PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES vs.

WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @ "PORDOY,"

G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision1 dated 18 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No.
00246, affirming the Decision2 dated 30 September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao" (Wenceslao)
and Ricardo Ajok @
"Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were likewise
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3 Hernando P.
Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 each as moral damages and ₱
50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the said victims. Similarly, appellants were directed to pay,
jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, as well as the
costs of the suit.
Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido Abais @ "Bidok" (Brigido), Pedro
Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.),
Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel),
Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and other John Does, were charged in an Amended
Information3 dated 3 October 2001 with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellants and their co-accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with assorted high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in
strength and in numbers, and with intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the persons
of the following, namely:
1. PO3 Dela Cruz, Philippine National Police (PNP);
2. T/Sgt. Dacoco, Philippine Army (PA);
3. Private First Class (PFC) Haron Angni, PA;
4. PFC Gador4 Tomanto, PA;
5. Juanito Ibunalo;
6. Mosanif5 Ameril;
7. Macasubar6 Tandayao;
8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;7 and
9. Jun Palanas
by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms thereby inflicting upon the persons of PO3
De la Cruz, T/Sgt. Dacoco, PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba
Tandayao gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco and the serious wounding of said PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril
and Macasuba Tandayao that without the medical assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan and Jun Palanas were not hit.8
When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel de parte 9 and counsel de
oficio,10respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise assisted by counsel de oficio, 11 all entered separate pleas
of
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case, however, remained at large. Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.
Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge Accused Samuel To Be
Utilized As State Witness,12 which the court a quo granted in an Order dated 12 February 2003. 13 Also, upon motion of
the prosecution, the court a quo issued another Order dated 17 March 2003, 14 directing the release of Samuel from
detention following his discharge as state witness.
As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba Tandayao (Macasuba), Mosanip Ameril
(Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina Dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police Inspector Renato Salazar
(Senior P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer 4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4
Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring (SPO1 Suaring), Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco
(SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police Officer 4 Emmie Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior
Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan (Mayor Tawan-tawan), testified for the
prosecution.
The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is as follows:
On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his security escorts composed of
some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco;
(2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun,
respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. In the afternoon, the group went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on
board the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at
the passenger seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were Mosanip, Jun,
and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear
(open) portion of the said yellow pick-up service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other facing the right side of the road while PO3 Dela
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road. 15
At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-accused, brought Samuel to a
waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on the left side of the road going to
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting shed
while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road, which is more or less five (5)
meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group
of Mayor Tawan-tawan.16
A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching towards the
direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed
by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using
high-powered firearms.
Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was then sitting on the rear
(open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at
them in a squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as
among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The
vehicle stopped upon reaching the army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva,
Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked assistance therefrom. 17
Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt located, more
or less, 10 meters away from the site of the ambush to get their bags and other stuff. The house of Samuel’s aunt was
the place where appellants and their co-accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed appellants and their co-
accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay
Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte.18
On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt.
Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip
sustained injury on his shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and left sides of his
body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right
head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured. 19
All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao Country Clinic in Maranding, Lala, Lanao
del Norte, and were later transferred to Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz,
however, died before reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed at Mindanao
Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de
Oro City, and then in a hospital in Manila and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao
Sanitarium and Hospital before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was confined for one (1)
month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City and was confined therein for two (2) months. 20
On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU went back to the site of the
ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of
Salvador Municipal Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside the Salvador
Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-
tawan was ambushed prompting him and his troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed
SPO4 Medrano that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano and his
troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation
Samuel denied any involvement in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he
and his fellow police officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of Lala,
Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte.
Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and the rest of the troops who were at
the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints believed to be from the culprits. They conducted a hot pursuit
operation towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and their co-
accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16 armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a
nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a Spot Report and a follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however,
reveal the identity of appellant Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao could be arrested at
the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also informed the provincial headquarters about the incident through a radio
message.21
The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member of PNP Lala Municipal Police, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by
the malefactors. SPO1 Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a certain
SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they found the materials near the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30 meters away from the house of Samuel’s aunt. These were
photographed.22
Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call from Barangay Kagawad Renato
Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black backpack was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, which is two (2) kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon went
to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack an army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand
pouch and one fragmentation grenade cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police station in
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar. 23
On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and their co-accused as the persons
responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. Samuel was, thereafter, incarcerated at the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. 24
On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant Wenceslao was arrested while he was in
Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001
while working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who effected the arrest of the
appellants.25
Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao presented as witnesses Armida
Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey), Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant
Teofanis Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on the other
hand, did not present any witness other than himself.
Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his family. At around 1:00 p.m., he went
outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed the pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain
Romy, who is a military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election returns of the 15 May 2001 elections upon the
orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He told them that he has no copy of the returns. He then advised
them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside
the house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them. After 10 minutes, his visitors
left.26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao heard gunfire coming from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His
nephew, Jeffrey, approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter’s group were ambushed. After
about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This time the bullets were already hitting the roof and walls
of their house. He then instructed Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said incident and to ask help
from the members of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 27
When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know where his wife and the rest of the
women, who were in their house, went after the gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked barefooted and
unarmed towards Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former regarding the incident
happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain Esmeralda (Capt. Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of
Bravo Company of the Philippine Army, arrived. He also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident
in their house. Capt. Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch appellant
Wenceslao’s wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-by-six truck returned to Camp Allere
carrying appellant Wenceslao’s wife and relatives.28
On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and daughter, slept in his father’s house
located, more or less, 100 meters away from Camp Allere and stayed there for five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslao’s
wife then requested for transfer to their son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer sleep
because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to their son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and
stayed there for eight (8) days. During that period of time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No policemen
even bothered to arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the house of their son and moved to
Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there until he was arrested on 29 August 2001. 29
Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15 minute-vehicle ride from his
residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the site of the ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte.
Also, from his house to Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant Wenceslao also
admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador, Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the
2001 elections. Way back in the 1998 elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor
Tawan-tawan but he lost. On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same political party.
Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were
charged with illegal possession of firearm.30
Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and
niece, respectively, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony on all material points. They all denied that appellant
Wenceslao has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted
that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also
vehicles for hire plying the route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa. 31
Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony with respect to the fact that on 5 June
2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a certain member of the army intelligence group, went to the house of
appellant Wenceslao to get the election returns. However, he could not recall anything unusual that happened while
he was in the house of appellant Wenceslao. They left the house of appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no
unusual incident happened thereafter. Rudy similarly revealed that he did not go inside the house of appellant
Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group inside their vehicle
parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters from the house of appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not
hear the subject of the conversation between appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army
intelligence group.32
Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, while he was at the
legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to secure the canvass of the elections, they received a radio
call from M/Sgt. Cudilla informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of appellant
Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to
Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get some
information from the police officers therein. They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived
at Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw appellant Wenceslao waiting and talking to 1st Sgt.
Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then requested that his family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus,
Capt. Esmeralda ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant Wenceslao’s house. Upon
reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao’s wife came out from
the nearby house. Then they ordered her to board a six-by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of
appellant Wenceslao in the latter’s house.33
M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001, while he was at their command post at
Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed
him through radio that an ambush incident happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao, Salvador, Lanao
del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the
latter about the said ambush incident. He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of
T/Sgt. Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15 minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla
heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.
M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around 3:00 p.m., he saw appellant Wenceslao at the
back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post one. Appellant Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing
incident in his house. When their commanding officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the former. Thereafter,
a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 34
Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in his house in Purok 5, Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and children because his wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the
afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by some
commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in
his house.35
Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he and his family transferred to the house
of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he heard rumors that the
supporters of Atty. Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being persecuted.
Being one of Atty. Umpa’s supporters, he got scared, prompting him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed
there until the following morning and then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three
(3) months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he worked in the farm of his friend.
He stayed there until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. 36
Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that Atty. Umpa was harassed or
intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed that only Atty. Umpa’s supporters were harassed. He also
revealed that prior to the ambush incident, there was never an instance that he was threatened by the group of Mayor
Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpa’s supporters were being harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-
tawan because others were already harassed.37
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims of the ambush, to be credible,
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent, coupled with their positive identification of the appellants as
among the perpetrators of the crime and their lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense of
denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005 finding appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and
imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court’s Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein appellants
Wenceslao and Ricardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder, and the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the indivisible prison term of
reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late PO3 Dela Cruz the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 as
moral damages and another sum of ₱ 50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt. Dacoco the sum of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages plus ₱ 50,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto; and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the amount of ₱
50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and the Garand pouch are hereby ordered turned-
over to the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for proper
disposition as authorized by law.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the appellantsshall be credited to them and deducted from their
prison term provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant Wenceslao
was arrested on 29 August 2001 and detained since then up to the present. While appellant Ricardo was arrested on
20 December 2001 and detained since then up to the present.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the part of the prosecution to prosecute
the case against the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said accused are apprehended. 38 [Emphasis
supplied].
Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals via Notice of
Appeal,39 and, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs.
In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE
CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO FALSELY IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO
APPELLANT WENCESLAO;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE
HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO AND RICARDO] FAILED TO CAST ILL-
MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT THESE WITNESSES HAD NO IMPROPER
AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE APPELLANTS;
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE MILITARY MEN WHO ARE NEUTRAL,
IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE WITNESSES;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT WENCESLAO ABSCONDED AND IN IMPUTING
MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE;
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WENCESLAO OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY;
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] BASED ON
JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.40
While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT RICARDO DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 41
On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision affirming appellants’ conviction of the
crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies
pointed to by appellant Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not damage the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial points serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a
crime. Moreover, since the prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants in open court as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as well as the defense of denial
and alibi interposed by the appellants. Denial is a negative and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the
victim’s affirmative, categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must be established
by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission and not merely assert that he was somewhere else. As in the present case, the trial court took
judicial notice of the distance of seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants reside,
and San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place. Appellants, therefore, could not
successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of
the crime.42 The Court of Appeals then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are DENIED, and the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.43
Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court via Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation 45 stating
that it will no longer file a supplement to its Consolidated Appellee’s Brief 46 dated 14 December 2006 there being no
transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the appellate court’s Decision was rendered.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47 which were a mere rehash of the arguments
already discussed in their respective Appellant’s Briefs48 submitted before the appellate court. In his Supplemental
Brief, appellant Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors when
they decided a question of substance which is not in accord with established facts and the applicable laws. 49 He, once
again, enumerated the following errors committed by the appellate court, thus:
I.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they ruled that the inconsistencies committed by
the prosecution witnesses are on minor and trivial points when these inconsistencies are indicative of the
innocence of appellant Wenceslao;
II.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative of innocence of appellant Wenceslao
the fact that the authorities did not include in the police report the name of appellant Wenceslao and did not
arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within a couple of months from the date of the ambush;
III.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they deliberately refused or failed to
consider and appreciate the testimonies of the military officers who are neutral, impartial, and objective
witnesses;
IV.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to consider the evidence for the defense despite
the clear and unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity;
V.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately misinterpreted the facts and misapplied the
laws regarding "flight" as an alleged indication of guilt;
VI.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant Wenceslaobased on jurisprudence on "alibi"
which are not applicable in the case at bar50 [Emphasis and italicized omitted].
Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would show
these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which are badges of lies and dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their
credibility.
The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1) whether PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni
were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan from Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa, or
they merely hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (2) if so,
the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle; (3) the officer from
whom PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni got permission in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni
allegedly knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and he even saw appellant
Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush, yet, he did not mention the name of the former in his affidavit;
(5) Mayor Tawan-tawan should have mentioned the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the
ambush incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano should have included the name of
appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should have
immediately caused his arrest if he truly participated in the ambush incident; (7) it would no longer be necessary to
discharge Samuel and to make him as state witness if the victims of the ambush incident, indeed, saw the
perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers, Samuel would not have failed to
mention the former in his sworn statement.
Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only proved that he has no participation in
the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. The declaration of his innocence is thus called for.
Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in testifying
against him. The motive was to remove him, being the only non-Muslim leader, in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, who has the courage to challenge the reign of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an act of
revenge against him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. As to Samuel’s motive, appellant
Wenceslao claims that it was for self-preservation, freedom, leniency and some other consideration. Evidently, after
Samuel’s testimony, the latter was released from jail.
Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June 2001 as can be gleaned from the
testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.
Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt. He justified his temporary absence
from his residence by stating that it was because of the traumatic experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind
since their house was riddled with bullets by lawless elements without any cause.
With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the determination of credibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so
because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth.51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the
trial court. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the
matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 52 A careful perusal of the records of this case revealed
that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.
The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court places this case under the rule that
factual findings are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No reason has been given
by appellants to deviate from the factual findings arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito
and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June 2001 ambush incident. As such, they actually witnessed what
exactly happened on that fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant Wenceslao on
the right side of the road and in a squatting position firing at them with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC
Angni, having seated behind the driver and on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle,
respectively, both facing the right side of the road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction how
appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle while they were traversing the road of
San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to
identify appellant Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the
ambush.
It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad daylight, such that it would not be
impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have seen and identified their assailants, particularly appellant
Wenceslao, who was once chief of Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice elected
vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.53
The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by Samuel, an accused-turned-state-
witness, who, in his testimony before the open court, narrated how appellants and their co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo,
Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed in Purok 2, San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously
waited for the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the moment the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting shed.
Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the appellants and their co-accused as the
perpetrators of the ambush because he was near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely five (5) meters away therefrom.
This is aside from the fact that appellants and their co-accused were the very same people who brought him to the site
of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused likewise stayed for a long period of time in the house of Samuel’s aunt
prior to the ambush incident and Samuel is very well-acquainted with these people for he himself resided therein. 54
Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba, PFC Angni and Samuel,
have firmly established the identities of appellants as the perpetrators of the ambush. In addition, their testimonies on
who and how the crime was committed were characterized by the trial court as simple and candid. Even their answers
to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical. Such simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only
prove that they were telling the truth, thus, strengthening their credibility as witnesses.
Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that allegedly cast doubt on the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant and have nothing to do with the
essential elements of the crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder. In the same manner, they do not detract from the fact that Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which includes
PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were ambushed by appellants and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the
yellow pick-up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. And,
said ambush resulted in the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC
Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito.
It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral matters do not affect
his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not coached to
fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to
reverse a conviction.55
Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel’s failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their affidavits/sworn statements as one of
the ambushers does not necessarily render their testimonies implausible and unworthy of belief.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit the
witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the
testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are
much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate
for a variety of reasons. More so, because of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In
addition, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant’s statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not
infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses’ direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to
their extrajudicial statements.56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the name of the culprit does
not necessarily impair his or her credibility. 57
A meticulous perusal of Samuel’s sworn statement reveals that he categorically mentioned therein the name of
appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his sworn statement, Samuel specifically stated that during the
ambush, he saw appellant Wenceslao at the other side of the road, just a few meters away from the bridge, who, at
that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise firing towards the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. 58
Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in open court as one of those
responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. 59 Such open court declaration is much stronger than
their affidavits/sworn statements.
Mayor Tawan-tawan’s failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those
responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medrano’s failure to include the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot
Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not inure to appellant Wenceslao’s benefit.
As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor Tawan-tawan and SPO4 Medrano met at
the scene of the crime, the former immediately told the latter that appellant Wenceslao was one of the
ambushers.60This belied the claim of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4 Medrano that he
(appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers. Also, SPO4 Medrano provided an explanation 61 for his failure to
state in his Spot Reports the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. And, even granting that his
explanation would not have been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medrano’s failure to mention appellant Wenceslao’s name in
his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. More especially because appellant Wenceslao was
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact that prosecution witnesses,
Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were
not the only persons accused of the crime; they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido,
Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the victims of the ambush, especially those who
have died by reason thereof, all persons responsible therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who
have participated in the ambush incident, his testimony as to the other accused in this case is material to strengthen
the case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately, the other accused in this case remained at large until now.
As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:
x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses
who are all in one pointing to herein appellant Wenceslao as one of those who participated in the ambush, and on the
veracity of the testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses – Macasuba and Samuel – to the effect that appellant
Ricardo was among the people who perpetrated the said ambush.
The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The simplicity and candidness of their testimonies only
prove that they were telling the truth. Their answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical;
spontaneous, frank and consistent. Thus, a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and consistently
is a credible witness.62
Appellant Wenceslao’s allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of prosecution witnesses, including Samuel,
have no leg to stand on.
The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant Wenceslao that the motive of the
prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in the Municipality of
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998
elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence to support his aforesaid allegations. As properly
stated by the Court of Appeals, "mere allegation or claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative
allegation." Also, it must be emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the
mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan, who emerged as the victor, to take
revenge against the losing candidate, appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are
moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies are therefore
entitled to full weight and credit.63
To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the aggrieved parties, they all desire
justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the real
culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent person to the
crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so,
the victims themselves, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than
the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity. 64
Contrary to appellant Wenceslao’s assertion, this Court is convince that his and appellant Ricardo’s flight from the
scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush
incident, appellant Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his father’s house, then to his son’s house
in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested.
Appellant Ricardo did the same thing. From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to
his parents-in-law’s house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and thereafter, moved to Puting
Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the
crime charged, they would not go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go by
the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 65
Appellants’ respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this Court. It bears emphasis that after the
alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslao’s house, all he did is to move from one place to another instead of having it
investigated by the authorities. Until now, the alleged strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that strafing incident
truly happened, he would be much eager to know who caused it in order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant
Ricardo, on the other hand, was allegedly afraid of being persecuted for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-
tawan’s political rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid claim of appellant Ricardo was
uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given any considerable weight.
In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with their positive
identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the ambush, appellants’ defense of denial and alibi cannot
prosper.
As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellants committed the crime. 66 For alibi to
prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that appellants were
somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission.67 Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law.68 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving
negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.69
In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective houses in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, when the ambush incident happened and they have no involvement whatsoever in the commission thereof.
To corroborate appellant Wenceslao’s testimony, the defense presented Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are
appellant Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece, respectively. This Court, however, cannot give credence to the
testimonies of these defense witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslao’s relatives, their testimonies are rendered suspect
because the former’s relationship to them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The
defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by
credible persons.70 This Court further quote with conformity the observation made by the trial court, viz:
FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for herein appellant Wenceslao were shattered by the
testimony of Rudy, another witness for appellant Wenceslao, who categorically told the Court that during the time he
and his companions Jacob Pepito and a certain Romy were in the house of appellant Wenceslao in the afternoon of 5
June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they left
the house of appellant Wenceslao at about 2:45 in the afternoon.
The foregoing testimony of Rudy clearly imparts that the visit of Rudy and his companions to the house of appellant
Wenceslao, if any, happened on another date. This will be so because if appellant Wenceslao and his closely related
witnesses are telling the truth that Jacob Pepito, Rudy and Romy were in the house of appellant Wenceslao talking
about the said election returns during that fateful afternoon, then definitely, Rudy should have had known of the
ambush incident, said incident being spreaded throughout or shall we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5
June 2001.
If the ambush incident occurred on the day Rudy and his companions visited appellant Wenceslao, then, no doubt that
Rudywill tell the Court about it. But his testimony was otherwise. 71 [Emphasis supplied].
In the same breath, appellant Ricardo’s defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any evidentiary value as it was
unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented any witness to support his claim that he was simply inside their
house attending to his wife and children during the time that the ambush incident happened. This Court reiterates that
mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight
in law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of
the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the former indisputably deserve more
credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 72
Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the crime in the afternoon of 5 June
2001. As observed by the trial court and the appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both
appellants’ reside, is only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the
ambush took place.73
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that, indeed, appellants were among the
perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. Prosecution witnesses’ categorical, positive
and straightforward testimonies, coupled with their positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of
the crime, prevail over appellants’ defense of bare denial and alibi.
As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted appellants of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. This Court believes, however, that appellants should be
convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of
attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of
several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.
Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group with bullets discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
resulted in the death of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].
Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of the crime. Time and again, this Court, in
a plethora of cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. There are two (2)
conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately
and consciously adopted. "The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a
swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape."74
The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless victims, i.e., PO3 Dela
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The attack was executed by appellants and
their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it is
very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. 75 Thus, as to the
death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be appreciated as it is deemed
absorbed in treachery.76
Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation, the circumstance cannot
likewise be appreciated. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof,
sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 77 None of these elements could be
gathered from the evidence on record.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, although they were injured during
the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their injuries and wounds were
mortal or fatal such that without the timely medical assistance accorded to them, they would have died. 78 However, it
does not necessarily follow that the crimes committed against the aforenamed victims were simply less serious
physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does
not mean that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough not to have sustained
any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants were motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should be held guilty of
attempted murder.
What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Its
resolution would determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which explicitly states that: 79
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience
of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 80
Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case do not fit exactly
the description of a compound crime.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a
single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts
died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their
bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one
gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of
their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts
which cannot give rise to a complex crime.82
Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in
the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single
act."
There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact that several
acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the death and/or injuries to their
victims.
In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas, simultaneously and
successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there held that the killing was the result of a
single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and every victim separately and
distinctly from each other.
If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However, "single
criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in the said case
because there was therein no evidence at all showing the identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There
was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the
accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to
find all the accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them responsible for 50
deaths.84
Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court held in People v. Remollino, 85 the
Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable
for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a
crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all. 86
The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy, among others. Although the trial
court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the concerted actions of the appellants
and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left
side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass;
(2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously
waited for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by
the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and
wounding of the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt to
get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-
accused fled.
Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and their co-accused.
Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a single criminal impulse ─ to kill the victims.
Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is
sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. 87
With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had assumed joint criminal
responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually hit, killed and/or caused
injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas
doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,88 People v. Abella,89 People v. Garcia90 and People v. Pincalin,91 this Court also
applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even though several acts were performed by the accused and
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.
In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside the national penitentiary between
the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14)
inmates were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in the commission of the
crime was duly proven. There was, however, no discussion why the accused were convicted of a complex crime
instead of separate crimes.
In a similar case of People v. Abella,93 involving the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony and a
reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national penitentiary on 16 February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all
the accused were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Conspiracy
likewise attended the commission of the crime. This Court applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the
ruling in the said case is predicated on the theory that "when for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes
an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense," a complex one. The Lawas
doctrine was equally applied although conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a
conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act – the act of execution – giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement
produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being." 94
People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual background as De los Santos and Abella. They were
the third and fourth cases, respectively, of prison riots resulting to the killing of convicts by fellow convicts while inside
the national penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and double
attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused were convicted for the complex crime of double murder and frustrated
murder. In both cases, this Court found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.
In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court, gave the same justification as in
Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule that "when for the attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes
an offense various acts are executed, such acts must be considered as only one offense, a complex one."
Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense.
Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense. 97
We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to Lawas, that Article 48 is applicable
even in cases where several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: nonetheless, this Court further held that "in other cases where
several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied,
that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in
some decided cases."98
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general rule stated in Article 48 which
exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance of the cases.
It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again, applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
although the circumstances of the case were not the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin,
where this Court departed from the general rule.
In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney boarded by
the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the ambush and suffered only
minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Accused were convicted for the complex crime of
murder and multiple attempted murder. We there held that the case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas and Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts were
performed by the accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed Rolando; and that there
was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from
each other. On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a
whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts
done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single
complex offense.100
The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.
The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several killings on the same
occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would
be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a case of
prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella would not apply.
To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code because of the
impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven therein,
joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not be held liable for separate
crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of persons actually killed by each of them.
Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act of
each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several
victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the
singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies."
This is not an original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101 the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted
x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes."
As we observed in People v. Tabaco,102 clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court
further stated in Hon. Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act;
singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 103
With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven
(7) counts of attempted murder.
As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon
appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 104 of the Revised Penal Code.105
Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty prescribed by law for murder, i.e.,
reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 106 of the Revised Penal
Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61,107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision
mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium
period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64108 of the Revised Penal Code.109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
in the case of attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, which is 8
years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed
upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of attempted murder.
As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages.110
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof thereof. Moral damages like
civil indemnity, is also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. 111 Therefore, the trial court and the appellate
court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of ₱
50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, treachery may no longer be considered as an aggravating
circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior strength
which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages was already absorbed in the treachery. 112However, in
People v. Combate,113 this Court still awards exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to
deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter future similar transgressions, the
Court finds that an award of ₱ 30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is
proper.114 The said amount is in conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v. Gutierrez. 115
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the expenditures for the wake, coffin,
burial and other expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it
has been shown that the victim’s family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil Code. 116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court
similarly awards ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims. 117
The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, are also entitled to moral,
temperate and exemplary damages.
Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted upon the aforesaid victims would
naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries. 118 It is only justifiable to
grant them moral damages in the amount of ₱ 40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v.
Mokammad.119
The award of ₱ 25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito
is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these victims were hospitalized and spent money for their medication. As to
Macasuba, although he was not confined in a hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that he also spent for the treatment of the
minor injuries he sustained by reason of the ambush. However, they all failed to present any receipt therefor.
Nevertheless, it could not be denied that they suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to award temperate
damages in the amount of ₱ 25,000.00 to each of them.1âwphi1
The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito
are awarded exemplary damages in the amount of ₱ 30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. 120
This Court likewise affirms the award of ₱ 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, as well as costs of the suit, in favor of
Mayor Tawan-tawan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246 dated 18 June
2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, for each count; (3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court and
the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in
the amount of ₱ 30,000.00 and ₱ 25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims; and (4) appellants
are also directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the amount
of ₱ 40,000.00 each as moral damages, ₱ 25,000.00 each as temperate damages and ₱ 30,000.00 each as
exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR.
G.R. No. 199892 December 10, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02816
denying the appeal of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. of the Decision 2 dated March 21, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of fba, Zambales and affirming his conviction for the complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted
murder, with certain modifications on the civil liability imposed on appellant. 3
In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of the Philippine Navy sent for
schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. On August
10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the "All-in-One" Canteen to have some drink. Later, at
around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they continued their drinking
session. Shortly thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering light
bulb inside "Aquarius."4 When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw"), appellant who
must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong
papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him. 5 SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and
appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly
angry, mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table. 6
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the NETC camp. They walked in
two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first group, followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1
Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last group, with each group at one arm’s length distance from the
other.7 Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and
F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time.8 SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some
barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions. 9
Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala flagged down a
rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The sentries approached the van and
recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga
‘yan!," while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal to
proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!"10 While F1EN Dimaala
was writing the van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De
Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the
walking navy personnel prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, "chief, binangga ang tropa!" SN1 De Guzman
then asked permission to go to the scene of the incident and check on the navy personnel. 11
When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away towards a grassy spot
on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness.12 When they came to, they saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless
on the ground.13 SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van. 14
SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was pushed away from the path of the speeding
van. He was able to see the vehicle’s plate number. He also tried to chase the van with SN1 Bacosa but they turned
around when the vehicle made a U-turn as they thought that it would come back for them. The vehicle, however, sped
away again when other people started to arrive at the scene of the incident. 15
SN1 De Guzman found SN1 Cuya administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on SN1 Duclayna. He also saw
the misshapen body of SN1 Andal lying some 50 meters away, apparently dragged there when the speeding van hit
SN1 Andal. SN1 Cuya instructed SN1 De Guzman to get an ambulance but the car of the officer on duty at that time
arrived and they boarded SN1 Duclayna’s body to the vehicle to be brought to the hospital. 16 The other injured navy
personnel, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, and SN1 Bundang, were brought to the infirmary for treatment. 17
Members of the local police soon arrived at the scene of the crime. Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Roberto Llorico, the
police investigator, found the bloodied lifeless body of SN1 Andal lying on the side of the road. SPO1 Llorico was
informed that appellant was the suspect. Fortunately, one of the responding officers was appellant’s neighbor and led
SPO1 Llorico to appellant’s place where they found appellant standing near his gate. Appellant appeared drunk and
was reeking of alcohol. They also saw the van parked inside the premises of appellant’s place. Its front bumper was
damaged. When they asked appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply answered that he was drunk.
The police officers then invited appellant to the police station and brought the van with them. 18
A post mortem examination was conducted on the bodies of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna by Dr. Jericho Cordero of
Camp Crame Medical Division. Dr. Cordero’s findings were that the injuries sustained by SN1 Andal were fatal and
caused by a hard blunt object that hit his body. The force of the impact was such that the internal organs like the
kidneys, mesentery and spleen were also fatally injured. SN1 Andal died of cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of
massive blunt traumatic injuries to the head, thorax and abdomen. On the other hand, SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal
injuries to the head and liver. The head and neck injuries were such that a lot of blood vessels were ruptured and the
fractures were embedded in the brain. The laceration on the liver, also a mortal injury, was a blunt traumatic injury. 19
As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and different parts of the body
for which he was confined at the infirmary for about eighteen (18) days; 20 SN1 Bacosa sustained injuries on his knee
and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a day; 21 and SN1 Bundang suffered injuries to his right foot. 22
Appellant was thereafter charged under an Information 23 which reads as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 2002, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy. West Dirita, Municipality
of San Antonio, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate no. DRW 706, did there and then
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from behind with the use of the said van, the
following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal, Evelio Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar
Domingo, all members of the Philippine [N]avy then assigned at the Naval Education and Training Command in San
Antonio, Zambales, thereby inflicting upon them the following physical injuries, to wit:
DANILO CUYA:
"Head Injury, grade 1 (Lacerated wound 5.0 cm, accipitoparietal area, (L) and lacerated wound, Lower lip) 2 to VA"
EVELIO BACOSA:
"Multiple abrasion, wrist, volar surface (L), 2nd digit, abrasion, dorsun, (L) foot"
ERLINGER BUNDANG:
"Abrasion, medial maleolus, (R)"
ARNULFO ANDAL:
"Head Injury, Grade IV; (Depressed Fracture, Frontal: Lacerated wounds, 8.0 cm 3.0 cm. forehead, and 5.0 cm
parietal, (R);
Avulsion, medial aspect, upper arm to elbow, hip and enguinal area, (L);
Multiple abrasion, anterior and posterior chest, knees and (R) footsecondary to VA"
ANTONIO DUCLAYNA:
"Head Injury, Grade IV (Lacerated wound, Contusion, Hematoma (R) Parietal) secondary to VA"
which act of said accused directly caused the death of Arnulfo Andal and Antonio Duclayna, and in so far as Danilo
Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger Bundang were concerned, said accused performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce said crime by reason of
cause/s independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Danilo Cuya, Evelio
Bacosa and Erlinger Bundang, which prevented their death, and finally as to Cesar Domingo, said accused
commenced the commission of the acts constituting Murder directly by overt acts, but was not able to perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause other than accused’s own desistance, that is due to the timely avoidance
of the van driven by accused, and that the commission of the crimes was attended with treachery, evident
premeditation, cruelty and use of a motor vehicle, and by deliberately and inhuman[ely] augmenting the suffering of
the victim Arnulfo Andal, to the damage and prejudice of Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar
Domingo and the family and heirs of the deceased Arnulfo Andang and Antonio Duclayna.
When arraigned, appellant maintained his innocence. 24
After pre-trial, trial ensued and the prosecution presented evidence to establish the facts stated above.
In his defense, appellant testified that in the evening of August 10, 2002, he was drinking with Marvin Acebeda and
Romeo Eusantos at the "Aquarius" videoke bar. When he sang, the navy personnel who were also inside the bar
laughed at him as he was out of tune. He then stood up, paid his bills and went out. After a while, Acebeda followed
him and informed him that the navy personnel would like to make peace with him. He went back inside the bar with
Acebedo and approached the navy personnel. When SN1 Bacosa appeared to reach out for appellant’s hand,
appellant offered his hand but SN1 Bacosa suddenly punched appellant’s right ear. To avoid further altercation,
appellant left the bar with Acebeda in tow. Appellant went home driving his van, with the spouses Romeo and Alicia
Eusantos who hitched a ride as passengers. When they passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at the van.
When he alighted and inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the headlights was broken. Thereafter, he saw SN1
Bacosa and another man approaching him so he went back inside the van but the duo boxed him repeatedly on his
shoulder through the van’s open window. When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards him, he
accelerated the van. During the whole incident, Romeo was asleep as he was very drunk while Alicia was seated at
the back of the van. Upon reaching appellant’s home, the spouses alighted from the van and proceeded to their place.
After 20 minutes, police officers arrived at appellant’s house and told him that he bumped some people. Appellant
went with the police officers to the police station where he was investigated and detained. 25
Appellant’s only other witness was Alicia Eusantos. She testified that she and her husband hitched a ride with
appellant in the evening of August 10, 2002. She did not notice any unusual incident from the time they rode the
vehicle until they alighted from it. She learned about the incident on the following day only when her statement was
taken by the police.26
After the parties have rested their respective cases, the RTC of Iba, Zambales found appellant guilty and rendered a
Decision dated March 21, 2007 with the following dispositive portion:
IN VIEW THEREOF, accused ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of
use of motor vehicle and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
For the death of SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal, civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 each is awarded to their
heirs. This is in addition to the amount of moral damages at ₱50,000.00 each for the emotional and mental sufferings,
plus ₱12,095.00 to the heirs of Duclayna representing actual damages.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger
Bundang ₱30,000.00 each or an aggregate amount of ₱120,000.00 as indemnity for their attempted murder. 27
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In his brief, 28 appellant claimed that the trial court erred in not
finding that he may not be held criminally liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying
circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. His act of increasing his vehicle’s speed was
reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men whose four companions were also approaching. He
asserted that the attack against him by the two navy personnel constituted actual and imminent danger to his life and
limb. The sight of the four approaching companions of his attackers "created in his mind a fear of greater evil,"
prompting him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a greater evil or injury to himself. According to appellant, if he
accidentally hit the approaching navy men in the process, he could not be held criminally liable therefor. The instinct of
self-preservation would make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another. 29
Appellant further faulted the trial court in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He asserted that
nothing in the records would show that he consciously or deliberately adopted the means of execution. More
importantly, treachery was not properly alleged in the Information. 30
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the People of the Philippines, refuted the arguments of
appellant and defended the correctness of the RTC Decision. In its brief, 31 the OSG claimed that the trial court rightly
rejected appellant’s defense of avoidance of greater evil or injury. Appellant’s version of the events did not conform to
the physical evidence and it was not consistent with the testimony of his own witness.
The OSG also argued that treachery was appropriately appreciated by the trial court. The Information was written in a
way that sufficiently described treachery where "the unsuspecting victims were walking towards their barracks and
totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind." 32
After considering the respective arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dated
April 29, 2011 with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is Denied. The assailed Decision, dated March 21, 2007, of the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-3492-I, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that
Accused-Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal civil indemnity
of Php75,000, moral damages of Php75,000, temperate damages of Php25,000 and exemplary damages of
Php30,000. In addition to the foregoing damages, Accused-Appellant is as well held liable to pay the heirs of SN1
Andal the amount of Php2,172,270.21 to represent the amount of loss of earning capacity of SN1 Andal.
Accused-Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1
Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php40,000 and Php30,000,
respectively. Award of temperate damages in the amount of Php25,000 is proper in favor of SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Cuya
and SN1 Bundang for the unsubstantiated amount of pecuniary losses they suffered on account of the injuries they
sustained. SN1 Cesar Domingo, however, is not entitled to temperate damages. 33
Hence, this appeal.
Both appellant and the OSG adopted the respective briefs they filed in the Court of Appeals. 34
Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?
After a thorough review of the records of this case and the arguments of the parties, this Court affirms appellant’s
conviction.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the evidence presented and offered by the prosecution credible and that
the "prosecution witnesses had overwhelmingly proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the Accused-
Appellant."35 The Court of Appeals correctly observed that prosecution witnesses F1EN Dimaala and SN1 De Guzman
"positively identified accused-appellant as the one who hit and ran over the victims." 36 The Court of Appeals further
found:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, inevitably showed the criminal intent of the Accused-
Appellant to inflict harm on the victims. They testified on the incident in a clear, concise, corroborative, and
straightforward manner. Thus, their testimonies must prevail over the testimony given by the Accused-Appellant which,
on the other hand, was neither substantiated nor supported by any evidence.
The prosecution witnesses testified that they actually saw how Accused-Appellant ran over the victims who were
walking inside the NETC camp on the night of August 10, 2002. Accused-Appellant, who was driving his van from
behind, suddenly bumped and ran over the victims. The victims were thrown away, resulting in the instantaneous
death of SN1 Duclayna and SN1 Andal and causing injuries to the other victims.
xxxx
Accused-Appellant’s version of the crime, upon which the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury
is invoked, is baseless. This is because his assertions anent the existence of the evil which he sought to be avoided
[did] not actually exist as [they] neither conformed to the evidence at hand nor [were] [they] consistent with the
testimony of his own witness, Alicia Eusantos x x x.
xxxx
Accused-Appellant’s own witness, Alicia Eusantos, not only failed to corroborate his claim but also belied Accused-
Appellant’s claim that he was attacked by the Philippine Navy personnel. Alicia Eusantos categorically stated that she
did not witness any unusual incident in the evening of August 10, 2002 while on board the Nissan Urvan Van driven by
Accused-Appellant while they were cruising the access road going to the NETC compound. Accused-Appellant’s
claim, therefore, is more imaginary than real. The justifying circumstance of Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury cannot
be invoked by the Accused-Appellant as the alleged evil sought to be avoided does not actually exist. 37
Moreover, whether or not petitioner acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question of fact. It is an issue which
concerns doubt or difference arising as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. 38 In this connection, this Court
declared in Martinez v. Court of Appeals39 :
[T]he well-entrenched rule is that findings of fact of the trial court in the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of the evidence on record affirmed, on appeal, by the CA are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by the Court and in the absence of any justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings.
This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial
and appellate courts. There is nothing that would indicate that the RTC and the Court of Appeals "ignored,
misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered,
will alter the outcome of the case."40
Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a
justifying circumstance, 41 the following requisites should be complied with:
(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and
(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of avoidance of greater
evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even appellant’s own witness who was in the van with appellant at the
time of the incident contradicted appellant’s claim. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the evil
appellant claimed to avoid did not actually exist. This Court agrees.
Moreover, appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so that
a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least
possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or,
if there is no such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self,
then such course should be taken.
In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width, 42 and the place was well-
lighted.43 Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or structures. 44 Appellant was a driver by
occupation.45 However, appellant himself testified that when he shifted to the second gear and immediately stepped on
the accelerator upon seeing the four navy personnel approaching from in front of him, 46 he did not make any attempt to
avoid hitting the approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might run them over. 47 He
therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available means of preventing the evil or injury
he claimed to be avoiding.
The appreciation of treachery as a circumstance that qualified the killing of SN1 Duclayna and SN1 Andal and the
attempted killing of the others is also correct. This Court agrees with the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
We find that the RTC correctly appreciated the existence of treachery in the commission of the offense. Treachery
qualifies the killing to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The elements of
treachery are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.
Accused-Appellant’s act of running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims were walking inside the
NETC camp was a clear act of treachery. The victims were not given any warning at all regarding the assault of the
Accused-Appellant. The victims were surprised and were not able to prepare and repel the treacherous assault of
Accused-Appellant. The prosecution witnesses testified that after they had flagged down Accused-Appellant’s van, the
latter accelerated and upon reaching the middle of the road, it suddenly swerved to the right hitting the victims who
were startled by the attack.
xxxx
A close review of the information would disclose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was stated in ordinary
and concise language and the said act was described in terms sufficient to enable a layman to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enables the court to pronounce proper judgment.
We quote pertinent portion of the information, which reads:
"x x x the said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate No. DRW 706, did
then and there willfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from behind with the use of said van, x x x."
Applying the Supreme Court’s discussion in People vs. Batin, citing the case of Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of
Batangas, to wit:
"The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set forth in an Information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. x x x.
It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to
render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as
distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not
necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a
matter of evidence at the trial.
We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
wherein we found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to the
circumstances surrounding it."
Clearly, We find that the information is sufficient as it not merely indicated the term treachery therein but also
described the act itself constituting treachery. Such statement, without a doubt, provided the supporting facts that
constituted the offense, sufficiently alleging the qualifying circumstance of treachery when it pointed out the statement,
"smash and hit from behind."48 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving
the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. 49 The six navy personnel were walking by the roadside, on
their way back to their camp. They felt secure as they have just passed a sentry and were nearing their barracks. They
were totally unaware of the threat to their life as their backs were turned against the direction where appellant’s
speeding van came. They were therefore defenseless and posed no threat to appellant when appellant mowed them
down with his van, killing two of them, injuring three others and one narrowly escaping injury or death. Beyond
reasonable doubt, there was treachery in appellant’s act. This was sufficiently alleged in the Information which not only
expressly mentioned treachery as one of the circumstances attending the crime but also described it in
understandable language:
[T]he said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate no. DRW 706, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from behind with the use of said van,
the following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal, Evelio Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar
Domingo, x x x.50 (Emphasis supplied.)
Use of motor vehicle was also properly considered as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant deliberately used the
van he was driving to pursue the victims. Upon catching up with them, appellant ran over them and mowed them down
with the van, resulting to the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and injuries to the others. 51 Thereafter, he
continued to speed away from the scene of the incident. Without doubt, appellant used the van both as a means to
commit a crime and to flee the scene of the crime after he committed the felonious act.
The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, double murder with
multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the
accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1
Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang
and SN1 Domingo.52 The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies 53 as the law attaches an
afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished
by prision mayor,54 an afflictive penalty.55
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 6356 of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the
instant case, and there is an aggravating circumstance the higher penalty should be imposed. Since use of vehicle
can be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing,
the proper imposable penalty – the higher sanction – is death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9346,57 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.58 The penalty of reclusion perpetua thus imposed by the Court of
Appeals on appellant for the complex crime that he committed is correct.
The awards of ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 moral damages to the respective heirs of SN1 Andal and
SN1 Duclayna are also proper. These awards, civil indemnity and moral damages, are mandatory without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder. 59
Moreover, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, namely the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the award of ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages to the
respective heirs of the deceased victims is also correct.60 In addition, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased
victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty.1âwphi1 Thus, the award of
₱25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victim is appropriate. 61
As it was proven that, at the time of his death, SN1 Andal had a monthly income of ₱13,245.55, 62 the grant of
₱2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity is in order. 63
As to the surviving victims, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo, the Court of Appeals correctly
granted each of them ₱40,000 moral damages for the physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and
similar injuries caused to them by the incident.64 And as the crime was attended by aggravating circumstances, each of
them was properly given ₱30,000 exemplary damages.65
Finally, those who suffered injuries, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, were correctly awarded
₱25,000 temperate damages each for the pecuniary loss they suffered for hospitalization and/or medication, although
no receipts were shown to support said loss.66
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02816 affirming the conviction of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. for the complex crime of double murder
with multiple attempted murder, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the
following:
(a) To the respective heirs of SN1 Arnulfo Andal and SN1 Antonio Duclayna:
(i) ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity;
(ii) ₱75,000.00 moral damages;
(iii) ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
(iv) ₱25,000.00 temperate damages;
(b) To the heirs of SN1 Andal, ₱2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity;
(c) To each of the surviving victims, SN1 Danilo Cuya, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Erlinger Bundang and SN1
Cesar Domingo:
(i) ₱40,000.00 moral damages; and
(ii) ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages; and
(d) To SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, ₱25,000.00 temperate damages each is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE DULAY
G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03584 which
affirmed the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch
31, finding accused–appellant Dante Dulay (Dulay) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder
and Frustrated Murder.

The following are the antecedent facts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[Dulay] entered a plea of “not guilty” to the indictment which reads as follows:
"That on or about 6:30 in the evening of December 30, 2002 in Ligaya, Aglipay, Quirino, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused by using a grenade and by means of explosion, did
then and there willfully and unlawfully and after removing the safety pin of the said grenade, throw it at the house of
Orlando Legaspi Sr., producing a land explosion and as a consequence[,] the shrapnels hit ORLANDO LEGASPI SR.
to [sic] the different parts of his body that caused his death.

That on the same occasion, said accused armed with the same grenade and by means of explosion did then and
there willfully and unlawfully threw the grenade after removing its safety pin at the house of ORLANDO LEGASPI SR.
causing loud explosion as the shrapnel of the grenade hit ORLANDO LEGASPI, JR. Thus accused performed all the
acts of execution that would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but did not produce it because of timely
medical assistance rendered unto ORLANDO LEGASPI JR. which prevented his death.

Acts contrary to law.”

The records reveal that in the evening of 30 December 2002 at around 6:30, Orlando Jr. (or simply “Junior” ), a child
about six years of age, was outside the kitchen of their house located in Ligaya, Aglipay, Province of Quirino. His
father, the late Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the yard and was asking Junior to hand him a chair. They had just
finished dinner and were intending to watch the television later.

Wondering why the dog was barking loudly, Mrs. Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the kitchen and noticed Dulay’s
dog in the vicinity. She surmised that its master, [Dulay], was also present. Junior’s elder sister, Melanie went out to
look for the dog–leash to transfer the mutt to another area.

Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, Junior directed a beam towards the grassy area
where he discovered [Dulay] whom he recognized because of the characteristic “mumps” below his left ear. Melanie
also saw [Dulay] as he was staring at Orlando Sr. Their uncle Dante suddenly threw something that resembled a ball,
towards the cemented part of the yard. It turned out to be a grenade, and it landed about seven meters from where
Junior and his father were. [Dulay] then went away on his bicycle towards the direction of his house, x x x.

When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally hit by shrapnel, causing his
death. Melanie rushed to the succor of her bloodied father, barely noticing Junior who was likewise lying on the
ground, but was still conscious and crying. Engracia hollered for help from the neighborhood. Because of the
firecrackers in that New Year’s Eve, people did not readily render assistance, until they realized the intensity of the
explosion that shook the ground.

Police operatives who arrived at the crime scene instructed the assisting neighbors to locate the grenade fragments.
In the early morning of 31 December 2002, three of the male neighbors continued the search and found a grenade
safety lever, along with a torn–out pair of rubber shoes in the road near Dulay’s house. Examining the rubber shoes
which turned out to belong to the latter, the three men further recovered a grenade ring pin from inside the left shoe.

Orlando Sr. was rushed to the hospital but he expired shortly thereafter. His Certificate of Death states that he died of
cardio–respiratory arrest due to hemorrhagic shock due to “transection of the right kidney, perforation of the
duodenum, pancreas and stomach due to grenade blast injury.”

[Dulay’s] alibi consists of his purported trip from the house of his uncle Onofre Dulay in Gamis to his friend, Joel
Ritualo in another barangay, Dibul. According to his story, he was Onofre’s caretaker while the latter was in Manila.
Since he had no electricity in Gamis, he went on a bike to Ritualo to have his Motolite battery recharged. While waiting
for the recharging to finish, he went on a drinking spree with Ritualo and another man, Pepito Maluret, until around
7:30 p.m. when he bid the two liquor–companions goodbye. With the energized battery in tow, he left, but Ritualo
insisted on accompanying him to the road as he was already drunk. Not long afterwards, Ritualo hailed the passenger
jeepney that passed them which was driven by his uncle, witness Robert Daileg.

In convicting Dulay, the trial court noted that Junior had no ill–motive to testify falsely against his uncle. Against the
self–serving alibi of the appellant, the prosecution witnesses positively identified the perpetrator because they were
familiar with him, the court added.3(Citations omitted)

The RTC found Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Attempted Murder. The
dispositive portion of the RTC ruling is as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds accused Dante Dulay GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt with the complex crime of Murder with Attempted Murder and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion
Perpctua.
1. He is further ordered to pay the heirs Orlando Legaspi Sr., the sum of [P]50,000[.00] as civil indemnity, and
moral damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00[.]
2. Also he must pay [P]30,000[.00] pesos as moral damages to Orlando Legaspi, Jr.
3. [P]115,956[.00] as actual expenses/damage [s] for the hospitalization of the two victims, namely: Orlando
Legaspi, Sr., and Orlando Legaspi, Jr.
SO ORDERED[.]4

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification. The fallo of the judgment
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Accordingly, the
accused–appellant is convicted of the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder and is sentenced to
suffer:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;

2) the award of actual damages in the amount of [P] 115,956.00 for the hospital expenses of the two victims;
3) the award of civil indemnity for the death of Orlando Sr., in the increased amount of [P]75,000.00;
4) the award of moral damages in the respective amounts of |P]75,000.00 and [P]55,000.00 for Orlando Senior and
Junior; [and]
5) the award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]30,000.00 each for both Orlando Senior and Junior.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

The CA held that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death which would have been imposable is
properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in the body of the decision that Dulay was guilty
as well of “frustrated murder” as charged in the Information with respect to the bomb–injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr.
(Junior), and yet convicted him in the dispositive part only of “attempted murder.” The prosecution was able to
establish that all acts of execution, not merely preparatory acts, were performed to produce the felony as a
consequence, but Junior nevertheless survived for reasons independent of the will of the perpetrator; that is, the
timely medical assistance to him.6

The records of this case were then elevated to this Court pursuant to CA Resolution 7 dated August 5, 2010, which
gave due course to Dulay’s notice of appeal.
Our Ruling

"It is settled that this Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses' credibility, absent any
indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, especially
where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the CA. In the present case, we see no compelling reason to
disturb the factual findings of the courts a quo”

Dulay averred that he was in Dibul, Saguday, Quirino, when the crime occurred. While defense witness Robert Daileg
(Daileg) testified that Dulay rode as a passenger in the former’s jeepney from Dibul to Gamis one night, Daileg cannot
even remember the exact date when this occurred. Consequently, Daileg cannot adequately support Dulay’s version
of facts that the latter was somewhere else that fateful night.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was
committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of
the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 9Since Dulay was not able to prove that he was in
Dibul when the crime was committed, both the CA and the RTC were correct in disregarding his alibi. Junior and
Melanie, Junior’s elder sister, on the other hand, have both positively identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score,
this Court has held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive
identification.10

As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the CA’s conclusion that Dulay is guilty of
frustrated murder. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s
will.”

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution in throwing the grenade which
could have caused Junior’s death as a consequence, but because of immediate medical assistance, a cause
independent of Dulay’s will, Junior survived.12

The Court thus affirms the CA decision, with modification on the awarded indemnities.

First, the Court retains the award by the CA of P75,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages at P30,000.00 and
civil indemnity at P75,000.00 to the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. (Orlando, Sr.) in conformity with our ruling in People
v. Barde.13 Next, the Court awards moral and exemplary damages to Junior in the amounts of P50,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively. Furthermore, the Court upholds the CA’s award of P115,956.00 as actual damages for the
hospital expenses of both Orlando Sr. and Junior. Lastly, the Court imposes an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence.14

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–H.C.
No. 03584 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that accused–appellant Dante Dulay is ordered: (a) to pay the
heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) to pay Orlando Legaspi, Jr., the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) to pay P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both
Orlando Legaspi, Sr. and Orlando Legaspi, Jr. An interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on the award of
civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated
March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-
94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed
by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290
(Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She
alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was
dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set
for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set
the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion stated that while
the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect
benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with
the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to
reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that
they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying
the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended
Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-
185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering
Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification
is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is letter in the July 29,
1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he
has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo,
pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992 issue of
the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against
petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal
morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who
would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft
charges against her. Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and
returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the
peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The
Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of
perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to travel,
whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people
transacting with her office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with
having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the
Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had
been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in Criminal Case No.
16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting
the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same,
thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan,
prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons
facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the
letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the
letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three
divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any
decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless
petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA
688 [1969] ).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before
October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8,
1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was an
unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues
involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity
of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only
when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the
investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela
Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela
Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the
charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution
with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos.
99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and
the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of
causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and
that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for
legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the
Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash
the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7
SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely
followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or
unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish
at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party,
including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In
other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is
not an indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by
petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public prosecutors filed 32
Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one
amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to
admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of
justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor
in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should
only be one information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes
referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito
continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period
of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of
the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one
crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and
Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law,
1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same time
and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same
period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil.
437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's
benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits
(People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same
motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the
same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December
1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The
said acts were committed on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said
offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the
result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66
Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn
over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments
for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the
employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes
penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war
veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter
provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses
has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have
evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether
belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have
abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim.
Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or
for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one
continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257,
138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in
jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a
humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary
for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law —
Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single
day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the
word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one
amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12,
1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the accusation
against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law represented by the approval of
the applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this
respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is
categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay
of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government
suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:
. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but
because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to
those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original
case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED
insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the majority opinion in Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having become final,
has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply directing, for the reasons
expressed for the Court by
Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that opinion directed the Office of
the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal
Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court
seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in this
respect were spelled out in detail in my dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez,
Ombudsman, et al. (205 SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as
follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, being the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April
13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury
to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to the said aliens in the
discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of Executive
Order No. 324 approved applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that the Executive Order "does not
allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain
Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as
amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may
prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation for waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order
provides, among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines before January
1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the
filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived
after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens
who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of
qualified aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before January
1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order
No. 324 — to apply for waiver of passport requirements and, after compliance with requirements of
Executive Order No. 324, approved such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard
of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this
case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was
expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its
provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive
Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not
ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and hence
quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order
provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of
individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to
aliens likely to become public charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so
much of those provisions as relates to a single offense of simple possession of marijuana;
and (d) those relating to national security and members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under
the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the
public interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of
aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the
provisions of this Act.2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of
grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted
official acts of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order
No. 324. There is no question that the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and
minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses and minor children did not fall under
any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly
undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner had anypersonal or corrupt interest in any of the
cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested,
for instance that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not collected by
petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly
 authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children
below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary
investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the
Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally" which are recited redundantly in
the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no undue
injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple
acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization")
by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor
children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of
Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring
family unity — there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the
benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of qualified
aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive
Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute
or implementing regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the
implementation of such a stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts.
This Court itself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such administrative
officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje,
81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969];
University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104
Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter
of law by this Court, the official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be
held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to
impose liability upon the public officer who has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error of
judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See
generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were
made during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature,
is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is
nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof
of any additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a
public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this Court resolved at the earliest possible
opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and
expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is
the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime.Indeed,
if the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences
would follow for the administration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of
the criminal information here would appear to be that public officers interpret and apply statutory and
regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of
any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the
penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
are still going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed. Had
this Court ruled on the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case
should be terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not be
compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of
the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations.
Romero, J., concurs
PEOPLE v. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA
GR NO. 170236 Aug 31, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed as follows:

On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11-year old son of appellant; Rowena Quiachon,
the victim and appellant's daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus.

Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however, that he no longer wanted to use his father's surname
describing him as "masama" for raping his (Rowel's) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used to sleep in the
same bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling. Rowel slept beside his youngest sibling while their
father, appellant, and Rowena slept together in one bed.

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or
"kumot." His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do
anything, however, because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he,
forthwith, told his mother's sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together,
Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel executed
a sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using the surname Mateo. [2]

Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual intercourse with her and even touched her breasts
against her will. She was only eight years old at the time. She cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what
appellant did to her. She consistently declared that she does not love her father and wants him to be punished for
what he did to her.[3]

Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital Health Services testified
that she received a letter request from the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an examination on Rowena. While she
was about to proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed that Rowena was deaf and mute, hence, could not
verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani proceeded to conduct a physical examination and, based thereon, she
submitted her medico-legal report.

Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a "contusion hematoma" on her left cheek, which was
compatible with her claim that she was slapped by her father. Rowena also had an "ecchymosis" or "kissmark" at the
antero-lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital injuries suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show any sign of sexual abuse, when it was opened
up, the following were discovered: "markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis and
markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior
hymenal notch with attenuation." Further, the labia was "very red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a
pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum."[4] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent
chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a day before the examination. She pointed
out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock notch. [5]

For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto Quiachon.

He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by their barangay chairman. He did not know
then the reason for the invitation. At the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the two sisters of his deceased live-in
partner and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his daughter Rowena had accused him of raping her.
Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police Station. He suffered hypertension and was brought to the hospital.
When he recovered, he was taken to the Pasig City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He denied raping Rowena and
alleged that Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held a grudge
against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to support them. His common-law wife died of cancer
and her relatives were allegedly all interested in his house and other properties. The said house was being leased and
they were the ones getting the rental income. Further, the nephew of his deceased partner was sending financial
support of US$100 a month for his child.

According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his son Rowel was already hostile to him
because he was closer to his daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of any reason why his children, Rowel and
Rowena, accused him of a very serious offense.[6]

After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and defense, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 159, rendered its Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B [8] of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, PI00,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]
The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death penalty imposed on appellant. However,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August 25, 2005, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court. In affirming appellant's conviction, the CA held that there was no justification to make a finding contrary to that of
the trial court with respect to the credibility of the witnesses. The CA particularly pointed out that the trial court, after
having "meticulously observed" the prosecution witness Rowel and complainant Rowena, had declared that "their
narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material points involved. When the testimony
of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by an inconsistency
or contradiction as in the present case, the same must be given full faith and credit." [12]

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena recounting the bestial act perpetrated by appellant
on the latter were corroborated by physical evidence as presented by Dr. Guialani in her medico-legal report.

On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a bare denial. On this matter, it applied the salutary
rule that denial is not looked upon with favor by the court as it is capable of easy fabrication. Consequently, the CA
held that appellant's bare denial could not overcome the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
including Rowena, the victim herself.

The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so grave as rape against her father because "it is
very unlikely for any young woman in her right mind to fabricate a story of defloration against her own father, undergo
a medical examination of her private parts, and subject herself to the trauma and scandal of public trial, put to shame
not only herself but her whole family as well unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her."[13]

In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape and in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated September 10,
2001, the prosecution and the defense agreed on the following stipulation of facts:

1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;

2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and
3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]
According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the offender were
alleged in the Information and were duly proved during trial. These circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim and her
relationship to appellant, are special qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape that warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death.

The CA, however, modified the trial court's decision with respect to the damages awarded to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159,
in Criminal Case No. 120929-H finding the accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y Bayona guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified rape and imposing upon him the DEATH penalty is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Quiachon, the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity;
P75,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[15]
In this Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were required to submit their respective supplemental
briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer be filing a supplemental brief. Similarly,
appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the conviction of appellant.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three (3) well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation
for rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16] Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning
the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's testimony. [17]

Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in a better position
than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying.[18]

In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on the record that would impel this Court to deviate from
the well-entrenched rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless
these were reached arbitrarily or when the trial court misunderstood or misapplied some facts of substance and value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [19]

In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena. The
trial court observed that Rowel and Rowena "never wavered in their assertion that accused sexually abused Rowena.
Their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material points involved." [20] Further, the
trial court accorded great evidentiary weight to Rowena's testimony. It justifiably did so as it characterized her
testimony to be "simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by inconsistency or
contradiction."[21]

Significantly, Rowel and Rowena's respective testimonies were corroborated by Dr. Guialani's medico-legal report: [22]

Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm noted at the left

mandibular area of the left cheek compatible with the
PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS/PHYSICAL
disclosed slapping of the cheek by her father; 2x2 cm
INJURIES
ecchymosis (kissmark) noted at the antero-lateral border of
the left breast
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
Tanner 2
Pubic hair - none
Labia majora - no evident sign of injury at the time of
EXTERNAL GENITALIA
examination
Labia minora - no evident sign of injury at the time of
examination
URETHA
AND Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus and periurethral area
ERIURETHRAL AREA
PERIHYMENAL
AREA Markedly hyperemic perihymenal area, and pale fossa
AND navicularis
FOSSA NA VICULARIS
HYMEN Tanner 2
 Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted at 5 o 'clock with
attenuation of the hymenal rim from 5 o 'clock to 7 o 'clock;
very hyperemic hymen
PERINEUM Hyperemic perineum
DISCHARGE Whitish, foul-smelling discharge, minimal in amount noted
IE AND SPECULUM EXAM Not indicated
ANAL EXAMINATION No evident sign of injury at the time of examination;
REMARKS
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
None
COLLECTED
LABORATORY Requested a) Urinalysis
EXAMINATION b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
IMPRESSIONS
No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)

For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and competence to appear in court.

Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and ecchymosis on the antero-lateral border of the left
breast show clear evidence of Physical Abuse.

Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings were consistent with Rowena's claim of sexual
abuse. Specifically, her internal genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse such as: "markedly hyperemic urethra and
peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis, markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the
peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation." Further, Rowena's labia was "very red all
throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum." [23] All these,
according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could
have happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena
was almost in the 6 o'clock notch.[24] Dr. Guialani, likewise, confirmed that Rowena was deaf and mute.

Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellant's simple denial of the charge against him must
necessarily fail. The defense of denial is inherently weak. A mere denial, just like alibi, constitutes a self-serving
negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.[25]

All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his daughter Rowena pursuant to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to
appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information and their existence duly admitted by the defense on
stipulation of facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on appellant.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 [27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of
the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof
which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal
law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive
effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. [28]
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the
law, shall not be eligible for parole."

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, [29] correctly awarded the
following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have
suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00
as exemplary damages in light of the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of
P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity."

Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves,
to maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25, 2005 of the Court of Appeals finding appellant
Roberto Quiachon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on the appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. NICANOR SALOME
GR NO. 169077 Aug 31, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on June 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR. No.-H.C. No. 00767,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nicanor Salome," affirming the decision, dated April 3, 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 2536, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape against thirteen-year old Sally Idanan, and imposing upon him the death penalty.

The antecedents are:

On February 18, 1998, upon the complaint of Sally Idanan, an information was filed against appellant under the name
Canor Sabeniano. Appellant, however, filed a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that his name is Nicanor
Salome and not Canor Sabeniano.

An amended information was filed on August 26, 1998 accusing CANOR SABENIANO also known as NICANOR
SALOME, of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about or within the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997 in the morning, in [B]arangay
Lourdes, [M]unicipality of Pandan, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a bladed weapon, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of SALLY IDANAN, a minor who was then 13 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense.

That the commission of the crime was aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime was committed inside the house
of the offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Sally Idanan, fifteen years old, single, and a resident of Lourdes, Pandan, Catanduanes testified before the trial court
that she personally knew appellant because they used to be neighbors. In 1997, they transferred residence but
appellant would frequently pass by their place.[2]

Sometime in July of 1997, Sally, then thirteen years old, was sleeping with her three-year old brother inside their
house when appellant entered their house. She was awakened by the presence of the latter who, allegedly, was
poking a knife at the base of her neck. While holding the knife with one hand, appellant undressed her with his other
hand. He threatened her that he would kill her and her family if she would tell anyone about the incident. After
undressing her, appellant forced her to lie down. He removed his shorts and underwear. He then spread her legs and
inserted his penis into her vagina.

According to Sally, she just closed her eyes while appellant had his way with her. She did not call for help because she
was afraid that nobody would be in the next house which was about 800 meters away. [3]

She cannot remember how long appellant remained on top of her but before he left, he reiterated his threat to kill her
and her family if she told anybody of what happened. After that, she would frequently see appellant but the latter never
spoke to her.

Fearful for her life and for her family's safety, she did not inform anyone of the incident. Although it entered her mind
that she could be pregnant, she left her province to work as a domestic helper in the house of SPO2 Constantino B.
Saret in West Crame, San Juan, Manila.

On November 12, 1997, she had a pelvic ultrasound examination which confirmed her pregnancy. [4] Upon learning
this, she reported the rape incident to the police on November 17, 1997. She executed a sworn statement and filed a
complaint.

A criminal complaint for rape was initiated before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pandan-Caramoran,
Pandan, Catanduanes. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge during the arraignment.

Evidence for the prosecution consisted primarily of Sally's narration of the incident, and the testimony of Ma. Luz T.
Santos, Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, on the medico-legal report
issued by Dr. Anthony Joselito Llamas[5]who examined Sally.
Ma. Luz T. Santos, while referring to the medical report, explained that the hymen has a deep healed laceration at
6:00 o'clock position but she cannot determine as to the time when it was inflicted. [6] Due to the fact that the vaginal
canal was still narrow with prominent rugosities, Sally has not yet given birth although she was 18 to 19 weeks
pregnant counting from the last day of her menstruation which was on July 5, 1997. On cross-examination, Santos
declared that she was uncertain as to the exact date of sexual intercourse that caused the pregnancy of Sally, and that
said act may have occurred days before or after July 5, 1997 on account of the fact that the life span of an average
sperm cell lasts for three days.[7]

Evidence for the defense, on the other hand, consisted of the testimonies of appellant, Salvador Villarey and Manny
Torralba.

Appellant denied having raped Sally and offered the defense of alibi. He claimed that in the month of July 1997, he
went fishing at the sea of Gigmoto, Catanduanes on three different days but could not exactly remember when.
Villarey and Torralba corroborated the fact that they went fishing with appellant in July of 1997. They maintained,
however, that while they had been appellant's fishing companions, they would go their separate ways after fishing and
were not aware of appellant's activities after that.

On April 3, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the crime of rape and sentencing him as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Nicanor Salome also known as Canor Sabediano GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with the use of a deadly weapon, committed inside the dwelling of the offended party, as
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to give monthly support in the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos to the offspring of complainant Sally Idanan born on April 11, 1998, and to indemnify Sally Idanan in the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellant, the case was directly elevated to this Court for review.
Subsequently, however, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo.[9]

The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the case, rendered its Decision on June 15, 2005 affirming the conviction of
appellant, with modifications:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 3, 2001 of the trial court is affirmed subject to the following modifications:

The award of civil indemnity on the amount of P50,000.00 is increased to

(1)
P75,000.00; and,

Appellant is ordered to pay private complainant moral damages of

(2)
P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to govern Death Penalty
Cases) which took into effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated and certified to the Supreme Court for its
automatic review.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Appellant assigns the following errors:
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE UNCONVINCING AND IMPROBABLE
TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SALLY IDANAN; AND,

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING DWELLING AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.

As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the highest degree of weight
and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while testifying.[11]
In giving credence to the Sally's testimony, the trial court noted that she did not have any improper motive against
appellant other than her desire to tell the truth and obtain redress from the criminal act. [12]

In the commission of rape, it is usually only the rape victim who can attest to its occurrence, [13] and if the lone
testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, it is
competent to establish the guilt of the accused.[14] This is even more so if it involves the testimony of a rape victim of
tender or immature age such as in the instant case. Thus, if the victim is a young, immature girl, her testimony is given
credence by the courts [15] because no one would contrive a rape story, allow an examination of her private parts and
subject herself to scrutiny at a public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.[16]

Appellant asserts that the conduct of private complainant during and after the commission of the offense militates
against her credibility because it is inconsistent with human experience. She did not shout nor offer any resistance as
expected of a woman being sexually abused. She likewise kept the incident to herself until she learned of her
pregnancy three months later. Appellant further claims that there is no evidence that he threatened her or her family or
that he prevented her from reporting the incident to anybody. [17]

The Court finds nothing incredible in Sally's behavior. She woke up with appellant poking a knife at the base of her
neck. The act of holding a knife, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the
victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her to submission. The victim's failure to shout for help or resist the sexual
advances of the rapist does not negate the commission of rape. [18] As noted by the trial court:
The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts and panty were removed because of fear (TSN, Oct.
21, 1999, p. 12) does not lessen complainant's credibility. To an innocent girl who was then barely thirteen (13) years
old, the threat engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial desires of the
accused, she and her family would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore,
subjective. It must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime and not by any hard and fast rule. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout; some may faint; and some may
be shocked into sensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. (People v. Cabradilla, 133 SCRA 413
(1984)). The test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is whether it produces a reasonable
fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter
threatened to do would happen to her, or those dear to her, in this case, her family. Where such degree of intimidation
exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be
extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of
resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape
to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character
as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which the accused had in mind. (People v. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320 (1974)).
Likewise, Sally's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is understandable. It is not uncommon for young girls
to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of the threats on their lives. [19] Failure, therefore, by
the victim to file a complaint promptly to the proper authorities would not necessarily destroy the truth per se of the
complaint nor would it impair the credibility of the complainant, particularly if such delay was satisfactorily explained.
[20]
As a matter of fact, delay in reporting a rape case due to threats is justified. [21] As the Court held in People v.
Ballester:[22]
Neither can appellant find refuge in complainant's failure to promptly report the sexual assault to her relatives. Long
silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape has not always been construed as an indication of a false accusation.
In fact this principle applies with greater force in this case where the offended party was barely twelve years old, and
was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm.
Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying
degrees of behavioral responses is expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled
that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. [23]

Appellant further denies having raped Sally, asserting that he went fishing on three occasions in July of 1997. Denial,
however, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim. [24] For the
defense of alibi and denial to prosper, appellant must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was
physically impossible for him to have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.[25]

Here, appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the house of Sally when the crime was
committed. As the trial court aptly held:
The defense offered by the accused that he could not have raped the complainant because he went fishing three (3)
times in the month of July 1997 in Sicmil, Gigmoto, Catanduanes (TSN, February 8, 2000, p. 3) is sorely inadequate to
overcome the evidence adduced by the prosecution relative to his guilt, considering that his absence for only three (3)
days could not prevent him from committing the offense in the remaining twenty-eight (28) days of the month. In any
event, a probe into the accused's alibi readily yields the latter's inherent weakness. It is settled that for the defense of
alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the physical impossibility for him to have been present at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996) In the instant case, the
accused failed to demonstrate such impossibility.

The allegation in the Information that the offense was committed within the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to
July 31, 1997, sufficiently informs the accused of the approximate time of commission of the offense and affords him
opportunity to show that he could not have committed the crime on any of the thirty-one (31) days of July 1997...

Additionally, Manny Torralba, one of the accused's fishing companions, declared that they went home from fishing
everyday (TSN, February 28, 2001, p. 6) and that every time they went home from fishing, they parted ways as each
went to his own home, and would not know what the accused would be doing while he was at his own home (Idem, p.
9). Thus, even in those days when the accused went to fish out at sea, the accused's presence in the house of the
complainant where the subject offense was committed was far from impossible. [26]
The Court notes that appellant does not deny the existence of the knife during the commission of the rape. This Court
sustains the finding that the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of the crime of rape perpetrated with the use
of a deadly weapon. The presentation of the knife is not necessary to his conviction, in light of the victim's unwavering
testimony as to how appellant, armed with a knife, threatened and raped her.

This is consistent with this Court's ruling in People v. Degamo:[27]

It is settled that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction
of the accused. The testimony of the rape victim that appellant was armed with a deadly weapon when he committed
the crime is sufficient to establish the fact for so long as the victim is credible. It must be stressed that in rape, it is
usually only the victim who can attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject the testimony of the alleged
victims to strict scrutiny before relying on it for the conviction of the accused.
People v. Philippines Vitancur[28] also illustrates this principle:
The fact that the weapon with which complainant claimed she was intimidated by accused-appellant could not be
presented in court could not impeach private complainant's credibility as the weapon is not essential to the
prosecution of rape cases. What is important is that because of force and intimidation, private complainant was made
to submit to the will of accused-appellant. ... [T]he test is whether the threat or intimidation produces in the mind of a
reasonable person fear that if she persists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat will be carried
out.
Appellant committed the crime of rape with the use of a bladed weapon, the imposable penalty of which is reclusion
perpetua to death in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. � Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Whenever by reason of or on occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
In addition, and in relation to the second assignment of error, the crime of rape is aggravated by dwelling. [29] As the
Court of Appeals noted:
There is no question that the amended information sufficiently alleged "that the commission of the crime was
aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime was committed inside the house of the offended party." Accused-
appellant does not dispute that the crime was committed inside the victim's house. However, he posits that the
prosecution must prove the absence of provocation by Sally.

It suffices to state that private complainant categorically testified that she was sleeping inside her house when
appellant came and perpetrated the crime. This is proof enough of the absence of provocation on the part of private
complainant. For a sleeping thirteen (13) - year old barrio girl cannot possibly give any kind of provocation to appellant
under the circumstances.

Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without the presence of any mitigating
circumstance, justified the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. [30]
The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that in all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when an
aggravating circumstance, such as dwelling in this case, is present in the commission of the offense.

In People v. Alfeche,[31] wherein the complainant, employed as a domestic helper, was inside the house of her
employer when she was raped by the appellant who was armed with a deadly weapon, the Court considered dwelling
as an aggravating circumstance in convicting the latter, and affirmed the trial court's imposition of the greater penalty,
which is death.

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction of herein appellant and the imposition of the death penalty, concluded
that:
The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the trial court's imposition of the death penalty.
This is without prejudice, of course, to the provisions of section 25, R.A. 7659 regarding the possible exercise of the
pardoning power of the Office of the President upon the finality of the death sentence. [32]
In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines," which was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition
of the death penalty has been prohibited.[33] The law provides:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the evidence by the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the new law, even as the Court sustains the conviction of appellant, the
penalty imposed upon him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, but appellant shall not be eligible for parole under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling
in People v. Sambrano[34] which states:
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that
require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be P75,000 .... Also, in rape cases,
moral damages are awarded without the need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the
victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape. Lastly,
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is also called for, by way of example, and to protect the young from
sexual abuse.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law
for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still
P75,000. On the other hand, the automatic appeal in cases when the trial court imposes the death penalty will
henceforth not apply, since its imposition is now prohibited, so that there is a need to perfect an appeal, if appeal is
desired, from a judgment of conviction for an offense where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the
death penalty pursuant to the new law prohibiting its imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.-H.C. No. 00767, dated June 15, 2005, is
hereby AFFIRMEDinsofar as the conviction of appellant and the amount of damages are concerned. The sentence
that shall be imposed upon appellant, however, is MODIFIED. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without parole.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ARNEL COLINARES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated
homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of
the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. 1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus
Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with
Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone,
about 15 ½ inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias
tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that
Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house.
He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the
forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino
chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified that he was
on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino
where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and
Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a
stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and
tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled
and hid in his sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the incident. His
three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was
only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed
the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel
comes to this Court on petition for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their
respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its
imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes
out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants
such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for
probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone;
 2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty,
whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Court’s Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-defense when he
hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the
victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal
intent of the accused.4
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person whom the
offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with
sufficient provocation.5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the
other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an
actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating
attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon. 6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that
Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s
testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those
involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his
point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions. 7
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their
versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were one in what
Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable
and consistent with reality, hence deserving credence.8
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the
wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution
has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. 9And the intent to
kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.10
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out.
Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on
his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v.
People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the
wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or
frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim’s wounds.
While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious," 12 he could not categorically say that Rufino’s
wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the patient
preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not the depth of
the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always
call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth. 13
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred fracture or that
he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required
suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus – the problem the
contusion that occurred in the brain.
xxxx
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and then come
back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino
would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of
the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the
penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified
convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." 15 Since Arnel
appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he
certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it
is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have
been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on
the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that
such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel
will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where
is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling
of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 16 that the probation law requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and
this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and
sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly
probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving
his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course
let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and
probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the
accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of
truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’
thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction." 17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not
have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to
apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that
the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level
where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is
an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from
the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and
four months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he
comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed
from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation
law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel
who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel
of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to
feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide
with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him
straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender,
defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two
years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty
that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed
his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the
new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to
probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of
₱20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that
the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution 2 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated
November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the
latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of
Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation.
Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976
(Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated
December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for preliminary hearing. After due
proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed with the Comelec en
banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20,
2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno
merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local
office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take precedence over the case
of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a special law
setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to those who
have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law
which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that
this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense
involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and pointing out material
differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him.
According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense
involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the
petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his
conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefor. He
never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within two (2) years after serving
sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of which
Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under the first part of the above-quoted
provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was never raised in the
petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed
resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2) years from his discharge
from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves
moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue being whether Moreno’s sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that the grant of probation
does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding
that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not
obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been interpreted
and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code.
The Court’s declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, we should add, ought
to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because he appealed
his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection
of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase "service of
sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and unambiguous provision,
however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Court’s attention because the Comelec, in the assailed
resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of
their sentence because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged
sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
During the period of probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this case. They focused on the
fact that Moreno’s judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the question of
whether his sentence had been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of
probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from
running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the
Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which gives room for judicial
interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the intended meaning of
the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those who have been granted
probation. The Court’s function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation
Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the
state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by
law for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding
who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the
security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have
been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the
Probation Law became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of
this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not
covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years
after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect
of probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the
purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers.
It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior
special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the disqualification to
include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not
disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the
July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty
than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005
and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as all other actions and orders issued
pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in accordance
with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y BROCA
G.R. No. 201447 August 28, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, with the rape of his daughter, AAA, 1 alleged to be 12 years old
at the time of the incident. The Information2 specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision 3 finding Amistoso guilty, not of statutory rape, but of
qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified Rape, he is hereby sentenced
to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Ph₱75,000.00) as
indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay
the costs.4
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision5 dated August 25, 2011, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012, affirmed Amistoso’s
conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346 6 and the
latest jurisprudence on awards of damages. The appellate court decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated March 23, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. In addition to civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.7
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision 8 dated January 9, 2013, the Court
affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the
amounts of damages awarded, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca is DENIED. The Decision
dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that Amistoso is further ORDERED to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision.9
However, in a letter10 dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents
and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11,
2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa City. Roque attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death
Report11 signed by Marylou V. Arbatin, MD, Medical Officer III, NBP, stating that Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about
5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of Cardio Respiratory Arrest. Roque’s letter was received by the Court on February
12, 2013.
Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), Officer-in-Charge, Maximum Security
Compound, NBP, wrote another letter12 dated February 12, 2013, likewise informing the Court of Amistoso’s death on
December 11, 2012. PIS Lansangan appended to his letter a mere photocopy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate. 13The
Court received PIS Lansangan’s letter on February 18, 2013.
Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso and which was apparently
also unaware of its client’s demise, still filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 of the Court’s Decision dated January 9,
2013.
In a Resolution15 dated March 20, 2013, the Court required Roque to submit a certified true copy of Amistoso’s Death
Certificate within 10 days from notice and deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PAO pending
compliance with the Court’s former directive.
In a letter16 dated June 20, 2013, and received by the Court on June 25, 2013, PIS Lansangan finally provided the
Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate. 17
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
In People v. Bayotas,18 the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. (Citations omitted.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. 19
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on
January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled
upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death.1âwphi1
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming
Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still
has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NOTE PIS Lansangan’s letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the Court with a certified true copy of
Amistoso’s Death Certificate;
(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS Criminal Case No. 10106 before the RTC of
Masbate City, Branch 48 by reason of Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012; and
(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013
filed by the PAO given the Court’s actions in the preceding paragraphs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO
G.R. No. 194068 November 26, 2014
PEREZ, J.:
For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration 1 of our Decision dated 9 July 2014,2 which affirmed
the conviction of accused appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 2010 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01806 is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;
and (2) that the amount of exemplary damages is increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. An interest, at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date of finality of this
judgment until they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.3
Accused-appellant raises the incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the crime. 4 He avers that despite the
alleged positive identification made by Rolando Visbe (Visbe), the testimony of prosecution witness Aneline Mendoza
clearly shows the impossibility of the same.5 Moreover, further casting doubt on the alleged identification of accused
appellant is Visbe’s unbelievable and inconsistent statements on how such identification was made. 6Meanwhile, in a
Letter dated 21 September 2014,7 the Officer-inCharge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that
accused appellant died on 14 July 2014, as evidenced by the attached Death Certificate issued by NBP Medical
Officer III Ruth B. Algones, M.D.8
Owing to this development, the Court now addresses the effect of death pending accused-appellant’s appeal with
regard to his criminal and civil liabilities.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By the death of the
convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Brillantes,9 the Court, citing People v. Bayotas,10 clarified that:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon.1âwphi1 As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for reconsideration is still
pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well
as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment. 11
WHEREFORE, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines assailing the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784, reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 19, Manila and dismissing the criminal case for slight physical injuries against respondent on the
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and
private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was
reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999. 2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight
physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an
Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by
First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The
Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the
60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already
elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC denied said petition and concurred
with the opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it
held that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the
OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the
Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively
terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter
ego, to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of
the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months
into the next year. To use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was
"unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much more than the
prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with
the court on June 20, 2000. x x x3 (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed Orders of both courts below and Criminal Case
No. 344030-CR, entitled: "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, -versus- Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista,
Accused," is ordered DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision. The Court gives due course
to the petition notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA
before the filing of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day
prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution in
this case is whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to
file the proper criminal information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine Archipelago. (Emphasis
supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the
filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not agree. It
is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive
period.6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from
the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or
acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence
should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. 8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition
considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the
Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the
information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of the information. The
Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong
purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors’ apparent lack of a sense of urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the
circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative disciplinary action
against the erring public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-
103990 is hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of herein Decision for appropriate action against
the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules
of Court, by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari
annulling and setting aside the April 1, 20131 and April 23, 20132 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Second Division and En bane, respectively, in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) a Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013
winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada’s (former President Estrada) disqualification to run for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic
of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, et al." The dispositive part of the graft court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the
accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER,
defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to
prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty
shall be applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the accused Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention shall be
credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court
hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos
(₱545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos
(₱200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos (₱189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and
income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located at #100 11th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled
and released to the said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon presentation of the original receipt
evidencing payment thereof and subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-
departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby recalled and declared functus oficio. 4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive
clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full, including all writs and processes issued by
the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s) he owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October, in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted" 6 the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy 7 for the position of President. During
that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09-024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due
Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA No. 09-028
(DC), a petition for "Disqualification as Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA
No. 09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B" filed by Mary Lou Estrada. In
separate Resolutions8 dated January 20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second Division, however, all three petitions were
effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the former’s
right to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the
COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought recourse to this Court and filed a petition for
certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v. Joseph ‘ERAP’ Ejercito
Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in a Resolution 9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy,10 this time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC). Risos Vidal anchored
her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
(Emphases supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification, the
fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. 12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial cognizance of the consolidated resolution for
SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this Commission
will not be labor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the
standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since
this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in
wastage of government resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the present petition. She presented five issues
for the Court’s resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON WAS NOT
CONDITIONAL;
II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN
AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING
BEEN CONVICTED OF PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND
THAT THE CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY RESOLVED IN THE CASES
OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09-028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY
ESTRADA EJERCITO, JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104 (DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON NEITHER
RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE
DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY
RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC OFFICE
AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR PLUNDER. 14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were conducted as scheduled and
former President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local board of
canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to
intervene in this case. His motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution 15 dated June 25, 2013. Lim subscribed to
Risos-Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada
is disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained by the latter should be declared stray, and, being
the second placer with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning candidate for the
position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only
one essential question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon granted to former President Estrada
was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof. The "acceptance," she claims, is an
indication of the conditional natureof the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the
pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office." She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon
former President Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach thereof, that is,
whenformer President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he
breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of
his sentence x x x and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila." 16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon which former President Estrada mustbe
disqualified from running for and holding public elective office is actually the proscription found in Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC. She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude; such that former President Estrada must be
disqualified to run for and hold public elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however, Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate
to make available to former President Estrada the exception provided under Section 12 of the OEC, the pardon being
merely conditional and not absolute or plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible requirements
provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not enough that a pardon makes a general statement
that such pardon carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon
restoring civil and political rights without categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are
restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she considers the above constraints as mandatory requirements that shun a
general or implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the right to hold public office to one who
has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference,
no matter how intensely arguable, but must be statedin express, explicit, positive and specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal reckons that "such express restoration is further
demanded by the existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the pardon x x x indubitably indicating
that the privilege to hold public office was not restored to him." 19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the
issue of whether or not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to run for public office had
already been passed upon by public respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos. 09-024, 09-
028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former President
Estrada] disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of Manila in the absence of any new argument that
would warrant its reversal. To be sure, public respondent COMELEC correctly exercised its discretion in taking judicial
cognizance of the aforesaid rulings which are known toit and which can be verified from its own records, in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on the courts’ discretionary power to take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, orare capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to them
because of their judicial functions."20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that [former President Estrada’s] conviction for
plunder disqualifies him from running as mayor of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC], the subsequent grant of
pardon to him, however, effectively restored his right to run for any public office." 21 The restoration of his right to run for
any public office is the exception to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section 12 of the
OEC. As to the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express
restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that "an airtight and rigid
interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too much the clear and plain meaning
of the aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking into consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon granted to
former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon and
cannot therefore serve to restrict its effectivity." 23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions."24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following significant arguments to defend his stay in office: that
"the factual findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body mandated to administer and enforce all
laws relative to the conduct of the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the pardon, the effects thereof, and the
eligibility of former President Estrada to seek public elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this Honorable
Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and political rights,
including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral (sic) position in the City of Manila;" that "the
majority decision in the case of Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which was erroneously cited by
both Vidal and Lim as authority for their respective claims, x x x reveal that there was no discussion whatsoever in the
ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case as to the alleged necessity for an expressed restoration of the ‘right to hold
public office in the pardon’ as a legal prerequisite to remove the subject perpetual special disqualification;" that
moreover, the "principal question raised in this Monsanto case is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher former position without need of a new
appointment;" that his "expressed acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon extended to [him] is
conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a mere rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for
President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code "cannot abridge or diminish the
pardoning power of the President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of the pardon granted to him
substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it was
categorically stated in the said document that he was "restored to his civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an
act of grace, it must be construed favorably in favor of the grantee; 25 and that his disqualification will result in massive
disenfranchisement of the hundreds of thousands of Manileños who voted for him. 26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language
of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the
petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC),
was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President Estrada must
be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that
includes a statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that
former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains
disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President
Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for public
office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada does
not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the
pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of
the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were decided under the 1935 Constitution,wherein the
provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987
Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this pronouncement in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of
this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by
Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically
through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when
they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of
"offenses involving graft and corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of
a law. The following is the pertinent portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to introduce an amendment on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation.
I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of corrupt practices may include a very little offense
like stealing ₱10; second, which I think is more important, I get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that subconsciously
we are drafting a constitution on the premise that all our future Presidents will bebad and dishonest and, consequently,
their acts will be lacking in wisdom. Therefore, this Article seems to contribute towards the creation of an anti-
President Constitution or a President with vast responsibilities but no corresponding power except to declare martial
law. Therefore, I request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of Commissioner Davide because of the fact that similar to
the provisions on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of that Commission is required before executive
clemency isgranted because violations of the election laws go into the very political life of the country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that it is also necessary to have that subjected to the
same condition because violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of such magnitude as to affect the very
economic systemof the country. Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will be the Congress that will
provide for the classification as to which convictions will still require prior recommendation; after all, the Congress
could take into account whether or not the violation of the Corrupt Practices Law is of such magnitude as to affect the
economic life of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of dollars. But I assume the Congress in its collective
wisdom will exclude those petty crimes of corruption as not to require any further stricture on the exercise of executive
clemency because, of course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a lowly clerk committing malversation of
government property or funds involving one hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the possibility that the corrupt
practice of a public officer is of such magnitude as to have virtually drained a substantial portion of the treasury, and
then he goes through all the judicial processes and later on, a President who may have close connections with him or
out of improvident compassion may grant clemency under such conditions. That is why we left it to Congress to
provide and make a classification based on substantial distinctions between a minor act of corruption or an act of
substantial proportions. SR. TAN. So, why do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the word
"violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction because "GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be
misconstrued by putting it purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially an executive power, and that is precisely why it
is called executive clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to delete, an exception is being made.
Congress, which is the legislative arm, is allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it limits the
power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of the President to grant executive clemency by limiting the power
of Congress to only corrupt practices laws. There are many other crimes more serious than these. Under this
amendment, Congress cannot limit the power of executive clemency in cases of drug addiction and drug pushing
which are very, very serious crimes that can endanger the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and treason.
Aside from the fact that it is a derogation of the power of the President to grant executive clemency, it is also defective
in that it singles out just one kind of crime. There are far more serious crimes which are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit that the pardoning power is anexecutive power.
But even in the provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it is required that there be a
favorable recommendation by the Commission on Elections for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of that and as a member of the Committee, has
explained in the committee meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this particular provision. May we call on
Commissioner Davide to state his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We have just approved the Article on Accountability of
Public Officers. Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a public trust, and all government officers are under
obligation to observe the utmost of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives and to act with
patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the concept that a public office is a public trust, the violation
is itself a violation not only of the economy but the moral fabric of public officials. And that is the reason we now want
that if there is any conviction for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which, in effect, is a violation
of the public trust character of the public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender, unless some limitations
are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of the convicting court, but the Committee left it entirely
to the legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to distinguish between grave and less grave or
serious cases of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is now the best time, since we have
strengthened the Article on Accountability of Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate that the President’s right
to grant executive clemency for offenders or violators of laws relating to the concept of a public office may be limited
by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and arguing before this Constitutional Commission that
we are emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this provision to me is another clear example of that. So, I
speak against this provision. Even the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this kind of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the amendment by deletion because I am in sympathy with the
stand of Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should remember that above all the elected or
appointed officers of our Republic, the leader is the President. I believe that the country will be as the President is, and
if we systematically emasculate the power of this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be also handcuffed that
he will no longer be able to act like he should be acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the approval of proposals, but now I find that the
proposal of Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.
Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other crimes which cast a bigger blot on the moral character
of the public officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost absolute power of our Chief Executive in deciding
whether to pardon, to reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered by the court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and after him will be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-Graft Court, so if
this is allowed to stay, it would mean that the President’s power togrant pardon or reprieve will be limited to the cases
decided by the Anti-Graft Court, when as already stated, there are many provisions inthe Revised Penal Code that
penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case merits the consideration of the exercise of executive
clemency, usually under Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will recommend such exercise of clemency.
And so, I am in favor of the amendment proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this last sentence in
Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the President. In case of
other criminals convicted in our society, we extend probation to them while in this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency extended
to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than the
murderers and the more vicious killers in our society. I do not think they deserve this opprobrium and punishment
under the new Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to submit this to the floor and also because of the
objection of the main proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the Commissioners should vote on this
question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan to delete the last
sentence of Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the amendment is approved. 30 (Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any
way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said Articles contain specific textual commands
which must be strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualifications
specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as
to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so
if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From
the words of a statute there should be no departure. 31 It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential
pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal that there was no express remission and/or
restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as
required by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must be followed by the President, as
they do not abridge or diminish the President’s power to extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the
coverage of the President’s pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only provide a procedural prescription. They
are not concerned with areas where or the instances when the President may grant pardon; they are only concerned
with how he or she is to exercise such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give
it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the pardon the restoration of the
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification,he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains the power to
make such restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it. 32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may dictate as to how the President may
exercise his/her power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the President, or Congress for that
matter, should exercise their respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so
provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply ingrained in our
system of government which "ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere." 33 Moreso, this fundamental
principle must be observed if noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal and coordinate
branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give full effect to
the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve
to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the
Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to
define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of the President to grant executive clemency.
All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does notcarry with it the remission of the
accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes
the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon
so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposedin accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil
and political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,"
reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their
profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:
 (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which theyare naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a signatory,
acknowledges the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, 35 the Court unequivocally referred to the right to seek
public elective office as a political right, to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their
citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The
petitioner’s failure to comply there with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to
regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship,
she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political
right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no
other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted tohim, he regained his FULL civil
and political rights – including the right to seek elective office.
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a
formal requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could be in derogation of the constitutional
prohibition relative to the principle that the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected by legislative action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. 36 to justify her argument
that an absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has been restored, and that the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification has been remitted.
This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the learned views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and
Florentino P. Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of
the law of the land. On the contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by no less than
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, reveals no statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and overly nuanced
application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code that will in effect require the President to use a statutorily
prescribed language in extending executive clemency, even if the intent of the President can otherwise be deduced
from the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained above, the pardon here is consistent with, and
not contrary to, the provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues
that former President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s conviction for plunder disqualifies him from
running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the
subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to seek public elective
office. This is made possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of
the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to candidates running for local elective positions is not
unprecedented. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 37 the Court acknowledged the aforementioned provision
as one of the legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. 38 The pertinent ruling in the
Jalosjos case is quoted as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prision mayor, a petition under
Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The
petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which
remedy to adopt belongs to petitioner. 39 (Emphasis supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not
an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas."40 Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. 41 In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to
make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the
pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia Padaca’s
separate concurring opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which
captured the essence of the legal effect of preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January 2010 Resolution did not conclude upon. Here,
Petitioner Risos-Vidal raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause" or preambular paragraph of
the decree of pardon. It states that "Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office." On this contention, the undersigned reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular
paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute nature of the pardon extended by former
President Arroyo to herein Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional and customary usage of
preambular paragraphs. In the case of Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the legal effect
of preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses on statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s decision torun for
President in the May 2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the political party of former President
Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his
rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is in issue, the Court must turn to
the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe four corners of said
document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso,
stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek
public office will result ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of
fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the
efficacy orto delimit the scope of the pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third Whereas Clausewas one of the reasons to grant the
pardon, the pardon itself does not provide for the attendant consequence of the breach thereof. This Court will be hard
put to discern the resultant effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put to determine which civil or
political rights were restored if the Court were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the restoration of former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage
and to hold public office. The aforequoted text ofthe executive clemency granted does not provide the Court with any
guide asto how and where to draw the line between the included and excluded political rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on
the condition that former President Estrada will not seek janother elective public office, but it actually concerns the
coverage of the pardon – whether the pardon granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as to have
restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view
that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite the statement that former President Estrada is
"hereby restored to his civil and political rights," that is, the foregoing statement restored to former President Estrada
all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He adds that had the
President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, she should have
been more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear
– the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was
unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled
meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the omission of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as
excluding the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office. There appears to be no distinction as to the
coverage of the term "full political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone without any qualification. How to
ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies one’s understanding. More so, it will be
extremely difficult to identify which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when the text of the latter is silent
on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying word "full"
when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former President Estrada without any exclusion or reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to former President Estrada was
absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the
Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the
provisions of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst actions of the COMELEC is confined only to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial of due process, because the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain. 43
As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having
been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross. 44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion orrefusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and gross" as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-
intervention, which substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1,
2013 of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission on
Elections, En bane, both in SPA No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private
Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against
petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED. 3
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million
Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant
which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability
and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her
issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount
of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges
involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however,
dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished
by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000
Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although
received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the
same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo
is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review 5 on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to
comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City,
thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had
already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was
notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period
granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four
years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the
proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly
prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper
court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act
3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits
that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930,
governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with
the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. 10 It
submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the
subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the
case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial
proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed to
consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing
of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four
years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed
outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims
that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore
covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is
indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction
should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses
covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period
of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified
true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal
of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was
also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed
by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law.
The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty
person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et.
al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There
is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes
v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving
special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et.
al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of
the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it
is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the
City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg.
22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was
notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law
elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached
the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of
"prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the
petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated
on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file
the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations
for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent. SO ORDERED.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S.
RECTO, RENE S. VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA, FRANCISCO ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY
and SANTIAGO TANCHAN, JR.
G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, 1 dated 20
August 1998, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) from taking cognizance of or initiating any action against the respondent corporation
Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) and members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel S. Recto, Rene S.
Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, Antonio Reina, Francisco Anonuevo, Joseph Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with respect to
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. In the same Decision of the appellate court, all the proceedings
taken against the respondents, including the assailed SEC Omnibus Orders of 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995,
were declared void.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings
Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda
Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI),2 which would own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating
barge. The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National
Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-
September of 1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88
billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.3
On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns
25.724 hectares of real estate property in Makati. Under the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of
Companies in Malaysia, shall extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. 4
IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent through
facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could
not receive it. Upon the advice of the SEC, the IRC sent the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994. 5
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB
and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information.
On 16 August 1994, the SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed all principal officers of IRC to appear at a
hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department (BED) of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately
disclose the information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. 6
In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16 August 1994 to the SEC, attaching
thereto copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde,
also appeared before the SEC on 22 August 1994 to explain IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material
information as required under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. 7
On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of
Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its
negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into
transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act. 8
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was superseded by an Amended Omnibus
Motion, filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority to investigate the subject matter, since under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,9 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred
upon the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC. Respondents also claimed that the SEC
violated their right to due process when it ordered that the respondents appear before the SEC and "show cause why
no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them," and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to the
respondents. Lastly, they sought to have their cases tried jointly given the identical factual situations surrounding the
alleged violation committed by the respondents.10
Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994, wherein they moved for
discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings before the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and the
investigating officials had become reasonably free from prejudice and public pressure. 11
No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions, but on 25 January 1995, the SEC
issued an Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same in this wise: 12
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the Commission resolves and hereby rules:
1. To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide the instant case in accordance with the Rules of
Practice and Procedure Before the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED), Securities and
Exchange Commission, to be composed of Attys. James K. Abugan, Medardo Devera (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department), and Jose Aquino (Brokers and Exchanges Department), which is hereby directed
to expeditiously resolve the case by conducting continuous hearings, if possible.
2. To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994 requiring the respondents to appear and show
cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them.
3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 13 questioning the creation of the special
investigating panel to hear the case and the denial of the Motion for Continuance. The SEC denied reconsideration in
its Omnibus Order dated 30 March 1995.14
The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, questioning the
Omnibus Orders dated 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995. 15 During the proceedings before the Court of Appeals,
respondents filed a Supplemental Motion16 dated 16 May 1995, wherein they prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating and proceeding with the hearing of the case
against respondents herein. On 5 May 1995, the Court of Appeals granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against the
respondents herein.17
On 23 October 1995, the SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so that the case may be
investigated by the PED in accordance with the SEC Rules and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special
body whose creation the SEC had earlier ordered.18
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision19 on 20 August 1998. It determined that there were no implementing
rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts
which the respondents allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for
the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it
ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without
violating their rights to due process and equal protection. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the
SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of re-filing the same case against
the respondents.20
The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the PED, which took effect on
14 April 1990, did not comply with the statutory requirements contained in the Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8,
Rule V of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the PED affords a party the right to be present but without the
right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code. 21
In the dispositive portion of its Decision, dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals ruled that 22:
WHEREFORE, [herein petitioner SEC's] Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders is hereby DENIED.
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is GRANTED. Consequently, all proceedings taken
against [herein respondents] in this case, including the Omnibus Orders of January 25, 1995 and March 30,
1995 are declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent and,
accordingly, [SEC] is hereby prohibited from taking cognizance or initiating any action, be they civil,
criminal, or administrative against [respondents] with respect to Sections 8 (Procedure for Registration), 30
(Insider's duty to disclose when trading) and 36 (Directors, Officers and Principal Stockholders) in relation to
Sections 46 (Administrative sanctions) 56 (Penalties) 44 (Liabilities of Controlling persons) and 45
(Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses) of the Revised Securities Act and Section 144
(Violations of the Code) of the Corporation Code. (Emphasis provided.)
The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution 23 issued on 30
September 1998.
Hence, the present petition, which relies on the following grounds 24:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO QUASH
THE ASSAILED SEC OMNIBUS ORDERS DATED JANUARY 25 AND MARCH 30, 1995.
II
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
WHATSOEVER FOR PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR
ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT CORPORATION AND ITS DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO
SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS
AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION
BEFORE THE PED AND THE SICD RULES OF PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS25 ARE INVALID AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted that while this case was pending in this Court, Republic
Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was already repealed as provided for in Section
76 of the Securities Regulation Code:
SEC. 76. Repealing Clause. - The Revised Securities Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 178), as amended, in its
entirety, and Sections 2, 4 and 8 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, are hereby repealed. All other
laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the Securities Regulation Code has taken the place of the
Revised Securities Act.
The Court now proceeds with a discussion of the present case.
I. Sctions 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of implementing rules to
make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents without violating their right
to due process and equal protection, citing as its basis the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins.26 This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that every law has in its favor
the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the
same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes. 27 The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively
invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. In People v.
Rosenthal,28 this Court ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the
ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act
will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure
the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means,
and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith." (25
R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,29 the Court underlined the importance of the presumption of validity of laws and the
careful consideration with which the judiciary strikes down as invalid acts of the legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is
to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is based on the
impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and varying details of management. 30 To rule
that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act,
would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert
that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the
power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or
to things future and impossible to fully know.31 It is well established that administrative authorities have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and
regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its
general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more
extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. 32 Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient
standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there
should be no impediment to its implementation.
The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins33 shows a glaring error. In the cited case, this Court
found unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the board of supervisors authority to refuse permission to carry on
laundries located in buildings that were not made of brick and stone, because it violated the equal protection clause
and was highly discriminatory and hostile to Chinese residents and not because the standards provided therein were
vague or ambiguous.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, such
that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads:
Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading. - (a) It shall be unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a
security of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer or the security that is
not generally available, unless (1) the insider proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party
to the transaction (or his agent) is identified, (a) the insider proves that the other party knows it, or (b) that
other party in fact knows it from the insider or otherwise.
(b) "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or
gave him access to a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available,
or (4) a person who learns such a fact from any of the foregoing insiders as defined in this subsection, with
knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider.
(c) A fact is "of special significance" if (a) in addition to being material it would be likely, on being made
generally available, to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) a reasonable person
would consider it especially important under the circumstances in determining his course of action in the light
of such factors as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference from information generally available
previously, and its nature and reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in subsection (b) (3) hereof only to the extent that he
knows of a fact of special significance by virtue of his being an insider.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the
gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud, committed when an
insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose
material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose or
abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone; and second, the
inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.34
In the United States (U.S.), the obligation to disclose or abstain has been traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders,"
particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders, but that definition has since been expanded. 35The term
"insiders" now includes persons whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave them access to a
fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, and one who learns such a
fact from an insider knowing that the person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders have the duty to
disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. In some cases, however, there may be
valid corporate reasons for the nondisclosure of material information. Where such reasons exist, an issuer's decision
not to make any public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as a violation of insider trading. At the same time, the
undisclosed information should not be improperly used for non-corporate purposes, particularly to disadvantage other
persons with whom an insider might transact, and therefore the insider must abstain from entering into transactions
involving such securities.36
Respondents further aver that under Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act, the SEC still needed to define the
following terms: "material fact," "reasonable person," "nature and reliability" and "generally available." 37 In
determining whether or not these terms are vague, these terms must be evaluated in the context of Section 30 of the
Revised Securties Act. To fully understand how the terms were used in the aforementioned provision, a discussion of
what the law recognizes as a fact of special significance is required, since the duty to disclose such fact or to abstain
from any transaction is imposed on the insider only in connection with a fact of special significance.
Under the law, what is required to be disclosed is a fact of "special significance" which may be (a) a material fact
which would be likely, on being made generally available, to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent,
or (b) one which a reasonable person would consider especially important in determining his course of action with
regard to the shares of stock.
(a) Material Fact - The concept of a "material fact" is not a new one. As early as 1973, the Rules Requiring Disclosure
of Material Facts by Corporations Whose Securities Are Listed In Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under
the Securities Act, issued by the SEC on 29 January 1973, explained that "[a] fact is material if it induces or tends to
induce or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of its securities." Thus, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
provides that if a fact affects the sale or purchase of securities, as well as its price, then the insider would be required
to disclose such information to the other party to the transaction involving the securities. This is the first definition
given to a "fact of special significance."
(b.1) Reasonable Person - The second definition given to a fact of special significance involves the judgment of a
"reasonable person." Contrary to the allegations of the respondents, a "reasonable person" is not a problematic legal
concept that needs to be clarified for the purpose of giving effect to a statute; rather, it is the standard on which most
of our legal doctrines stand. The doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the "reasonable man" as the
standard.38 A purchaser in good faith must also take into account facts which put a "reasonable man" on his guard. 39 In
addition, it is the belief of the reasonable and prudent man that an offense was committed that sets the criteria for
probable cause for a warrant of arrest.40 This Court, in such cases, differentiated the reasonable and prudent man
from "a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge," and identified him as "the average man on the
street," who weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have in
abundance.41 In the same vein, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly determined its standards by the actual significance in
the deliberations of a "reasonable investor," when it ruled in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 42 that the
determination of materiality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder' would draw
from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him."
(b.2) Nature and Reliability - The factors affecting the second definition of a "fact of special significance," which is of
such importance that it is expected to affect the judgment of a reasonable man, were substantially lifted from a test of
materiality pronounced in the case In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc. 43:
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether information is material under this test are the
degree of its specificity, the extent to which it differs from information previously publicly disseminated, and its
reliability in light of its nature and source and the circumstances under which it was received.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the "nature and reliability" of a significant fact in determining the course of
action a reasonable person takes regarding securities must be clearly viewed in connection with the particular
circumstances of a case. To enumerate all circumstances that would render the "nature and reliability" of a fact to be
of special significance is close to impossible. Nevertheless, the proper adjudicative body would undoubtedly be able to
determine if facts of a certain "nature and reliability" can influence a reasonable person's decision to retain, sell or buy
securities, and thereafter explain and justify its factual findings in its decision.
(c) Materiality Concept - A discussion of the "materiality concept" would be relevant to both a material fact which
would affect the market price of a security to a significant extent and/or a fact which a reasonable person would
consider in determining his or her cause of action with regard to the shares of stock. Significantly, what is referred to in
our laws as a fact of special significance is referred to in the U.S. as the "materiality concept" and the latter is similarly
not provided with a precise definition. In Basic v. Levinson,44 the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against confining
materiality to a rigid formula, stating thus:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of
all the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the
Securities Act and Congress' policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as
always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be
overinclusive or underinclusive.
Moreover, materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." 45 In drafting the
Securities Act of 1934, the U.S. Congress put emphasis on the limitations to the definition of materiality:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have absolute certainty in the application
of the materiality concept, it is its view that such a goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is
judgmental in nature and it is not possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The Committee's
advice to the [SEC] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to continue consideration of materiality on
a case-by-case basis as disclosure problems are identified." House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (Comm.Print 1977). (Emphasis provided.) 46
(d) Generally Available - Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act allows the insider the defense that in a transaction
of securities, where the insider is in possession of facts of special significance, such information is "generally
available" to the public. Whether information found in a newspaper, a specialized magazine, or any cyberspace media
be sufficient for the term "generally available" is a matter which may be adjudged given the particular circumstances of
the case. The standards cannot remain at a standstill. A medium, which is widely used today was, at some previous
point in time, inaccessible to most. Furthermore, it would be difficult to approximate how the rules may be applied to
the instant case, where investigation has not even been started. Respondents failed to allege that the negotiations of
their agreement with GHB were made known to the public through any form of media for there to be a proper
appreciation of the issue presented.
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act
As regards Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act, respondents claim that the term "beneficial ownership" is
vague and that it requires implementing rules to give effect to the law. Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward provision that imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity
security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his
or her ownership of the issuer's securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof. The said provision reads:
Sec. 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders. - (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any [class] of any equity security which is registered pursuant
to this Act, or who is [a] director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the
registration of such security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or
within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner, director or officer, a statement with the Commission
and, if such security is registered on a securities exchange, also with the exchange, of the amount of all equity
securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each
calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission, and if such security is registered on a securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange, a
statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as
have occurred during such calendar month. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 36(a) refers to the "beneficial owner." Beneficial owner has been defined in the following manner:
[F]irst, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also called "equitable ownership"); and second,
to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not
registered in the corporation's books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked
ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the
bare title to property.47
Even assuming that the term "beneficial ownership" was vague, it would not affect respondents' case, where the
respondents are directors and/or officers of the corporation, who are specifically required to comply with the reportorial
requirements under Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. The validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 48
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to promote full disclosure in the securities market and
prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of an
uninformed public. No individual would invest in a market which can be manipulated by a limited number of corporate
insiders. Such reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities market. To avert the occurrence of such an
event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act prevented the unfair use of non-public information in securities
transactions, while Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into by corporate officers and
directors as regards the securities of their companies.
In the case In the Matter of Investor's Management Co.,49 it was cautioned that "the broad language of the anti-fraud
provisions," which include the provisions on insider trading, should not be "circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications." The ambit of anti-fraud provisions is necessarily broad so as to embrace the infinite variety of
deceptive conduct.50
In Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy,51 this Court brushed aside a contention, similar to that made by the
respondents in this case, that certain words or phrases used in a statute do not set determinate standards, declaring
that:
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been defined in
R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate and determinable standards. This stubborn submission
deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse
men of reasonable intelligence. x x x. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of
executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of
similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
Among the words or phrases that this Court upheld as valid standards were "simplicity and dignity," 52 "public
interest,"53 and "interests of law and order."54
The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February 1982. The fact that the Full Disclosure Rules were
promulgated by the SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not render ineffective in the meantime Section 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. It is already unequivocal that the Revised Securities Act requires full disclosure and the Full Disclosure
Rules were issued to make the enforcement of the law more consistent, efficient and effective. It is equally reasonable
to state that the disclosure forms later provided by the SEC, do not, in any way imply that no compliance was required
before the forms were provided. The effectivity of a statute which imposes reportorial requirements cannot be
suspended by the issuance of specified forms, especially where compliance therewith may be made even without
such forms. The forms merely made more efficient the processing of requirements already identified by the statute.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no civil, criminal or
administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents in connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete
by themselves. Their requirements are specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. In
particular, Section 855 of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the
registration of securities and the particular matters which need to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The
Decision, dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC from such requirements. The
lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent
reason to prevent the SEC from exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation of Section 8 of the
Revised Securities Act.
II. The right to cross-examination is not absolute and cannot be demanded during investigative proceedings
before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals pronounced that the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V56 thereof failed to provide for the parties' right to cross-examination, in
violation of the Administrative Code of 1987 particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII thereof. This ruling is
incorrect.
Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, categorically stated that the proceedings before
the PED are summary in nature:
Section 4. Nature of Proceedings - Subject to the requirements of due process, proceedings before the "PED"
shall be summary in nature not necessarily adhering to or following the technical rules of evidence obtaining in
the courts of law. The Rules of Court may apply in said proceedings in suppletory character whenever
practicable.
Rule V of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure further specified that:
Section 5. Submission of Documents - During the preliminary conference/hearing, or immediately thereafter,
the Hearing Officer may require the parties to simultaneously submit their respective verified position papers
accompanied by all supporting documents and the affidavits of their witnesses, if any which shall take the
place of their direct testimony. The parties shall furnish each other with copies of the position papers together
with the supporting affidavits and documents submitted by them.
Section 6. Determination of necessity of hearing. - Immediately after the submission by the parties of their
position papers and supporting documents, the Hearing Officer shall determine whether there is a need for a
formal hearing. At this stage, he may, in his discretion, and for the purpose of making such determination, elicit
pertinent facts or information, including documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness to complete,
as far as possible, the facts of the case. Facts or information so elicited may serve as basis for his clarification
or simplifications of the issues in the case. Admissions and stipulation of facts to abbreviate the proceedings
shall be encouraged.
Section 7. Disposition of Case. If the Hearing Officer finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties
have submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall so inform the parties stating the
reasons therefor and shall ask them to acknowledge the fact that they were so informed by signing the
minutes of the hearing and the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may require the parties to submit their respective verified
position papers, together with all supporting documents and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing was not
mandatory; it was within the discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine whether there was a need for a formal
hearing. Since, according to the foregoing rules, the holding of a hearing before the PED is discretionary, then the right
to cross-examination could not have been demanded by either party.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, entitled "Adjudication," does not
affect the investigatory functions of the agencies. The law creating the PED, Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A, as amended, defines the authority granted to the PED, thus:
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject to the Commission's control and
supervision, the exclusive authority to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the
Board of Directors/Trustees of corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their
stockholders, officers or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of
any law or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; to file and prosecute in
accordance with law and rules and regulations issued by the Commission and in appropriate cases, the
corresponding criminal or civil case before the Commission or the proper court or body upon prima facie
finding of violation of any laws or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; and to
perform such other powers and functions as may be provided by law or duly delegated to it by the
Commission. (Emphasis provided.)
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC and
to file and prosecute such cases. It fails to mention any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is concerned. Thus,
the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure need not comply with the provisions of the Administrative Code on
adjudication, particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,57 this Court sets out the distinction between investigative and adjudicative
functions, thus:
 "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on,
study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely; inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into" xx to subject to an official probe xx: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of an
investigation, of course is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of
the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out
by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
In a legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. x x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
There is no merit to the respondent's averment that the sections under Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code,
do not distinguish between investigative and adjudicatory functions. Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, is
unequivocally entitled "Adjudication."
Respondents insist that the PED performs adjudicative functions, as enumerated under Section 1(h) and (j), Rule II;
and Section 2(4), Rule VII of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and Enforcement Department is
primarily charged with the following:
xxxx
(h) Suspends or revokes, after proper notice and hearing in accordance with these Rules, the franchise or
certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the following grounds:
1. Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation can do or is doing to the great prejudice of or damage
to the general public;
3. Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of the Commission restraining commission of acts which
would amount to a grave violation of its franchise;
xxxx
(j) Imposes charges, fines and fees, which by law, it is authorized to collect;
xxxx
Section 2. Powers of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer shall have the following powers:
xxxx
4. To cite and/or declare any person in direct or indirect contempt in accordance with pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court.
Even assuming that these are adjudicative functions, the PED, in the instant case, exercised its investigative powers;
thus, respondents do not have the requisite standing to assail the validity of the rules on adjudication. A valid source of
a statute or a rule can only be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 58 In the
instant case, respondents are only being investigated by the PED for their alleged failure to disclose their negotiations
with GHB and the transactions entered into by its directors involving IRC shares. The respondents have not shown
themselves to be under any imminent danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the exercise of
adjudicative functions by the SEC. They are not being or about to be subjected by the PED to charges, fees or fines;
to citations for contempt; or to the cancellation of their certificate of registration under Section 1(h), Rule II of the PED
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
To repeat, the only powers which the PED was likely to exercise over the respondents were investigative in nature, to
wit:
 Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the Prosecution and Enforcement Department is
primarily charged with the following:
xxxx
b. Initiates proper investigation of corporations and partnerships or persons, their books, records and other
properties and assets, involving their business transactions, in coordination with the operating department
involved;
xxxx
e. Files and prosecutes civil or criminal cases before the Commission and other courts of justice involving
violations of laws and decrees enforced by the Commission and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder;
f. Prosecutes erring directors, officers and stockholders of corporations and partnerships, commercial paper
issuers or persons in accordance with the pertinent rules on procedures;
The authority granted to the PED under Section 1(b), (e), and (f), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure,
need not comply with Section 12, Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code, which affects only the adjudicatory
functions of administrative bodies. Thus, the PED would still be able to investigate the respondents under its rules for
their alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into by its directors involving
IRC shares.
This is not to say that administrative bodies performing adjudicative functions are required to strictly comply with the
requirements of Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code, particularly, the right to cross-examination. It should
be noted that under Section 2.2 of Executive Order No. 26, issued on 7 October 1992, abbreviated proceedings are
prescribed in the disposition of administrative cases:
2. Abbreviation of Proceedings. All administrative agencies are hereby directed to adopt and include in their
respective Rules of Procedure the following provisions:
xxxx
2.2 Rules adopting, unless otherwise provided by special laws and without prejudice to Section 12, Chapter 3,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, the mandatory use of affidavits in lieu of direct testimonies and
the preferred use of depositions whenever practicable and convenient.
As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, created under laws which authorize summary
proceedings, decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are
not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. 59 In fact, the hearings before such agencies do not connote
full adversarial proceedings.60 Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be
cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.61 In Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran,
Jr.,62 this Court stated that:
[I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is
sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is
needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due process, what is required, among other things, is that every litigant be
given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor. 63
III. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act since
said provisions were reenacted in the new law.
The Securities Regulations Code absolutely repealed the Revised Securities Act. While the absolute repeal of a law
generally deprives a court of its authority to penalize the person charged with the violation of the old law prior to its
appeal, an exception to this rule comes about when the repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the
old law. The Court, in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, sets down the rules in such instances:64
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving the court of its authority to punish a
person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal
law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the
offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are, however,
exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the
repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the
former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act
committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not
affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused. (Emphasis
provided.)
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the respondents despite the repeal, since Sections
8, 65 12,66 26,67 2768 and 2369 of the Securities Regulations Code impose duties that are substantially similar to
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the repealed Revised Securities Act.
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which previously provided for the registration of securities and the information
that needs to be included in the registration statements, was expanded under Section 12, in connection with Section 8
of the Securities Regulations Code. Further details of the information required to be disclosed by the registrant are
explained in the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulations Code, issued on 30
December 2003, particularly Sections 8 and 12 thereof.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been reenacted as Section 27 of the Securities Regulations Code, still
penalizing an insider's misuse of material and non-public information about the issuer, for the purpose of protecting
public investors. Section 26 of the Securities Regulations Code even widens the coverage of punishable acts, which
intend to defraud public investors through various devices, misinformation and omissions.
Section 23 of the Securities Regulations Code was practically lifted from Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act.
Both provisions impose upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2)
a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her
ownership of the issuer's securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof.
Clearly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the courts of their authority to punish a person charged with
violation of the old law that was repealed; in this case, the Revised Securities Act.
IV. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities Act, reenacted in the
Securities Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints for violations of rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary
investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers. 70 Additionally, the SEC may still impose
the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law. 71
In Morato v. Court of Appeals,72 the cases therein were still pending before the PED for investigation and the SEC for
resolution when the Securities Regulations Code was enacted. The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate
dispute, while the subject matter of the other case investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and
violations of pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of directors. The enactment of the Securities Regulations
Code did not result in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this Court ordered the transfer of one case to the proper
regional trial court and the SEC to continue with the investigation of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the SEC already commenced the investigative
proceedings against respondents as early as 1994. Respondents were called to appear before the SEC and explain
their failure to disclose pertinent information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already made
initial findings that respondents failed to make timely disclosures of their negotiations with GHB, ordered a special
investigating panel to hear the case. The investigative proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals, which became permanent by virtue of the Decision, dated 20 August 1998,
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of this case, the Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised
Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of its jurisdiction to continue
investigating the case; or the regional trial court, to hear any case which may later be filed against the respondents.
V. The instant case has not yet prescribed.
Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any criminal complaint that may be
filed against them resulting from the SEC's investigation of this case has already prescribed. 73 They point out that the
prescription period applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities
Act, is twelve years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Act."74 Since the offense was committed in 1994, they reasoned that prescription set
in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot. Such position, however, is incongruent with the factual
circumstances of this case, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period. 75 A preliminary
investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense has been committed, and whether there is probable
cause for the accused to have committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed or whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 76
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of
Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such investigations as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a
finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar duties as the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan, 77 this Court
enunciated that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the existence of probable cause,
before a preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case, the complaint filed directly
with the DOJ was dismissed on the ground that it should have been filed first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was
a violation of the Securities Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for criminal prosecution was reproduced from
Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act. 78 This Court affirmed the dismissal, which it explained thus:
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule
administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable
cause, then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural
requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first
be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the
SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be
filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ
for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his
criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in
dismissing petitioner's complaint.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation undertaken by the SEC, which is a requisite before a
criminal case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court declared that it is imperative that the criminal prosecution be
initiated before the SEC, the administrative agency with the special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings against the respondents as early as 1994. This
investigation effectively interrupted the prescription period. However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal,
civil, or administrative case against the respondents herein. 79 Thereafter, on 20 August 1998, the appellate court
issued the assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and
prohibiting the SEC from taking cognizance of and initiating any action against herein respondents. The SEC was
bound to comply with the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining it from continuing with the investigation of respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from
the injunctive writs would be sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes in defiance of such
orders will be considered void for having been taken against an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or judicial body would likewise be impossible pending the
injunctive writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan,80 the DOJ itself
could not have taken cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary investigation without a prior determination
of probable cause by the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was not enjoined by the Court of Appeals from
conducting a preliminary investigation, any preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile
effort since the SEC had only started with its investigation when respondents themselves applied for and were granted
an injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary investigation or filed a criminal case against the
respondents during the time that issues on the effectivity of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and
the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure were still pending before the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals
declared the aforementioned statutory and regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no civil, criminal or administrative
case may be filed against the respondents for violations thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there was no
statutory provision which respondents could be accused of violating.
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 20
August 1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any kind of investigation against the respondents for
violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed
interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable cause in accordance with the
doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.81 In this case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary
investigation since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its investigation. Such a situation
leaves the prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation
against the respondents, who, in the first place, sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC
could do in order to break the impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had done at
the earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during which the SEC was prevented from continuing with
its investigation should not be counted against it. The law on the prescription period was never intended to put the
prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed way beyond their control;
for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still be barred from investigating and prosecuting
the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused.
In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses
punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a
complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a finding of probable
cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that was
commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively
interrupted the prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would surely
interrupt the prescription period.
VI. The Court of Appeals was justified in denying SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders
dated 23 October 1995.
The SEC avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied its Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders,
dated 23 October 1995, in the light of its admission that the PED had the sole authority to investigate the present
case. On this matter, this Court cannot agree with the SEC.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals denied the SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders,
since it found other issues that were more important than whether or not the PED was the proper body to investigate
the matter. Its refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed
against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations. Moreover, the validity of the PED Rules on Practice and Procedure was also
raised as an issue. The Court of Appeals, thus, reasoned that if the quashal of the orders was granted, then it would
be deprived of the opportunity to determine the validity of the aforementioned rules and statutory provisions. In
addition, the SEC would merely pursue the same case without the Court of Appeals having determined whether or not
it may do so in accordance with due process requirements. Absent a determination of whether the SEC may file a
case against the respondents based on the assailed provisions of the Revised Securities Act, it would have been
improper for the Court of Appeals to grant the SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders.
In all, this Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to render effective Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act; nor was the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure invalid, prior to the enactment of the Securities
Regulations Code, for failure to provide parties with the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented against them.
Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper rules of procedure of the
Securities Regulations Code for violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. 82
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 20 August 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the permanent
injunction issued pursuant thereto. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents for
violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be undertaken by the proper authorities in
accordance with the Securities Regulations Code. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. vs. HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO
CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision promulgated on February 20, 2003, 1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in
Oroquieta City ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries charged against him. 2
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz
(Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz was
attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost to
spare him the pain. With the parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after
his appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles
were swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter,
but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital
over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess formation between the base and the
shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner referred him
to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy,
and thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge
against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the
information3 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to which the latter pleaded not
guilty on May 22, 1998.4 Under the order of April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme
Court Circular No. 11-99.5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as
the physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had
been diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma that had necessitated the
conduct of two operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that the injury to
the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused the
injury.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January
16, 1995, he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that
had required immediate surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his
parents’ consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents’ claim that their child had been
cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no
complications when Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the abscess formation
between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
6
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999, the RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of
the evidence. It held that the Prosecution’s evidence did not show the required standard of care to be observed by
other members of the medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner
was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the
injurious trauma from his circumcision by the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion
Lumantas, of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Ruling of the CA
7
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had
been acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily mean that he had not incurred civil liability
considering that the Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the
circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on April 28, 2004. 8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of an
accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 10the
Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on
the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.1âwphi1 First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This
is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist."11
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being
rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for
the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of
based on mere preponderance of evidence.12 In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency
of the evidence did not require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a
separate civil action for that purpose.13
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no proof of his negligence
deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did
not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. 14With
the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the
occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur
with their uniform findings. In that regard, the Court need not analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the
factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a clear showing by the petitioner that such
findings were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body.1âwphi1 Although we have long advocated the view that
any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss,
and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed once that integrity has been
violated. The assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of one’s body. The usual practice is to award
moral damages for the physical injuries sustained.15 In Hanz’s case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision
performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair
his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded
as moral damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the
award as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but just and
commensurate. Unless we make the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing legal interest on the award,
his sufferings would be unduly compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should be from the filing of the
criminal information on April 17, 1997, the making of the judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 20, 2003, with the modification that legal
interest of 6% per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award of:₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA vs. MARLA OLIVA

G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L.
Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information 4 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in
connection with the death5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina
Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the
Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. 6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive
medical attention,she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal
case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle. 7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the
incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover
and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the
testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s
death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina
Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the
incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the
incident.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) 9 asserting, inter alia, that
he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and
that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired. 10
The MeTC Ruling
11
In an Order dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya’s
demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the
crime imputed upon him.12 Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually, the MeTC found
that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver
of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not identify
Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez,
while he did investigate the incident, likewise declared thathe did not witness the same. 13
Marla moved for reconsideration,14 which the MeTC denied in an Order15 dated November 4, 2010, clarifying that the
grant of Daluraya’s demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya’s
demurrer would violate the latter’s right against double jeopardy. 16 With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the
MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that
Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise. 17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed18 to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting that the MeTC
failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, 19 which finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the
criminal aspect of the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s ruling,declaring that
"the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist." 21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration22 which, although filed beyond the reglementary period, was nonetheless
accepted. However, the RTC found the same without merit and thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of the
MeTC in its Order23 dated May 10, 2012. Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review,
maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to
pay Marla the amounts of ₱152,547.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.25 In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC’s Order showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from
civil liability.26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support its finding that Daluraya must be held civilly
liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the subject vehicle
which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from Serrano’s testimony that the woman he saw crossing the street
who was hit by a Nissan Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died, are one and the
same; (c) the Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying
Daluraya as the suspectin the case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death of Marina
Oliva, and stating that he brought the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for treatment but was declared dead
on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was registered in the name of Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria Zilmar, 27 who authorized
him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC. 28
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration,29 which the CA denied in a Resolution30 dated November 22, 2013,hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly
liable for Marina Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged,
however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. 31 In Manantan v. CA,32 the Court expounded on the two kinds
of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated inRule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. 33
In Dayap v. Sendiong,34 the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case.1âwphi1The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delictmay be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence
on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence
both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.
What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting
the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35
(Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." 36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Daluraya’s acquittal was
based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is
clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against
him."37 Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated
and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan
Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva"38 and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the
accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva." 39
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya’s
acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo
for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil aspect.1âwphi1 Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was
based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of
the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his
civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 22,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 8,2011 and the Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the
team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an
imperforate anus.1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald
underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal
wall,3 enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. 4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation.5Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr.
Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). 6 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, 7 and went into
a coma.8His coma lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a month.10 He could no longer see,
hear or move.11
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending
physicians.12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum,13alleging: –
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then an anesthesiologist at
the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer the anesthesia on three-year old baby
boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with
an imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through operation], did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of his
judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia
administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications,
causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a
cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the
brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or
hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997), 15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.
01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10)
DAYS of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita
So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability, 18 the RTC excluded them from
solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount
of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled. 19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, 20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major operation. As noted by the OSG,
the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure that the child could withstand the
surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he
was suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the
nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident to a failure in the
proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs.
Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584 –
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof
of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due
care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without
need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed
because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the injury sustained, and in line
with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court the respect they deserve in the
absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the case.
People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a presumption of
negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward with his
own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. 22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL
COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO,
THERE IS A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT
THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON
 THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC
AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE
(1%) PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE.
THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE
WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD
IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur
means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."24 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the
very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged
with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience
or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or
a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not
meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach
of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively
explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court said –
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied
when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of
negligence as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a
question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of
law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a
negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill
and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable
degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may
be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the
patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while
under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish
the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the
body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the
area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while
a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was
under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.
The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The
real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event
outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in
such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent
cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the
accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. 29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be
conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and
the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during
the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz
delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the
imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he
experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the
insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians,
including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the
course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to
administer atropine to the patient.30
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v. Brigham, 31 relevant portions of the
decision therein being as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and some breathing difficulty. Early in the
morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of
the patient's air passage revealed that it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone
call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be
administered and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a second time
to advise the doctor that the patient was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be administered, and he
departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the physician who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to
revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia,
as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air passage had been adequate to
maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
xxxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis dies of
asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself
prove that the injury was probably caused by someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d
909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d
737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case – Res Ipsa Loquitur § 24:10 (1972). The evidence
presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute
closing of the patient’s air passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under
these circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There was no palpably
negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected without
negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines whether the CA correctly
affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 32Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act.33
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of
anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA
observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and conclusions in his report
except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted
to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared
that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it should have been 100%
oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record – A portion of the chart in the record was marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate
the administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract – A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B –
Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient was noted to have bradycardia (CR = 70)
and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent
was shut off, and the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was given.
However, the patient did not respond until no cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were
immediately told to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage – still with no
cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45 secs, patient’s vital signs
returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then told to
proceed to the closure and the child’s vital signs throughout and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70;
CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22 cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and
another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another, he read it as 100% halothane.
He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly
note I can’t understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent
used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a
nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the operation
began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100%
oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was
the pure oxygen introduced after something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut
off.
The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used before bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr.
Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance that he gave his patient the
utmost medical care, never leaving the operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but
leaving behind the other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he
administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the
record should be enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things that
happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during
the operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidum’s interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so
to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of halothane used in the operation is one
percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions – the concentration of halothane as
reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) – The numbers
indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the
patient Gerard Gercayo for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one
percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
xxxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-face of Dr. Vertido on the
question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate the non-guilt of the
anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless
unaware of the implications of the change in his testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described the
condition of the child as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT Scan.
All the symptoms attributed to a failing central nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in
heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why
would there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court, whether
oxygen or halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable, and they can
only be led to one conclusion – if the application of anesthesia was really closely monitored, the event could not have
happened.34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the
circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of
precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v.
Court of Appeals35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated
that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct
in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a
causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc.,
where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this
Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.’"
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by
competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as
created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by
his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of
care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or
omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. 36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly
referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear
definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are
highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge
necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be
determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the
standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar
specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the general
practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice
may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician’s own knowledge either. In
attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The
judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical
experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to
the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of
the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint
against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the investigation. 39 Even
then, the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum, 40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a pull-thru operation and was
administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was
manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The
anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to
block it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt
resuscitative measures were administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5)
minutes and that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest,
patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the
same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any
fault or negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, was also presented as a
Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results of the physical examination he had conducted on
Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and in this case, halothane
was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
xxxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and 45 minutes after the
operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a doctor, would you be able to tell
this Honorable Court as to what cause of the slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time because is some
reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, we’re talking about possibility
here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart rate, now what is the
immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex
in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck, when you press that, you produce
the slowing of the heart rate that produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the supply of oxygen by the patient,
would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen
level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia but a … to counter act the
Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
(sic).
xxxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications probably were contributory to the production of hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of the anesthesia record and the
factors that could have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz:
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this Honorable court your last
paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be contributory to the production of
Hypoxia and - - - -"
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you kindly look at this and tell me
where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to
this Honorable Court and even to this representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you just call me and even the
attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.
WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA I’m asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100 figures, tell me, yes or no?
WITNESS I’m trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily, because this is just a
xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the
patient is 1% only so may we request that this portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record
as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1% Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many factors that contributed to
Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to what you call hypoxia and
according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might lead to this Hypoxia at the time
of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be due to operations being
conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being done might also contribute to that hypoxia is that
correct?
A That is a possibility also.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a possibility that this Gerald might
[be] exposed to some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald’s operation for his imperforate anus,
considered a major operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same condition. 43 He then corrected his
earlier finding that 100% halothane had been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen. 44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered
to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." 45However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the
probability that other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to
the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr.
Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a
reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey: 47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered
merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting
a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to
that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not
proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability.1âwphi1 But
we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not
present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There
was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the
bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the
cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent
evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum.
The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal
action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. 48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could
have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious
fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the
product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it
important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person
can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule
would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions
for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The
term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and
capital, and is engaged in industry. 49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in
industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. 50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng
Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting
in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a
consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee
(which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FELICIANO GALVANTE vs. HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1
FEDERICO BALOLOT
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the October 30, 2003
Resolution1 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices - Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal complaint, docketed as OMB-P-
C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante2 (petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie
Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal search
and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order 3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private respondents
confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine
super .38 live ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated
September 2, 1999.5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information 6 for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case,
docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS),
Region XIII, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG); 7 and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-
0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. 8
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated how, on May 14, 2001, private
respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon after having lunch
for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire
about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin
Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately
went down of the jeep but before I could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP
both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico
Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all
pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the release of the safety lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG"
which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no
firearm," showing my waistline when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and showed their waistline
when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them
to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former
police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner
type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and asked me of the MR of
the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the
asked [sic] document;
8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying anything bringing with them the
firearm;
 9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station where I saw a person
in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I asked the police officers including those who
searched my jeep to apprehend him also;
10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the armed civilian person so
I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when
already inside his office, the disarming was done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by Police Chief Rocacorba and
was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of Illegal Search, Grave
Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil
Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran. 9
Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and Percival Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he interposed the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector
Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-
Affidavit;11 and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even though he was not armed with a warrant, he
searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in plain view, was committing a violation of Comelec Resolutions No.
3258 and No. 3328 by carrying a firearm in his person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit dated March 25, 2002, which
contradicts the statements of private respondent Conde, viz:
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated among other things, that
"we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on his waist;"
2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said handgun was taken by
SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from
the jeep of Mr. Galvante after searching the same; and
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28, 2001 after we have
already affixed our signatures thereon.13
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with both the IAS and Ombudsman,
absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde
alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. 14
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, finding all private
respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with suspension only. The IAS noted however that private
respondents were merely being "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 15
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and to Hold
in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of Arrest. 16 The RTC granted the same in an Order17 dated August
17, 2001. Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss" dated
November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the
policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same
intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his property." 18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano
Pag-ong approved said recommendation.19
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order 20 dated January 16, 2003.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer
Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for any of the offenses charged
against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the complaint, it appearing from the
records that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an
affidavit of desistance by the complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt,
especially so since it merely exculpated some but not all of the respondents. These circumstances, coupled
with the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, negates any criminal liability on the part of the
respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the above-captioned case be dismissed
for lack of probable cause.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military Orlando C.
Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved the October 30, 2003 Resolution. 22
In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the
Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the
warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal,24 which are contradicted by the October 30, 2003
Ombudsman Resolution declaring the warrantless search legal.
The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the latter offered "no new evidence
or errors of law which would warrant the reversal or modification" 25 of its October 30, 2003 Resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor
Garcia (public respondents) the following acts of grave abuse of discretion:
I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public
respondents found that the incident upon which petitioner's criminal complaint was based stemmed from a
valid warrantless arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the fact that:
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private respondents was made
without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of the instances of valid warrantless searches.
B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was arrested and detained by the private
respondents.
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order dated January 20, 2004, public respondents
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. 26
In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public respondents acted within the bounds of
their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching
petitioner and confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of enforcing the law against
illegal possession of firearms and the Comelec ban against the carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for himself.29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran,
Rufano and Balolot filed their separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004. 30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 31 The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or
through the Deputy Ombudsman,32 except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act in contemplation of law as when judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private respondents with
warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a
criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC
punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained. - In addition
to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause,
or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the
same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall
search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his
family, or in their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused
private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation,
while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, 35 under Article 32, in relation
to Article 221936 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:
 Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975. 37
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for damages with the regular
courts38 or an administrative case with the PNP/DILG,39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007,
and not a criminal action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman
against private respondents was therefore proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the
complaint are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by
private respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity
of his complaint.40 Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable
by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the
dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court
need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for
that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a
criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the
offender detained the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. 41 The second element was not
alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment 42 and
Memorandum,43 petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused
his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in
any other way involved in it.44 There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary
detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed out that the same is based
merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him. 45 Such bare allegation
stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official function. 46 The IAS itself observed that private respondents may have
been carried away by their "enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 47 Petitioner expressed the same
view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private respondents may have been merely following orders
when they pointed their long firearms at him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against
private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL" vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.
Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged with the crime of
Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 4 The Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL Alias "TAPOL" of
the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:
That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay Greenhills, Municipality
of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a
Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, armed with garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper
judicial order, entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of
the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and then mauled one
of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty. 6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989
inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not
armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him,
striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his
airgun. Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and corroborated
his testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President Roxas Police Station
who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he
affirmed the medical certificate that he issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side
of the nose, back portion of the body at the level of the hip region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular
region as well as abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region. 7 Dr. Cabrera
opined that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days. 8 For the defense, petitioners denied the crime
charged, declaring in unison that they were in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They
alleged, however, that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other
barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen carabao owned
by a certain Francisco Pongasi9 from three unidentified persons who managed to escape.
On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious
Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC.
It held:
The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime; on the issue of
whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were named CVO’s and the other as a
barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such an
admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and
convincing evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a
doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favorof the
accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of
moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; x x x.10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial
court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be convictedfor Less Serious Physical
Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they
were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case
of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on hand, the appealed
decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to an
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day
of prision [correccional] minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a professionor calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is double jeopardy since
the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being now final and executory, is res
judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious
Physical Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their
constitutional right to due process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.
We deny.
An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the
parties.12 When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she waives the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. 13 An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to
examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.14 The appellate court may, and generally does,look into the entire records to ensure that no
fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. 15
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are
deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on doublejeopardy since it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed
twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as
charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the open court as well
as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that
they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public officers/employees. 16
As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall
be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6]
years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime
be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of
Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence Law 17 requires courts
to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code.1âwphi1 Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods
of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:
Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3 years, 6 months and 21
days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there
are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC
for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby sentences the
petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso
Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY
ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL
CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his
capacity as the Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO)
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the above-
named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and
the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP,
with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the
government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP –
mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare Group – entered the premises
of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and
planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances
against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the
illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire
more military assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-
in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her
cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed
by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then
taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of
that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to
persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the
Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel
involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of
the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then
AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the
AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
d’etat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61,
presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678,
involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B.
Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under
Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a)
violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of
Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article
96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC,
Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the
military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial
with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31
(petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the
RTC an Amended Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup
d’etat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation
Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etatbefore
the RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before the court martial against
the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of
the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate
General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court
the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense
for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-
connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by
the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law
provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners
is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction
of the court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the offense
charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their
original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of
Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July
27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable
circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of
the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25,
2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of
July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused
could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have
already been arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court
martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges that
"contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords
show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor
Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July
13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to
refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood
as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these
articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine
Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active
duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to
duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey
the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including members
of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused,
victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except
when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the
offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice,
order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that members
of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal
laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e.,
where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending
soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of
the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited
to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these
specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court
martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system
over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature,
aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military
law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of
the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time
immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its
administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become
invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline
both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-
constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among
others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously
disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor
and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW
96 of the Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying
cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall
be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly
provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
"service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service
– imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse
the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February
11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat,"
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly
vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the
court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or
officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional
amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely
to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion
of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-
connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration
was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as
the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth quoting,
thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of
‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike
here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over
both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses,
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to
civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected
to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment by asking
a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a
restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is
allowed, military discipline will collapse.
xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75
Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of
the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex
of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article
50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release a
military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable
procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on
the ground that the offense charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil
courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in
Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we
cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were
actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our
power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues
affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed
facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging
petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO
"REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES
"NONONG NONOY ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large, TITING GALI BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO
large, TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a. "NEGRO MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA
CRUZ," Accused, vs. EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE LB
RANDO ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG ITCOBANES," and
CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ,"
G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo (Rey),
Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz (Bulldog) seek liberty from the
judgment1 of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, which found them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime ofMurder with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No. 05-238607.
The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy), 2 Titing Booc
(Titing),3 and Gali Itcobanes (Gali),4 and Orlando Tagalog Materdam (Negro)5 were all charged in an Information dated
July 30, 2004 that reads:
That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary School, 6 Brgy. Villa
Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being the District Supervisor of public
schools, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death. 7
On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information, 8 which provides:
That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of Masbate, the above-named accused EX-
MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously induce their co-accused, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO AL[I]AS "EDEL ESTONILO[,] "
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS "NONONG ITCOBANES[,] " NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI
ITCOBANES, ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM[,]" [and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ
AL[I]AS "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]" who wereall armed with firearms, to attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public
schools, by then and there shooting the latter, hitting said FLORO A. CASAS on the differentparts of his body which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. 9 When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which
stated, among others:
a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:
1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;
2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the Honorable Supreme Court asto the
transfer of venue;
3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;
4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a District Supervisor of the Department
of Education.
b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit that Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr.
and Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene ofthe incident during the incident. 10
The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victim’s wife; Felix Q. Casas (Felix), the
victim’s son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health Officer, Placer, Masbate; Senior Police
Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan), Placer Police Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo (Serapion), employee of
Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of Placer, Masbate; Diego
L.Casas (Diego), cousin of the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda), a resident of Placer, Masbate; and
Servando P. Rosales (Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. 11 The testimonies of the foregoing
witnesses consisted of the following:
Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down, he was with the
latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that they were working on the
closing ceremonies to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro and told him that Mayor
Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they
saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation of 7th Day
Adventist that contained the names of the governor, the congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero
(Cotero), as guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his father why Cotero’s picture was so big while Mayor Carlos,
Sr.’s name was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied that he cannot help it because Cotero paid for the
program; that the answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said "you are now
for Cotero but you’re only Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the voucher. This is up to now thatyou will be
the supervisor of Celera"; that Floro responded "when are you a superintendent when you don’t have any scholastic
standing. Just look if I will still vote for your son"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "let’s see if you can still vote"; and that
the following day, Floro was shot to death.12
But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon invitation of Nonoy, he joined
the latter’s group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they talked about the death of one Titing Villester; that
Nonoy told Felix that "brod, do not be afraid, because others are supposed to be afraid [of] us because they believe
that we were the ones who killed Titing Villester" that afterwards Felix and the group were fetched at the videoke bar
by Edel, a messenger of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to the house of one Bobong Baldecir (a nephew of
Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in Daraga; that uponarriving thereat, Rey uttered "it’s good that Dodong (Felix’s nickname) is with
you; that Nonoy then said "who would not [be] otherwise, his father would be the next victim after Titing
Villester";13 that Rey then turned to Felix and said, "it’s very important that your father is with us because a District
Supervisor has a big [role] in the Comelec’s choice for those teachers who would become members of the Board of
Election Inspectors"; that Felix clarified that Rey was then the 2004 mayoralty candidate for Placer, Masbate; and that
Felix went along with him since he was in Daraga, the bailiwick of the Estonilos. 14
On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on why it took him a long
time to execute an affidavit relative to his father’s killing. Felix explained that he went to Cebu to stay away from
Placer, which isunder the Estonilo’s jurisdiction.15 The defense confronted Felix of a criminal case against him for
illegal use of prohibited drugs, for which he was out on bail. 16
On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco yPedrano and SPO4 Restituto
Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation offacts relative to their testimonies.
[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco’s testimony:]
1. That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is expert in medicine;
2. That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead body of Floro Casas
yBaronda on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;
3. That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post Mortem Examination Report, marked as
Exhibit "F," the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, marked as Exhibit "F-1";
4. That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit "G" and the Sketch of a Human Body,
marked as Exhibit "H";
5. The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-Mortem Examination
Report; and
6. In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three slugs: the 1 st slug was
marked as Exhibit "I," the fragmented slug as Exhibit "I-1," and the metallic object consisting of two pieces of
Exhibit "I-2."
[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.’s testimony:]
1. That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate Police Station relativeto
the shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary School. Said Police Blotter was
requested to be marked by the prosecution as Exhibit "J";
2. That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the blotter written on the
Blotter Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit "J-1" and the signature of Sr. Police
Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit "J-1-a";
3. The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number 325. Said Police Blotter
book page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. "K" and the bracketed portion thereof as Exh. "K-1." 17
According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the sizes of
the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The counsel for the accused waived his cross
examination.18
Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela
Pisa on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5, 2004, he heard gunshots coming from
inside the compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or less six persons coming out of the
school; that he was able to identify three of themas present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he saw
the six men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey
came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. "mission
accomplished, sir"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did using two
motorbikes towards the direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the
direction of Daraga.19
During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the fact thathe has a
pending criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on bail. 20 Antipolo testified that on April 5, 2004, he
was riding his motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera Elementary School when he heard gunshots and
someone shouted that Floro was shot; that he stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to the gate, and saw four
persons holding short firearms; that he identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about seven times;
that he identifiedEdel and Nonong as the two other gun holders; that at that moment, Gali shouted "sir, that’s enough,
escape!"; that Gali was accompanied by someone named Ace, Titing and Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for
them to escape, all of them hurriedly left the school compound; that he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s pick-up vehicle arrive
soon thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the proceedings; that he
heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "leave it because it’s already dead"; and that afterwards, the police officers arrived. 21
In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case against him for homicide
of one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that happened on October 30, 2005. 22
Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances surrounding the killing
and its discovery, their family background, her husband’s line of work, how she felt on their loss, and the expenses
relative to his killing. She testified that she heard there were people who were jealous of Floro’s position because he
could bring voters to his side during election time;that Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated medals for the
2003-2004 closing ceremony of the entire district of public schools; that during the closing ceremony, the donor’s
name was announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.; 23 that when Floro was processing a voucher worth
₱70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the same and even threw the voucher on the floor saying "let this be
signed by Vicente Cotero"; and that Floro’s cousin, Diego Casas, helped Floro secure the Mayor’s signature by
ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was for him, and only then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher. 24
Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsa’s testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s
signature on the voucher.25
Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told her thathe would
kill her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus, she went to the Placer Police Station and
reported the incident; that she went to see her husband, who was then campaigning for mayoralty candidateCotero,
and informed him of what happened; and that she went to Elsa’shouse and informed the latter of the threat. 26
Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor Carlos,Sr. together with said
Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias "S" [Ace], Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he
witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas"; that Servando later learned thatthe mayor’s men were
unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was no longer in Barangay Taberna, where they intended to execute the
mayor’s order;and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary School on April
4, 2004.27
During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latter’s Affidavit of Retraction, which he executed
on June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang Salaysaytaken on May 30, 2004 at the
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate
City relative to the criminal complaint for direct assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company.
He was also asked about two criminal charges filed against him in Cebu relative toviolation of Republic Act No. 9165,
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.28 On re-direct examination, Servando narrated that Mayor
Carlos, Sr.’s nephew, Bobong Baldecir, fetched him from his house and he was brought to the house of Mayor Carlos,
Sr. in Daraga; that from there, he was brought to Atty. Besario in Cebu; that Atty. Besario informed him about the
Affidavit of Retraction that he was supposed to sign, which he did not understand as it was written in English; and that
he clarified that the contents of the affidavit was not his but those of Bobong. 29
The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D. Calipay (Quirino),
and the five accused-appellants.
Jesus denied Servando’s allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction. Jesus narrated that
Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that upon their meeting, Servando told him that
he wanted to retract his sworn statement because Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company did nothing wrong; that Jesus,
Servando and Servando’s wife went to Cebu to meet Atty. Besario; that while traveling, Servando told him that was
evading the men of Governor Go, Vicente Cotero and Casas because he feared for his life; that during the meeting
Atty. Besario prepared the affidavit and translated it to Cebuano dialect; that afterwards, Jesus, Servando and
Servando’s wife went to the Capitol so that Servando could sign it before the prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario,
Servado and his wife, and Dante Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor Carlos) went to Manila to meet with the media;
that the media asked Servando whether he was forced to sign, or was given money or reward to sign the affidavit of
retraction, Servando replied in the negative; and that the purpose of the press meeting was to present Servando and
show that he was not kidnapped.30
But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ishis
uncle; that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the kidnapping of Servando; and that it was Dante (Dante)
Estonilo who arranged for the meeting with the media, and who served as Servando’s and his wife’s companion, while
he was with Atty. Besario.31 During his turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that in the early evening of
April 5, 2004 hewas in a house near the Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party; that while thereat, he
heard successive gunshots and went out to ridehis vehicle so he could check the source of the gunshots; that when
he reached the school gate someone informed him that Floro was gunned down; that he did not see the victim
because according to the people it was boarded in a jeep and brought to the hospital; and that he and his son, Rey,
confirmed that they were at the school minutes after the incident. 32
During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he learned that he and his son
were suspects in Floro’s killing five months after the incident; that he confirmed that Rey and Calvin dela Cruz were
with him while inquiring about the shooting at the school; and that he denied having met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing
Rosalinda after April 5, 2004, or that Servando was his bodyguard. 33
Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house and was planning
tocampaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to said barangay, he passed by Celera
Elementary School and noticed his father’s vehicle, and that there were several people thereat; that he stopped and
stayed in the school for a few minutes, and then proceeded to meet his candidates for counselors at Ranio’s house;
and that afterwards, they all went to Barangay Matagantang. 34
On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated because his opponents
could not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor. 35
Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at their house located in
front of Celera Elementary School’s guardhouse, when they heard gunshots; that they immediately laid down, while
Quirino ran across the road and took cover at the school fence; that he peeped through the fence and saw three
persons firing a gun; that he could not identify them or their victim because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to 20
seconds, hewent back home; that a certain Joel Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him to go with them
inside the school, once inside the school, they saw Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go to the police
headquarters located five minutes away; and that when he and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at the school, he
noticed Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near the gate.36
For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged in a drinking
spree in Nining Berdida’s house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that he stayed in her place until 11:00 p.m. 37
During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his uncle and Rey is
his second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s bodyguard, but admitted that he handled the latter’s fighting
cocks; and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away from the poblacionof Placer. 38
Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called him to go to Ranio’s
house in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera Elementary School and saw that there were
plenty of people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that their group stopped to inquire about what happened, and
learned that Floro was gunned down; and that he and his group stayed for about five minutes and left. 39
Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his wife
attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they went to the school to check on what
happened and learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay long and went home to Daraga. 40
During cross examination, he deniedthat he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he was merely
accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to work. 41
After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of its
March 30, 2009 Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR
REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES alias
"NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all of the
Revised Penal Code and each of said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty
(20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the accused are all hereby
ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00). Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said accused are furthermore ordered to solidarily pay the said
family the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).
The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they have been denied.
Let this case be archivedas against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and GALIITCOBANES who
have warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large, pending their arrest/s.
As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM," separate trial isnecessary
considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to the other accused was already about to
end.42
The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of Serapion, who were
both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC pronounced that the evidence on record
showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the killing of Floro. Accused-
appellants Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as backup
gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts. 43
The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused to kill Floro based on
the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-
Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey conspired with his father. In sum, the
prosecution was able to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation among all the accused-appellants. 44
The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification of the prosecution
witnesses. The accused appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in Placer, Masbate when the shooting
took place. However, they were not able to establish the physical improbability of their being in the crime scene at the
time of the shooting. The RTC was convinced thatthe motive for the murder was due to Floro’s support for mayoral
candidate Vicente Cotero. Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the RTC convicted the accused
appellants of the complex crime of murder with direct assault. 45
All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC erred
in concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution evidence and disregarding the salient
points of the defense evidence, and in convicting the accused. 46
In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. 47 The dispositive part
thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30 March 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with modificationin that the penalty imposed upon
accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties and that the award of civil
indemnity is increased to Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00). 48
The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC considering that the RTC had
observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The
Court of Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained that reclusion perpetuais an indivisible penalty which
should be imposed without specifying the duration.
On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration, 49 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
November 8, 2011 Resolution.50 Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants appealed their case before this Court. 51
This Court’s Ruling
The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the following
assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving credence and weight to the prosecution
evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants, and (3) finding the accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the prosecution evidence.
In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for murder
with direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial
evidence, and that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants for murder with
direct assault.
The age-old rule is that the task ofassigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the witness stand and weighing
their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies before it. It is,
thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of
respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 52
This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial and the appellate
courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of this case. The trial
court and the appellate court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly
of Antipolo who was an eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly detract from his
credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as those who fired at Floro about seven
times, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms. He also witnessed
accused Gali shouting to the gunmen to stop and escape. He narrated that after all the accused left, Mayor Carlos,
Sr., Rey and Materdam arrived aboard the mayor’s vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said "leave it because it’s
already dead." From his direct and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: 53 (1) that a person was
killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 54
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel,
Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as
treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The Court finds that the
prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point to the
accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floro’s support for Vicente Cotero,
who was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the prosecution was able to establish
that the accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was
present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.’shouse when they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say
"ipatumba si Floro Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by
another witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he
heard the gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them said "mission accomplished sir," after which,
Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The testimony of
the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference.55 It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. 56 Here, the circumstantial evidence consists
of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill
Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness account as well as
Serapion’s testimony.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he was present
on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning tokill Floro. His categorical and straight forward
narration proves the existence of evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro
successively fired at Floro about seven times – and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been
inflicted at close range giving the latter no chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected
onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms to insure the success of
their "mission" without risk to themselves; and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their
collective acts point to a clear case of treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the positive identification
made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic
that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. 57 The accused-appellants’ alibis that they were at different
places at the time of the shooting are negative and self-serving and cannot be given more evidentiary value vis-à-vis
the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses. The accused-appellants, the victim, and the prosecution witnesses
reside in the same municipality and are, therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that the two principal accused in
this case are prominent political figures. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could not havebeen mistaken on the
accused appellants’ identity including those who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of
access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present atthe crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.58 Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were near
the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place. Certainly, the distance was not too
far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away from where they
were supposed to be, unnoticed.
 Penalties
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should be held accountable
for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad
o sus agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault,
the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a
person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that
the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate, thus, was a person
in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct assault just because Floro was a person in
authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro
was, in reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arisesthe complex
crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been death. Plus the
fact that there exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the
proper penalty is death. But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
properly imposed upon accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Proper Indemnities
As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made herein.1âwphi1 The
award of ₱100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper to conform with current jurisprudence. 59
Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 223060 of the New Civil Code. Thus, conformably with the above, the
legal heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary damages 61 in the amount of ₱100,000.00.
Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn
from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 62
At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison informed this
Court of the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In view thereof, the case against
deceased Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04142, affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, in
Criminal Case No. 05-238607, finding accused appellants REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO "EDEL"
ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO "NONONG" ITCOBANES, and CAL VIN "BULLDOG" DELA CRUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder with Direct Assault, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages is increased to ₱100,000.00 each, in addition to ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and the imposition of 6% thereon as legal interest upon finality of this Court's Decision.
SO ORDERED.
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011 Decision 1and
July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. The assailed issuances affirmed the
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn,
affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty of
drunk driving and resisting arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136 5 and
another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 6 were filed against petitioner Sydeco with the
MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated
informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the
second, respectively read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and owner
of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor.
Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act
4136.
Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict
Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and
while in the actual performance of their official duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and
pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation of Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be governed by, the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of SPO4
Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos Santos,9 plus the documents each identified
while in the witness box, among which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 10executed by
SPO2 Bodino and two other police officers. The defense’s witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself,
his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the CA decision now on
appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another officer
were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about
twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was
behind the wheel. The team members, all inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom
the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,before he resumes driving. 11 Petitioner, who the
policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised
voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo,
bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had seen him
swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who put up resistance. Despite
petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to
the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate
issuedby that hospital, marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for
disposition.12 Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question, adding in this regard that
he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al.
In his Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early morning
of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in his
restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when signaled
to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle
and its occupants, the policemen then asked the petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle
search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle
window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp.
Aguilar, as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in the
trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his
restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his head,
at the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi." The officers then
pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked
his companions to call up his wife. The policemen then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they
succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as
positive of alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was conducted.
He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his
release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate
indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his
Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place the erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate
his driver’s license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN; and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos
(₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this case, stating further
the data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1) according credit to the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented to
testify thereon instead of the issuing physician, and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP
Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court
to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the first issue
thus raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to petitioner’s alcoholic breath,
as indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony on
the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting thatunder the Rules of Court, 17 observations of the police officers regarding the
petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state on the day he was
apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how many witnesses it
needs to present before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single credible witness as to the guilt of the accused
being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established jurisprudence 19 enunciating the rule that
preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered."
Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review, the
recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a Decision dated December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a
Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the RTC, Manila, Branch
12, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers;
and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey Balucating, in the absence of
his testimony before the Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does hold sway
when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal prosecutions
throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence. 21`
Peace officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties with
prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs. 22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period material appearednot to
have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They
spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not
demand the presentation of the driver’s license orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as
required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant
thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and issue a receipt
prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period
not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt
shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.) Instead of requiring the vehicle’s
occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists’ right of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al.
engaged petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made doubtless
not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of
beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then petitioner went on with
his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed the police officers off no end as one of them immediately
lashed at petitioner and his companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous
response to an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this particular event
in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming
mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang aking kasama kong
waitress na bumaba.
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG" pero iyon ayhindi nila
pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang ang isang pulis
ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril. x x x na matapos
suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya
ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang kanilang baril. 24
Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers themselves who admitted that
they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its occupants to a body search. The
officers wrote in their aforementioned joint affidavit:
xxxx
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving under the influence of
liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006
along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and converse with us rudely without considering that we
are in uniform, on duty and performing our job. P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and
driving under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting him to our police station in which our intention was to
make him rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added.)
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed
any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood,refers to a movement wherein
a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement. 25 The act may
become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature
ofreckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without
reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the
highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safetyor rights of
any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the consequences is required. 26 Nothing in the records indicate that the
area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around
3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and
property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket
for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and
his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the
cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the charged in for
Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the accused swerving, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"
xxxx
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on
one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search
juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as
resisting a lawful order.28 He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make
him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an
overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He
came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished
under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty
or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his
agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person
in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable
searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting
a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under
dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people
to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. 31 Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA
4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the
vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the
occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no
less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a
crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead
of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the
petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of
the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation aboutbeing physically hurt before being
brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three
(3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority granted
under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no
physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn
that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the
medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the
certificate. The trial court, in its decision, merely stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor who issued
it.1âwphi1Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the Prosecution to testify on the
said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the contents of the Medical
Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court finds that the observation of herein
private complainants as to the accused’s behavior and condition after the incident was sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding x x x x
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person Under
Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same." 32
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on
June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the
testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular
performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence
of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether a person
is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence of alcohol. The
legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of
2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), 33 a term defined under its Sec.
3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being
subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the
NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with
gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher
shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586,
petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not
been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold
level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, 34penal laws
shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified
Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner
could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed inculpatory
act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution 35 of November 21, 2006 found, on the
strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner
on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That
finding to be sure tends to indicate that the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled
out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time
incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr. Balucating, whomhe accused of
issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s
profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be
overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper
motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a legitimate
grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a harassment
criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason. 36 It is thus required that every circumstance favoring
one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual
procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcoholand executing an arrest,
the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct
of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio, 38 the presumption of regularity is merely just
that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the
absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the
police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken
driving and resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of the
milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the
guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of
the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
No pronouncement as to costs.