G.R. No. 132305 December 4, 2001
She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner,
vs.
NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated
March 4, 1997,1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which
reversed and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990, 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-41515,
finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a
parcel of land. 1âwphi1.nêt
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729,
located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose
had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and
Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property.3 On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in
favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of
the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of
Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the
certificate of title to said property.4
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said
property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them
by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother,
who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported
sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March 19795 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with
malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer
certificate of title (TCT No. 1723346) in petitioner's name alone.7
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed
showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents
averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put
his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name
in full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging
to his "poor and unschooled sisters who. ..sacrificed for his studies and
personal welfare."8 Respondents also pointed out that it is highly
improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of
P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was
unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the
alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and
questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January
26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale. 9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C.
Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not
to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be
the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property.
She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since
she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was
in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose
from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature.
She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged
respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to
claim portions thereof.
in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment
cases against her and other occupants of the property. The first was
decided in her and the other defendants' favor, while the second was
dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as
decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a
title in her name alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take steps
that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction for their
failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her
name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, decreeing
thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership and possession
each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the property originally covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago
and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the
name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No.
3075-A Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and
the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this
Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share
adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is
hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and
entitled to possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge
damages, attorney's fees and costs. Upon finality of this judgment,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered cancelled and a new
title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as
owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed
to effect the same upon payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for
the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed
constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be
entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter. The trial
court ruled that the following evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter
of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents
which stated that petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2) Jose's income tax
return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that
respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her being the daughter of
Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against
petitioner. According to the court, respondents were not candid with the
court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting
that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered
declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in
equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose
Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT No. 172334.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said title
and issue in its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the
birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida
was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into
account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did
not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for
consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to
prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the
petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had
adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago,
making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She
points out that respondents had, before the filing of the instant case,
previously "considered"11 her as the daughter of Jose who, during his
lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter. She asserts that
her identification as Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the "strange"
answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation
collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals12 in which we
held that "(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law."13 Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code
in support of this contention.14
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of
Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala
and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas.15 They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code
do not apply to the present case since this is not an action impugning a
child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and possession
of property .
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not
respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of
title and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's
1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through
succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil
Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil
Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case,
any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they
should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the
discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the
same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations
where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and
the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It
does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at
all of a particular couple.16
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However,
the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy.
Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. 17 Moreover, the
present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside
the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu
present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being
challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2)
the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and
Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel had already
been born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time
made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the couple. The
Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree of
adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct
proceeding.18
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but
are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth
certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)19 plainly states that... Ida was
the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This
document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the
Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said
Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she
is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate,
then where is hers? She did not present any though it would have been
the easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal
certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials
and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee
Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony
and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee's parents were
Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in
evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage
of the baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of the
baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal
sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing
more.20 (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel
admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is
Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.21
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship
with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal
certificate.22 However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of
Appeals :
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
declarations therein stated with respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same
is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the
Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not
prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the
certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized. 23
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation.24 More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.25
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her
birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor,
failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again,
of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We as explained by the Court of Appeals:
find petitioner's silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate
telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would
...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It
show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code.
Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the
Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been
presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to
made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or
her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using
her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of
Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not
those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the "donation"
establish pedigree.
for Ida.32

Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the
In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of
same birthdate as Ida Labagala.26 The similarity is too uncanny to be a
the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld. 1âwphi1.nêt
mere coincidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of

During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of
Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that
Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner Costs against petitioner.
made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast
along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation. SO ORDERED.

Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago
and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that G.R. No. 141323 June 8, 2005
petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now
remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA* B. PELAYO, Petitioners,
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation. vs.
MELKI E. PEREZ, Respondent.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that: DECISION

...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake.
The intrinsic defects are extractable from the following questions: a) If
This resolves the petition for review
Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in question to Ida, what
on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of
was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of the
the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 20,
sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened
1999 which reversed the Decision of the Regional
that Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only
Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao, Branch 34, in
1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or donated the
Civil Case No. 91-46; and the CA Resolution dated
whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven's name did Jose Santiago, a
December 17, 1999 denying petitioners’ motion for
college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring
reconsideration.
his signature (citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale?
d) If Ida was [the] child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter
donating his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway upon The antecedent facts as aptly narrated by the CA are as follows:
his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed
which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier married to David Pelayo (Pelayo),by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January
Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s ]he was then just 15 11, 1988, conveyed to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of agricultural land
years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao which are portions of Lot 4192, Cad.
encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim and Entry 276 covered by OCT P-16873.
No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the title of
said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced
only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature
possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?27 is illegible witnessed the execution of the deed.

Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to
transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof
belonged to his sisters.28 Petitioner could not have given her consent to
the contract, being a minor at the time. 29 Consent of the contracting
parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, 30including one of
sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner
admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, 31 which makes the
sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be
shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space provided for
witnesses on account of which Perez’ application for registration of the
deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum, Davao was
denied.
Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the
deed but she refused, hence, he instituted on August 8, 1991 the instant
complaint for specific performance against her and her husband Pelayo
(defendants).
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
stated no cause of action, citing Section 6 of RA 6656 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which took effect on June 10,
1988 and which provides that contracts executed prior thereto shall "be
valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of
three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act."
The questioned deed having been executed on January 10, 1988, the
defendants claimed that Perez had at least up to September 10, 1988
within which to register the same, but as they failed to, it is not valid and,
therefore, unenforceable.
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint. On appeal to this Court, the
dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.
In their Answer, the defendants claimed that as the lots were occupied
illegally by some persons against whom they filed an ejectment case,
they and Perez who is their friend and known at the time as an
activist/leftist, hence feared by many, just made it appear in the deed that
the lots were sold to him in order to frighten said illegal occupants, with
the intentional omission of Loreza’s signature so that the deed could not
be registered; and that the deed being simulated and bereft of
consideration is void/inexistent.
Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in
consideration of his services as his attorney-in-fact to make the
necessary representation and negotiation with the illegal
occupants-defendants in the ejectment suit; and that after his
relationship with defendant Pelayo became sour, the latter sent a letter to
the Register of Deeds of Tagum requesting him not to entertain any
transaction concerning the lots title to which was entrusted to Perez who
misplaced and could [not] locate it.
Defendant Pelayo claimed in any event, in his Pre-trial brief filed on
March 19, 1996, that the deed was without his wife Loreza’s consent,
hence, in light of Art. 166 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent . . .
it is null and void.
The trial court, finding, among others, that Perez did not possess, nor
pay the taxes on the lots, that defendant Pelayo was indebted to Perez
for services rendered and, therefore, the deed could only be considered
as evidence of debt, and that in any event, there was no marital consent
to nor actual consideration for the deed, held that the deed was null and
void and accordingly rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering and directing the
defendants to pay plaintiff Melki Perez the sum of TEN THOUSAND
(₱10,000.00) Pesos as principal with 12% interest per annum starting
from the date of filing of the complaint on August 1, 1991 until plaintiff is
fully paid.
The defendants shall likewise pay to plaintiff the sum of THREE
THOUSAND (₱3,000.00) as attorney’s fees.
The court further orders that the Deed of Absolute Sale, (Annex ‘A’) of
the complaint and (Annex ‘C’) of the plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is declared null and void and without force and it is likewise
removed as a cloud over defendants’ title and property in suit. . . ." 2
The RTC Decision was appealed by herein respondent Perez to the CA.
Petitioners failed to file their appellees’ brief. The CA then promulgated
its Decision on April 20, 1999 whereby it ruled that by Lorenza’s signing
as witness to the execution of the deed, she had knowledge of the
transaction and is deemed to have given her consent to the same; that
herein petitioners failed to adduce sufficient proof to overthrow the
presumption that there was consideration for the deed, and that petitioner
David Pelayo, being a lawyer, is presumed to have acted with due care
and to have signed the deed with full knowledge of its contents and import.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, declaring as valid and
enforceable the questioned deed of sale and ordering herein petitioner
Lorenza Pelayo to affix her signature on all pages of said document.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the decision but the same was
denied per Resolution dated December 17, 1999. The CA found said
motion to have been filed out of time and ruled that even putting aside
technicality, petitioners failed to present any ground bearing on the merits
of the case to justify a reversal or setting aside of the decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds:
1. The CA erred in ignoring the specific provision of Section 6, in relation
to Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 which took effect on June 15, 1988 and
which provides that contracts executed prior thereto shall "be valid only
when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3)
months after the effectivity of this Act."
2. The CA erred in holding that the deed of sale was valid and considering
the ₱10,000.00 adjudged by the trial court as Perez’s remuneration as the
consideration for the deed of sale, instead of declaring the same as null
and void for being fictitious or simulated and on the basis of Art. 491, Par.
2 of the New Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase
properties from his principal under his charge.
3. The CA made a novel ruling that there was implied marital consent of
the wife of petitioner David Pelayo.
4. Petitioners should have been allowed to file their appellees’ brief to
ventilate their side, considering the existence of peculiar circumstances
which prevented petitioners from filing said brief.
On the other hand, respondent points out that the CA, in resolving the first
appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 387003 brought by respondent
assailing the RTC Order granting herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss,
already ruled that under R.A. No. 6657, the sale or transfer of private
agricultural land is allowed only when the area of the land being conveyed
constitutes or is a part of, the landowner-seller retained area and when the
total landholding of the purchaser-transferee, including the property sold,
does not exceed five (5) hectares; that in this case, the land in dispute is
only 1.3 hectares and there is no proof that the transferee’s (herein
respondent) total landholding inclusive of the subject land will exceed 5
hectares, the landholding ceiling prescribed by R.A. No. 6657; that the
failure of respondent to register the instrument was not due to his fault or
negligence but can be attributed to Lorenza’s unjustified refusal to sign
two pages of the deed despite several requests of respondent; and that
therefore, the CA ruled that the deed of sale subject of this case is valid
under R.A. No. 6657.
Respondent further maintains that the CA correctly held in its assailed
Decision that there was consideration for the contract and that Lorenza is
deemed to have given her consent to the deed of sale.
Respondent likewise opines that the CA was right in denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration where they prayed that they be allowed to file
their appellees’ brief as their counsel failed to file the same on account of
said counsel’s failing health due to cancer of the liver. Respondent
emphasized that in petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, they did not
even cite any errors made by the CA in its Decision.
The issues boil down to the question of whether or not the deed of sale
was null and void on the following grounds: (a) for not complying with the
provision in R.A. No. 6657 that such document must be registered with
the Register of Deeds within three months after the effectivity of said law;
(b) for lack of marital consent; (c) for being prohibited under Article 1491
(2) of the Civil Code; and (d) for lack of consideration.
We rule against petitioners.
The issue of whether or not the deed of sale is null and void under R.A.
No. 6657, for respondent’s failure to register said document with the
Register of Deeds within three months after the effectivity of R.A. No.
6657, had been resolved with finality by the CA in its Decision dated
November 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 38700.4 Herein petitioners no
longer elevated said CA Decision to this Court and the same became
final and executory on January 7, 1995.5
In said decision, the CA interpreted Section 4, in relation to Section 70 of
R.A. No. 6657, to mean thus:
. . . the proper interpretation of both sections is that under R.A. No. 6657,
the sale or transfer of a private agricultural land is allowed only when said
land area constitutes or is a part of the landowner-seller retained area
and only when the total landholdings of the purchaser-transferee,
including the property sold does not exceed five (5) hectares.
Aside from declaring that the failure of respondent to register the deed
was not of his own fault or negligence, the CA ruled that respondent’s
failure to register the deed of sale within three months after effectivity of
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law did not invalidate the deed of
sale as "the transaction over said property is not proscribed by R.A. No.
6657."
Thus, under the principle of law of the case, said ruling of the CA is now
binding on petitioners.1avvph!1 Such principle was elucidated
in Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals,6 to wit:
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the
case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts
on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court.
Petitioners not having questioned the Decision of the CA dated
November 24, 1994 which then attained finality, the ruling that the deed
of sale subject of this case is not among the transactions deemed as
invalid under R.A. No. 6657, is now immutable.
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her
signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is
deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which
may either be express or implied.7 A wife’s consent to the husband’s
disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set
forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife
that such consent or approval was indeed given. 8 In the present case,
although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed
only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution
of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the
sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.
In their Pre-Trial Brief,9 petitioners admitted that even prior to 1988, they
have been having serious problems, including threats to the life of
petitioner David Pelayo, due to conflicts with the illegal occupants of the
property in question, so that respondent, whom many feared for being a
leftist/activist, offered his help in driving out said illegal occupants.
Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware of serious
problems such as threats to her husband’s life and the reasons for such
threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners’ problems over the subject
property had been going on for quite some time, so it is highly improbable
for Lorenza not to be aware of what her husband was doing to remedy
such problems. Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza Pelayo was present
during the execution of the deed of sale as her signature appears thereon.
Neither do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever
about the contents of the subject document. Thus, it is quite
certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal property between her
husband and respondent.
Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns.10 Petitioners did not even attempt to overcome the
aforementioned presumption as no evidence was ever presented to show
that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her mental faculties and, hence,
could not have fully understood the ramifications of signing the deed of
sale. Neither did petitioners present any evidence that Lorenza had been
defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened either by her own husband or
by respondent into affixing her signature on the subject document. If
Lorenza had any objections over the conveyance of the disputed property,
she could have totally refrained from having any part in the execution of
the deed of sale. Instead, Lorenza even affixed her signature thereto.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil
Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in
question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of
conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely
voidable. Said provisions of law provide:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
property without the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give
her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
...
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the
same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was not
obtained.11 In the present case, despite respondent’s repeated demands
for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale,
showing respondent’s insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza still
did not file a case for annulment of the deed of sale. It was only when
respondent filed a complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991
when petitioners brought up Lorenza’s alleged lack of consent as an
affirmative defense. Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered into
without Lorenza’s consent, we find it quite puzzling why for more than
three and a half years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek the
nullification of the assailed contract.
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza
knew of the full import of the transaction between respondent and her
husband; and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in effect,
signified her consent to the disposition of their conjugal property.
With regard to petitioners’ asseveration that the deed of sale is invalid
under Article 1491, paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code, we find such
argument unmeritorious. Article 1491 (2) provides:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
...
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;
...
In Distajo vs. Court of Appeals,12 a landowner, Iluminada Abiertas,
designated one of her sons as the administrator of several parcels of her
land. The landowner subsequently executed a Deed of Certification of
Sale of Unregistered Land, conveying some of said land to her
son/administrator. Therein, we held that:
Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the prohibition against agents
purchasing property in their hands for sale or management is not
absolute. It does not apply if the principal consents to the sale of the
property in the hands of the agent or administrator. In this case, the
deeds of sale signed by Iluminada Abiertas shows that she gave consent
to the sale of the properties in favor of her son, Rufo, who was the
administrator of the properties. Thus, the consent of the principal
Iluminada Abiertas removes the transaction out of the prohibition
contained in Article 1491(2).13
The above-quoted ruling is exactly in point with this case before us.
Petitioners, by signing the Deed of Sale in favor of respondent, are also
deemed to have given their consent to the sale of the subject property in
favor of respondent, thereby making the transaction an exception to the
general rule that agents are prohibited from purchasing the property of
their principals.
Petitioners also argue that the CA erred in ruling that there was
consideration for the sale. We find no error in said appellate court’s ruling.
The element of consideration for the sale is indeed present. Petitioners,
in adopting the trial court’s narration of antecedent facts in their
petition,14 thereby admitted that they authorized respondent to represent
them in negotiations with the "squatters" occupying the disputed property
and, in consideration of respondent’s services, they executed the subject
deed of sale. Aside from such services rendered by respondent,
petitioners also acknowledged in the deed of sale that they received in
full the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos. Evidently, the consideration for
the sale is respondent’s services plus the aforementioned cash money.
Petitioners contend that the consideration stated in the deed of sale is
excessively inadequate, indicating that the deed of sale was merely
simulated. We are not persuaded. Our ruling in Buenaventura vs. Court
of Appeals15 is pertinent, to wit:
. . . Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact
value of the subject matter of sale. . . . As we stated in Vales vs. Villa:
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad
bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from
one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot
constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally
incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated
or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts,
use miserable judgment, and lose money by them – indeed, all they have
in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There
must be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law
knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold
of the situation and remedy it.16
Verily, in the present case, petitioners have not presented proof that there
has been fraud, mistake or undue influence exercised upon them by
respondent. It is highly unlikely and contrary to human experience that a
layman like respondent would be able to defraud, exert undue influence,
or in any way vitiate the consent of a lawyer like petitioner David Pelayo
who is expected to be more knowledgeable in the ways of drafting
contracts and other legal transactions.
Furthermore, in their Reply to Respondent’s Memorandum, 17 petitioners
adopted the CA’s narration of fact that petitioners stated in a letter they
sent to the Register of Deeds of Tagum that they have entrusted the titles
over subject lots to herein respondent. Such act is a clear indication that
they intended to convey the subject property to herein respondent and the
deed of sale was not merely simulated or fictitious.
Lastly, petitioners claim that they were not able to fully ventilate their
defense before the CA as their lawyer, who was then suffering from
cancer of the liver, failed to file their appellees’ brief. Thus, in their motion
for reconsideration of the CA Decision, they prayed that they be allowed to
submit such appellees’ brief. The CA, in its Resolution dated December 17,
1999, stated thus:
By movant-defendant-appellee’s own information, his counsel received a
copy of the decision on May 5, 1999. He, therefore, had fifteen (15) days
from said date or up to May 20, 1999 to file the motion. The motion,
however, was sent through a private courier and, therefore, considered to
have been filed on the date of actual receipt on June 17, 1999 by the
addressee – Court of Appeals, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Technicality aside, movant has not proffered any ground bearing on the
merits of the case why the decision should be set aside.1awphi1
Petitioners never denied the CA finding that their motion for
reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. On
that point alone, the CA is correct in denying due course to said motion.
The motion having been belatedly filed, the CA Decision had then attained
finality. Thus, in Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation,18 we held that:
. . . Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land.
Moreover, it is pointed out by the CA that said motion did not present any
defense or argument on the merits of the case that could have convinced
the CA to reverse or modify its Decision.
We have consistently held that a petitioner’s right to due process is not
violated where he was able to move for reconsideration of the order or
decision in question.19 In this case, petitioners had the opportunity to fully
expound on their defenses through a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners did file such motion but they wasted such opportunity by failing
to present therein whatever errors they believed the CA had committed in
its Decision. Definitely, therefore, the denial of petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, praying that they be allowed to file appellees’ brief, did
not infringe petitioners’ right to due process as any issue that petitioners
wanted to raise could and should have been contained in said motion for
reconsideration.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 1999 and its Resolution
dated December 17, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. NO. 165420, June 30, 2005 ]
CONCEPCION R. AINZA, SUBSTITUTED BY HER LEGAL HEIRS, DR.
NATIVIDAD A. TULIAO, CORAZON A. JALECO AND LILIA A.
OLAYON, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ANTONIO PADUA AND
EUGENIA PADUA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 24, 2004
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70239,[1] and its
September 28, 2004 resolution, denying reconsideration thereof. [2]
In her complaint for partition of real property, annulment of titles with
damages,[3] Concepcion Ainza (Concepcion) alleged that
respondent-spouses Eugenia (Eugenia) and Antonio Padua (Antonio)
owned a 216.40 sq. m. lot with an unfinished residential house located at
No. 85-A Durian corner Pajo Sts., Barangay Quirino 2-C, Project 2,
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
271935. Sometime in April 1987, she bought one-half of an undivided
portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latter’s
husband, Antonio, for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the transaction, but
cash payment was received by the respondents, and ownership was
transferred to Concepcion through physical delivery to her
attorney-in-fact and daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion
authorized Natividad and the latter’s husband, Ceferino Tuliao (Ceferino)
to occupy the premises, and make improvements on the unfinished
building.
Thereafter, Concepcion alleged that without her consent, respondents
caused the subdivision of the property into three portions and registered
it in their names under TCT Nos. N-155122, N-155123 and N-155124 in
violation of the restrictions annotated at the back of the title.
On the other hand, Antonio averred that he bought the property in 1980
and introduced improvements thereon. Between 1989 and 1990, he
and his wife, Eugenia, allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the
premises temporarily. In 1994, they caused the subdivision of the
property and three (3) separate titles were issued.
Thereafter, Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the
latter refused and claimed that Concepcion owned the property. Antonio
thus filed an ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented
by Natividad, also filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for partition of real
property and annulment of titles with damages.
Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered
to buy one third (1/3) of the property who gave her small amounts over
several years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she
signed a receipt.
On January 9, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85,
rendered judgment[4] in favor of Concepcion, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants and ordering:
1. the subdivision of the subject property between
the said plaintiff and defendants in equal shares
with one-half of the property, including the portion
occupied by the spouses Severino and Natividad
Tuliao to be awarded to the plaintiff;
2. the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. N-155122, N-155123, N-155124 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
3. the defendants to pay to the plaintiff P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The trial court upheld the sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. It ruled
that the sale was consummated when both contracting parties complied
with their respective obligations. Eugenia transferred possession by
delivering the property to Concepcion who in turn paid the purchase
price. It also declared that the transfer of the property did not violate the
Statute of Frauds because a fully executed contract does not fall within its
coverage.
On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court, and declared the sale null and void. Applying Article 124
of the Family Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that since the subject
property is conjugal, the written consent of Antonio must be obtained for
the sale to be valid. It also ordered the spouses Padua to return the
amount of P100,000.00 to petitioners plus interest.[6]
The sole issue for resolution in this petition for review is whether there was
a valid contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion.
A contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, upon a meeting of the
minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter,
price and terms of payment.[7]
In this case, there was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and
Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of
the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to pay
P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated
when both parties fully complied with their respective
obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn,
paid Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00),
as evidenced by the receipt which reads:
RECEIPT
Received the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as payment for
the lot on 85-A Durian St., Project 2, Quezon City,
from Mrs. Concepcion R. Ainza, on April, 1987.
_______(Sgd.)______
Mrs.. Eugenia A. Padua[8]
The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not
violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds that a contract for the sale of
real property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or
memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the party charged
or his agent.[9] When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or
partially consummated, as in this case, its enforceability will not be barred
by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory
agreement.[10] Thus, where one party has performed his obligation, oral
evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.[11]
In the instant case, the oral contract of sale between Eugenia and
Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia. Antonio also
stated that his wife admitted to him that she sold the property to
Concepcion.
It is undisputed that the subject property was conjugal and sold by
Eugenia in April 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, Article 254 of which repealed Title V, Book I of the Civil
Code provisions on the property relations between husband and
wife. However, Article 256 thereof limited its retroactive effect only to
cases where it would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. In the case at bar, vested
rights of Concepcion will be impaired or prejudiced by the application of
the Family Code; hence, the provisions of the Civil Code should be
applied.
In Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, et al.,[12] the legal effect of a sale of conjugal
properties by the wife without the consent of the husband was clarified,
to wit:
The legal ground which deserves attention is the
legal effect of a sale of lands belonging to the
conjugal partnership made by the wife without the
consent of the husband.
contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage
because he was the victim who had an interest in the
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for
the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their
children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
contract while the marriage subsisted because they
merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
(Emphasis supplied)
The consent of both Eugenia and Antonio is necessary for the sale of the
conjugal property to be valid. Antonio’s consent cannot be
presumed.[13] Except for the self-serving testimony of petitioner Natividad,
there is no evidence that Antonio participated or consented to the sale of
the conjugal property. Eugenia alone is incapable of giving consent to the
contract. Therefore, in the absence of Antonio’s consent, the disposition
made by Eugenia is voidable.[14]

It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary
rules: The husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code) Subject
to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. (Art. 166,
Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband’s consent, except
in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.).
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the husband and the sale is not covered
by the phrase “except in cases provided by law.”
The Court of Appeals described the sale as “invalid”
– a term which is imprecise when used in relation to
contracts because the Civil Code uses specific
names in designating defective contracts,
namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et
seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et
seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void
or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.).
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective
contract but of what category? The answer: it is
a voidable contract.
The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral
contract, the action to annul the same must be commenced within six
years from the time the right of action accrued.[15] Eugenia sold the
property in April 1987 hence Antonio should have asked the courts to
annul the sale on or before April 1993. No action was commenced by
Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its annulment was
extinguished by prescription.
Even assuming that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period under Art. 173
should apply, Antonio is still barred from instituting an action to annul the
sale because since April 1987, more than ten (10) years had already
lapsed without any such action being filed.
In sum, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia without the consent of
her husband is voidable. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to
exercise his right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period,
hence, he is now barred from questioning the validity of the sale between
his wife and Concepcion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated February
24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70239 and its
resolution dated September 28, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision dated January 9, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. Q-99-37529, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the

voidable contracts are “[T]hose where one of the
parties is incapable of giving consent to the
contract.” (Par. 1.) In the instant case Gimena had
no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale.
The capacity to give consent belonged not even to
the husband alone but to both spouses.

The view that the contract made by Gimena is a

voidable contract is supported by the legal
provision that contracts entered by the husband
without the consent of the wife when such
consent is required, are annullable at her
instance during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173,
Civil Code).

Gimena’s contract is not rescissible for in such a

contract all the essential elements are untainted but
Gimena’s consent was tainted. Neither can the
contract be classified as unenforceable because it
does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the
Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void
or inexistent because it is not one of those
mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process
of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable