1) MERCADO v.

LOPENA
GR. No. 230170, June 6, 2018

FACTS:
The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses
petitioner Mercado and private respondent Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing
of numerous suits by both parties against each other.

Petitioner avers that the cases filed by private respondents against them (the
subject cases) are forms of SLAPP intended to harass, intimidate, and silence
them. Petitioners claim that the subject cases are false and baseless complaints that
were filed to emotionally, psychologically, and financially drain them and ultimately to
pressure them to give up custody of petitioner Mercado's minor children. Petitioners
also argue that the filing of the subject cases falls within the definition of "abuse" and
"violence against women" under R.A. No. 9262. In this regard, petitioners claim that
public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the subject cases even though petitioner
Mercado is a "judicially declared victim of domestic violence" and in whose favor a PPO
has been issued.

Public respondents stress several procedural infirmities in the Petition, namely:

(i) that the requisites for judicial review are not present in this case; (ii) that the filing
of the Petition is premature because there are other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies available to petitioners; and (iii) that there was also a failure to observe the
hierarchy of courts.

With respect to the substantive issue, public respondents further aver that they did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the subject cases as the
same cannot be considered as SLAPPs because such rule applies specifically to
environmental cases only.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court was proper.

2) Whether the cases filed against the petitioner constitutes SLAPP.

RULING:
1) No. The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary
remedies that may be availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess,
or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
 or hostility. Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that
petitioners herein utterly failed to establish their entitlement to a corrective
writ of certiorari or prohibition.

2) No. The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence

against women and children under R.A. No. 9262.

The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). SLAPP
refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against
any person, institution or any government agency or local government unit
or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue
pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or
government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of
environmental rights.

SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules;

accordingly, it may only be exercised in the manner and within the scope
prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. Here, petitioners cannot,
under the guise of substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not
available to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making power in
their Petition, petitioners have admitted that the instant action has no basis
under any of the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court takes this
occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size
fits-all" tool that may be invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the
litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly administration of justice.
2) ZABAL v. DUTERTE
GR NO. 238467 February 12, 2019

FACTS:
President Duterte made public his plan on shutting down the Boracay during a
business forum held in Davao sometime in Feb 2018. This was followed by several
speeches and news stating that he would place Boracay under a state of calamity.
Petitioner Zabal and Jacosalem filed a petition despite the government was yet to
release a formal issuance on the matter, they prayed for the grant of TRO and/or writ
of Preliminary Prohibition Injunction and that the banning of tourist and non-resident
to travel from Boracay be declared as unconstitutional. Following the day of filling their
petition the president issued Proclamation No. 475 declaring state calamity in Boracay
ordering its closure for six months. Petitioner implore the court to declare the
proclamation unconstitutional, that the right to travel is impaired resulting to economic
loss. Respondent argued that the petition filed by the petitioner is a SLAPP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is a SLAPP.

RULING:
: No, while the case touches on the environmental issue on Boracay, the
ultimate issue is the resolution of the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 475 which
allegedly impairs the petitioners right to travel. The procedure under Rule 6 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases should not be applied.
3) SPS. IMBONG v. OCHOA
GR NO. 204819 April 18, 2014

FACTS:
This is a compilation of cases assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

RULING:
1) The scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be
it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to
the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative
and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but,
rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

2 ) The country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to
solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a
law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is
to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as
saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law
nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of
this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be
necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality,
the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the
Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of
saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and
enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with
coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional,
there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No.
4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No.
9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the
principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning
method should be maintained.

Thus, R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to some
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
4) SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICER v. LIM
GR NO. 187836 & 187916 November 25, 2014

FACTS:
On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance
No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas
from Industrial II to Commercial I. Owners and operators of the businesses affected
by the reclassification were given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop
the operation of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.

On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled
“An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone.
On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor
Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective of
the ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic devastation
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP
enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was
limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a
Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil
depots are expressly allowed.

Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their
contentions are as follows:

It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the general
welfare of the people - It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution as well as health and environment related municipal laws and
international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment
Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance
and human relations; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention
on the Rights of the Child - The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance
No. 8027.

ISSUE: WON the Rules of Procedure on Environmental cases should be availed first
before availing Rule 65.

RULING:
No. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied
in Section 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure
in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs,
and the RTCs involving the enforcement or violations of environmental and other
related laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic
Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in C.A.
No. 141; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development,
preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations
of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral
attacks that would support the other position of the petitioners – the protection of the
right to life, security and safety.

Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was specifically
intended to meet the following objectives:

SEC. 3. Objectives.—The objectives of these Rules are:

(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of
environmental rights and duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules
and regulations, and international agreements;
(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective
enforcement of remedies and redress for violation of environmental laws; and
(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments
in environmental cases.
Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these Rules.
5) WEST TOWER CONDO CORP. v. FPIC
GR NO. 194239 June 6, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White
Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, ; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System.
These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro
Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the
residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the
condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises led
to the discovery of a fuel leak.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day
affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the
City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage
system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their
respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation interposed the
present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of
West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil
society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and
public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the
magnitude of the environmental issues... involved.
The Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO).
On January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers
filed a Joint Compliance submitting the report required by the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page
“Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”
Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November
19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL.
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals.
As to the merits of the case, the CA submitted the following recommendations:
(a) That the people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and public
interest groups that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof
of juridical personality (namely: the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines;
Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc.; Women's Business Council of the
Philippines, Inc.; Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter;
Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations; and the Consolidated Mansions
Condominium Corporation) be allowed to be formally impleaded as petitioners.
(b) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the DOE
Secretary that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. The certification
should take into consideration the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection
 system to be used in monitoring the entire pipeline's mass input versus mass output.
The certification must also consider the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing
patches and sleeves. In case of failure of respondent FPIC to submit the required
certification from the DOE Secretary within sixty (60) days from notice of the
Honorable Supreme Court's approval of this recommendation, the TEPO must be
made permanent.
(c) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for
similar contingencies in the future be denied for lack of sufficient basis.
(d) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable under the TEPO.
(e) That without prejudice to the outcome of the civil and criminal cases filed against
respondents, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be not held liable
in their individual capacities.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other
petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West
Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the
respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect,
preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future
similar contingencies; and
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be
held liable under the environmental protection order.

RULING:
1. YES.
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real... parties-in-
interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who
has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected
all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to
evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the
condominium’s electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and
residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there
is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest
of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the
instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA
4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions
in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the
management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or
all of the condominium unit owners or users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence
to the filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of
such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who
signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive
environmental disaster.
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit
owners and residents of West Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant
case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and

submitted proof of juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,
Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the
Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan Chapter,
Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions
Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their
intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster.
The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation.

2.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE
Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability
The CA observed that all of the tests and measures presented by FPIC are
inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity
maintenance. Hence, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a
certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, the SC
required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in its July 30, 2013
Resolution. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the
July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE
Secretary Carlos Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities
and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a
dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination
by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its proposed activities, and
not merely through a short-form integrity audit, that the factual issue on the WOPL’s
viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s structural integrity has
not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.
Consequently, the SC cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification
adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.
3.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, the SC noted that
under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund
is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals
that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This
is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the
environment that has presumably already suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with
concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for
damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As
such, the Court is of the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is
misplaced.

4.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and
officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the
outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and
criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and
officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors
and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court
cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e)
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil
case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper
proceedings to ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents, if any,
on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the
dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the
leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC
officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now
pending against them.
6) ISAAA v. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
GR NO. 209271 Dec. 8, 2015

FACTS:
On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) was
executed between UPLBFI, ISAAA and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc.
(UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research and development project
on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner
agencies involved in the project were UPLB through its Institute of Plant
Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell
University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of
US AID.
The Field Trial Proposal submitted by the implementing institution (UPLB),
the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was described as a
"bioengineered eggplant." The crystal toxin genes from the soil
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant
(talong) genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to the target
insect pests. CrylAc protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran
larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect
pest of eggplant.
NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment stating that
"During the conduct of the experiment, all the biosafety measures have been
complied with and no untoward incident has occurred."
BPI issued Biosafety Permits to UPLB on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010.
Thereafter, field testing of Bt talong commenced on various dates in the following
approved trial sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili,
Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace,
et al.) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). They
alleged that the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right to health and a
balanced ecology.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB)/BPI/Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and
UPLB,[18-a] ordering them to make a verified return.
By Resolution dated July 10, 2012, the Court referred this case to the CA.
Under Resolution October 12, 2012, the CA resolved that: (1) Greenpeace, et al.
possess the requisite legal standing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2)
assuming arguendo that the field trials have already been terminated, the case is not
yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) the alleged
non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present justiciable
controversies for resolution by the court.
Denying the motions for reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and
UPLBFI, the CA in its Resolution dated September 20, 2013 rejected the argument of
 UPLB that the appellate court's ruling violated UPLB's constitutional right to academic
freedom.
The CA then justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a
genetically modified plant into our ecosystem is an "ecologically imbalancing act."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Greenpeace et. al. has a legal standing
2. Whether or not the case is moot and academic
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies
4. Whether or not the law on environmental impact statement applies on projects
involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
5. Whether or not there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public
respondents in the processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field
testing
6. Whether or not the Precautionary Principle applies
RULING:

1.Yes.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." It

refers particularly to "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged,
and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. signaled an even more liberalized policy on locus standi in
public suits.

Since the Oposa ruling, ordinary citizens not only have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own
and future generations.
The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature," and aims
to "further encourage the protection of the environment."

There is therefore no dispute on the standing of respondents to file before this Court
their petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus.

2.No.
An action is considered 'moot' when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties.

Nonetheless, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. We
find that the presence of the second and fourth exceptions justified the CA in not
dismissing the case despite the termination of Bt talong field trials.

This case falls under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the
mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular staple vegetable among
Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.

3. No. The provisions of DAO 08-2002 do not provide a speedy, or adequate remedy
for the respondents "to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection,
thus they were justified in coming to the Supreme Court." The Court took judicial
notice of the fact that genetically modified food is an intensely debated global issue,
and despite the entry of GMO crops (Bt corn) into the Philippines in the last decade,
it is only now that such controversy involving alleged damage or threat to human
health and the environment from GMOs has reached the courts.

4. Yes. EO 514 clearly mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most
particularly petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, make a determination whether the
EIS system should apply to the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint
guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct
and indirect impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment and
ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate environmental protection
and enhancement measures. It "aids proponents in incorporating environmental
considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the environment's
impact on their project." There are six stages in the regular EIA process. The
proponent initiates the first three stages while the EMB takes the lead in the last
three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least been
considered for EIA under existing regulations of petitioner EMB on new and emerging
technologies, to wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not listed in any of the
groups, e.g. projects using new processes/technologies with uncertain
impacts. This is an interim category - unclassified projects will eventually be
classified into their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation.[137] (Emphasis
supplied)
All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who
intend to undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of the
environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity. An environmentally critical
project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as "likely to have significant adverse impact
that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse" and which "include activities that
have significant environmental consequences." In this context, and given the
overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential hazards of GMOs to
human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field
testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

5.Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 08-2002 and related DA orders are not the only
legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO
514[130] establishing the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) clearly provides that
the NBF shall apply to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety
policies, measures and guidelines and in making biosafety decisions concerning the
research, development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the
environment and management of regulated articles.
The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which reads:
2.6 Using Precaution. - In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of
1992 and the relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular
Articles 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), the precautionary approach shall guide
biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of this approach are hereby
implemented through the decision-making system in the NBF;
The NBF contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the concerned
agencies are expected to follow and which their respective rules and regulations
must conform with. In cases of conflict in applying the principles, the principle of
protecting public interest and welfare shall always prevail, and no provision of the
NBF shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of
departments and agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare in
making biosafety decisions.
Notably, Section 7 of the NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and
participatory public consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting and
publication of notices and information sheets, consultations with some residents and
government officials, and submission of written comments, provided in DAO 08-
2002.
The Supreme Court found that ISAAI, et al. simply adhered to the procedures laid
down by DAO 08-2002 and no real effort was made to operationalize the principles of
the NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt talong. The failure of DAO 08-2002 to
accommodate the NBF means that the Department of Agriculture lacks mechanisms
to mandate applicants to comply with international biosafety protocols. Greenpeace's
claim that BPI had approved nearly all of the applications for GMO field trials is
confirmed by the data posted on their website. For these reasons, the DAO 08-2002
should be declared invalid.
During the hearing at the CA, Arty. Segui of the EMB was evasive in answering
questions on whether his office undertook the necessary evaluation on the possible
environmental impact of Bt talong field trials subject of this case and the release of
GMOs into the environment in general. While he initially cited lack of budget and
competence as reasons for their inaction, he later said that an amendment of the law
should be made since projects involving GMOs are not covered by Proclamation No.
2146.
The foregoing stance of the EMB's Chief of the Legal Division is an indication of the
DENR-EMB's lack of serious attention to their mandate under the law in the
implementation of the NBF, as provided in the EO 514.
Petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates in the
implementation of the NBF.

6. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing

the normative idea that governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" harm to
the environment. In the following decades, the precautionary principle has served as
the normative guideline for policymaking by many national governments.
The Rules incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

SEC. 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a

causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply
the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be
given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC. 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the

following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the
environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those
affected.
When these features— uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and
the possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the precautionary principle
is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of the
strongest fora in which the precautionary principle may find applicability.

Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO research
worldwide, the Court finds all the three conditions present in this case - uncertainty,
the possibility of irreversible harm and the possibility of serious harm.

Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by small-scale
farmers, majority of whom are poor and marginalized. While the goal of increasing
crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies revealed
uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse
effects on the environment associated with use of GE technology in agriculture, and
serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country
like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and
genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial
stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the
applicability of the EIS requirements to GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for
the application of the precautionary principle. There exists a preponderance of
evidence that the release of GMOs into the environment threatens to damage our
ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people
once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food. Adopting the precautionary approach,
the Court rules that the principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the
coordinated actions of the concerned departments and agencies before allowing the
release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant. The more prudent
course is to immediately enjoin the Bt talong field trials and approval for its
propagation or commercialization until the said government offices shall have
performed their respective mandates to implement the NBF.
7) OSMEÑA v. GARGANERA
GR NO. 231164 March 20, 2018

FACTS:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the Solid Waste Sanitary Landfill
Project at Inayawan landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu Development Project Office
(MCDPO). Thereafter, the Inayawan landfill served as the garbage disposal area of
Cebu City.

Respondent asserted that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill

causes serious environmental damage which threatens and violates their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. Respondent also asserted that the Inayawan landfill
has already outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-suited for its
purpose. Respondent further asserted that its reopening and continued operation
violates several environmental laws and government regulations, such as: R.A. 9003;
R.A. 8749 or the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999"; R.A. 9275 or the "Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004"; Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 856 or the "Code on Sanitation of
the Philippines"; and DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2003-30 or the
"Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) for the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement System.

The CA, in a Resolution dated October 6, 2016, granted a writ of kalikasan,

required petitioner to file a verified return and a summary hearing was set for the
application of TEPO.

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the
privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established.

RULING:
Yes. The Spreme Court affirms the CA when it ruled that the requirements for
the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were sufficiently established.
Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to
avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Contrary to respondents' belief, the magnitude of the environmental damage

can be gleaned from the fact that the air pollution has affected resident not just from
Cebu City but also from the neighboring city of Talisay. Also, in light of the EMB's
finding that the proper treatment of the leachate at the Inayawan landfill has not been
complied with prior to its discharge to the Cebu strait, there is no question that the
scope of the possible environmental damage herein has expanded to encompass not
just the City of Cebu but other localities as well that connects to such strait. Since
leachate is contaminated liquid from decomposed waste, it is not difficult to consider
the magnitude of the potential environment harm it can unleash if this is released to
a receiving water body without being sufficiently treated first, as in this case. In view
of the foregoing, the Court finds that that the closure of the Inayawan landfill is
warranted in this case.
8) ISAAA v. GREENPEACE
RESOLUTION July 26, 2016

FACTS:
The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for
"bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt
talong), administered pursuant to the Memorandum of Undertaking5 (MOU)
entered into by herein petitioners University of the Philippines Los Baños
Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), and the University of the Philippines
Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), among others.
From 2007 to 2009, petitioner University of the Philippines Los Banos (UPLB), the
implementing institution of the field trials, conducted a contained experiment on Bt
talong under the supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the
Philippines (NCBP). Upon the completion of the contained experiment, the NCBP
issued a Certificate therefor stating that all biosafety measures were complied with,
and no untoward incident had occurred.
On March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industries (BPI) issued
two (2)-year Biosafety Permits for field testing of Bt talong after UPLB's field test
proposal satisfactorily completed biosafety risk assessment for field testing.
Consequently, field testing proceeded in approved trial sites in North Cotabato,
Pangasinan, Camarines Sur, Davao City, and Laguna.
On April 26, 2012, respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)
(Greenpeace), Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura
(MASIPAG), and others (respondents) filed before the Court a Petition for Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) against herein petitioners.
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners (except
UPLB25) and UPMFI, ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI, and UPMFI filed their respective
verified returns.
In a Decision, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to
permanently cease and desist from conducting the Bt talong field trials.
Aggrieved, petitioners separately moved for reconsideration. However, in a
Resolution, the CA denied the same and remarked that introducing genetically
modified plant into the ecosystem is an ecologically imbalancing act.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari before
this Court.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2015, the Court denied the petitions and
accordingly, affinned with modification the ruling of the CA. Agreeing with the CA,
the Court held that the precautionary principle applies in this case since the risk of
harm from the field trials of Bt talong remains uncertain and there exists a possibility
of serious and irreversible harm. The Court observed that eggplants are a staple
vegetable in the country that is mostly grown by small-scale farmers who are poor
and marginalized; thus, given the country's rich biodiversity, the consequences of
contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.
The Court likewise agreed with the CA in not dismissing the case for being moot and
academic despite the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials, on
account of the following exceptions to the mootness principle: (a) the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; and (b) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Further, the Court noted that while the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were observed,
the National Biosafety Framework (NBF) established under EO 514, series of 2006
which requires public participation in all stages of biosafety decision-making,
pursuant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which was acceded to by the
Philippines in 2000 and became effective locally in 2003, was not complied with.
Moreover, the field testing should have been subjected to Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA), considering that it involved new technologies with uncertain
results.
Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the field testing of Bt talong. In addition, it
declared DAO 08-2002 null and void for failure to consider the provisions of the NBF.
The Court also temporarily enjoined any application for contained use, field testing,
propagation, commercialization, and importation of genetically modified organisms
until a new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.53

ISSUES:
Whether or not the case should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the
completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials and the expiration of the
Biosafety Permits

RULING:

1. Yes. As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The
requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper
exercise of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as
to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.
Nevertheless, case law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest are
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, jurisprudence recognizes
these four instances as exceptions to the mootness principle.
In the December 8, 2015 Decision of the Court, it was held that (a) the present case
is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved, and (b) it is
likewise capable of repetition yet evading review. Hence, it was excepted from the
mootness principle.
However, upon a closer scrutiny of the parties' arguments, the Court reconsiders its
ruling and now finds merit in petitioners' assertion that the case should have been
dismissed for being moot and academic, and that the aforesaid exceptions to the
said rule should not have been applied.
In contrast to the foregoing cases, no perceivable benefit to the public - whether
rational or practical - may be gained by resolving respondents' petition for Writ
of Kalikasan on the merits.
To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for Writ
of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits
issued by the BPI and the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials
subject of the same. These incidents effectively negated the necessity for the reliefs
sought by respondents in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer
any field test to enjoin. Hence, at the time the CA rendered its Decision dated May
17, 2013, the reliefs petitioner sought and granted by the CA were no longer capable
of execution.

The paramount public interest exception to the mootness rule should not have been
applied.1âwphi1
Likewise, contrary to the Court's earlier ruling, these cases do not fall under the
"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception.
The Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before a case is
deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was
in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and
(2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action.
Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too
short to be fully litigated. It must be emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the
subject field tests were issued on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010, and were valid
for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by Justice Leonen, respondents filed
their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only on April 26, 2012 - just a few months before
the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field testing activities were already over.
Obviously, therefore, the cessation of the subject field tests before the case could be
resolved was due to respondents' own inaction.
Moreover, the situation respondents complain of is not susceptible' to repetition.
DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by JDC 01-2016. Hence, future
applications for field testing will be governed by JDC 01-2016 which, as illustrated,
adopts a regulatory framework that is substantially different from that of DAO 08-
2002.
Therefore, it was improper for the Court to resolve the merits of the case which had
become moot in view of the absence of any valid exceptions to the rule on mootness,
and to thereupon rule on the objections against the validity and consequently nullify
DAO 08-2002 under the premises of the precautionary principle.
With respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of
the Biosafoty Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of these cases,
and with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly attending, the
Court grants the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby dismisses the
aforesaid petition.