PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK

G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
CORONA, J.:
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son, Christopher, two
weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later when
he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child be punished to the
full extent of the law.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s
outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while
Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter.
Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister
frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search
for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to
appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christopher’s
whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have
custody of Christopher and asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son
from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone
gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the
latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa
reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of
April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police
Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece.
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City
and proceeded to the designated meeting place.1awphi1
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were
Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked
who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the
back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that
she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan.
Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed
them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak
reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a
nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed
over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor
understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name
with "Taurak" as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and
pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under
Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture,
PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa
almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born
very sickly, eventually died.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following Information:
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his
liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for
his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher
Basario in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time and date of the
alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering about
aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited for
someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the Muslim
Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so they just
brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later,
Teresa contacted her and asked for Christopher’s picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak arranged a
meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a
precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was the boy’s mother did she relinquish custody to her.
However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was
innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on
December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she
had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia but only by chance. She happened
to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a few
hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was
returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m.
She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime
and there was no warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on November 30, 2004
finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA
SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by
RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are
hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario
the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against
the accused.
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.3
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision 4 dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court
ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for ₱30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance
required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak
with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as
amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly
ordered the elevation of the records.6
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats
to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim 7 or a public officer who has a duty
under the law to detain a person;8
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is
qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.9
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the
accused to effect it.10 It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces
one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. 12
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only after almost 16
months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire
time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means,
opportunity or capacity to leave appellants’ custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay
with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender
age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She
demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s actions (e.g., her
presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister
and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts.
There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.
Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a man
accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there
was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development’s social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time during
the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they
were total strangers to each other?
Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was only there that
she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on
her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of
Teresa and demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly established that
Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in
itself.13The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve
credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 14
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the
imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to
what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore
treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child.
(Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will
release him from captivity.15 No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom
as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. 16 The amount of and
purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom.
One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has banned the death penalty and reduced
all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty
imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity 19 was proper. Pursuant to People
v.Garalde,20 the award of ₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000 considering the minority of Christopher.
Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is
entitled to ₱100,000 exemplary damages.22
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak
are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱200,000 moral damages and ₱100,000 exemplary damages to their young victim
Christopher Basario.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILLANO MUIT, SERGIO PANCHO, JR., EDUARDO HERMANO ALIAS
"BOBBY REYES," ROLANDO DEQUILLO, ROMEO PANCHO, and JOSEPH FERRAER
G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008
TINGA, J.:
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.), Rolando Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo),
Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo "Eddie" Hermano alias "Bobby Reyes" alias "Eddie Reyes" (Hermano), and
Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were charged with
kidnapping for ransom with homicide1 and carnapping2 in two separate informations. Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo,
Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial. However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal cases by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was utilized as a state witness. 3 All appellants pleaded not guilty during their
arraignments.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the latter’s house in
Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men on
board a gray Mitsubishi car with plate number PSV-818. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that
Pancho, Sr. is also their relative. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their
"visitor." Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told Ferraer not to
worry because they are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they
will get would be shared equally among them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other men
came and they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri. They had dinner
and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with
masking tape contained in a big paper bag, and a green backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package contained
guns. Ferraer brought the package inside his room; he inspected the contents before placing them under the bed, and
saw that the carton contained a shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also showed
him their .45 caliber guns tucked at their waists.4
At one o’clock in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano with a companion,
seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their companion as Romeo. They informed Ferraer
that the following day, they would proceed with their plan. Romeo would be the informant since he is an insider and a
trusted general foreman of the victim. The next day, at nine o’clock in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraer’s
house alone and asked Ferraer if he was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the affirmative. Pancho, Sr.
told him to wait for the group’s return. However, the group returned without the intended victim because the latter did
not show up at the construction site.5 On 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo informing them that
the victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the
construction site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on board the Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At around two o’clock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997, Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal
driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero with plate number UDL-746 carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit
the Flexopac project site at Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted
from the Pajero and, along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand Chavez
(Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss. 6
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of the Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see
that the three engineers who stood together suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an
unidentified man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero. Two of them
approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the armed men, Muit, poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez
to lay prostrate on the ground.7 The assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order
Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero. When the victim was already on board the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of
them say, "Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay."8
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate. Two more persons who were
waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.9
At 2:30 that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt. Mission) received a radio
message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was ongoing and the kidnappers on board a Pajero with
plate number UDL-746 were heading towards Lipa City. Supt. Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the
Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In the meantime, two teams were organized to intercept the Pajero. They
proceeded to the barricade.10
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted. When policemen flagged
down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front
passenger opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the policemen present at the
scene fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and
the front passenger who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who
turned out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero, at Barangay San Carlos, Batangas, about 200 meters from the place of
the shootout.11
On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting
place but did not find Hermano’s group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway in front of the construction site. He
thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the group, so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraer’s
house, he told Ferraer what happened to their operation. Worried that something bad might have happened to the
group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for the rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. watching the TV
program "Alas Singko y Medya." He joined them and saw on the news the Pajero riddled with bullets. Pancho, Sr. and
Pancho, Jr. left Ferraer’s house at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car they used.
That night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales, Manuel,
Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong, Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr.
Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy; Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state
witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare12 (Atty. Mallare), the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in
executing their respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecution’s
documentary evidence such as the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with
the assistance of Atty. Mallare. Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December
1997, in which he was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December 1997 in
which he was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his
brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and
Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997 he was working as a mason at
Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. His work starts at 8:00 in the morning and ends at 5:00 in the afternoon. He
stated that on 8 December 1997, he was arrested by the CIDG at his house in Purok Sto. Domingo, Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City. At the CIDG Detention Center, he was questioned about the guns used in the kidnapping of the
victim. He was allegedly tortured when he denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a
statement without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement. He
denied any participation in the crimes charged against him. 13
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He was first brought to the
Calbayog City Police Station, and then transferred to Camp Crame. He alleged that the police tortured him and forced
him to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He denied having participated in the commission of
the offenses charged against him.14
On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of the shootout. He had
just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He
denied having any knowledge of the crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra
judicial confessions. He claimed that the names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel
during the custodial investigation.15
In a decision16 dated 22 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 83 of Tanauan City, Batangas found Muit, Pancho, Jr.,
Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.17 Only the cases involving the charges of carnapping and kidnapping for ransom which
resulted in the death of the victim were automatically appealed to this Court.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the
prosecution’s witnesses. It found the prosecution’s witnesses more credible than appellants, whose self-serving
statements were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability. The RTC did not give credence to
the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through torture as these were belied by the
testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants’ medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration and after
the execution of their statements. And the RTC noted that even without appellants’ extra judicial confessions, there
was still sufficient evidence on record to hold them guilty.
In a resolution dated 17 January 2006, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. 18
The Court of Appeals in a decision19 dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the RTC. 20 The appellate court
held that the RTC was correct in convicting appellants for kidnapping and carnapping. The prosecution was able to
prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one another in the planning and execution of their plan to kidnap
the victim. Moreover, appellants executed extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their
participation in the kidnapping. As for Muit, other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified
during the kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. Appellants filed their notices of appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
Before this Court, appellants opted not to file supplemental briefs, and instead adopted the assignment of errors in
their respective original briefs.21 Taken together, appellants claim that: (i) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges against them; (ii) the RTC erred in its finding that they acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes charged against them; and (iii) the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them. 22
The appeals are bereft of merit.
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention 23 are the following: (a) the accused is a private
individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in
Article 267 is present. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled
with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. 24 The totality of the prosecution’s evidence in this
case established the commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, defines "carnapping" as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 25 The crime was committed in this case when the
victim’s Pajero was forcibly taken away from him contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct testimony of Ferraer,
Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced him to let them use his house to
keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraer’s house and waited for the call from Romeo
to inform them when the victim would be at the construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2
December 1997 informing them that the victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out
their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group
pointed their guns at the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the
keys to the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit driving it. They immediately
reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt.
Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in
which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out, but was
apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their
meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a
shoot out and most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo, and Dequillo who all took part in
the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the
assistance of their counsels and family members, executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in
the planning and execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they should still
be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of a crime. 26 Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all. 27 The degree of
actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial.
The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly planned the
kidnapping in Ferraer’s house and patiently waited for the day when the victim would be at the construction site. Then
on 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the construction site and carried out
their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to consummate their
common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual abduction were described earlier.
As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the
back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the group’s informant.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them. There is nothing
on record to support appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial
confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of appellants’ extra judicial statements is that each
contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied,
without the knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers
when they executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements
voluntarily and affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional
rights.28 Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra judicial
confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador. Muit
cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra judicial confession. Nevertheless, in
Muit’s case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the
kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the ground. 29
Appellants’ claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical examinations done on
them.30 These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during trial; appellants
did not even inform their family members who visited them while they were imprisoned about the alleged
tortures.31Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to complain of the alleged torture done to him to the
Department of Justice when he was brought there.32 Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given
credence unless substantiated by competent and independent corroborating evidence. 33
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the prosecution’s case against
Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes various
exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial statements had been made by several persons
charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact
that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is
admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime and
may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as "interlocking
confessions."34 Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial statements
but also on Ferraer’s testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in his house as the informant when they were
planning the kidnapping.
As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the kidnapping was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Neither actual demand for nor payment of ransom is
necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that the deprivation of liberty was for the purpose of
extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration. 35The
death of the victim as a result of the kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for the rule is that
when more than one qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances.36
The imposition of death penalty is also proper in the carnapping of the victim’s Pajero because it was committed by a
band, which serves as a generic aggravating circumstance, without any mitigating
circumstance.37 There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of the offense.38 As planned, Muit and three other armed men kidnapped the victim and drove away with
the latter’s Pajero while two more persons waiting near the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalties imposed
are commuted to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole under Act No.
4103.39
As to damages, the RTC erred in awarding compensation for loss of earning capacity. Pursuant to jurisprudence, the
Court precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof as it partakes of the nature of actual
damages.40 The bare testimony of the father of the deceased that, at the time of his death, the victim was earning
₱5,000.00 per month as an engineer is not sufficient proof. 41 But pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v.
Abrazaldo42 wherein we deemed it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 in cases where
evidence confirms the heirs’ entitlement to actual damages but the amount of actual damages cannot be determined
because of the absence of supporting and duly presented receipts, the Court awards ₱25,000.00 temperate damages
to the heirs of the victim in the present case.
The civil indemnity should be increased to ₱75,000.00.43 The award of civil indemnity may be granted without any
need of proof other than the death of the victim. 44 In line with jurisprudence, the moral damages should also be
increased to P 500,000.00.45
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide46 and ₱25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping should be awarded. The law allows exemplary damages in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances.47
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02044 which commuted the death
penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607 to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the compensation for loss of earning capacity be deleted while the civil
indemnity be increased to ₱75,000.00 and the moral damages to ₱500,000.00, and that appellants shall also pay the
heirs of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and ₱25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO
GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron
(Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro
(Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from
another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. 2 Records show that three (3) men, later identified as
Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him
inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194. 3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately
reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, he received a phone call from
Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police. 4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom money
in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19,
2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of
₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call. 5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom money,
the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard
light when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in
Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his
vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word
"alat," the men returned to their car and drove away. 6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero
(SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym,
confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off
Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio 7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the
ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003.
In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio
Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified. 9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information 10 which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private persons,
did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and
superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the
occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted. Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty 11 and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Except
for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their respective houses when they were
taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and
detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003,
while walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from
the vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made to
sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist
him, the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death 13 with Registry No. 2003-
050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
14
In a Decision dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case No.
C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which clearly established
that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of
his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants‟ respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not
substantiated. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom,
which is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic
Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual participation was geared toward a joint
purpose and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was
abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of death, it did
not consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-appellants, finding
that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when the accused
is any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim. 22 Moreover, the
CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from
the same purpose or common design, and they were united in its execution. 23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and that Rodolfo voluntarily
signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent counsel in its execution. 24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
ISSUE: The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court’s Ruling: The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to
be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of
the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court. 25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly
established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his
liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting ransom. 26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness
or misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its factual findings
on this score.1âwphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the
RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the
extent of their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can
be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and
community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-appellants acted
in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their acts emanated from the same purpose or common
design, showing unity in its execution,29 the CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy
among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the
crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is
in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, 30and (b) clearly
established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court,
the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as
in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though
unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment. 31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same Code
now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats
to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the
accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article
267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex crime‟ of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing
of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended
by RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom,
accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment
of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the
CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that
the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole. 34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well as damages to the
family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even if the death penalty was not to be
imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless
proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime. 36 In the present case,
considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during captivity were duly
alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must therefore be
awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil
Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral
shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases
of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and
serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying
circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the
kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date
of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accusedappellants herein are equally
found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the
kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
·from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM and MARON LAJIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179570 February 4, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475, affirming the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50, finding accused Sajiron Lajim and
Maron Lajim2 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of abduction with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281 and
finding accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal
detention in Criminal Case No. 12309.
In view of our decision in People v. Cabalquinto,3 the real name and identity of the rape victim, as well as the members
of her immediate family, are withheld. In this regard, the rape victim is herein referred to as AAA; her mother, BBB; and
her father, CCC.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron) were charged with the crime of
abduction with rape in an Information4 dated March 17, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1994, in Barangay Malitub, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
together and helping one another and by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, while armed with a bladed
weapon known as "Badong", did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one AAA, a
girl of 16 years of age, against her will and consent and brought to the forest and on the occasion thereof the said
accused by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation, and while armed with a knife, accused Sahiron Lajim,
with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said AAA, against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That on the occasion of the said Rape, accused Maron Lajim helped Sahiron Lajim by acting as look-out during the
commission of the said crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) were charged with the crime of serious
illegal detention in an Amended Information5 dated August 28, 1995, which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1994 in the morning up to December 15, 1994, at Barangay Malitub, Municipality
of Bataraza, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and detain AAA, an unmarried woman under
15 years of age in the house of Egap Madsali thereby depriving said AAA of her liberty all against her will and as a
result of that illegal detention, said AAA was not able to go home to her mother for a period of more than five (5)
months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and with the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Criminal Case No.
12309 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 12281, pending before the RTC of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City,
Branch 50.
Sajiron was arraigned on April 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 12281 and on September 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No.
12309. He pleaded not guilty to both charges. Egap was arrested and, thereafter, arraigned on March 8, 1996. He
pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12309. Maron was arrested and, later, arraigned on March 11, 1996. He
pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 12281. A joint trial ensued. However, in July 1996, Egap escaped while under
the custody of prison guards.
The evidence presented by the prosecution are as follows:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were fetching
water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and
carrying a badong (bolo). They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and told
her, "Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will kill you." Inon Dama came to AAA's rescue, but Sajiron
tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA was crying while she held her
aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, "If you will not
go, I will shoot you." Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the
place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused,
Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the
forest. There, AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she
pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire, her life would be spared.
Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no
avail. She felt pain and she noticed blood on her private parts. She was sexually abused three times on the ground,
where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron,
Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day
and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and
to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAA’s mother came to get AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she would
report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to
the police authorities.6 Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign
an unknown document, which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam
Musli Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the
marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA
stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the
place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to
escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to roam within the vicinity of the
house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard. She was also guarded and
threatened by Egap's sons. She got pregnant after some time.
On November 24, 1994, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's abduction to the proper
authorities. AAA was detained at the house of Egap from July 2, 1994 until December 15, 1994. On December 16,
1994, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having committed the crimes charged. Sajiron claimed that he and AAA were
engaged for three years prior to their elopement. During the period of their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in her
mother's house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and out of her own free will. The sexual intercourse between AAA and
Sajiron was consensual. The defense further claimed that AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because
he did not pay the dowry (dower) in the amount of ₱10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not pay
the dowry because he had already rendered services to AAA's family for about three years prior to his marriage with
AAA. After the marriage, Sajiron and AAA were brought by the latter's father to his house in Balabac, Palawan. They
stayed there for about four months. Then they went to Brgy. Malitub, Bataraza, Palawan and stayed at the house of
Egap for about two weeks. Sajiron was thereafter arrested by the authorities. He only learned that a case for
abduction with rape was filed against him by AAA when he was being interrogated by the Bataraza Police.
On July 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, to suffer imprisonment as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12281, the accused Sa[j]iron Lajim and Maron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or forty (years) and each of the accused are ordered to indemnify the
complainant AAA the same amount of ₱50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity;
2. In Criminal Case No. 12309, the accused Egap Madsali and Sa[j]iron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and both accused are ordered to separately indemnify the complainant AAA
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, and the records of the case were forwarded to this Court. However, pursuant to
this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,8 the case was transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dated July 31,
2007 affirming the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 12281 and 12309.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE IMPLICATION OF THE 5-MONTH INACTION
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S MOTHER IN REPORTING THE ALLEGED ADBUCTION AND ILLEGAL
DETENTION OF HER DAUGHTER; AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S OWN FATHER.
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners allege that the five-month inaction of BBB through his failure to
report the alleged abduction and illegal detention of her daughter is totally inconsistent with AAA's claim that she was
abducted and illegally detained.
We are not persuaded.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility of the complainant, nor can it
be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained.9 BBB explained that she did not immediately report the abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to
the authorities, because Egap threatened to kill AAA, 10 who was then in his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared to report the matter to the
authorities. True enough, when Egap learned that she did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat and
shot her at the back.11 Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five months should not be taken against her.
Anent the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the unrebutted testimonies of CCC and Imam Musli
Muhammad cast a reasonable doubt on the charge against them. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and
proposed marriage after their three-year courtship. He claimed that he gave his consent to the marriage of his
daughter to Sajiron. Prior to the marriage, CCC said that he was even able to talk to his daughter and his wife, and
both were amenable to the marriage. AAA never mentioned to him anything about having been kidnapped or raped.
Neither did his wife tell him of their daughter's alleged harrowing experience. He and his wife were present during the
marriage celebration.
Again, the testimony of CCC fails to persuade Us. AAA testified that she had never seen her father since she was a
child, as her father had abandoned them.12 BBB testified that she and her husband had been separated for a long
time, and she did not know his whereabouts. She further said that CCC left their place in March 1983 to go to
Malaysia, and that was the last time she saw him.13 CCC's allegation that his wife was present during the marriage
celebration was also controverted by the testimonies of AAA, her mother, and Imam Musli Muhammad. Thus, save for
CCC's self-serving allegations, he could not muster any sufficient evidence to beef up those allegations. It is also very
surprising that CCC, after his long absence, suddenly appeared and testified for the defense. CCC would like to
impress upon this Court that he has maintained constant communication with his family; however, no single witness
was presented to corroborate this claim.
Furthermore, CCC, in his Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay14 dated December 28, 1995, alleged that in 1991, his wife
wrote and informed him that Sajiron asked for their daughter's hand in marriage. CCC replied that he was giving his
permission for their daughter to marry. In the same salaysay, he also said that Egap wrote him a letter on July 4, 1994
and instructed him to proceed to Malitub, Bataraza to discuss the intended marriage of AAA and Sajiron. However,
records are bereft of proof of the existence of these letters. Clearly, these allegations, being unsupported by evidence,
are self-serving and cannot be given any probative value.
Moreover, Imam Musli Mohammad, while testifying as prosecution witness, attested that the parents of AAA and
Sajiron were not present during the marriage,15 thus controverting CCC's allegation that he was present and gave
consent to the marriage. Although Imam Musli Muhammad, when presented as an accused witness, recanted his
earlier testimony that CCC was not present at the wedding, the same cannot be given credit. Recantations are
frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability
that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by
the courts.16 Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply
because the witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another. 17
As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be
given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi,
denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not
shown to have any ill motive to testify against petitioner. 18
The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him was his failure to pay the
₱10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has
been raped unless that is the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle holds true. 19 When the offended parties
are young and immature girls from 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be
exposed by a court trial, if their accusation were not true. 20
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a horrid story and impute to the accused a crime
so grave and subject herself and her family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public trial just to avenge the
alleged non-payment of the dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to expose the truth, vindicate her honor
and seek justice she so greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the "sweetheart theory," the defense of the accused, by alleging that AAA and
Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and marriage. If there were indeed romantic relationship
between AAA and Sajiron, as the latter claims, her normal reaction would have been to cover up for the man she
supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to the National Bureau of
Investigation,21 right after she was rescued by the authorities.
Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the
victim, which consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial
evidence.22 The "sweetheart theory" hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence,
such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts. 23 In the case
at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a
self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed
against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and
Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house. 24
More importantly, in rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always the single most important
factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for the accused's conviction. 25 This is so
because, owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter
is the testimony of the offended party. 26
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony credible. The trial court held that AAA's testimony was clear,
categorical and consistent. She remained steadfast in her assertions and unfaltering in her testimony given in court on
the unfortunate incident.27 The trial court found that AAA positively identified Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and
narrated how she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest. AAA recounted her sordid experience as follows:
AAA on Direct-Examination by Private Prosecutor Narrazid.
Q: On July 1, 1994 more or less at 3:30 p.m. do you remember where you were?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Where were you?
A: We fetched water on July 1, 1994.
Q: Where?
A: In a cave, ma’am.
Q: Was there anything unusual that happened during that time?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: What was that incident?
A: I noticed that Sahiron Lajim run towards me and held me by my hair. He was carrying a Barong and he was
forcing me to go with him but I refused ma’am.
Q: And what did you do if any when he forced you to go with him?
A: He threatened me to kill me if I will not go with him. What I did was to hold the hair of Inon Dama who came
to my rescue, ma’am.
Q: What did Sahiron Lajim do if any?
A: He hacked Inon Dama but was not hit and it was the container that was hit, ma’am. And Sahiron Lajim left
and I was forced to go with him telling me, "go with me if you do not want to die."
Q: When this Inon Dama left what happened next and you were left alone with Sahiron Lajim?
A: His father suddenly appeared who was also carrying a gun.
Q: What happened next?
A: The father of Sahiron Lajim told me to go with them but I refused. What they did was to tie my hands
behind my back and my mouth was covered by them by a piece of cloth, ma’am.
Q: And after that what happened next?
A: Then they brought me to the forest ma’am.
Q: And when you were in the forest what happened next?
A: Sahiron Lajim raped me while his father was watching ma’am.
Q: And how did Sahiron Lajim raped you?
A: When we reached the forest my hands were untied and my dress were removed and only my bra was left
ma’am.
Q: Who removed your dress?
A: Sahiron Lajim ma’am.
Q: And you stated that it was only your bra that was left in your body how about your panty?
A: It was already removed.
Q: While Sahiron Lajim was undressing you what did you do, if any?
A: I pleaded to him not to pursue his intention and Sahiron Lajim threatened me that if I will allow him to do
such thing to me he will not kill me, ma’am.
Q: And did he hold the private parts of your body?
A: Yes ma’am. (witness pointing to her bust, and the lower part of her body)
Q: What other part did Sahiron Lajim touch in your body?
A: My private part, my vagina, ma’am.
 Q: What else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his organ to my vagina. Then after raping me he required me to wear my blouse. He repeated
the act again for two times up to the following day, ma’am.
Q: How long was the private part of Sahiron Lajim inside your private part?
A: A little bit long. Nearing one (1) hour.
Q: That was the first time his organ entered your private part?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Did you notice anything in your private part?
A: I have seen blood. I was even pushing him away.
Q: How did you feel at that time when his organ was inside your private part?
A: It was painful, ma’am.
Q: And you stated that his organ entered your private part again for the second time, how long?
A I did not notice anymore how long was it, ma’am.
Q: And you stated Madam Witness that you were repeatedly raped that night, is that correct?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Up to what time?
A: The first time that he raped me was about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, the second was midnight. And the
third was 3:00 o’clock in the morning.
Q: Were you able to sleep that night?
A: No ma’am.
Q: At the time when you were raped for the first time where was the father of Sahiron Lajim?
A: He was guarding ma’am.
Q: How far was his father?
A: He was near a tree which was 10 meters away from us.
Q: Now, the place where you were brought by Sahiron Lajim is a forest?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Was there a hut in that forest?
A: None ma’am, we were at a place where there were big trees, ma’am.
Q: So, you mean to say you were raped on the ground?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Without any blanket?
A: He got some leaves of trees, ma’am.
Q: What did he do with that leaves of trees?
A: He secured some leaves and placed it on the ground, which served as mat, ma’am.
Q: Now, the second and the third time that Sahiron Lajim raped you where was his father?
A: He was also there, ma’am.28 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
As a rule, this Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness, because the trial
court had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying,
thus, putting it in a better position to determine whether a witness was lying or telling the truth. 29
However, the Court does not agree with the findings of the CA affirming the trial court's judgment finding Sajiron and
Maron guilty of abduction and rape in Criminal Case No. 12281. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question, including one not raised by the parties 30 Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the
elements of the crime of forcible abduction, thus: (a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
A reading of the Information in Criminal Case No. 12281, for abduction with rape, would readily show that the
allegations therein do not charge the accused with forcible abduction, because the taking, as alleged, was not with
lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was the act of rape. Upon further
perusal of the allegations in the information, it appears that the crime charged was actually the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Although the information does not specifically allege the term "kidnap or detain," the information specifically used the
terms "take" and "carry away." To "kidnap" is to carry away by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the
purpose of so carrying away.31 Whereas, to "take" is to get into one's hand or into one's possession, power, or control
by force or strategem.32 Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as alleged in the information,
was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.
Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information or
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no
way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the
information.33 Simply put, the crime charged is determined by the information's accusatory portion and not by its
denomination.
The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron against
her will and brought to the forest; and, on the occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and
intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code34 are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another
or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer.35
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a minor, to the
forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person
in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 36 For there to be kidnapping, it
is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. 37 Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. 38 In the present case, although
AAA was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because
she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the
forest away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give
in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible abduction and the subsequent
rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to
commit it.39 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which,
when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is
frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable
as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of
one is the act of all.40 In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to prevent AAA from
resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her back and putting a piece of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched
and stood guard to make sure that no one would interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his son against
AAA. Maron did not endeavor to prevent his son from raping AAA thrice. The next morning, Sajiron and Maron brought
AAA to the house of Egap to detain her there.
The last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
In People v. Larrañaga,41 the Court explained that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime:
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder
or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659."
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2)
robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape
with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in
the original)
Thus, we hold that Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 12281.
In Criminal Case No. 12309, we also find Sajiron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal
detention.
All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant case: AAA, a female and a minor,
testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap
and forced to cohabit with Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to guard
her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape.42 She did not dare to escape because the accused threatened to kill her
and her family if she attempted to flee.43
AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife.44 Even the two sons of Egap, upon the latter's instruction, constantly guarded
and threatened her to keep her from leaving.45 In fine, the accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that
escaping would cause her not only her own life, but also the lives of her loved ones.
To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA. However, the marriage between her and Sajiron
is considered irregular under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15 (b) of said the
law provides that no marriage contract shall be perfected unless the essential requisite of mutual consent of the
parties be freely given. And under Art. 32 of the same law, if the consent of either party is vitiated by violence,
intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the marriage is considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its
celebration.
AAA did not give her consent to the wedding.46 The marriage was solemnized only upon the instruction of Egap. 47She
was also forced to sign the marriage contract without the presence of her parents or any of her relatives. 48 She did not
want to marry Sajiron because she did not love him.49 The Imam who solemnized their marriage did not even ask for
the consent of the parties.50 He was merely compelled to solemnize the marriage because he was afraid of Egap, and
the latter threatened him.51 Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a farce, and was only orchestrated by the accused in
an attempt to exculpate themselves from criminal responsibility.
Anent Criminal Case No. 12309, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating
or modifying circumstance in the commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to Criminal Case No. 12281, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
and rape is death. However, R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines," which was approved on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the penalty of
death is reduced to reclusion perpetua,52 without eligibility for parole.53
As to accused Egap, his act of escaping from his police escort during the pendency of his case and his subsequent
unexplained absence during the promulgation of the decision convicting him of the crime charged has divested him of
the right to avail himself of any remedy that may be available to him, including his right to appeal. In a recent case, this
Court held that once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he
loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from it.54 Hence, insofar as accused Egap is concerned, the judgment against him
became final and executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment.
As to the award of damages.
In Criminal Case No. 12281, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil
indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape. 55
In People v. Quiachon,56 even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346,
the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission
of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,57 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still
heinous. Accordingly, the civil indemnity for AAA is ₱75,000.00.
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, 58 without the necessity of
additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. 59 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.60 Such award is separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity.61 Therefore, the Court awards the amount of ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.1avvphi1
In Criminal Case No. 12309, for serious illegal detention, the trial court's award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity to AAA was
proper, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.62
We also find that AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, which provides that moral
damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. 63 This is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety
and fright when she was detained for more than five months. Thus, the Court awards the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.64
Finally, AAA was sexually abused on July 1, 1994 and gave birth on April 8, 1995. There was no showing that AAA had
previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations with other men. Further, Dr. Ma. Rebethia Alcala, a Municipal
Health Officer of Bataraza, Palawan, testified that since AAA gave birth on April 8, 1995, the baby must have been
conceived sometime in July 1994, which was at or about the time of the commission of the rape. Therefore, it can be
logically deduced that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, 65 he is civilly liable
for the support of his offspring. Hence, he is directed to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape,
subject to the amount and conditions to be determined by the trial court, after due notice and hearing, in accordance
with Art. 201 of the Family Code.66
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00475
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 12281, accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay jointly and severally, the offended party AAA, the
amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Sajiron Lajim is further
ordered to support the offspring born as a consequence of the rape. The amount of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in arrears to be reckoned from the date
the appealed decision was promulgated by the trial court; and
(b) In Criminal Case No. 12309, accused Sajiron Lajim is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR.

G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
PEREZ, J.:
For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00271, 1 dated 29
February 2008, finding accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape through sexual assault.
Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not have kidnapped and raped the victim,
AAA,2 whom he claims to be his live-in partner. The records, however, reveal with moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly,
We modify the CA Decision and find him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with
rape.
THE FACTS
AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.
It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA was dancing
with her elder sister, BBB.3
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way back through the crowd, a
man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with a knife’s point thrust at her right side. She will come to
know the man’s name at the police station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. 4 He told her not to move or ask
for help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They
slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-
hour walk through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting
tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a
gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera
de Legazpi in Rawis.5
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he ordered her to
remove her pants.6 When she defied him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her
pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened
her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside. 7 "Sayang ka," she heard
him whisper at her,8 as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help, shouting until her throat dried.
But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her to open her
mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and
slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At
the road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh,
and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt Mirandilla’s penis inside her
vagina. A little while, a companion warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away. 9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun
aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina. 10
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the same fate. They
repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights, first
to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on the
grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field.
She was allegedly raped 27 times.11
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla and his
companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued
running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of people’s sight for
two nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought
her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave
her a bath and the police gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she
recognized the man’s face – she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her. 12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health
Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen,
indicative of sexual intercourse.13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea. 14
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each other at the Albay Park where
AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San
Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for good. 15
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her, 16 and, after five days, as AAA
celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in cheap motels. On 24 October 2000,
after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house in Kilikao, they met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front
of the park’s comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard. 17 They decided
to elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio
Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for ₱1,500.00. 18 They lived there from 28 October until 11 December
2000.19 From 12 December 2000 until 11 January 2001,20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio Marcellana’s house, at
the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAA’s menstrual periods, the last
of which she had on 7 December 2000.21 In late December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting
his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach pain. 22 AAA had abortion – an
inference he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she
left him in January 2001 after quarrelling for days.23
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that AAA missed her menstruation in
December 200024 and that he would not have known she had an abortion had she not confessed it to him. 25
THE RTC RULING
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 5, with kidnapping with rape
(Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim.
Case No. 9279).
The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of
rape through sexual assault with this finding:
This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the company of three others [conferrers],
kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of xxx, on or on about midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning of
December 3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx.
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times, employing force
and intimidation. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the
towns of xxx and xxx. At least once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while
employing intimidation, threats, and force.26
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It found him guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of
rape by sexual assault.27 It rejected Mirandilla’s defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual
encounters were consensual.28 It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to sustain
his defense.29
Hence, this appeal.
Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution’s lone witness, AAA, was not a credible witness and that he and
AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy they expressed in consensual sex.
OUR RULING
We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA, which happened almost nightly during their
cohabitation. He contended that they were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy they
expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly because of AAA’s intentional
abortion of their first child to be – a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific ordeal and her flight to freedom after
39 days in captivity during which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
First Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witness
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only come from a credible witness
but must be credible in itself – tested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct
that has evolved through the years.30
Daggers v. Van Dyck,31 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself –
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance. 32
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA’s manner and demeanour on the witness stand, was
convinced of her credibility: "AAA appeared to be a simple and truthful woman, whose testimony was consistent,
steady and firm, free from any material and serious contradictions." 33 The court continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to influence her in fabricating criminal charges
against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The absence of ill motive enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., to positively identify him in
open court, she was crying. Felipe Mirandilla Jr.’s response was to smile. AAA was a picture of a woman who was
gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x.34
Second, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible in itself. AAA’s ordeal was entered into the police blotter
immediately after her escape,35 negating opportunity for concoction.36 While in Mirandilla’s company, none of her
parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them
knew her whereabouts.37 AAA’s testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer, who
discovered the presence not only of hymenal lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross examination. The defense lawyer tried to
impeach her testimony, but failed to do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA’s credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility, when affirmed by the CA, is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. 38 This is so
because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having
heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under
gruelling examination.39 Thus, in Estioca v. People,40 we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) the
reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower courts, unless there is a showing that it overlooked or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity
to examine their demeanour when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear,
positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.41
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be corroborated by
documentary, testimonial, or other evidence.42 Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible
testimonies of those who know the lovers. 43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape.
Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love,
is not a license for lust.44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that
needs convincing proof;45 after the prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, 46 the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused,47 who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. 48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a
finding and adjudication for him of the issue in litigation. 49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a
prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow one when created against him." 50(Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the prosecution’s prima facie case. To
corroborate it, he presented his mother, Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and,
his friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified that on 30 October 2000, AAA and
Mirandilla arrived together at the park.51 They approached her and chatted with her. On cross examination, she
claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting with her first, before AAA finally came. 52 She
also claimed meeting the couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination
with the version that she met them previously, three times at least, in the previous month. 53 On the other hand,
Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the park. 54
The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and living in Kilikao only after his
imprisonment.55 This contradicted Mirandilla’s claim that he visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from October
2000 until January 2001.56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in blood, agonizing in pain, with the
abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he came to know AAA’s abortion
only through the latter’s admission.57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies contradicted each other and flip-flopped on
materials facts, constraining this Court to infer that they concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate the
accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should be reconciled, 58 it being true that such is
possible since a witness is not expected to give error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory.59 But, this principle, learned from lessons of human experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters
– innocent lapses that do not affect witness’ credibility. 60 They do not apply to self-contradictions on material
facts.61 Where these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies, 62 and apply the
maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony
must have been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify
a material point. In other words, its requirements, which must concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is
as to one or more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsity. 63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question, including one not raised by the
parties.64 This was our pronouncement in the 1902 landmark case of U.S. v. Abijan, 65 which is now embodied in
Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or
reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or
dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant.66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape (Crim.
Case No. 9278), four counts of rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one count of rape through sexual assault
(Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and
seriously and illegally detained her for more than three days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her,
against her will.67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, instead
of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her
in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife. 68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that
(1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each
element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his
penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:
la detención, la prición, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio ó por
cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad." 69
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, 70 states that
when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As
the Court explained in People v. Larrañaga,71 this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses.72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. 73 This is because these composite acts are regarded as a
single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A.
7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present
case, there is only one crime committed – the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd
designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, 74 we explained that
if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and
each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape. 75
It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible abduction)
and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death.
However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, 76the
penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua, 77 without eligibility for parole.78
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations of rape cannot be considered as
separate and distinct crimes in view of the above discussion.
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil damages ex delicto is
mandatory.79 As we elucidated in People v. Prades,80 the award authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex
delicto for the offended party, aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory
damages in civil law.81 Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is,
restitution, reparation, and indemnification,82 all correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code. 83
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor,84 the Court enunciated that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is
imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be in the increased amount of NOT85 less than ₱75,000.00. To
reiterate the words of the Court: "this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence
of heinous crimes..."86 xxx (Emphasis supplied)
After the enactment R.A. 9346,87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, questions arose as to the continued
applicability of the Victor88 ruling. Thus, in People v. Quiachon,89 the Court pronounced that even if the penalty of death
is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto of ₱75,000.00 still applies because this
indemnity is not dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the penalty of death attended the commission of the offense. 90 As explained in People v. Salome,91 while R.A. No.
9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a
heinous offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous. 92 (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, 93 without the necessity of
additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape. This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral damage in
rape cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades,94 where we held that:
The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may additionally
be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal
prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such
allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which
constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since
the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by
necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through superfluity of still being proven
through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis supplied) 95
AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, pursuant to the present jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL BALUTE y VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Arnel Balute y Villanueva (Balute) assailing the
Decision2 dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 which affirmed the
Decision3 dated June 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 03-211951,
finding Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
The Facts
On November 22, 2002, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the
accusatory portion of which reads:5
Crim. Case No. 03-211951
"That on or about March 22, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating
together with one whose true name, real identityand present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each
other, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there poking a gun at
one SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS, forcibly grabbing and snatching his Nokia 3210 cellular phone, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the same valued at ₱6,000.00 against his will, to the
damage and prejudice of the said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS in the aforesaid amount of ₱6,000.00 Philippine
Currency; thereafter shooting said SPO1 RAYMUNDO B. MANAOIS with an unknown caliber firearm, hitting him at
the back, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal gunshot wound which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
According to the prosecution, at around 8 o’clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois
(SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing
Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2)
malepersons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the
jeepney, withBalute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying "putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute
grabbed SPO1 Manaois’s mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1
Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants
as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite undergoing surgical operation
and medical intervention.6
In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him.1âwphi1 He maintained, inter alia,
that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol) wherein he worked as a pedicab welder
from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 10:00 o’clock in the evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day
as he was busy working the entire time. Nicol corroborated Balute’s story, and imputed liability on Blaster and a certain
Intoy.7
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision8 dated June 11, 2012, the RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, in lieu of the death penalty, as well as ordered him to pay the heirs of
SPO1 Manaois the amounts of ₱50,000.00 ascivil indemnity, ₱6,000.00 as compensatory damages for the value of
the stolen mobile phone, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
(p.a.) from the filing of the Information.9
It found that the prosecution was ableto establish the existence of all the elements of Robbery with Homicide, as it
proved that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois’s side, took his mobile phone, and shot him, resulting in the
latter’s death. In this relation, the RTC gave credence to Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the
assailant, as compared to the latter’s mere denial and alibi. 10
Aggrieved, Balute appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
11
In a Decision dated February 3, 2014, the CA affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification in that: (a) the
aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the prosecution failed to allege the same in the
Information;12 (b) the civil indemnity was increased to ₱75,000.00 in view of existing jurisprudence; (c) the ₱6,000.00
compensatory damages, representing the value of the mobile phone, was deleted in the absence of competent proofof
its value, and in lieu thereof, actual damages in the aggregate amount of ₱140,413.53 representing SPO1 Manaois’s
hospital and funeral expenseswas awarded to his heirs; and (d) all the monetary awards for damages are with interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a. from the date of finality of the CA Decision until fully paid. 13
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The lone issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with
Homicide.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
It must be stressed that in criminalcases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and
respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will
re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below. 14 Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
In People v. Ibañez,15 the Court exhaustively explained that "[a] special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes
place when a homicide is committed either by reason,or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A
conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing
is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery."16 Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if,
for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession
by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the
commission of the crime.17
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that
Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death
despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute
as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both
the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying
on the matter."18 This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim – such as Cristita and
Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively – since "[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who
are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons
other than the true culprits."19
In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) of the RPC, as amended. However, the Court deems it appropriate to adjust the award
of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 20Further, the
Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 in favor of the heirs of SPO1 Manaois due to the
highly reprehensible and/or outrageous conduct of Balute in committing the aforesaid crime. 21WHEREFORE, the
instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649
finding accused-appellant Arnel Balute y Villanueva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
and is ordered to pay the heirs of SPOl Raymundo B. Manaois the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱140,413.53 as actual damages, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE OROSCO

G.R. No. 209227 March 25, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 which
affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 finding the accused-
appellant Charlie Orosco guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Appellant, along with Abner Astor, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe," were charged with Robbery with Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain
and by means of violence, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly enter the store owned by
one Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City, and once inside said store, take, steal and carry
away cash money, to the damage and prejudice of said Lourdes Yap, and by reason of or on occasion of said robbery,
and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid cash money in pursuance of their
conspiracy, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of their superior strength and
with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab the aforesaid Lourdes Yap, thereby inflicting upon her injury which directly
caused her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on the eyewitness account of Albert M. Arca (Arca), the
postmortem findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo Belgira who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim, and the victim’s grandson, Ryan Francis Yap.
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one o’clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at
Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet hardened (frozen) so he went home. At
around two o’clock, he was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed
there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they were given
insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered
the store. From outside the store and thru its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the
neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her hands. He
recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco (appellant), while he described the man who
covered her mouth as thin, with less hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest.
When they released her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the
religious icon or "santo" at the altar infront of the store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled
together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went
home afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts. 4
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later, at the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark
thin man who stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to him, Arca positively
identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of
arrest were issued against appellant and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe
remained at large.
Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal Report 5 stating:
TRUNK:
1)Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, 9 cm deep. The wound
tract is directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, cutting the sixth anterior thoracic rib and piercing the
heart.
CONCLUSION:
The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the trunk.
He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object, such as a knife, was inflicted
while the victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense wounds. 6
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house in Bigaa taking care
of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry
at past 3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co- accused Astor. While he admitted that he was a resident of
Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not
know of any motive for Arca to testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting for
work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling fish. He was arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi when he was
buying medicine for his sick child.7
Appellant’s wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the incident he was at their
house while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On cross-examination, she was asked the
distance between their place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis. 8
On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of the crime of
robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Lourdes
Yap P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending their eventual arrest.
SO ORDERED.9
Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA upheld his conviction as it found no compelling reason
to deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.
In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the trial court erred in giving credit to
the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the trial, and that even granting
that criminal charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery with
homicide considering the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and
credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and
credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is
necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate.10
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing
notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from
physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands from behind and took her money at the store after
she was stabbed by appellant’s cohort (John Doe).
In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap but refused to pinpoint him
in open court, thus:
ACP NUQUI x x x x
Q.This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, were you able to identify him?
A.Yes, sir.
Q.Do you know the name of this person?
A.Yes, sir. He is Charlie.
Q.Do you know the family name?
A.Orosco, sir.
Q.If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, if he is in Court, would you please
point to him?
WITNESS (answering)
A.Yes, sir.
Q.Please look around you and point at him.
A.He is here.
Q.If he is in Court, please point at him.
Q.Why can’t you point at him? COURT INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling. ACP NUQUI
Oh, you see. ATTY. BAÑARES
The witness can not answer. ACP NUQUI
By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid. Perhaps….
xxxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q.Please point at him.
ATTY. BAÑARES
We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at anyone. ACP NUQUI
No. He said that the…. ATTY. BAÑARES
Then, let him voluntarily do it. ACP NUQUI
Okay.
ATTY. BAÑARES
Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to another question because we keep on waiting already.
ACP NUQUI
Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he keeps on glancing at the person.
COURT
Observations are all noted.
xxxx
ACP NUQUI
At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record that when it comes to the person of Charlie Orosco, Your
Honor, he stopped and did not say ---- he did not nod or do anything of what he has been doing when the other
persons were identified.
COURT
Okay. Noted.11
Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by appellant’s companion and appellant taking the thick
wad of P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts. When asked for the fourth time to pinpoint appellant,
Arca was still hesitant:Q.Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?
A.Yes, sir, he is around.
Q.This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you said "he is in Court," will you please look at him.
xxxx
ACP NUQUI (continuing)
Q.Is he now in Court?
A.Yes, sir.
Q.Please point at him. ATTY BAÑARES
The same observation, Your Honor. COURT
Oh, the same observation? ACP NUQUI
Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable because he is afraid.
xxxx
COURT (to the witness)
Q.Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according to you he is inside the Court?
WITNESS (answering)
A.I can’t afford to point at him.
ACP NUQUI (to the witness)
Q.Why?
A. I am afraid.
COURT
He can not because he is afraid.12 (Emphasis supplied)
At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to pinpoint appellant as among
those persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus:
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to Lourdes Yap. Who are these persons you are referring to?
ATTY. CHAN
Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.
COURT
Witness may answer.
WITNESS
A- Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of the persons talking, how long have you known Charlie
Orosco?
A- He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and because of that I know him.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
Q- You mentioned that you have long known Charlie Orosco. Will you look around and point to him if he is in
Court?
INTERPRETER
At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow T-shirt with handcuff and when asked
answered by the name of Charlie Orosco.
PROSECUTOR NUQUI
No further questions Your Honor.13
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively identified appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz:
Here, Albert Arca, the prosecution’s main witness, positively identified accused Orosco as one of [the] two men who
robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful day. As observed by the trial court during the bail hearings, when asked
to identify one of the men who robbed and killed the victim, Arca was trembling and constantly looking towards the
direction of accused Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca was well-aware of the possible consequences his testimony
could trigger. To the Court’s mind, Arca’s act of constantly looking towards Orosco’s direction whenever he was asked
to point out one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. As such, Arca’s act is sufficient identification already.
Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer some additional questions, he was able to gather enough
courage to point out to Orosco as the man who held the hands of Lourdes Yap while his companion stabbed her. Arca
stated that he was hesitant to identify and point out accused earlier because he feared what Orosco might do to him.
Incidentally, both Orosco and his wife stated that they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap. Thus, it appears
that there is no reason whatsoever for Arca to lie and attribute the crime to Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence,
Arca’s positive identification of Orosco prevails over the latter’s alibi. 14
We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court on its evaluation of Arca’s
testimony. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the
result of the case.15
Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the trial court’s firsthand
observation of said witness’ deportment revealed, Arca’s fear of appellant sufficiently explains his initial refusal to point
to him in open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally able to point to appellant as one of the perpetrators
of the robbery and killing of Yap during his additional direct examination when he had apparently mustered enough
courage to do so.
Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides in part:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence
or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi;
and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is
committed.16 Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime. 17In robbery
with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The
homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. 18
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and John Doe had to
kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to
have paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim
kept her earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the
store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her. Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any
offense, it was only robbery since Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed
the victim.
We disagree.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.
Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal altercation until she allowed them to enter
the store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant
held her hands at the back. With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest
before releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar inside the store and fled
together with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy
between appellant and his co- accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was
behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the
victim without any means of defending herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in
conspiracy with his co- accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
As we held in People v. Baron19
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they
actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.There
was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts
individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act
of one is the act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant
and his co-accused are one and the same. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide. Appellant was positively
identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among those who perpetrated the robbery and killing of Yap at the latter’s
store on May 16, 2006 in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This positive identification prevails over accused’s defense of alibi.
As pointed out by the trial court, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime
considering the presence of many public conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to
Rawis to only a "couple of minutes."20
On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death and P75,000.00 as moral
damages, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.21 We also find the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 proper due to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength,
though these were not alleged in the information. While an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the
information (albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended party to
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the information
affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. 22
The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment
until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 in
Criminal Case No. 10916 is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded as civil indemnity (P75,000.00), moral damages
(P75,000.00) and exemplary damages (P30,000.00) shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
finality of judgment until full payment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN CABBAB, JR.

G.R. No. 173479 July 12, 2007
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the decision 1 dated February 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 which affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 687, finding appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo2 which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was earlier 3 referred to the CA, whereat it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01978, for appropriate action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, was charged with
the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in an Information 4 alleging, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay Kimmalasag, Municipality of San Isidro, Province of
Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, while armed with a firearm (not-recover), conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot from ambush
WINNER AGBULOS and EDDIE QUINDASAN, consequently inflicting thereby multiple gunshot wounds on the
different parts of their bodies, killing Winner Agbulos on the spot and causing the death of Eddie Quindasan shortly
thereafter, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shot William Belmes, said accused
having commenced the execution of Murder by overt acts but were unable to perform all the acts of execution, which
would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, due to alertness of victim William Belmes to roll
and poor marksmanship of the accused thus prevented his death, then and there willfully and unlawfully and
feloniously, with the intent of gain, take, steal and carry away the money of Winner Agbulos in the amount of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), Philippine currency..
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of: (1) uninhabited place.
On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused Segundino Calpito separately entered their pleas of "Not
Guilty" to the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which the prosecution presented
the oral testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police investigator at Camp Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO
William Belmes, a member of the Integrated National Police at the Villaviciosa Police Station; Vidal Agbulos, father of
the victim Winner Agbulos; Dra. Leona Garcia-Beroña, medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of
Winner Agbulos; and Dr. Godofreco Gasa, a physician at the Abra Provincial Hospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself; accused Segundino Calpito; and George de Lara, a Forensic
Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The People’s version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Appellee’s Brief,5 to wit:
In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan,
Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to attend a
"fiesta" celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out that the fiesta celebration was already over, thus, they
decided to go home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime, the group took their lunch at Sitio Turod,
located in the same area of Barangay Kimmalasag. After taking their lunch and on their way home, they were met by
accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the
game of "russian poker."
Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played "pepito" with the group of accused-appellant. Winner Agbulos
played the dealer/banker in the game while accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito acted as players therein.
Around 3:00 o’clock p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan that they should be going
home after three (3) more deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner Agbulos’s group wrapped-up the game and were set for
home together with his group. Winner Agbulos won the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Segundino Calpito and a companion
running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then
walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-appellant. PO
William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the group, and informed the two
that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three
(3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan
whom they mistook for dead. The three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene
of the crime where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and
Segundino Calpito who ambused them and took the money, estimated at ₱12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he
won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day.
Postmortem examination of Winner Agbulos showed that the cause of his death was "cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds." On the other hand, Eddie Quindasan’s cause of death
was "cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to multiple gunshot wounds."
For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand claiming that in the morning of April 22, 1988, he went to
Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all surnamed Borreta. He stayed
there almost the entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at
around 5:30 p.m. He declared that his co-accused Calpito was not with him that day. He likewise averred that he did
not know prosecution witnesses PO William Belmes and Vidal Agbulos nor did he know of any motive for them to
testify against him.
Appellant’s co-accused Calpito denied having committed the crimes charged. He testified that at around 8:30 a.m. of
April 22, 1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the following day.
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the paraffin cast taken
from appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on appellant’s hands. The results of the
said examination showed that appellant was negative of nitrates. He opined that certain factors may affect the result of
the test such as perspiration, wind velocity, humidity or the type of gun used. He also theorized that a paraffin test
would yield a negative result if fertilizers or cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast is taken.
The Trial Court’s Decision
6
In a decision dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted Segundino Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr.
guilty of two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with
robbery or better put, robbery with double homicide and attempted murder as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery with double homicide defined and penalized under Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 6 of the Same Code with aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating
circumstances and sentences him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the killing of Winner Agbulos and
for robbing the said victim after killing him and for the killing of Eddie Quindasan. The court likewise finds the accused
Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the attempted murder defined and penalized in Art. 48 in relation
to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. These offenses attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place
with no mitigating circumstances and sentence him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as
maximum.
He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 for each of them plus P20,000.00 also for each of
them as actual expenses and finally, the amount of P100,000.00 also for each of them as moral and exemplary
damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic review. As stated at the onset hereof, the
Court, in its Resolution7 of January 17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo, 8 referred the case and its
records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968.
In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial court’s decision and found appellant guilty of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
also affirmed appellant’s conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted murder.
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its Resolution 9 of September 20, 2006,
the Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of appellee People, informed the Court that it is no
longer filing a supplemental brief and was merely adopting its appellee’s brief before the CA as its supplemental brief.
Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his supplemental brief on the lone assigned error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE VERSION IS MORE CREDIBLE
AND SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant pleads for acquittal. He
avers that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to positively identify him as the perpetrator of the crime as they did
not actually see him shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on the results of the paraffin test showing that he was
negative of gunpowder nitrates.
The appeal must fail.
Appellant’s contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime is
belied by the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the victims when the incident happened. We quote from
the transcripts of the stenographic notes:
 William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30, 1988, exactly eight (8) days after the incident when the
incident wherein you were investigated upon still very very fresh in your mind (sic). Now, in your statement which you
gave to the investigator, Pat. Tubadeza, you stated that you saw the persons shot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan and after the two (2) had fell down then you also likewise saw them shot at you at the time you were rolling
to the ground. Do you affirm and confirm this statement of yours which you subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte Valera?
ATTY. YANURIA:
Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the shooting of Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos was not
seen. He only saw the persons who were firing at him namely: Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito.
COURT:
In his testimony before the court he testified before the court that he saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shot at
Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos. Reform the question.
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shoot at you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2) accused when they were firing at you?
A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at you?
A. If I’m not mistaken it was 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. 10
xxx xxx xxx
William Belmes on cross-examination
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino Calpito and Juan Cabbab but you did not see them shoot at
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?
A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan (the witness using the word
"banat") and when they already fell down, they continued firing attempt and in my case I rolled and they also fired at
me.11
The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to look at and see appellant at the time he perpetrated
the crime. To our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to appellant’s identity, what with the fact
that just a few hours before the incident, it was even appellant himself who invited Belmes and his group to play poker.
For sure, Belmes had a face-to-face encounter with appellant before the assault and thus would be able to
unmistakably recognize him especially because at the time of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away from
appellant and conditions of visibility were very good at the time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the
afternoon. Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the
appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime was committed. 12
Belmes’ testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who was also with the group when the robbery and
shooting took place. Again, we quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:
Vidal Agbulos on direct examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you again that your son was already killed and Eddie Quindasan
was injured?
A. Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
Q. What happened next when he told you that?
A. When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet from my son.
COURT:
Q. At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on the ground?
A. Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down. 13
Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the person who robbed his son, Winner, of his winnings.
Just like Belmes, Agbulos could also not have been mistaken as to appellant’s identity considering that it was
appellant who personally approached Agbulos’ group and invited them to play poker just a few hours prior to the
 commission of the crime. Further, Agbulos testified that he was familiar with appellant as he would often see him in a
cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at first hand the demeanor of witnesses Belmes
and Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the truth or not, gave full faith and credence to their testimonies.
Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the
Court accords the highest respect to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of these witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands yielded no trace of
gunpowder residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test would not exculpate him. The negative
findings of said test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was
committed. This Court has observed that it is quite possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet exhibit no trace
of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly washes
his hands thereafter.14 As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the trial court, if a person applies
cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken, gunpowder residue would not be found in that person’s hands. He
also testified that certain factors could contribute to the negative result of a paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity
or the type of firearm used. In fine, a finding that the paraffin test on the person of the appellant yielded negative
results is not conclusive evidence to show that he indeed had not fired a gun.
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Belmes and
Agbulos that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. In fact, appellant himself declared that he did not
know of any reason why Belmes and Agbulos would implicate him in the crime. Where there is nothing to show that
the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the
witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence. 15
Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends in
the morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to prosper, however, the hornbook
rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 16Where there is even
the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water. 17
Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra where appellant allegedly visited his friends was only
30 minutes drive from Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the crime was committed. In short, appellant
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime
on the date and time of its commission.
The weakness of appellant’s alibi is heavily underscored by the fact that appellant was positively identified by
witnesses Belmes and Agbulos who were with the victims at the time of the incident. For sure, appellant’s positive
identification as the perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of alibi unworthy of credit. 18
The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties.— Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of
the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. 19
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after
the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. 20
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, having lost to Winner Agbulos in the
game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting to ₱20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to rob
Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, like that for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC provides that "when in the commission of the
deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied." In this case, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime, as appellant’s attack on the victims who
were then unsuspectingly walking on their way home was sudden and done without any provocation, thus giving them
no real chance to defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, 21 the trial court
and the CA correctly imposed upon appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.1avvphi1
The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of attempted
murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the
occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex
crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection
with the robbery.22
We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan are each entitled to civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00,23 to moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00,24 and to exemplary
damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00.25
With respect to actual damages, Winner’s father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he spent a total of ₱50,000.00 as burial
expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor. In People v. Abrazaldo, 26 we laid down the doctrine that where the
amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove
them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Winner because although the exact amount
was not proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the
victim. We, however, cannot grant the same to the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on the matter.
Finally, appellant is obliged to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of ₱20,000.00 he had taken from
Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of ₱20,000.00 representing
the amount stolen from him. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Winner Agbulos the following: (a)
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, (c) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(c) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
3. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Eddie Quindasan ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the separate crime of attempted murder against the
person of PO William Belmes.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. RODOLFO SUYU

[ GR NO. 170191, Aug 16, 2006 ]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01238 affirming, with modification, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City in Criminal Case No. 7177 convicting petitioners
Rodolfo Suyu, Willy Suyu, Francis Cainglet and Rommel Macarubbo of robbery with rape.
 The Antecedents

An Information was filed with the RTC of Tuguegarao City charging appellants with robbery with rape. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:

That on or about January 13, 1996, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Rodolfo Suyu alias Rudy, Rommel Macarubbo y Licawan alias Rommel
Bariuan, Francis Cainglet y Gargolla and Willy Suyu, armed with guns and sharp-pointed bladed instrument with intent
to gain by the use of threat, violence and intimidation of persons, conspiring together and helping one another, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away against the will of the owner, the
following items:
I - TAKEN FROM CLARISSA B. ANGELES

a) A pair of gold earrings valued at - P1,500.00

b) A gold ring valued at - 1,000.00
c) Cash money in the amount of - ____10.00
TOTAL - P2,510.00

II - TAKEN FROM WILLIAM C. FERRER

a) A wallet containing cash money in the amount of - P 150.00

all belonging to Clarissa B. Angeles and William C. Ferrer with a total value of P2,510.00 and P1 50.00, respectively,
to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner, Clarissa B. Angeles and William C. Ferrer in the aforesaid
amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TEN (P2,510.00) PESOS and ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (P150.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, respectively; that on the same occasion of the robbery, the above-named accused,
likewise, armed with their aforesaid arms, with lewd design and by the use of force, violence, threat and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspiring together and helping one another, have sexual
intercourse with the aforesaid party, Clarissa B. Angeles, against her will.

Contrary to law.[2]
Appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged when arraigned.

The Case for the Prosecution

At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a third-year student of St. Paul University, was
with her boyfriend, William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-up truck parked in a vacant lot near the
Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) [now DepEd]
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, about fifteen meters from the highway. Momentarily, a tricycle passed by the truck on its way
to the COA Building.[3] Clarissa was seated on the passenger's side, while William was behind the wheel. The two
were alarmed when they saw shadows of persons near the truck. Clarissa suggested to William that they leave. The
latter opened the window on his side halfway to check if there were persons outside. Suddenly, a man, who turned out
to be Rommel Macarubbo, appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them and said: "This is a holdup. If you will
start the engine of the car, I will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who turned out to be Willy Suyu, lifted the lock
on William's side and entered the pick-up. Clarissa told William to give everything so that they would not be harmed.
Willy Suyu then took Ferrer's wallet which contained around P150.00. A third man, who turned out to be Francis
Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry valued at around P2,500.00 and cash amounting to PI0.00. Thereafter, Willy Suyu
clubbed William and dragged him out of the truck. Fortunately, William was able to escape and immediately went to
the police station to report the incident.

Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of the pick-up truck at Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then opened the door. The two
and Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place, not far away. Macarubbo and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while
Cainglet poked a fan knife at her. She pleaded for mercy as she was brought to a house near a muddy place. At that
point, a man, who turned out to be Rodolfo Suyu, the half-brother of Willy Suyu, came out of the house. Willy Suyu,
Cainglet and Macarubbo pushed Clarissa towards Rodolfo Suyu. The latter pushed Clarissa and said: "You stay there
because I will be the first one." Rodolfo Suyu then started embracing and kissing Clarissa and fondling her breast.
When Rodolfo Suyu removed her pants, the ring she kept hidden inside her pants fell to the ground. She felt a knife,
flashlight and pliers at the perpetrator's back. Pretending that she was submitting to him, she suddenly reached for the
knife. They briefly struggled and Clarissa kicked his groin. Cursing, Rodolfo Suyu loosened his grip on her. And she
tried to run, but she stumbled and she was grabbed by the hair. He then punched her stomach twice. She pleaded to
the three others for help, but the three did nothing.

Rodolfo Suyu passed Clarissa to Cainglet. Clarissa again pleaded, "Please do not hurt me, do not kill me and do not
rape me. I am willing to join your group." She further begged, "Just give me the knife and I will be the one to kill
myself." Cainglet kissed her but she pushed him away. He continued to kiss her and then pushed his tongue inside
her mouth. She bit hard at his tongue, causing it to bleed down her shirt. She was cursed anew.

Then the three others came shouting, "They are coming." A beam of light illumined them. Cainglet and Rodolfo Suyu
then brought her to the top of the hill near the Capitol. She attempted to shout but she feared for her life as a knife was
thrust against her. She was forced to lie down on her back. Willy Suyu and Macarubbo served as lookouts, as Cainglet
punched her on the thighs. Cainglet pinned her hands on the ground as Rodolfo Suyu removed her pants and
undergarments. Rodolfo Suyu then spread her legs apart, removed his pants and undergarments, and went on top of
her. Rodolfo Suyu then tried to insert his fully erected penis inside her vagina but the girl kicked him. He rolled down
but was able to recover immediately. He resumed molesting her. Clarissa uttered, "It is better that you will just kill me
and not rape me." Rodolfo Suyu insisted "Ipitem (sic) met lang e. Anyway, this is just for a few minutes." When he
pushed his tongue inside her mouth, Clarissa bit it so hard that her teeth went through it. As the blood dripped on her
shirt, he uttered, "I will let the blood drip on your shirt, mahirap na." Rodolfo Suyu inserted two fingers inside her. He
then commented to Cainglet, who was still pinning her down, "Pare, this is still a virgin." Thereafter, with the aid of his
two fingers, he inserted his penis inside her vagina.

Afterwards, Rodolfo Suyu told Cainglet, "You will be next." Cainglet then climbed on top of Clarissa while Rodolfo
Suyu held her by the hands. She again pleaded for help from Willy Suyu and Macarubbo. But all her pleas fell on deaf
ears. She kicked Cainglet, who then let go one of her hands. When one of her hands was briefly freed, she placed the
crucifix pendant of her necklace on her mouth and uttered, "Lord, I offer you my soul." Rodolfo Suyu remarked, "We
do not have God (sic), we do not believe in God." Cainglet continued to move on top of her. The two lookouts, Willy
Suyu and Macarubbo, on the other hand, shouted, "They are coming." Rodolfo Suyu then helped her to sit down.
Cainglet then spoke to her saying, "Put your pants. We will not give you your panty because we will have your panty
be 'makulam' and tomorrow, we will display your panty on the gate of St. Paul with a dedication 'to Marie Sanchez',"
the name she gave them. Cainglet was able to insert half an inch of his penis into her vagina. [4]

Cainglet suggested that she be released for ransom. The two lookouts again yelled, "They are coming." Then a beam
of light illumined them and engines from vehicles became audible. Thereafter, two vehicles arrived from about 10 to 15
meters away from the pick-up truck. After pleading for mercy and promising not to report them to the police authorities,
she was allowed by the culprits to leave.

Clarissa fled to a house illumined with a fluorescent light and climbed over its gate. She went around the house and
knocked on the door. An old man answered the door. Blood-stained and covered in mud, she then pleaded to be let in.
At first, the old man got a piece of wood to club her, but because one of his children recognized her, she was allowed
inside. Thereafter, the barangay tanod was summoned. After 15 minutes, two police jeeps arrived and took her to the
Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital (CVRH). The nurses there, however, merely examined her bruises.

At the Don Domingo Police Station, Clarissa saw William. The authorities asked her if she had been sexually abused,
she declared that there was merely an attempt to rape her. At that time, she was ashamed to admit in front of her
boyfriend that she had been abused.[5]

On January 17, 1996, Clarissa submitted herself to a physical and gynecological examination at the CVRH. The
examining physician, Dr. Elsie A. Pintucan, found hematoma and contusions, which she diagnosed to have been
sustained five days before. Furthermore, she made the following findings:

xxxx

Genitalia: external examination = abundant pubic hair, nulliparous outlet,

no bleeding note.
= hymen (+) complete, old healed laceration at 4 and 7 o'clock.
speculum = vaginal wall no erosions/laceration.
cervix = pinkish, (+) whitish discharge.

Internal examination = admits 1 finger with ease,

cervix = closed, small midline, firm, non-tender on wriggling,
uterus = small,
adnexae = negative for tenderness.[6]
On January 19, 1996, Clarissa signed and filed a criminal complaint for robbery and rape against Rodolfo Suyu, Willy
Suyu, Francis Cainglet and Rommel Bariuan (also known as Rommel Macarubbo) with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Tuguegarao City. Appended to her complaint was her sworn statement executed on the same date. She later
gave supplemental statements on January 25, 1996. [7]

Accused Macarubbo, who was born on August 24, 1978, then, still a minor, moved to be released on recognizance.
Upon the recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare and Services, he was released on recognizance. [8]

Meanwhile, Macarubbo, accompanied by an old woman, arrived at Clarissa's boarding house. The woman offered that
her son, Macarubbo, would testify for her case. Clarissa was amenable to the idea because the authorities had earlier
advised her to agree to Macarubbo being a state witness. The old woman pleaded that Clarissa pity Macarubbo, who
then worked as a part-time newspaper vendor to help his parents. [9] Moreover, Macarubbo did not rape her.

On April 2, 1996, Macarubbo, assisted by his counsel Atty. Gabriel O. Valle and his mother, Angelina, signed a sworn
statement, in the form of questions and answers before Municipal Judge Elpidio Atal. He confessed to his participation
and implicated Rodolfo and Willy Suyu, and Cainglet, in the robbery and the rape of Clarissa. [10]

The Case for the Accused

Rodolfo Suyu denied the charge against him. He also interposed the defense of alibi. He declared that, on January 13,
1996, he was in their house at Alimannao, Tuguegarao City, taking care of his three young children, the youngest of
whom was five months old.[11] His wife was in Manila with her sister-in-law who had just given birth. He never left their
house in the evening.[12]

At 3:00 p.m. on January 16, 1996, he left his house and gathered cogon at the Bassig Resort, which was about a
kilometer away. He was shot on the left thigh, but he did not know who shot him; neither did he bother to ascertain the
identity of the perpetrator.[13] He managed to escape and arrived home at 7:00 p.m. [14] His wound was treated by his
neighbor and eldest child.[15] While away, his 9-year-old eldest child took care of his five-month-old baby. He did not
report the shooting incident to the police.

On January 18, 1996, policemen led by SPO4 Teodulfo Cudal arrested him and brought him to the hospital where his
wound was treated. He was later brought to the Sto. Domingo Police Substation where he was detained. He was told
to join a police line-up. SPO4 Cudal told Clarissa to point to him as one of the culprits. [16]

Cainglet declared that he was employed as a security guard inspector by the Night Hawk Security Investigation
Agency with principal office in Quezon City. At about 7:15 p.m. on January 13, 1996, he was in the company of Nestor,
an employee of the security agency, conducting a roving inspection at the Corinthian*Gardens. At 8:00 p.m. on
January 21, 1996, he boarded a Victory Liner passenger bus and arrived in Tuguegarao City at 7:30 a.m. the next day,
January 22, 1996. He intended to seek financial help from his mother since his wife needed money for her placement
fee. A neighbor told him that his mother had left for Mindanao. He opened the door of the house with a duplicate key.
After lunch, 12 armed men, led by SPO4 Cudal, barged inside and searched the house without any warrant. The
armed men took his wedding ring and that of his wife, his wallet with cash of P2,150.10, and his Seiko watch. The
personal properties taken from him were worth P10,000.00. [17]

He was tortured, hogtied with a nylon cord, and boarded in an owner-type jeep with only his underwear on. He was
brought to the police headquarters for investigation for robbery with rape. [18] When the policemen failed to secure a
confession from him, SPO4 Cudal took out a knife from his table. He was ordered to bring out his tongue and when he
did, another policeman held out his tongue while SPO4 Cudal pointed the knife to his tongue. When he turned his face
to the left, his tongue was injured.[19] He was brought to the CVRH where he saw Rodolfo Suyu. When SPO4 Cudal
told Rodolfo Suyu that Cainglet was one of his companions, Rodolfo Suyu told SPO4 Cudal that he did not know him.
[20]

At 7:30 a.m. the next day, he was ordered to join a line-up, including two persons he knew only while in detention,
namely, Rodolfo Suyu and Rommel Macarubbo.[21] Clarissa arrived and was ordered by SPO4 Cudal to point to him as
one of those who raped her. She failed to point at him at first, but when ordered anew by SPO4 Cudal, she finally
pointed to him.[22] She also pointed to Rodolfo Suyu and Rommel Macarubbo. From the time Cainglet was arrested
and while detained, he had no counsel.

Macarubbo testified that he was born on August 24, 1978. [23] He denied knowing any of his co-accused before his
arrest on January 17, 1996. He declared that he was a native of Cagayan, Tuguegarao City, and went to San Pablo,
Isabela on January 12, 1996 to visit his aunt Emma Pagulayan. He arrived in San Pablo at 7:00 a.m. [24] On January
17, 1996, he visited his friend Joel Iringan in San Pablo for a drinking spree. One of the guests created trouble and
shot him on his right leg.[25] He was brought to Tumauini District Hospital but was transferred to the CVRH in
Tuguegarao City. The next day, the policemen, led by Capt. Salvador, [26] maltreated him. He was forced to confess to
the crime in Carig.[27] After his wounds were treated at the hospital, he was brought to the police station where he was
detained. He never left San Pablo from January 12, 1996 until his arrest on January 17, 1996. [28]
Willy Suyu testified that on the day of the alleged robbery and rape, he was in their house at Dodan, Penablanca,
Cagayan, about 45 minutes by tricycle from Centro, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. [29] At 6:00 a.m., he and his wife went on
foot to a place called Hot Spring to gather firewood. They arrived at the place at around 11:00 a.m., had their lunch at
the house of his wife's niece, Lanie Tuliao, gathered firewood, then proceeded back home to Dodan. By 6:00 p.m.,
they were already at their house. They had their dinner at 8:00 p.m. Before going to bed, their neighbor, James
Taccad, invited him for a bottle of beer. He went back home at around 8:20 p.m., and went to bed with his wife at 9:00
p.m. He worked as a tricycle driver, but he did not go out the following day, as the piston ring of the tricycle he was
driving was broken.[30]

James Taccad, Willy's neighbor, and Eduardo Dalin, Willy's brother-in-law, were presented to corroborate Willy's
testimony.[31]

Willy Suyu further testified that on February 12, 1996, he was arrested and detained. [32] At the police station in
Tuguegarao City where he was brought, he was maltreated by policemen. After 3 or 4 days in detention, Clarissa,
whom he met for the first time, went to the station and asked for the person named Willy Suyu. The other detainees
pointed to him and Clarissa said, "So you are the person named Willy Suyu." She asked him to show his tongue. He
did so and Clarissa said, within the hearing distance of the other detainees, that he was not the one. [33]

Willy, moreover, admitted that Rodolfo Suyu was his half-brother. He, however, denied having known Macarubbo and
Cainglet prior to his detention as he met them only in jail. He also saw Clarissa, for the first time, at the police station
when she asked for him.[34] Rodolfo Suyu used to stay at their father's house in Capitol Hills (near the place where the
robbery and rape happened), but stayed at Barangay Gosi, Tuguegarao, most of the time where he helped in the
farming.[35]

Accused Rodolfo Suyu and Macarubbo presented SPO4 Cudal as their witness. The police officer testified that, as
gleaned from the police blotter, at 9:30 p.m. on January 13, 1996, Clarissa failed to identify the culprits and to declare
that she was raped. However, she insisted that in the event that she saw the culprits again, she can identify them.
[36]
Cainglet was a mere caretaker of the house where he was arrested. [37] It was the owner of the house who informed
the police officers that he was hiding in the house. [38] He noticed a bite mark on the tongue of Cainglet when he viewed
it.[39]

On cross-examination, SPO4 Cudal declared that Macarubbo, assisted by his counsel, executed an extrajudicial
statement on April 2, 1996, in the presence of his mother. [40]

SPO1 Alexander Tamang, the investigator assigned at the Domingo Police Substation on the evening of January 13,
1996, was presented by Willy's counsel and testified, among others, that the blotter, as written, did not state the name
of the malefactors, their features or characteristics, or the unlawful taking of personal property; and that the blotter did
not state a sexual abuse but only that Clarissa bit the tongue of one of the suspects and kicked the sex organ of the
other accused.[41] He, however, added that he did not write the word rape because what he understood from Clarissa's
statement was the biting of the tongue and the kicking of the sex organ. [42]

The prosecution presented SPO4 Cudal as rebuttal witness and testified that accused Macarubbo gave an
extrajudicial confession on April 2, 1998 while detained at the jail, and that he signed his extrajudicial confession
before Judge Atal.[43] The prosecution wanted to present Atty. Gabriel Valle as rebuttal witness because the judge was
already dead; but, after an off-the-record conference between the court, the counsel of the accused and the
prosecution, the plan of the prosecution did not materialize. [44] The court admitted the extrajudicial confession of
Macarubbo[45] only as part of the testimony of SPO4 Cudal because, according to the court, the prosecution failed to
present Judge Atal.[46]

On February 10, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with rape. The RTC gave credence and probative weight to Clarissa's testimony and rejected the defenses of denial
and alibi of the accused. The court ruled that the latter's testimonies were full of inconsistencies and were not in
accord with human experience. The RTC further ruled that the four accused conspired in the robbery with rape. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) Finding RODOLFO SUYU, WILLY SUYU, FRANCIS CAINGLET and ROMMEL MACARRUBO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and hereby sentence each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;

(2) Ordering the accused to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of PI,510.00 representing the value of the jewelry
(earring) and cash belonging to Clarissa Angeles; and

(3) Ordering the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, Clarissa Angeles the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.

SO ORDERED.[47]
The accused appealed the decision to the Court. After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the Court ordered
the transfer of the case to the CA pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo. [48]

The CA rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the decision of the trial court. The fallo of the decision of the
CA reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the decision dated 10 February 2003 of the court a quo is
perforce AFFIRMEDbut with the modification that insofar as the accused-appellant ROMMEL MACARUBBO is
concerned, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) years and One (1) day
of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period,
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[49]
Hence, the present petition, where the appellants raise the following arguments:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT CLARISSA ANGELES.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROMMEL MACARUBBO.[50]
Appellants assert that Clarissa was not able to identify any of them at the city jail and succeeded in identifying them
only after she was coached by SPO4 Cudal. They contend that Clarissa was declared by Dr. Pintucan to be
ambulatory and coherent with no signs of cardio-respiratory distress, proof that she was not forcibly and sexually
assaulted. It was also discovered that there was no evidence of forcible assault despite the insertion of one finger on
her cervix. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant
Macarubbo.

Appellants, moreover, aver that the testimony of Clarissa is postmarked with inconsistencies. She executed no less
than five sworn statements before the MTC. These statements were substantially inconsistent. In her January 13,
1996 statement made immediately after the alleged commission of the crime, she declared to the police investigator
that appellants attempted to rape her, but she actually succeeded in thwarting all attempts. [51] In her second sworn
statement dated January 18, 1996, she maintained the said story. The police blotter did not even carry an allegation of
rape. However, in her January 19, 1996 statement:, Clarissa declared that she had been raped. [52] Appellants, thus,
argue that the alleged victim has the propensity to lie and withhold valuable information in her affidavits. [53]

We are not persuaded. To begin with, the rule is that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance, which would have affected
the result of the case, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal.[54] The stringency with which appellate tribunals have observed this rule is
predicated on the undisputed vantage of the trial court in the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence. [55]

The trial court found Clarissa's testimony to be consistent, [56] believable,[57] and credible,[58] hence, is worthy of full faith
and credit.[59] The CA reviewed Clarissa's testimony and found the same to be clear, sincere and could have only
come from the mouth of a victim. During the grueling cross-examination conducted by three separate counsels of
appellants, she remained steadfast in her testimony that she was raped. The credibility of complainant's testimony is a
primordial consideration in rape cases for the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. [60] When
the testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigorous cross-examination and unflawed by
any serious inconsistency or contradiction, the same must be given full faith and credit. [61]

While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was raped after the robbery, this
does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum
about what really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an
indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained.[62] Besides, Clarissa sufficiently explained her initial reluctance on cross-examination, thus:
Atty. Morales:
Q: And what did you tell these policemen at the Don Domingo police station?
Naturally (sic) I told them what transpired to me, Sir.
A:

Will you please tell now before this court what exactly were those things
Q:
that you reported to the police station?
At that time, Sir, I was then trembling because of fear so that I told them
that there was only an attempted rape to me (sic) because I was then
A:
ashamed to the policemen and infront (sic) of my boyfriend.

As a matter of fact when you arrived at the CVRH you also informed the
Q: nurses that what was committed was only an attempted rape, is that
correct?
I did not talk to the nurse but it was only the policemen who told the nurse.
A:

You heard these policemen informed the nurses that what was committed
Q:
is an attempted rape, is that correct?
Yes, Sir.
A:

Your boyfriend was present when you went to the Don Domingo police
Q:
station?
Yes, Sir.
A:

Q: And your boyfriend also accompanied you when you went to the CVRH?
No, Sir.
A:

When you heard these policemen mentioned to the nurses that what was
committed was attempted rape (sic) you did not try to call the attention of
Q:
the policemen (sic) and correct them that what actually happened (sic) you
were allegedly raped?
Because I was ashamed, Sir.[63]
A:

xxx

Atty. Salud:
You stated that at first you did not divulge that you were sexually molested,
Q:
did you?
At first, Sir, what I have stated is that they held my breast, the different
parts of my body and they also fingered me, Sir. But I did not state that
A:
their penis were inserted to my vagina.

So all that you have divulged at first was that your breast was held and so
Q:
with the different parts of your body?
Yes, Sir.
A:

Q: To whom did you divulge that?

To Sir Cabildo, Sir.
A:

Q: That was the first time you divulged it to any person?

A: At first, Sir, I divulges (sic) that to the PNP Substation at Don Domingo,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, then to my parents, to my classmates and lastly to
Sir Cabildo, Sir.
 Q: Whom (sic) for the first time did you disclose that you were raped?
To Sir Cabildo, Sir.
A:

Q: When?
January 19 in the afternoon, Sir.
A:

Are you very certain that you first divulges (sic) it (sic) that you were raped
Q:
to Cabildo on January 19, 1996 in the afternoon?
Yes, Sir.
A:

You are certain in the sense that there can be no probability that you have
committed mistake (sic) in remembering that you divulged for the first time
Q:
to Mr. Cabildo that you were rape (sic) in the afternoon of January 19,
1996?
No, Sir.
A:

Is it not a fact that you executed a second sworn statement before a police
Q:
officer named SP02 Marcelo R. Cabildo on January 18, 1996?
Yes, Sir.
A:

And still you are sure that on January 18, 1996 on the occasion of the
taking of your sworn statement by SP02 Marcelo R. Cabildo inside the
Q:
investigation room of the Tuguegarao Police Station, you did not disclose to
him that you were raped?
I was investigated on the 18th day of January and I have not yet divulge
(sic) to SP02 Cabildo that I was fingered and I was raped because I was
A: then ashamed at that time. Because this policeman Cabildo is from
Baggao, he might have (sic) divulged what had happened to me in our
town of Baggao, Sir.[64]

Understandably, Clarissa was reluctant to reveal, while at the police station, the fact that she was raped, considering
that her boyfriend was present when she. made her first statement before the police investigator. Further, one of the
investigating officers was her townmate. Indeed, the fear of social humiliation prevented Clarissa from revealing, at the
time, the details of her defilement. She was in a state of trauma, impelled by her natural instinct to put out of her mind
such a painful and disturbing experience. Oftentimes, victims would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private
than reveal their shame to the world.[65] In her desire for justice, she, nonetheless, later revealed the true events that
happened on that fateful night of January 13, 1996, thus:

Pros. Sagucio:
Now, you said that when you were first investigated by the police or at the CVRH
Q: that you are (sic) not raped which is half true (sic) and now when you were again
investigated you said you were raped, what made you changed (sic) your mind?

I finally thought of filing a case of rape because of the fact that I am helping other
people whom (sic) might be the next victim and (sic) aside from the fact that I did
A:
not owe anything to them, I did not owe any obligation to anybody else and finally
I want justice that (sic) will prevail of (sic) what they have done to me. [66]

Certainly, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such
were true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor and obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon
her.[67]

Appellants, likewise, contend that Clarissa was coached by SPO4 Cudal during the police line-up, while Rommel had
to be pointed by the other detainees. She even asked them to show their tongues so that she could ascertain whether
they were the ones who molested her.[68]
The arguments of appellants do not persuade. The victim recounted that there were lights emanating from the nearby
DECS (now DepEd) and COA buildings, and several residences. [69] The place was bright enough for her to see the
faces of her assailants, only that she did not know their names. [70] Familiarity with the physical features of a person is
an acceptable way for proper identification.[71] Indeed, We agree with the following ruling of the trial court, thus:

Defense' contention that they were not sufficiently identified cannot be taken seriously. Accused did not resort to any
disguise. There could be no doubt as to their identities. Besides, it appears that the accused stayed with Clarissa for a
couple of hours so that there was ample time and opportunity for her to see and observe their features. [72]
Appellants, in their brief, further fault the trial court in not declaring as inadmissible the alleged extrajudicial confession
of Macarubbo, as it was not affirmed in open court and the latter even denied having executed the statement. [73]

The contention of appellants has no merit. The trial court never admitted Macarubbo's sworn statement for the
purpose offered by the prosecution,[74] but only as part of the testimony of SPO4 Cudal. Appellants were not convicted
based on the said sworn statement, but rather on the credible testimony of the victim, [75] and her positive identification
of the culprits.[76]

The claim of appellants that their arrest was irregular, which consequently rendered their detention illegal, cannot be
considered in this appeal as the matter was not raised at the opportune time. Records reveal that warrants for the
appellants' arrest were indeed issued on January 19, 1996 and February 1, 1996. [77] Appellants, likewise, entered their
pleas[78] without moving for the quashal of the information. As we held in People v. Bongalon,[79] in such case, the
defect of the arrest and detention are cured thereby:

Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash
the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without
objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a
person illegally detained will cure the defect of that detention. [80]
Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan does not conclusively suggest that Clarissa was
raped, for during the examination, her deportment was not of that of a rape victim and the examination of her cervix
did not even suggest forcible assault.[81]

The said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete
penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the
penis into the lips of the vagina takes place.[82] Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is
deemed consummated in either case.[83] Dr. Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the victim, which
bolsters Clarissa's recount that she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped.

The common defense of alibi used by the appellants cannot, moreover, prevail over Clarissa's clear and convincing
narration of the events that transpired and her positive identification of her assailants. It is a time-honored rule that
alibi is a weak defense when unsubstantiated by credible and plausible testimonies. [84] To merit approbation, clear and
convincing evidence must be adduced that the accused was in a place other than the situs of the crime at the time the
crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime.

Willy Suyu, a tricycle driver, relied solely on his testimony to prove his alibi that he and his wife were in Hot Spring,
had lunch with the spouses Tuliao, and arrived home at 6:00 p.m. He and his wife had dinner at 8:00 p.m., he drank
beer in the house of his neighbor James Taccad, and finally went to bed at 9:00 p.m. However, appellant failed to
present his wife, and the spouses Tuliao to corroborate his testimony, and he gave no justification for his failure to
present any of them as witnesses. The records show that the distance from Willy Suyu's house to Capitol Hills can be
negotiated in 15 minutes by tricycle; hence, it was not impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

Macarubbo testified that he left Tuguegarao City on January 13, 1996; and arrived in the house of his aunt, Emma
Pagulayan and worked in her farm; he was shot at the thigh on January 17, 1996. However, appellant Macarubbo
failed to present his aunt and his friend, Joel Iringan, to corroborate his alibi. Moreover, it is incredible that Macarubbo
did not even know who shot him despite his claim that the perpetrator was known to his friend, Iringan. Rodolfo Suyu's
claim that he was in his house in Alimannao, Tuguegarao City on the night in question is equally weak, for he failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be near the DECS (now DepEd) and COA buildings in the city.

For his part, appellant Cainglet failed to present any record from the Night Hawk Security Agency to prove that on
January 13, 1996, at 7:15 p.m., he was conducting a roving inspection at the Corinthian Gardens in Quezon City, as
he claimed; neither did he present the driver of his employer who was purportedly with him at the time.

After going over the voluminous records, We find no error in the aforesaid observations of the trial court as affirmed by
the CA. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an
accused can concoct them to suit his defense.[85] Again, these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive
identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim. [86]Clarissa, in this case, as aforesaid, passed the test of
credibility in her account of her ordeal; positively identified her assailants; and had no ill-motive to falsely implicate
them to the commission of a crime, other than her desire to seek justice for a wrong. Where an alleged rape victim
says she was sexually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her
person, provided her testimony meets the test of credibility. [87]

Conspiracy to commit the crime was also correctly appreciated by the trial court. Indeed, "at the time of the
commission of the crime, accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to rob the victim
and although only two of them, through force and intimidation, raped Clarissa, the failure of Macarubbo and Willy Suyu
to prevent its commission although they were capable would make their act to be the act of all." [88] We have previously
ruled that once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they
would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by any of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of
them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing rape. [89]

The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code is correct. The law provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape. [90]

The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is
accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. We note that aside
from raping the victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ. Appellant Suyu, thus, committed
sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. [91] Also, aside from
Rodolfo Suyu, Cainglet raped the victim. Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with
rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single
and indivisible felony of robbery with rape.[92]

As to the damages, the RTC only awarded actual damages of P| 1,510.00 and civil indemnity of P50,000.00 to
Clarissa. In line with settled jurisprudence, however, this Court rectifies the same and orders all ppellants to, jointly
and severally, pay Clarissa Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by
Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by Francis Cainglet; and
P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. [93]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that all the appellants are also ordered to, jointly and severally,
pay Clarissa Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by Rodolfo Suyu;
P50,000.00 s moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the rape by Francis kinglet; and P30,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH BARRA

G.R. No. 198020 July 10, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal of the February 11, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
041552 affirming with modification the August 24, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, San
Jose, Camarines Sur in Crim. Case No. T-2678 and finding appellant Joseph 4 Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted robbery with homicide instead of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On March 21, 2004, an information5 for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was filed against
appellant, to wit:
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, at Barangay Tinawagan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into
the residence of his victim, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and steal money from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the occasion of the said robbery
and for the purpose of enabling him to take and steal the money, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which caused his death, to the
prejudice of his heirs. (Emphases deleted.)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. 6 Trial ensued thereafter.
Dr. Peñafrancia N. Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, examined the corpse of Elmer
Lagdaan and stated in her Postmortem Report7:
Findings:
1. Gunshot wound, point of entry, 0.5 x 0.5 cms, circular, with inverted edges at the mid left frontal area. Hematoma
formation is noted at the site of entry.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted edges of the point of
entry. She concluded that since there was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close range. 8
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that he was on his way home to the
neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9, 2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant
enter the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded
money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his
possession, appellant shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following morning. 9
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s house to collect his daily wage
when he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s house. He inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant
responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a
gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the victim died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident. 10
The victim’s mother, Flora Lagdaan, testified that she spent for funeral and burial expenses in the amount of
₱33,300.00.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas City, with his
brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime
of "robbery with murder."11 Appellant’s brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his testimony. 12
The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses deserved
more weight than the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi. Thus, finding the prosecution’s witnesses to be credible
and that the killing of the victim to be by reason of the robbery, the RTC decision’s decretal portion read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, Joseph Barra GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 291(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. To pay the surviving heirs
of Elmer Lagdaan, the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death, as actual damages in the amount of
Php55,579.80, as moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accused is entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he abides by the disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners during his confinement, otherwise he shall only be entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof. 13
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. It stated
that:
Regarding the trial court’s finding that accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Lagdaan, WE will not disturb
the same as it is well supported by the evidence on record and in accord with prevailing law and jurisprudence.
However, WE disagree with its determination of the nature of the crime that accused-appellant committed. Instead of
robbery with homicide at its consummated stage, accused-appellant should have been declared guilty only of
attempted robbery with homicide.
As correctly observed by the OSG,14 the only evidence introduced by the government to establish robbery is the
statement of De la Peña that when accused-appellant reached the victim’s place, the latter barged into the said
residence, poked a gun at the victim’s forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to accede to his
demand, fired a gun and shot the victim. Indeed, no iota of evidence was presented to establish that accused-
appellant took away the victim’s money or any property, for that matter.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established,
accused-appellant should be held liable only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which provides –
"When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of
such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the
homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code."
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he commenced the commission of robbery
directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce robbery by reason of some
causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the crime of homicide is bereft of merit.
The killing of the victim herein was by reason of or on the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellant’s intent to rob the victim. That motive was manifested by
accused-appellant’s overt act of poking a gun at the victim’s forehead demanding money from the latter. When the
victim refused to accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing was an offshoot of accused-
appellant’s intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent on resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to
the victim’s failure to give his money, the crime of robbery was, however, not consummated. 15 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals stated:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows –
1) Accused-appellant is adjudged GUILTY of the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
2) Accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Elmer Lagdaan the following:
a) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
e) the cost of suit.16
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 18, 2011. 17
After appellant’s confinement was confirmed, both the OSG and appellant manifested that they would adopt the
pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu of supplemental briefs. 18
Appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established by the prosecution.
Appellant stated that the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses were rife with inconsistencies. Moreover, appellant
argued that the elements for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide were not proven particularly the
element of taking of personal property.
We affirm the February 11, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the award of damages.
In People v. Bocalan and Gatdula19 we stated that:
Findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration and assessment of the probative weight of the testimonial evidence of
the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing at close range the demeanor,
conduct and deportment of the said witnesses as they testify, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood and
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which if considered will change the outcome of the case. x x x.
(Citation omitted.)
In the present case, while appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, he does not present any
sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC indeed ignored, misunderstood and misinterpreted the facts and
circumstances of the case. We also found, after reviewing the records, nothing that would indicate any
misinterpretation or misapprehension of facts on the part of the appellate court that would substantially alter its
conclusions.
Appellant in this case was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
In People v. Quemeggen,20 this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the prosecution for appellant to be convicted
of robbery with homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. (Citation omitted.)
In the case before us, appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the victim’s refusal to
give up his personal property - his money - to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We,
however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the element of taking was not complete, making the crime one of
attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC. Appellant is, therefore,
liable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC. Article 297 of
the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. — When by reason or on
occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall
deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were discussed in People v. Macabales, 21 to wit:
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) There is an
attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to
appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot.
Appellant can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard
of dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion pe1petua.1âwphi1
Anent the awards of damages by the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of existing rules and recent
jurisprudence, we find the same to be in order and need not be disturbed. 22
However, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal
rate of 6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 23
WHEREFORE, the February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04I55 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages shall be increased to ₱30,000.00 and all monetary
awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RAMON AMPARO Y IBAÑEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated January 31, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 33336.

Information was filed against Ahmed Alcubar y Sabiron (Alcubar), Roberto Guarino y Capnao (Guarino), Juanito
Salmeo y Jacob (Salmeo), and Ramon Amparo y Ibañez (Amparo) for robbery. The Information 3reads:
That on April 26, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, all the accused conspired and confederated together and
helped one another armed with deadly bladed weapons and therefore in band, with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, that is, by boarding a passenger jeepney with Plate No. DGM-407 at the corner of
C.M. Recto Avenue and T. Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and immediately poked said arms upon RAYMOND
IGNACIO y GAA, and announced the holdup, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, robbed and
carried away the Nokia 6680 worth [P]14,000.00, Philippine Cu[r]rency, of said Raymond G. Ignacio against his will, to
the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the same amount as aforesaid.

Contrary to law.4
The accused were arraigned and they pleaded "not guilty." 5 Trial on the merits ensued.

Raymond Gaa Ignacio (Ignacio) testified that on April 26, 2007, he was riding a jeepney going to Lawton when two (2)
men boarded the jeepney along T. Mapua Street. 6 One of them sat beside him, pointed a knife at him and declared a
hold-up.7 He was ordered to take his necklace off and hand over his mobile phone. 8

Ignacio then heard a gunshot, causing the robbers to be rattled and drop their knives on the jeepney bench. 9 A police
officer arrived and ordered the robbers to alight from the jeepney. 10 Four (4) men, later identified as Alcubar, Guarino,
Salmeo, and Amparo, were handcuffed and taken to the police station. 11

Ignacio identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one who announced the hold-
up.12 He also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the front seat beside the driver. 13 He admitted that
he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time of the incident. 14 However, he testified that he saw
them place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police fired the warning shot. 15

SPO3 Renato Perez (SPO3 Perez) testified that on the day of the incident, he was about to report for work when he
noticed a commotion inside a passenger jeepney.16 He then saw Alcubar embracing a man later identified as Ignacio,
while pointing a "stainless one[-]foot long double bladed fan knife" at him. 17He followed the jeepney and fired a
warning shot.18 Later, he arrested Alcubar.19

SPO3 Perez ordered the other three (3) men to alight from the jeepney when the other passengers pointed them out
as Alcubar's companions.20 Another police officer arrived and helped him make the arrest. 21 Upon frisking the men, he
recovered a balisong from Guarino, an improvised kitchen knife from Salmeo, and a fan knife from Amparo. 22 He also
testified that he invited the other passengers to the police station to give their statements but only Ignacio went with
him.23

Amparo, on the other hand, testified that on April 26, 2007, he was in Carriedo, Quiapo, Manila, working as a parking
attendant when a person he did not know arrived and arrested him. Later, he was brought to the Philippine National
Police Anti-Carnapping Unit where he saw Ignacio for the first time. 24

On March 3, 2010, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 rendered a Decision 25 finding the accused guilty of
robbery in band. The dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in band defined and
punished under Art. 294 in relation to Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to its commission granting the accused the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, all the
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.

The accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive imprisonment under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Their bodies shall be committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary,
Muntinglupa (sic) City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.

SO ORDERED.26
All the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals.27 Amparo, in particular, argued that he and Salmeo should be
acquitted since the witnesses for the prosecution did not testify that they performed any act in furtherance of the
robbery.28

On January 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 29 dismissing the appeal.

The Court of Appeals noted that Amparo had abandoned his earlier defense of alibi, and was arguing that there was
no evidence that he actively participated in the commission of the robbery. 30 It found, however, that he was "caught
red-handed"31 with a weapon during the robbery, which was sufficient to establish that he had a common unlawful
purpose with the rest of the accused.32

Amparo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,33 which was denied in the Resolution34 dated November 29, 2012. Hence,
the Petition for Review35 was filed.

Petitioner argues that Ignacio did not implicate him as a co-conspirator in his testimony since he did not even witness
how the weapon was allegedly recovered by the police.36 He points out that the bank employee who allegedly
pinpointed him as part of the group, and the police officer who allegedly recovered the bladed weapon from him were
not brought to court to testify.37 He asserts that he was arrested, not for his participation during the robbery, but due to
his alleged possession of a bladed weapon, which was a violation of the city ordinance. 38

In its Comment,39 the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the prosecution was able to prove petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It points out that direct proof is unnecessary to prove conspiracy since conspiracy can be
inferred from the acts of the accused that they all had a common purpose. 40 It argues that the prosecution was able to
show that petitioner and his co-accused had the common objective of committing an armed robbery inside the jeepney
and armed themselves with knives to accomplish their objective. 41

In his Reply,42 petitioner insists that the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses failed to implicate him as a co-
conspirator.43 He also argued that there was no proof that a knife was recovered from his person, and other than this
allegation, the prosecution was unable to prove that he committed any other overt act constituting the crime of
robbery.44

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with band.

Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by use of force, violence or
intimidation.45 Under Article 294 (5)46 in relation to Article 295,47 and Article 29648 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery
in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All members are punished as
principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the
commission of the crime.49

Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime is still
classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage 50 under Presidential Decree No. 532.51 It is highway
robbery only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing
that crime.52

In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of robbery in
band.

Ignacio testified on cross-examination that Guarino announced a holdup, and that Alcubar pointed a weapon at him,
forcing him to take off his necklace and hand over his mobile phone. 53 He did not see what petitioner was doing at the
time of the incident since petitioner and his co-accused Salmeo were seated beside the driver. 54 Ignacio's failure to
see what petitioner was doing during the robbery is justified considering that the configuration of a jeepney bench
makes it hard to see precisely what passengers seated in the front seat are doing.

Ignacio was also able to testify that he saw both Salmeo and petitioner place their knives on the jeepney bench when
the police fired a warning shot.55 SPO3 Perez corroborated this, and testified that there were eight (8) other
passengers in the jeepney, who pointed out all four (4) of the accused. 56 After making the arrests, the four (4) accused
were frisked, and a fan knife was recovered from petitioner. 57

Petitioner initially offered a defense of alibi before the trial court. 58 He abandoned this defense on appeal after the trial
court concluded that petitioner's alibi was not enough to overcome Ignacio's positive identification. 59 He then argued
before the Court of Appeals that while Ignacio might have seen him at the scene of the crime, there was no evidence
of petitioner's exact involvement.60 His changing defenses, however, only show the weakness of his arguments.
Nevertheless, a conviction stands not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence.61 As discussed, the evidence of the prosecution was strong enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence.

Under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the imposable penalty for robbery is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Article 295 of the same Code, however,
qualifies the penalty to its maximum period if the robbery is committed by a band. Thus, the proper penalty is prision
mayor in its maximum period.62

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the minimum
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, prision mayorminimum, or from six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years. The maximum of the penalty shall be within the range of the medium period of prision
mayor medium, or from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to nine (9) years and four (4) months. 63

The trial court imposed a penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum and ten (10) years as
maximum,64 which is not within the prescribed range. Thus, the imposable penalty must be modified to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor medium as
maximum.

However, per the January 19, 201665 letter of Bureau of Corrections P/Supt. I Roberto R. Rabo, petitioner's maximum
sentence imposed by the trial court had already expired upon adjustment of his sentence pursuant to Republic Act No.
10592.66 It is noted, however, that the Bureau of Corrections does not detail how the maximum sentence was
adjusted. Nevertheless, the service of the modified penalty is rendered moot since the Bureau of Corrections certified
that the adjusted penalty was based on the maximum penalty imposed by the trial court. Thus, petitioner is ordered
released unless he is detained for some other lawful cause. 67

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The judgment of conviction in the Decision dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33386 and Criminal Case No. 07-252654 is AFFIRMED. The imposable penalty is MODIFIED. Petitioner
Ramon Amparo y Ibañez is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in band defined and
punished under Article 294 in relation to Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum to nine (9) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor medium as maximum.

Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal Case No.
07-252654, his immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless he is detained for some other lawful
cause.

SO ORDERED.

AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered the residential house of the
victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in the process of committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that
imposed for the robbery in an inhabited house, the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because the act of
one is the act of all.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Case

Aurora Engson Fransdilla (Fransdilla), the lone appellant, seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on February 28,
2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis
of conspiracy, with modifications as to the penalty imposed, under the decision rendered on September 15, 1999 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, in Quezon City2

As factual background, the CA adopted the summary rendered by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
appellee's brief, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at private complainants' residence at No. 24,
Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon City, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant Aurora Engson in front
of their gate. Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there were
four (4) of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, Lalaine's sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in
the Japanese Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that
Aurora told Lalaine that she was from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said
pretension that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and allowed her to enter their house. When they were
already having a conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and
handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even said
that the person she was calling did not know how to use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the telephone.

Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other men
outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who
was still dialing the telephone. When Aurora told that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked
Lalaine if she could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up, put down the telephone,
got her bag and went to the comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down again but in crossed-legs as she
said she was having a menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention was focused on her. At this juncture,
accused Edgardo Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo
Cacal was poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other men proceeded to the
kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions herded their maids, private complainant's niece and
cousin inside the bodega.

Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair and dragged her
upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked around the room
and when he spotted upon the vault he dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his companions to come
along. Accused Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But
before they went downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room, but Lalaine
opened the door and followed them.

When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal then brought her
inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her to just stay, and then
he searched the room. Lalaine managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came
and tied her arms at her back. While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room. It was
also at the time that accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the jewelries and things they
saw.

When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle downstairs, she saw Cacal,
Cuanang and their two other companions tucking their guns around their waists. Appellants and their co-accused then
left the house on board two (2) cars that were waiting for them just outside the house, and one of which, a black Colt
Mirage, was driven by accused Manuel Silao, together with appellant Edgardo Silao who was seated at the front
passenger seat.

At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her. Lalaine then called her
sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident to the police authorities. Not too long thereafter,
the police investigated the incident.

In relation thereto, Lalaine executed her sworn statement on February 20, 1991 (Exhibit "J"). After said investigation,
Lalaine underwent medical examination at the East Avenue Medical Center as her hands were bruised when she was
tied by her hands and her face being slapped by one of the accused. A medical certificate was issued in relation
thereto (Exhibit "N").

Thereafter, Lalaine went to Camp Karingal at Sikatuna, Quezon City where there were at least fifteen (15) person(s)
presented before her in the police line-up, but she was not able to identify any of the accused among said line-up.

After which, she went to the Station Investigation Division (SID) Station 4, Quezon City where she was shown about
fifty (50) pictures in order for her to identify the robbers, but she was not able to identify any of them.

Since she failed to identify any of the malefactors, she proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Manila. She was referred to a cartographer for the sketch of herein appellants and their co-accused as the malefactors
in robbing their house (Exhibits "B", "C" and "D").

Thereafter, Lalaine proceeded to the Western Police District, Manila. There, she went to the rogues gallery where a
picture of about (5) persons were shown to her. After carefully examining the pictures, Lalaine was able to pinpoint the
picture of accused Danilo Cuanang as one of the robbers. She was also able to identify Manuel "Sonny" Silao in a
group picture where she identified accused Cuanang (Exhibits "E" and "F") It was also in said rogues gallery that they
were able to get accused Cuanang's address at Iriga, Cubao, Quezon City.

Lalaine, together with her police officers companions, proceeded to Cuanang's indicated address. Upon arrival
thereat, they inquired from the security guard of the townhouse if Danilo Cuanang was residing there, which the latter
confirmed.

On the following day Lalaine and her police companions went back to Cuanang's house. Lalaine knocked at the door
and accused Cuanang himself opened the door. When Lalaine confronted him and told him that he was one of those
who entered their house, the latter did not answer. Lalaine asked Cuanang if he could come with them at the PNP-
SID, Station 4, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City and the latter acceded.

On their way to the police station, Lalaine inquired on Cuanang about their lady companion (herein appellant
Fransdilla), but the latter just bowed his head. When Lalaine threatened him that if he would not tell the whereabouts
of their lady companion (herein appellant Aurora) he would be answerable for all the things stolen, the latter replied
that they had no share in the stolen items. Lalaine then asked the name of their lady companion and the latter said
that her name was Jessica Engson (also known as Aurora Engson Fransdilla) and she was living in Antipolo Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. Cuanang also volunteered himself to accompany them to Aurora's house provided that they should
not hurt him. Agreeing thereto, the group of Lalaine, accompanied by Cuanang, proceeded to Aurora's house at the
given address. Upon arrival thereat, Lalaine inquired from a child if Aurora was awake, and upon asking, she saw
appellant Aurora who was trembling at that time. Lalaine noticed that Aurora was nervous and even told her that
Lalaine was able to remember her face. Appellant even voluntarily told Lalaine that she would tell her the whole truth.
She (Aurora) told that she was instructed by her companions Edgar (Silao), Sonny (Manuel Silao) and Danilo Cacal.
Lalaine even confronted her when she implicated her cousins (Sonny and Edgar).

Upon reaching PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, Lalaine and her police companions rested for a while
before they proceeded to 921 Adelina St., Sampaloc, Manila, where accused Manuel "Sonny" Silao lived. Upon
reaching the said address, Lalaine knocked at the gate, and a maid opened the same and allowed them to enter the
house. In the house, Lalaine asked the maid where Sonny's room was and the latter said it was on the third floor.
When Lalaine and her police companions were going upstairs, they passed by the second floor and saw accused
Cacal sitting on a folding bed. She then told her police companions that that man (Cacal) was among those who
entered and robbed their house, Cacal just remained silent. Thereafter, the group proceeded to the third floor of the
house, knocked at the door and it was Manuel's (a.k.a. Sonny) wife who opened it. At this point, Manuel (a.k.a. Sonny)
was lying on the bed and holding his gun, thus, Pat. Randy Quitoriano immediately handcuffed him. Lalaine's group
invited Manuel and Danilo to go with them at the police station; both acceded.

On March 21, 1991, Lalaine went back to the PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, where she was informed
that they (Rod Fortaleza's group) were able to recover some money (dollar bills) from appellant Edgardo Silao. When
these dollar bills were shown to her, she recognized that these were the same dollar bills withdrawn by her sister
Cynthia from the RCBC Bank as the bills bear red markings (Exhibits "M" to "M-5". 3
Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged with robbery under the following information, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person
rob the residence of CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN located at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village,
Quezon City, this City, by pretending to be from PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (POEA) and once
inside took, rob, and carried away the following items therefrom, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
nine (9) pieces of expensive jewelry .... P1 .5 M
$30,000.00 (U.S. Dollars equivalent to ... 900,000.00
belonging to CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN.
two (2) pairs of gold earings P 10,000.00
one (1) gold necklace with pendant 180,000.00
one (1) Louie Viton Brown Leather (sic)... 11,000.00
one (1) Gucci Ladies watch 13,000.00
two (2) gold earrings w/diamond pendant... 80,000.00
CASH MONEY 7,000.00
belonging to LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in the total amount of PhP2,701,000.00, Philippines Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the aforementioned sum and in such other amounts as maybe
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. The identity of all the accused as indicated in the information.
2. The accused Manuel Silao and Edgar Silao are brothers and first cousins of private complainant Cynthia
Yreverre and prosecution witness Lalaine Yreverre.
3. The accused Manuel Silao had entered the house of complainant on several occasions to visit relatives.
4. The accused Edgardo Cacal is the driver of Manuel Silao and knows Manuel's brother accused Edgar Silao.
5. The accused Manuel Silao has a pending criminal case for illegal possession of firearms before the RTC,
Manila.
6. The accused Manuel Silao is the owner of one Cal. 9mm Springfield bearing Serial No. 64624 with one
magazine containing eight (8) ammunitions, although only 4 were delivered to the Court.
7. The accused were all investigated in connection with the instant case, without the assistance of counsel.
8. The person depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit "E" is accused Manuel Silao while the one in the
photograph marked as Exhibit "D" is accused Danilo Cuanang.

9. On February 20, 1991, Edgar Silao was in Quezon City. 5

The prosecution presented complainants Lalaine Yreverre and Cynthia Yreverre, NBI Illustrator Amando Mendoza,
SPO2 Randolf Quitoriano, RCBC Manager Ma. Teresa Jamir, Joel Yreverre and Dr. Richard Pascual as its witnesses
during the trial on the merits. On its part, the defense relied on Celia Syquian, Edgardo Y. Silao, Dominador Pilar,
Lourdes Samson Lopez, and Danilo Cuanang as witnesses.

As stated, the RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery, decreeing in its decision of September 15,
1999, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, EDGARDO CACAL
Y SANCHEZ, DANILO CUANANG Y VALDEZ, MANUEL SILAO Y YREVERRE and EDGARDO SILAO Y YREVERRE
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery punished under Article 299 of the Revised Penal
Code and in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusión temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS oí reclusión temporal as maximum. Said accused are
likewise ordered to indemnify the herein private complainants the amount of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, the value of the property taken less the amount recovered, and to pay the amount of PhP200,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.6
As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and circumstances either proved by the Prosecution or admitted by
the Defense established her having conspired with her co-accused in committing the offense charged. 7
Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC, as
follows:8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 15, 1999 of the trial court is affirmed subject to the modification that
accused-appellants and accused are sentenced to an imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusión temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
Rejecting the claim of insufficiency of the proof of conspiracy raised by Fransdilla, the CA observed that the clear and
categorical testimony of Lalaine positively showed that Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her common design with the
other accused to commit the robbery,9 stressing that "it is a common design which is the essence of conspiracy,
though the conspirators may act separately and on different manner but always leading to the same unlawful result." It
adverted to Fransdilla's various acts as evincing her role in the concerted resolve to commit the robbery, such as
introducing herself to Lalaine as a representative of the POEA in order to gain access into the house; trying to distract
Lalaine by using the telephone, asking for a cigarette, going to the bathroom, and pretending that she was then having
her menstrual period in order to have her cohorts enter the house; and peeping inside the bedroom when her co-
accused were tying Lalaine up to enable themselves to search for and take away jewelry and other valuables inside
the latter's bedroom without hindrance.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issue: The accused still insists on her innocence, protesting that the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the
failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator in robbery. 10
Ruling of the Court
The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.
Conspiracy of Fransdilla with
her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt

It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present evidence in her defense during the trial. On appeal, the core of
her contentions in the CA was that the Prosecution did not establish her having conspired with the other accused in
committing the robbery. She reiterates such contentions here, stating that the State's formal offer of evidence did not
include any reference to any evidence specifically incriminating her.

The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions.

Our review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's contentions, the State competently and
credibly established her active participation in the execution of the robbery through Lalaine's testimony detailing her
specific acts, as follows:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, do you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened on that particular date and time on
February 20, 1991 between 3:00 o'clock to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What was it?

A- On February 20, 1991, between 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon while I was resting at our sala I saw them and
I met them at the gate and I asked the lady because there were four of them I asked the lady to come in.

Q - How did the lady come in?

A - When I saw the lady I asked the lady what is her purpose and she said I am from the POEA and she is looking for
my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - When she inquired about my sister I told her that my sister Cynthia Yrreverre is in Japan embassy and she said if
there is any other person she could talked to.

Q - What was your answer?

A - When she said that she is from POEA I recommended myself to her and I said you can talk to me and I allowed
her to enter our house, sir.

Q - After you allowed that lady who represented herself to you that she is from the POEA to enter, what happened
next?
A - I let her enter our house and I inquired and asked from her who are the persons she know in POEA, sir.

Q - And what happened next after that?

A - She mentioned a name whom according to her from the POEA but I do not remember anymore, sir.

Q - What happened next after that?

A - While we were chatting or conversing for a while she asked if she can use our telephone, sir.
Q - And what was your answer to that?
A - I said yes and I handed to her the cordless telephone, sir.

Q - What happened after you gave the telephone to the lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA?
A - After I gave the cordless telephone she keep on dialing, dialing and dialing and according to her she constantly
dialing the number and she even remarked: "the person she is calling does not know how to use the telephone"...

Q - What happened after that remarks?

A - She still kept on dialing and she remarked that she did not know how to use the phone...

Q - What happened after that?

A - After that, she asked for a cigarette sir.

Q - Did you give to the lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA a cigarette?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What happened next after that? A - After I gave the cigarette the four (4) men entered suddenly and came in our
house.

Q - Where did they come from?

A - I do not know, sir.

Q - From what direction of the house they came from Miss Witness, do you know?
A - They came from the outside of the gate, sir, and suddenly entered our house, sir.

Q - When for the first time did you see that lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA and the four (4)
men burged (sic) in your house?
A- Last February 20, 1991 only, sir.

xxxx

ATTYl COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, would you look around the courtroom and pinpoint if that lady who represented herself from the
POEA is here present?
A - Witness is pointing to a lady wearing black and when asked by the interpreter she answered to the name of Aurora
Engson Fransdilla.

xxxx

Q - Miss Yrreverre, what happened after four (4) men suddenly entered your residence on that particular date and
time you mentioned earlier?
A - As I was looking on the lady dialing, kept on dialing the number in the telephone I saw the four (4) men standing
behind the lady, sir.

Q - And when you saw the lady, you are referring to Aurora Engson Fransdilla?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - When we were in the sala we were talking Aurora Engson Fransdilla remarked she can not really contact the
number as it was busy, sir.

Q - What happened next after that?

A - And Aurora Engson Fransdilla after which asked if she can use the comfort room to which I agreed, sir.

Q - What happened next?

A - She stood up and put down the cordless telephone and took her bag because she wanted to get a napkin as she
said she still has to call up before going to the comfort room, sir.

Q - What happened next?

A - After which she sat down again and crossed legs and remarked that she had a monthly period so my attention was
focused on her, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - While my attention was with Aurora Engson Fransdilla, Cacal approached me and poked the gun on my neck, sir.
Q - What happened after that?
A - And he announced hold-up.

Q - Who announced that hold-up?

A - Cacal, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - While Cacal poked a gun at my neck Cuanang and the two other men went to the kitchen to which I could see very
well in my position from where I stood, sir.

COURT:
Q - How many men went to the kitchen?
A- The three (3) others went to the kitchen, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - What happened next?
A - While Cacal was poking the gun at my neck, I saw Cuanang and the two (2) men herded our maids my one cousin
and my niece, sir in the bodega, sir.

Q - What happened next?

A - And our maids and my niece and my cousin were locked inside the bodega, sir.

Q - Where is this bodega located Miss Witness?

A - In our kitchen, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A — While Cacal who was still poking the gun at my neck held and pulled the tail of my hair and dragged me upstairs
and brought me upstairs to the room of my sister Cynthia Irreverre, sir

Q - What happened next?

A - While I was at the room of my sister Cynthia and while the gun was still poked at my neck and still held by Cacal
he looked around the room, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A — While I was looking around the room he saw the vault of my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.

Q - What happened next then?

A- Suddenly he dropped me and opened the door and shouted that one (1) of your should come up.

Q - What happened after that?

A- While they carried the vault of my sister downstairs Cuanang came up and Cuanang carried the vault with Cacal
and before they went down they told me, Cacal told me that you should not follow us. You should stay here.

xxxx

ATTY. COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, will you please describe the vault which Cuanang and Cacal got from the room of your sister
Cynthia Yrreverre?
A - Witness is demonstrating the size of the vault it is a small one it is as small television.

ATTY. VALDEZ:
Can we measure that Your Honor.

COURT:
You agree on the size.

WITNESS:
A- Witness is pointing half of the area of the table which is more or less 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 cubic feet.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - After Cuanang and Cacal brought out the vault from the room and you were told by Cacal to stay from the room
and not to get out, what did you do?
A - When the two (2) got out I just stay and they simultaneously closed the door, sir.

Q - What happened next then?

A — When they closed the door I got the courage to open the door and followed them, sir.
Q - What happened then?
A - I went down the stairs when I was at the middle of the stairs Cacal turned his back and he saw me and came after
me and brought me up to my room, sir.

Q - How far was your room to the room of your sister Cynthia Yrreverre?
A - Just near sir, the dividing portion for the room of my niece is so near.

Q - What happened after Cacal brought you to your room?

A - While I was in my room he pushed me towards my bed, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - So when he pushed me and I was felt on my back he said to me just stay right there and he searched my room
(naghalughog), sir.

xxxx

ATTY. COPE:
Q - How did you fall Miss Witness?
A - When he pushed me I felt at my back sir and Cacal searched my room, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - While Cacal was searching (naghahalughog) I stood up when Cacal saw me stood up he slapped me, sir.

Q - What happened when you were slapped by Cacal?

A - He said (putang ina mo matigas ang ulo mo) son of a bitch you are hard headed.

Q - And what happened after that?

A — While I was sitting Cuanang came inside my room and he tied my hands at my back, sir

Q - What happened after that?

A - While I was being tied by Cuanang at my back Aurora Engson Fransdilla peeped inside my room, sir.

Q - Is that Aurora Engson Fransdilla the lady who represented to you from the POEA?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What happened after that while you were hogtied by Cuanang and Aurora Fransdilla peeped into your room?
A - While my hands was (sic) tied, that was the time Cacal and Cuanang took my jewelries, sir.

COURT:
Q - Where did she get those pieces of jewelry?
A - In my room at the headboard of my bed, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - What else if there were any taken by Cacal and Cuanang?
A - Many sir.

Q - What are those?

A - They took the following: two pairs of gold earrings, one gold necklace with pendant, one Loui(s) Vuitton brown
leather, one Gucci Ladies watch, two gold earrings with diamond pendant and cash money of SEVEN THOUSAND
(P7,000.00) PESOS.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - This one gold necklace with pendant how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for PI80,000.00, sir.

COURT:
How many karats this gold necklace?

WITNESS:
That is 18 karats gold, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, how about the two gold earrings with diamond pendant, how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80,000.00) PESOS.
COURT:
Q - Do you know the karats of this diamond? How big is this?
A - It is as big as big mongo, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - This two pairs of gold earrings, how much did you buy this, how much is this?
A-TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - What else?
A - One gold necklace with pendant, sir.

Q - How much is this?

A- ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (PI80,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - How about this Louie Vitton brown leather bag, how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for ELEVEN THOUSAND (PI 1,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - This Gucci ladies watch, how much did you buy this?
A-THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.

COURT:
What kind of Gucci is this, US Gucci or Hongkong?

WITNESS:
I do not remember anymore, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q - How much did you buy this?
A - I bought that for THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir. 11
The State thus discharged its burden to produce before the trial court sufficient evidence against all the accused,
including Fransdilla, that would warrant a judgment of conviction. Fransdilla's non-presentation of her defense, despite
her being directly incriminated by Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for her specific overt acts of complicity in
the robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence unrefuted. By this the Court simply means that Fransdilla did
not discharge her burden of evidence, which is "the duty of a party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage
of the trial until he has established a prima facie case, or the like duty of the adverse party to meet and overthrow
that prima facie case thus established."12

As such, the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof against Fransdilla.

In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a crime and decide to commit it.13 For an accused to be validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in
committing the crime, her overt acts must evince her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed.
The overt acts of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive
conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such conspirator is the
mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active
one who had facilitated the access into the house by representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that
respect, it is not always required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to
commit the crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried
out.14Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be
inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.15 Once conspiracy is established, the act of each conspirator is the act of all.

In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Lalaine's testimony
against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct testimony showed the latter's overt participation
in the execution of the robbery, while the following circumstances indicated the unity of action and common purpose or
design to commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and her co-accused
went together to the complainants' house at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. of February 20, 1991; (2) she talked to Joel to
solicit information on the whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning that Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside
the gate and talked to two men sitting inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be an employee
of the POEA in order to gain entry into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to distract Lalaine in order
to give her cohorts the opportunity to enter the house and commit the robbery; (5) during the robbery, she was not tied
up like the household members, but moved freely around the house, and at one point Lalaine spotted her peeping into
the bedroom where Lalaine was then being held; and (7) she and the others fled together in two separate vehicles
after the robbery.
In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the State established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt for of all
the accused, including Fransdilla, for the robbery.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.
Correction of the Indeterminate Sentence
was necessary to conform to the letter and spirit
the Indeterminate Sentence Law

That the trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum" was a patent
elementary error. Such fixing contravened the letter and spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1 of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
The CA justifiably deemed it necessary to correct the indeterminate sentence. Under Section 1, supra,the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence is a penalty "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [Revised
Penal] Code for the offense," and the maximum is "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code." Considering that the clear objective of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to have the convict serve the minimum penalty before becoming eligible for release on parole
pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,16both the minimum and the maximum penalties must be definite, not
ranging. This objective cannot be achieved otherwise, for determining when the convict would be eligible for release
on parole would be nearly impossible if the minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the
indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such imposition
would leave the period between the minimum and the maximum penalties indeterminate"in the sense that he may,
under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part." 17
3.
Crime committed was the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code

Citing Napolis v. Court ofAppeals.,18 the CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing
the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with
intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code. Thus, it held that the penalty for the complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code was that for the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum
period. Taking into consideration that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present, it set the indeterminate
sentence of 12 years of prision mayor,as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

We concur with the CA.

In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States v. De los Santos19 that
when the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with
violence against or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code are committed, the penalty
for the latter crime (although the lighter one) should be imposed because the violence against or intimidation of a
person was the "controlling qualification," on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation
against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence
or intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the
individual." Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepción observed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall,
enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or
intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Pursuant
to the above view, adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any
person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of
Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty - under paragraph (5) thereof- shall be much lighter. To our mind,
this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification,"
is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation
against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this
reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited - reduction of the penalty for
the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violation or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our
mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of a
person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal
Code.

We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of bothprovisions are present, that the
crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition — as provided in Art. 48 of said Code — of the penalty for the most
serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This
penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period - from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal - owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime.
xxx.20
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information fully alleged the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under
Article 294, Revised Penal Code by averring that "the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by
means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently
proved the commission of the complex crime by showing during the trial that the accused, after entering the residential
house of the complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including the
vault containing Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and intimidation
of persons during the robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other members of
the household inside the bodega of the house.

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed.21

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusión perpetua when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery
accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by PD No. 767).

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for
the commission of the crime, or when the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person
not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As
amended by R. A. 18).
Paragraph 5, supra, is the relevant provision, under which the penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period.

On the other hand, Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship.— Any armed person who
shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:

(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the following
means:

1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.

3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.

4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.

Or if —

(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;

2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery.

When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower
in degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property taken does not exceed
250 pesos.

When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, they shall
suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.

If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to
religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.
Relevant are paragraph (a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA) and paragraph (b)2 (because the
accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the
robbery was committed), supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion temporal.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for the more serious felony,
which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by armed men punishable by reclusion temporal, to be
imposed in the maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal, must be corrected to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal.
4.
Exemplary damages to be deleted
for lack of legal basis

The CA affirmed the order of the RTC for the accused to return the value of the articles stolen totaling P2,250,000.00
and to pay to the complainants P200,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of exemplary damages as part of the civil liability in crimes only
when one or more aggravating circumstances were present in the commission of the crime. With the conceded
absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, therefore, we delete the P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. However, interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the
P2,250,000.00,22 to be reckoned from the filing of the information until full payment because the value of the stolen
articles, which the information individually averred, could be established with reasonable certainty. 23

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS in all respects the conviction of
accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (1) she shall suffer the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; (2) the award of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal basis; and (3)
and the actual damages of P2,250,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the
information until full payment.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes
having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged
guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. The proposition rests
on a common theory expounded in two well-known decisions1 rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals,
upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty. However, the
rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told,2 the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao. 3 A more cursory
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla, 4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.5 This petition
now gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the
Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information 6 charging petitioner Aristotel
Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m.,
petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex
along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking
area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the mark "Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand. Petitioner
unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the
supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these
boxes to the same area in the open parking space. 7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking
space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the
vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area.
When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but
Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended
at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.8 The filched items seized from the duo were four (4) cases of
Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an
aggregate value of ₱12,090.00.9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to
the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police
investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the security
guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident. However,
after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon were charged
with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident. 10
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent
bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago
and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged that on the
afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his
neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada.11 As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided to buy snacks
inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head
out of the building to check what was
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus commencing their
detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, 13 had been at the
parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw
the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start running, at
which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the
security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the Baler Police Station. At the
station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually
brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was charged with theft. 14 During petitioner’s cross-examination, he
admitted that he had been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing, "assigned at the supermarket" though not at
SM.15
In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted
both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum. 17 The RTC found
credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the convictions on the positive identification of
the accused as perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal,18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with the Court of Appeals,
causing the appellate court to deem Calderon’s appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before the Court
of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. 20 However, in its Decision
dated 19 June 2003,21 the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 22 Hence the
present Petition for Review,23 which expressly seeks that petitioner’s conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated
Theft."24
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his actual
participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a total value of ₱12,090.00 of which he was charged. 25 As
such, there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the prosecution, as
affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is whether under the given facts, the
theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites 26 two decisions rendered many years
ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Diño27 and People v. Flores.28 Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as
they modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears
similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the
appellate court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Diño and Flores rulings since they have not
yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the silence
on our part, Diño and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings. They
are comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law annotations, 29 and studied in criminal law
classes as textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law
exams more than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such
conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace shoplifting.
Any scenario that involves the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress, such as a
supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application of Diño and Flores. The
fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Diño and
Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential system. The
time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and should continue to influence prosecutors
and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Diño and Flores, as well as the specific issues relative to "frustrated theft," it is
necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code. 30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present." It is frustrated
"when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted
"when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance."
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective phase," or that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. 31 After that point has been breached, the subjective phase
ends and the objective phase begins.32 It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the
offense, the crime is merely attempted.33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of
frustrated crimes, for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete." 34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on
the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a
felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime
under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime is
attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that constitute
the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that
all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony
itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony was "produced" after all
the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory
definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a crime,
that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no
crime when the criminal mind is wanting.35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, 36mens rea has
been defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," 37 and "essential for criminal
liability."38 It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of
the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea
requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights." 39 The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts
that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also
be an actus reus.40
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced.
As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the
law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the
elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-
up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code
does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded
which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder or
homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of
the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled
out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft
may be committed.41 In the present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it
was under it that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition, there is
only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. It is also
clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the
descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as
defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of physical handling of property belonging to
another against the will of the owner,"43 a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief "handles (touches, moves) the
property of another."44 However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical
handling, there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: "[f]urtum est contrectatio rei
fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve." 45 This requirement of animo lucrandi,
or intent to gain, was maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been abandoned in
Great Britain.46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft.
Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation and application.
Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding
that it had to be coupled with "the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to
appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing." 47 However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the
Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the taking 48 or an intent to permanently deprive
the owner of the stolen property;49 or that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere
temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted
apoderamiento.50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no need
of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. 51
So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and
apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at
least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the moment petitioner
obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by
intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction
for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only, once
the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce [such theft]
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two determinative factors to consider:
that the felony is not "produced," and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The
second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily
on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code 52 as to when a particular felony
is "not produced," despite the commission of all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is
the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property
of another without the latter’s consent."
U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was charged with theft after he
abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom
House. At no time was the accused able to "get the merchandise out of the Custom House," and it appears that he
"was under observation during the entire transaction." 54 Based apparently on those two circumstances, the trial court
had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft. The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive,
and holding instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that "all the elements of the completed
crime of theft are present."55 In support of its conclusion that the theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3)
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion of which we replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the
fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but
sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of
consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen
who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking
full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on account
of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently, however, while
the defendant was still inside the church, the offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court said
that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as consummated. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the case
took a small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales and 20
centimos, and then he placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards
who were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated robbery, and said: "[x x x]
The accused [x x x] having materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where
it had been, and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary
to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing having been frustrated,
which, however, does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, June 13, 1882.)56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in all
these cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. The interval
between the commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary, from "sometime later" in the
1898 decision; to the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse which had been stored as it was
in the 1882 decision; and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building where the theft took
place, as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no consequence in those
cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession of the
property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than
consummated theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla,57 where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public
market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter, perceiving the theft,
"caught hold of the [accused]’s shirt-front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a struggle, he recovered
his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman." 58 In rejecting the contention
that only frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said, without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the
[accused’s] criminal liability, which arose from the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book. 59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the fact
that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how momentary,
was able to consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner in this
case. Yet to simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as there is another school of thought on
when theft is consummated, as reflected in the Diño and Flores decisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The
accused therein, a driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South
Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused
drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was stopped by
an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later contended that he
had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve
the rifles after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of consummated theft, but the Court of
Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles "pass
through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would
be allowed to pass through the check point without further investigation or checking." 60 This point was deemed
material and indicative that the theft had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals pronounced that "the fact
determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or
less momentary."61 Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24
January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito de
hurto es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella,
siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede
decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de tomar la cosa
ajena.62
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of the
culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was opportunely
discovered and the articles seized after all the acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under
the final control and disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully consummated, as it was
frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard. The offense committed, therefore, is that of frustrated theft. 63
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of
apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again by
the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the division of the court that decided it,
bore "no substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and in [Diño]." 64 Such conclusion is borne out by the
facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery
receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his truck at the
terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at
the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and discovered that the "empty" sea van
had actually contained other merchandise as well.65 The accused was prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of
confidence, and found himself convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of Appeals, accused argued in
the alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that there was no
intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However, the
Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on Diño, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not
consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no substantial variance" between Diño and Flores then before
it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that case from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling" which
unfortunately was not identified in the decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the said
"traditional ruling" was qualified by the words "is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its contents at
once."66 Pouncing on this qualification, the appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the truck and the van were still
within the compound, the petitioner could not have disposed of the goods ‘at once’." At the same time, the Court of
Appeals conceded that "[t]his is entirely different from the case where a much less bulk and more common thing as
money was the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use of it is palpably less restricted," 67 though
no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had that alternative circumstance been present
instead.
Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft
was produced is the ability of the actor "to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary." Such
conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had pronounced that in
determining whether theft had been consummated, "es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al
sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente." The qualifier "siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente" proves another important consideration, as it implies that if the actor was in a capacity to freely
dispose of the stolen items before apprehension, then the theft could be deemed consummated. Such circumstance
was not present in either Diño or Flores, as the stolen items in both cases were retrieved from the actor before they
could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were filched. However, as implied in
Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there could have been "free
disposition," as in the case where the chattel involved was of "much less bulk and more common x x x, [such] as
money x x x."68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the import of the Diño ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of the stolen
articles even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in another case[ 69 ], theft is consummated upon the
voluntary and malicious taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the
thing whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of it at once. This ruling
seems to have been based on Viada’s opinion that in order the theft may be consummated, "es preciso que se haga
en circumstancias x x x [70 ]"71
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other cases, also states that "[i]n theft or
robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate
the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Diño and Flores rulings.
People v. Batoon73 involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police
detective, who followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. While the trial court found
the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused was guilty of consummated
qualified theft, finding that "[t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x x x indicate that
actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft." 74
In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded them
onto a truck. However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the Military
Police running the checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Diño, the Court of
Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were able to take or get hold of the
hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the use or
benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense." 76
In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that "[w]hen the meaning of an
element of a felony is controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that
felony."77 Indeed, we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated theft is
concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself, the
question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we
undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this Court’s 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC. 78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his
plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the
plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene, dropping the
coconuts they had seized, and were subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to the police. After
trial, the accused were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only
of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 79 but
further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated was
raised by any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two
sentences, which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts
away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner. 80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities who may
have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors "were not able to perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the felon as a consequence." 81 However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution," though not producing the felony as a result.
If the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted, provided that the non-
performance was by reason of some cause or accident other than spontaneous desistance. Empelis concludes that
the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the owner. However,
following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only
attempted, especially given that the acts were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner, and not
because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition. Even if the two
sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such
passage bears no reflection that it is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or jurisprudential
thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so settled it required
no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot
see how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once
deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a precedent for frustrated
theft, its doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that inform it, and also by the fact
that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this jurisdiction.
Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument
to persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft are beyond cavil in this
jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place. The
definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las
cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño.
2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropriaren co intención de lucro.
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos en los
artίculos 606, núm. 1.0; 607, núms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, núm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo párrafo del 617 y 618.
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed
down. However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo
Penal Español de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as "[e]l que, con ánimo de lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño será castigado" 82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the property is
not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps was
fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de
España. Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated
theft had occurred. The passage cited in Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer the question whether frustrated
or consummated theft was committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa ajena, viéndose
sorprendido, la arroja al suelo."83 Even as the answer was as stated in Diño, and was indeed derived from the 1888
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision’s factual predicate occasioning the statement was apparently
very different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved an accused who was surprised by the
employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a mannequin, and who then proceeded to
throw away the garment as he fled.84
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain that have held to that effect.85 A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed out the
inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.
Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro
que los conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la intervención
de la policia situada en el local donde se realizó la sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustraído,
30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por lo menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el culpale no llega a disponer de la
cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de
cometer la sustracción, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de frustración cuando,
perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22
febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es admissible, éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son hurtos
consumados.86
Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible:
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la
disposición del agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada últimamente porla jurisprudencia española que
generalmente considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede por tiempo
más o menos duradero bajo su poder. El hecho de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es indiferente. El
delito no pierde su carácter de consumado aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere recuperada.
No se concibe la frustración, pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumación del hurto
no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados
son verdaderos delitos consumados.87 (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calón’s submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish
Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft
could truly be frustrated, since "pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la consumación del
hurto no lo consume efectivamente." Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts
necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges us to
accept frustrated theft, as proposed in Diño and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated
theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in light of Cuello
Calón’s position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective,
as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that
theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate of
statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt the Diño and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the negative.
If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the exercise of the function
of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows breathing room
for a variety of theorems in competition until one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature, through
statute, to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the
sovereign people, which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature. Judicial interpretation of
penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of
the law as it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.88 The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of a crime which was unintended by
the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the statutory language. Due respect for the
prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal
laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court must take heed of language, legislative history and
purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids." 89
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely dispose
of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308,
whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what
this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 90
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is
again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that
perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of
execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone
has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries,
as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the
thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of
"taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item.
But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for
it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been accomplished."
Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a
crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue
will not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the
petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of
detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long
enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 92 And long ago, we
asserted in People v. Avila:93
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical
power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo
lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does not require that the
taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of
no slight importance.94
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which
is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At
the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have
a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained
possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of
property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that
the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the
stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any
legislated intent,95 since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated penalty under
applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a
stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at
the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the
property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number
and identity of people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in
which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or edibility of
the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free
disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed
deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the
presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking, have
been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect
could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed. But
once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property,
and ultimately the consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do not align with the
legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in
such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly
allows that the "free disposition of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been
produced. Diño itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was
ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and
even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds
true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from this Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched
the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline
to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there can be no
frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take
considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference
to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

HERMAN MEDINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182648 June 17, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
January 7, 2008 Decision1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29634,
which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City,
Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple theft,
defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Information4 filed against Medina states:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime thereafter, in the City of Santiago, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away the
following to wit: one (1) unit alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00, battery worth Php2,500.00[,]
and two (2) sets of tire 2.75 x 15 with mugs worth Php10,000.00 all valued at Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY LIM,
represented by PURITA LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount of Php22,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW[.]
The factual antecedents appear as follows:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered owner of a Sangyong
Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door.
On April 27, 2002,he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista,
Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and
serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other
parts were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita
Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement
that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00, and ₱10,000.00,
respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and installed them on Lim’s another
vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same
day and was able to get the jeep, but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop.
Before placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in
good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint5 for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing her brother. The City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.6 Subsequently, an Information was filed before the court a quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No settlement, stipulation or admission was made by the parties during
the pre-trial.8 During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina
and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former barangay kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense.
Eventually, the case was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the defense. 9
The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the March 31, 2005
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and considering
the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim the total amount of ₱22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina. While the trial court was not convinced with Medina’s justification
that he installed the jeep’s missing parts to the pick-up also owned by Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is "so lame
and flimsy." The CA agreed with the lower court’s findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the
pickup; that unlike the pick-up, the needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove that
the pick-up was completely repaired and was placed in good running condition; and that he failed to prove that the
pick-up is owned by Lim. The CA also held that the positive testimony of Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the
self-serving testimony of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to Medina’s assertion that the missing auto parts
were turned over to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim. For the CA, the trial court correctly
ruled that such claim was unsubstantiated in view of Medina’s failure to formally offer in evidence the purported
acknowledgment receipt. Assuming that the exception in Mato v. CA 11 is taken into account, the receipt could not still
be considered because it was not incorporated in the records of the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed this petition which alleges the following errors:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION ONLY PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. WORST, IT
SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED ONLY ONE SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DANILO BELTRAN THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO (2)
PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE KORANDO JEEP WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,]
NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OFTHE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS
EVIDENCE BUT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN PHILIPPINES VS. ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN
THE CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2"
FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C" FOR THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT
FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ONE OFTHE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK. 12
We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. 13 As defined and penalized, the
elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things. 14 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of
asportation.15 Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the
intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. 16 As to the concept of "taking" –
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of
appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled
that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes
any act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed through the use of the offenders' own hands,
as well as any mechanical device x x x.17
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter, battery, and two tires
with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. 18 With such
admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon
perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden.
Even bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the
missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or
impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and
their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina adduce any justifying 19 or exempting20 circumstance to avoid
criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was still in running condition
and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went missing by the time the vehicle was recovered from
the auto shop.21 Likewise, the testimony of Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he was not able to
get the jeep in the morning of September 4, 2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims could
not be found, and that when he asked Medina as to their whereabouts the latter told him that he took them, placed the
starter in Lim’s pick-up while the alternator was in the repair shop. 22 Medina informed him that the jeep’s missing parts
were actually installed to Lim’s other vehicle which was also being repaired at the time. 23However, Beltran did not
know or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina’s shop. 24 In the afternoon of the sameday, he was able
to get the jeep but not its missing parts.25 He concluded that they were lost because he inspected the jeep. 26
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,27 which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the element of lack of
owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records showed that Abundo made a request in
writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A
memorandum receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking
or unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his
request, with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by the public officials who had
legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there
can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the
observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious. 28
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt 29 that he and Tumamao identified
during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to his testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina’s)
place and saw the subject auto parts while being transferred from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto,
Medina even called barangay officials and let them signed a document to bear witness on the matter. 30 The document,
dated July 25, 2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed byMendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim’s chief
mechanic), Mario Pascual (said to be Medina’s helper), and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay
kagawads). Ostensibly, they signed the document while facing each other in front of Medina’s house. 31
In Mato v. CA,32 which referred to People v. Napat-a,33 citing People v. Mate,34 We relaxed the application of Section
34, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court by allowing the admission of evidence not formally offered. To be admissible,
however, two essential conditions must concur: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. 36
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it was not formally
offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was
not incorporated in the case records. For its part, the CA opined that nowhere from the case records does Medina’s
acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examination, it appears that the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt
was attached as Annex "3" of Medina’s Appellant’s Brief. 37 Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece of
document, especially so since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the trial proper that said receipt
be marked as Exhibit "C."38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same would still not exonerate
Medina.1âwphi1 This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him remove the
alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and put the same to the pick-up. 39 Likewise, while Medina
asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to
the pick-up, the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim. As against the positive
and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for being self-serving
and uncorroborated. Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with caution because it is inherently
weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted.40
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus, courts – both
trial and appellate – have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not
with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable
by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all,
denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and
self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.41 Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive
on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.42
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings of the trial court,
which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed
by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon Us. 43 It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the court below. 44 As held in Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals:45
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and
authority (Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought toit from the Court of Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of facts being conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).
In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to reviewing
questions of law, unless the factual findings are totally bereft of support in the records or are so glaringly erroneous as
to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Canete, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 13).
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the Supreme Court
are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and are allowed only on questions of law and only when there
are special and important reasons, which we do not find in this case (Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365). 46
Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court:
Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of simple theft when the value of the stolen property exceeds
₱22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. 47
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into
consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC. 48 As the value of the auto parts
stolen from Lim is in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
Article 309, which is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since the penalty prescribed
is composed of only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division into three equal portions the time included
in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Thus, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of
the penalty prescribed are:
Minimum - 6 years and l day to 7 years and 4 months
Medium - 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Maximum - 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years
The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be-anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to
that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of
the crime.49 In this case, the pep.alty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, or anywhere from Two (2) years,. Four (4) months and One (1) day to Six (6) years.
Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six
(6) months and Twenty-One (21) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and
One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 50 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
January 7, 2008 Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634,1 which
affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3), Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal
Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the crime of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERA "JOY" ELEUTERIO NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles @Mera Nielles Delos Reyes was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft in an
Information that reads as follows:
That on or about and sometime in July, 2004 in the City of Makati, Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the cashier of complainant Juanita J. Flores and as such
enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon her by the said complainant, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal, and carry away collected money in the total amount of ₱640,353.86 to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant, in the aforementioned amount of ₱640,353.86. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
In an Order2 dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132, ordered appellant's
release from confinement after having posted a bond in the amount ₱100,000.00 undertaken by Far Eastern Surety &
Insurance Company, Inc. under Bond No. 8385. Appellant was thereafter arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to
the charges.3
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged in the business of
guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and disposing, selling or transferring them
for consideration. Appellant initially worked as Flores’ house help but was eventually hired to work at Flores’ office
performing clerical jobs like sorting invoices. When Flores’ business grew, appellant was assigned to bill and collect
from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004, appellant collected ₱640,353.86 from the
sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores’) account. Instead,
she issued 15 personal checks totaling ₱640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores’ account. All the checks were
dishonored upon presentment due to "account closed." Appellant thereafter absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of ₱640,353.86.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
In a Judgment4 dated March 26, 2008, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, found appellant guilty of the crime of
qualified theft, thus:
Given the foregoing, accused Nielles took ₱640,353.86 belonging to private complainant Juanita J. Flores, without the
latter’s consent. The taking was done with intent to gain because when the accused’s checks bounced, she failed to
remit or return the amount. The accused’s act was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, but rather by the use of abuse of confidence reposed [by] private complainant [upon]
her. Thus, the elements of theft, as well as the circumstances that made the same as qualified theft, are present in the
instant case.
Accused Nielles, on the other hand, denied having stolen and carried away ₱640,353.86. Aside from her bare denial,
she did not present any evidence to support this claim. In fact, she did not deny that the checks were issued and
deposited by her. Furthermore, she did not provide any reason or motive why Juanita would file the present case
against her. Accordingly, her denial has no basis and deserves no consideration. 5
The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Mera "Joy" Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles Delos Reyes, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. She is ordered to pay private complainant Juanita J. Flores ₱640,353.86 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.6
Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal. At the same time, she submitted a Renewal Certificate 7 of her bond
effective for the period January 18, 2008 to January 18, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad on July 15, 2004, she could not have
personally known whether appellant indeed collected amounts from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere
issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed
to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected
monies from the sub-guarantors amounting to ₱640,353.86. Appellant also theorized that she might have issued the
checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for whatever transactions they have between them; and that thereafter, when
she went to these sub-guarantors to collect their dues for private complainant, these sub-guarantors used the same
checks she previously issued as their payment for private complainant. For that reason her personal checks were
deposited in private complainant’s account.
The CA, however, in its Decision8 dated May 26, 2011, was not impressed by appellant’s protestations. It held that the
fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission of the offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has
satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in the Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to
the sub-guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15 personal checks in lieu of the amounts
collected and deposited the same to Flores’ account but were all dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the CA
noted that aside from her bare denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her claim that she did not
steal the amount of ₱640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified theft to
be present.
Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed 26 March 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 in Criminal Case No. 04-3643 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. She is further
ordered to pay Private Complainant the amount of ₱640,353.86.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution10 dated April 18, 2012, we required both parties to file their Supplemental Briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing its supplemental brief. On the other hand,
appellant maintains in her Supplemental Brief11 that the prosecution failed to establish that she unlawfully took the
amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to Flores. She claims that mere issuance of the checks does not prove unlawful
taking of the unaccounted amount. She insists that, at most, the issuance of the checks proves that the same was
issued for consideration. On February5, 2013, appellant furnished this Court her bond renewal certificate 12 issued by
Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. effective for the period January 18, 2013 to January 18, 2014.
Our Ruling
We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution satisfactorily established all
the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal property;2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the
said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owner’s consent; 5) that it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave
abuse of confidence.13 As correctly found by the appellate court:
Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of ₱640,353.86 from her without her consent by
failing to turn over the amount she collected from the former’s sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15)
personal checks and deposited the same to Private Complainant’s account which however, all bounced for the reason
"account closed". The taking of the amount collected by Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as
she failed to remit the same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further,
the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
[or] of force upon things as the payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors
as she was known to be entrusted with the collection of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also
proven.1âwphi1 Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and responsibilities include billings
and collections from their agents and making of deposits and withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover,
when the payment for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks
given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an
employee like a cashier who comes into possession of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her
by her employer, as in the instant case.14
We are one with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the element of taking of personal property was
satisfactorily established by the prosecution. During her cross-examination, private complainant Flores testified that
upon having been apprised of the unremitted collections, she conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-
guarantors who admitted making payments to appellant. 15 She also testified during cross-examination that when
appellant arrived from Hongkong, the latter went to Flores’ office and admitted to having converted the collections to
her personal use.16 Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify, appellant did not rebut Flores’ testimony. During her
direct examination, appellant only testified thus:
Atty. Regino – Question:
Madam Witness, you are being charged here with taking, stealing and carrying away collected money in the total
amount of ₱640,353.86, that is owned by Juanita J. Flores. What can you say about this allegation?
Witness:
That is not true, sir.
Atty. Regino – Question:
What is your basis in stating that?
Witness:
I never took that six hundred forty thousand that they are saying and, I never signed any document with the sub-
guarantors that I [took] money from them.17
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to the sub-guarantors who admitted having
made payments to appellant, the latter’s counsel no longer made further clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus,
Flores’ testimony on this fact remains on record unrebutted. Clearly, it is futile on the part of the appellant to belatedly
claim in her Brief before the appellate court that the prosecution should have presented these sub-guarantors so they
could be cross-examined.18 There is likewise no merit in her contention that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of
evidence when they did not present these sub-guarantors 19 simply because the defense, on its own initiative, could
very well compel, thru the compulsory processes of the court, the attendance of these sub-guarantors as
witnesses.20 Moreover, we note that appellant did not even attempt to discredit the testimony of Flores to the effect
that upon her arrival from Hongkong, appellant went to Flores’ office and admitted to having committed the offense.
Significantly, when appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any attempt to explain her
issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made any mention about the personal
checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. It was only in her Memorandum 21 filed with the trial court and
her Brief22 submitted to the appellate court that the same was discussed. However, her explanation as to its issuance
is so convoluted that it defies belief. All that appellant could claim is that the issuance of the checks only proves that
the same was for a consideration – but omitted to explain what the consideration was. She also theorized that she
might have issued the checks to the sub-guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed to elaborate on
what these transactions were. In any event, if indeed appellant did not steal the amount of ₱640,353.86 belonging to
Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in favor of the latter and deposited the same in her account, albeit
they were subsequently dishonored? Besides, we note that in appellant’s Counter Affidavit 23 dated August 20, 2004
subscribed before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City, she already admitted having
taken without the knowledge and consent of private complainant several purchase orders and gift checks worth
thousands of pesos. She claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna Cruz and cohorts.
We also concur with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt that the amount of ₱640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that appellant stole the amount with intent to gain
and without Flores’ consent; that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, or of force upon things; and that it was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Anent the penalty imposed, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Based on the foregoing, since the amount taken is ₱640,353.86, then the imposable penalty shall be the maximum
period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or eight(8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten
(10) years, adding one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00. Thus, from ₱640,353.86, we deduct ₱22,000.00,
giving us a balance of ₱618,353.86 which we divide by ₱10,000.00. We now have sixty-one (61)years which we will
add to the basic penalty of eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. However, as stated in
Article 309, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus, if appellant
had committed only simple theft, her penalty would be twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. Considering however
that in qualified theft, the penalty is two degrees higher, then the appellate court properly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.24
Finally, we note that appellant has not yet been committed to prison. In view thereof and based on our foregoing
discussion, appellant must be ordered arrested and committed to prison to start serving her sentence.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31635 is AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 is DIRECTED to issue a warrant for the arrest of appellant and to
order her commitment at the Correctional Institution for Women, and to submit to this Court a Report of such
commitment, all within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. The Superintendent, Correctional Institution for
Women is DIRECTED to confirm to this Court the confinement of appellant within ten (10) days therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta, challenging the June 27,
2005 decision2 and the November 24, 2005 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369. The
CA decision affirmed the January 12, 2004 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case No. 20109-R, convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft. The CA resolution denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with Concordia O. Loyao, Jr., with the
crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:That sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the
Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm,
ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and
implement the fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the receipt,
audit and checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site – a position of full trust and confidence, and
CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating,
and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City,
wide flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value of ₱2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent of
the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and
prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum of ₱2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency. 5
Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." 6 Loyao remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo Bernardo, Edgardo Cano,
Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus, 7 as well as
documentary evidence consisting of a security logbook entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn
affidavits. The prosecution’s pieces of evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building construction in
Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel
framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial
in Pasig City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It assigned
the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of all
building construction materials.8
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s truck driver, and about 10
Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at
Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner
again instructed Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters
and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio City. 9
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon that several
wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar’s warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in
the security guard’s logbook. Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply
denied that the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an
inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange steel
beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing
steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to
retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The
stolen steel beams amounted to ₱2,269,731.69.10
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar,
employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr. Marigondon’s motive in falsely accusing him of
stealing construction materials.11
The RTC’s Ruling
12
In its January 12, 2004 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses’ straightforward and consistent testimonies and rejected the petitioner’s bare denial. It
sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years,
as maximum, to indemnify Anmar ₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment, and to
pay Engr. Marigondon ₱100,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA’s Ruling
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ statements, and reiterated his
status as an AMCGS employee.13
In its June 27, 2005 decision,14 the CA brushed aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s decision
convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies deserve full credence in
the absence of any improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioner. It noted that the petitioner admitted his
status as Anmar’s employee and his receipt of salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner’s defense of
denial for being self-serving. It, however, deleted the award of moral damages to Engr. Marigondon for lack of
justification.
When the CA denied15 the motion for reconsideration16 that followed, the petitioner filed the present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed "sometime in the month of October,
2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus delicti was never identified and
offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the issues raised
by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness of the calibration of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, which are issues of fact, not of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent
contends that the evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner’s liability for qualified theft.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision
convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the
commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency
of a complaint or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
(italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis
ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need
not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at
any date within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated the
approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the month of October, 2001." The
petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the
contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to
enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, as to be
inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material element of the offense. As such, the
offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.17 Clearly, the month of November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was
committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be
done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. 18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the prosecution’s
eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered,
twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the
petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took
construction materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the
construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission
of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or corpus delicti had not
been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution’s
cause.
The petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us.
"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its
legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered" or, in this case, to the stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the
crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence." 19 "In theft, corpus
delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious
taking."20
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the corpus delicti. The positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating that the petitioner directed
them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were
crucial to the petitioner’s conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved the
existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a different location other than the project site.
Proper Penalty
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and
three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and to indemnify Anmar ₱2,269,731.69, with legal interest from
November 2001 until full payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to specify the appropriate name of the penalty
imposed on the petitioner.
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal terminology in the imposition of
penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties. The
appropriate name of the penalty must be specified as under the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty
for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. 21 Thus, the courts must employ the
proper nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten days of
arresto menor" not "ten days of imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua based
on Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "the crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Article 309." 221âwphi1
To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is ₱2,269,731.69. Based on Article
309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds ₱22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one day to 10
years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct ₱22,000.00 from ₱2,269,731.69, which gives us
₱2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be divided by ₱10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
₱10,000.00. We now have 224 years that should be added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for
simple theft should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would
be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27, 2005 decision and the November 24, 2005 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V.
Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG

G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 137, Makati City in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from
December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds
of the WPESLAI.1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and
appropriated the same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the
WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then
transfer these funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in
her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to
be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in
her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip
to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution. 3

The trial court found that Cahilig employed

the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of
qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total
of ₱6,268,300.00, brokendown into the following amounts:
Criminal Case No. 03-2178 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2179 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2180 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2181 ₱55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2182 ₱55,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2183 ₱85,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2184 ₱350,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2185 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2186 ₱20,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2187 ₱250,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2188 ₱60,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2189 ₱150,000.00

 Criminal Case No. 03-2190 ₱50,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2191 ₱46,300.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2192 ₱205,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2193 ₱200,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2194 ₱25,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2195 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2196 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2197 ₱30,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2198 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2199 ₱300,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2200 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2201 ₱65,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2202 ₱47,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2203 ₱500,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2204 ₱40,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2205 ₱400,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2206 ₱35,000.00

Criminal Case No. 03-2207 ₱500,000.0

All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru
trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the basis of which these were
submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others: That for purposes of efficient and speedy administration
of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that
the actualtrial and presentation of evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on Cases
Numbers 03-2178 to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination of the hearing onsaid
three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27) counts, considering that
all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods or modus operandi used in committing the crime
charged, and involving the same accused and the same offended party[.] 4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to suffer the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱250,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱200,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱55,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 03-2182, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱55,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 03-2183, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱85,000.00;
7. In Criminal Case No. 03-2184, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱350,000.00;
8. In Criminal Case No. 03-2185, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱20,000.00;
10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱250,000.00;
11. In Criminal Case No. 03-2188, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱60,000.00;
12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱150,000.00;
13. In Criminal Case No. 03-2190, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱50,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱4[6],300.00;
15. In Criminal Case No. 03-2192, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱205,000.00;
16. In Criminal Case No. 03-2193, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱200,000.00;
17. In Criminal Case No. 03-2194, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱25,000.00;
18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱500,000.00;
19. In Criminal Case No. 03-2196, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱500,000.00;
20. In Criminal Case No. 03-2197, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱30,000.00;
21. In Criminal Case No. 03-2198, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱400,000.00;
 22. In Criminal Case No. 03-2199, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱300,000.00;
23. In Criminal Case No. 03-2200, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱500,000.00;
24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱65,000.00;
25. In Criminal Case No. 03-2202, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱47,000.00;
26. In Criminal Case No. 03-2203, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱500,000.00;
27. In Criminal Case No. 03-2204, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱40,000.00;
28. In Criminal Case No. 03-2205, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱400,000.00;
29. In Criminal Case No. 03-2206, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱35,000.00;
30. In Criminal Case No. 03-2207, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱500,000.00.
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers ofthe
association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records of the association, a
circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds which she converted to her personal use in
the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer."6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA denied her appeal and
affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI checks
issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be redeposited to another account of
WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the
taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse
showing that the funds were credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account.
Fourth, the taking was done with intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby means
of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were
made in the normal course of business and with the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished without
violence or intimidation against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with grave
abuse of confidence considering that her position as cashier permeates trust and confidence. 7
The Court’s Ruling
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30 cases are incorrect
and, therefore, must be modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
 1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or
other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in
the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation by reason of
dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree
of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused." 9
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association.1âwphi1 Cahilig’s
responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing disbursements
for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-
2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are ₱20,000.00, ₱46,300.00, ₱25,000.00, ₱30,000.00,
₱40,000.00, and ₱35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed pr is ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below ₱12,000.00. Hence, if the crime charged had been
simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least, prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310
provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion
perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194,
03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the
corresponding charges stands.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN
G.R. No. 212815 March 1, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the November 4, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05418,
which affirmed the Decision2 dated January 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Angeles City in
Criminal Case No. 04-594.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan (Donia) was charged with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539,
otherwise known as AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Co-accused Val
Paulino (Paulino) and one @Ryan (Ryan), both remains at-large, were similarly charged. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November 2003, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with them one (1) Honda TMX 155
tricycle, colored black and with Body [No.] 817, valued at Ninety-Six Thousand ([P.]96,000.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, and on the occasion thereof, Raul L. Layug, being the driver and owner of the said Honda TMX 155 tricycle,
was killed with the use of a mini jungle bolo.
Contrary to law.3
Pending Donio's arraignment, POI Emessito N. Bansagan and the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Luzon
Regional Office submitted the returns on the Warrant of Arrest against Ryan and Paulino, respectively, stating that the
said persons could not be located at the given addresses, and requested for alias warrants against them. The trial
court issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest against accused Ryan on September 4, 2004 and against Paulino on
November 4, 2004.4
At his arraignment, Donio, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-
trial conference, it was stipulated that Donio is the same person whose name appears in the Information and was
arraigned before that court.
Thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.
On November 26, 2003, six police officers of the Concepcion Police Station, Tarlac City, headed by SP04 Leodegario
Taberdo (SP04 Taberdo ), conducted a checkpoint along the junction of MacArthur Highway in relation to the
campaign of the Philippine National Police against hijacking, camapping, and kidnapping, hailing cargo trucks and
closed vans, and issuing cards to southbound vehicles.5
At 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003, a speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few meters from the checkpoint
and caught the attention of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others approached the vehicle. The driver, later
identified as Donio, was noticeably agitated while repeatedly kicking the starter of the tricycle. When asked for his
identity, he introduced himself as Raul Layug (Raul) and then handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary license bearing
the said name. The police officers asked the driver and his companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan, to bring the
vehicle, a Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817, to the checkpoint when they failed to produce its certificate of
registration and the official receipt.6
Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They seized the tricycle and
the bolo, and then brought the three to the police station. At 9 o'clock in the morning, Donio asked permission to leave
in order to get the registration papers. The officers allowed him, however, he did not return. 7
Meanwhile, around 6:30 in morning of the same date, Rodrigo Layug (Rodrigo) was searching for his brother Raul, the
victim, who has not returned home since last night. Raul was the driver of Rodrigo's Honda TMX 155 tricycle with
Body No. 817. Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver cousin from Mawaque to ask him if he saw his brother. His cousin
accompanied him to Barangay Madapdap where they found the remains of Raul. Words spread about his death.
Thereafter, a tricycle driver informed them that he saw a vehicle similar to Rodrigo's at the Concepcion Police Station.
Rodolfo, Raul and Rodrigo's other brother, went to the station where he learned that Paulino and Ryan were
released.8
Sometime in December 2003, the brothers returned to the station upon learning that Donio was apprehended. On
December 7, 2003, the Chief of
Police summoned SP04 Taberdo to identify the driver who asked permission to retrieve the registration papers but did
not return at the Concepcion Police Station. Upon seeing Donio, the disgruntled SP04 Taberdo asked him, "Why did
you do that?" He was referring to the incident when Donio did not return. It was also that same day that he learned
Donio's real identity.9
Dr. Reynaldo C. Dizon (Dr. Dizon) conducted the post-mortem examination of Raul's body and determined that he
sustained stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument.
Defense's sole witness, Donio, a 35-year-old grass cutter and a resident of Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, denied
the accusations. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long palang for harvesting and cutting. It was not similar
to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo. As a stay-in plantation worker, he does not leave the workplace for six
months. His wife visits him instead.
On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac. However, from the evening of November 25,
2003 until the next day, he was at home after his wife fetched him to tend to their sick child. He first learned of the
carnapping charge when the police officers came to his house looking for a certain Val Paulino. He was taken to the
municipal hall where he was investigated and detained for five days. Three officers beat and electrocuted him for three
hours forcing him to admit the crime.10
The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ENRILE U. DONIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Carnapping as defined in Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with credit of his
preventive imprisonment.
Accused ENRILE U. DONIO is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Raul L. Layug the following amounts: Fifty
thousand pesos ([₱]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Twenty-five thousand pesos ([₱]25,000.00) as actual damages.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
The trial court ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime. Donio failed to substantiate his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense or the physical impossibility of his presence at
the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. 12 Under the Rules, SP04 Taberdo's action as
police officer enjoys the presumption of regularity. In the absence of evidence showing that he was motivated by bad
faith or ill-will to testify against Donio, SP04 Taberdo's categorical identification of the accused stands. 13
In a Decision dated November 4, 2013, the CA denied Donio's appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
found his averment that he was taken from his house, tortured and made to sign a blank sheet of paper as highly
implausible. His sworn affidavit was replete with details which were unlikely the product of creative imagination of the
police. There was no proof that the police singled him out, or was impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. The said
affidavit was voluntarily and freely executed with the assistance of counsel. 14 The fallo of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.
In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief, 16 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this
Court that it opted not to file a supplemental brief for the same would only be a repetition of the raised arguments
considering that all relevant matters regarding Donio' s guilt for the crime of carnapping with homicide were
extensively argued and discussed in the People's Brief17 dated July 9, 2013.
Likewise, Donio, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested his intention not to file a supplemental brief and
prayed that the case be deemed submitted for decision. 18
In essence, the issue to be resolved by this Court in this appeal is whether the prosecution has successfully proven
beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse
Donio' s conviction. At the outset, the CA noted that the prosecution should have filed an Information for the special
complex crime of qualified carnapping in aggravated form. 19 while it is necessary that the statutory designation be
stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not
a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the
real nature of the crime.20 Recently, it was held that failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if
the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. 21 The recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information determines the character of the crime and not the caption or preamble
of the information or the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated. 22 In the case at bar, the
acts alleged to have been committed by Donio are averred in the Information, and the same described the acts
defined and penalized under Sections 2 and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as amended are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 23
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove the essential
requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the
original criminal design of the culprit was camapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof "24 In other words, to prove the special complex crime of
camapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was
the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
camapping or on the occasion thereof.25
Records show that all the elements of camapping in the instant case are present and proven during the trial.
The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale in his
favor.26 Donio was found driving the vehicle in the early morning of November 26, 2003, the same day Rodrigo was
looking for his missing brother Raul. Also, SP04 Taberdo positively identified Donio as the driver he flagged down at
the checkpoint in his testimony, viz.:
xxxx
Q- On or about that time 2:45 early in the morning of November 26, 2003, could you recall if there was any unusual
incident that required your attention as Police Officers manning the check-point?
A- Yes, sir.
Q - What is that incident?
A - During that time, we are issuing pass card among vehicles going to South when suddenly a speeding tricycle
approaching our PCP its engine suddenly stop.
Q- Who was driving the tricycle when the engine suddenly stop[s]?
A-The one who gave me the Driver's License was Raul Layug.
Q - If this person who gave his license as Raul Layug is here present today, will you be able to identify him?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Will you please look around the premises of the Court and point to him.
A - This one, sir. We came to know later on that his real name is Enrile Donio.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to accused Enrile Donio.
x x x27
"Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 28 Section 3 (j), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.
The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the person robbed and killed
is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been
invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. 29 The said principle may be applied in this case as
the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. 30 Here, Donio failed to produce the
vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the police officers when his identity was asked,
and left under the guise of getting the said documents. It was also established that he and the others were strangers
to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the
presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's death.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes
gain.31Donio's intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were using it as means
of transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers.
Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in the instant case, We now discuss the argument that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient to convict Donio of the crime of carnapping
with homicide.
He alleges that while it is true that criminal conviction may be predicated on a series of circumstantial evidence, the
same must be convincing, plausible and credible. It cannot be discounted that SP04 Taberdo testified only on the
circumstances after the alleged carnapping. He failed to establish his alleged participation prior to or during the actual
taking of the vehicle. The facts established by SP04 Taberdo' s testimony- the Concepcion police operatives caught
him in possession of the stolen tricycle on November 26, 2003; the tricycle was registered under the name of Rodrigo;
and he was in possession of Raul's license - are insufficient bases and do not lead to an inference exclusively
consistent with his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Such contention fails scrutiny. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused can no longer be proved by any other evidence. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient,
can replace direct evidence as provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to warrant the conviction
of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime. 32 Hence, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 33
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds that the confluence of the following pieces of circumstantial
evidence, consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond reasonable doubt:
First, Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a checkpoint at the junction of
the MacArthur Highway by elements of the Concepcion Police Station at around 2:30 in the morning on November 26,
2003;
Second, his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to produce its registration papers;
Third, he was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even presented it and introduced himself as Raul to
the police;
Fourth, a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle;
Fifth, Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was looking for him on the same day that
Donio and the others were flagged down;
Sixth, Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003 when he passed by at the
Mawaque Terminal at the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque Road. 34
Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at around 6:30 in the morning on November
26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia Resettlement comer Barangay Dapdap.
Eighth, Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument as depicted in the post-mortem
examination sketch by Dr. Dizon and reflected in the Certificate of Death, which states:
17. CAUSES OF DEATH:
I. Immediate Cause: Cardio respiratory arrest
Antecedent Cause: Hemo-pneumothorax L
Underlying Cause: Penetrating Stab Wounds, Multiple.35
Ninth, Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04 Taberdo positively identified him as the driver they flagged
down at the checkpoint.36
Likewise, the victim's lifeless body was found sprawled with multiple stab wounds and was noted in a state of rigor
mortis. Rigor mortis, which consists in the stiffening of the muscular tissues and joints of the body setting in at a
greater or less interval after death, may be utilized to approximate the length of time the body has been dead. In
temperate countries, it usually appears three to six hours after death but in warmer countries, it may develop earlier. In
tropical countries, the usual duration of rigor mortis is twenty-four to forty-eight hours during cold weather and
eighteen to thirty-six hours during summer. When rigor mortis sets in early, it passes off quickly and viceversa.37
From the foregoing, it was established that Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on
November 25, 2003, and that his body was discovered at 6:30 in the morning the next day. Considering the condition
of the body upon discovery, he could have been killed between 10:00 in the evening and 3:30 in the morning on the
next day. Donio and his companions were hailed at the checkpoint at around 2:30 38 in the morning on November 26,
2003 aboard the missing tricycle. Taking into account the distance of the Mawaque Terminal area or of the vacant lot
near Barangay Dapdap from the junction of the MacArthur Highway in Concepcion, Tarlac and the time they were
hailed at the checkpoint, it can be logically concluded that Donio and the others were in contact with Raul during the
approximate period of the latter's time of death. Also, it was during that period that they gained possession of the
vehicle. Thus, the only rational conclusion that can be drawn from the totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances
is that Donio and his companions, to the exclusion of others, are guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of killing Raul in
the course thereof.
Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked permission from the officers to get the registration
papers but never returned. Undoubtedly, Donio's flight is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. Indeed, the
wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion. 39
This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique
position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the
best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. 40 The factual findings of the appellate court generally are
conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that
the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.41 In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witness. Records are bereft of evidence which showed ill-will or malicious intent on the part of SP04
Taberdo. In absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err in the findings of
facts and the credibility of the witnesses.
As for Donio's defense of alibi, he argues that it must not be looked with disfavor, as there are instances when the
accused may really have no other defense but denial and alibi which, if established to be truth, may tilt the scales of
justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence is inherently weak. He insists that he was tortured and
subjected to harsh treatment during arrest.1âwphi1 He insinuates that the police arrested the first person they
suspected without conducting any in-depth investigation.
Donio maintained that he first learned of the camapping charge when the police came to his house in Madapdap,
Mabalacat, Pampanga on December 6, 2003. However, he also alleged that as a stay-in sugarcane plantation worker
in Capas, Tarlac with a six-month work period ending in January, he never left the workplace and that his wife visited
him instead. Donio testified during direct and cross examination as follows:
xxxx
ATTY. LOPEZ
Q: Mr. Witness, prior to your incarceration at the Angeles District Jail, where were you residing?
A: Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, sir.
Q: On November 25, 2003 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening to November 26, 2003, do you remember where
[you were] on the said dates?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you, Mr. Witness?
A: At home, sir.
Q: Who were your companions there?
A: My family, sir, my wife and child.
x x x x42
PROS. HABAN
Q: Where are you working again?
A: Capas
xxx
Q: How about on November 27, 2003, where were you then?
A: At work.
Q: How about on November 25 and 26?
A: At work.
Q: During the whole day?
A: Stay-in.
Q: So you never left work?
A: No, sir.
Q: Never, not even Saturday and Sunday?
A: No, sir.
Q: The whole year of 2003 you never left work?
A: We stayed there for six (6) months.
Q: When is the end of six months period?
A: January.
x x x 43
No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive
and difficult to disprove, and for which reason, it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, the accused must
establish the following: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. 44 It must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. 45
When he was confronted with his inconsistency, Donio clarified that he was in Capas, Tarlac and was fetched by his
wife in the evening to attend to his sick child. We note, however, the proximity of the area of Donio’s residence with the
Barangay Dapdap and Sta. Lucia Resettlement area where the victim was found dead. To buttress his defense of alibi,
Donio could have presented the testimony of a fellow plantation worker or any disinterested witness who could have
substantiated the same. Aside from his bare allegations, he failed to present convincing evidence of the physical
impossibility for him to be at the scene at the time of carnapping. Similarly, this Court is unconvinced of his insistence
that he was tortured in view of lack of any evidence to validate the same. Thus, the uncorroborated alibi and denial of
Donio must be brushed aside in light of the fact that the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained his
identity. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. 46
In sum, the prosecution established through sufficient circumstantial evidence that the accused was indeed one of the
perpetrators of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
As to the imposable penalty, Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. -Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two
of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 47
The RTC is correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua considering that there was no alleged and proven
aggravating circumstance.
However, in line with the recent jurisprudence,48 in cases of special complex crimes like carnapping with homicide,
among others, where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages are pegged at ₱75,000.00 each .. This Court orders Donio to pay ₱50,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of the award of ₱25,000.00 as actual damages. Also, Donio is ordered to pay the heirs of Raul
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the
Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05418, finding
accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant Donio is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Raul L. Layug the amount of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of the Decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JAIME ONG y ONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted
accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as.
the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of gain for himself
or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person
involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling
One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused
JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-
Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with
accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s finding of guilt was
affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He
acquired the same for the total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was
evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the
tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before
storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1,
Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in
charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside
the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were
stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal,
reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an
attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store
selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling
any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought
out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse,
based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of
such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and reported
the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant's store
in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior
Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District,
proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-
buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the street. Atienza
asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced
one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside
his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and
found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant
then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires
stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store.
However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by
representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening when
appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust
team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires
were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse. 5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business of buying
and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in
Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13)
Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link
Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer
bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the
store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires. 7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of
Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. 8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years
and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner
deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2)
the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. 10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all
the elements of fencing are present in this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose
Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen – testified that the crime of robbery
had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No.
456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery
was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort
Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February
1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that
thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal
nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his
possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s
possession.15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500
where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern
his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past
twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of
ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one
day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the
thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may
have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale,
both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold,
and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality
of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No.
1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no
other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft." xxx.22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.1âwphi1 Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is
located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances
from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his
duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for all practical
purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a
defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of the
receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. 24Ong failed
to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was
unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was actually
caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence of
possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of
robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on ₱5,075 for each tire recovered, or in the
total amount of ₱65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total
amount of ₱223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption
that private transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of
business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between
Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient basis to
reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the
minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MEL DIMAT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to have known that the
thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.
The Facts and the Case
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law 1 before the Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in
substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing
plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari
on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle,
they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They
also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and
there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking
area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for
value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the
Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number,
they were not actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to an
imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also
ordered him to pay ₱850,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of
suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794 2 the RTC decision but modified the
penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to
Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
The Ruling of the Court
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. 3
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat
sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to
Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale
covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-
119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and,
therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.4 Of course, the
prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.1âwphi1
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But
Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice
him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true
because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to
make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came
from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers
covering her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in
the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR
29794.
SO ORDERED.
NENITA CARGANILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182424 September 22, 2014
BRION, J.:
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we review the decision 1 and the resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29371 which denied the appeal of Nenita Carganillo (petitioner). The CA affirmed, with modification
as to penalty, the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, convicting the petitioner
of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
THE CASE
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the amount of
₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged tobe an "ahente" or agent in the buy-
and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998.
According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palaybought the
petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palayis purchased and delivered on
November 28, the petitioner must return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palayor the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week thereafter, respectively,
Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the ₱132,000.00 but her demands were
simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office.
Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime of estafawas filed in court.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty tothe crime and denied that she entered into a "principal-agent" agreement with, and
received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owedTeresita a balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers
and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, 5 and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a
blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date and amount. 6 She likewise denied personally receiving any written
demand letter from Teresita.7
In a decision dated November 19, 2004, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime of estafaand sentenced her to
suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. 8 Also, the RTC ordered the
petitioner to indemnify Teresita the sum of ₱132,000.00 representing the amount embezzled and to pay the costs of
suit.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction. 10 The CA held that the prosecution properly established the
elements of the crime of estafa. In debunking petitioner’s claim that her agreement with Teresita was merely a money
loan, the CA stated that:
In this case, the Kasunduan dated September 23, 1998, which-accusedappellant admittedly signed, is clear inits tenor
and the failure to comply therewith makes out a case for estafa. Accused-appellant’s insistence that she signed the
said Kasunduan in blank is belied by her admission of "the existence or authenticity of the documentary exhibits x x x"
during the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and her own testimony x x x.
Further, the CA ruled as immaterial the petitioner’s defense that she did not personally receive a writtenletter of
demand from Teresita. The CA held that even a verbal query as tothe whereabouts of the money suspected to be
misappropriated isalready tantamount to a demand, and that the petitioner failed to refute Teresita’s claim that she
went to the petitioner’s house to ask for the palayand/or the return of the ₱132,000.00. 11
The CA, however, found error inthe RTC’s computation of the penalty and imposed upon the petitioner an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00 (in excess of ₱22,000.00), equivalent to
eleven (11) years, or a total of nineteen (19) years. 12
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
THE PETITION
In her petition, the petitioner raisesthe sole issue of whether the CA erred in affirming (with modification)the judgment
of conviction against her, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable
doubt.
The petitioner maintains that she isnot engaged in the business of buying and selling palayand that the "Kasunduan"
between her and Teresita does not contain their real agreement of a simple money loan. She argues that the
prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she never received the ₱132,000.00 from Teresita;
that an element of the crime is that "the offender receives the money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same."
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the present petition. The CA did not commit any reversible error in its decision of September 10, 2007.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of estafacommitted with abuse
of confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, orfor
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. 13
We find that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust the amount of
₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palayand misappropriated it when she failed to return the said
amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the
prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement between her
and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of ₱132,000.00 from
Teresita for the purpose of buying palaywith the corresponding obligationsto (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay
Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November
28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties,
and obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention.Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.14However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the following:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
xxxx
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real agreement between her and
Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan agreement and not that of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-
and-sell of palay. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to support her
claims.
The RTC found that the receipts presented by the petitioner to prove her loan obligation with Teresitawere vague,
undated and unsigned.15 Also, the RTC observed that the witnesses who testified that they saw the petitioner sign the
"Kasunduan" were not even certain of the real transaction between the petitioner and Teresita. 16 These findings of fact
and evidence, which were affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect and finality by this Court. Where the factual
findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there is great reason not to disturb these findings
and to regard them not reviewable by this Court.17
Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she had been the victim of a fraud becauseTeresita deceived her
into signing a blank document; that she signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had no date and amount written on it,
because Teresita led her to believe that the document would be used merely for show purposes with the bank. 18
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo causante) inducement to the making of
the contract,19 and must be serious in character.20 It must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person
into error, taking into account the circumstances of each case. 21
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her Memorandum 22 to this Court, she narrated
that after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made her execute a deed of sale over her property,
which deed she refused to sign.23 This statement negates the petitioner’s self-serving allegation that she was tricked
by Teresita into signing a blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible implications of the act of signing a
document.
We affirm the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as it is fully in accordance with the law.1âwphi1 We
explained in People v. Temporada24 that:
"The prescribed penalty for estafaunder Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds
₱22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty
next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). xxx
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00,
provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. xxx To compute the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions oftime
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this
procedure,the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by ₱22,000.00, and the difference
shall be divided by ₱10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as was done starting with the case of People
v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused.
xxx"25
In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, 26 we recognized the "perceived injustice" brought about
by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property, such as estafa, committed
today based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eight years ago in 1932. This Court, however,
cannot modify these range of penalties in our decisions, as such action would be an impermissible encroachment
upon the power of the legislative branch of government and would constitute proscribed judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision dated
September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371,
finding petitioner Nenita Carganillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph
l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007,
of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in
1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing
that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he
turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within
a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value
of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond
ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies'
bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine
currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or
to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand,
the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing
business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied
having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the
supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San
Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of
the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition stating the
following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY
THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE
COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT
CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY
SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY
1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF
SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,
CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense and the acts
complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records,
or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the
CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and
substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May
2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the
best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence
at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed
out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and
even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against him. He
contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned
and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating
that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts
or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That
the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise
fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time
only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential
element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant
should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there
was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not
properly apprised of the charges proferred against him. 7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender, was not
proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the
latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991,
the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he promised me
that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to
a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be
formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under
Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would have
stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and
oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we held
that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It
so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements
of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in
the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place,
failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious.
Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the
trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. 15 The assessment by
the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. 16 Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses
are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the continued
validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged
these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited
at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were
Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc,
with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on
crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty
years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of
the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately
presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which
reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and
in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress
and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions
of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by
law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the
court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The
second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to
suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the
said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the
court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no
punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration
with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired
Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code, 21 echoed the above-cited
commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with
mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or
not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce
the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation rate or
at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as
opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the
proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change,
thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present
times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of
those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder,
from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the
same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from
₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive
compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is
more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property
stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the
proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that
under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence,
the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months),
making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for
probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from
the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not
at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa. 23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the
damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis
of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor
minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional
medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). 24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum
to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision
correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties are not
changed, as follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). 25
 2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional
minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). 26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6
months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty
provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid classification.
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00
may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so
that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer
achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals
hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the
IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article 315
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the
amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters
to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to
Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is
absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that
would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you
were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00)
Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the
application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the
penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what respondent
therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the latter’s
recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for
the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony
convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is high.
Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person
the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the
crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of the
offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now
becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to
the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by
any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years) 32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become
higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his
public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the
value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in
Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as
proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no
longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding
₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation,
which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished
with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine
despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused
exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00
will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become
₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact
that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC. 33 Unless we
also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same
through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal, such as
those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311
(Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of
swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious
mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose
Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses),
Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render
accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are punishable by
special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license
as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. 35 Under the law, the offender shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 36 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense.
Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also
in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The
answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related
provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity.
There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to
conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of
the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature
which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due
proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral
arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate
seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws
that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from
today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers
by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the
law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect
to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should
shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would
lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the
Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall
be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is
not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to
the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the
civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution.
Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a
thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would
sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly
modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of
the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel punishment.
However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to
cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law,
especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental penalty
provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the
amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from
now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate
penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime
of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos
Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this
Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was
re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the
death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1), 42 Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to
its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from
which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter,
it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must
be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon
the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments
which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." 45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the
present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be
taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly
adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be
made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to
conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code.
This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take into
consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic
terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred
(₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power that
belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is
not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the
present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into
consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a statute. The
issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had
previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code
mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals
ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court
should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil
liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of
money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded
and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be
adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total
of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People 48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the
same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the
penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum
should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in
accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds
₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding
one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision
mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus
an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against petitioner
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court
should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most
expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited
judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS
and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

BELEN REAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 152065 January 29, 2008
AZCUNA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 125 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Rule 45 thereof, is the
August 3, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which affirmed the June 23, 1992
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No. 4116 finding petitioner guilty of
swindling (estafa) under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts appearing from the record are as follows:
Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his jewelry business. On several occasions,
Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale
or to return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house at Nueva Villa Subdivision, Barangay
Alangilan, Batangas City and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she had a buyer at that time.
Because petitioner is his "kumadre," since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding of petitioner’s daughter, and
because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of jewelry and
allowed the latter to select from them.
Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items selected by petitioner and handed
the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the name Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof
and affixed her signature at the lower portion including her address. The receipt reads:
KATIBAYAN
PINATUNAYAN KO na aking tinanggap kay Benjamin Uy, ang mga sumusunod na alahas: No. 1449
Bilang Kalakal Halaga

1 Collar Emerald Cut Diamond P155,000.00

1 Pendant Solo Diamante 4 kts 55,000.00

1 Set Solo Marquez Lequids 50,000.00

1 Set 3 Stones Diamante Lequids 47,000.00

1 Domino 12 Stones Men’s ring 35,000.00

1 Set Blue Pearl with Lequids 25,000.00

1 Set Corrales with broach 4,500.00

KABUUANG HALAGA P371,500.00

nasa mabuting kalagayan upang ipagbili ng KALIWAAN lamang sa loob ng 10 araw mula ng aking paglagda;
kung hindi ko maipagbili ay isasauli ko ang lahat ng alahas loob ng taning na panahong nakatala sa itaas;
kung maipagbili ko naman ay dagli kung [isusuli] at ibibigay ang buong pinagbilhan sa [may-ari] ng mga
alahas. Ang aking gantimpala ay ang mapapahigit na halaga sa nakatakdang halaga sa itaas ng bawat
alahas; HINDI AKO pinahihintulutang [ipautang] o ibigay na hulugan ang alin mang alahas; ilalagak,
ipagkakatiwala, ipahihiram, isasangla o ipananagot kahit sa anong paraan ang alin mang alahas sa ibang tao.

NILAGDAAN ko ang kasunduang ito ngayon ika-10 ng January, 1989 sa Batangas City.

(Sgd) Belen Real Aplaya, Bauan, Bats.

 LAGDA NG TAO NA TUMANGGAP NG TINITIRAHAN3
NASABING ALAHAS SA ITAAS NITO

Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and asked about their transaction.
Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the payment was in the form of check.
Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and requested the latter to collect on said
date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on January 31, 1989, petitioner again requested him to return the following
day as she had not encashed the checks yet. Uy again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day,
petitioner called him "makulit" and "could not sleep for that matter." Petitioner further remarked that the more she
would not pay Uy.
Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who thereafter sent a demand letter to petitioner.
Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to make good her obligation. Consequently, Uy lodged a criminal complaint
against petitioner before the City Prosecutor of Batangas.
On April 13, 1989, an Information for estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC was filed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Amelia Perez-Panganiban against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty."
While admitting to have had several dealings with private complainant Uy, petitioner claimed that her last transaction
with him was on December 22, 1988. She denied the truth of the Katibayan, alleging that there was a time, prior to
January 10, 1989, when she got pieces of jewelry from Uy that she was required by him to sign in a blank piece of
paper.
On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision, 4 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Belen Real guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS of
reclusion temporal, to indemnify Benjamin Uy in the amount of P371,500.00, to pay the costs, and to suffer all
the accessories of the law.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court ratiocinated:
From the evidence adduced during the trial of this case, it has been clearly established that all the elements of
the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence are present in the commission of the offense and that the guilt of
the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Undoubtedly, accused had received the seven (7) pieces of jewelry from Benjamin Uy on January 10, 1989 at
around 8:30 o’clock in the morning at Nueva Villa Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City in trust or on
commission[,] with the obligation on her part to return the said pieces of jewelry if unsold, or to deliver the
proceeds of the sale, if sold within ten (10) days from receipt. This agreement is clearly embodied in the
receipt dated January 10, [1989] signed by the accused.
That there was misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the accused is very evident in
this case. The fact that the accused had failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale of said jewelry items nor had
she returned the same jewelry items when demanded to do so by the private complainant shows that accused
had misappropriated or converted to her personal use the amount of P371,500.00. In fact, she even required
the private complainant to return to her house for several times so that she could remit the proceeds of the
sale to him. However, accused did not comply with her obligation.
In a litany of cases, the Supreme Court held that the failure to account upon demand, for funds or property
held in trust is a circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it [is] the
agent’s duty to return the jewelry upon demand by the owner and the failure to do so is evidence of that
conversion of the property by the agent.
It was also established that there was a demand made by the private complainant from the accused, verbal
and written[,] as shown by the letter of demand which was received by the accused.
Notably in the instant case[,] accused enjoyed the full trust and confidence of Benjamin Uy when the latter
entrusted the pieces of jewelry to the accused, it being a fact that the latter is a "kumadre" of Benjamin Uy, the
latter having been a sponsor in marriage of a daughter of the accused, aside from the fact that previous to
January 10, 1989 there had been transaction between Benjamin Uy and accused involving a great amount of
money.
Obviously, accused abused the trust and confidence reposed upon her by Benjamin Uy when she refused and
failed to comply with her obligation. Her intention to defraud Benjamin Uy of P371,500.00 is[,] therefore,
definitely clear.
 The defense of the accused that she had not transacted with Benjamin Uy on January 10, 1989 and that her
last transaction with the [latter] was on December 22, 1988 deserves not even a scant consideration in the
face of the positive declaration made by Benjamin Uy and his witness and supported by the receipt, [Exhibit
"A"], embodying their agreement.
On the allegation of the accused that she was required by Benjamin Uy to sign blank receipts [the same] is
also unbelievable considering the fact that accused had reached third year in college and had been a sales
agent of private complainant for quite a time before January 10, 1989. 6
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, on August 3, 2000, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.7 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. 8
Petitioner now raises the following points:
1. That one element of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC does not exist, hence, acquittal from the
crime charged is proper; and
2. That the courts below erred in imposing a penalty that contravenes the imperative mandate of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.9
Petitioner argues that a reading of the trial court’s decision reveals its total silence on the presence of damage or
prejudice caused to private complainant Uy; ergo, she could not be held guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of
the RPC. Moreover, petitioner advances that instead of imposing a straight penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, the trial court should have imposed a penalty with minimum and maximum periods in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The petition is in part meritorious.
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC10 are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.11
Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private complainant Uy, it cannot be
denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that petitioner’s refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry
had prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in
itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. 12 In this case, Uy, who is a
businessman, not only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. Anxiety
also set in as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To
assert his legal recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.
While sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the crime charged, this Court rules, however, that the penalty imposed
by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,13 in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, and the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the RPC for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. 14
Specifically, the penalty provided in the RPC for estafa is as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
The penalty prescribed by Art. 315 above-quoted is composed of two periods; hence, to get the maximum period of
the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods should be divided into three. Article
65 of the RPC requires the division of the time included in the prescribed penalty into three equal periods of time
included in the penalty imposed, forming one period for each of the three portions. Thus, the maximum, medium and
minimum periods of the penalty prescribed for estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are:
 Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days
Medium – 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days
Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years15
In the present case, as the amount involved is P371,500, which obviously exceeds P22,000, the penalty imposable
should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. However, Art. 315
further states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000 defrauded in excess
of P22,000 but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from
Uy exceeds the amount of P22,000 which, when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000
defrauded, goes beyond 20 years (close to additional 35 years to be exact). Hence, under the law, the maximum
penalty to be imposed to petitioner should be 20 years of reclusion temporal.
On the other hand, the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC. In this case, the penalty next lower to prision
correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2 years and
4 months) to prision correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. 16
Considering the attendant factual milieu as well as the position of the Office of the Solicitor General in the present
case, this Court is convinced that the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon petitioner, which is in accordance with
law to best serve the ends of justice, should range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the August 3, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13885, which affirmed the
June 23, 1992 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusión temporal as
maximum.
Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Court of Appeals is hereby required to explain why he concurred in the
decision aforementioned applying the wrong penalty, the explanation to be submitted in thirty (30) days from receipt of
a copy of this Decision, which copy is hereby directed to be furnished upon him forthwith upon finality of this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
VILMA M. SULIMAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 21,
2009, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30693 which denied herein petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration,
as well as the appellate court's Resolution2 dated January 8, 2010, which likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated July 21, 2009.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
In six (6) Informations,3 all dated June 6, 2003,herein petitioner and one Luz P. Garcia were charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and
(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as
four (4) counts of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-large despite the
issuance of a warrant for her arrest.
The six cases were consolidated and, after trial, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, rendered judgment finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision,4 dated June 7, 2006, reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds as follows:
1) In Crim. Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubtas principal of the crimes charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS each and to pay fine of ₱200,000.00 for each count.
2) In Crim. Case No. 03-216190, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to
TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify Anthony Mancera y Rey the
amount of ₱120,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
3) In Crim. Case No. 03-216191, accused VILMA SULIMAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of Estafa and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify private complainant Perlita A. Prudencio the amount of
₱132,460.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
4) In Crim. Case No. 03-216192, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused VILMA SULIMAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
5) In Crim. Case No. 03-216193, accused VILMA SULIMAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) and to indemnify Jimmy Tumabcao the amount of ₱21,400.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency and to pay the cost.
Accordingly, the bond posted for her provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
Considering that the accused Vilma Suliman was detained from January 6, 2003 to July 23, 2004 prior to her posting
bond for her provisional liberty, her period of detention shall be credited in the service of her sentence.
Considering that Luz Garcia has not been apprehended nor voluntarily surrendered to date, let warrantbe issued for
her arrest and let the case against her be ARCHIVED to be reinstated upon her apprehension.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,6 but the RTC denied it in its Order7 dated January 23, 2007 for lack of
merit.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 21, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus: WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing premises, the appeal filed in this case is hereby DENIED and consequently, DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated June 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, in the City of Manila in Criminal Cases
Nos. 03-216188, 03-216189, 03-216190, 03-216191 and 03-216193 are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-216188 and 03-216189 for illegal recruitment, the Court sentences accused-
appellant VILMA SULIMAN to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) for each
count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-216190 for estafa involving private complainant Anthony Mancera, the Court
sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer a minimum period of six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to a maximum term of fifteen (15) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal.
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-216191 for estafa involving private complainant Perlita A. Prudencio, the Court
sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum period of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional to maximum term of seventeen (17) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of reclusion temporal.
4. In Crim. Case No. 03-216193 for estafa involving private complainant Jimmy Tumabcao, the Court
sentences accused-appellant Vilma Suliman to suffer the minimum term of six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to maximum term of six years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's counsel received a copy of the above CA Decision on May 26, 2009. 9 However, neither petitioner nor her
counsel filed a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period for filing the said motion. Hence, on
June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision became final.
On July 3, 2009, petitioner, through her new collaborating counsel, filed a Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration10 praying that the same be admitted in the higher interest of "substantial justice and due process."
Petitioner contended that her former counsel committed gross and inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in failing
to immediately inform petitioner about his receipt of the subject CA Decision, thereby depriving petitioner of her right to
file a motion for reconsideration which, in turn, is a violation of her right to due process.
On July 21, 2009, the CA issueda Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 8, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF THE PETITIONER
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING [THAT] PETITIONER SHOULD NOTBE
BOUND BY THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF ATTY. MAYO IN NOT INFORMING HER ABOUT HIS RECEIPT OF THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ADVERSE TO HER ON MAY 26, 2009 OR IN NOT FILING A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER. 12
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that she should not be bound by her counsel's gross neglect of
duty in not informing her of the adverse decision of the CA. The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that
petitioner is not entirely blameless as she was not vigilant in monitoring the progress of her case. Evidence of her
negligence is the fact that she did not make any effort to personally follow up her appeal with her counsel. Instead, she
merely relied on a certain Conrad Lucero, the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates ofher appeal
with the CA. In this respect, the Court's ruling in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People 13 is instructive, to wit:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural
technique. The rationale for the rule isthat a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts
necessary or, atleast, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act
or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of
the client himself. A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives
the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied
by the client’s own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his
interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in thisduty, the client should suffer whatever
adverse judgment is rendered against him.
Truly, a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his
case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order
to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his
lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. 14
It may not be amiss to add that this Court notes the propensity of petitioner and her counsel to disregard the Rules
and directives of the Court. In a Resolution15 issued by this Court on March 14, 2011, petitioner's counsel was
admonished for his failure to file petitioner's Reply to Comment which was required in an earlier Resolution issued by
this Court.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. 16 An appeal
being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. 17 The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate
as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. 18 In an age where courts are be
devilled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to befollowed by appellants with greater fidelity. 19 Their observance
cannot be leftto the whims and caprices of appellants. In the instant case, petitioner remained obstinate in her non
observance of the said Rules. Such obstinacy is incongruous with her late plea for liberality in construing the Rules.
On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
In any case, even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, as it appears that petitioner assails not only
the denial by the CA of her motion to admit her belated Motion for Reconsideration but likewise seeks the reversal of
her conviction for illegal recruitment and estafa, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling
of the CA. Indeed, after a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the lower courts
did not commit any error in convicting petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.
At this point, it bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally held binding and conclusive on the
Court.20 We emphasize that while jurisprudence has provided exceptions 21 to this rule, the petitioner carries the burden
of proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are present in the case. 22 The petitioner must additionally show
that the cited exceptional circumstances will have a bearing on the results of the case. 23 In the instant case, the Court
finds that none of the exceptions are present . Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the
RTC and the CA that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contact services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines. Provided, that such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following
acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount
greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the
purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him
another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of
employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for
employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to
dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly
authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign
exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be
required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment;
 (j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board
of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly orindirectly in the management of a
travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial
considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories.1âwphi1 In case
of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. 24
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established that petitioner and her co-
accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a), (l) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they
separately charged the private complainants the amounts of ₱132,460.00, ₱120,000.00 and ₱21,400.00 as placement
fees; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse
the said complainants after such failure to deploy.
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits. The elements of estafaby means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must
be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.25
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the
RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had
the capacity to deploy the private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The
misrepresentation was made prior toprivate complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation
and false pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that inducedthe private complainants to part with their
money. As a result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the
promised employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware of the recruitment
activities done by her coaccused. Petitioner avers that when her co-accused received several amounts of money from
the private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and
consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the
recruitment activities of Suliman International. Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the business
of the said company. Petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in the face of positive assertions
made by the private complainants who had no ill motive to falsely testify against her. Indeed, of marked relevance is
the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against petitioner other than to bring her
to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse
another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against human nature and
experience.26 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive,
their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and
credence.27 In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private complainants because
the prosecution has established that petitioner was the one who offered the private complainants an alleged
alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not materialize. WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated July 21, 2009 and January 8, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30693, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALMY TIBAYAN and RICO Z. PUERTO
G.R. Nos. 209655-60 January 14, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan (Tibayan) and Rico Z. Puerto (Puerto)
(accused-appellants) is the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR Nos. 33063,
33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 which modified the Decisions dated December 4, 2009, 3 June 24,
2010,4August 2, 2010,5 August 5, 2010,6 January 21, 2011,7 and August 18, 20118 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 198 (RTC) and convicted accused appellants of the crime of Syndicated Estafa, defined and
penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1689.9
The Facts
Tibayan Group Investment Company,Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001.10 Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation
on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public
without a registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation
Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003,
the SEC revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for being fraudulently procured. 11 The foregoing led to the filing of
multiple criminal cases12 for Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and directors of TGICI, 13namely, Jesus
Tibayan, Ezekiel D. Martinez, Liborio E. Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and herein accused-
appellants.14 Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against all of them; however, only accusedappellants were
arrested, while the others remained at large.15
According to the prosecution, private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita P. Gacayan, Irma T.
Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon, Leonida D. Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina
DelaPeña, and Rodney E. Villareal16 (private complainants) were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high
interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI,
private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal
investment and the monthly interest earnings, respectively. 17 Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the
account was already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to
demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave private complainants
acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However,
the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were constrained to file
criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI. 18
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators to defraud private
complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and
that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in
the TGICI’s Articles of Incorporation was a forgery,as she was neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI. 19
The RTC Rulings
On various dates, the RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts
of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689, to wit: (a) in a Joint
Decision20 dated December 4, 2009, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion
temporalfor each count and ordering them to pay the amounts of ₱1,500,000.00 to Hector H. Alvarez, and 119,405.23
and ₱800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez;21 (b) in a Joint Decision22 dated June 24, 2010, the RTC acquitted Puerto of all
the charges, but found Tibayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Estafa, sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for each count, and ordering her to pay the
amounts of ₱1,300,000.00 and US$12,000.00 to Clarita P. Gacayan and ₱500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador; 23 (c) in a Joint
Decision24 dated August 2, 2010, the accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of Estafa, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal for
each count, and ordered to pay the amounts of ₱1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer and ₱556,376.00 to Nonito
Garlan;25 (d) in a Joint Decision26 dated August 5, 2010, the RTC found the accused appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Estafa, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20
years of reclusion temporaland ordering them to pay Emelyn Gomez the amount of ₱250,000.00; 27 (e) in a
Decision28 dated January 21, 2011, accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of
Estafa each, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 20 years of reclusion temporal
and ordered to pay Judy C. Rillon the amount of ₱118,000.00; 29 and (f) in a Joint Decision30 dated August 18, 2011,
accused-appellants were each convicted of four (4) counts of Estafa, and meted different penalties per count, as
follows: (i) for the first count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay Reynaldo A. Dacon the amount of ₱100,000.00; (ii) for the second count, they were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Leonida D. Jarina the amount of ₱200,000.00; (iii)
for the third count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years of prision
mayormedium, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay Cristina
Dela Peña the amount of ₱250,000.00; and (iv) for the last count, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional medium, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporalmedium, as maximum, and to pay Rodney E. Villareal the amount of ₱100,000.00. 31
In the aforesaid decisions, the RTC did not lend credence to accused appellants’ denials in light of the positive
testimonies of the private complainants that they invested their money in TGICI because of the assurances from
accused-appellants and the other directors/incorporators of TGICI that their investments would yield very profitable
returns. In this relation, the RTC found that accused-appellants conspired with the other directors/incorporators of
TGICI in misrepresenting the company as a legitimate corporation duly registered to operate as a mutual fund to the
detriment of the private complainants.32 However, the RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as the
prosecution failed to allege in the informations that accused-appellants and the other directors/ incorporators formed a
syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce documentary evidence substantiating its
claims that the accused-appellants committed Syndicated Estafa. 33
Aggrieved, accused-appellants separately appealed the foregoing RTC Decisions to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
Nos. 33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398. Thereafter, the CA issued a Resolution 34 dated February 19,
2013 ordering the consolidation of accused-appellants’ appeals.
The CA Ruling
35
In a Decision dated June 28, 2013, the CA modified accused appellants’ conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa, and
accordingly, increased their respective penalties to life imprisonment for each count. 36 The CA also increased the
amount of actual damages awarded to private complainant Clarita P. Gacayan from ₱1,300,000.00 to ₱1,530,625.90,
apart from the award of US$12,000.00.37
It held that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent investors to pay
its earlier investors – and is what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish. Inevitably, TGICI could no longer hoodwink new
investors that led to its collapse.38 Thus, the CA concluded that as incorporators/directors of TGICI, accused-
appellants and their cohorts conspired in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation of fraud against the
unsuspecting public. As such, they cannot hide behind the corporate veil and must be personally and criminally liable
for their acts.39 The CA then concluded that since the TGICI incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5)
persons, accused-appellants’ criminal liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their respective
penalties increased accordingly.40 Undaunted, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4,
Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).– Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that there must be a false
pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.41
In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa)
is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations,
or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316
of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public.42
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandiof inducing the public to invest in it on
the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to
five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43 Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into
TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating withoutany paid-
up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, 44 they cannot comply with
their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-
appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage ina Ponzi scheme, resulting in
the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a typeof investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing
investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest
funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators
focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance
that investors are profiting from a legitimate business. 45 It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which
works only as long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. 46 It is difficult to sustain
the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue
paying the promised profits toearly investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-man" collects his
money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most. 47
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Esta/a, committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in
this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people, including
herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private
complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them;
(b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c)
relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the
incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the
latter's prejudice.
Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants' conviction from simple Estafa to Syndicated
Estafa.1âwphi1 In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues whether raised or
not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court. 48 Hence, accused appellants' appeal conferred upon the
appellate court full jurisdiction and rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 49
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR Nos.
33063, 33562, 33660, 33669, 33939, and 34398 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, accused appellants Palmy
Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of
Syndicated Esta/a and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each count. Accused-appellants are
further ordered to pay actual damages to each of the private complainants in the following amounts: (a) ₱1,500,000.00
to Hector H. Alvarez; (b) ₱119,405.23 and ₱800,000.00 to Milagros Alvarez; (c) ₱1,530,625.90 and US$12,000.00 to
Clarita P. Gacayan; (d) ₱500,000.00 to Irma T. Ador; (e) ₱1,000,000.00 to Yolanda Zimmer; (f) ₱556,376.00 to Nonito
Garlan; (g) ₱250,000.00 to Emelyn Gomez; (h) ₱118,000.00 to Judy C. Rillon; (i) ₱100,000.00 to Reynaldo A. Dacon;
(j) ₱200,000.00 to Leonida D. Jarina; (k) ₱250,000.00 to Cristina Dela Pefia; and (l) ₱100,000.00 to Rodney E.
Villareal.
SO ORDERED.
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao
and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision 2 dated February 28, 2006
and resolution3 dated June 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 2004 4 and
July 26, 20045 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the petitioners' motion to
defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. 6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners and
Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, in relation with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689. 7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was the manager. Because of
their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a
higher rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who
presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development
Corporation (State Resources), the recommended company that can give Dy his higher investment return. 8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the approximate amount of Ten
Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of
Gracia, toincrease his investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased his
investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources. 9 In return, Gracia also issued several
checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred
Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos (₱114,286,086.14). All
these checks10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo promised assistance,
but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located.
Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money
in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the
petitioners never returned Dy’s money.
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas,
Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators and/or directors of State Resources. 11
On the basis of Dy’s complaint12 and supplemental affidavit,13 the public prosecutor filed an information14 for
syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other accused. Consequently,
petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions,
they invoked the absence of probable cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners’ twin motions. 16 The petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its July 26, 2004 order. Consequently, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial ofthe petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. 17 The CA noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants
of arrest after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with the
Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him. 18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions in Dy’s affidavits only show
probable cause for the crime of simple estafa,not syndicated estafa. Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated
estafato exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or more persons, and the fraud must be against the
general public or at least a group of persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the
petitioners’ false representations and was defrauded into parting with his money, causing him damage. 19 Since there
was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to solicit money
from other persons aside from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for simple estafa. 20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants of
arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable cause to believe that the petitioners committed the crime of
simple estafa.21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy’s affidavits shows inconsistencies in his cited factual circumstances.
These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the existence of probable cause against themfor the crime
charged.
The petitioners also contend thatit was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money. As early as August 1995, State
Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the assertion that Dy advanced funds for this
corporation.22 They question the fact that it took Dy almost five years to file his complaint despitehis allegation that he
lost almost ₱100,000,000.00.23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null and void. Contrary to the trial
court’s findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD 1689 was inapplicable to their case. There was no
evidence to show that State Resources was formed to solicit funds not only from Dy but also from the general public.
Since simple estafaand syndicated estafaare two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners
were erroneous because these warrants pertained to two different crimes. 24
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DENYthe petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA’s decision and resolution on the petition for certiorarithe petitioners
filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denialof
their twin motions to defer arraignment and to lift warrant of arrest.
This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya v. Transmed Manila
Corporation25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45 petition before us, a CA decision made under
Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of review that this Court should undertake given the
distinctionsbetween the two remedies. In Rule 45, we consider the correctness of the decision made by an inferior
court. In contrast, a Rule 65 review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon
was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the trial
court’s denial of petitioners’ motions was strictly legally correct. In question form, the question to ask is: did the CA
correctly determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motions to defer
arraignment and lift warrant of arrest?
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,27 a judge is mandated to personally determine
the existence of probable cause after hispersonal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting
evidence for the crime charged. These provisions command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence
to the prosecutor’s findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both
parties.
Section 5(a) of Rule 112, grantsthe trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint orinformation. He
may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of
arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice
in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause. 28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-accused.To be valid,
these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that probable cause be personally
determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not conduct a de novohearing; he only needs to personally
review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of probable cause to
support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present any evidence to controvert this. As the
trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the suspension of arraignment
exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joya’s motions, which may be considered a
petition for review, and that of co-accused Spouses Hao’s own petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in
the resolutionby the Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused DeJoya’s motion to determine probable
cause and co-accused Spouses Hao’s motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic with the
issuance of warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances
strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of the crime that in fact happened. 30 [Emphasis
ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issuedafter his personal evaluation of the factual circumstances
that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal
offense.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive level, where
determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before the filing of the criminal
information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In order to properly
resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is
necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these provisions, the different modes by
which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is
estafaby means of deceit. Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business orimaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; 3) the reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, which induced him to part withhis money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered
damage.31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with State Resources and promised him
a higher rate of return.32 Because of his good business relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive
financial representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so that he eventually advanced
almost ₱100,000,000.0033 with State Resources. Gracia’s succeeding checks representing the earnings of his
investments, however, were all dishonored upon deposit. 34 He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his
money for Danny’s construction and realty business.35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners’ constant
assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s invested money and its supposed earnings. 36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafaby means of deceit. The petitioners inducedDy to invest
in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his
money to be used in Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when they
admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved. 37This admission
strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State Resources in
order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’ deceit. "Deceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." 38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have placed his money in
State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but lead us to the conclusion that probable cause existed
as basis to arrest the petitioners for the crime of estafa by means of deceit.
We now address the issue of whether estafain this case was committed through a syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is syndicated estafaif the following elements are present: 1) estafaor other
forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2) the estafaor swindling was
committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted inthe misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. 40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of syndicated estafaare
present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s
supplemental complaint-affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo
and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who
allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the corporation must
come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the
petitioners, through State Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging
that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not complied
with. Thus, no syndicated estafaallegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial ofthe petitioners’ motion
to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances is convinced
that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believethat an offense was committed by the person sought to be
arrested.41 This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the
proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds of probable cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such
official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or
not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that the petitioners have probably
committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners remains to be valid and
proper. To allow them to go scot-free would defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to
put the accused in the court’s custodyto avoid his flight from the clutches of justice.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes. Simple estafais a
crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is necessarily included in another offense when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause
exists for simple estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review
of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of
suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had
not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right.1âwphi1 In
Spouses Trinidad v. Ang,47 we explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of
the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners' petition for review
had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period
allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the petitioners' refusal to
submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable
cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may
properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the February
28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order
that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERT REYES WAGAS

G.R. No. 157943 September 4, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to
overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the
identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused
to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to
gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and
without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter, did then and there issue Bank
of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of ₱200,000.00, which check was
issued in payment of an obligation, but which check when presented for encashment with the bank, was dishonored
for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused
to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present time still fails
and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty, 2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense admitted that the check
alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 3 On its part, the Prosecution made no
admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April
30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not agree at first
to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not
disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in the bank,
they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time
received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May
8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return
to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him. 6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they transacted through
telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who
signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.7
After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the amount of
₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray’s affidavit;
and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Cañada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its
case.8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-
law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the
check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not
push through, he did not anymore fund the check.9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him
and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory. It is worthy also to discuss
with you the environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth ₱200,000.00 and I promised to settle the same last May 10,
1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in Manila, and promised to
pay the consideration on the same date as I promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to
make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still to no avail attributable to
the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as collateral. This other means is
resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be rele[a]sed within
thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial obligation.
xxxx
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed
the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the responsibility. 11 On
redirect examination, Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter
only to accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s application for overseas
employment.12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence. 13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged and
he is hereby sentenced as follows:
To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum;
To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of ₱200,000.00;
To pay said complainant the sum of ₱30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the crime of
estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been informed
that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check and
upon Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, 15 arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that it was
he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed that
Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone conversation was not
reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of
the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not testify during
the trial because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence
Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no compelling ground
to reverse its decision.16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal. 17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC
granted the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00. 18 Wagas then posted bail for his provisional liberty pending
appeal.19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas’ application for bail. On
November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail. 20 On January 15, 2004,
the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. 21 On July 5, 2005, the Court, upon the
OCA’s recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint for simple ignorance of the law against the
RTC Judge.22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with its July 5, 2005 directive, and to
cause the filing of the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to explain why
his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously granted. 23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September
27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed the administrative complaint against the RTC
Judge.24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one other; that it was
highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a huge amount
of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person with whom
Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Cañada, indicated that the
goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in good order and
condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the
check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element
of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty that it was him who had transacted
with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the
elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money
or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other
words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his
money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. 25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the
payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the non-payment of
a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check the latter
had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of
funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was
Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the
telephone, thus:
Q:
On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?
A:
Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
Q:
How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A:
He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred bags of rice and he will just
issue a check.29
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom
he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone, to wit:
Q:
After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
A:
I made a demand on them.
Q:
How did you make a demand?
A:
I called him over the phone.
Q:
Who is that "him" that you are referring to?
A:
Gilbert Wagas.30
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type
of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else
like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did
not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who
signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the
complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could
not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must
still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him.
Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had
no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal
bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable
because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was
really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and
trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first
authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed by
telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. 32 Without the authentication,
incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too easy. In this
respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable
peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be established by the caller’s self-
identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the
statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts
known peculiarly to the caller.34
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded probative
weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to one ruling of the
Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and
admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the party
against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the
witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had, provided
subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of the case.
The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of
corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or
following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness of the identification goes to
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the district
court to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has been met. 35 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish that it had been
Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the
trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him was
whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:
Q:
Do you know the accused in this case?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
If he is present inside the courtroom […]
A:
No, sir. He is not around.
Q:
Why do you know him?
A:
I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela. 36
During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had determined that his caller
was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:
Q:
Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice selling, particularly with these
200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?
A:
I know it was him because I know him.
Q:
Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused through telephone
conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused through telephone he issued a
check in your favor?
A:
No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q:
But still through the telephone?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
A:
No. It was through telephone only.
Q:
In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused himself?
A:
Yes. It was through Robert.
Q:
So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody other than the accused?
A:
Yes, sir.37
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him was still
vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s
familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not even an
acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas
had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification
of the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by
telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to
controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be
considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely
for the purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands such
exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,
which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, 40 and as a means of respecting the presumption of
innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to
show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with
the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength
of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be
weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.
The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to
establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her
shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. 42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be
accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the
person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accused’s
constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an
acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance of the
established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it
to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable
doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of ₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this decision.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 163662 February 25, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the judgment rendered on January 24, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Makati City
convicting Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code.2 The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed
as hereinabove indicated. The Resolution of January 15, 2004 granting her bail pending appeal is REVOKED and her
profferred bail bond is REJECTED. Pursuant to Section 13, second paragraph, Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the case, inclusive of the entire record thereof, is CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Supreme
Court for review. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.3
Antecedents
Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised
Penal Code under the information that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of
deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
following PNB checks, [to] wit:

Check No. Date Amount

031526 9-02-94 ₱185,000.00

031527 9-17-94 185,000.00

031528 10-02-94 185,000.00

031529 10-17-94 185,000.00

031532 9-16-94 85,000.00

031533 10-16-94 85,000.00

031534 11-16-94 85,000.00

as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased to (sic) the said complainant, the accused well knowing that at the
time of issue thereof, the said checks have no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount of
the said checks, neither will said checks be honored or paid upon presentment, the bank dishonored and returned the
said checks for the reason "account closed" or "stopped payment" or should have been dishonored for insufficiency of
funds had not the said accused, without any valid reason, ordered her drawee bank to stop payment and despite
repeated demands accused failed and refused to deposit the amount necessary to cover the aforesaid check or to pay
the value thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforesaid amounts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Version of the Prosecution
In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a townmate. The latter was interested in buying jewelry.
Being then engaged in the business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to Villanueva's residence at the Galeria de
Magallanes, and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth ₱1,010, 000. 00. 5 Villanueva made out nine
checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated. Villanueva signed a receipt
reading as follows:6
August 16, 1994
Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the corresponding amount

1 set diamond - ₱70,000

1 set South Sea Black

w/ necklace & bracelet - 220,000

1 set heart shape diamond

w/ pendant (4.56 cts) - 450,000

1 set marquee xxx dia. 2 cts. - 220,000

1 bracelet diamond - 50,000

₱1,010,000

paid by the following checks issued by me

PNB #031501 - August 6, 1994 ₱5,000

PNB #031531 - August 19, 1994 10,000

PNB #031526 - Sept. 2, 1994 185,000

PNB #031527 - Sept. 17, 1994 185,000

PNB #031528 - Oct. 2, 1994 185,000

PNB #031529 - Oct. 17, 1994 185,000

PNB #031532 - Sept. 16, 1994 85,000

PNB #031533 - Oct. 16, 1994 85,000

PNB #031534 - Nov. 16, 1994 85,000

₱1,010,000

with a total of One Million Ten Thousand pesos.

(sgd)
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored upon
presentment.7 However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB Check No. 131531, the
remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds.8Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but
Madarang was barred by security guards from reaching Villanueva. 9 Madarang resorted to sending demand letters,
but her effort to contact Villanueva proved futile. 10 After Villanueva did not settle her obligations, Madarang brought the
criminal complaint for estafa,11 and the corresponding information for estafa was ultimately filed in court on September
4, 1995. On arraignment, Villanueva pleaded not guilty. 12
Version of the Defense
Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang three times. The first was at the residence of
Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was then selling jewelry. The second time was at her residence in the Galeria de
Magallanes where Madarang arrived without prior notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang was
persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she
was dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry, for which she
issued six checks as payment, five of which were postdated. On August 16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang for the
last time to have the jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the checks she had previously issued and replaced them
with another set of postdated checks that were the subject of the criminal case against her. Villanueva maintained that
the second set of checks were issued as guarantee under the agreement that they were not to be deposited until
Villanueva advised Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she did not receive
any notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks. 13 Ruling of the RTC
On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as charged, 14 viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court finds accused Julie Grace K. Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of
estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2( d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818, said
crime having been committed in the manner described in the information filed on September 4, 1995.
As a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for a period of Fourteen Years
Eight Months and One Day to Twenty Years which is within the range of Reclusion Temporal in its medium and
maximum periods.
She is also ordered to pay the private complainant Mrs. Loreto Madarang the sum of Nine Hundred Ninety Five
Thousand Pesos (₱995,000.00) plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum until the mount is fully paid with said
interest accruing at the time the information was filed on or October 25, 1995.
The period of accused's detention shall be credited in her favor conformably with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
She shall serve her entire sentence at the Correccional Institute for Women at Mandaluyong City.
SO ORDERED.15
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court, which is 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is erroneous. Said court did not pay obeisance to the teaching of
People v. Hernando, viz:
Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:
"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished
by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case
exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
x x x x."
"x x x x
Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos but the total penalty shall
not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the
prescribed penalty for the offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the
fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (₱22,000.00) pesos.
"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such as estafa, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense." "The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence." Here, complainant was
defrauded in the amount of seven hundred [thousand] (₱700,000.00) pesos. The fact that the amount involved in the
instant case exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty;
instead the matter would be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term
of the full indeterminate sentence. This accords with the rule that penal laws are construed in favor of the accused.
Applying the above-cited provision, accused shall be meted an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which shall
be taken from the maximum period of the basic penalty, that is, reclusion temporal, to be imposed in its maximum
period, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00 of the amount of the fraud, but the total penalty shall not
exceed thirty (30) years. On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance nor the incremental penalty for the amount of the fraud in excess of twenty two thousand (₱22,000.00)
pesos. Such penalty is prision mayor, with a duration of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day to twelve (12) years."
Accordingly, the accused-appellant in the case at bar should be, as she is hereby, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to THIRTY (30) YEARS of reclusion perpetua as
maximum.
x x x x.16
The CA then certified the case to the Court pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, Rules of Court.
Issues
Villanueva submits the following errors for our consideration:
I
THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT POST-DATED CHECKS.
IV
WHETHER THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, OF EST AF A. 17
Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks, averring that: (a) the checks were
issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed after Madarang was notified of the
sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the
parties.18 She argues that estafa under paragraph 2( d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was not committed
because the checks were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the alleged fraud; and because Madarang had
instigated her to issue the checks.19
Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code in issuing the
seven postdated checks?
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the conviction.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x
x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. 20 The deceit should be the efficient cause of the
defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. 21
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had
issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang
accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely
knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise established because the
checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed.
The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from
Villanueva the balance of ₱995,000.00.
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or encash the
checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account. Villanueva posits that the receipt
the Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody such agreement.
This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the
negotiable character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For instance, when there is an
agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not
encash or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is
lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks are not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall
not arise.22
Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed
agreement.1âwphi1The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks by
listing the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang to
deposit the checks only after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in
the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another document with Madarang's express
conformity for Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including
the supposed agreement that would shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a
businesswoman23 presumably made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded checks. 24 All that she is
claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true intention of the parties, implying that no written document
substantiated her alleged defense. She did not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the
receipt as written. Her self-serving statements on the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her assertions,
for they were not proof.25
Under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818, the penalty for estafa when the total
value of the checks exceed ₱22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four moths and
one day to 20 years), plus one year for each additional Pl0,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be from six years and one day to 12 years of prision mayor. In imposing the indeterminate
sentence of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum,
the CA correctly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is well to state that reclusion perpetua merely describes in
this instance the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. 26
We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC of 12% interest accruing from the time that the
information was filed until the full satisfaction of the obligation in the amount of ₱995,000.00. Conformably with the
ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames27 applying Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board
(BSP-MB), said amount should earn interest of 12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4,
1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction. WHEREFORE, the
Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION
that the amount of ₱995,000.00 shall earn interest 12% per annum from the filing of the information on September 4,
1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171672 February 2, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court should impose the penalty for the
graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid, and will not attain finality.
Antecedents
The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in Malibay, Pasay City, appeals
the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document committed on
separate occasions in October and November 1993 by forging the signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina
and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw a total of ₱65,000.00 and ₱2,000.00
from the respective savings accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo.
The antecedent facts were summarized in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), 1 as follows:
As culled from the evidence, Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with the accused within the
space of a week in October - November 1993 when they went to the bank's Malibay branch to transact on their
accounts. Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum of ₱500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the accused
upon the latter's instruction. She had to return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that
something wrong was going on. Leaming of Matuguina's problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to
her on November 8. On this day, the accused came up with the convenient excuse that she had already returned the
passbook. Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina's account and found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29
and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of the depositor and
covering a total of ₱65,000. It was apparent that the accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips
because her initials were affixed thereto. Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to
Matuguina, a move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused. Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in
the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her. When she went back to the bank worried about
the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she met with the accused in the presence of the bank manager. She
insisted that the signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the passbook was still with her
and kept in her house.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4 withdrawal. When she was
asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the accused as the person who gave to her the
slip. Since she saw the accused's initials on it attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed
that the withdrawal was genuine. She posted and released the money to the accused.
On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they
feared was also victimized by the accused. Their worst expectations were confirmed. According to Cornejo, on
November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and because there were many people there at the time, she left
her passbook with the accused. She returned days later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at home.
Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers
appeared. Cornejo denied that it was her signature. As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of the accused
were unquestionably affixed to the paper.
Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims against her but when
she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt. She started crying and locked herself inside
the bathroom. She came out only when another superior Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some questions. Since then,
she executed three more statements in response to the investigation conducted by the bank's internal auditors. She
also gave a list of the depositors' accounts from which she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary.
The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina P.65,000, while Cornejo got her
refund directly from the accused. In the course of her testimony on the witness stand, the accused made these further
admissions:
 (a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake signatures of Matuguina
and Cornejo;
(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K; (c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the
branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the auditors' questions in Exhibit M, N and O;
(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.2
Judgment of the RTC
On July 13, 1998, the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City (RTC) rendered its judgment,3 finding the petitioner guilty as
charged, and sentencing her to suffer as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of ₱20,000.00 from the account of Matuguina, the
indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years,
eight months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱20,000.00 and the costs of
suit;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of ₱2,000.00 from Cornejo's account, the
indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of
prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱2,000.00 and the costs of suit;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of ₱10,000.00 from the account of Matuguina, the
indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months
and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱10,000.00 and the costs of suit;
and
(d) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of ₱35,000 from Matuguina's account, the
indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family ₱35,000.00 and the costs of suit.
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended in the CA that: (1) her conviction should be set aside because the evidence
presented against her had been obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination; (2) her rights
to due process and to counsel had been infringed; and (3) the evidence against her should be inadmissible for being
obtained by illegal or unconstitutional means rendering the evidence as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision 4 affirming the judgment of the RTC, to wit:
In summary, we find no grounds to disturb the findings of the lower court, except the provision of the dispositive
portion in case 94-5525 requiring the accused to pay BPI Family ₱2,000. This must be deleted because the accused
had already paid the amount to the depositor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
₱2,000 to the complainant in case 94-5525 be deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner still insists that her conviction was invalid because her constitutional rights against self-
incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied. In behalf of the State, the Office of the Solicitor General
counters that she could invoke her rights to remain silent and to counsel only if she had been under custodial
investigation, which she was not; and that the acts of her counsel whom she had herself engaged to represent her and
whom she had the full authority to replace at any time were binding against her.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave rise to the
accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. She raised
no challenges against such findings of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting herself to the supposed
denial of her rights to due process and to counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In
the CA, her main objection focused on the denial of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial
resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.
Debunking the petitioner's challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel
guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was
not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an
administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her
superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down
bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the relevant
portions of the decision of the CA, viz:
The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence presented against her
was obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination. She also contends that her rights to due
process and counsel were infringed. Without referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous metaphors of
constitutional law to demonize and exclude what she believes were evidence obtained against her by illegal or
unconstitutional means - evidence constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold, however, that in the particular
setting in which she was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to counsel and against self-
incrimination are not apposite.
The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an official proceeding for the
investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial, is
contained in this terse injunction - no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, he
may not be required to take the witness stand. He can sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel is
expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This means inversely
that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed without having a counsel by his side. These are the traditional rights of
the accused in a criminal case. They exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal indictment and trial for a
criminal offense. But since Miranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to recognize that an accused needs the
same protections even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very inception of the criminal process - when a
person is taken into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a person says or does during custodial
investigation will eventually be used as evidence against him at the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin
of his eventual conviction. His trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-
incrimination and to counsel. This is the logic behind what we now call as the Miranda doctrine.
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the exercise of the new right and the
protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected to police interrogation while in custody at
the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial investigation is underway that
the certain procedural safeguards takes over - the person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.
We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never intended to hamper the
traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime involving persons not under restraint. The general questioning
of citizens in the fact-finding process, as the US Supreme Court recognizes, which is not preceded by any restraint on
the freedom of the person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since the compelling atmosphere inherent in in-
custody interrogation is not present.
The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, a provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the companion rights of a
person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had
also to be institutionalized by declaring that any confession or admission obtained in violation of these rights is
inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for the
commission of an offense? The answer has been settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in the much
later case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into the above-cited
provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in
which the Miranda doctrine applies - when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a
custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the Supreme Court
said very clearly that the rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be
considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not
even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative investigation by her
superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She
was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of
conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to
have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply
irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did not get effective legal
representation from her former counsel who was already old and feeble when the case was being heard. In fact, the
records show, her counsel died during the pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case
from one's lack of a competent and independent counsel, but we are not prepared to say that the accused was so
poorly represented that it affected her fundamental right to due process. Except for the several postponements
incurred by her counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any serious blunder during the trial. We have
read the transcripts of the trial and failed to get this impression. The evidence against the accused was simply too
overwhelming. We may take note that once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his
absences, but she did not. She must live by that.5
Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records, and that her investigation
as a bank employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of the Constitutionally protected right against
self-incrimination, right to counsel and right to due process, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in
affirming the conviction of the petitioner by the RTC.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document was established
beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough
to leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal
slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due
course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips.
She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her employer, in the various
sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by
forging the signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor
concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal
slips.
Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.
According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,6 the penalty for a complex crime is that corresponding to the most
serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and
will not attain finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial documents is punished with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of
₱5,000.00.7 In contrast, the estafa is punished according to the value of the defraudation, as follows: with the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and
one day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is over Pl2,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00, and if such
amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year for each additional
Pl0,000.00, but the total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the penalty shall be termed pris ion mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be, in connection with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two months) if the amount of the fraud is over
₱6,000.00 but does not exceed ₱12,000.00; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months) if the amount of the
fraud is over ₱200.00 but does not exceed ₱6,000.00; and with the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (i.e., two months and one day to six months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed ₱200.00. 8
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the fraud was ₱20,000.00; hence,
the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum period. However, the RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate
sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20
days of prision mayor, as maximum. Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short by one day, the maximum
period of the penalty being six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate sentence is
corrected to three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor,
as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving ₱2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four months and one day of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to two years and four months of prision correccional in its minimum period. The
falsification of commercial document is penalized with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e.,
two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of ₱5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and
its penalty is to be imposed in the maximum period, which is from four years, nine months and 11 days to six years
plus fine of PS,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months). Thus, the indeterminate sentence
of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that
both the RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the error by prescribing in lieu thereof the indeterminate
sentence of two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision
correccional plus fine of PS,000.00, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving ₱10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the indeterminate sentence of four
months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum. However, the penalty for the falsification of commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa. To
accord with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents (i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of ₱5,000.00) should be imposed in the maximum period.
Accordingly, we revise the indeterminate sentence so that its minimum is two years and four months of prision
correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was ₱35,000.00, the penalty for estafa (i.e., prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four years, two months and one day to
eight years) is higher than that for falsification of commercial documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11
months and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, was
prescribed. Considering that the maximum period ranged from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years, the
CA should have clarified whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor already included the incremental
penalty of one year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00. Absent the clarification, we can presume that the
incremental penalty was not yet included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and specific, the indeterminate
sentence is hereby fixed at four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus one year incremental penalty. In other words, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence is seven years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor.
The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the ₱2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case No. 94-5525 on the ground that
such amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa Cornejo. There being no issue as to this, the Court
affirms the deletion.
The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum on the remaining unpaid sums
reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is only fair and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on August 18, 2005, subject to
the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of three years of prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional plus fine of
₱5,000.00, as maximum;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to five years of prision correccional plus fine of ₱5,000.00, as
the maximum; and
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.
The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per annum on the aggregate
amount of ₱65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full payment.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211917 February 27, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Decision2 dated November 25, 2013, and Resolution3 dated February 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City in
Criminal Case No. 15407 finding petitioner Norma C. Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, while exonerating petitioner Josephine G. Umali from the crime charged. The RTC also
adjudged the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in favor of private complainant Joan
Fructoza E. Fineza.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal
Code before Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following Information:
That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, defraud one JOAN FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following manner, to wit: That Norma C. Gamaro,
pretending that she is knowledgeable in the business of buy and sell of jewelry, other merchandise and financing,
assuring complainant of a sure market and big profit lure and entice complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into
the business and the latter purchased and delivered to her the jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,519.00 with the obligation
to manage the business for private complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from
complying, with her obligation, managed the business as her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and
pledging jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused Josephine Umali work while the checks issued by respondent
Rowena Gamaro to guarantee their payment were all dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds, to
the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while accused Rowena C.
Gamaro remained at-large.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence disclosed the following facts:
Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business venture with
petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G. Umali (Umali) and accused Rowena
Gamaro Fineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali
who was then the manager of the said pawnshop located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces of jewelry
would then be sold for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the Social Security System (SSS) in San Pablo
City. The proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following manner: fifty percent (50%) would
go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena
Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her
daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of Fineza
reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry. 6
The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma Gamaro, together with
her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar business with other suppliers of pieces of
jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. To wind up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro and
Rowena Gamaro would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried
to encash the checks which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the account
of the Gamaros had been closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and
the latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks. Fineza also learned that
the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what they had agreed
upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to
redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was the nephew of
Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who pledged the pieces of jewelry. 7
To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her possession but the
latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for the pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did
not accept the said offer.8
A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated February 16, 2004,
asking for the return of the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of jewelry which were not returned
to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand letter was left unanswered. 9
For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters. Umali
likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro and with Fineza. While admitting that
there were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin, Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where she was the
manager, Umali denied that she knew where those pieces of jewelry came from. 10
On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment, as follows:
a. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized
under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate
prison term of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Twenty (20) Years
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
b. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal liability;
c. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine Umali to pay the private complainant jointly and
solidarily the following amounts:
1. ₱1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on February 16, 2004, until fully paid;
2. ₱50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;
3. ₱25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;
4. ₱50,000.00, for and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs.
Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau of Immigration is likewise directed to issue a HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal circumstances are as follows:
Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO
Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority (NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San Pablo City
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated November 25, 2013, the CA affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. The fallo of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, San Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the CA on February 21, 2014.
Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:
A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RTC
DECISION FINDING NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER SECTION l(B), ARTICLE 315
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE INFORMATION ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA
UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(A) ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;
B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC) RELIED
ON THE FINDINGS ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WITH SSS AGAINST NORMA
GAMARO;
C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC)
CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY. BALDEO DESPITE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA GAMARO ADVISE REGARDING HER CASE; AND
D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE RTC THAT NORMA GAMARO RECEIVED
THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE INCOMPETENT AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION ITSELF.13
The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from the one
charged is legally permissible.
The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime, among them
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.14
The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him" is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be
absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. It is hornbook doctrine that what
determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. 15
The controlling words of the information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v.
Hon. Layosa16as follows:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among
others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and
character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Court's ruling in US. v. Lim San is
instructive:
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold
that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and
that the facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and
for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is
thoroughly in accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x. 17
In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph
2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below
shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case maybe.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four
cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
x x xx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. 18
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means;
(2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means and was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.19
However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa).
x x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x x xx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
x x x20
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal
properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 21
The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which petitioner Norma
Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
l(b) instead of paragraph 2(a)?
What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of a crime charged
in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of the Information yields an
affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza
entrusted petitioner Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,5l 9.00 on the condition that the
same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to
Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop
where petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of
Fineza.
Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This,
at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information. 22
There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the
acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa by misappropriation.
Petitioners are fully apprised of the charge against them and for them to suitably prepare their defense. Therefore,
petitioner Norma Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right. She was sufficiently apprised of the facts that
pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa, because the RTC has the discretion to read the Information in the
context of the facts alleged. In the case of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,23 We explained the rationale behind this discretion in
this manner:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of
the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be,
its result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the
technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime
characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did
he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in
the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is
a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the
trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no
consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights ... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner,
stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of
the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named x x x. 24
Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1 (b). As held by the CA, Fineza
positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her and petitioners and accused
Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was
received by her in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to
petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is
tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. 25 As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the
pieces of jewelry using her own money.
The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or
disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed
upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the
items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts. 26
Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, petitioner
Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense, the same having been proved.
Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of prosecution witness
Atty. Baldeo violated the rule on "privileged communication between attorney and client" for the reason that Atty.
Baldeo allegedly gave petitioner Norma Gamaro "advise" regarding her case.
The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication;
(2) The client made the communication in confidence;
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. 27
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not
be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice.28
Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate petitioner's allegation.
The testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that petitioner Norma Gamaro was indeed engaged in
the business of selling jewelry supplied by private complainant Fineza. We note that the testimony is merely
corroborative to the testimony of private complainant Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma
Gamaro. Atty. Baldeo testified primarily on the fact that she personally saw petitioner Gamaro, on several occasions,
showing the jewelry for sale to their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered to buy the pieces of jewelry on
some instances, and she was told by petitioner Norma Gamaro that the pieces of jewelry came from Fineza. 29
The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC to dispute the defense of petitioner Norma
Gamaro that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:
Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the aforementioned administrative case, accused
Norma Gamaro's defense of denial of her participation in the business transaction involving the sale of jewelry
supplied by private complainant, fall flat on its face. 30
Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the one who received the
pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive
between the parties. Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein
which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision.31
We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro received
some pieces of jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned the jewelry entrusted to them by Fineza
which is a clear act of misappropriation, thus:
x x x x. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and Josephine through the testimony of Frederick San Diego
is understandable.1âwphi1 The argument, however, that it was Frederick San Diego, upon instructions of
RowenaGamaro who pledged the jewelry, without the knowledge of Norma or Josephine is unavailing. The records
show that Frederick San Diego is not only a mere nephew of Norma, and cousin to Rowena and Josephine, but also
the messenger and collector of Rowena, who had knowledge of the fact that Rowena's partner was the private
complainant, Frederick San Diego also knew that the private complainant went to the house of Norma asking the
missing jewelry.
As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the private complainant to Norma Gamaro, not Rowena
Gamaro. Yet the defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the same pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier
Pawnshop, Cebuana Lhuillier, and the owner of Collette's upon instructions of Rowena Gamaro. Clearly then, Norma
turned over the said jewelry to Rowena with knowledge that they will be pledged to the pawnshops and to the owner
of Collette's. To hold otherwise would run counter to human nature and experience. 32
It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the eighteen (18) index cards given by accused Rowena
Gamaro to Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by Fineza, with the corresponding appraised
values. The due dates of the checks issued in favor of Fineza (Exhibits "F" to "F-7"and "F-11""F-27") were also
indicated on the index cards.33 The pieces of jewelry were pawned to various pawnshops and individuals, instead of
offering them for sale. Hence, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to return the jewelry to the damage and prejudice of
Fineza. She even offered her house and lot to Fineza as payment for the jewelry.
We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that Fineza entrusted the possession of the jewelry to
petitioner. The CA observed that the prosecution duly proved petitioner's misappropriation by showing that she failed
to return the diamond ring upon demand. That misappropriation took place was strengthened when petitioner Norma
Gamaro informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the terms of their business
agreement.
Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We note the declaration of the RTC that Umali had
knowledge as to who owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. The RTC further pointed out that Umali
was part of the business transaction between Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro with Fineza, as she too signed
the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino to enable them to open a checking account. It was against
this account that Norma and Rowena Gamaro drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Fineza from
the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry. These findings support the conclusion of the CA that Umali's acquittal
was based on reasonable doubt. Hence, Umali's civil liability was not extinguished by her discharge. 34 We, therefore,
concur with the findings of the CA:
On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to private complainant Fineza. As may be recalled,
appellant Umali was exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding, she is not entirely free from any liability
towards private complainant Fineza. It has been held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt her from civil liability where a mere preponderance of
evidence is required.35 There is no question that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is preponderant enough to
sustain appellant Umali's civil liability. Accordingly, We agree with the court a quo’s ratiocination in this wise:
"What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by Frederick that it was Rowena Gamaro who
instructed him to pledge the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were true, then, with more reason Josephine had
knowledge as to who owns the jewelry. It may well be pointed out, as earlier stated, that Josephine is part of the
business transaction between Norma and Rowena with the private complainant, as she too signed the Joint Solidary
Account Agreement with Banco Filipino purposely to enable them to open a checking account, and it was against this
account that Norma and Rowena drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Joan from the proceeds
of the sale of the jewelry. It follows then that Josephine also knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged with
her (sic) M. Lhuillier Pawnshop Branch. x x x"
With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a quo’s ruling that herein appellants be held jointly and
solidarily liable to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the
court a quo.36
There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the
facts.37 We, therefore, adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their
appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 2013, and its
Resolution dated February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST WOMEN'S CREDIT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ma. Rosario P. Campos (Campos) to assail the
Decision1 dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31468, which affirmed the conviction of Campos for fourteen (14) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(B.P. 22), otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women's Credit
Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover
the agreed installment payments.3 Fourteen of these checks
drawn against her Current Account No.
6005-05449-92 withBPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored when
presented for payment, particularly:
Check No. Date Amount
138609 August 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138610 August 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138611 September 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138612 September 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138613 October 15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138614 October 30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138615 November15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138616 November30, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138617 December15, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138618 December31, 1995 ₱3,333.33
138619 January 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138620 January 31, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138621 February 15, 1996 ₱3,333.33
138622 February28, 1996 ₱3,333.33

₱46,666.62
The checks were declared by the draweebank to be drawn against a "closed account." 4
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, Branch 48, with violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as
she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned. 5
On December 7, 1999, the MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads: WHEREFORE, all the
foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14) counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of ₱46,666.62 representing the total value of the checks, plus legal interest from
date of default until full payment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Feeling aggrieved, Campos appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July 30, 2007, the RTC of Pasay City,
Branch108 rendered its decision upholding Campos’ conviction. A motion for reconsideration filed by Campos was
denied for lack of merit.7
Unyielding, Campos appealed the RTC decision to the CA, which rendered on July 21, 2008 its decision 8 affirming the
ruling of the RTC. Campos moved to reconsider, but her motion was denied via a Resolution 9 dated February 16,
2009. Hence,this petition for review on certiorari which cites the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT A DEMAND LETTER THAT WAS SENT THROUGH REGISTERED MAILIS
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF [B.P. 22] AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT OF THE
DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT [CAMPOS’] WANT OF INFORMATION OF THE FACT OF THE CHECKS’ DISHONOR
AND HER SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR PAYMENT [ARE] TANTAMOUNT TO GOOD
FAITH SO AS TO PERSUADE THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITY
POWERS AND TO LEND SUCCOR TO [CAMPOS’] CASE.10
Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s issuance that she did not
have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon presentment was not established
by the prosecution. She denies having received a notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos
discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by FWCC through registered
mail. She also invokes good faith as she allegedly made arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her obligation
after the subject checks were dishonored.
The petition lacks merit.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.11
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos through the present
petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the
dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of
such notice of dishonor,12 although not as an element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a
check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the
second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind
which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, 13 as it
reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in
full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of dishonor from
FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not
sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were
presented by the prosecution. The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return
receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or
served on issuers of checks.1âwphi1 The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service
by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of
the second element of the offense.14
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts
to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee
bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show
that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the
dishonor of the checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were receipts 16 dated January 13, 1996, February 29,
1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various amounts ranging from
₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996
until May 1998 if she had. not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making arrangements for
payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not
established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC,
and to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the
subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the
trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed
her former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during the trial, 17 it is settled that the
negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse
the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Campos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 21, 2008 and Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31468 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC JUDGE MANUEL
D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 129764 March 12, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the decision1 dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19621,
affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision2 finding petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six
months on each count, to be served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals' resolution 3 dated July 8,
1997 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two
years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his
capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks:
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986 for P100,000.00, payable to
Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and
Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986 for P115,442.65, payable to
Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.4
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later than
May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils.
shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable. 5
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because
they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln
Gerard.6
Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln
Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the leased premises since a new
tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed "in our compound and
under our custody."7
On June 2, 1986,8 when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the
two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks
and asking him to fund them within the time prescribed by law. 9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith
sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln's inability to fund said checks due to the strike. 10Subsequently, on
June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went
ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986, 11 despite Lincoln Gerard's protest.12
On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 73260 and 73261 were
filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed,
and so were his petition for review filed before the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before
the RTC. Griffith then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.1âwphi1.nêt
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 55276
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted the
auction sale.13 On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied the
proceeds thereof to Lincoln Gerard's arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard
the P1,072,586.88 as excess.14 The court stated:
The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the amount of P254,600 as a result of
the invalid auction sale. The latter amount should be applied to the rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff
corporation to the defendant corporation (P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff corporation still owes the defendant
corporation the amount of P47,953.12 as rental arrears. In order to get the true and real damages that
defendant corporation should pay the plaintiff corporation, the balance of the rental arrears should be
deducted from the amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items belonging to the plaintiff corporation
and sold by the defendant corporation at a public auction. The net result is P1,072,586.88.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and executory. 16
On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were remanded to the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty on both counts for
violation of B.P. 22,17 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served
consecutively. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, GUILTY OF
VIOLATION of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law on two
counts.
The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS in
Criminal Case No. 41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41679, both of which shall be
served consecutively.
Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the Regional Trial Court Branch
69, Pasig, regardless of its finality, of which this court has no record, this Court shall not resolve the same
because they are either "Res Judicata" or "Pendente Litis".
SO ORDERED.18
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision dated March 14, 1997, the
appellate court ruled:
WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under consideration is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated
July 8, 1997.20 Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA decision and resolution on the criminal cases, anchored
on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY
1997 ARE CONTRARY TO THE RULING IN MAGNO V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE
COURT LAID DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE BASED ON AN
INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTON DATED 8 JULY
1997 RESULT IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY
1997 STATING THAT PAYMENT THROUGH NOTARIAL FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES NOT ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS
AND RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY
1997 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-
G.R. NO. 20980) INVOLVING THE SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE SAME
TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY
1997 WHICH RELIED ON THE RULING IN THE CASE OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO
JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22,
ARE CONTRAY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.21
Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher attached to the checks,
the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance. Petitioner contends that this good faith on his
part negates any intent to put worthless checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as
regards the second check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with
said check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not have known at the
time of its issuance that the postdated check would be dishonored when presented for payment later on.
Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional proscription against
imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check
but for failing to pay an obligation when it fell due.
Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and
auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise violation of B.P. 22 are present in
this case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor,
provided by the law and thus did not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability.
For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge, through the note on the
voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient funds by May 30, 1996, which
assurance was "final and irrevocable".22 The OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check that
is postdated and one that is not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds
and the check is dishonored upon presentment.
There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since according to the OSG, what B.P. 22
penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the
failure to pay a debt.23
The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodge's notarial foreclosure of Lincoln
Gerard's properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial.
Moreover, said payment was made only after the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made
beyond the five-day period, from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.
The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been
erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His
conviction on two counts and sentence of six months imprisonment for each count by the respondent MTC Judge
Manuel Villamayor was upheld by respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of
Appeals. But private respondent appears to have collected more than the value of the two checks in question before
the filing in the trial court of the case for violation of B.P. 22. Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted
and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we must determine whether the alleged payment of the amount of the checks
two years prior to the filing of the information for violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.
Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this case, however, does not appear to
us an appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be
resolved if essential to the decision of a case and controversy. But here we find that this case can be resolved on
other grounds. Well to remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that are not the very lis mota of a
case.24
In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the
voucher for each check that the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to
be given at a specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that
paralyzed its business and resulted to the company's inability to fund its checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the
checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard
before May 30, 1986, the checks would be presented for payment. "This is final and irrevocable", according to the note
that was written actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps
Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge
had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and
auction sale of Lincoln Gerard's properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge.
In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is meritorious.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account user."25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through
manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. 26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this
Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to
"best serve the ends of criminal justice."
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties
for retribution,27 such retribution should be aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers". 28 Note that in the two criminal
cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly
failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge,
through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerard's property
for cash amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in
Phelps Dodge's custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The
obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was only P301,953.12.30 Thus, by resorting to the
remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks,
totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the
checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts
of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no
longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary. 31 That the money
value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the
antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge
was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances,
see how petitioner's conviction and sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and
justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and
auction sale as its chosen remedy.
That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in deciding the petition for
Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioner's
motion to quash the charges herein before they were tried on the merits. 32
Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani:
"…We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both charges in Criminal Cases
Nos. 73260-61. We can even say that the decision rendered in Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-
written as it is, had put up a formidable obstacle to any conviction in the criminal cases with the findings
therein made that the sale by public auction of the properties of Lincoln was illegal and had no justification
under the facts; that also the proceeds realized in the said sale should be deducted from the account of
Lincoln with Phelps, so that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears which Lincoln should pay,
computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case as the trial court had
resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to pay Lincoln in damages P1,072,586.88 from which had been
deducted the amount of P47,953.12 representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and that
consequently, there is absolutely no consideration remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks." 33
Petitioner's efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated on procedural grounds
because, according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy. 34 In a petition for certiorari,
only issues of jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless
checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. 35We
must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et
cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also
that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice
but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the
checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal
offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two
years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could
not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued
determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other
kinds of checks need no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated
March 14, 1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith
is ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190834 November 26, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on June 30, 2009, and its Resolution 2 dated January 4, 2010. The CA affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), convicting petitioner of one (1) count of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
Records reveal that petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June 30, 1998
and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.00) for
each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor) as his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the
elections of 1998. It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for
the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop
Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and during
trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn against
insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated July 20,
1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8, 1998 in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash
said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two
Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327138-CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did thenand there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account or for value
BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013814 dated July 15, 1998, payable to Cash in the amount of ₱100,000.00
said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT
STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice of such dishonor failed to pay
said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
CRIMINAL CASE No. 327139 – CR
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses ARIEL LIM of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to MAGNA B. BADIEE to apply on account or for value
BANK OF COMMERCE CHECK No. 0013813 dated June 30, 1998 payable to Cashin the amount of ₱100,000.00
said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "PAYMENT
STOPPED," but the same would have been dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused, despite receipt of notice of such dishonor failed to pay
said Magna B. Badiee the amount of the said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On September 12, 2006, the MeTC promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), and on July 20, 2007, the RTC issued a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court therefore modifies the lower court decision with respect to criminal case no. 327138 (07-
249931), because the lower court of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the essential ingredients
of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. The decision of the lower court with respect to criminal case no.
327138 (07-249931) is ordered vacated and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court findings that accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of BP 22 with respect to
criminal case no. 07-24992 is affirmed and is ordered to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00 plus costs. No findings as to civil
liability because the court agrees with the lower court that the check was paid, is affirmed and there is no cogent
reason to disturb the same. In case of failure to pay fine, the accused shall undergo subsidiary imprisonment of not
more than six (6) months.
SO ORDERED.5
A petition for review was then filed with the Court of Appeals, and on June 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied per Resolution dated
January 4, 2010.
Thus, the present petition wherein petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal of the criminal case
against him on the ground that he has fully paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the Informations
against him were filed incourt. Petitioner mainly relies on Griffith v. Court of Appeals. 6 The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) likewise recommends the acquittal of petitioner, opining that Griffith 7 is applicable to the present case.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
In Griffith,the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the filing of the Information for
violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant an amount greater than the value of the
bounced checks. The CA held that the factual circumstances in Griffith are dissimilar from those in the present case.
The Court disagrees with such conclusion.
The CA found Griffithin applicable to the present case, because the checks subject of this case are personal checks,
whilethe check involved in Griffithwas a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or miscommunication could
easily occur between the signatories of the check and the corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in
the present case are not exactlythe same as those in Griffith, it should be noted that the same kind of confusion giving
rise to petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued by petitioner merely as a
campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to
issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign materials, for which the checks were used as
payment, were not delivered on time. Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it was
Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is easy to see how petitioner made the mistake
of readily complying with the instruction to stop payment since he believed Castor's wordthat there is no longer any
valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not made as agreed upon. Nevertheless, two monthsafter receiving
the demand letter from private complainant and just several days after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement check which was successfully encashed by private complainant.
The CA also took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only after receiving the subpoena from the
Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he wanted to
settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous, because in Griffith, the
accused therein did not even voluntarily pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid
from the proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's property. In saidcase, the Court did not differentiate as to
whether payment was made before or after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. It only
mattered that the amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before the Information against the
accused was filed in court. In thiscase, petitioner even voluntarily paid value of the bounced checks. The Court,
therefore, sees no justification for differentiating this case from that of Griffith. Records show that both in Griffithand in
this case, petitioner had paid the amount of the dishonored checks before the filing of the Informations in court. Verily,
there is no reason why the same liberality granted to the accused in Griffithshould not likewise be extended to herein
petitioner. The precept enunciated in Griffith is herein reiterated, to wit:
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless
checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We
must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et
cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also
that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice
but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the
checks for payment of rentals, viaauction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal
offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two
years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could
not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x x 8 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, 9 the foregoing principle articulated in
Griffithwas the precedent cited to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the
elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being "(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for
value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." 10 To facilitate proving the
second element, the law created a prima faciepresumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is
established when it is shown that the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the check, however,
is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted.
Evidently, one of the essential elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted
for B.P. Blg. 22. Said payment withinthe period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period would exculpate
the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to
cover the value of the checks representing rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to the
institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the
petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.
xxxx
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in possession the
four buses – trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant to Section 7 of the
Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about ₱6.6 million." It thus appears that the total amount of the
dishonored checks – ₱1,785,855.75 – , x x x was more than fully satisfied priorto the transmittal and receiptof the July
9, 1992 letter of demand. In keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored
checks to have obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused.1âwphi1And since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the
application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x x 11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg.
22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court acknowledges the
existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of
the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, 12petitioner should
not be penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to bepresent. The fact that the issuer
of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of
the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information incourt. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22,
is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who
have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been
filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the
purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has been filed in
court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that
the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then
there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be
applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from cases where the
accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated
by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and
deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In
such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely
satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of Informations
with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2009, in CA-GR. CR No. 31725, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ariel T. Lim is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 07-249932.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163938 March 28, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among members of the bar, but also
among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what law to apply and what penalty to impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or arson of an
inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming
with modification that2 of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos and Sarmelito
Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel,
Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child.3 She was lying down when she heard some noise around the house. She
got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos
and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. 4 When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already
on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled. 5
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe
to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping over the
fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr.6 He also saw Rolando Buela running away.7
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel,
Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o’clock in the Barangay Hacienda, Island of San Miguel,
Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the
latter’s damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private complainant Adelina Borbe
and Olipiano Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and their co-accused. The trial court
summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident; Rolando Buela claimed to
be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents’ house on occasion
of the death anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja’s having
gone there in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o’clock noontime of January 1, 1994;
Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the
day the incident happened and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence
at Añgas after having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after the incident
happened when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the accused to corroborate
their testimonies.9
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The dispositive part of the
judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE BUEBOS, SARMELITO
BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged; accordingly, each of
the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.10
Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their appeal, they contended that
(1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy;
and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and credence to their defense of denial and alibi.
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, the CA
disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each
of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.11
In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson, punishable by
prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege with specificity the
actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson in its simple form. 12
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The following arguments are now
raised for the Court’s consideration:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED
IN THE CASE AT BAR.13
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this part of our penal law.
Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and bar, a
brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised Penal Code: Article 320
(destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not included in the preceding
articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning
one’s own property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender, Article
326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists,
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code
provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance read:
SECTION 1. Arson. – Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be punished by prision mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under circumstances which expose to
danger the life or property of another.
SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or combustible materials
are stored;
 2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture, education or social
services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for transportation of persons or
property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative or other official
proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center, public or private market,
theater or movie house or any similar place or building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. – The penalty in any case of arson shall be imposed in its
maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons.
SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. – Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie
evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the building not necessary in
the business of the offender nor for household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or materials soaked
therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to
start a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building
or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of the issuance of
the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have occurred in the
same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a building or property had
been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in exchange for the
desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or property of the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. – Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished by prision mayor in its
minimum period.
SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. – The building which is the object of arson including the land on which it
is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no
participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law expanded the definition
of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also
paved the way for the reimposition of the capital punishment on destructive arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes) was passed on
December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code
is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather
or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite
purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or
terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice
at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group
of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no longer a
capital offense.14
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners’ culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence. They argue that the inference
that they were responsible for the burning of private complainant’s hut was not duly proven by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony
would result in setting a felon free."15
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which
a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or
impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. 16 Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned
by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. 17
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 18
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the circumstantial evidence extant in the
records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00 a.m.;
 2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners, together with their two
other co-accused, standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted for help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive testimony. 19 Evidently, these
circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair conclusion – the culpability of petitioners for the
burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner
perpetrated the arson.
Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and appellate courts. They posit
that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in
concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all
and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. 20
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito
Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making
boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina’s house was ablaze. These acts
clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:
Accused-appellant’s assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the accounts of the prosecution
witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved after the private complainant shouted for help clearly
indicated a confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no
direct evidence showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on fire, the
doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime.
Very seldom such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only
rarely documented by agreements in writing.21
Crime committed and the penalty
The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On
appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the particular provision
breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not having been
established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed to
have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense of
simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-appellants should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period as provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correccional. 22
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The said
provision of law reads:
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling.23 Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the
information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and
specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of
the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information. 24
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts
was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that "accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the
nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice." 25
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were convicted by the RTC on April 7,
1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application
insofar as they benefit the accused.26
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable
by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified the RTC and CA judgments
for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano, 27 the accused was found guilty of
destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court held that he should be held liable only for
simple arson. The explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-
appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law.
The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather
than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par.
1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents a greater
degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special
aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of
the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse,
heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego.
Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson
penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling. 28
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v. Malngan. 29 Said the
Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No.
1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of
the damage caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known
as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to
effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and
protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its
wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe
punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the
malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally
difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater
impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should result, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code remains the governing law
for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size,
not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses,
dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other
crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of
the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson
recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on
the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to
the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand,
acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling
under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present. [Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the
Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson – for having
"deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same
to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration
ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire."
[Emphasis supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano. The accused in the latter
case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring
houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically
described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or
edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code.
In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against
the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar."
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally burned the two-
storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced
accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense
in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein."
"What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited."
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613 categorically provides that
the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied]1avvphil
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable penalty on accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua.30
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correccional, which
has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALAMADA MACABANDO

G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the August 26, 1002 judgment 2of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on
the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). 3 Afterwards, he uttered that
he would burn his house.4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went
out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its
contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who
was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. 6 The
appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. 7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. 8 Eric also returned to his
house to save his belongings.9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and
concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional. 10 Barangay
Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City Social
Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage. 11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on
December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. 13 The appellant claimed that he went
to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied
making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his
neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration. 14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the appellant carry a
revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he and
the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire
broke out.16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. 18 In its
judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since these findings
were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the totality of the presented
circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct
evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction
provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused."19
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable conclusion
that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe,
acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still
in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith
Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house; fourth,
the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the
appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house; sixth,
the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the
Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house, and that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his
house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his
house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual
whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural
order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and
firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to
note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate
planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep
inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s
indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with
his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any
improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no
misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, which reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually gather
or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite
purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or
terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice
at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure.1âwphi1
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
 1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person
or group of persons."20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law
provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 22 This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty
because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson. 23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the present case.
The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses.
These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial
and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which
stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from
the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s
act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to
be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts punished
under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own
house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which
has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose
maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended
the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not adequately reflect any
concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable.25
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
 (1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson under Section
3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX

CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the commission
of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same
shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the
crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the
blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death
of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of
Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix 1 of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit 2 for estafa against her brother-in-
law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince
Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1)
of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as
Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging to
the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my sister Zenaida
Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in
1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively,
I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on
o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to
secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four
 (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as
ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because
William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my
mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my other
niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the
second wife of my sister’s widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that they were in
connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and
made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194,
Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331,
Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc.
No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale
were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her
grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid ₱7,000,000.00 for the property covered by
TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were
turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita
Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid ₱8,000,000.00 for the property
covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William
Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual
knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory
thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her father’s
orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney fraudulently
secured from my mother, which total ₱22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never
delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the
sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to
fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s]
and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x 3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal,
however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87:6
I N F O R MATI O N
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means
of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said
document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at
Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
 3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration
No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735,
Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special
power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of
Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for ₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for ₱250,000.00
and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above
properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages
from ₱1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to ₱22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his
relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting
circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity
between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the
correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein
complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond
the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,]
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and
obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather
against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred
by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed
for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity
between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the
exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or
existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship
by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent
Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out
by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created havoc among
members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause
with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis
and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the
crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-
law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot
draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of
Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is
indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended
a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn
power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the
law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the
plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato. 14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the
commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-
ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the
estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28,
1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land
could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such
right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the
spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage
with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother,
Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided
under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the
members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision
exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her
liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for
the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving
spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It
limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to
the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions are
parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather
who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson; 19 by
the stepfather who steals something from his stepson; 20 by the grandson who steals from his grandfather; 21 by the
accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother. 23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of
marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the trial
and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in
the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some who
believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs.
Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is
that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is
dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it
(Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite
the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of
the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this
view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the
marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse
to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. 28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of
the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers
that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these
people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married
parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is more
consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest. 31 On the other
hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-
relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to
relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in
general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and
the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or
her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its
language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous
social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the
family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of
the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 35The
view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it
is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor
of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article
332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of
relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the
said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. 39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. 40 What controls is not the title of the Information
or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. 41 In other words, it is the recital of facts
of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the
Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. 43 The determination
by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the
court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by
means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to sign and
thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in fact a
special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to
Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of
the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who
participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of
signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that
something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such
intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of
Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita
showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it
involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she
execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special
power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief
that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely
attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato] made
Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that
Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase
the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount
of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only ₱1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of
₱22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s properties. 45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were
public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in the
deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary
means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is required for
a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in
Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a
public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the
nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that
complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple
crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate
charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family
relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. 47 Thus, the action provided under the
said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document,
however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the
integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the
protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two component
crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same
criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability. 48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words,
while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates the
right to life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights
or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself. 50 Since only a single criminal intent
underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex
crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal intent
results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal
liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is
different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for
each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept of complex
crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de
delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single
penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component
crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case
where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the elements of both
estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate
crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of public
document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material
plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished
individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315
(3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document be falsified
for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a
necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a "necessary
means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. 55 In
People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure
the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle
his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third
persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes
form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. 59 In other words, the crime of
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. 60 Actually utilizing the falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document. 621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of public
document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of
the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when
he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was
caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time
she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of
the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the
estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of
the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and
at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would
only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself
had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was
presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January
23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded
to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents.
SO ORDERED.