SANTE vs.

CLARAVALL
G.R. No. 173915. February 22, 2010

FACTS:
On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners. In her complaint,
respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of
other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as
follows, “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to
Albert Gacusan, respondent’s friend and one of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station and
who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad,
Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent
prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the MTCC and not the RTC, that had jurisdiction
over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional
amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

RTC: Denied the motion to dismiss; the total claim of respondent amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the
jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila.

Meanwhile, respondent amended the complaint, increasing the claim of moral damages to P1,000.000. Petitioners
filed another petition before the CA claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC.

CA (Certiorari): The case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff
was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the
jurisdictional amount of the MTCC.
CA (MTD): Affirmed the RTC’s denial of the motion to dismiss; the total or aggregate amount demanded in the
complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case

HELD:
YES. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section
19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages
is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.”

The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they
were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in
the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes
of action.20 It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages.
Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief
prayed for in the complaint.

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling
that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
 SEBASTIAN vs. NG
G.R. No. 164594. April 22, 2015

FACTS:
Sometime in 1997, Angelita Lagmay, acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter Annabel Lagmay
Ng, filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice. She sought to collect from Michael the sum of P350,000.00 that
Annabel sent to Michael to purchase a truck. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts, and
that they agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. However, after Annabel and Michael’s
relationship has ended, Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the
matter before the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document denominated as
“kasunduan” wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of P250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan
was signed by Angelita (on behalf of Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo.

Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in
accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita
brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead,
issued a Certification to File Action.

After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan Angelita filed with the MCTC a
Motion for Execution of the kasunduan. Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution, citing as a
ground Angelita’s alleged violation of Section 15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

MCTC: In favor of Annabel

RTC: Upheld MCTC; Michael failed to assail the validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute
Annabel’s claims or the applicability of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7160.

Michael filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be
enforced by the Lupon within 6 months from date of settlement or after the lapse of 6 months, by ordinary civil
action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and (ii) the MCTC
does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan)
is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00.

RTC: Granted MR
CA: Reversed RTC; the “appropriate local trial court” stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of
R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to Michael’s contention, the MCTC has
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the amount involved.

ISSUE:
WON the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the amount involved

HELD:
YES. Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides that after the lapse of the 6 month period from the date
of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the “appropriate city or municipal court” as the forum for the execution
of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these
courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved.
Thus, there can be no question that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts the regardless of the amount. A basic principle of
interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation where
the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.
 BARRIDO vs. NONATO
G.R. No. 176492. October 20, 2014

FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo Nonato and petitioner Marietta Barrido, they were able to
acquire a house and lot in Bacolod. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato
asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the MTCC.

Barrido moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

MTCC: Adjudicated the property to Marietta Barrido

RTC: Reversed MTCC; ordered equitable partition of the property
CA: Affirmed RTC; since the property’s assessed value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s
jurisdiction

ISSUE:
WON the MTCC has jurisdiction over an action for partition

HELD:
YES. The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for
the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the
required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
 BRGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR
G.R. No. 138896. June 20, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the MTC of Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. The MTC
dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that “eminent domain is an exercise of
the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court.”

RTC: Affirmed MTC

“The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or
possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction
of the court. That the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real property is included in a real action affecting
title to or possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, ‘Real actions are those
affecting title to or possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of
mortgage on, real property.”

PETITIONERS: Exercise of the right of eminent domain is incapable of pecuniary estimation

RESPONDENTS: The complaint affects the title to or possession of real property

ISSUE:
WON expropriation is incapable of pecuniary estimation

HELD:
YES. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation,
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment
or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the
rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other
factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the
lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine
the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the
main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
 GONZALES vs. GJH LAND
G.R. No. 202664. November 10, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Complaint for “Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Three (3)- and Twenty
(20)-Day TROs, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages” against respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly
known as S.J. Land, Inc.), before the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.’s shares
which they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial
Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining order, and later granted the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out
that the case involves an intra- corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial
Court of Muntinlupa City.

RTC (Branch 276): Granted the motion to dismiss; Branch 256 was specifically designated by the Court as the
Special Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and cannot lawfully exercise
jurisdiction on the matter

PETITIONERS: As the raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences of the
wrong assignment of the case

ISSUE:
WON Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

HELD:
YES. As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case’s
subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is
governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court. The matter of whether the
RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is
only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.

Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court in
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance
with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action. Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly
raffled to a regular branch, i.e., Branch 276, instead of being assigned to the sole Special Commercial Court in the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256.

The erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure
— that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which
the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the
commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for
re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only
designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.
GUIDELINES:

1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper courses of
action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned to the sole special
branch;
1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall be
referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off among those
special branches; and
1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be
referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon
referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if
the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special
branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case
among those special branches.

2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case.
Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special branches which, by
statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under
existing rules.

3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On
the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.
 LARENA VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. CAPISTRANO
G.R. No. 25401, October 19, 1926

FACTS:
In the matter of the estate of Demetrio Larena, the CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order directing the committee
of appraisers of the estate to prepare and present to the court a scheme for the distribution and partition of the
property of the estate among the heirs. The heirs were Josefina Rubio, his widow; Asuncion Larena, an
acknowledged natural child; and four legitimate children Demetrio, Enrique, Mariano and David Larena, the last
three of whom were minors at the time.

Buenaventura Lopez, one of the commissioners, presented a scheme of partition in conformity with said rules. This
scheme of partition was accepted in writing by the heirs, the minors being represented by their guardian Juan
Montenegro. Judge Fermin Mariano approved the same.

On August 9, 1923, the heirs Asuncion Larena and Demetrio Larena acknowledged in writing the receipt of their
respective share of the inheritance in accordance with the order of the court and to their entire satisfaction.

However, on November 9, 1925, Judge Capistrano, the successor in office of Judge Mariano, on his own motion
ordered the intestate proceedings set down for hearing on November 24, 1925, all of the inherited parties except
Asuncion Larena being notified of the order.

On December 21, 1925, the CFI issued an order directing that a new partition and distribution of the property of the
deceased be had and appointing new commissioners for that purpose. The court also laid down new rules for the
distribution, which rules differ somewhat from those stated by Judge Mariano in his order.

ASUNCION AND DEMETRIO: Filed an exception on the ground that the 'court had no jurisdiction to set aside
the distribution already made and to order a new one. They filed a notice of appeal and asked that the appeal bond
be fixed. They presented the record of appeal for approval.
CFI: Refused to approve on the ground that the record of appeal was premature

Thereafter, they filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to order Judge Capistrano to approve and certify the record
of appeal for approval.

ISSUE: WON the petition for the writ of mandamus should be granted.

HELD:
YES. It is true that where there is no question as to the propriety of a partition or distribution of property, an appeal
will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated in the lower court, but it is otherwise when,
as here, the appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole or part of the property in question and maintains that
a partition or distribution of the same is improper. In such cases an appeal may be taken directly from the order or
judgment directing that a partition or distribution be made and it is not necessary to await the termination of the
proceedings before perfecting the appeal.
 BLOSSOM & CO. vs. MANILA GAS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 32958, November 8, 1930

FACTS:
Blossom & Co. (BC) entered into a contract with Manila Gas Corporation (MGC) in which BC undertook to
purchase and receive from MGC and MGC agreed to sell and deliver to BC for a period of 4 years, 3 tons of water
gas tar per month from September to January 1, 1919, and 20 tons per month after January 1, 1919 for the remaining
period of the contract.

On January 31, 1919, the contract was amended so that it should continue to remain in force for a period of 10 years
from January 1, 1919. In consideration of the modification, BC agreed to purchase from MGC a certain piece of
land lying adjacent to its plant at the price of P5 per square meter. BC executed a mortgage on the land to secure
the payment of the balance of the purchase price.

In July 1920, MGC breached the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar to it thereunder solely
because of the increased price of its tar products and its desire to secure better prices therefor. Because of MGC’s
refusal to comply despite repeated demands, BC filed an action against MGC for damages and for specific
performance. The court refused to order the MGC to resume the delivery of the coal and water gas tar to BC but
granted the action for damages.

BC then claimed the right to set-off its damages against the balance due from it to MGC on account of the purchase
of the land. In another case, BC was ordered to pay MGC the balance of the price of the land it mortgaged to MGC.

On March 26, 1926, MGC offered to resume delivery to BC from that date of the minimum monthly quantities of
tars stated in its contract. BC commenced to accept deliveries of the tars. However, BC ascertained that MGC was
charging it prices higher than the contract price. BC accepted the deliveries and paid for the same, albeit under
protest and with the express reservation to demand from MGC an adjustment of the prices charged in violation of
the contract.

After several demands, MGC still failed to comply with the contract, which prompted BC to ask the court for a
rescission of their contract and also asked for damages.

MGC: The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

ISSUE: WON BC, in a former action, having recovered judgment for the damages which it sustained by reason of
a breach of its contract by MGC up to September, 1923, can in another action recover damages it may have sustained
after September, 1923, arising from, and growing out of, a breach of the same contract, upon and for which it
recovered its judgment in the former action.

HELD:
NO. As a general rule a contract to do several things at several times is divisible in its nature, so as to authorize
successive actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a
suit for a subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be
only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.

The complaint in the former case specifically alleges that the defendant "has refused, and still refuses, to deliver to
the plaintiff any coal and water gas tar whatsoever under the said contract Exhibit A, since the said month of July,
1920." "That owing to the bad faith of the said Manila, Gas Corporation, defendant herein, in not living up to its
said contract Exhibit A, made with this plaintiff, and refusing now to carry out the terms of the same." That is a
specific allegation not only of a breach of the contract since the month of July, 1920, but of the bad faith of the
defendant in its continuous refusal to make deliveries of any coal and water gas tar. That amended complaint was
filed on July 11, 1924, or four years after the alleged bad faith in breaking the contract.
Having recovered damages against it, covering a period of four years, upon the theory that the defendant broke the
contract, and in bad faith refused to make deliveries of either of the tars, how can the plaintiff now claim and assert
that the contract is still in force and effect? In the instant case the plaintiff alleges and relies upon the ten-year
contract of January 1, 1920, which in bad faith was broken by the defendant. If the contract was then broken, how
can it be enforced in this action?

The record tends to show that the tars which the defendant delivered after April 7, 1926, were not delivered under
the old contract of January 1, 1920, and that at all times since July, 1920, the defendant has consistently refused to
make any deliveries of any tars under that contract.
 SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005

FACTS:
On 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997, Swagman Hotels through its President and VP, Infante and
Hegerty, respectively, obtained from Neal Christian loans evidenced by 3 P/Ns in the amount of US$50,000 payable
after 3 years from date with 15% interest per annum payable every 3 months.

It was alleged that they paid the interest of 15% per annum every 3 months but starting January 1998 until December
1998, they paid him only an interest of 6% per annum, in violation of the terms of the P/Ns. Thus, in December
1998, Christian informed Swagman that he was terminating the loans and demanded the principal amount with
interests. On February 2, 1999, Christian filed a complaint for sum of money against Swagman.

SWAGMAN: Christian has no cause of action because the P/Ns were not yet due and demandable; and that he
agreed to waive the 15% interest per annum in December 1997 because Swagman was experiencing huge losses.
Instead, it paid US$750 per month as capital repayment.

RTC: When the complaint was filed, the P/Ns were not yet due and demandable, but as of the date of the decision,
they already were, so it ordered Swagman to pay Christian US$100,000 plus interest.
Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states no cause of action may
be cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he
filed the instant complaint, as defendants’ obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may nevertheless
recover on the first two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable.
CA: Affirmed RTC; Swagman failed to object toChristian’s presentation of evidence to the effect that the
promissory notes have become due and demandable.
SWAGMAN: At the time of the filing of the complaint, Christian had no cause of action because none of the
promissory notes was due and demandable.

ISSUES: 1) WON a decision is valid even when there was no cause of action at the time the complaint was filed;
2) WON a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued can be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading

HELD:
NO. Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1.A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2.An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3.Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to
maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

The term of the principal loans remained unchanged in that they were still due three years from the respective dates
of the promissory notes. Thus, at the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, none of
the three promissory notes was due yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999
and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts also found that the
petitioner had been religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month from January 1998 and even during
the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the private respondent had accepted all these monthly
payments.

With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum of money and
damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner
had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation
in December 1997. Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court,
and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint.

2) NO. According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, Section 5, Rule 10 allows a complaint
that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without objection during the trial. Such
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous.

Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual
merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities,
and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding
multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the
pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently
amended on motion of a party.

Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the
complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. For example, if a complaint
failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the cause of action depends, evidence showing
that such condition had already been fulfilled when the complaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and
the complaint may accordingly be amended thereafter.

It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an
amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending.
Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court
upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should
not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature.

We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at
the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while
the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action
is not permissible.

Hence, contrary to the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the defect of lack of cause of action at
the commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of this case
arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.
 ADA vs. BAYLON
G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012

FACTS:
This case involves the estate of spouses Baylon who died on November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. At
the time of their death, Spouses Baylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita, Victoria, Dolores,
Panfila, Ramon and petitioner Lilia.

Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was survived
by her daughter, petitioner Luz Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by respondent
Florante Baylon, his child from his first marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their
legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby.

PETITIONERS: After the death of Spouses Baylon, Rita took possession of 43 parcels of land owned by the
Spouses and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using said income, Rita allegedly purchased two
parcels of land, Lot 4709 and half of Lot 4706.
RESPONDENTS: They and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43 parcels of land, whereas Rita actually owned
10 out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining 11 parcels of land are
separately owned by other people. The 2 parcels of land were acquired by Rita using her own money.

During the pendency of the case, Rita donated Lot 4709 and half of Lot 4706 to Florante. Rita died intestate on July
16, 2000. When they learned of the donation, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading, asking for the rescission of
the donation on the ground that the properties are under litigation.

RTC: Ordered the rescission of the donation inter vivos

MR: Denied
CA: Remanded the case to RTC for determination of ownership of the disputed lots; before the petitioners may file
an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling the lots actually belonged to the estate of
Spouses Baylon and not to Rita.

ISSUE: 1) WON there was a misjoinder of causes of action;

2) WON a new cause of action may be asserted in a supplemental pleading

HELD:
YES. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the
said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the
ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the
ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding
to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the
determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting
upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be
proceeded with separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu
proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined
causes of action.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed
with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the
misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It acknowledges
the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance
of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or
the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).

2) YES. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary
pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover,
a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original
pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to
set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original complaint.

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the
kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original
right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they
themselves constitute a right of action.

Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after
the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of
action.

Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita
in favor of Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. However, the
petitioners’ prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to,
and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition case. Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 are
included among the properties that were sought to be partitioned.

The petitioners’ supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of the gratuitous
conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the original complaint and prayed for
additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said lots form part of the estate of Spouses
Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same is rescinded. Thus, the principal
issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint remained the same.
 MARILAG vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 201892. July 22, 2015

FACTS:
Rafael Martinez obtained from Norlinda Marilag a loan of P160,000 with 5% monthly interest, payable in 6 months,
and secured by a REM over a parcel of land. Rafael failed to pay. Thus, Marilag filed a complaint for judicial
foreclosure of the REM. Rafael was declared in default. The RTC declared the 5% interest to be usurious and
reduced the same to 12% per annum. It ordered Rafael to pay the principal of P160,000 and the accrued interest of
P59,200.

Meanwhile, Marcelino, Rafael’s son, agreed to pay his father’s obligation in the amount of P689,000. After making
a total payment of P400,000, he executed a P/N in the amount of P289,000, representing the balance of Rafael’s
debt. When Marcelino learned of the decision of the RTC, he refused to pay the amount covered by the P/N. Marilag
then filed a complaint for sum of money and damages.

MARCELINO: Marilag has no cause of action against him and that he committed a mistake in paying more than
the amount due under the loan

RTC: Ordered Marilag to return the excess payment

MR: The causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and respondent’s failure to comply
with his obligation under the subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial relief
CA: Reinstated the first decision of the RTC; the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case,
considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the nonpayment
of Rafael’s loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary
consideration for the execution of the subject P/N

ISSUE: WON the judicial foreclosure case is a bar to filing the collection case

HELD:
YES. A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the judgment
sought to bar the new action must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

The Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This is because the records are
bereft of any indication that decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality. Accordingly, with
the very first element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain.

This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner’s prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead, by the
principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the
foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner’s recourse to the subsequent
collection case.

To lay down the basics, litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
judicata in the other.

Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits
as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum
shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground
of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).

In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not
always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by reference to the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and
the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and
different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits.

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of
action against the debtor¬-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection
of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are
alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee
opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for
the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after
deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment
shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than
the outstanding obligation.

In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor¬-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael’s debt. In light of the
foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action
for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure
case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.

As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred
from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure
case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order.
 BANDA vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 166620. April 20, 2010

FACTS:
The National Printing Office was formed by virtue of EO 285 during the term of former President Corazon Aquino.
During PGMA’s term, she issued EO 378, amending EO 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over
the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing
services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by
the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive
Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.

Employees of the NPO challenged EO 378’s constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers
of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter
still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because
it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE: WON the petition is a class suit

HELD:
NO. The requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the
parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is
or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action
should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and
the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to
determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether
claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest.

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive
Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents,
who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small
fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent.

An element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of
fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named
party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as
it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party
to speak for the rest of the class.

A Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance was attached, was filed
by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation
expressed NAPOWA’s opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the
contention of petitioners’ counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the
said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class
sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an apparent conflict between
petitioners’ interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners
sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.
 NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788. November 27, 2009

FACTS:
Karen Go is doing business under the trade name Kargo Enterprises. Kargo, through its manager, Glenn Go, leased
2 motor vehicles to Roger Navarro. Navarro in turn delivered postdated checks. However, some of the checks
bounced. Demands to pay the balance or to return the motor vehicles were made, but to no avail. Thus, Karen filed
2 complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Roger Navarro.

NAVARRO: The two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease
Agreements—the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.

RTC: Karen had sufficient interest in Glenn’s leasing business (which was presumed to be conjugal property) to
file the action against Navarro. However, Karen should have included her husband in the complaint based on Section
4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
MR: Denied
CA: Affirmed RTC

NAVARRO: Even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite
juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go
who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a
cause of action.
KAREN: It is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no real interest in the subject of the complaint, even if
the lease agreements were signed only by her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn
Go signed the lease agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises.

ISSUES: 1) WON Karen is the real-party-in-interest

2) WON Glenn’s non-inclusion in the suit would warrant its dismissal

HELD:
1) YES. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo
Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro, while the
lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises’ name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so
the actual parties to the lease agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by
a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is
legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the
Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.

2) NO. Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases that
the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. the
proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court,
either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the
plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the
order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal
to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. In these lights, the RTC Order requiring Karen Go
to join her husband as a party plaintiff is fully in order.
 BACALSO vs. PADIGOS
G.R. No. 173192. April 18, 2008

FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land which was in the name of 13 co-owners. Maximo Padigos, Flaviano Mabuyo,
Gaudencio Padigos, Domingo Padigos, and Victoria P. Abarquez, who are among the herein respondents, filed a
Complaint against Rosendo and Rodrigo Bacalso who are among the herein petitioners, for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and damages.

PETITIONERS: Their father Alipio, Sr. purchased via deeds of sale the shares in the lot of Fortunata, Simplicio,
Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix from their respective heirs, and that Alipio, Sr. acquired the shares of the other
co-owners of the lot by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
RESPONDENTS: The shares of the other co-owners of the lot cannot be acquired through laches or prescription.

Respondents filed an amended complaint which impleaded additional defendants, and a seconded amended
complaint where additional plaintiffs were impleaded. Petitioners contended that the Second Amended Complaint
should be dismissed in view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other registered owners of the lot who are
indispensable parties. Thereafter, a third amended complaint was filed, impleading additional plaintiffs.

RTC: In favor of herein respondents

CA: Affirmed RTC

PETITIONERS: The Second Amended Complaint cannot be valid and legal, since not all indispensable parties
are impleaded or joined.
RESPONDENTS: The omission did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because Article 487 of the Civil Code
states that “any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.”

ISSUE: WON the court’s ruling is void for failure to implead an indispensable party

HELD:
YES. Respondents’ contention does not lie. The action is for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents,
recovery of possession and ownership, and damages.

“Parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined
either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires,
of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any
and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely “when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed.” The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

The absence then of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent party but even as to those present.
 VALDEZ-TALLORIN vs. HEIRS OF TARONA
G.R. No. 177429. November 24, 2009

FACTS:
Carlos, Rogelio and Lourdes Tarona alleged that unknown to them, the Assessor’s Office of Morong, Bataan,
cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father, Juanito. The cancellation was said to be based on an
unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly executed in favor of Anicia Valdez-Tallorin and two
others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez. However, no copy of the affidavit could
be found among the records of the office.

The Taronas filed a complaint against Tallorin for the cancellation of their Tax Declaration. Margarita and Dolores
were not impleaded. Tallorin filed to answer the complaint within the time allowed, so the Taronas filed a motion
to declare her in default. But, before the RTC could act on the motion, Tallorin filed a belated answer, alleging
among others that she held a copy of the supposedly missing affidavit of Juanito who was merely an agricultural
tenant of the land covered by Tax Declaration 463.

RTC: Refused to declare Tallorin in default because it received the answer before it could act on the motion
CA: Remanded the case; RTC gravely abused its discretion in admitting Tallorin’s late answer in the absence of a
motion to admit it
RTC (Remand): Annulled the Tax Declaration in favor of Tallorin, et al
TALLORIN: Complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead the other indispensable parties
CA: Affirmed RTC

ISSUE: WON the complaint should have been dismissed for not impleading Margarita and Dolores in whose
names, like their co-owner Tallorin, the annulled tax declaration had been issued

HELD:
NO. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Joining indispensable parties into an
action is mandatory, being a requirement of due process. Without their presence, the judgment of the court cannot
attain real finality.

Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not only as to the absent party, but as to those
present as well. And where does the responsibility for impleading all indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.

Here, the RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that belonged not only to defendant Tallorin but also to
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, which two persons had no opportunity to be heard as they
were never impleaded. The RTC and the CA had no authority to annul that tax declaration without seeing to it that
all three persons were impleaded in the case.

But the Taronas’ action cannot be dismissed outright. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
dismissal. Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of
non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings,
through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.

There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an order to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de
Valdez and Dolores Valdez as defendants so they may, if they so desire, be heard.
 CRISOLOGO vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 196894. March 3, 2014

FACTS:
Spouses Crisologo giled 2 collection cases (RTC Branch 15) against Robert Limso, So Keng Kok, et. al. JEWM
was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case (RTC Branch 8) against the
same defendants.

RTC Branch 8 directed the defendants to transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter
subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM. TCTs were issued
in the name of JEWM both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in
connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok.

After a year, RTC Branch 15 decided in favor of Spouses Crisologo. When this decision attained finality, they
moved for execution. When the writ was issued, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an. The notice
of sale included, among others, the subject properties covered by the TCTS in the name of JEWM. In the same
proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It
prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale.

To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action with RTC Branch 14 for cancellation of lien with prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Spouses Crisologo’s counsel appeared and filed in open court their Very
Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br.
15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case.

RTC (Br. 14): Denied Spouses Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted JEWM’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction
MR: Denied for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make the written formal
notice of appearance
JEWM: Moved that defendants be declared in default
CRISOLOGOS: They could not be deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent
motion and order of default

RTC (Br. 14): Ruled in favor of JEWM; writ of injunction was made permanent
CA: the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait accompli and, as such, the issue of
grave abuse of discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and academic
CRISOLOGOS: They allege deprivation of their right to due process when they were not impleaded in the case
before RTC-Br. 14
JEWM: Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties since their rights over the properties had been rendered
ineffective by the final and executory Decision of RTC-Br. 8

ISSUES: WON Spouses Crisologo are indispensable parties to the suit

HELD:
YES. The cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties
annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required
to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title.

Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of the TCTs issued to
JEWM. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to
the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in
the final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As indispensable parties,
Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case.
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible
issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the
judgment.

Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and
the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including
the assailed orders, which may be “ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”
 MACAWADIB vs. PNP DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
G.R. No. 186610. July 29, 2013

FACTS:
Macawadib was a police officer with the rank of Police Senior Superintendent. On July 30, 2001, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 39 of “DILG Act of 1990,” the Chief of Directorial Staff of the PNP issued General Order
No. 1168, enumerating the names of commissioned officers who were subject to compulsory retirement on various
dates in the month of January 2002 by virtue of their attainment of the compulsory retirement age of 56. Among
the names included was that of petitioner, who was supposed to retire on January 11, 2002, as the files of the PNP
Records Management Division indicate that he was born on January 11, 1946.

On September 3, 2001, he filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar’s
Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. In the said application, petitioner swore under oath that he was born on January
11, 1956. The application was, subsequently, approved. In October, he filed with the RTC a petition for correction
of entry regarding his birth date.

PETITIONER: He correctly entered his birth date of January 11, 1956 in the records of the local police and INP,
as well as his Service Record at the National HQ of the PNP; but in the GSIS and NAPOLCOM, he erroneously
entered the same as January 11, 1946.
RTC: Ordered the correction of Macawadib’s birth date
RESPONDENT: The RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, “an unimpleaded indispensable party.”
CA: Set aside the RTC decision

ISSUE: WON the PNP is an indispensable party

HELD:
YES. The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the
custody of the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC which are involved and which would be affected by any decision
rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The aforementioned government agencies are, thus,
required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.” If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any
judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is “precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court
(that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.” The
purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between
the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on
its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be
adversely affected by petitioner’s petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in petitioner’s
service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, if petitioner’s service is extended by ten years, the
government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that would have to be given
to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by the
change should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.

As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceedings, the
decision of the trial court granting petitioner’s prayer for the correction of entries in his service records, is void.
 REPUBLIC vs. UY
G.R. No. 198010. August 12, 2013

FACTS:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. Impleaded as
respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is
the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is
"Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further
claimed that her school records, PRC Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she
had to follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all
her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However, the
NSO records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.

After finding compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC granted the petition. The CA affirmed the
decision. The decision was challenged on the ground that indispensable parties were not impleaded.

ISSUE: WON the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.

HELD:
YES. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given
to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing
to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and
not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far
reaching.
 RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF TAÑON STRAIT vs. REYES
G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015

FACTS:
Petitioners, collectively referred to as the “Resident Marine Mammals” in the petition, are the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are
joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be
collectively known as “the Stewards”) who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned
marine species.

On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey
and Exploration Contract-102 (which was later converted into SC-46) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.

It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied for redress, wherein they commonly seek that
respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

PETITIONERS: Assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental
laws created in their favor and for their benefit
RESPONDENTS: Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons; the Stewards cannot represent animals and they
are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision.

ISSUE: WON petitioners (Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards) have standing to file the case

HELD:
YES. Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a
“citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental
laws. Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively applied to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already
taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It
is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition.
 MIGUEL vs. MONTANEZ
G.R. No. 191336. January 25, 2012

FACTS:
Jerry Montanez secured a loan of P143,864 from Crisanta Miguel, payable in 1 year. As collateral, he gave his
house and lot. Due to Montanez’s failure to pay, Miguel filed a complaint before the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
Brgy. San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein Montanez agreed to
pay his loan in installments in the amount of P2,000/month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral is
sold, he would settle the balance of the loan in full. However, he still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the
Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of Miguel. Miguel filed a case before
the MeTC of Makati for collection of sum of money.

MONTANEZ: Raised the defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong,
Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal

MeTC: Ordered Montanez to pay

RTC: Affirmed MeTC
CA: Reversed RTC; dismissed the complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of improper venue.
Since the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before the Lupon ng Barangay, such settlement has the force
and effect of a court judgment, which may be enforced by execution within 6 months from the date of settlement
by the Lupon ng Barangay, or by court action after the lapse of such time. Considering that more than 6 months had
elapsed from the date of settlement, the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the execution of the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not for collection of sum of money.
PETITIONER: The cause of action did not arise from the Kasunduang Pag-aayos but on the respondent’s breach
of the original loan agreement

ISSUE: WON a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner, notwithstanding the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos

HELD:
YES. Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is
deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original
demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy.

It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory
insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public policy.

Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force and
effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules.18 Thus, under
Section 417 of the LGC, such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the
Barangay Lupon within 6 months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in
the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.

Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay IRRs. The
Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of
the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under
the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The
cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final
judgment.

It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either under the first or
the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such settlement within 10 days
from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the LGC. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one
party, either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in
accordance with the LGC or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.

The language of this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no action for
rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement
may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration
of rescission, for he may “regard” the compromise agreement already “rescinded”.

In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be
bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner
has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for
collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
 SABAY vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192150. October 1, 2014

FACTS:
While the Federico Sabay and his daughter Erlinda were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo
Lopez, the latter confronted Federico about his alleged intrusion into Godofredo’s property. A verbal altercation
ensued between them. Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object. Federico joined in by throwing a stone
at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy. The Sabays
then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.

Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez came and pacified the three. But in the course his efforts, he was hit in the
hand with a bolo. The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the parties. Godofredo and Jervie filed a
complaint against Federico before the barangay. The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the
recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated June
20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make the
promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties. Thus, the Office of the Barangay
Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action. Federico was charged with the crime of physical injuries.

MTC: Found Federico guilty of 2 counts of slight PI

RTC: Affirmed MTC
PETITIONER: Lower courts erred in disregarding the existence of the Kasunduan executed by the parties before
the Lupon.
CA: Sustained RTC

ISSUE: WON the certification to file action issued by the office of the barangay is valid

HELD:
YES. The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation prior to the institution of
the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact admitted that a meeting before the Lupon transpired between
them, resulting in a Kasunduan.

Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduan that embodied their agreement was never
implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his promised
recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to File an
Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement.

Furthermore, the Barangay Captain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the performance of official
duty. In the absence of contrary evidence, this presumption prevails; his issuance of the disputed Certification to
File an Action was regular and pursuant to law. Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to File
an Action.

Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the Certification to File an
Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases
before the MTC.

Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioner’s case; the claimed irregularity in conciliation
procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to File an Action, did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the parties’ cause of action.
 TRAVEÑO vs. BOBONGON
G.R. No. 164205. September 3, 2009

FACTS:
In 1992, Timog Agricultural Corporation (TACOR) and Diamond Farms, Inc., (DFI) hired Oldarico Traveño and
his co-petitioners to work at a banana plantation which covered lands previously planted with rice and corn. While
they worked under the direct control of supervisors assigned by TACOR and DFI, these companies used different
schemes to make it appear that petitioners were hired through independent contractors. under the last scheme
adopted by these companies, the nominal individual contractors were required to, as they did, join a cooperative
and thus became members of respondent Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

Without first seeking the approval of the DOLE, the respodents changed their compensation package from being
based on a daily rate to a pakyawan rate that depended on the combined productivity of the “gangs” they had been
grouped into. Soon thereafter, they stopped paying their salaries, prompting them to stop working. Thus they filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against TACOR, and DFI.

LA: Declared Traveño, et. al to have been illegally dismissed; found the cooperative to be their employer
NLRC: Sustained LA
CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the accompanying verification and certification against
forum shopping was defective, it having been signed by only 19 of the 22 therein named petitioners

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying
verification and certification against forum-shopping was proper

HELD:
NO. “For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification
against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth
of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule
on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.”

The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged Resolutions of the appellate court. Petitioners’
contention that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition only as to the non-signing petitioners or merely
dropped them as parties to the case is thus in order.
 PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. WG&A
G.R. No. 158401. January 28, 2008

FACTS:
Due to the the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans Shipping Corporation over the Marine Slip Way in the
North Harbor, WG&A requested PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said facility. Thereafter, then
President Estrada issued a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of the DOTC and the General Manager of PPA,
stating to the effect that in its meeting, the Economic Coordinating Council (ECC) has approved the request of
WG&A to lease the Marine Slip Way from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that PPA turns over its
operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization Project.

Believing that the lease already expired on June 30, 2001, PPA subsequently sent a letter to WG&A directing the
latter to vacate the contested premises not later than November 30, 2001 and to turn over the improvements made
therein pursuant to the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract. In response, WG&A wrote PPA, urging
the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former. Said request was denied by the PPA.

WG&A commenced an Injunction suit claiming that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely terminated the
lease contract. It likewise prayed for the issuance of a TRO to arrest the evacuation. It also sought recovery of
damages for breach of contract and attorney’s fees.

On December 11, 2001, WG&A amended its complaint for the first time, incorporating statements to the effect that
PPA is already estopped from denying that the correct period of lease is “until such time that the North Harbor
Modernization Project has been bidded out to and operations turned over to the winning bidder. It likewise included,
as its third cause of action, the additional relief in its prayer, that should the petitioner be forced to vacate the said
facility, it should be deemed as entitled to be refunded of the value of the improvements it introduced in the leased
property. The TRO was denied. Its MR was also denied.

Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second Amended Complaint. This time, however,
the complaint was already captioned as one for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or for Reformation of Contract. Also, it included as its fourth cause of
action and additional relief in its prayer, the reformation of the contract as it failed to express or embody the true
intent of the contracting parties.

PPA: The reformation sought for by the petitioner constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will
substantially alter the latter’s cause of action and theory of the case.

RTC: Denied admission of the Second amended complaint

CA: Reversed RTC; ordered the admission of the same

ISSUE: WON the seconded amended complaint should be admitted

HELD:
YES. The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered” was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or
defense.” This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action
or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent
delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.”
 E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD. vs. BENITO
G.R. No. 136426. August 6, 1999

FACTS:
E.B. Villarosa (EB) executed with Imperial Development Corporation (IDC) a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land belonging to the latter into a housing
subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding
any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.

IDC filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against EB before the RTC Makati. Summons were
served upon EB through its Branch Manager, Engr. Sabulbero at Kolambog, Lapasan, CDO, but the Sheriff’s Return
stated that the summons was served at EB’s new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, CDO.

EB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.

EB: The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its
employee in its branch office at CDO who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.

RTC: Denied the MTD; there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons
EB(MR): Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons
on persons enumerated therein; the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word “manager– was changed
to “general manager,– “secretary– to “corporate secretary,– and excluding therefrom agent and director.

ISSUE: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of EB by service of summons upon its branch
manager

HELD:
NO. Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager; a corporation’s assistant
manager; ordinary clerk of a corporation; private secretary of corporate executives; retained counsel; officials who
had charge or control of the operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager; or the corporation’s
Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. In these cases, these persons were considered as “agent– within the
contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation
is no longer authorized.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or
partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
rule now states “general manager– instead of only “manager–; “corporate secretary– instead of “secretary–; and
“treasurer– instead of “cashier.– The phrase “agent, or any of its directors– is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The
officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient.

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action
against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such
person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, ‘to bring home to the corporation
notice of the filing of the action.

Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at
Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper.
Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
 GALURA vs. MATH-AGRO CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167230. August 14, 2009

FACTS:
Spouses Dante and Ma. Teresa Galura purchased broiler starters and finishers from Math-Agro Corporation (MAC).
Despite several demands, the spouses failed to pay the unpaid balance.

MAC filed a complaint against the spouses, wherein it stated the spouses’ addresses in Tarlac or Sta. Mesa Heights,
where they may be served with summonses and other processes of the Court. The Clerk of Court issued the
corresponding summons on August 15, 2000, requiring the spouses to file their answer within 15 days, otherwise
judgment by default would be taken against them.

On September 17, 2000, Court Process Server Sildo went to Sta. Mesa Heights. There, he saw Dante’s father,
Dominador, who told Sildo that the spouses were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision. On September 22,
2000, Sildo went to Tarlac, where he learned that the property had already been foreclosed. On September 26, 2000,
he went to Tierra Pura wherein he served the summons on Victoria Lapuz, Ma. Teresa’s sister. The Spouses Galura
still failed to file their answer. The RTC ordered the spouses to pay the unpaid balance to MAC.

In its Order dated November 10, 2004, the RTC issued a writ of execution to implement the June 27, 2001 Decision.
On December 13, 2004, the spouses received from their parents-in-law a copy of the decision. They subsequently
filed with the CA a petition of annulment of judgment.

SPOUSES GALURA: The RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because the substituted service of
summons was invalid; leaving the summons with Lapuz was premature
CA: Dismissed the petition; there was a valid substituted service of summons

ISSUE: WON there was a valid substituted service of summons

HELD:
NONE. Whenever practicable, the summons must be served on the defendant in person. Substituted service may be
resorted to only when service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible. Impossibility of prompt service
should appear in the return of service—the efforts exerted to find the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed
must be stated in the return of service.

The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown
by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement
should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It has been held that this method of service is “in derogation of the common law; it is a method
extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute.” Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered
ineffective.

In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of personal service within
a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served, was of suitable age and discretion;
and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the Spouses Galura. Consequently, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Galura, and thus the Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTC’s 27
June 2001 Decision and 10 November 2004 Order.
 CITIZENS’ SURETY & INSURANCE CO. vs. MELENCIO-HERRERA
G.R. No. No. L-32170. March 31, 1971

FACTS:
Citizens’ Surety & Insurance Co. (CSIC), at the request of Santiago Dacanay, issued surety bonds in favor of
Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturers Bank to guarantee payment of P/Ns. In consideration of the bonds, Santiago
and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements and mortgaged a parcel of land as securities.

The P/Ns were not paid, so CSIC was compelled to pay Fajardo and the bank. The Dacanays failed to reimburse
CSIC. Thus, the latter caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. At CSIC’s request, Judge Melencio-
Herrera caused summons to be made by publication in the newspaper Philippine Herald. But despite the publication
and deposit of a prepaid copy of the complaint at the Manila post office, the spouses did not appear within the period
of 60 days from last publication, as required by the summons. CSIC asked that the spouses be declared in default.

RTC: Asked CSIC to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the suit being in personam and the
defendants not having appeared; subsequently dismissed the case

ISSUES: 1) WON the court can acquire jurisdiction over a non-appearing defendant in an in personam suit; and
2) WON the dismissal of the case is proper

HELD:
1) NO. The action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a
non-appearing defendant, absent a personal service of summons within the forum.

It is well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal
service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication
cannot—consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights—confer upon the court jurisdiction over said
defendants.

Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly
in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state
or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance
with the constitutional requirement of due process.

The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the
resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section 1(f), in which
case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication
may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective.

2) NO. Because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at concealing their properties,
the dismissal of the case should be set aside and the case held pending in the court’s archives, until petitioner as
plaintiff succeeds in determining the whereabouts of the defendants’ person or properties and causes valid summons
to be served personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period of prescription
for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter of court record, and he can not emerge after
a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from his own misdeed and claim prescription of
his just debt.
 SANTOS, JR. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170943. September 23, 2008

FACTS:
PNOC filed a complaint for sum of money against Pedro Santos, Jr. Personal service of summons failed because he
could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. On PNOC’s motion, the RTC allowed
service of summons by publication.

PNOC caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation. It submitted the
affidavit of publication of Remate’s advertising manager and an affidavit of service of its employee, to the effect
that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to Santos’ last known address. Santos failed to answer within
the prescribed period, so PNOC’s motion to present evidence ex parte was granted on September 11, 2003. The
case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003. On October 28, 2003, Santos filed an MR to admit
the attached answer.

RTC: Denied the MR

CA: Affirmed RTC

SANTOS: The rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions
in rem, not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money

ISSUE: WON the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to
actions in rem, not actions in personam

HELD:
NO. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.—In any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.”

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts,
respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.

Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted
service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was
significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because
of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.

This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies “in any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry.” Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
 RAPID CITY vs. VILLA
G.R. No. 184197. February 11, 2010

FACTS:
Rapid City filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans against several people including spouses
Villa. After one failed attempt of personal service of summons, the court process server, Gregorio Zapanta. resorted
to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents’ househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof
and refused to divulge their names.

Despite substituted service, spouses Villa still failed to file their answer. Rapid City filed a motion to declare them
in default which the RTC granted on May 3, 2005. After more than 8 months, spouses Villa filed a motion to lift
order of default.

SPOUSES VILLA: They only officially received the pertinent papers on January 27, 2006 and denied the existence
of 2 househelps
RTC: Set aside the order of default

However, spouses Villa failed to file their answer again. They were declared in default again. They filed an MR
claiming that there was invalid service of summons so the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.

RTC: Denied MR
CA: Annulled RTC order; a party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court
based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court

RAPID CITY: Spouses Villa, in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court

ISSUE: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over Spouses Villa

HELD:
YES. It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance.

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we
have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction
over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the courtover the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where
a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.”

Respondents did not, in the first motion to lift order of default, allege that their filing thereof was a special
appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the court.
 PALMA vs. GALVEZ
G.R. No. 165273. March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Leah Palma filed an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center, Dr. Giron, and Dr. Cruz for their
negligence in removing her right ovary against her will. The defendants filed their answers. Subsequently, Palma
filed a motion for leave to admit amended complaint to include the nurses of PHC, including Psyche Agudo, as
additional defendants. Summons were issued to them.

On February 17, 2004, the RTC’s process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons,
together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon Psyche thru her husband Alfredo
Agudo, who received and signed the same as Psyche was out of the country. On March 1, 2004, Psyche’s counsel
filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, stating that he was just engaged
by Alfredo as she was out of the country and the Answer was already due.

PSYCHE (MTD): RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her; she was not properly served with summons because
the service should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
PALMA: A substituted service of summons on private respondent’s husband was valid and binding on her; that
service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service,
i.e., by personal or substituted service

RTC: Granted the MTD; while the summons was served at private respondent’s house and received by respondent’s
husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time
the summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not
validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that private
respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by
publication.

ISSUE: WON Section 16, Rule 14, of the Rules of Civil Procedure limits the mode of service of summons upon a
defendant residing in the Philippines, but temporarily outside the country, exclusively to extraterritorial service of
summons under section 15 of the same rule

HELD:
NO. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of
summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Private respondent
was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus,
service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons
allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily
out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes
of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal
service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam
against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that
will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant.

A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local
base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one
temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his
place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time
any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at
his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot
just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being
filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or
regular place of business.

Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly
served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is,
thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and
discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.

Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such
a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore,
assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.
 CHU vs. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184333. April 1, 2013

FACTS:
Sixto Chu purchased equipment from Mach Asia Trading Corporation (MATC). He paid through postdated checks,
which were subsequently dishonored. Because of his failure to pay, MATC instituted a complaint for sum of money
and replevin against him. The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of replevin on the heavy equipment.

Sheriff Doroteo Cortes went to Chu’s given address to serve the summons, complaint and writ of replevin, but he
failed to serve the summons personally because Chu was not there. He resorted to substituted service by having the
summons and complaint received by Rolando Bonayon, Chu’s security guard.

Chu failed to file any responsive pleading so MATC moved to declare him in default. The RTC declared Chu in
default and allowed MATC to present evidence ex parte.

RTC: Ruled in favor of MATC

CHU: Substituted service of summons was invalid
CA: Affirmed RTC; Chu received the summons through his security guard

ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons

HELD:
NONE. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received
the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring
that the latter would actually receive the summons.

Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the
defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered
ineffective.

It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of
service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance
with the requirements of substituted service.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not
been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them
is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered
by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void.
 REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION vs. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY AND
MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204796. February 4, 2015

FACTS:
Reicon leased its building to Diamond from 1991-2011. In turn, Diamond sublet portions of the property to Jollibee
and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises (Maybunga), represented by Andrew Palangdao. Starting 2006, Diamond failed to
pay its monthly rentals. Reicon demanded payment from Diamond. It also entered into separate contracts with
Jollibee and Maybunga.

Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract against Reicon, Jollibee and Maybunga, and Mary Palangdao,
claiming that there was no provision on unilateral termination of the contract.

REICON (MTD): RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person because the summons was served upon a
houseboy/gardener, at a place which is not its principal office
DIAMOND: Improper service is not a ground to dismiss a complaint

RTC: Denied the MTD; improper service of summons is not among the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1 of Rule 16

CA: Asked Reicon to show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Diamond

REICON: From the institution thereof up to the filing of Reicon’s petition before the CA, Diamond has not
submitted any paper or pleading notifying the RTC of any change in its address. As such, the service of its petition
to Diamond’s address should be deemed effective.
DIAMOND: Alleging that it received a copy of Reicon’s Compliance, through its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, filed
a manifestation, under a special appearance, averring that Reicon’s petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright
for its failure to serve a copy thereof on its counsel of record (i.e., Atty. Marqueda)

ISSUE: WON jurisdiction over the person Diamond was acquired by the CA

HELD:
YES. The Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint before
the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence,
Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light
of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above cited, which merely entails service of the
petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.

Jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by
virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would
show, had consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before this Court.

Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition requiring Diamond to comment, was
returned with the notation “RTS-Moved Out,” the alternative mode of Diamond’s voluntary appearance was enough
for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over its person. Diamond cannot escape this conclusion by invoking the
convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere “special appearance,” considering that it affirmatively
sought therein the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position
that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates
submission to the Court’s jurisdiction. Here, Diamond’s special appearance cannot be treated as a specific objection
to the CA’s jurisdiction over its person for the reason that the argument it pressed on was about the alleged error in
the service of Reicon’s certiorari petition, and not the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on
the said pleading. Properly speaking, this argument does not have anything to do with the CA’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over Diamond for it is the service of the appellate court’s resolution indicating its initial action, and not
of the certiorari petition itself, which is material to this analysis.
Note that the conclusion would be different if Diamond had actually objected to the CA’s service of its resolution
indicating its initial action; if such were the case, then its special appearance could then be treated as a proper
conditional appearance challenging the CA’s jurisdiction over its person. To parallel, in ordinary civil cases, a
conditional appearance to object to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when
said party specifically objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the
complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the service of the
complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an objection to the court’s jurisdiction
over his person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial
court’s service of summons — same as the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari
petition — which remains material to the matter of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the
defendant’s/respondents’ person.

Thus, by asking for an affirmative relief, i.e., the dismissal of Reicon’s certiorari petition, bereft of the proper
jurisdictional objection, the Court therefore concludes that Diamond had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court.
 MANOTOC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006

FACTS:
Imee Marcos-Manotoc is the defendant in a civil case filed by Agapita Trajano. Trajano seeks the enforcement of
a US court’s judgment in a case for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military
intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance,
sufferance and/or influence of Manotoc.

The trial court issued a summons addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium Corporation. The summons
and a copy of the complaint were allegedly served upon Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of Manotoc. When
she failed to file an answer, she was declared in default. Manotoc filed a MTD on the the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.

MANOTOC: 1) The address indicated was not her dwelling, residence nor her regular place of business; 2) De la
Cruz who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; 3) She was a
resident of Singapore;
TRAJANO: Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioner’s residence was at the Alexandra Apartment

RTC: Rejected the MTD; the sheriff’s substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty
CA: Adopted the findings of RTC

ISSUE: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over Manotoc through the substituted service of summons

HELD:
NO. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served
with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service
of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.” Hence,
it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.
Indeed, “compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.”

We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there
is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable
time” to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time”
is defined as “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to
do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility
of loss, if any, to the other party.” Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the
return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the
service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to
demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time” means 15
to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to
submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk
of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant. Sheriffs are asked
to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and
speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts
to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process
on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff
to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to
prove impossibility of prompt service. “Several attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility
of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail
in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to
serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s
Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that “impossibility of prompt
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,”
which should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of
“suitable age and discretion then residing therein.” A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained
the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons. “Discretion” is defined as “the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed.” Thus, to be of sufficient
discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons,
and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for
the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the “relation of confidence” to the defendant,
ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be served on
a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be
the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.

A meticulous scrutiny of the Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the
Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts
proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable. Besides,
apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that respondent Trajano or
Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner.

Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the
requirement that the summons must be left with a “person of suitable age and discretion” residing in defendant’s
house or residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable
age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements were not
met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la
Cruz, aside from the sheriff’s general assertion that de la Cruz is the “resident caretaker” of petitioner.
 FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147406. July 14, 2008

FACTS:
An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against Figueroa. The RTC convicted him
as charged. On appeal to the CA, he questioned for the first time the trial court’s jurisdiction.

CA: Considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction
of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.

FIGUEROA: Lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first
time on appeal

ISSUE: WON the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by
him but by the public prosecutor, amounts to estoppel

HELD:
NO. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13jurisdiction to hear and try the same is
conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be
barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no
longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by
laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous
to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must
have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it.

The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant
from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a
court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction
must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer
any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not
sustain the defense of “estoppel by laches” unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought
to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot
be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention
of equities, and other causes.
 SOLIVEN vs. FASTFORMS PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 139031. October 18, 2004

FACTS:
Marie Antoinette Soliven loaned P170,000 to Fastforms Philippines, Inc. Dr Escobar, as president of Fastforms,
issued a postdated check. Eventually, when the obligation became due, Fastforms refused to pay its principal
obligation and interests due. Thus, Soliven instituted a suit for sum of money.

FASTFORMS: It did not authorize Dr. Escobar to secure any loan

RTC: In favor of Soliven

FASTFORMS (MR): Questioned for the first time the RTC’s jurisdiction; complaint should have been filed with
the MTC because the demand did not exceed P200,000
RTC: The totality of the claim exceeds P200,000; and under the principle of estoppel, Fastforms has lost its right
to question its jurisdiction.

CA: Reversed RTC; MTC has jurisdiction, petitioner’s claim being only P195,155

ISSUES: 1) WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case;

2) WON Fastforms is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court

HELD:
1) NONE. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim
for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered
in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages
being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included
in determining the jurisdictional amount. It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that
it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the instant case.

2) YES. While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel has not
supervened.” In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial
court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging
the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered.

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable
practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
 HSBC vs. ALDECOA & CO.
G.R. No. 8437. March 23, 1915

FACTS:
Aldecoa & Co. obtained from HSBC a credit in account current up to the sum of P450,000. Later it was agreed that
the defendants, Isabel Palet and her two sons, Joaquin and Zoilo, should mortgage, in addition to certain securities
of Aldecoa & Co., some of their real properties as additional security for the obligations of Aldecoa & Co. So, on
March 23, 1906, the mortgage, was executed wherein certain corrections in the description of some of the real
property mortgaged to the bank were made and the amount for which each of the mortgaged properties should be
liable was set forth. These two mortgages, were duly recorded in the registry of property of the city of Manila.

In October, 1908, Joaquin and Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa instituted an action against the plaintiff bank for the purpose
of obtaining a judgment annulling the mortgages created by them upon their interest in the properties, upon the
ground that the emancipation by their mother was void and of no effect, and that, therefore, they were minors
incapable of creating a valid mortgage upon their real property.

On January 31, 1911, HSBC brought an action against defendants for the purpose of recovering from the principal
defendant, Aldecoa & Co., an amount due from the latter as the balance to its debit in an account current with the
plaintiff, and to enforce the subsidiary liability of the other defendants for the payment of this indebtedness, as
partners of Aldecoa & Co., and to foreclose certain mortgages executed by the defendants to secure the indebtedness
sued upon.

ISSUE: WON there is identity between the two actions which will justify the dismissal of one of them on the ground
of litis pendentia

HELD:
NONE. The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed
unnecessary and vexatious. When the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat another, the case must be the same.
There must be the same parties, or at least such as represent the same interest, there must be the same rights asserted,
and the same relief prayed for. This relief must be founded on the same facts, and the title or essential basis of the
relief sought must be the same. The identity in these particulars should be such that if the pending case had already
been disposed of, it could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties.

It will be noted that the cases must be identical in a number of ways. It will be conceded that in so far as the plea is
concerned, the parties are the same in the case at bar as they were in the action to have the mortgages annulled.
Their position is simply reversed, the defendants there being the plaintiffs here, and vice versa. This fact does not
affect the application of the rule. The inquiry must therefore proceed to the other requisites demanded by the rule.
Are the same rights asserted? Is the same relief prayed for?

The test of identity in these respects is: A plea of the pendency of a prior action is not available unless the prior
action is of -such a character that, had a judgment been rendered therein on the merits, such a judgment would be
conclusive between the parties and could be pleaded in bar of the second action.

The former suit is one to annul the mortgages. The present suit is one for the foreclosure of the mortgages. It may
be conceded that if the final judgment in the former action is that the mortgages be annulled, such an adjudication
will deny the right of the bank to foreclose the mortgages. But will a decree holding them valid prevent the bank
from foreclosing them? Most certainly not. In such an event, the judgment would not be a bar to the prosecution of
the present action. The rule is not predicated upon such a contingency. It is applicable, between the same parties,
only when the judgment to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such that, regardless of which party is
successful, it will amount to res adjudicata against the second action.

The pending action to annul the liability of the two appellant children on the mortgages cannot operate as a plea in
abatement in the case in hand which seeks to foreclose these mortgages. The subject matter and the relief asked for
are entirely different. The facts do not conform to the rule and it is therefore not applicable.
 TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
G.R. No. L-21450. April 15, 1968

FACTS:
On July 19, 1948—barely one month after the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948—the spouses Tijam
commenced a case before the CFI against the spouses Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of money. A writ
of attachment was issued against the Sibonghanoy’s properties, but it was dissolved upon the filing of a counterbond
by them and Manila Surety.

After being served with summons, the Sibonghanoys filed their answer with counterclaim. The CFI ruled in favor
of the Tijams. A writ of execution was issued. However, it was unsatisfied to the Tijams moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. The Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing. The motion was denied.

SURETY (BEFORE THE CA): Appellees’ action was filed in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery
of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date, the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective,
Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.

ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction

HELD:
NO. It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against
the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only—an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had
taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case—which shall forthwith be set forth—We are of the
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the
first time.

Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written
opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief—that it be relieved of its
liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition—lack of jurisdiction of
the court a quo not being one of them.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
 SANTOS vs. SANTOS-GRAN
G.R. No. 197380. October 8, 2014

FACTS:
Eliza Zuñiga-Santos through her authorized representative, Nympha Sales, filed a complaint for annulment of sale
and revocation of title against Maria Divina Gracia Santos-Gran (the child of her second husband, Lamberto) and
the Register of Deeds of Marikina before the RTC.

SANTOS (AMENDED COMPLAINT): Pursuant to void and voidable documents, Lamberto succeeded in
transferring the subject properties in favor of and in the name of Gran; the Deed of Sale could not be located despite
diligent efforts
GRAN: Filed a MTD; the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents
sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth

RTC: Granted the MTD; the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action, considering that the deed of sale
sought to be nullified — an “essential and indispensable part of petitioner’s cause of action” — was not attached.
CA: Sustained the dismissal of the complaint but on the ground of insufficiency of factual basis; disagreed with the
finding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action

SANTOS (MR): Attached the Deed of Sale

CA: Denied the MR; admission of the contested Deed of Sale at this late stage would be contrary to Gran’s right to
due process.

ISSUE: WON the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action

HELD:
YES. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of
a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an
act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If
the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but, importantly, the statement
thereof should be “sufficient.” This is why the elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or
not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.

A judicious examination of petitioner’s Amended Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently state a cause
of action. Contrary to the findings of the CA, the allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which would
warrant an action for nullification of the sale and recovery of the properties in controversy, hence, rendering the
same dismissible. The claim that the sale was effected through “voidable and void documents” partakes merely of
a conclusion of law that is not supported by any averment of circumstances that will show why or how such
conclusion was arrived at. In fact, what these “voidable and void documents” were not properly stated and/or
identified.

Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion, the Amended Complaint presented no sufficient allegation upon which
the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. Thus, said pleading should be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state cause of action.
 SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC. vs. MAGSALIN
G.R. No. 170026. June 20, 2012

FACTS:
Shimizu claims that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business as “Karen’s Trading,” breached their subcontract
agreement for the delivery of parquet tiles for Shimizu’s condominium project. The agreement was thus terminated.
Magsalin also refused to return Shimizu’s unliquidated advanced payment and to account for other monetary
liabilities. Shimizu sent a notice to FGU Insurance, demanding for damages. Shimizu then instituted a complaint
against FGU and Magsalin. FGU was served with summons but Magsalin was not because she could not be found.

FGU filed a MTD. It was denied so FGU was obliged to file an answer. Thereafter, Shimizu filed a motion for leave
to serve summons on Magsalin by way of publication, which was denied. The order of dismissal stated, “For failure
of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.” Shimizu appealed.

FGU: Moved for dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; appeal raised a pure question of law
SHIMIZU: It raised questions of fact; facts to support its alleged failure to prosecute

CA: Dismissed the appeal

ISSUE: WON the order of dismissal is valid

HELD:
NO. The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be
dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as
such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly
state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.” As a prejudicial dismissal, the
December 16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint
in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint
is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication
on the merits.

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders.

The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner
failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular
facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial
date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length
of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal
order does not say.

A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court
can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.

We thus agree with the petitioner that the dismissal constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due process
demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation
of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. Where the reasons are absent, a decision has
absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.
 SOLIMAN vs. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 176652. June 4, 2014

FACTS:
SMC Pneumatics filed a Motion for Appointment of Management Committee. It was consolidated with cases for
involuntary dissolution of SMC. RTC appointed Juanito Fernandez as receiver, pending the hearing on the
composition of the management committee.

Fernandez found out that 2 of SMC’s vehicles were still in the possession of Augusto Soliman, who failed to return
said vehicles. Thus, Fernandez filed a complaint for recovery of personal properties with writ of replevin. The RTC
issued a writ of replevin and a writ of seizure. Soliman filed a motion to admit his answer, which was granted.

SOLIMAN: The receiver is not entitled to the possession of the vehicles; he is entitled to it as president of SMC

RTC: Dismissed the case for failure to prosecute because of counsel’s failure to take any step for the further
prosecution of the case
MR: Denied

FERNANDEZ: It is the duty of the Branch Clerk of Court to set a case for pre-trial

CA: Reversed RTC; Clerk of Court should issue the notice of trial

ISSUE: WON the failure of plaintiff to move that the case be set for pre-trial constitutes failure to prosecute which
would warrant the dismissal of the case

HELD:
NO. It has long been established and settled that the question of whether a case should be dismissed for failure to
prosecute is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, a court can dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute. The true test for the exercise of such
power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for want of due diligence in failing
to proceed with reasonable promptitude. As to what constitutes “unreasonable length of time,” this Court has ruled
that it depends on the circumstances of each particular case and that “the sound discretion of the court” in the
determination of the said question will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse.

The power of the trial court to dismiss an action for non-prosequitur is not without its limits. If a pattern or scheme
to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part
of the plaintiff is not present, as in this case, courts should not wield their authority to dismiss. Indeed, while the
dismissal rests on the prerogative of the trial court, it must soundly be exercised and not be abused, as there must
be sufficient reason to justify its extinctive effect on the plaintiff’s cause of action. Deferment of proceedings may
be tolerated so that the court, aimed at a just and inexpensive determination of the action, may adjudge cases only
after a full and free presentation of all the evidence by both parties. In this regard, courts are reminded to exert
earnest efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits, and adjudicate the case in accord with the relief
sought by the parties so that appeals may be discouraged; otherwise, in hastening the proceedings, they further delay
the final settlement of the case.

The resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC provides that: “Within five (5) days from date of filing of the
reply, the plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said
motion within the given period, the Branch Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pre-trial.” Dismissal of the case
for failure to prosecute is not the result stated in the rule. The trial court is required to proceed to pre-trial through
the notice of pre-trial and setting the case for pre-trial by the Branch Clerk of Court.
 ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. SANNAEDLE CO., LTD.
G.R. No. 181676. June 11, 2014

FACTS:
Asian Construction (AC) and Sannaedle Co., Ltd. (SCL) entered into a MOA wherein respondent was engaged to
supply and erect insulated panel systems at various pavilions at the Philippine Centennial Exposition Theme Park.
AC made various payments but nevertheless failed to pay the balance despite several demands. Thus, SCL was
constrained to file a complaint for sum of money against AC for the amount of US$615,620.33. AC filed an answer
with counterclaim.

SCL moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Answer admitted all material allegations of the
Complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an issue.

SCL: AC’s Answer, in effect, admitted the existence of the MOA and its failure to pay the balance despite repeated
demands

RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of SCL; The Court notes that in the Answer with Counterclaim of the petitioner,
the execution of the MOA was admitted (paragraph 13, Answer). Further, it did not deny specifically the claim of
the respondent of being entitled to collect the said amount of US$615,620.33
CA: Affirmed RTC

AC: Judgment on the pleadings is not proper, because it raised special and affirmative defenses in its Answer
SCL: Petitioner’s Answer admitted the material allegations of its complaint regarding the cause of action, which is
collection of sum of money

ISSUE: WON judgment on the pleadings was proper

HELD:
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the
requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10 Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.

Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner acknowledged having entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with
respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of US$615,620.33.

We note that respondent’s complaint for a sum of money is based mainly on the alleged failure of petitioner to pay
the balance of US$615,620.33 under the Memorandum of Agreement. Quoting petitioner’s Answer, it is obvious
that it admitted the foregoing material allegations.

While petitioner allegedly raised affirmative defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of nonforum shopping, no
legal capacity to sue and fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar respondent from seeking the collection of the
unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative defenses, petitioner’s denial neither made a specific denial that a
Memorandum of Agreement was perfected nor did it contest the genuineness and due execution of said agreement.

The defenses raised by petitioner cannot prevent the respondent from seeking the collection of the amount of
US$615,620.33. The express terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, the genuineness and due execution of which
are not denied by the petitioner. It cannot assert the said defenses in order to resist the respondent’s claim for the
aforesaid sum of money, especially where it has been sufficiently shown by the allegations of the Complaint and
the Answer that the petitioner is clearly liable for the payment thereof.
 NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141524. September 14, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land against the Bureau of Forest Development
(BFD), Bureau of Lands (BL), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. In the
course of the proceedings, the parties filed various motions, such as a motion to declare the defendants (except LBP)
in default and motions to dismiss filed by the heirs as well as LBP.

RTC: Granted the motion to declare BL and BFD for their failure to answer; denied it as to the heirs because
substituted service of summons upon them was improper;
Denied LBP’s MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action and the heirs’ MTD on the ground of prescription
because there were factual matters that could only be determined after trial
MR: Dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription

March 3, 1998 – petitioners received a copy of the order of dismissal

March 18, 1998 – filed MR
July 1, 1998 – RTC denied the MR
July 22, 1998 – Petitioners received a copy of the order dismissing the MR
July 27, 1998 – Petitioners filed a notice of appeal

CA: Denied the appeal on the ground that it was filed 8 days late

PETITIONERS: Argued that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be
construed as the “final order,” not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. The 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final
order of the trial court denying their MR. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only 5 days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

CA (CERTIORARI): The 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. The order was the “final order” appealable under
the Rules

ISSUE: WON the appeal was seasonably filed

HELD:
YES. The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it.
It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of
the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of
appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the RTC, the MR only interrupted the
running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only 1 day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of
their MR.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is
not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to
the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
 DINGLASAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 145420. September 19, 2006

FACTS:
Elmyra Trading Corporation represented by its President, Rafael Dinglasan, and Antrom, Inc., represented by its
President, Antonio Garcia, entered into a MOA. They agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation in
favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. To guarantee the obligation, Elmyra will issue checks. The check
issued for initial payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. An information charging Dinglasan with
violation of BP 22 was filed.

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt

MR: Denied
CA: Affirmed RTC
SC: Denied the petition for review on certiorari
MR: Denied
2ND MR: Merely noted without any action

When the resolution denying the petition for review became final and executory, the prosecution moved for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and writ of execution to satisfy judgment. They also prayed for an HDO.

RTC: Granted the motions

MNT
RAFAEL DINGLASAN: He has newly-discovered evidence – the affidavits of Elena Dinglasan (EVP and
Treasurer of Elmyra) and of Encarnacion Dinglasan (sister-in-law of Rafael, whose husband, Mariano was the
Cashier and Liaison Officer of Elmyra), as well as a transmittal letter, which tend to prove that he made good the
check within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor
ELENA: She was not aware that the said letter has any significance on Dinglasan’s liability and she was diagnosed
with cancer; thus, the belated offer of evidence
ENCARNACION: Her husband used to take home some of Elmyra’s documents. It was only when a minor
renovation was made in their house after her husband passed away that she was able to chance upon the said
documents again
ANTROM: The MNT should be filed at any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and
before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final. The judgment of this Court dated
28 June 1999 became final and executory on 14 October 1999. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed
only on 30 October 2000 or a year after the finality of the decision. The filing of the instant action, therefore, has
already prescribed. Moreover, documents are not newly-discovered evidence.

ISSUES: 1) WON the petition was filed on time; and

2) WON a new trial or reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence should be allowed

HELD:
1) NO. A Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused
becomes final.

To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second
motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or
resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments
shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the
running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only
illogical but also unjust to the winning party.

Very clearly, the filing of the instant Petition for New Trial and/or Reopening of the Case on 30 October 2000 was
made way beyond the prescriptive period for doing so. The claim of Dinglasan that he honestly believed that this
Court will appreciate his defense of payment as reiterated in his Second Motion for Reconsideration which was
why he deemed it premature to file the instant petition before receiving the Court’s ruling on the said motion, could
not be given credence.

2) NO. The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence
discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 14138, it appears that the appellate court already considered that transmittal letter dated 8
October 1985 in rendering its Decision dated 26 October 1998.

The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was already offered as evidence in CA-G.R.
CR No. 14138 and was even annexed to the Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as Annex “B.”
Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly discovered.
 SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. vs. BAYANG
G.R. No. 194702. April 20, 2015

FACTS:
SLR Builders, as seller, and Ma. Cristina Bayang, as buyer, entered into a contract to sell a lot in a subdivision.
Upon full payment, Bayang demanded the execution of a deed of absolute sale and the lot’s certificate of title but
SLR failed to deliver. Thus, she filed a case for specific performance and damages against SLR Builders and its
President, Oscar Violago before the HLURB.

HLURB ARBITER: In favor of Bayang; ordered the execution of the deed and delivery of title
HLURB BOARD: Affirmed the Arbiter
OP: Dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time; the HLURB Decision affirming the Arbiter’s decision
was received by the respondents/appellants (referring to the petitioners) on July 27, 2005. On that date, the 15-day
prescriptive period within which to file an appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal, respondents-
appellants opted to file an MR on August 10, 2005. Their filing of the said motion interrupted the period of appeal
by that time, however, 14 days had already elapsed. On April 17, 2006, respondents-appellants received the
Resolution denying their MR. Following the above rules, respondents-appellants have only 1 day left, or until April
18, 2006, within which to file their notice of appeal to this Office. Unfortunately, they were able to do so only on
April 27, 2006, or 9 days late.

PETITIONERS: Neypes ruling should be applied to the case

OP: Fresh period rule only applies to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals
CA: Denied petition for review

ISSUE: WON the Neypes ruling applies to administrative appeals

HELD:
NO. It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals.

As reflected in the decision in Neypes, the “fresh period rule” shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is
not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the “fresh period rule” in Neypes does not apply. As aptly pointed
out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners
to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, Series of 2004, in relation to paragraph 2, Section
1 of Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987, provides that in case the
aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has
the only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the
decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.
 DE LEON vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 181970. August 3, 2010

FACTS:
Bernardo De Leon filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Public Estates Authority
(PEA) due to the latter’s alleged unlawful destruction of De Leon’s fence and houses in Lot 5155, which has been
in his family’s possession for more than 50 years.

RTC: Granted the WPI

PEA: RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
CA: No grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC
SC: Lot 5155 was a public land so that De Leon’s occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer
ownership or possessory rights

The decision became final and executory. PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon
and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of Lot 5155. Such
writ was issued.

DE LEON: The Order for the issuance of the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive portion of
the SC Decision as it did not categorically direct him to surrender possession of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA
RTC: Denied MR and MTQ
2nd MR: Denied
CA (R65): Denied

Meanwhile, De Leon filed a second Rule 65 petition with the CA. PEA filed a very urgent motion for the issuance
of a Writ of Demolition to direct De Leon to remove all improvements on the property and in case of failure to do
so, that a Special Order and Writ of Demolition be issued directing the sheriff to remove and demolish the
improvements.

ISSUE: WON PEA is entitled to possess the property

HELD:
YES. As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed;
an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is
that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may
not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed.

However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel
of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the
decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown
any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. This is precisely what
happened in the present case. This Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that
De Leon does not have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party
in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party,
the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision;
nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have
the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period
of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision,
subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the improvements.
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to
court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s
claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of this
Court’s decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential
consequence of this Court’s ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same time
dismissing De Leon’s claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust
de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
 NOCEDA vs. ARBIZO-DIRECTO
G.R. No. 178495. July 26, 2010

FACTS:
Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed a complaint against her nephew Rodolfo Noceda for recovery of possession and
ownership and rescission/annulment of donation. According to Aurora, she donated to Rodolfo a portion of her
hereditary share in a land (Lot 1121) she inherited from her father. However, Rodolfo occupied a bigger area. The
judgment was rendered in favor of Aurora. This decision was appealed.

RTC: In favor of Aurora; ordered Rodolfo to vacate and remove improvements on the land
CA: Ordered Rodolfo to vacate the portion allotted to Aurora

Subsequently, spouses Dahipon filed a complaint against Aurora, Rodolfo and other defendants. They alleged that
they were the owners of Lot 1121-A and the defendants purchased portions of the land from them without paying
the purchase price.

NOCEDA (Quieting of Title): Admitted that there was a case decided in favor of respondent and a writ of
execution had been issued, ordering them to vacate the property. However, petitioners claimed that the land, which
was the subject matter of another case, was the same parcel of land owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they
purchased a portion. They prayed for the issuance of a WPI to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution

AURORA: Filed a MTD on the ground of res judicata

RTC: Denied the MTD; but granted the subsequent demurrer to evidence
CA: Affirmed RTC

PETITIONERS: Res judicata does not apply, considering that the essential requisites as to the identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action are not present

ISSUE: WON res judicata is applicable

HELD:
YES. The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
“Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact,
or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles
governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. The first general rule above stated,
and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred
to as “bar by former judgment”; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same
section and rule, is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.”
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in
former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been
made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually
or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as
the judgment itself.”

The foregoing disquisition finds application in the case at bar. Undeniably, the present case is closely related to the
previous case where petitioners raised the issue of ownership and possession of Lot No. 1121 and the annulment of
the donation of said lot to them. The RTC found for respondent, declaring the deed of donation she executed in
favor of petitioners revoked; and ordered petitioners to vacate and reconvey the donated portion to respondent. The
decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA, and became final with the denial of the petition for review by this
Court in G.R. No. 119730. In that case, the Court noted the established fact “that petitioner Noceda occupied not
only the portion donated to him by respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo, but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C
which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus, petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against
the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.” Clearly, therefore,
petitioners have no right of ownership or possession over the land in question.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the
parties. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when
an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Thus, petitioners can no longer question respondent’s
ownership over Lot No. 1121 in the instant suit for quieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars
the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or
cause of action.
 INFANTE vs. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 156596. August 24, 2007

FACTS:
Aran Builders (AB) filed an action for revival of judgment against Adelaida Infante before RTC Branch 276 in
Muntinlupa. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by RTC Branch 60 in Makati. It declared the plaintiff
as the owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City.

Infante filed a MTD on the ground that the Muntinlupa RTC had no jurisdiction over the the parties and that venue
was improperly laid.

RTC: Denied the MTD; the Decision was rendered by the Makati RTC at the time that there was still no RTC in
Muntinlupa City, then under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that cases from this City were tried
and heard at Makati City. With the creation of the RTCs of Muntinlupa City, matters involving properties located
in this City, and cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be litigated before these Courts.
MR: Denied

INFANTE: Complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action and,
therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; the venue of the action for revival of
judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the
election of private respondent.
AB: The subject action for revival judgment is “quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or adjudged
right on a real property”; and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is situated.

CA: In favor of AB; since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which
should be filed with the RTC of the place where the real property is located.

ISSUE: WON an action for revival of judgment is strictly an action personam

HELD:
NO. Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from
entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may
be enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real
action or a personal action. Applying the rules on venue, if the action for revival of judgment affects title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place
where the real property is located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal
action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.

The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent’s right to have the title over the disputed
property conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot
in question; and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment.
The sole reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent’s adjudged rights over a
piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent’s interest
over real property.

The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
 FLORES vs. LINDO, JR.
G.R. No. 183984. April 13, 2011

FACTS:
Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 with 3% compounded monthly interest and
3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of REM covering a property of
Edna and her husband, Enrico. Edna issued 3 checks for the loan but all were dishonored for lack of funds. Thus,
Flores filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage with damages against Spouses Lindo.

FORECLOSURE
RTC: Flores is not entitled to the foreclosure of the mortgage because the Deed was executed w/o the consent of
Enrico; he could just file a personal action against Edna to recover the loan but it has no jurisdiction over the
personal action which should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides
MR: Denied

Flores then filed a case for sum of money against Spouses Lindo. They alleged that Enrico was not a party to the
loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the
grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. They
also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.

RTC: Denied the MTD; res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of
the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former action
MR: Denied; RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover
the loan petitioner extended to Edna.
CA: Set aside the RTC decision; there was a splitting of a single cause of action

ISSUES: 1) WON there was a multiplicity of suits

2) WON Flores is precluded from recovering the amount of the loan

HELD:
1) YES. The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to
recover the debt. The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of
money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. An election of the first bars recourse to the
second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another
depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.

In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit
of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that
would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and
obnoxious to law and equity, but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his
residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.”

2) NO. The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists notwithstanding the
illegality of the mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not
thereby rendered null and void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation
pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a
special remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the
mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor
may be enforced in an ordinary action.
 FGU INSURANCE vs. RTC
G.R. No. 161282. February 23, 2011

FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking (GPS) agreed to transport 30 units of Condura refrigerators in one of its Isuzu trucks
driven by Lambert Eroles from its plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., (CII) in Alabang, to Central Luzon
Appliances in Dagupan. On its way to Dagupan, the truck collided with another truck, which resulted in the damage
of the appliances.

FGU, as insurer, paid CII, the insured, the value of the covered goods. As subrogee, FGU sought reimbursement
from GPS. However, GPS failed to pay FGU. Thus, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of
carriage against GPS and its driver. GPS filed a demurrer to evidence.

RTC: Granted the demurrer; FGU failed to adduce evidence that GPS was a common carrier and that its driver was
negligent
CA: Modified RTC decision; GPS is not a common carrier but it is still liable for breach of contract
MR: Denied

The MR was denied with finality on September 18, 2002. The decision became final and executory on October 3,
2002. On October 14, 2002, FGU filed a motion for execution with the RTC. GPS filed a motion to oppose the
same.

GPS: Alleged that it discovered, upon verification from the insured, that after the insured’s claim was compensated
in full, the insured transferred the ownership of the subject appliances to FGU. In turn, FGU sold the same to third
parties thereby receiving and appropriating the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS believed that FGU
should not be allowed to “doubly recover” the losses it suffered.

GPS filed a motion to set the case for hearing on the merits. The RTC granted the same. Both parties were ordered
to present evidence in support of their positions regarding the turnover of the refrigerators.

FGU: The decision is already final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution should issue. The lower
court should not be allowed to hear the matter of turnover of the refrigerators to FGU because it was not an issue
raised in the Answer of GPS

ISSUE: WON the circumstances of the case warrant the reopening of the case which is already final and executory

HELD:
YES. Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher court has become final and executory and has
been returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the decision and
issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding
thereto a relief not originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a
writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the
mandate of the superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution; much less may it review
the same upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much
as has been demanded.

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The exception to the doctrine of
immutability of judgment has been applied in several cases in order to serve substantial justice.

In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of the
subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue of whether or not there was an
actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If there was an actual turnover, it is very
important to find out whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and profited from such sale. These
questions were brought about by the contention of GPS in its Opposition to Motion for Execution that after the
assured, CII, was fully compensated for its claim on the damaged refrigerators, it delivered the possession of the
subject refrigerators to FGU as shown in the certification of the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII.
Thereafter, the subject refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and FGU received and appropriated the
consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS claims that it verified the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators from
the CII because it wanted to repair and sell them to compensate FGU.

If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited from the sale after the delivery, there
would be an unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted from the judgment amount. “The Court
is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability
of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.”