PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |1
Q4 (Canon 19)
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO
Canon 19: A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within
the bounds of the law.
Doctrine: A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client. It is his duty to counsel
his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their
adversaries
Facts: On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment
against respondent.[2] RBCI alleged that respondent violated
his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients,
Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios Relampagos, Dr.
Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-
Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the
use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the
premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay
(Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and
installed their own staff to run the bank.mIn his comment,
respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained
that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon
him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and
validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he
was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of
management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice
was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. On 1 April 2002,
to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations,
respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the
bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted
violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm.
Respondent then directed the security guards to prevent entry
into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction
with the bank. Respondent, through the orders of the
Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the
banks vault. Respondent added that the criminal complaint for
malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already
dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered
suspended because of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed
against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed
against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any
evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that the
affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified,
affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies.
Ruling of the IBP: On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted
his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the
exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that
the repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a
more severe penalty. According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.,
respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could
not just forcibly take over the management and premises of
RBCI without a valid court order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over
RBCI was one of the issues pending before the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that
respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of
RBCI and that it was a naked power grab without any
semblance of legality whatsoever. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.
added that the administrative complaint against respondent
before the IBP is independent of the dismissal and suspension
of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner
Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules
of Procedure when they filed a verified complaint and
submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and
respondent agreed to dispense with the mandatory conference
hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position
papers. On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that respondent
dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law
profession and suspended respondent from the practice of law
for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct
will warrant a more severe penalty. On 5 July 2006, respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008
Resolution, the IBP denied respondents motion.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 19 and
Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Held: Yes. SC affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to
promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening
confidence in the legal system. Canon 19 of the Code provides
that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code
requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with
the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and
lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an
intentional wrong to their adversaries.
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace.
Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of
truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a
tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but,
first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to
protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy
or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made
within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense
of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair
and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and
unethical.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict
Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year
effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and in all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |2
R1
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed
by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty.
Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of
payment representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of
respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist
in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank,
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the
release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba,
Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and
registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is
the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna,
Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before
the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession and did not protect her interests in the
Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into
to end LRC Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred
that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was
payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with
Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No.
B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna.
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules
1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee
for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons
specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees
in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in
part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt
a case which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its
disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as
well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.
x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of
respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and
solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account
of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to
wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a
Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to
effectuate the compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other
individuals as commission/referral fees respondent violated
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a
compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance
that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her
foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated
violations to protect the public and the legal profession from his
kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6)
months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will
be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of
the investigating commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show
that they possessed and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct8 and are mandated to serve their
clients with competence and diligence.9 They shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in
connection therewith shall render them liable.10
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the
recovery of complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s
Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he
acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |3
compromise agreement between the latter and the bank
relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he
explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before
the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal
assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to
P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair
and reasonable fees.11
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in
the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where
the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her
property; that the redemption period has already expired thus
consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her
claims against it.12 As found by the Investigating
Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions
because respondent misled her to believe that she could still
redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The
duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences
from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final
disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The
canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with
zeal, care and utmost devotion.13
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with
two other people as a referral fee does not release him from
liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except
in certain cases.15
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following
grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6)
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and
7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held
that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a
basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s
cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of
vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts
and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his
client’s case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this
duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer
should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle
in order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not
enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the
legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal
work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take
the cudgels for his client’s cause.18
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the
practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is
directed to return to complainant the amount he received by
way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of
violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and
STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within
thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to
complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
R2
Romeo G. Roxas, et. al. vs. Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et.
al.
G.R. No. 152072
January 31, 2006
Facts: The case is a consolidation of two petitions.
Respondents engaged the services of both Atty. Roxas and
Pastor to represent them in their civil case filed before the 141 th
Branch of the RTC of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No.
26804, by the National Housing Authority. The case involved
the expropriation of parcels of land belonging to the
Respondents covering a total land area of 1,790,570.36 square
meters. Eventually, both parties entered into a compromise
agreement wherein the Respondents would be paid, as just
compensation, P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA
bonds. In total, the Respondents were to be paid the amount of
P34,916,122.00. For its part, the NHA released the amount of
P54,500,000.00 as payment. The difference between the two
amounts, the Court noted, was the yield on the bonds,
amounting to P19,583,878.00. However, based on the receipts
issued by the Respondents to Atty. Roxas, to whom the bonds
were released by the NHA, the Respondents only received
P30,520,000. When demand for the yield on the bonds were
unheeded by Petitioners, Respondents filed a civil action for
Sum of Money and Damages before the 9th Branch of the RTC
of Quezon City against, among others, Petitioners. The RTC
held in favor of the Petitioners but on appeal the CA, the latter
overturned the decision ordering as well the return of the yields
minus P4,476,426.27. The CA based the latter amount on the
December 10, 1985 Agreement executed by the parties which
stipulated that the legal fees to be paid to the Petitioners was
any amount in excess of the P17.00 per square meter price
point the Respondents agreed to. Both parties appealed the
decision in their separate petitions for review. In the second
petition, where the Zuzuarreguis are the Petitioners, they
contend that both Atty. Roxas and Atty. Pastor violated their
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue: Whether or not Attys. Roxas and Pastor violated the
Canons under the CPR.
Held: Yes. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and
Pastor were to receive contingent fees for their professional
services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not
per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, in cases
where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only
fair and reasonable fees. Attorney's fees are unconscionable if
they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.
It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |4
reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's
fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts. In the instant case, Attys.
Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to
forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid
(including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the
Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of
the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown
hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a
Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably,
unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its
reduction is, therefore, in order.
R3
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant, versus ATTY.
MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent. A. C. No. 6281
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
Facts: Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners
of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square meters located at
Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. In 1994,
complainant initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC)
Case for the registration of the aforesaid property. During the
course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services
of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his
original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular
accident.
Complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to
pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as
acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as
appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts
due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter.
During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the
additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for
the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further
strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty
percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as
additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was
contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned
the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have
agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without
the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of
complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the
latter became furious and their relationship became sore. On
January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No.
M-226, granting the petition for registration, which Decision
was declared final and executory.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the
owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same
had already been claimed by and released to respondent.
Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the
PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to
378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would
deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again,
complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed
upon.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate
penalty upon respondent, complainant invokes the provision of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Facts:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
In its Report and Recommendationthe Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the
owner's duplicate in the exercise of his so-called attorney's
lien. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Issue: Whether respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law for unjustly withholding from complainant the
owner's duplicate in the exercise of his so-called attorney's
lien.
Held: Yes. As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no
proof of any agreement between the complainant and the
respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area covered by
OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the parties only shows
that respondent will be paid the acceptance fee and the
appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received.
Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that
would entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence,
respondent could not validly withhold the title of his client
absence a clear and justifiable claim.
In collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent
violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates that a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose
additional professional fees upon his client which were never
mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of
his services. At the outset, respondent should have informed
the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would
charge before handling the case and not towards the near
conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the
complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay
respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property
belonging to his client and imposing unwarranted fees in
exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of
disciplinary sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of
Governors, adopting and approving with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be
Issue:
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and that respondent be ordered to return the
Held:
complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby
Yes, Atty. Barrios is disbarred.
affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from notice given to
respondent within which to return the title should be modified
and, instead, respondent should return the same immediately
upon receipt of the Court's decision.
R4
SPOUSES MANUEL C. RAFOLS, JR. AND LOLITA B.
RAFOLS, Complainants,
vs. ATTY. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, Respondent
[25 March 2010]
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and
consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,
commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |5
- Spouses Manuel and Lolita Rafols had a civil case for
cancellation of a deed of sale before the RTC of
General Santos City, presided by Judge Dizon, Jr.
- The spouses’ counsel was respondent, Atty Ricardo
G. Barrios.
- During the pendency of the case, on 22 Dec.
1997,Atty. Barrios visited the complainants and told
them that the judge wanted to talk to Manuel.
Thereafter, both Manuel and Atty. Barrios met Judge
Dizon at the East Royal Hotels coffee shop. The judge
told Manuel that he, the judge, would resolve the
case in Manuel and Lolita’s favor if they could deliver
P150,000 to him at noon that day.
- Manuel and Lolita were able to deliver P50,000 only.
The judge, two days later, demanded the balance of
P100,000, to which only 80,000 was delivered.
- The following month, on 20 January 1998, the judge
demanded again the balance. This time, the spouses
were able to deliver the full amount. Right after
handing the amount, the judge told them that the RTC
judge in Iloilo City before whom the perpetuation of
the testimony of Soledad Provido was made should
still testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in
order for the spouses to win. The jusdge persuaded
the spouses to give money also to that judge;
otherwise, they should not blame him for the outcome
of the case.
- The spouses ultimately sensed that they were being
fooled, and so, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their
mediamen friend. The details were released to the
media, and the exposé was published in the
Newsmaker.
- In the administrative case against the judge, the
Supreme Court dismissed Judge Dizon from the
service.
- In the instant administrative case, the spouses
presented more evidence, aside from the ones above,
against Atty. Barrios for his misconduct. The
complainants related that Atty. Barrios demanded
P25,000 as his expenses in securing the testimony of
Provido. He also requested the spouses to borrow
P60,000 because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed
Isuzu Elf, and because he needed to give money to
his nephew who was about to go abroad for work.
Whether or not Atty. Barrios should be disbarred.
1. In Rivera v. Corral, the SC held that a lawayer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.
2. The respondent did not measure up to the exacting
standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of
him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any
personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly
or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For
monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to "delay no
man for money or malice" and to "conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients" that he made when he took the
Lawyer’s Oath. He also disobeyed the explicit

command to him as an attorney "to accept no
compensation in connection with his client’s business
except from him or with his knowledge and
approval." He conveniently ignored that the relation
between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in
nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and
confidential character.
3. Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct,
which is "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere
error of judgment." Any gross misconduct of an
attorney in his professional or private capacity shows
him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a
ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension
or disbarment, because good moral character is an
essential qualification for the admission of an attorney
and for the continuance of such privilege.
R5
A.C. No. 7472 March 30, 2010
LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.
The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April
2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of
Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law
despite having been suspended by the Court.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against
Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No.
699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with
office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.
Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios
had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court
since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in
court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case
(Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special
Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 134, where Atty. De Dios appeared as his
counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be
disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and
deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme
Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases
filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she
was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in
the cases.
Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed
filed against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No.
4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month
suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon
receipt of the Court’s Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to
November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19,
2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was
resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she
actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity
as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City,
erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering
respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |6
notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that
the directive was rather questionable, respondent,
nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the
court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for
Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge
Farrales’ letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some
municipalities in Zambales, which "gave the impression that
Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law
and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008
is revoked." Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a
resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) –
Respondent’s Urgent Motion for Clarification dated 14 March
2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six
(6) months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice
on 17 November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to
DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6)
month suspension and her recommencement of law practice
on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution
dated 30 January 2002.
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of
complainant Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced
law, she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from
practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and
malicious, and should be dismissed outright.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court
referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC
directed the complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating
therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De Dios and
the particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in
the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil
Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a
Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which reads:
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear
si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach
ang Certification mula sa Branch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,]
Olongapo City.
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang]
mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10, 2005,
nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito
ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at
hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox
Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng Subic Municipal Trial Court
na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case
No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus- Simeon
Pullido noong December 14, 2001.
5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de
Dios, x x x -
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17,
2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil
Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1)

araw pa lamang mula magsimula ang kanyang suspension
noon[g] May 16, 2001.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001
entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla Tabasondra-Ramos and
Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang
(2) araw mula magsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios
noong May 16, 2001.
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit
executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong May 16, 2001, (b)
Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001
at (c) isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May
16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong
nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16,
2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay
sa mga nakasaad base sa aking personal na kaalamanan at
mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty.
de Dios ang kanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk
of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may
petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission ni Atty. de Dios na
nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent,
stating that there were no new matters raised in the
Supplemental Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar
Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her
letter dated 12 February 2007, cannot supersede the
Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court."
According to her, the resolution should be the "final nail to the
coffin of this case."
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum
for the Court’s consideration.
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant
in her affidavit was the OBC’s reply to an inquiry made by the
Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty.
De Dios.1 Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the
suspension order was not automatic, following the
pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario
K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose
Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v.
Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he
would have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the
Court’s resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby
extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyer’s
suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated
in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the
suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to
enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession.2
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first
present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the
Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice
of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court,
after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from
the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension
and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC
alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was
overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |7
resume her practice of law without submitting the required
certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In
order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the
Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform
policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law.1avvphi1
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but
a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.3 Whenever it is made
to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only
the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made
him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.4 However, as much as
the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it
should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be
deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession
unreasonably.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that
the following guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting
of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended
from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision
imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.
The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent
shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court
during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the
Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the
courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or
her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a
more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
R6
[A.C. No. 5834. February 22, 2011.]|
TERESITA D. SANTECO, complainant, vs.
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, respondent.
Canons 16, 18.03, 20
FACTS: The case originated from an administrative complaint
filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna B.
Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to
declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and for
reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

On March 14, 2002, Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro submitted a Report finding
respondent culpable as charged and recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years. She found that:
As it is, respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for having failed to
account to the complainant the official receipt of the
supersedeas bond she got from complainant to
withdrew the same from the court relative to the
ejectment case.
Respondent also violated Canon 18.03 for having
failed to file the [petition for] certiorari before the Court
of Appeals as she promised the complainant and even
got litigation expenses relative to the same.
Likewise, respondent violated Canon 20 when she
discontinued her legal services for complainant
without any notice of withdrawal and even ignored the
issuances of the Commission for her to answer the
complaint filed against her.
In an En Banc Decision dated December 11, 2003, the Court
found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for, among others,
abandoning her client's cause in bad faith and persistent
refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any
explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise
directed to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from
notice, the amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her for
the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), which she never filed.
Respondent moved to reconsider the decision but her motion
was denied.
Subsequently, while respondent's five-year suspension from
the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-
Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, sent a
letter-report to the Court Administrator informing the latter that
respondent had appeared and actively participated in three
cases wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl
Tanglao." When her opposing counsels confronted her and
showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension,
respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B.
Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three
years and that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge
Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent nonetheless
withdrew her appearance from all the cases.
Acting on Judge Amog-Bocar's letter-report, the Court required
respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice.
Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. The
Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise the case
would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available
records on file with the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply
despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution on
September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the
Code
HELD: Yes. The Court finds that respondent is unfit to continue
as a member of the bar.
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |8
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect
for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court
orders and processes.
Here, respondent's conduct evidently fell short of what is
expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously
possesses a habit of defying this Court's orders. She willfully
disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice
despite the five-year suspension order against her and even
misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade
said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to
comment on her continued law practice while still suspended,
nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions
from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine
imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution.
We have held that failure to comply with Court directives
constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect
which merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.
In repeatedly disobeying this Court's orders, respondent
proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar.
Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself.
Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the
court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby
DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of
lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
R7
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF
EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
Doctrine: While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant
to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have
reformed their ways as in this case.
Facts:
In a Decision dated February 27, 2004, the Court
disbarred respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo from the
practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one
Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen
Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross
immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for
Compassion and Mercy which the Court denied with finality in
the Resolution dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June
4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll
of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a
second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it
for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.
On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to the
Court by the Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo’s petition
for judicial clemency may be granted
Held:
 PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S |9

Yes. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, S1

Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing A.C. No. 7023. March 30, 2006.
for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in BUN SIONG YAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO A.
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit: AURELIO, respondent.
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These
shall include but should not be limited to certifications or FACTS: November 11, 2004, Bun Siong Yao filed against Atty.
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar Leonardo A. Aurelio before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent (IBP) seeking for his disbarment for alleged violations of the
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A Code of Professional Responsibility. Complaint alleged that:
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
1. Since 1987, Yao retained the services of Aurelio as
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
his personal lawyer;
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Aurelio is a stockholder and the retained counsel of
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the
Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar
penalty to ensure a period of reform.
Textile Finishing Corporation of which Yao is a
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that
majority stockholder;
he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to
3. Yao purchased several parcels of land using his
good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
personal funds but were registered in the name of the
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
corporations upon the advice of respondent;
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
4. Aurelio, who was also the brother in-law of Yao's wife,
scholarship and the development of the legal system or
had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
thereafter Aurelio demanded the return of his
public service.
investment in the corporations but when Yao refused
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that
to pay, he filed:
may justify clemency.
a. eight charges for estafa and falsification of
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant
commercial documents against Yao and his
must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy
wife and the other officers of the corporation;
the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
b. a complaint against Yao for alleged non-
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
compliance with the reportorial requirements
acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his
of the SEC with the Office of the City
personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City:
complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with
c. complaint with the Office of the City
them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records also
Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged
show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his
violation of Sec. 75 (Stockholder’s right to
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an
financial statements) of the Corporation
orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in
Code; and
2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the
d. similar complaint before the Office of the City
Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position
Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in
5. Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him
the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to
and his wife is a form of harassment and constitutes
date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of
an abuse of the confidential information which
Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School
respondent obtained by virtue of his employment as
Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in
counsel;
socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who
6. Yao argued that respondent is guilty of representing
are in dire need.
conflicting interests when he filed several suits not
Furthermore, respondent's plea for reinstatement is duly
only against the complainant and the other officers of
supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan
the corporation, but also against the two corporations
Chapter‚ and by his former and present colleagues.Ï‚rνl1‚rνl1
of which he is both a stockholder and retained
Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his
counsel.
previous marital squabbles,½l1 as in fact, no opposition to the
instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends Aurelio’s claim:
regular support½l1 to his children in compliance with the
1. that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar
Court's directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.cral
Textile;
From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court
2. that the funds used to purchase several parcels of
finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his
land were not the personal funds of Yao but pertain to
transgressions. At 581 years of age, he still has productive
Solar Farms;
years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
3. that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for Yao
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society.
or Solar Textile;
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and
4. that he never used any confidential information in
even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to
pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only used
show compassion to those who have reformed their ways½l1
those which he obtained by virtue of his being a
as in this case. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered
stockholder;
reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however, reminded
5. that his requests for copies of the financial statements
that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
were ignored by the Yao and his wife hence he was
adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
constrained to file criminal complaints for estafa thru
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law
concealment of documents;
are continuing requirements.
6. that when he was furnished copies of the financial
statements, he discovered that several parcels of land
 PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S | 10

were not included in the balance sheet of the venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the
corporations; investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather
7. that the financial statements indicated that the than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his
corporations suffered losses when in fact it paid cash being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing
dividends to its stockholders, hence, he filed so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from
additional complaints for falsification of commercial his dealings with complainant and complainant's companies for
documents and violation of reportorial requirements of his own end.
the SEC.
Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
investigating commissioner to suspend Aurelio from the integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Lawyers cannot be
practice of law for 6 months on the ff grounds: allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting
vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any
1. from 1987-1999, respondent had been the personal
person — most especially against a client or former client.
lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and
counsel of Solar Farms; In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a
2. that respondent is guilty of forum shopping when he breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness, sufficient
filed identical charges against the complainant before to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City and
in the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan;
3. respondent was remiss in his duty as counsel and
incorporator of both corporations for failing to advise
the officers of the corporation, which he was
incidentally a member of the Board of Directors, to
comply with the reportorial requirements of the SEC
and the BIR. Instead, he filed cases against his
clients, thereby representing conflicting interests.

ISSUE: W/N there was abuse of confidence.

RULING: YES.
We find that the professional relationship between the
complainant and the respondent is more extensive than his
protestations that he only handled isolated labor cases for the
complainant's corporations (during investigation: “went to the
office at least half day every week but that was cut short. And
when there are cases that crop-up involving labor then they
called me up”).
Aside from being the brother-in-law of complainant's wife, it
appears that even before the inception of the companies,
respondent was already providing legal services to the
complainant (counsel for other legal matters before
incorporation; charge corporation for professional fees
rendered it). He was also present during the negotiations for
the purchase of the parcel of land and was privy to the fact that
it was purchased by the complainant subject to reimbursement
by the Board and should the corporation finally have sufficient
fund to cover the payment advanced by complainant then the
property will be transferred to the corporation.
It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney
and his client is a fiduciary one. Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that
an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made
to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not
cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by
the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It
even survives the death of the client.
Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondent's
act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different
 PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S | 11

T1 accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted

homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to
A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006
be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JAIME
JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent.
Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement
undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere
Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on
effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath did he file the
15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal
Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly
(respondent) for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, gross
irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent
misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to
and personal representation with the members of the Division
petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C.
of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of
Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin
conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into
v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed
the case of the accused, his other professional obligations
the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.
were neglected and that all these were done without proper
and adequate remuneration.
The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged
mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually
As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it
led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of
was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the
petitioners therein.
petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with
this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
The facts are as follows:
Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the
petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by
On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato
registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees.
F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in
Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary
G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the
period.
accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in
the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another.
Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean"
As a result, Informations were filed against them before the
efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after
Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused
the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He
pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the
considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from
Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of
the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his
homicide and one count of attempted homicide.
other equally important professional obligations; the lack of
adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his
At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein
plans to travel to the United States to explore further
respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for
professional opportunities. He then decided to formally
Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a
withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3
Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial,
Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact
respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second
person between respondent and complainants, explaining his
Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion
decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice
for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the
to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign
Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition
and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered
for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt
issued for the letter.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again
despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office.
Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be
When respondent did not return their phone inquiries,
discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of
complainants went to respondent’s last known address only to
Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court.
find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.
Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly
aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would
More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants
be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent
were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad
suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls
cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent
complainants made to his office.
about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were
shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a
On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to
Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
filing and non-payment of docket fees.
report and recommendation.1awph!l.net
Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had
The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland
attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been
R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of
issued against the accused because respondent, whose
hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only
whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the
complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory
reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
conference held, the other two complainants were declared as
having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP
In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital
proceedings.8
significance that the Court notes that he was not the original
counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the

The parties were directed to file their respective position
papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid
submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility9
and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from
reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.1awph!l.net10 On
12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved
to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolid’s
recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to
recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.
The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering
all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross
negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23,
which eventually led to the ad cautelam petition’s dismissal
with finality.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court
finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.
In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of
the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect
in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the
accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their
right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v.
Sandiganbayan:11
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high
degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest x x x .
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that
distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x12
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam
petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed
with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second
Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a
second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading13
and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to
admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the
reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the
accused had already lost their right to appeal long before
respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore,
respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on
time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants
that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This
respondent does not dispute.
As to respondent’s conduct in dealing with the accused and
complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of
assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the
rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner
Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings
with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though
respondent represented to the accused that he had changed
his office address, still, from the examination of the
pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings
have the same mailing address as that known to complainants.
Presumably, at some point, respondent’s office would have
received the Court’s Resolution dismissing the petition. Of
course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least
PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S | 12
inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had
constantly called respondent’s office to check the status of the
case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling
his office, he opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls
of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3
Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of
the case. However, though aware of such likelihood,
respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he
and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved
matters between them.
Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for
the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in
court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of
withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he
should have informed this Court through the appropriate
manifestation that he had already given instructions to his
clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of
Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not
so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the
accused.
Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who
should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused.
His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and
gave them instructions on how to go about respondent’s
withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been
respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the
proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have
relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case.
Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the
return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the
recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the
Court cannot lend credence to respondent’s naked claim,
especially so that complainants have been resolute in their
stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter
had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of
his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written
conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right
to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or
without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate
the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics
is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not
at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s
right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.16
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of
the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross
negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v.
Boncavil17 that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s
rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to
 PALE 3E/3D: R-T C A S E S | 13

the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3)
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the months’ suspension.25 The Court finds it fit to impose the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative same in the case at bar.
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and
to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.18

Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the
endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper
remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently
disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper
filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the
amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of
one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.19
Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed
the deposited amount.

The Court also rejects respondent’s claim that there was no

formal engagement between the parties and that he made all
his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban
(presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:20

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes

fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid
any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.21

Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:

A written contract is not an essential element in the

employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. x x x 22

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case

he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still
remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in
handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just
because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.

Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation

respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was
engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused
police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the
‘salvage’ of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and
[a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato."23 Rule 14.0124 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers
not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the
latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually
branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged"
the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the
Sandiganbayan had not done so.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of

respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty