Study Guide MostarMUN 2019

Commission on Crime Prevention and

Criminal Justice
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Introduction to the Committee 3

TOPIC A 4

Prevention of Illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons Trade in the Western Balkans 4

Introduction to the Topic 4

Contextualization 5

Historical Development 8

Open issues 10

Conclusion 12

Guiding Questions for Resolutions 12

Additional material 13

TOPIC ​B 14

Human Trafficking and other Exploitations of Migrants in the Balkans 14

Introduction to the Topic 14

Contextualization 15

Historical development 18

Open issues 20

Conclusion 23

Guiding Questions for Resolutions 23

Additional Material 25

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Introduction to the Committee

This committee was formed by the resolution 1992/11 of the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations. Its goal and purpose are to act as a principal policy-making body in the field of
criminal justice and prevention. Its mandate was determined by the subsequent resolution 1922/222
and it includes ​improving international action to combat national and transnational crime and the
efficiency and fairness of criminal justice administration systems.

Its mandate was expanded 2006 by resolution 61/252 as a governing body of the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and to approve the budget of the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund, which provides resources for technical assistance in the field of
crime prevention and criminal justice worldwide. The CCPCJ implements the outcome of the United
Nations Crime Congresses through decisions and congresses with recommendations from ECOSOC.

Meetings are regularly convened to provide policy guidance to UNODC. Towards the end of each
year, the CCPCJ meets at a reconvened session to consider budgetary and administrative matters as the
3
governing body of the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme.

1
http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/ECOSOC_Resolution-1992-1_E.pdf
2
http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/ECOSOC_Resolution-1992-22_E.pdf
3
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/index.html

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TOPIC A

Prevention of Illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons Trade in the Western
Balkans

Introduction to the Topic

The aim of this study guide is to help you understand the nature Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW) illegal trade in the Western Balkans region and its importance to European, and to a lesser
but notable extent, global security. While this topic is tackled by European actors (for example
4 5
Franco-German Initiative on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Western Balkans ) and OSCE ,
but it remains largely untouched by CCPCJ policy, even though it falls within its mandate. This issue
is deeply connected with issues of terrorism and organized crime in Europe and its urgency has risen
sharply with deadly attacks by extremist groups in Western Europe.

This study guide is structured into a few parts. First one is contextualization and here you will get
general information on the nature of the problem being discussed and of relevant actors involved in
this topic. Then, study guide covers historical development, giving a short overview of the evolution of
SALW trafficking in the Balkans. The “Open issues” chapter serves to point out the topics of the
greatest importance to the debate. After that, study guide ends with a conclusion and additional
material for further research.

4
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sustainable-solution-to-illegal-small-arms-and-light-weapons-salw-in-the-western-balkans-by-
2024-roadmap
5
https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/405647

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Contextualization
The arms trade is generally defined as the international transfer of (conventional) military equipment
and includes arms, its parts, munitions, equipment for support and other goods manufactured for
military use. This also includes donated arms.

Global arms trade can be divided into:

● Transfers of Major weapons - main battle tanks, artillery, ships, airplanes

● Transfers Dual-use equipment - those devices and goods which can be utilized for both
civilian and military application

● Small Arms and Light Weapons trade – (pistols, assault rifles etc.)

While arms trade is largely performed by state actors for geostrategic and geo-economic reasons,
gaining profit or straightening allies, a huge part of it happens in unreported, illegal trade, as a
6
violation of Arms Trade Treaty .

Green – countries that ratified the Arms Trade Treaty

Yellow – countries that signed the Arms Trade Treaty
Dark Green – countries that acceded the Arms Trade Treaty
Source: Wikipedia

6
https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf

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In this committee, you will tackle the issue of the illegal arms trade in the Western Balkans region, but
more precisely, you will be combating the issue of ​SALW trafficking​.

7
It is estimated that the illicit SALW trade makes between 10-20% of the total global arms trade. This
means it is ​highly profitable, clandestine industry​. The reason why the UN and many other
international organizations find it important to fight it is that SALW trafficking is that poorly regulated
arms trade has devastating, multifaceted effects. These include fuelling violence and armed conflict,
hindering efforts to promote socioeconomic development and creating a permanent atmosphere of fear
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and instability in conflict settings.

The particular problem of the SALW trafficking in the Balkans affects European security by arming
illegal actors, such as organized crime groups and terrorist and extremist organization, with means to
endanger national security and safety of citizens of Europe. Lack of regulation and enlargement of
SALW trafficking in the later years has increased complexity and effectiveness of terrorist cells in
Western Balkan countries. These organizations use SALW as both means of acquiring profit and of
arming themselves and are heavily connected to various terrorist attacks in Europe as well as fighting
in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Libya, etc).

Of course, the destructive influence of this practice also presents at the local level. While there is no
great risk of a major conflict in the region, it is important to note that the countries in this region are
often facing problems with their stability, democratic rule, corruption and human rights violations.
Unregulated SALW trafficking between various criminal groups over badly monitored borders has
been seen as a multiplayer of these issues.

7
https://fas.org/asmp/library/articles/SchroederLamb.pdf
8
https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP23.pdf
*Kosovo self-proclaimed independence is not universally recognised and it is not a member of the United Nations

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As for actors, we can differentiate between ​local, regional​ and global.

● Local actors are countries of the Western Balkan region – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo*. These countries
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all have a legacy of conflict in the late 1990s and high numbers of weapons in civilian hands.
Various terrorist and organized crime groups could also be considered actors, as they play an
active role in trying to expand their influence and the severity of SALW trafficking

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● Regional actors - OSCE , The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the
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Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) and the EU . France and Germany
are especially interested in weakening terrorist networks in the Western Balkans region by
eliminating SALW trafficking.

9
https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/19/small-army-survey-montenegro-serbia-bosnia-macedonia-and-kosovo-top-ranked-06-19-2018/
10
https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/405647
11
http://www.seesac.org/About/
12
http://www.seesac.org/EUSAC/

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● Global actors – It really only includes the UN. While CCPJC has not (as of yet) put their
policy for SALW in the Balkans, and only UN document indirectly addressing this subject is
their Arms Trade Treaty, this issue has proven resilient and therefore requires more attention
from the UN/CCPJC.

Historical Development
The problem of illegal arms trading in the Western Balkans begins with the 1990-s and the breakup of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With nationalistic tensions rising and exploding into
civil wars, a large number of arms were procured for the warring factions. These came from two main
sources:

● Internal – Yugoslav People’s Army held extensive amounts of major weapons and light
weapons which it procured to sympathetic militias (Serbian paramilitary formations fighting in
both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another form of internal trafficking of arms was
more oriented towards SALW and was in a form of military equipment of the Yugoslav civil
defense. Prior to the war, Yugoslavia held a doctrine in which huge parts of the civilian
population would engage in local resistance in a form of armed civil defense units.
Accordingly, the country was full of known warehouses storing light weapons. These were
quickly taken over by both sides in the war and used as supplies during the war.

● External – During (and a just prior to) the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, arms, mainly from
what used to constitute eastern bloc countries, was traffic to the hands of warring faction in the
country.

After the war, there was an attempt to diffuse the tension and eliminate the possibility of conflicts
reemerging between Ex-Yugoslavian republics. This was achieved through Agreement on
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Sub-regional Arms Control (aka Florence Agreement) , signed 1996, through which local actors
limited their armed forces and between them destroyed 1.261 Main Battle Tanks, 663 Armored
Vehilecls, 7302 pieces of artillery, 163 warplanes and 14 helicopters. This was a major success in
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downsizing threat of conflict in the Western Balkans.

13
https://web.archive.org/web/20110721101240/http://arhiva.morh.hr/hvs/SPORAZUMI/tekstovi/SSKN-engleski.pdf
14
https://web.archive.org/web/20110721101240/http://arhiva.morh.hr/hvs/SPORAZUMI/tekstovi/SSKN-engleski.pdf

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However, as we noted earlier, these constitute major weapons category of the arms trade. SALW,
while mentioned in policy papers, saw no great success. This is because of several factors. This
includes high levels of corruption, weak implementation of regulation due to lack of capacity or
educated professionals.

Recent changes, however, proved to be of great importance, with several initiatives taken in the recent
year to combat this problem that has started to influence the security of the whole continent.

Steps were taken by a few organizations to destroy weapons that were circulating since the war. Some
17,244 SALW, 4,967 SALW parts and components and 12,867 pieces of ammunition were being
disposed of in: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and the
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former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between 2014 and 2016.

Destroying arms was not the only step taken, the emphasis is also given to registration of numerous
weapons in hands of civilians, as well as cooperation between the states.

Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo are among the top 25 countries
in the rate of civilian firearms possession per 100 people. Worldwide, Montenegro and Serbia shared
16
third place, after the United States and Yemen.

15
http://www.seesac.org/EUSAC-2013---2016/
16
https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/19/small-army-survey-montenegro-serbia-bosnia-macedonia-and-kosovo-top-ranked-06-19-2018/

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Open issues
As we now covered the nature, importance, actors and history of the topic, we shall present open
issues you will have to face and deal with in prevention of illegal small arms and light weapons trade
in the Western Balkans listed as:

Criminal activity
Organized crime has an evident connection to small arms trafficking. Organisation such as these have
a deep connection to the Balkans region, having operated in the fields prostitution and supplying
narcotics, human trafficking in its various forms (including smuggling of migrants), sexual slavery and
even theft of human tissues for transplant (this last one is still a political contention point between
Belgrade and Prishita) for a long time. Besides these operations, criminal activity is also involved in
well-organized trafficking of various goods throughout the region, due to poor border-control.

SALW trafficking has empowered these organizations. In the latter years, there has been a resurgence
of active clan-fighting between these criminal organizations and the wealth and equipment they get
from SALW proved to be valuable tool to corrupt and deter law enforcement.

Furthermore, criminal organizations from the Balkans are often connected to a large diaspora
(Albanian mafia organizations or the “Pink panther” diamond robbers for example), increasing their
influence and their violent ways to the rest of the world, making this more than just a local issue.

Fighting SALW trafficking will diminish their influence and limit their ability to be well supplied with
arms.

Terrorism
Terrorism is a huge part of SALW trafficking in the Balkans. While not the direct cause of the issue,
the existence of radical cells and terrorist networks in the region further magnify and complicate the
problem.

In a way, Balkans are both their armory and training ground, and that is unacceptable for European
actors who want to see the end of this issue as fast as possible.

Terrorism in the Western Balkans also has it roots in the turbulent history of the region. The Muslim
population of what used to be Yugoslavia was feeling oppressed and this lead to radicalization during

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the conflict in which Bosniak Muslims fought for their right to be recognized as a nation. The war in
Kosovo saw similar radicalization.

This problem came to light after attacks in France and Germany by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS). This organization exploited already radicalized groups, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
17
particular, became the biggest exporter of jihadist in Europe.

Civilian armament
Despite quite limiting laws, many households in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo* and
other countries in the region have registered weapons. This poses the danger of selling arms to illegal
entities or using them in illegal activities.

This also poses a problem of safety of citizens. Many of these weapons are military stockpiles taken
home after the wars. Troublingly, these also include hand grenades and there have been instances of
these being used law enforcement. Age of this weapons lens and its improper storage can lead to
deadly consequences.

Implementing large civilian disarmament should be considered a priority.

Weapons manufacturing
Recent developments in the region led to the expansion of Croatian and Serbian military industry,
leading to greater production of SALWs. While not directly in causing illicit trade of arms,
rearmament in the region poses a threat of greater amount of phased out (or even new) weapons
ending up in the wrong hands.

This is a problem of mainly political implication. It is to be expected that the nations invested in
weapon manufacturing programs of these countries will try to preserve their investment. Fight a
balance between geopolitical/geoeconomic interests of states and the need for proper arms control will
be a challenge CCPJC committee will have to deal with.

17
https://balkaninsight.com/2017/06/08/isis-wows-to-wreak-vengeance-on-balkans-in-new-threat-06-08-2017/

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Conclusion
Small Arms and Light Weapons trafficking in the Western Balkans is a complex issue to understand
and solve. Complicated, often contradictory history narratives, uneasy relations, global manipulations,
and deeply rooted corruption and mistrust in government are all factors that contributed to this issue is
a topic of a UN committee.

However complicated it may be, however, this Study Guide should have made you aware of its
elements, connections, origins, actors and open issues. Now it's up to you to continue the research. In
this, you will find help with various articles and publications listed as additional material at the end of
the study.

Guiding Questions for Resolutions

1. No resolution is of any worth without a proper plan of implementation. Where did other policy
solutions for this particular problem fail? Analise other attempts to battle SALW illegal trade.
Do they share something in common?

2. Not all states are as equally interested in this region as others. And of those interested (for
example, France considers this issue connected to threats to its national security) not all will
have the same view on the topic. While pretty much every country on earth finds the
organized crime to be a problem worth solving, some approaches might be more aggressive
than others. Trying to find a common ground between nations heavily impacted and those
solving this issue from a “safe distance” will be a challenge on its own. How will you solve it?

3. How will you approach the question complicated as terrorism? Will it be named in the
resolution, and if so, will this leave political consequences for the states named? How will the
tone of narrative influence actual decision making of the committee?

4. How will the legacy of mistrust and active corruption impact your plans? Will the states of the
region be willing or able to cooperate?

5. Will the resolution also touch upon troubling trend of rearmament? If so, how will this be seen
by those who see this matter as their economic or political interest?

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Additional material
https://balkaninsight.com/2018/12/19/germany-steps-up-efforts-on-balkan-firearms-control-12-19-201
8/

https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/19/small-army-survey-montenegro-serbia-bosnia-macedonia-and-k
osovo-top-ranked-06-19-2018/

https://balkaninsight.com/2018/12/13/serbian-guns-have-consequences-for-balkans-and-beyond-12-12
-2018/

http://www.seesac.org/SALW-Resources/

http://www.seesac.org/EUSAC-2013---2016/

http://www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/dergi/tybook/45/4.-Bulent-Sarper-Agir.pdf

https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/news/gfp-and-partners-present-their-contribution-t
o-the-fight-against-illicit-firearms-trafficking-in-the-western-balkans.html

https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/405647

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TOPIC B

Human Trafficking and other Exploitations of Migrants in the Balkans

Introduction to the Topic

The UN defines trafficking as “the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or
deception, with the aim of exploiting them.”18 Virtually every country in the world is affected by these
crimes. Over the past 20 years, trafficking in persons has been one of the main types of organized
crime in the Balkans. The region has been a source of trafficked victims, a transit region, as well as
destination for trafficked women.19

Even if only around 100,000 people are now being smuggled through the Balkans per year, the profits
are massive. EUROPOL20 estimates that migrant smuggling into Europe (not just the Balkans) was
worth between 3 and 6 billion euros in 2015. By a conservative estimate, it costs between €5,000 and
€7,000 to be smuggled from Greece via the Western Balkans into the EU.

Every year21, thousands of migrants die during smuggling activities. Accidents, extreme terrain and
weather conditions, as well as deliberate killings have been reported along most smuggling routes.
Systematic killings of migrants have also been reported, making this a very violent illicit trade. The
reported deaths – most of them along sea smuggling routes - represent only the tip of the iceberg of the
ultimate human cost suffered by smuggled migrants. Many migrant deaths are likely to go unreported,
along unmonitored sea routes as well as remote or inhospitable stretches of overland routes.

In addition to fatalities, smuggled migrants are also vulnerable to a range of other forms of crime.
Some of the frequently reported types faced by smuggled migrants include violence, rape, theft,
kidnapping, extortion and trafficking in persons. Such violations have been reported along all the
smuggling routes considered. In addition, smugglers’ quest for profit may also lead them to neglect the
safety of migrants during journeys. For example, smugglers may set off without sufficient food and

18
​https://www.unodc.org/unodc/human-trafficking/
19
www.GlobalInitiative.net - Walter Kemp
20
EUROPOL, Migrant smuggling in the EU, February 2016. Indeed, EUROPOL reported on 27 June 2016 that in the first half of 2016,
prices for migrant smuggling tripled. See EUROPOL press release 27 June 2016, “Latest Trends in Migrant Smuggling”.
21
www.GlobalInitiative.net - Walter Kemp

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drink, the vehicles they use might be faulty, and migrants who fall ill or are injured along the way
might not receive any care.

The Committee shall care about it to target the criminals who exploit desperate people, to protect and
assist victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants, many of whom endure unimaginable hardships in
their bid for a better life and to reduce the influence of criminal money in the region.

This Study Guide is structured in 4 sections: a) Contextualization: business, actors b) Historical

development: CCPCJ actions and consequences, new Balkan route c) Open issues: closing borders,
declining or raising migrants flow, business d) Conclusions

Contextualization
Smuggling and trafficking of migrants affects all regions of the world and it is a big business with high
profits​. There is evidence22 that, at a minimum, 2.5 million migrants were smuggled for an economic
return of US $5.5-7 billion in 2016. This is equivalent to what the United States of America (some
US$7 billion) or the European Union countries (some US$6 billion) spent on humanitarian aid
globally in 2016. This is a minimum figure as it represents only the known portion of this crime.

The smugglers’ profits stem from the fees they charge migrants for their services. The fees are largely
determined by the distance of the smuggling trajectory, number of border crossings, geographic
conditions, means of transport, the use of fraudulent travel or identity documents, risk of detection and
others. The fees are not fixed, and may change according to the migrants’ profiles and their perceived
wealth. For example, Syrian citizens are often charged more than many other migrants for smuggling
along the Mediterranean routes (an extra charge that may or may not lead to a safer or more
comfortable journey).

Human trafficking has become the world’s third largest criminal business, after trafficking in drugs
and weapons. South Eastern European countries are particularly affected as countries of origin, transit,
and final destination of trafficked persons. Every year an estimated 175,000 persons—mainly
women—are trafficked from, to, or through South Eastern European countries, including the countries
of the Western Balkans, and held in conditions amounting to slavery.

22
​https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf

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Actors involved worldwide23 The average age of an identified victim of trafficking is 26 years old (at
the time of assistance), and half of those identified are between 18 and 34 years old. The average age
of victims identified in 2015–2016 was 29 years old, with male victims being, on average, older than
female victims. At least 16 percent of identified victims in the same period were children. On average,
a victim is trafficked for approximately two years; therefore the average age of entry into trafficking is
below 26 years.

In recent years, the proportion of identified cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation has declined,
while the share of identified cases of trafficking for forced labour has increased. There is now a higher
propensity to identify victims of human trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation.

The vast majority of victims identified between 2002 and 2016 entered the trafficking process through
labour migration, although a large share of identified child victims in 2014–2016 were sold by their
families or entered the trafficking process through family or relatives. Victims identified in sectors like
mining and constructions are almost exclusively men, while victims identified in prostitution and
sectors such as hospitality are mostly women.

23
https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/human-trafficking

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Most Balkan states are source countries for men, women and children subjected to sex trafficking and
forced labour, including domestic servitude and forced begging. Particularly vulnerable are women
and children, as well as Roma, trafficked to Western or South Eastern Europe. According to latest
figures, most victims from the region are women trafficked for sex. Most of the traffickers are men
from the countries where they were convicted.24.

24
UNODC (2016) Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, New York

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Historical development

Has the Commission addressed this topic before​? When we analyse the work of the Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) we notice that the issue of traffic and smuggle of
migrants has been one of the core topics since at least 2011 until now (see reference 1)

Did the work of the Committee have any consequences on the issue​? 2018 Global Report25 indicates
that the overall number of reported trafficking victims has increased. The Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also referred to as
the Trafficking Protocol or the Palermo Protocol), is an international agreement under the
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) which entered into force on 25
December 2003. It is the first global, legally binding instrument on trafficking in over half a century,
and the only one with an agreed-upon definition of trafficking in persons. One of its purposes is to
facilitate international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting such trafficking. Another is to
protect and assist victims of human trafficking with full respect for their rights as established in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 117 countries had signed it in November 2018.

While we are far from ending impunity, there has made headway in the 15 years since the Palermo
Protocol entered into force. Nearly every country now has legislation in place criminalizing human
trafficking. Globally countries are detecting and reporting more victims, and are convicting more
traffickers. This can be the result of increased capacity to identify victims and/or an increased number
of trafficked victims. Also more countries are now also able to collect and record data and report on
trafficking in persons, the capacity to collect official statistics on trafficking in persons at the national
level has improved. In 2009, only 26 countries had an institution that systematically collected and
disseminated data on trafficking cases, while by 2018, the number had risen to 65.

Most trafficking victims are detected in their countries of citizenship. Detections of domestic victims
have increased over the last 15 years. In addition to domestic and sub regional trafficking, wealthy
countries are more likely to be destinations for detected victims trafficked from more distant origins.
Western and Southern Europe and countries in the Middle East, for example, record sizable shares of

25
​https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf

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victims trafficked from other regions; whereas such detections are relatively rare in most other parts of
the world.

Furthermore, detected trafficking flows towards richer countries are also more geographically diverse.
Despite the progress, impunity still prevails in large parts of the globe, as shown, for instance, by the
low levels of victim detections and trafficker convictions recorded.

The new Balkan route​. In 2015, hundreds of thousands of migrants entered Western Europe via
the Balkan route. But in March 2016, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia announced that they
would be closing their borders to non-citizens without visas. Since then, several countries in the region
have build border fences, including Hungary, which built a fence along the border with Serbia in
mid-2015. Bulgaria also erected a fence along the Turkish border, in June 2017.

Smugglers are currently operating on many diverging routes from Greece and Turkey to Western
Europe. This includes the most common route that was used in 2015, through Serbia and Croatia, and
which is usually what is referred to as the Balkan route.

Croatian media has recently reported that a new Balkan route has opened, with people attempting to
get from Greece to Western Europe via Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and
Slovenia. Bosnian immigration officials recently released numbers that showed a significant increase
in people entering the country from Serbia and Montenegro en route to Western Europe, seeming to
confirm reports of a new Balkan route.

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Open issues
The effects of closing borders to Western Europe. Although most borders on the Balkan route from
Turkey to Western Europe have been closed for almost three years, the flow of migrants has not
stopped. People smuggling is booming, and new trafficking hubs are being established. It is worth
noting that, according to EUROPOL, many such facilitators engage in poly criminality, in other words
they are also involved in other forms of crime, including trafficking in human beings (20%),
trafficking drugs (15%), and property crime26 (23%). There are also frequent reports of refugees and
migrants being beaten and robbed by smugglers and criminals (including by Afghans and Pakistanis),
for example around the notorious smuggling towns of Lojane, Moin and Vaksince – known as “the
jungle” – on the Macedonia/Serbian border. Significantly, while the number of non-regional migrants
dropped by 88%, the number of detected facilitators increased by 18%. Most of the facilitators (73%)
were nationals of Western Balkan countries27. Many of the others are former refugees and migrants.

26
​EUROPOL, “Latest Trends in migrant Smuggling: EPMT one year anniversary infographic” (12 September 2016).
27
​FRONTEX (April-June 2016), Western Balkans Quarterly, Quarter 2, p. 7.

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Is there a declining of human trafficking and migrant’s smuggling in the region? The problem seems to
have become more localized. In several countries of the region, women and girls are victims of sex
trafficking within the country in private residences, bars and nightclubs, as well as truck stops28. In the
past two years, migrants and asylum seekers transiting the region trying to reach Western Europe have
become vulnerable to trafficking. Yet they are reluctant to come forward to police – if they can – for
fear of being returned as illegal migrants. As the number of unaccompanied minors rises, there are
fears that they may be vulnerable to trafficking.

A March 2005 report released jointly by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), and UNICEF
analysed two mutually exclusive hypotheses on trafficking into the Western Balkans. Statistics
gathered by border police, governments, police anti-trafficking units, and shelters indicated that
trafficking to the region had plummeted in recent years. Non-governmental organization leaders and
some experts within the United Nations countered that human trafficking had not declined. Instead,
they argued, trafficking had shifted its guise and moved underground29.

In terms of trends, compared to 2014, it appears that the share of detected child victims in Central and
South-Eastern Europe – particularly girls – is increasing, whereas the share of men is decreasing.
Some countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary and Romania) reported having detected more child
victims than adults in the period considered. In a longer-term perspective, going back to 2014, there
has been a significant reduction in the shares of men among detected victims in this sub region, while
there are increased shares In Central and South-Eastern Europe, 70 per cent of the total detected
victims are trafficked for sexual exploitation. One third of the victims are trafficked for forced labour
or for ‘other’ purposes.

The rate of victim detection per 100,000 people in this subregion is among the highest in the world,
second only to Central American countries.

“Crime-as-a-service” business model in the Balkans. In the past few years, the smuggling of migrants
has become one of the most lucrative types of organized crime in the Balkans. War in Syria as well as

28
U.S. Department of State (June 2016), Trafficking in Persons Report
29
GABRIELA KONEVSKA; 7 POLICY RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE BALKANS (pp. 119-135)
DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt5vkfgr.10

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a haphazard European strategy to deal with the large flow of refugees and migrants since 2014 has
created a major opportunity for criminal groups in the Balkans.

The record number of refugees and migrants arriving in Greece had a major impact on the Western
Balkans since most of the people on the move tried to make their way via the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, through Serbia into Hungary and then towards Western Europe. In 2015,
764,000 people illegally crossed the border into the Western Balkans – 16 times more than the
previous year30. Most of the people on the move were Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans.

It is worth noting that a large number of people from Albania and Kosovo took advantage of the chaos
to move with the mixed migration flows. In fact, according to German immigration figures, Albania
and Kosovo were the second and third highest source countries for people claiming asylum in
Germany in 2015 – after Syria, but before Afghanistan and Iraq31.

Unsurprisingly, some of the most common routes are those used for other forms of trafficking, like
drugs and weapons: the triangular border region between Kosovo, northern Macedonia and southern
Serbia; the borders of Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, and Turkey. Cities like Bodrum in Turkey,
Belgrade, Subotica and Budapest have become key hubs.

Initially, the demand for facilitators was relatively low. With porous borders, people were able to
move quite freely. “The smugglers on the Balkan section of the journey operate not unlike travel
agencies”32. EUROPOL describes it as a “crime-as-a-service” business model: a network33.

Along the Balkan route, there is now an increased demand for “facilitators” (smugglers) who provide
false documentation, act as guides and scouts, provide transport, accommodation and tickets, and bribe
border guards.

30
​Frontex (online), “Western Balkan Route”.
31
​54,762 people from Albania and 37,085 from Kosovo claimed asylum in Germany in 2015. See BMI (2016):„2015: Mehr Asylanträge in
Deutschland als jemals zuvor“.
32
​Spiegel Online, “The Deadly Business of Human Smuggling” (7 September 2015).
33
​EUROPOL, Migrant smuggling in the EU, February 2016. Indeed, EUROPOL reported on 27 June 2016 that in the first half of 2016,
prices for migrant smuggling tripled. See EUROPOL press release 27 June 2016, “Latest Trends in Migrant Smuggling”.

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Conclusion
The report of Walter Kemp34, Senior Fellow at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized
Crime, illustrates that in the Balkans things are not always what they seem. “In the Balkans what
might look like an ethnic conflict is actually a diversion from high-level bi-ethnic collusion. Someone
who looks like a businessman one day may be a politician or a crook the next. With one quick twist, a
calm image can fracture into myriad pieces. Friends may betray you, while enemies may assist you.
This is the crooked kaleidoscope of organized crime in the Balkans.”

Guiding Questions for Resolutions

The increasing numbers of unaccompanied and separated children among smuggled migrants on some
routes pose great challenges to children’s rights and wellbeing. Institutions providing assistance to
migrants as well as law enforcement and migration authorities need to be equipped and trained to
address the particular vulnerabilities among children who are smuggled and to guarantee the best
interest of the child.

1. Increased border enforcement efforts in geographically limited areas often result in

displacement of smuggling routes to different borders, smuggling methods or to other routes.
If applied in isolation these measures do not reduce the number of smuggled migrants or the
size of the smuggling problem. Only policies that integrate different types of interventions and
broaden the geographical spectrum to include countries of origin, transit, and destination can
be successful in the long term.

2. Broadening the possibilities for regular migration and increasing the accessibility of regular
travel documents and procedures can achieve limiting the demand for migrant smuggling.
Making regular migration opportunities more accessible in origin countries and refugee
camps, including the expansion of migration and asylum bureaux in origin areas, would
reduce opportunities for smugglers.

3. Some smugglers actively recruit migrants in their communities by misinforming about the
risks and the prospects in destination countries. Raising awareness in communities of origin,

34
​www.GlobalInitiative.net

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and particularly in refugee camps, about the dangers involved in smuggling may also help
reduce the demand for smuggling services.

4. Tackling smuggling networks in their entirety requires improved regional and international
cooperation and national criminal justice responses. These policies and interventions can be
more potent with financial sanctions such as effective mechanisms to confiscate the proceeds
of the crime. Like other organized crime activities, smuggling of migrants is motivated by a
hunt for profits, so cutting the financial benefits may serve the purpose of reducing the crime.

5. Corruption at borders and within consular and migration authorities is one of the enablers of
smuggling of migrants. Combating smuggling of migrants can only be successful if
anti-corruption mechanisms are enforced in these institutions.

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Additional Material

● Resolution 27/2 (2018) Preventing and combating trafficking in persons facilitated by the
criminal misuse of information and communications technologies.

● Resolution 27/3 (2018) Improving the protection of children against trafficking in persons,
including by addressing the criminal misuse of information and communications technologies

● Resolution 27/4​ (2018) Strengthening measures against trafficking in persons

● Resolution A/RES/72/195 (2017) Improving the coordination of efforts against trafficking in

persons

● E/RES/2017/18 Implementation of the United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat

Trafficking in Persons (ECOSOC 2017)

● Resolution 25/1 (2016) Preventing and combating trafficking in human organs and trafficking
in persons for the purpose of organ removal

● Resolution A/RES/70/179 (2015 - General Assembly) Improving the coordination of efforts

against trafficking in persons

● Resolution 2015/23 Implementation of the United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat
Trafficking in Persons (ECOSOC)

● Resolution 2014/23 Strengthening international cooperation in addressing the smuggling of

migrants (ECOSOC)

● Resolution 23/2 (2014) Preventing and combating trafficking in human organs and trafficking
in persons for the purpose of organ removal

● A/RES/68/192 (General Assembly 2013) Improving the coordination of efforts against

trafficking in persons

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