations are suitable for their
intended purpose, and are installed correctly with due regard to design conditions, installation
standards and accepted codes of practice.
Operating conditions require a knowledge of the nature, and pressures and temperatures of
the gas or liquid being pressurised or contained, the safe operating limits of the system and
equipment linked with the system and the methods of operating within these limits; the
availability of operating instructions for the system and equipment linked with the system and
the accessability by workers to instructions on what action to take in the event of an
emergency.
As for protective devices, these should be suitable, adjusted to the correct settings and
should function properly at all times.
Maintenance is an important control measure and a programme should be drawn up for the
whole system, monitoring it for defects and for signs of corrosion and wear and ensuring that
both the examination and any necessary remedial work is carried out using safe systems of
work and under competent supervision.
Continued….

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Training would have to be provided for all operators, maintenance personnel, and those
responsible for carrying out inspections of the system to ensure they were in possession of
the necessary knowledge and skills to perform their duties.

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 LIGHTING AUDIT OF A FACTORY & FACILITIES

Outline the health and safety issues which should be identified during a lighting audit of a factory
which includes production, maintenance workshops and offices.
This is usually a reasonably well answered question, with many candidates able to draw on the
experience of their own workplace.
A few candidates confuse a lighting audit with a safety audit and included issues which were not
relevant to the question.
The health and safety issues which candidates should have identified include:
 The availability of natural light;
 Whether the factory is compliant with the requirements of the workplace (health, safety and
welfare) regulations;
 General requirements for pedestrians / vehicles;
 Close working requirements; task lighting;
 DSE work station lighting;
 Avoidance of glare;
 Avoidance of stroboscopic effects with respect to rotating machinery;
 Other work equipment lighting to comply with specific requirements of other legislation /
regulation (e.g.UK PUWER);
 Lighting for non-daytime external area working; emergency lighting;
 Level of luminance;
 Illumination ratio;
 Distribution of illuminates’ (shadowing);
 Psychological effects;
 Maintenance, cleaning and testing issues; and
 Ex considerations for lighting in flammable atmospheres.

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 MAINTENANCE OF PLANT – REACTIVE & PROACTIVE

a) Organisations may use a range of reactive and proactive strategies for plant maintenance.
Identify FOUR possible plant maintenance strategies AND outline the principles of EACH
strategy.
b) Outline the factors that you would advise the Engineering Department of an organisation to take
into account in deciding on a maintenance strategy following the installation of an item of process
plant.
Part a),
A range of strategies can include:
 Planned preventive maintenance (PPM),
 Breakdown maintenance,
 Condition monitoring and
 Emergency maintenance.
The principles of PPM include the need for planned maintenance and parts replacement set
against a schedule of time or running hours and driven by a record keeping system.
Breakdown maintenance, being reactive, means that maintenance is undertaken in response to
reports of malfunction of equipment and the maintenance activity is not required whilst the plant
continues to operate effectively.
Condition monitoring requires monitoring of specified parameters, (for example, vibration levels
or metal content of cutting fluids, etc.); specifying the level of each parameter when maintenance
work needs to be undertaken and measuring continuously or to a schedule.
Emergency maintenance includes maintenance undertaken to prevent more serious
consequences such as reinforcement to prevent failure or the use of temporary supports to
prevent collapse.
Part (b),
 Statutory requirements including examples of the types of work equipment involved such as
cranes and air receivers,
 The cost benefits analysis of ppm versus breakdown including the availability of spares,
competent staff, and the expected life-time of equipment.
 The outcome of risk assessments in terms of failure probability and consequences;
 The history of failure with example sources such as incident reports and maintenance
data;
 Any relevant manufacturer's data or recommendations for the plant; the extent of and / or
conditions of use;
 The opportunity for downtime and the integration with existing systems such as
condition monitoring.

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 PLANNED PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE – COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM

A motor vehicle repair workshop has installed a new electrically powered, compressed air system.
Outline the factors to be considered in developing a suitable planned preventative maintenance
programme.
The first stage in the development of a maintenance programme would be to consider:
 The design life and expected reliability of the system,
 The manufacturer’s specifications,
 The pattern of usage whether constant, periodic or only as a standby and
 The anticipated fault pattern based on experience gained in using similar equipment.
Consideration could then be given to further factors such as the need for routine operations
such as:
 Belt tightening,
 Lubrication and filter changes,
 The need for regular replacement of critical parts to prevent breakdown
 The availability of the component parts,
 The operations that would be required at specific times to counter corrosion, wear and
fatigue and
 Any statutory requirements or those required by insurance companies.
Additionally, thought should also be given to:
 The available occasions when ‘shut-down’ maintenance might be performed;
 The particular safety aspects of maintenance while equipment was running;
 The need for safe systems of work such as permits or electrical isolation;
 The availability of staff with the necessary skills and competencies to carry out the work.
A written scheme of maintenance might then be prepared which would include
 The safety precautions that should be taken
 The arrangements for recording details of the work carried out such as the results of
inspections, the defects found,
 The remedial action taken such as the replacement of parts.

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IC 06 MACHINERY SAFETY
FIXED GUARDS & THEIR DESIGN & USE

a) Identify when a fixed guard would be an appropriate means of providing protection against
mechanical hazards.
b) Outline the factors to be considered in the design and use of fixed guards in order to ensure that
persons are adequately protected.
Part (a)
Fixed guards may be an appropriate method of providing protection against mechanical hazards
when infrequent or no access is required to dangerous parts of a machine during its normal
operation.
Although not specifically required, Examiners' confidence would be increased by the use of an
appropriate example.
Part (b) requires an outline of the factors to be considered both in the design and use of a fixed
guard to ensure that the protection provided is adequate.
With respect to the design features, candidates should have referred to factors such as:
 The material of construction, which should be sufficiently robust to withstand the rigours of
the workplace and be able to contain any ejected material, but still allow sight of the
process when required;
 The method of fixing, usually requiring the use of a special tool for the guard's removal;
 The need to ensure that any necessary openings in guards are such that they do not allow
access to the dangerous parts (a function of the size of any opening in relation to the
distance to the hazard); and
 The need to address the possibility of the guard reverberating and exacerbating a noise
problem.
Factors to be considered in the use of fixed guards include
 Monitoring and supervision to ensure that the guard is not compromised,
 Safe systems of work for the carrying out of maintenance operations with the guard
removed, and t
 The provision of information and training for both operators and maintenance staff.
 FEATURES OF A FIXED GUARD

Outline the features of a ‘fixed guard’ in relation to machinery safety.

Features of a fixed guard are:
 A guard with no moving parts affixed in such a manner (e.g. by screws, nuts ,welding)
 that it can only be opened or removed by the use of tools or destruction of the affixing
means.
 It provides appropriate protection against mechanical hazards when infrequent or no
access is required to dangerous parts of a machine during its normal operation.
Some candidates outline features which were more appropriate for an interlocked rather than a
fixed guard. A point to be very mindful of.

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 INTERLOCKED SLIDING GATE – CONSTRUCTION HOIST

The horizontally sliding gate at the bottom of a construction site hoist used for raising and lowering
both persons and materials is electrically interlocked.
a) Illustrate, by means of a schematic diagram, a suitable interlocking arrangement and give reasons
for the level of protection shown.
b) Outline the factors that could prevent effective operation of the interlocking mechanism and the
measures that would be needed to ensure continued effectiveness.
The aim of this question is to test candidates' understanding of possible interlocking
arrangements on the sliding gate of a hoist on a construction site and how such
arrangements and their maintenance might be linked to the level of risk and the conditions of
service.
For part (a) of the question, candidates are asked to provide a schematic diagram of a suitable
interlocking arrangement and justify it in the context of risk.
Many of the diagrams provided are poor, with indiscernible interlocking and switching
arrangements.
A number of different arrangements could have been chosen, but a good diagram might have
shown two limit switches in opposite modes linked into control circuitry in a manner dependent
on the assessed risk.
An explanation of the chosen arrangement together with reliability advantages (or failure
routes avoided) should have been provided.
Most candidates manage to come up with one or two factors and measures for part (b) but
many seemed to forget that this was a scenario based on a construction site and so the:
 Arduous conditions,
 Dirty environment,
 Exposure to adverse weather conditions, and
 The use of the equipment by a variety of employees some of whom were not trained to do so
and some with the desire to defeat the safety measure in the desire to improve efficiency,
The above points need to feature in the discussion of factors that could prevent effective
operation.
Measures to ensure continued effectiveness could have included
 The selection of robust components,
 Circuit design to minimise the risk of earth faults,
 Arrangements for regular inspection and maintenance,
 Protection from the environment and
 Effective supervision.

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 INTERLOCKED MACHINE GUARD & INTERLOCKING DEVICES

a) Outline the principles of an interlocked machine guard

b) Describe the principles of operation of the following interlocking methods used to safeguard
machinery
i. Captive key control system
ii. Trapped key control system
iii. A cam activated position (limit) switch operating in the positive (normally open) mode
Part a) examiners look for answers that include the fact that an interlocked guard is linked to
the machine controls by mechanical, electrical, hydraulic or pneumatic means.
The principles of operation are that the machine cannot become dangerous when the guard
is open and, when the machine is in an otherwise dangerous condition, either the guard
cannot be opened or that by opening the guard it causes the machine to become safe.
The question did not ask why interlocked guards are used in preference to other types of
machine guards, which is included in the answers of candidates from time to time, thus there
were no marks available for such an inclusion.
Part b) Many candidates demonstrate a general confusion between a captive key system and
a trapped key system.
Candidates need to ensure, particularly in view of their similar sounding names, that they are
aware of the distinction between them.
In the first case, as the name suggests, the ‘key’ is at all times held captive in the guard
locking mechanism that incorporates an electrical switch connected to the power supply of
the machine.
Marks would be awarded for stating that it is necessary to turn the key to open the guard and
this has the effect of switching off the machine (often in a two stage process)
With a simple trapped key system, the key is removable but is held in the guard locking
mechanism until the guard is closed. On locking the guard, the same key can then be
transferred to a switch to allow power to the machine. While power is on, the key is again
held in the switch.
The principles of a positive-operated, cam-activated position switch relate to the making and
breaking of an electrical contact within the switch. When the guard is closed, a spring inside
the switch forces contact; on opening the guard, the action of a cam-follower on the cam of
the switch breaks that contact against the force of the spring. Some candidates find the use
of a simple sketch helpful and if properly labelled it would be given credit.

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 INTERLOCKED GUARD – CONSTRUCTION SITE LIFT

An external lift on a construction site has an interlocked guard to prevent the lift operating when the
gate is open. With reference to the diagram:
(a) identify the two types of switch shown (Switch A AND Switch B);
(b) identify the functional components associated with BOTH switches;
(c) outline the normal sequence of operation for the electrically operated, cam-activated switch
assembly when the gate opens and closes;
(d) outline ways in which electrically-operated, cam-activated witches may fail to operate as intended.

Part a)
Limit switch A is wired normally closed and is a positively operated switch while switch B is
wired normally open and is negatively operated.
Part b)
The functional components of the switches are the cam follower or plunger, an internal spring
compressed from the bottom, internal electrical contacts attached to the cam follower with the
gate acting as the cam.

Continued….

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Part c)
When the gate is closed the normal sequence of operations would be the depression of the
plunger on switch B and the compression of the internal spring and the release of the cam
follower on switch A causing de-compression of the spring.
This would allow electrical contact to be made in both switches, so making the circuit and
allowing the operation of the lift.
When the gate is open, the cam follower on switch A is depressed and the internal spring
compresses while the cam follower in switch B is released causing decompression of the
spring.
The electrical contact is broken in both switches thus breaking the circuit and preventing the
operation of the lift.
Part d)
There are a number of ways in which the type of switch described in the scenario might fail to
operate as intended. These include:
 Failure of or damage to the internal spring which prevents the appropriate contact being
made;
 Damage to other internal parts of the switch;
 The presence of debris or dirt within the body of the switch;
 A contact weld through electrical arcing;
 A misalignment between cam and cam follower or a wiring fault;
 Wear of or damage to parts such as a bent plunger;
 Damage due to a corrosive atmosphere and sabotage such as deliberate disconnection of
wiring or the ‘taping up’ of parts to simulate activation by the gate.

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 BAGGAGE CONVEYOR ACCCIDENT – AIRPORT

Members of the public have been injured when collecting baggage from a baggage conveyor at an
airport.
a) Identify typical mechanical hazards when the conveyor is in use.
b) Outline the control measures that should be in place to reduce the risk of injury from the
mechanical hazards.
Part (a),
Mechanical hazards include:
 Trapping between the interlaced parts of the conveyor bed, between moving items of
baggage or between the lip and trapped baggage;
 Abrasion hazards from coming into contact with the moving belt;
 Impact hazards from coming into contact with moving baggage which might have been
inadequately stacked or in attempting to replace items that had fallen from the belt;
 The possibility of entanglement when items of clothing or jewellery become caught in the
moving conveyor.
Part b)
The control measures that should be in place include:
 Control of the speed of the conveyor;
 A reduction in gaps in the belt at critical points such as turns;
 The replacement of worn conveyor parts;
 The use of emergency stops in the event of blockage or other emergency;
 The use of photo-sensitive detectors;
 Using a klaxon or strobe warning lights in the case of an inadvertent start-up;
 Using workers to assess the conveyors for blockages and to assist passengers when this
is seen to be necessary
 Providing signage advising caution when removing baggage from the conveyor, on the
action to be taken in the event of a blockage and warning against placing hands or feet on
the conveyor.

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 GUARDING OF CONVEYORS

Coal is delivered by train to a power station and is transported by conveyors to a furnace.

Conveyor workers check that the coal moves along the conveyors efficiently.
These workers have received suitable information, instruction and training and are supervised.
Outline additional control measures that could reduce risks to conveyor workers.
The additional control measures that could be considered are:
 Ensuring suitable guarding was in place for the conveyors for example fixed guards on the
conveyor drums, nip guards between the belts and rotating rollers and enclosures or
distance guards to prevent access to the conveyors;
 Edge guards or rails to prevent the coal from falling off the conveyors;
 Trip wires or emergency stops that were clearly visible to enable the belts to be stopped in
the event of an emergency;
 The provision of adequate space between the conveyors;
 Positioning the conveyor belts at a convenient height to facilitate the loading and
unloading of the coal;
 Carrying out maintenance on the conveyors on a regular basis by competent personnel;
 Carrying out a noise assessment and providing the workers with hearing protection if this
was found to be necessary;
 Monitoring the presence of dust and ensuring a good level of general ventilation together
with suppression sprays;
 Providing a level of lighting that will enable work to be carried out safely and importantly
 Introducing procedures for inspecting the machinery at the beginning of each shift to
ensure that the guards and safety devices were in position and installing a start up
warning device.
Most candidates refer to the need to provide guards for the conveyor but they generally do not
indicate the type and location of the protection required.
Some candidates concentrate on general working conditions such as exposure to dust and
dirt and write of job rotation and welfare issues while a few who perhaps do not read the
question with sufficient care discussed traffic management and the use of forklift trucks rather
than the hazards associated with the use of the conveyors.

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 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – LIGHT CURTAIN

It is proposed to use an electro-sensitive safety system ('light curtain') to safeguard the otherwise
unguarded entrance to a fenced enclosure in which dangerous machinery operates at high speed.
Outline the safety considerations and specific design criteria that would need to be addressed when
assessing the acceptability of the proposal.
It is not necessary to have an in-depth understanding of the technical aspects of electro-sensitive
safety systems ("light curtains") to achieve good marks since many of the specific points to be
made related to the basic principles of safety at machinery enclosures.

It is, however, necessary to recognise that an electro-sensitive safety system comprises a light
curtain protecting a defined space and that interrupting the curtain should result (via a control
circuit) in the safe shutdown of the machinery before dangerous parts can be accessed.

Considerations that are relevant include:

 Run-down time or braking performance of the machinery in relation to the distance from the
light curtain;

 Dangers of whole-body access to the enclosure while the machine is running;

 Unprotected dangers such as ejection of debris;

 Reliability issues; and

 Alternative safeguarding systems and methods such as a trapped key system or close
guarding of the machinery within the enclosure.

Specific design criteria that would have to be addressed include:

 Selection of the relevant interlocking standard in relation to reliability and risk (for example,
the need for a dual-circuit or self-monitoring system (with reference to BS EN 954);

 The precise geometry of the light curtain to detect access;

 The need for presence-sensing devices to prevent operation of the system with an operator
inside the enclosure;

 The positioning of the system reset control to allow visibility into, and to prevent access from
inside, the enclosure;

 The possible need to monitor braking performance electronically as part of the safety
system; and

 The lock-off and isolation arrangements for maintenance.

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 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – BENCH MOUNTED CIRCULAR SAW

Outline the factors that should be considered to ensure the safe operation of a bench-mounted circular
saw.
This question seeks the application of machinery safety principles to a specific item of work
equipment. Unfortunately, many candidates give very general answers and hence obtain only poor
marks.
Good answers included reference to:
 The need for the correct operation and / or adjustment of the top guard,
 The effective guarding of the blade beneath the bench,
 The use of a push-stick to feed through the material being sawn,
 The riving knife correctly positioned, and
 The correct selection, maintenance and adjustment of the blade
More general issues relate to:
 A suitable risk assessment,
 Training and competence of operators,
 The provision of a local exhaust ventilation system,
 Use of personal protective equipment (e.g. Goggles and hearing protection),
 Sufficient space around the machine that is kept free of obstruction,
 The provision of emergency stops and means of isolation,
 Adequate lighting,
 Stability of the machine and
 The need for maintenance

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 ILO CONVENTION 119 – GUARDING

The 1963 International Labour Organisation's Convention 1 19 (C119) concerns the Guarding of
Machinery. Part 1 considers general provisions; Part 2 concerns the sale, hire, transfer and exhibition
of machinery and Part 3 the use of machinery.
a) Outline the categories of machinery covered by Part 1 of the convention.
b) Give TWO examples of transmission machinery (exposed moving parts) specified in Part 2.
c) Outline the requirements for the use of machinery as specified in Part 3.
Part a),
 Categories of machinery such as:
 Power driven and manually operated machinery,
 Machinery which is new or second hand,
 Road and rail vehicles during locomotion with the safety of the operators in mind and
agricultural machinery with respect to the workers connected with the machinery.
Part b)
1. Belts and pulleys,
2. Fly wheels,
3. Gearing,
4. Chains and
5. Shafting.
Part c),
The requirements of Part 3 of the Convention apply to an employer and/or his/her prescribed
agent who should be aware that using machinery without guards is prohibited by law and
there is therefore an obligation on them to secure compliance with the law’s requirements.
As such an employer should not require a worker to use to use machinery without guards in
position nor make guards inoperative on machines that may be used by a worker.
The worker, too, has an obligation both to use and not misuse the guards provided.

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 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – GUILLOTINE OPERATION

Describe the risks associated with the task of cutting sheet metal with guillotine machines and the
measures that should be taken to ensure the health and safety of operators.
This question is not split into parts but it required a description of both the risks involved and
the control measures necessary to ensure the health and safety of operators. It would, therefore,
be helpful to candidates if they plan and structure their answers in two parts to ensure both
aspects were fully addressed.
As well as the risks arising from mechanical hazards posed by the machine itself, such as:
 Cutting,
 Crushing and trapping,
Candidates are expected to describe risks from all mechanical and non-mechanical hazards
arising from the operation.
These should include:
 Manual handling risks from movement of the sheet metal,
 The potential for hearing damage from the noise generated by the cutting process, and
 The risk of injury resulting from ejection of metal during cutting and disposal of off-cuts.
A description of the main protective measures to be taken should include
 The provision of fixed guards or other safeguarding systems such as photo-electric
devices ('light curtains') or pressure mats;
 Shrouding the foot pedal to ensure the guillotine was not accidentally operated;
 The maintenance of guarding systems;
 The possibility of introducing automated or mechanical systems for the handling of the
sheet metal;
 Methods for noise reduction such as hoods or absorbent bin lining;
 The provision of personal protective equipment for the operators' hands and eyes; and
 Operator training on safe guillotine operation.

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 SAFETY OF MACHINERY – POWER PRESS

a) Outline the factors other than legislation that may have influenced the decline in the number of
power press accidents over the last 40 years.
Answers to the second part of the question should include
 The decline of the manufacturing industry and replacement of power presses by hydraulic and
pneumatic presses;
 Improved guarding and not techniques;
 Increased interest in and development of health and safety management systems.
A number of candidates waste time by listing legislative factors in their answer, although these
were specifically excluded in the question.

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 COMPUTER CONTROLLED EQUIPMENT – REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR INJURY

a) Outline the features of computer controlled equipment (e.g. robots, Computer Numerical
Controlled (CNC) machines, wireless operated lifting equipment) that may have particular
implications on safety.
b) Describe how the risk of injury to personnel working with such equipment may be reduced.
The features of computer controlled equipment that may have particular implications on safety
include
 Sudden, rapid and forceful movements,
 Aberrant behaviour,
 Software faults,
 Dangers during teaching and maintenance,
 Stored energy and
 Leaking hydraulic and pneumatic fluid.
Risk of injury to personnel working with such equipment may be reduced by
 Carrying out a risk assessment which identifies the hazards and those at risk,
 Restricting access i.e. 2m high fencing, interlocks and pressure mats,
 Lock off procedures during maintenance,
 Mechanical restraints,
 Pre-start-up warning signals,
 Software checks and
 Remote diagnostics.
 Emergency stops,
 Training of relevant people on the hazards and controls associated with CNC machines and
 Planned maintenance.

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 LATHE – MECHANICAL HAZARDS AND CONTROL MEASURES

Metal components are being manufactured by workers using metal turning lathes.
a) Identify FIVE types of mechanical hazard associated with metal turning lathes AND give a
practical example of EACH.
b) Outline control measures that minimise risks associated with metal turning lathes.
Part a)
There are a number of mechanical hazards associated with the use of metal turning lathes. For
example,
 Cutting or severing by the cutting tools or swarf
 Entanglement when items of clothing, jewellery or hair comes into contact with rotating
parts of the machine.
 Crushing or shearing, trapping between the tool post and fixed parts of the lathe,
 Stabbing, puncture, friction and abrasion.
Part b)
Control measures that should be taken to minimise the risks associated with the lathes
include:
 The provision of guarding for exposed rotating parts;
 Using the correct size chuck;
 Providing support for the work-pieces
 Securing the tool post and cutting tool;
 Using a tool board instead of placing tools on the headstock;
 Ensuring that all controls including an emergency stop are within easy access and are
suitably marked and displayed;
 Siting the lathe so that there is adequate space for the operator
 Using barriers to prevent human and vehicular traffic from approaching the machine;
 Avoiding the wearing of loose clothing, gloves or jewellery;
 Ensuring that there is a high standard of lighting at the working position
 Keeping it clean and free from debris to prevent accidental slipping or tripping;
 Providing personal protective equipment such as eye and foot protection.

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 ROBOTS – MECHANICAL HAZARDS

With reference to the mechanical hazards associated with the operation of a hydraulic robotic arm on
a production line, outline a range of measures aimed at minimising the risk of injury.
From the outset, it is important for candidates to recognise that the question was asking for an
outline of the safety measures needed to protect against the various mechanical hazards
presented by robots.
Candidates who focus their responses on specific mechanical hazards, and then try to attach
controls to each of them, usually produce generic machine safety answers that did not
demonstrate the understanding of robot safety that was being sought.
The better answers come from candidates who take a hierarchical approach in referring to a
range of possible technical, procedural and behavioural controls.
While there may be few opportunities to eliminate the hazards entirely, the elimination of a
crushing hazard between the robot and another object by increasing the distance between
them was one that is worthy of mention.
In terms of safeguarding in this situation, distance guarding (of adequate height, interlocked
and allowing authorised access only), presence sensing devices (e.g. photoelectric systems,
pressure mats, etc.) and guarding of nip points are all relevant.
Procedural measures might include software checks to avoid aberrant behaviour (mainly related
to impact hazards) and adequate safety maintenance (e.g. to check the integrity of hydraulics).
In this situation, maintenance personnel would be at particular risk and so procedures such as
permit systems would be imperative.
In addition, technical measures should be introduced to allow maintenance work to be performed
remotely as far as possible.
This would also apply to 'teaching', which should be done either remotely or with the robot in
'slow mode'.
For anyone needing access to the robot, then measures should be in place to release any
stored energy and to protect against hydraulic failure.
Finally, in terms of behavioural controls, all staff should be informed of the dangers,
instructed in the procedures to be followed and trained in safe working practices.

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IC 07 MECHANICAL HANDLING
MOBILE CRANE – ERECTION OF MAST ON A BUILDING - MINIMISING RISK TO
EMPLOYEES & OTHERS

A mobile crane is to be used to erect a telecommunications aerial on the roof of a three-storey office
building.
Describe the precautions that should be taken in order to minimise risks both to employees involved in
the work and to other persons who may be affected by the operation.
The precautions that should be taken include:

 The selection of the crane with respect to its safe working load and reach

 Checking the existence of current test certificates;

 Ensuring ground conditions are appropriate for positioning the crane

 That outriggers are used;

 Avoiding contact with overhead services and other buildings or structures;

 Using adequate lifting gear

 Ensuring that there were competent people in control of and involved in the lifting operation.

 Take account of weather conditions and

 The need to follow safe roof work practices such as the provision of edge protection or the use
of harnesses.

The question specifically asks for the precautions needed in relation to the employees carrying
out the work and others who might be affected by the operation.

Such precautions would entail

 Providing sufficient personnel on site to control access of the public to the area;

 The provision of adequate signing and traffic control;

 Liaison with the local police and

 Planning the lift for a time of day when few people would be in the vicinity.

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 MOBILE CRANE – INSTABILITY

a) Describe the factors that may cause instability of a mobile crane.

b) Outline the measures that should be taken to reduce the likelihood of overturning during a lifting
operation.
Factors affecting crane stability that should be described include:
 Incorrect initial selection of the crane;
 Incorrect slinging;
 Unstable ground that is incapable of bearing the weight of the crane and its load;
 Sloping or uneven ground;
 Obstructions being struck by the crane or causing the load to snag;
 Exceeding the safe working load;
 Incorrect operation of the crane (for example in the non use of outriggers);
 Incorrect tyre pressures;
 Mechanical failure and
 Adverse weather conditions.
Controls centre around the
 Carrying out of an area survey including a full assessment of the environment and the load to
be lifted;
 Procedural controls such as the preparation of a lifting plan, selection of the appropriate crane,
ensuring the regular inspection and maintenance of the crane and appointing a competent
person to supervise the lift;
 Engineering controls such as ensuring the outriggers are fully extended and that the
capacity indicator and alarm system, the motion and performance limit device and over-
hoist limit switch are in good working condition; and
 Behavioural controls such as the competence and training of the driver, slinger and
banksman.

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 LIFTING TACKLE – SELECTION & SUITABILITY

State the factors to consider when selecting and assessing the suitability of lifting tackle to be used with
a crane in a lining operation.
This question focuses on lifting tackle or the 'lifting accessories' element of a lifting operation.
The Examiners are looking for answers that included factors such as carrying out an initial
assessment of the load to be lifted, including its weight in order to ensure that accessories are
used within their safe working load.
The assessment of the type of tackle to be selected would also have to consider
 The shape, size and centre of gravity of the load (to determine the choice of sling to ensure
stability),
 The fixing points on the load,
 Any sharp edges which might need packing to protect the sling, and
 The environment in which the lifting operation is to be undertaken.
Those carrying out the operation would also have to satisfy themselves that the tackle selected
 Is in good condition
 Its safe working load marked or indicated,
 Is within its examination date and
 Is fully compatible with the crane with which it is to be used.
Credit was given to those candidates who make appropriate reference to the need to consider the
legislation and standards applicable in such situations.

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 MEWP – HAZARDS

a) Outline a range of hazards associated with the use of mobile elevating work platforms (MEWP’s)
b) Outline the general requirements for the safe use of MEWPS

For part (a), there is a need to outline hazards including:

 Falls from a height of persons or materials,

 Instability of the vehicle,

 Being struck by other vehicles,

 Trapping

 Impact hazards,

 Mechanical failure,

 Contact with overhead lines or other obstructions and

 Exposure of employees to adverse weather conditions.

The measures which would be required to ensure the safe use of the equipment include the:

 Selection and training of operators;

 Guarding scissor mechanisms to prevent trapping;

 Correct positioning to prevent over-reaching and proximity to dangers such as overhead

lines;

 Maintaining stability by the use of fully extended and locked outriggers on firm ground;

 Preventing the use of the equipment in adverse weather conditions;

 Keeping within the safe working limit;

 Prohibiting the transfer of persons or materials to or from the platform while it was in a
raised position;

 Regular inspection and servicing of the equipment;

 Preventing falls from the platform by the use of hand rails or harnesses;

 Controlling working areas by the use of barriers and signs and

 Providing head protection where appropriate.

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 FORKLIFT TRUCK INSTABILITY & OPERATOR TRAINING

a) Outline the causes of instability in fork lift trucks (FLT).

b) Describe the different stages of training which FLT operators should undergo if they are to be able to
use a variety of fork lift trucks.
c) Give three situations in which refresher training for fork-lift truck drivers would be appropriate.
Good responses discuss the causes of stability in fork lift trucks under the headings of lateral
and longitudinal instability.
Causes of lateral instability could be due to:
 Having an insecure load;
 Driving laterally on slope (factors; angle of slope, elevation of load);
 Hitting low obstruction (e.g. Kerb);
 Driving on uneven ground;
 Cornering (e.g. Fast, sharp); or
 The poor condition of tyres or incorrect tyre pressure.
Causes of longitudinal instability included:
 Overloaded vehicle;
 Incorrect positioning of load on forks;
 Load slipping forward (often as a result of the mast not being tilted back);
 Driving with load elevated or changing tilt;
 Travelling with loads forward down slope, or reversing with load up slope;
 Sudden braking or striking an overhead obstruction
Training should include the following stages:-
(i) Basic training
(ii) Specific job training, relating to the FLT to be used
(iii) Familiarisation training at the workplace, under supervision.
Basic training covers:
 The skills and knowledge relevant to the type of fork lift truck;
 The risks arising from flt operation;
 Maintenance and
 Checks.
This is undertaken off site or in a dedicated area.
Specific training should also be undertaken off site or in a dedicated area.
This training covers:
 Knowledge and operating principles of truck to be used;
 Use of truck in conditions met in the workplace;
 On-site rules;

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 Work to be undertaken and
 Safe systems of work.
Familiarisation training is undertaken on site and covers:
 The application of skills already learned;
 Familiarisation with the site layout and
 Local emergency procedures.
Refresher training would be appropriate where operators:
 Have not used trucks for some time;
 Have been involved in an accident or near miss;
 Have developed unsafe working practices;
 Where there has been change in working practices or environment;
 Subject to company policy have regular refresher training.
Operators who are only occasional users would probably require refresher training more
frequently than those who operate fork lift trucks on a daily basis.
This is normally a very popular question with candidates, with good responses to parts (a) and (c).
Many candidates have difficulty identifying the three stages of training.

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 MOBILE CRANE – JIB FAILURE

The jib of a large mobile crane has failed during a lifting operation.
Describe, with sketches where appropriate, the range of issues and evidence that an investigation team
will need to examine in order to determine the reasons for the failure.)
The issues that an investigation team would need to look at relate broadly to

 The crane,

 The lift being performed and

 The forensic evidence from the accident scene.

Answers that were structured in this sort of way are more likely to identify the relevant points
associated with the failure.

In terms of the crane, the team would need to identify the type of mobile crane being used, its
safe working load and other operational criteria, its design characteristics (e.g. use of
counterbalance, outriggers, etc.) and its configuration for the task. Maintenance and certification
records, and lifting history, would provide some relevant information.

With respect to the lift, relevant factors would include details of the load (weight, centre of
gravity, slinging method, etc.), the type of lift (e.g. static, slewing, lift and travel, drag and lift) and
the site conditions (e.g. wet, windy, sloping, presence of obstructions / excavations, etc).

The lifting plan, witness statements and visual inspection should provide useful information on
these factors.

The training records of the driver, slinger, rigger and banksman may also need to be inspected.

The team would then need to look at the forensic evidence in order to determine the type of failure
(e.g. buckling, brittle, ductile), the integrity of the jib (looking for evidence of alterations, repairs,
corrosion, cracks, missing bolts, etc.) and the settings and functionality of controls, switches and
alarms.

Candidates who provide context and reasoning to these factors are able to gain high marks.

There are sometimes useful sketches provided - particularly in relation to failure types - that
helped to demonstrate knowledge of some of the technical issues (although reference to 'creep'
suggests a lack of proper understanding).

Candidates who perform less well are often those who concentrated on why the accident should
be investigated -producing answers that would have been more appropriate to Unit A - rather
than what should form part of the investigation.

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 AUTOMATED GUIDED VEHICLES – AUTOMATED ORDER PICKING WAREHOUSE

A company is planning a move from premises containing a 'manual' warehouse to one in which the
warehouse contains automated order picking and automated guided vehicle (AGV) goods transfer
facilities.
Identify and describe the risks which might be reduced by such a move, together with the new factors
or increased risks which might arise from the changes.
In the past many responses to this type of question demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the
risks associated with an automated warehouse and also failed to cover the range of risks in a
manual one.
The obvious reduction in risk would be
 Avoidance of manual handling, and
 Reduction of fork lift truck use along with
 The issue of their segregation from pedestrians.
Examiners expect candidates to consider other issues such as:
 Work at height to access racks above ground level would disappear;
 Falling objects will not find pedestrians at risk;
 There would be a reduction in the likelihood of racking collisions; and
 A reduction of noise exposure.
New factors that might be introduced include:
 Programming dangers (teaching routines);
 The need for AGV to have proximity sensors to prevent pedestrian contact;
 AGV collisions;
 The possibility of signal interference;
 Guarding of order picking machinery;
 Dropped loads and ejected materials would need to be dealt with within the automated
areas.

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 WORKPLACE TRAFFIC MOVEMENTS

Outline the design features and procedural arrangements that may need to be considered in order to
minimise risks associated with movement of vehicles in the workplace.
In outlining the design features that should be considered in order to minimise risks
associated with the movement of vehicles in the workplace, candidates should refer to matters
such as
 The provision of traffic routes with a smooth and stable surface and of sufficient width and
headroom for the types of vehicle that will use them;
 The elimination of sharp bends, blind corners and steep gradients with the siting of convex
mirrors on those corners that cannot be avoided;
 The installation of a one way system to minimise the need for reversing;
 The inclusion of passing places for vehicles;
 The introduction of speed limits and the provision of speed retarders;
 The provision of a good standard of lighting for the routes and particularly for the transition
areas between the inside and outside of buildings;
 The segregation of vehicles and pedestrians including separate access and egress and the
provision of clearly marked crossing places.
As for procedural arrangements, they would need to include
 The selection and training of competent drivers who would be subjected to regular health
screening;
 The provision of information on site rules for visitors including drivers visiting the site;
 The introduction of procedures for the regular maintenance both of the traffic routes and of
in-house vehicles and for the reporting of defects;
 The rigorous enforcement of speed limits and the provision and use of high visibility
clothing by employees working in close proximity to traffic routes.

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 LIFTING OPERATIONS – SAFE SYSTEM OF WORK – TANDEM LIFT

As a Health and Safety Officer you are asked to give advice to a lift supervisor regarding a proposed
lifting operation.
The lift requires the use of two cranes working together (Tandem Lift)
Outline the elements of a safe system of work you would expect to see in order that the lift may be
conducted safely.
A prime requirement would be that the proposed lifting operation should be planned by a
competent person and be closely supervised in accordance with the level of risk involved;
A risk assessment would need to be carried out which should address matters such as the
weight, shape and centre of gravity of the loads and the availability of lifting points;
The positioning of the cranes and any available resting places for the loads; the number of
times the lifting operation will be carried out;
The availability of the correct lifting equipment together with the availability of test certificates
and reports of statutory examination for the cranes;
The precautions taken to cordon off the area for the lift and the environment in which the
lifting equipment will be used and the likely weather conditions.
The cranes will have to be positioned using outriggers and jacks to ensure stability, and sited
on firm ground away from trench work or other excavations and overhead and underground
services.
The lift should be under the control of a competent person with knowledge of and training and
experience in carrying out a tandem lift.
Crane drivers and banksmen would have to be competent and there would need to be an
effective means of communication between them using standard methods of signalling,
Tag lines should be used to control movement during the lift and the load should be moved
slowly to its landing position avoiding positions where persons were working.
Calculations should be carried out by a competent person to decide whether the cranes would
need to be de-rated and the lift should be carried out in such a way that the agreed individual
safe working load of either crane is not exceeded.

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IC 08 ELECTRICAL SAFETY
CIRCUIT PROTECTION & PRECAUTIONS WHEN MAINTAINING ELECTRICAL
SYSTEMS

a) Outline the dangers against which protection is provided by a fuse I an electric circuit and explain
how such protection is achieved
b) With respect to mains voltage electricity, describe other methods / devices that could afford
protection
Part a)
This question was normally well answered with candidates outlining that a fuse:
 Prevents overload of electrical systems and overheating of electrical wiring;
 Limits shock under severe fault conditions;
 Limits over-current and achieves this by the heating effect of electric current which melts the
metal link if the current exceeds the design value, breaks the circuit and this remains broken
until the fuse is replaced.
Part b)
Other than fuses other methods and devices described could include miniature circuit breakers,
residual current devices and reduced low voltage systems.
Descriptions of miniature circuit breakers included that they:
 Involved close tolerances for design current flow and speed of operation;
 Provide visual detection following operation;
 Need to be reset after fault detection;
 Are reliable and
 Are a system protection system.
Residual current devices (RCDs) or earth leakage circuit breakers (ELCBs) are:
 Designed as shock limiting device, not for system protection;
 A shock is still received but time current flows through body is limited;
 Monitors balance of current flow in line and neutral;
 Operates on earth leakage fault;
 Live and neutral disconnect from local power supply.
Reduced low voltage systems such as 110v/50v/25v with transformer supply centre tap to
earth consist of:
 Earthed systems and class 1 equipment, or double insulated class 2 equipment and
 Require procedural measures to be followed.
Precautions for maintaining or repairing electrical systems candidates should include:
 Identifying the apparatus to be worked on;
 Obtaining system drawings and information;
 Considering whether working can be done dead and if so;
 Following a safe system of work for working dead including isolation and lock off;
 Testing for dead;
 Testing test equipment.
If however it is unrealistic to work dead then a safe system for live work includes:
 Screening any conductors near to work if it is reasonable for them to be live;
 Testing live conductors through holes for test probes;
 Using suitable test equipment;
 Having testing arrangements in place for testing equipment - before and after;
consideration of accompaniment;
 Consideration of insulating ppe
 Insulated tools;
 Adequate working space and
 Adequate lighting

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK / RCD / FUSES / 110VOLT / ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN

With respect to an electricity supply operating at 240v:

a) Outline the factors that determine the severity of the effects of an electric shock.
b) For EACH of the following protective devices outline their principles of operation:
(i) Residual current devices;
(ii) Fuses;
(iii) 110 v centre tapped to earth reduced voltage systems.
c) Outline other design features of electrical systems intended to improve safety.
Part a)
 Voltage,
 The nature of the current (whether alternating or direct),
 The body resistance of the individual with reference to age, gender,
 The amount of moisture on the body
 The type of footwear worn,
 The route taken by the current through the body,
 The speed of action of any protective measures
 The environmental conditions, such as the floor material and the presence of water.
Knowledge of Ohm’s Law is useful in relating the size of current to voltage and resistance.
Part b),
i) A residual current device is designed as a shock limiting device and not for system
protection. It operates on an earth leakage fault. Any differential in the current passing
through the line (neutral) and phase (live) conductors is detected, operating a switch to
cut off the electrical supply to the apparatus and preventing severe electric shock.
The device should operate within 40 milliseconds of the fault being detected.
ii) A fuse is a device placed in the live side of a circuit, designed to automatically cut off
the power supply to the circuit within a given time when the current flow in the circuit
exceeds a given value and produces sufficient heat to melt the fuse which is designed
to do so at a predetermined temperature.
It prevents the overload of an electrical system and overheating of electrical wiring.
However, its speed of operation is generally too slow to protect people from electric
shock.
iii) One of the better ways of reducing the risk from electricity is to reduce the voltage,
achieved by the use of a step down transformer.
A common reduction is to 110 volts and a transformer used to attain the reduction is
described as centre tapped to earth in that the secondary winding of the transformer is
earthed to its centre thus ensuring that the maximum voltage from live to earth
involved in an electric shock will be 55 volts.
Continued….

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Part c),
 The selection of suitable cables and placing them out of reach wherever possible;
 The provision of effective means of isolation to ensure the secure disconnection and
separation of electrical equipment from every source of energy;
 The use of earthed systems and class 1 equipment or double insulated class 2 equipment;
 The use of circuit breakers and
 The introduction of earth free zones.

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 STATIC ELECTRICITY

Identify the safety features needed to protect against ignition by static electricity of the vapour of an
extremely flammable liquid while it is being transferred from a bulk storage tank to a road tanker.(
Overall, this is usually a very poorly answered question and many candidates appeared not to
realise that it related solely to static electricity.
There is much unnecessary information on systems of work, bunding, intrinsically safe electrical
equipment, signage and other sources of ignition that bore no relation at all to the control of
static electricity in the situation described.
The question should provide an opportunity for candidates to demonstrate some technical
knowledge appropriate to Unit C but, almost exclusively, this opportunity is not taken.
The main methods of avoiding the build-up of static electricity – e.g.
 By controlling pump rate,
 Avoiding splash filling,
 Selecting appropriate materials,
 Eliminating contamination (due to water, for instance),
 Using anti-static clothing, and, importantly,
 By ensuring that all equipment is at zero potential, primarily by earthing and bonding (after
allowing sufficient relaxation time).
Some detail of the earthing and bonding arrangements is expected
Marks were available for specifying what should be earth-bonded and for referring to possible
interlocking arrangements to ensure the integrity of such measures.
In addition, candidates should mention of vapour return systems and nitrogen blanketing of the
road tanker barrel designed to minimise the risk of explosion, and of the instrumentation that
would typically be in place.

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 ROAD TANKER – HFL & STATIC ALSO SAFETY PROCEDURES

a) An extremely flammable liquid is being transferred from a road tanker to a bulk storage tank.
Outline the control measures which would reduce the risk of ignition of the associated vapour due
to static electricity.
b) Tanker drivers are routinely required to work on top of road tankers during transfer operations.
Outline the factors that should be considered when assessing the risk for work on top of the road
tanker.
Part a)
Note the word ‘static’ in the question
The main methods of avoiding the build-up of static electricity would included:
 Controlling the pump rate and transfer speed;
 Earthing and bonding the pipeline, the tanker and the storage tank to ensure all equipment
was at zero potential after allowing sufficient relaxation time;
 The provision of an interlock between the earthing arrangements and the pump;
 The avoidance of splash filling and the selection of conductive/smooth materials for the
transfer system;
 Elimination of possible contamination arising for example from the presence of water in
the pipeline;
 The use of a vapour return system;
 Nitrogen blanketing of the road tanker barrel to minimise the risk of explosion;
 The provision of instrumentation, for example, to detect earth leakage and the use of anti-
static clothing and footwear.
Part (b)
Note the emphasis here is working at height
The initial factor that should be taken into consideration is the need for access to be gained to
the top of the tanker.
If this is found to be unavoidable, then the height of the tanker, the frequency of access
required, the task to be performed, for example valve or pipe connection or valve operation,
and the normal duration of the work to be carried out would again be important factors in
assessing the risk of falls.
Additional matters to be considered include the means of access provided on the tanker, the
condition of the tanker roof and the walkway and hand rails, the consequences of falling which
might indicate the need for the use of harnesses when on top of the tanker or the provision of
fall mitigation equipment such as air bags; and the availability of an alternative existing
workplace such as an overhead gantry.
Other factors include the possible exposure of the driver to inclement weather, their
experience, competence, fitness and ability to work at heights and the personal protective
equipment that should be provided such as footwear and gloves.

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 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS – CORROSIVE ATMOSPHERES

A small company manufactures products using electro-chemical processes. The company has poor
general standards of health and safety, made worse by the presence of conductive and corrosive
fluids and humid, corrosive atmospheres.
a) Describe the types of fault that may be found under such conditions in a fixed electrical system.
b) Outline the technical information a competent electrician would require before conducting an
inspection of a fixed electrical system.
Part a)
Issues that could exist include:
Poor earthing and a a lack of earth continuity, damaged sockets and switchgear, covers
missing from junction boxes, inadequate excess current protection such as the fitting of fuses
with incorrect ratings, means of isolation in poor condition and badly sited and incompetent
workmanship in the original installation.
Additional problems caused by the atmosphere include exposed live conductors due to
damaged or perished insulation, short circuits caused by the ingress of fluids, corrosion of
system parts such as access grilles and transformer casings, and the unsuitability of the
equipment for use in such wet and corrosive conditions.
Part b)
The type of information required by a competent electrician prior to carrying out a survey
would include:
 An inventory of the equipment with details of its type and manufacturer;
 The operating parameters of the system such as its voltage, current, number of phases
and its impedance and/or resistance;
 Its IP classification including the measure of protection against the ingress of water;
 Any circuit diagrams and/or manuals for the equipment with details of any modifications
made;
 Means of isolation and its location;
 Earthing arrangements;
 The type and size of cables;
 Details on the operation of protective devices
 Copies of previous inspection reports.

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 LIVE WORKING

Maintenance work on electrical distribution panels and control circuitry commonly involves diagnostic
testing and fault finding on live systems.

Outline the conditions that must be met, and the safety measures that should be in place, before this type
of work is undertaken.

With a few exceptions, answers tend to lack the technical and legal detail that the question
requires.
Many candidates miss or ignore the point that the question relates to working on live systems and
inappropriately discuss isolation procedures, often at some length.
Most answers tend to take a very general approach and simply refer to the need for risk
assessment and appropriate control measures without saying exactly what these should
comprise of in this situation.
Some candidates seem to have a standard answer for any question relating to electrical safety
and rely on vague references to such issues as residual current devices, intrinsically safe
electrical equipment and earthing in the hope that some of it might somehow apply.
Best international practice (e.g. UK Electricity at Work Regulations) sets out three conditions for
working on a live system, the first two of which (that it is unreasonable for it to be made dead and
that it is reasonable to work on it while it is live) are clearly met since much diagnostic work will
require this.
Therefore, the third condition (that suitable precautions are taken) requires attention and
overlaps with other requirements, in particular relating to electrical systems, work activities
and protective equipment.
In this respect, distribution panels should have a protection rating of at least IP2X (IP codes) by the
provision of test points that do not allow access to fingers or tools other than test probes (e.g.
test points of 2 mm in diameter).
The test probes should be insulated and fused and the test meter must be checked prior to
use.
The area should be cordoned off by the use of barriers to prevent unauthorised access and,
depending on the circumstances, insulating mats and /or gloves may be required.
All live working should be subject to a permit-to-work system.
The engineer to be technically competent (or to be closely supervised, having regard to the
nature of the work, by someone who is competent).
Persons involved with the work should therefore possess recognised qualifications and have
experience in the type of work being undertaken.
Relating to the protection of conductors, all incoming and outgoing supplies should be
suitably insulated and shrouded. Additional shrouding may be required.
With regard to earthing, the cabinet should be connected to the main earth, and the cabinet door
earth-bonded to the cabinet.
The other main concerns are to ensure that there is sufficient working space, suitable access and
adequate lighting.

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 DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIVE MAINS VOLTAGE – PREVENTION CONTROL
MEASURES

Direct contact with a live, mains voltage electricity supply system within a workplace can result in
serious injury or death.
Outline a range of control measures that may prevent or limit the effect of such contact.
Technical control measures include:
 ELCB or earth detection,
 MCB or a fused system,
 All conductors protected by insulation, and
 Restricted access control to switch rooms and switchgear cabinets.
 Correct identification and labelling of electrical systems,
 Fitting new colour code sleeves,
 Ensuring isolators are capable of being locked off and
 'Live indicator' lights.
Good responses for procedural control measures included:
 Appropriate training, competency and authorisation,
 Operating procedures such as live working only when justified,
 Safe systems of work and permits to work.
 Design of systems to include lock off and diversion;
 Periodic testing for earth continuity and impedance loop testing,
 Control of third parties and employees bringing in own electrical equipment;
 Planned preventative maintenance of electrical systems and equipment;
 Signage and
 Personal protective equipment.
Are all control measures that can be employed to prevent or limit the effects of contact with
live, mains voltage electricity.

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 DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIVE PARTS – CONTROL MEASURES TO LIMIT THE
EFFECT

Direct contact with live parts of an electrical supply within a workplace can result in serious injury or
death.
Outline a range of control measures that may prevent or limit the effect of such contact.
The most obvious control measure would be the possibility of isolation with the supply locked
off to enable ‘dead’ working.
If this were not possible, then contact with live parts might be prevented by the complete
insulation of live parts such as cables, bus bars and connections.
Contact might also be prevented or at least deterred by placing barriers across the usual
direction of access or enclosures to prevent contact from any direction.
There are also occasions when contact is unintentional where consideration should be given
to positioning live parts of the supply out of reach taking into account activities which might
include the use of ladders or long metal tubes.
In addition to the above measures, in the event of contact, its effect might be limited by the
use of:
 Residual current devices (RCDs)
 The use of fuses or circuit breakers to protect against over current,
 Procedural measures such as permits to work and
 Physical measures such as mats and
 The use of appropriate tools.
Candidates should read the question – it is not about the control measures generally suited to
portable equipment.

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK – PHYSICAL EFFECTS; EMERGENCY ACTION AND
PRECAUTIONS

A worker has received an electric shock from a 240 volt portable drill whilst installing a set of wooden
shelves.
(a) Outline the physical effects the worker may have suffered from the accident.
(b) Identify the emergency action that should have been taken immediately after the accident.
(c) Outline the precautions that could have been taken to prevent the accident.
Part (a),
The physical effects suffered by the worker in such an accident would/could include
 Fibrillation of the heart muscles with possible cardiac arrest,
 Respiratory failure,
 Muscular contraction or spasm,
 Involuntary grip that can prolong current flow,
 Burns to tissue and
 Ultimately death.
There is also the possibility of secondary injuries such as those resulting from a fall.
Part (b)
The emergency action to be taken immediately after the accident:
 Isolating the source of power and using a non-conductive instrument to push the victim
clear;
 Wrapping them in insulating material and checking for breathing and pulse;
 Administering mouth-to-mouth resuscitation if needed or the use of a defibrillator;
 Placing the victim in the recovery position and contacting the emergency services.
Part (c)
The precautions that might have been taken in order to have prevented the accident include,
 Selecting equipment giving consideration to the use of reduced voltage, battery powered
and/or double-insulated tools and conformity with standards.
 Technical precautions - the use of residual current devices, ensuring earth integrity (where
appropriate), using correctly rated cables and fuses, and ensuring that equipment or
system components (plugs, sockets, cables etc.) are free from damage.
 Organisational issues - maintenance arrangements, inspection and testing of portable
appliances and electrical systems by a competent person and pre-use inspection by the
user, housekeeping standards particularly for cable management, and the provision of
information, instruction and training – particularly in relation to systems of work and pre-
use checks.

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 INTRINSICALLY SAFE EQUIPMENT – PURPOSE OF CLASSIFICATION AND
PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION

a) Areas involving flammable gases and vapours are classified by legislation surrounding the
existence of Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres according to the probability of
occurrence of flammable atmospheres.
Explain the purpose of classifying areas in this way AND distinguish between each zone class.
b) Describe the types and principles of protection required for electrical equipment in relation to
flammable atmospheres.
Part (a) requires an explanation of the Zone Classification system contained in legislation (e.g. the
UK Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (Regulation 7 and
Schedule 2).
The purpose of the zone classification system is to ensure that only suitably designed
equipment and protective systems are used in areas where a flammable atmosphere may arise.
Candidates are expected to explain this and to describe briefly the criteria for designating an
area as Zone 0, Zone 1 or Zone 2.
 In Zone 0, flammable atmospheres are present continuously or for long periods.
 In Zone 1, they are likely to occur in normal operation, while in
 Zone 2, they are not likely to occur in normal operation but if they do, they are present for a
short period only.
Part (b) of the question deals with the different types and principles of protection for equipment
that is suitable for use in zone-classified areas.
The principles of specific protection methods such as
 Intrinsic safety,
 Flameproof,
 Pressurised,
 Encapsulation,
 Non-sparking,
 Oil immersion and
 Powder filling.
Some marks are also available for observations on the general principles applicable to all types
of protected equipment such as
 The use of recognised design standards,
 Earthing of conducting surfaces and
 The need to comply with the legislative (DSEAR) requirements as to which category of
equipment may be used in the different zone-classified areas

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 ELECTRICAL RISKS – INTRINSICALLY SAFE & FLAMEPROOF EQUIPMENT
a) Identify the particular aspects of a working environment that may increase electrical risks.

b) Outline the means by which protection is afforded by, and the limitations of, the following:
(i) Intrinsically safe equipment
(ii) Flame proof electrical equipment.
Part (a) is normally well answered but there are many poor responses to part (b) where candidates
are unable to apply the principles of intrinsically safe or flame-proof.

Aspects of the working area that successful candidates identify in (a) are:
 Where the environment exposes equipment to mechanical damage such as impact, stress,
abrasion, wear, or vibration;
 Working outdoors where equipment is exposed to changes in the weather;
 High / low temperatures;
 Contaminants (water or corrosive atmosphere);
 Flammable atmosphere (vapour, gas or dust).
The protection afforded by intrinsically safe equipment: is based on the restriction of
electrical energy within the equipment such that it is insufficient to cause a spark or heating
effect. However, faults may raise energy levels above the safe limit.
Flame proof equipment is of substantial construction and enclosed so that, although a
flammable atmosphere may enter, it is able to withstand the pressure of an internal
explosion and prevent the ignition of any flammable atmosphere that surrounds the
equipment.
Flame proof equipment may not be suitable for use with combustible powders or dusts, and may
require special measures to prevent the ingress of water.

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 PORTABLE ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES – TESTING INTERVALS

Identify the factors that may determine appropriate intervals for the inspection and testing of portable
electrical equipment.
It is good practice (law in some countries e.g. UK - The Electricity at Work Regulations 1989)
that all systems, including portable electrical equipment, should be maintained so far as is
reasonably practicable to prevent danger.
Any factors that increase the probability of damage to the equipment, and hence an
increase in the level of risk, point to the need for more frequent inspections.
Such factors might include:
 Its frequency of use;
 The environment in which it is used that could lead to mechanical damage,
 Exposure to adverse weather conditions or
 Exposure to environmental contaminants;
 The frequency of connection or disconnection;
 Whether it is transportable or static;
 The robustness of the equipment and its accessories (cable and plug); and
 The number of users and their competence.
Any factors that affect the severity of the consequences should the equipment be damaged
also influence the risk and hence the inspection frequency.
This could include the
 Voltage at which it operates,
 Whether it is double-insulated and
 Its criticality to the processes of the organisation
 The age of the equipment,
 Its breakdown history and
 Any recommendations from the manufacturer should be considered.
Many candidates make a good attempt at answering this question, aiding their answer by
making appropriate references such as HSG 107

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 PORTABLE ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES – SCHEME OF EXAMINATION

Outline what should be considered when preparing a scheme for the systematic examination, testing
and maintenance of portable electrical appliances.
Initially start with the generation of an inventory of the equipment to be examined and tested
including its source such as in-house, contractors or workers and ensuring that each item was
provided with a unique means of identification.
Once this has been completed, it would then be necessary to determine the appropriate type
and frequency of inspection for each item based on factors affecting the level of risk, such as:
 The type of appliance,
 Any protective systems provided such as earthing, double insulation, or reduced voltage,
 The age and usage of the appliance,
 The environment in which it was used such as in a corrosive atmosphere where more
frequent testing may be required,
 The experience and competence of the user
 Historical data from data relating to repairs/replacement.
Refer to, consider and comply with manufacturer’s recommendations
Moving on to determining/establishing the criteria for each type of examination and test that
would include issues such as:
 The competence of the tester,
 The calibration and maintenance of test equipment,
 The format of records to be kept on the results of the tests and examinations
 The systems to identify and take out of use equipment that was found to
 Be faulty.
 ELECTRIC SHOCK & MAINS PROTECTIVE DEVICES

With respect to an electricity supply operating at 240v:

a) Outline the factors that determine the severity of the effects of an electric shock.
b) For each of the following protective devices describe their principles of operation:
i. Residual current devices;
ii. Fuses;
iii. 110v centre tapped to earth reduced voltage systems.
c) Outline other design features of electrical systems intended to improve safety.
In answering part (a) of this question, credit is given for reference to factors including the voltage,
the nature of the current (whether alternating or direct), the body resistance of the individual with
reference to age, gender, the amount of moisture (perspiration) on the body and the type of
footwear worn, the route taken by the current through the body, the speed of action of any
protective measures and the environmental conditions, such as the floor material and the
presence of water.
Knowledge of Ohm's Law was useful in relating the size of current to voltage and resistance.
In answering part (b), candidates are expected to describe that a residual current device is
designed as a shock limiting device and not for system protection. It operates on an earth leakage
fault.
Any differential in the current passing through the line (neutral) and phase (live) conductors is
detected, operating a switch to cut off the electrical supply to the apparatus and preventing
severe electric shock.
The device should operate within 30 to 50 milliseconds of the fault being detected.
A fuse is a device placed in the live side of a circuit, designed to cut off automatically the power
supply to the circuit within a given time when the current flow in the circuit exceeds a given value
and produces sufficient heat to melt the fuse which is designed to do so at a predetermined
temperature. It prevents the overload of an electrical system and overheating of electrical wiring.
However, its speed of operation is generally too slow to protect people from electric shock.
One of the better ways of reducing the risk from electricity is to reduce the voltage, achieved by
the use of a step down transformer.
A common reduction is to 110 volts and a transformer used to attain the reduction is described
as centre tapped to earth in that the secondary winding of the transformer is earthed to its
centre thus ensuring that the maximum voltage from live to earth involved in an electric shock
will be 55 volts.
For part (c), candidates should outline other design features intended to improve safety such as
 The selection of suitable cables and placing them out of reach wherever possible;
 The provision of effective means of isolation to ensure the secure disconnection and
separation of electrical equipment from every source of energy;
 The use of earthed systems and class 1 equipment or double insulated class 2 equipment;
 The use of circuit breakers and
 The introduction of earth free zones.

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK – EFFECTS, EMERGENCY ACTION & PRECAUTIONS

A joiner has received an electric shock from a 240 volt portable drill whilst installing a set of wooden
shelves.
a) Outline the physical effects the joiner may have suffered from the accident
b) State the emergency action that should have been taken immediately after the accident
c) Explain the precautions that might have been taken to prevent the accident
For part (a), candidates should outline effects such as
 Fibrillation of the heart muscles with possible cardiac arrest,
 Respiratory failure,
 Muscular contraction or spasm,
 Involuntary grip that can prolong current flow,
 Burns to tissue and ultimately
 Death.
 The possibility of secondary injuries such as those resulting from a fall.
Part (b) was concerned with the emergency action to be taken immediately after the accident
and it is anticipated that candidates would refer to matters such as
 Isolating the source of power or using a non-conductive instrument to push the victim
clear;
 Wrapping in insulating material and
 Checking for breathing and pulse;
 Administering mouth-to-mouth resuscitation if needed;
 Placing the victim in the recovery position and
 Contacting the emergency services.
Part (c) sought information on the precautions that might have been taken in order to have
prevented the accident, and there were many that could have been mentioned.
More successful candidates are those who provide a structured answer by looking at
 Equipment selection, Technical precautions and organisational issues.
 The use of reduced low voltage, battery-powered and / or double-insulated tools
 Conformity with standards.
 The use of residual current devices,
 Ensuring earth integrity (where appropriate),
 Using correctly rated cables and fuses, and
 Ensuring that equipment or system components (plugs, sockets, cables etc) are free of
damage,
 Maintenance arrangements, inspection and testing of portable appliances and electrical
systems,
 Housekeeping standards, and the provision of information, instruction and training - particularly in
relation to systems of work and pre-use checks.

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IC 09 SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION & DEMOLITION
ILO 175 – SLOPING ROOF REPAIR

The International Labour Organisation’s Standard R175 and its associated Code of Practice sets out
general principles for ‘Safety and Health in Construction’.
Minor repairs need to be carried out to the sloping roof of a large two storey property. A scaffold is to
be erected in order to gain access to the work area.
Using the guidance in R175, outline the precautions necessary for carrying out the repairs.
The more successful candidates were those who organised their answers under the general
headings of scaffolds, ladder access, roof edge protection and general workplace precautions.
Scaffolds:
For scaffolds, necessary precautions include ensuring that it is constructed of suitable and
sound material, is of adequate size and strength and is erected and modified where necessary
only by competent workers in accordance with any local regulations.
The scaffold should be stable which may mean that it has to be tied in to the building.
The working platforms must be provided with guard rails and toe boards to prevent the fall of
persons and materials and means should be provided to restrict access when it is not in use.
It is imperative that the scaffold is inspected prior to it being used for the first time, at regular
intervals thereafter, after alterations or interruption in its use and after exposure to extreme
weather conditions.
Ladder Access:
Where ladders are used for access, they should be secured and extend for a distance of at
least one metre above the landing platform.
Workers using the ladder should always ensure three points of contact whilst climbing and
arrangements should be made for lifting tools and materials to the working area by means of a
hoist or gin wheel.
Properly secured roof ladders should be used for work on a sloping roof with protection
provided round those areas where fragile material may be present.
Edge Protection:
Guard rails should be provided to protect workers from falling from eaves or roof edges.
If it is not practicable to provide guard rails, and workers could fall a distance of more than 2
metres, then other means such as harnesses or nets must be used.
General Precautions:
General workplace precautions include those to be taken when work is carried out near to
overhead power lines; the provision of chutes for the removal of debris or rubbish; the issue
and wearing of personal protective equipment such as hard hats, boots, eye protection, gloves
and high visibility clothing; and the provision of adequate welfare facilities.

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 WORKING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO OVERHEAD ELECTRICAL SUPPLY LINES

Construction work is to take place in a rural area where electrical power for the site is to be gained
from an existing 11 kV overhead supply that cuts across the site on wooden poles.
Outline the control measures to ensure electrical safety in relation to:
a) The overhead supply;
b) The provision and use of electricity on the site.
The first part of this question is concerned with the precautions to be taken when undertaking
work near an overhead electrical supply and so was seeking a description of the key elements.
Good answers begin by considering the possibility of re-routeing the cables and pointing out
that, before any actions were recommended by way of protective measures, the utility supplier
would need to be consulted.
Answers should then outline the usual methods of protection including
 Identification of safety distances,
 The use of barriers,
 Marking tape and bunting,
 The use of goal posts and tunnels,
 Height restrictions on plant,
 Safe systems of work,
 Supervision,
 Warning signs and
 Training for plant operators.
Part (b) was directed at the safe use of electricity on the site and was seeking an outline of the key
precautions.
Issues that are relevant include
 Planning and assessment for the development of the electricity supply by a competent person;
 The safe positioning of transformers;
 The routeing, marking and protection of cables;
 The use of protective measures such as reduced low voltage systems, residual current
devices and double insulated equipment;
 Arrangements for inspection and testing of the fixed supply (including the integrity of the
system earthing) and portable equipment;
 The development of safe systems; and
 The use of competent persons for installation of and work on the electrical supply.
There are sometimes good answers provided for this question but exposed a lack of technical
knowledge by many candidates. Some suggested cutting off the supply of power to the site even
though the scenario called for it to be used.

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 WORKING UNDER A LIVE OVERHEAD POWER LINE

Outline the precautions that should be taken when construction work is to take place under or near
overhead power lines that will remain live during the work.
The initial precaution to be considered would have been the possibility of re-routing the cables
but if this was not possible then the local electricity supply company would need to be
approached for advice on the precautions to be taken.
This would include advice on the maximum working heights and horizontal distances
permitted near the overhead lines.
The next step would be to establish the maximum height and vertical reach of plant to be used
on site including those of sub-contractors and those which could penetrate the safe distances
would have to have physical limiting equipment fitted.
Safe routes where plant could travel and operate would have to be marked, barriers and solid
goal posts erected which would need to be monitored on a regular basis to ensure they
remained intact and in place, and appropriate warning signs displayed.
Non-conductive equipment, for example wooden ladders, would have to be used on site.
Workers and sub-contractors should be briefed on the hazards associated with the work and
the safe systems of work to be followed and drivers of visiting vehicles would also have to be
instructed on the routes to be followed.
Procedures for dealing with an emergency would be necessary and information on these
procedures would again have to be passed on to workers.
A high level of supervision would have to be provided to ensure that there was strict
adherence with the precautionary measures that had been put in place.
Credit was given to those candidates who referred to the need to follow the precautions
contained in relevant guidance documents

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 SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION – WORKING CLOSE TO PUBLIC AREAS

A three-storey building is situated with one side fronting on to a pedestrian walkway.

The building is to undergo extensive maintenance to the external fabric which includes a sloping roof.
a) Outline the safety aspects of the work that will need to be considered before work starts.
b) Describe, with sketches, the means of providing safe working places for those working at height.
This usually is a reasonably popular question, although some candidates who attempt it do not
appreciate the focus of the question and digressed into CDM (significant construction
projects) issues. Sketches are generally poor which make it difficult to award some of the marks
in part (b).
The issues raised in this question relate to the safe management of construction work in an area
where the public has access and where workers need to work at height from scaffolding.
Examiners look to candidates to identify safety issues such as:
 Falling from a height;
 Access for people and materials;
 Methods of work
 Safe systems of work (e.g. Sand-blasting, water-jetting);
 Site security;
 Public safety (barriers, screening, protection from plant / falling materials, signage);
 Plant and equipment requirements (including suitability);
 Site access for vehicles;
 Movement and storage of material on site;
 Occupants' safety;
 PPE provision (hard hats, eye protection, harnesses, etc);
 Welfare facilities;
 Emergency arrangements;
 Compliance with any work at height regulations;
 Time of working and
 Hazardous materials (e.g. Asbestos).

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 CATEGORIES OF DUTY HOLDERS RELATING TO SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS – (UK CDM REGS)

You are still at the college answering students’ questions on health and safety.
You have now asked for the last question of the session, and it proves to be an awkward one:
Which five categories of individuals are main duty holders under the UK Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations 2007, and
Outline the answer you would give.
The five main categories of duty holders under the UK C D M Regs 2007 are:
1. The Client
2. The C D M Co-ordinator
3. Designers
4. Principal Contractor
5. Contractors
In addition with regard to health and safety there is a common duty placed on everyone – but
that was not part of the question.

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 ROLE OF THE DESIGNER

a) Outline the duties of designers when considering significant construction projects

b) Explain the importance of the designer’s role to health and safety
Designers duties are to inform client of client's duties under respective regulations
 To ensure that the design considers the need to avoid foreseeable risks to:
 Construction workers and cleaners, and others affected by the work of such persons;
 To combat at source risks to the health and safety of construction workers and cleaners, and
others affected by the work of such persons;
 To give priority to measures that protect all, not just individuals;
 To ensure that the design includes adequate information about hazards;
 To co-operate with the project co-ordinator and with other designers.
Good responses also make reference to the fact that the designer's duty applies at all times.
Good responses explain the importance of the designer's role in terms of:
 The ability to design out hazards from start (elimination);
 Specifying safer materials and construction methods;
 Designing the building to be safer to use and maintain;
 Providing key information for the health and safety plan and file.

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 INDEPENDENT SCAFFOLD – SAFE TO USE

An independent scaffold is to be used as a working platform to carry out repairs to a two-storey

building.
a) Outline factors which should be considered in order to confirm that the scaffold is safe to use.
b) Identify the inspection requirements for the scaffold.
Part a)
Factors to be considered in order to confirm that the scaffold is safe to use include that:
 It has been designed to carry all loads likely to be placed upon it including sheeting,
chutes and nets and has been erected by a competent person;
 It is constructed of sound materials and fittings and has been erected on firm level ground
avoiding all voids and drains;
 That the standards are supported on base plates on suitable sole plates with care being
taking to ensure joints are staggered;
 That longitudinal and diagonal bracing and ledger braces have been used;
 That the working platforms are fully boarded, are wide enough for the work to be
undertaken with the boards fully supported without any overhang;
 That guard rails, toe boards and brick guards or sheeting have been provided;
 That there is safe access to the scaffold with ladders extending to at least one metre above
the working platform;
 That appropriate methods for dealing with waste such as chutes have been fitted together
with the means for raising and lowering materials such as hoists or closed containers and
 That if the scaffold is erected in a position where there is likely to be movement of
vehicles, protection has been provided to prevent damage from any collision that might
occur.
For part (b),
 Inspection by a competent person is necessary following erection,
 At specified intervals,
 Following any alterations or damage or
 After a period of inclement weather.
Records of the inspections should be retained and the scaffold tagged as having been
inspected.
Answers to this question are generally to a good standard despite the fact that a few
candidates included inspection requirements in their responses to part (a) and thus are left
with nothing more to identify for the second part of the question.

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 INDEPENDENT TIED SCAFFOLD – SAFETY CRITERIA

An independent tied scaffold is to be used as a working platform in the repair and re-pointing of the
brick facade of a multi-storey building.
a) Describe the safety criteria that should be met in order to ensure that the scaffold is safe to use
by the contractors.
b) Outline the inspection requirements for the scaffold.
Part (a),
The safety criteria that should be met should include:
 The need for the scaffold to be designed to a recognised standard,
 Constructed of sound material,
 Able to withstand the loads to be placed upon it and
 Erected by competent persons.
 The use of base plates placed on sole plates on consolidated ground;
 The use of longitudinal and diagonal bracing;
 Tied into the building with vertical and horizontal spacing of no more than 8.5 metres;
 Provided with fully boarded platforms sufficiently wide for the work which was to be carried
out and
 Fitted with guard rails, toe boards and sheeting or netting where required.
It should also be provided with an exclusion zone at its base to prevent it from being struck by
passing traffic.
Part (b)
The specific inspection requirements for the scaffold includes:
 By a competent person after erection,
 Then at intervals not exceeding seven days, and
 After any alteration,
 After damage or
 After inclement weather.

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 TYING SCAFFOLD TO A BUILDING

An independent tied scaffold is to be erected against the facade of a multi-storey building.

(i) Provide simple sketches to show THREE methods of 'tying' the scaffold to the building.
(ii) Identify the factors that may determine the most appropriate method in any particular situation.
Part (i) of this question provides candidates with an opportunity to gain marks fairly easily by
providing three simple sketches of:
 A through tie,
 A reveal tie,
 A box tie and / or
 A ring-bolt tie.
There are normally some good sketches but these are balanced by others that conveyed no
meaning or showed features of a scaffold unrelated to forms of tie (such as bracing or brick
guards).
Through ties cause the most difficulty - some of the sketches actually show the scaffolding on
both sides of an opening suggested that pressure would be applied on opposite sides of the
same area of masonry.
Much more disturbing than this, though, is the significant number of candidates who referred to
putlogs, which are not only irrelevant to means of tying but also have nothing to do with an
independent tied scaffold.
Part (ii)
The principal factors that would determine how a scaffold would be tied to a building include:
 The presence and availability of windows or other openings (for through and/or reveal ties),
 The presence and suitability of columns (for box ties),
 The presence and width of pilasters and other reveals (for reveal ties again) and
 The possible presence of, or ability to install, ring-bolts.
General factors that would need to be considered are the condition of the fabric of the building
and the anticipated loading on the scaffold.
In practice, a variety of different types of tie may be needed and better informed candidates
indicate that their relative proportions can be important – e.g. no more than 50 per cent of the
ties should be reveal ties.

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 SCAFFOLDER LOWERING POLES FROM 3RD FLOR USING PULLEY

A scaffolder is lowering scaffold poles from the third floor of a scaffold tower to a colleague below
using a pulley wheel and rope.
Next to the scaffold tower there is a shop entrance.
The scaffolder on the ground floor places the scaffold poles horizontally onto the back of a vehicle
parked on a busy road.
The scaffolders have already received information, instruction, training and suitable supervision.
Outline the additional practical measures that could minimise the risk of injury to the scaffolders and
members of the public during this activity.
The first option would be to investigate the possibility of using an alternative means of lifting
such as a crane.
If this was not possible then there would be a need to ensure that the pulley wheel and rope
were in good condition and had been subjected to the required statutory inspections and that
the safe working load of the equipment was not exceeded.
The workmen would need to adopt the correct slinging techniques and knot tying on the
scaffold poles and use guide ropes where necessary.
Toe boards would need to be fitted on the upper platform to protect both the worker on that
floor and the public below while a harness should also be worn by the worker on the upper
floor as fall protection.
Attention should be given to nearby hazards such as obstructions and power lines and signs
and barriers erected at ground floor level to prevent public access to the lowering area.
There could be a danger from passing traffic and the placing of cones would help to prevent a
collision with the vehicle.
A good means of communication between the workers would be essential and
It would be advisable to allow frequent breaks or to introduce job rotation to avoid the
possibility of upper limb disorders.

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 CIVIL PROJECT – WELFARE & FIRST AID & CONTAMINATED LAND

Describe the broad legal and practical requirements relating to the provision of welfare and first-aid
facilities on a civil engineering site where the work involves excavation of contaminated land and on
which a large number of persons will be working.
The question asks for the requirements in relation to welfare and first-aid facilities on the project
described.
To remain focused, candidates need to be clear in their minds of the meaning of 'requirements'
and 'facilities'.
The question did not ask for all the factors that should be considered in deciding the extent of
provision; nor did it refer to employee welfare and first-aid in general.
Even then, there normally seems to be confusion in some candidates' minds over the meaning
of 'welfare' (with some answers including reference to safety issues in relation to excavations and
work from heights) and of 'first-aid' (with references to health surveillance, inoculation and similar
issues).
Answers that reviewed the relevant legal requirements relating to welfare facilities on a
construction site and to first-aid facilities, and then showed how these requirements might apply
to the situation described, are able to gain high marks.
Relatively few candidates actually make reference to applicable legislation and others erroneously
think that the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations would apply.
Some others included lists of other legislation, most of which had peripheral relevance at best.
Given the large number of issues relating to welfare facilities (sanitary conveniences, washing
facilities, drinking water, changing rooms and accommodation for clothing, and rest and eating
facilities) and the few that make up first-aid facilities (first-aid boxes, first-aid room and, in this
case, special facilities that might be needed in the context of first-aid, such as drench showers
and eye-wash stations), the balance of many answers is surprising.
Although some marks can be gained by describing the requirements that would generally apply
(e.g. toilets that are sufficient in number, gender-specific and/or lockable, clean, lit and ventilated),
candidates performing well on this question are those who additionally recognised the need for
specialised facilities in relation to contaminated land, such as decontamination facilities (e.g.
showers), the clear demarcation of 'clean' and 'dirty' changing areas and provision for
contaminated clothing.

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 ELECTRICITY ON SITES & BURIED SERVICES

a) Outline the factors related to construction work that can increase the risks from electricity on a
construction site.
b) Describe the control measures that may be used to address the problems outlined in (a).
A number of responses referred to use of intrinsically safe tools out of context.
Part (a)
The factors related to construction work that can increase the risks from electricity on a
construction site are:
 The working environment (including the weather),
 Water,
 Damp,
 Soil or mud;
 Damage by activities;
 Severing / abrasion of cables due to nature of work;
 Equipment supply by contractors (whose standards might vary);
 The possible temptation to use long trailing cables;
 Damage by vehicles;
 The difficulties in managing a range of people and activities on site.
Part (b)
Controls to include:
 Using reduced voltage systems,
 Cordless equipment etc;
 Using protective devises such as RCD’s;
 Having robust procedures to control the selection, inspection and testing of portable
equipment and
 Fault reporting along with control and co-ordination of equipment brought onto site; and
 Cable detection.

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 DEMOLITION – A TWO HOUSE IN A STREET OF OCCUPIED HOUSES

Outline the health and safety issues to be considered when planning the demolition of a two-storey
detached house in a street of occupied houses. (10)
Issues to be considered in relation to the scenario described in the question include, amongst
others:
 CDM (significant construction projects) requirements including prior notification;
 The use of a competent contractor;
 Proper planning including the preparation of method statements;
 Protection of the public by the erection of barriers
 Control of the movement of vehicles;
 Methods of work to protect adjoining properties such as the erection of fencing and shoring
up where necessary;
 The identification of buried services;
 Control of dust by damping down;
 Control of noise (emphasis at particular times of the day depending on local legislation)
 Removal of waste from the site by a licensed carrier;
 Avoiding injury from manual handling
 Falls of people and materials
 The provision of suitable personal protective equipment (hard hats, boots and eye and hearing
protection) and
 Welfare facilities.

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 FALL PROTECTION

Outline the advantages and limitations of the following types of fall protection devices, giving a
suitable application for each:
a) Safety harnesses;
b) Safety belts / fall restraint;
c) Safety nets;
d) Air bags.
This question requires candidates to outline the advantages and limitations of four types of fall
protection devices and to indicate a suitable application for each type.
Safety harnesses may be used in high fall potential areas where full arrest is required when
carrying out short duration work when it would be impracticable to provide more
sophisticated measures.
Their limitations include the need for secure anchoring points, their restrictions on movement,
their requirement for trained and competent users and the fact that they provide individual
protection only.
A suitable application for this device would be in general construction work.
Safety belts, too, can be used in high fall potential areas for short duration work where the
provision of more sophisticated measures would be impracticable.
However, this device offers restraint rather than fall arrest, again requires anchoring points,
provides individual protection only and may need to be supplemented with collective measures.
A suitable application for this device would be to gain access to a pole or pylon.
The advantage of safety nets is that they can provide collective protection (for the fall of persons
and materials) for long term work where full arrest is required.
Their installation, however, takes time and needs to be undertaken by competent persons.
They can be used only in low to medium fall potential areas.
They are most suitable for use over water or under fragile roofs.
Finally, air bags can provide collective protection for falls and have the advantage of being
available in different sizes.
They do, however, provide only small areas of protection, need installation by competent
personnel, require a continuous power supply and may be used only in low fall potential areas
such as short run construction projects or around workplace transport.

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 FALL PROTECTION – SAFETY HARNESSES & SUSPENSION TRAUMA

A worker suspended in a fall protection harness is at risk of suffering from suspension trauma with the
potential for serious injury or death.
Outline the precautions an employer could take to reduce the risks to the worker in this situation.
The precautions that should be taken by the employer include:
 The initial selection of the harness, particularly with respect to its shock absorbency and
its construction to a recognised standard;
 To implementation of plans to prevent prolonged suspension in the fall protection harness
but if prolonged suspension were to occur, to the drawing up of procedures for carrying
out rescue and providing treatment as soon as possible.
There will also be a need for workers wearing harnesses and those performing rescue
operations to have training in:
 Determining if the harness is properly fitted and correctly worn and performs as intended;
 How suspension trauma/orthostatic intolerance occurs together with
 The procedures that should be followed in a rescue operation and the methods of reducing
risks while suspended.
The procedures for rescue should contain
 Contingency based actions such as if self or prompt rescue is impossible, the worker
should be trained to pump their legs frequently; the need for rescue workers to elevate the
worker’s legs and rescue them in the direction of gravity to avoid negative hydrostatic
force;
 The need for continuous monitoring of the suspended worker for signs and symptoms of
suspension trauma / orthostatic intolerance;
 Ensuring the worker receives appropriate first aid treatment once rescued such as
supplementary oxygen administered by trained personnel;
 The need to call for medical assistance if the worker is unconscious in harness
suspension and monitoring the worker after rescue and ensuring evaluation by a
healthcare professional.
It is essential that the signs and symptoms of suspension trauma are recognised. These
include:
 Light headedness and palpitations,
 Poor concentration and fatigue,
 Nausea and dizziness,
 Headache, sweating, weakness,
 Paleness, breathlessness, and
 Unusually low heart rate and blood pressure.
Only a few candidates have knowledge of suspension trauma with others describing standard
precautions for working at height in order to prevent workers arriving in a position where they
were suspended.

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 INSTALLING SATELITE DISHES – WORKING AT HEIGHT AND LONE WORKING

You are the Safety Advisor to a company that installs satellite dishes.
The dishes need to be secured to the external walls of buildings and this involves work at height. Due
to limited access around these buildings and the typical heights involved (3 to 5 metres) ladders are
the only practicable way of carrying out the work. Workers are on their own when carrying out the
work.
a) Describe the safety precautions that could reduce the risk of falls from height when using
ladders.
b) Outline the emergency procedures you would implement in the event of accident or illness for
this type of lone working.
Part a)
Safety precautions that could reduce the risk of falls from height when working from a ladder
to install the dishes include:
the use of a recognised standard of ladder, whether conventional or combination, which
should be appropriate in length, strong enough to carry its intended load, provided with
stabilisers at the base, inspected at regular intervals by a competent person and tagged to
indicate its inspection date and should additionally be inspected on a daily basis by the user
before starting work.
The ladders should be sited on firm and even ground, at a 75 degree angle, and against a
stable upper contact point.
A safety rope should be attached to the ladder and secured to a suitable anchor point on the
wall.
Another rope should be provided to enable the dish to be elevated to the required height.
Workers should be competent and trained in the safe use of ladders with emphasis being laid
on constantly maintaining three points of contact on the ladder, the dangers of over-reaching,
the wearing of appropriate clothing, particularly foot wear, and the use of a tool pouch for
carrying the necessary tools and equipment.
Part b)
Emergency procedures to be implemented for lone working in the scenario described, would
fall into two categories – sources of help in non-life threatening circumstances and those
where there was a threat to life.
In the first instance it would be sufficient to provide the worker with a help line number and the
location of either walk-in services or first aid provision in the area where the work was being
carried out.
In a life threatening situation:
 There would need to be the introduction of procedures for contacting local accident and
emergency departments;
 A list of persons to be contacted in the event of such an emergency and carried by the
worker in circumstances where he would not be in a position to make the call himself;
 The provision of means of communication such as a mobile phone or radio and
 A routine requiring the worker to contact and report to base at set intervals.

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IC 10 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS – IPPS; BPEO; BAT

Environmental pollution is a major concern in many industrial processes. A number of alternative

strategies are available to organisations to manage these risks.
Give the meaning of:
(a) Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC);
(b) Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO);
(c) Best Available Techniques (BAT).
Part a),
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control applies to industrial installations and its main aim
is to achieve a high level of protection of the environment taken as a whole.
It takes into account the whole performance of the plant and as it is ‘integrated’ includes
emissions to air, water and land, the generation of waste, the use of raw materials, energy
efficiency, noise, the prevention of accidents and the restoration of the site upon closure.
Part b),
Best Practicable Environmental Option is the option which provides the most benefits or least
damage to the environment taken as a whole at an acceptable cost and in the long as well as
in the short term.
The option includes a range of methods such as kerb side recycling and green composting.
Part c)
Best Available Techniques applies to certain polluting installations and its aim is to avoid or
reduce emissions and their impact on the environment as a whole.
It takes into account the balance between costs and benefits to the environment so that the
greater the environmental damage that can be prevented, the greater the cost of the
techniques that must be provided. ‘Available’ are those techniques that are readily procurable
by any person, while ‘techniques’ included plants, systems, processes, monitoring measures
and staff.
 CONTROLLED WASTE & DUTY OF CARE

(i) Outline the meaning of 'controlled waste'.

(ii) Identify the categories of persons on whom the duty is placed, and those who are exempt.
This question is one to which either candidates know the answer or they do not, and responses
are very much polarised into these two categories.
For those who fell into the former category, high marks could be gained relatively quickly and
easily.
'Controlled waste' is defined as any household, industrial or commercial waste, the exceptions
being waste from mines and quarries as well as agricultural, explosives and radioactive
wastes.
The duty of care in relation to controlled waste is placed on any person who produces, imports,
carries, keeps, treats or disposes of the waste, or who brokers waste.
Householders are exempt from the duty in respect of their own household waste.
While the questions could hardly be clearer, a few candidates think that they were being asked
to explain the nature of the duty or how controlled waste should be transferred.
A number of candidates additionally confused controlled waste with special (or hazardous) waste.

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 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT – HAZARDOUS SLUDGE

A company produces waste in the form of a hazardous sludge.

Disposal of the waste is currently via a licensed contractor to a landfill site but this is becoming
increasingly costly.
Outline the various options that the company might consider to reduce the cost and environmental
impact of dealing with the waste.
The various options that the company may have include:
 Identifying recycling opportunities at all stages of the process;
 Substituting process materials for ones that give rise to a non-hazardous waste;
 Improving production efficiency in order to produce less waste;
 Treating waste on-site to reduce quantity (e.g. De-watering);
 Treating waste to reduce hazardous properties;
 Selecting waste contractors that can process the sludge;
 Seeking opportunities to exchange waste streams with companies that can use waste as
raw material;
 Exploring other disposal means (e.g. Incineration, liquefied waste to sewer, etc) or even
 Exploring becoming licensed to save costs.

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 WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY – ZOO

Animals are kept at a zoo where managers are planning to write a waste management policy.
For the solid waste produced, outline the issues that should be addressed by such a policy and
associated procedures.
Answer structuring is important under headings such as statement of intent, allocation of
responsibilities and practical arrangements.
The statement of intent would refer to the need to minimise the production of waste; to recycle
as much as possible; and to comply with environmental legislation without putting at risk the
health and safety of workers, members of the public, contractors or animals through the waste
handling procedures.
Responsibilities for achieving these objectives would then have to be clearly defined and
allocated to managers, workers and contractors.
As for the practical arrangements, these would include
 The separation of different types of waste;
 The procedures to be followed in handling the types of waste such as animal faeces, soiled
animal bedding, animal carcases, sharps, animal feed waste as well as paper and
packaging, horticultural waste and waste from the catering activities.
 The waste would have to be clearly labelled and safe storage provided for it on site with
attention being paid to its safe handling with manual handling and contamination risks in
mind.
 A licensed waste disposal contractor would have to be used and attention paid to ensure
the final destination of the waste such as to a licensed landfill site or to an incinerator.

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 POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE – DUST ON CARS OF RESIDENTS – MAY BE
PROCESS RELATED

The residents of a village have recently been affected by a fallout of dust on their cars and property.
They allege that the dust came from cement works situated a few miles away.
Outline the steps that should be taken by those responsible for the cement works in order to
investigate whether emissions from the works are the cause of the problem.
This question presented a scenario involving allegations of dust contamination from
residents of a village situated a short distance away from a cement works.
It involved a typical investigative process which would deal with the factors to be examined in
order to confirm or dismiss them.
In order to investigate whether the dust causing the problem emanated from the cement works,
management would
 Need to carry out a desk study involving contact with the residents
 A research into historical records,
 Weather patterns, possible links with the prevailing wind direction and
 The existence of other potential sources of dust in the area.
 Check the plant for obvious faults and
 Carry out continuous monitoring of the emissions on site together with off site background
monitoring.
 Analyse the dust collected from the village would also help to establish whether it matched
that produced at the alleged source.

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 EMERGENCY PLANNING – MAJOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT

As a Health, Safety and Environmental Manager at a hazardous installation you are responsible for
emergency planning.
The site is regulated under the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Code of Practice ‘Prevention
of Major Industrial Accidents’ 1991.
In the event of an uncontrolled release:
a) Outline the need for emergency planning
b) Outline the general emergency planning measures that should be taken by the competent
authorities in association with the works management of the installation.
Part a),
In the event of an uncontrolled release, there would be a need for emergency planning to:
 Localise the release and if possible, contain it; and to minimise the harmful effects of the
release on people, property and the environment both inside and outside the installation
by the use of safety systems, alarm systems and the emergency services.
 Clear and well defined plans should be made available for quick and effective use and
where emergency equipment and manpower are limited, provision should be made for
mutual assistance between neighbouring industrial activities.
Part b),
The general emergency planning measures that should be taken by the competent authorities
include:
 The need: to establish arrangements for an on-site emergency plan which should be drawn
up by the management of the installation;
 To establish arrangements for an off-site emergency plan to be drawn up by the competent
authority in conjunction with the installation’s management, which should be prepared
following consultation with various bodies such as the fire and police authorities and the
hospital and ambulance services and which should be consistent with the on-site
emergency plan;
 To ensure that regular rehearsals were carried out in order to keep the off-site plan in a
state of readiness and also to ensure that information on safety was provided to members
of the general public.

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 GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

A large manufacturing company wants to minimise its emission of greenhouse gases.

Identify a range of industrial activities that may lead to the release of greenhouse gas emissions into
the atmosphere.
This question is designed to test candidates' awareness of the ways in which an organisation
may contribute to global warming.
The first part to the question required candidates to demonstrate that they understood that there
is a wide range of ways in which activities can contribute to global warming, either directly or
indirectly.
A comprehensive answer would have included reference to:
 Combustion of fossil fuels (oil, LPG, gas and coal) leading to release of carbon dioxide and
other relevant gases through heating systems;
 Transportation emissions;
 Consumption of electricity generated from fossil sources and process use of fossil fuels;
 Use of cement and bricks in construction leading to release of carbon dioxide from calcium
carbonate in cement manufacture or greenhouse gases from energy used in manufacture;
 Use of chemicals deriving from fossil fuel sources;
 Disposal of waste to landfill leading to methane emissions;
 Emission of VOCs used as process solvents or from fuels;
 Emission of HFCs and chlorinated / fluorinated hydrocarbons;
Peat consumption and deforestation removal leads to a reduced capacity to absorb carbon
dioxide naturally.

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