Petition For Encumbrance

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015
MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa
partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako.
Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay ng
kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa
rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta
kung wala na akong saka?"
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha

na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.
- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable
doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their
own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the
Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision5 of
the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of theft.6
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.7 The Information provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan,
Municipality of Sogod, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain,
entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once inside
the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested
1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without
the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in the
aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00), Philippine
currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero),
Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto
Pacate.10
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca
plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On
June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and several men, including
Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate's instructions.
At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men.
Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in
harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the
police.11
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a
survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca,
valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.12
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod
Police Station.13Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the
plantation owner.14
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his
neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of
Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate
installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal
case.17
Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her
share to the harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact amount
anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in another land, around
15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21
Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca
from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca
since he was the rightful tenant of the land.22
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He
claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio
Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting
happened.23
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered
the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.26
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as
evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was
considered by both the trial court27 and Court of Appeals28 and without any
objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy
was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of
harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by
prosecution witnesses."32
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Theft, this court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as
maximum;cralawlawlibrary
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:

a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca
stole[n];cralawlawlibrary
b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary
c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's

fees;cralawlawlibrary
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the
burden to prove the existence of the tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He
was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy agreement.36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision
"declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at
bar":37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given
locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon
the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken
conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed
Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation.39
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership.

"He claims that the parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the
subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based merely on the testimony of
the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify parcels of land."40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by
harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive
possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's consent.42 "The subject of
the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order to
consummate the crime of theft."43
Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal
property under the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was
erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca hemp was
"capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about 1,000
kilos of abaca were already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by the
prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from
criminal liability.47 His alibi was doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi
is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability
should be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to show
that the case was initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to
ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land.50
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision
finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern
Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico
Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on
February 2, 2012.54
II
On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution.55 This court required People of the Philippines to file its Comment
on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;cralawlawlibrary
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of
the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak,
Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial
notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the
conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Petition is meritorious.
III
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of
Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the claim
of petitioner [as] tenant."57
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the
Rules of Court.59 Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and
binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.60 This court has
differentiated between a question of law and question of
fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses,
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond
the scope of the Rule he seeks redress from.62 However, there are exceptions to the
rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review under
Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures, (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7)
when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court, (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified
"when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial
court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they
would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to
acquittal."64
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is

generally a question of fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy
relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
statutory elements of tenancy.66
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it
held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the
prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the
land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the case is, thus,
proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
IV
Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated
by ill will and revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove petitioner from the
land he has legitimately occupied as tenant.69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed
his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the Information for
Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private

complainant's tenant.71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as
the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency vested with
primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy
relationship.72
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To

require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship through evidence other than the
DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond
the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private
complainant did not file an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy
relationship constitutes as res judicata.75
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the DARAB Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial
notice of the DARAB Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge.77(Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that
there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between him and private complainant and
that he did not take the abaca hemp.78Nevertheless, respondent maintains that
petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship
between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any
sharing of harvest between the parties.81
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is

conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal

proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases
are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or
vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal
liability for the same act.
....
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the

procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding
on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal
cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the
same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act
results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-
2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 involves
determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy
relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven
by the prosecution.
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB

found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in
the above-quoted Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence
submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any evidence
submitted by the respondent.
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as
such is entitled to a security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed
of his holdings by the landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and
only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by
the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of the land subject in this case and well described
in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain
plaintiff in the peaceful possession of the land in dispute;cralawlawlibrary
2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager of
Sogod Bay DAR Cluster to call the parties and assist them in the execution of
a leasehold contract covering the land in dispute, and for the parties to
respect and obey such call of the said MARO in compliance with the legal
mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand

(P5,000.00) Pesos representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in
vindicating his right and other actual expenses incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.
No cost.
SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial

powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence.85 This court is
not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."86
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to
determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.87 This
court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same
binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating
to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's
primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between
landowners and tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on courts
when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that administrative res
judicata exists in that case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of
the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained
finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of
respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in

accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the
rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is
examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was
already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively
to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable
attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom
judicial powers have been conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to
decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
purely administrative proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating

evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-
judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.95 (Citations
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior
judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal
Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and
differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in
Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated
or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases,
then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as
between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment"
applies.97 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive
on the parties.99 As in this case, the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano attained finality
when the landowner did not appeal the Decision.101 This court ruled that the
doctrine of res judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
empowered, through its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication
boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to
the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides that the
decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no
appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul
'89, there being no appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the
matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the
CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer open to
doubt and controversy.
....
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT
and Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB
Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively
the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB
Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul
'94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues
raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been
resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include

Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the adjudication board and the
DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the
applicability of the doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the
issues which have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment
precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the
same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as
it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to
be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was
predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding
effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since
said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle
of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment also applies in criminal cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged with
the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non-remittance
of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the findings of the
National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the
absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained finality.106 This
court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are
founded on sound public policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment
to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion
is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the
premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once
determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been
rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same
parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39,
Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are
based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like
the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters
settled by a Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again.
Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers,
creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could
be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court
ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists
is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship.109 (Citation
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential
elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there
was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as tenant of the land.111 In
rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of both
petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner's evidence,
which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was
installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres
Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.114 However, Andres
Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's
share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed
in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant
failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled
hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private
complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as
counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already
shown her intention not to participate the proceedings of the case for reasons
known only to her;cralawlawlibrary
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her
decision not to participate in the proceedings of the case;cralawlawlibrary
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to

withdraw as he is now withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-
entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of
other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings
on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant are
immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et
al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121
In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac

that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their
predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial
Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when the
registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents,
respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and
Josefina Roxas Omaña.122
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the

renunciation of their tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
However, they failed to comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before the
DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator.124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy
relationship [that] existed between the parties."125 He found that petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy
cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package.126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found
that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were deemed
tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were entitled to security of
tenure.127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial
Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that
all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of
tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be upheld.128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed to
overcome the burden of proving the existence of a tenancy
relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While
it appears that there was personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-
in-interest of the subject landholding, what was established was that petitioners'
claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme
with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-
serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced. Such
claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests
on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy,
which burden they failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie
must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of
harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect
that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the
claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported
sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The sharing
arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of petitioner
Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Self-serving
statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all,
the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court
of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria,
Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome substantial
evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made
upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent
ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are
merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling
holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as
herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable
elements of tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were
merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a
preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the Department of
Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further, the
tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the
DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into
finality.131 It is also established that private complainant participated in the initial
stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a
tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review
the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy
exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
VI
According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code were not established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The
DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that
he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's
land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without
the consent of the owner—petitioner argues that this, too, was negated by his
status as private complainant's tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by
the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to
stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding because
as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled him to
continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or
until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and
executory.135 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." In
acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven
snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence
failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law."136 (Citations
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to
the local authorities or to its owner;cralawlawlibrary
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another,
shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by
him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest
or farm products.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's
consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence
against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.137
Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancy system.138 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she
cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the
landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the
taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that
petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore,
failed to establish all the elements of theft.
In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and

banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove
lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It failed to clearly identify "the person
who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to
whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private
complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent to
it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged
to private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and
bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had
a criminal intent."144
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the
produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant.
Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent
of the crime until proven guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than
to convict one innocent person."146Thus, courts must consider "[e]very
circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that
"[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with
guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt
and should be acquitted."148
In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary

to discuss further the other errors raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the
crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISA YAS AND EMILY ROSE KO LIM

CHAO, Petitioners, v. MARY ANN T. CASTRO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Office of the

Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) against respondent Assistant City Prosecutor
Mary Ann T. Castro (respondent), assailing the decision1 and resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78933.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Sometime in 2001, Mariven Castro (Mariven) purchased on credit a Fuso Canter

vehicle from KD Surplus. Mariven executed a promissory note, and then issued six
(6) post-dated checks to KD Surplus. The checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds when presented for encashment. Mariven inquired
from Emily Rose Ko Lim Chao (Emily), the owner-manager of KD Surplus, if it was
still possible to just return the vehicle in exchange for the issued checks.3
At around 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 2002, Mariven's wife, Rosefil Castro
(Rosefil), accompanied by his (Mariven's) sister, herein respondent, brought the
Fuso Canter to KD Surplus' yard for appraisal and evaluation. Emily inspected the
vehicle and found out that it had a defective engine, as well as a rusty and
dilapidated body. Emily thus refused to accept the vehicle.
Rosefil requested the security on duty, Mercedito Guia (Guia), to register in the
company's security logbook the fact of entry of the motor vehicle in the premises of
KD Surplus. Guia refused to do so as it was already past 5:00 p.m. Upon the
prodding of Rosefil, Guia inserted an entry on the upper right portion of the
logbook's entry page for the date September 16, 2002, stating that the vehicle had
been "checked-in" on that day. This entry was signed by Rosefil.
The respondent then left the premises of KD Surplus, but returned there a few
moments later on board a Philippine National Police-Special Weapons and Tactics
(PNP-SWAT) vehicle. The respondent signed on the inserted entry in the logbook as
a witness, and then brought this logbook outside of KD Surplus' premises. The
respondent again left KD Surplus in order to photocopy the logbook. She returned
on board the PNP-SWAT vehicle after 30 minutes, and handed the logbook to the
security guard. The respondent also asked Emily to sign a yellow pad paper
containing a list of the issued checks, and told her to return these checks. When
Emily refused, the respondent threatened to file cases against Emily; the
respondent also threatened Emily's staff with lawsuits if they will not testify in her
favor.
On September 26, 2002, Emily filed an administrative complaint for violation of

Republic Act No. 6713 (the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) against the respondent before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas). The case was docketed as 0MB-V-A-0508-1.
The respondent essentially countered that the case Emily filed was a harassment
suit. She further maintained that the police arrived at the premises of KD Surplus
ahead of her.
The Ombudsman's Rulings
In its decision4 dated May 6, 2003, the Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed on her the
penalty of "three (3) months suspension from the service without pay." The
Ombudsman held that the respondent's act of summoning the PNP-SWAT to go with
her to KD Surplus, and riding on their vehicle, overstepped the conventions of good
behavior which every public official ought to project so as to preserve the integrity
of public service. It added that the respondent had encouraged a wrong perception
that she was a "dispenser of undue patronage."5 The Ombudsman reasoned out as
follows:
To our mind, the presence of SWAT in the vicinity was totally uncalled for as there
were neither serious nor even a slight indication of an imminent danger which
would justify their presence. Verily, we cannot string along with the complainant's
attempt to justify her aforesaid act as an act of prudence because it is very clear
that her recourse to the military by calling some members of the SWAT PNP to go
with her to complainant's shop was a display of overbearingness and a show of
haughtiness. Certainly, respondent cannot deny that if she were not Asst. City
Prosecutor Mary Ann Castro, it would be impossible for her to get in a snap of a
finger the services of this elite police team whose assistance she availed not for a
legitimate purpose but for her personal aggrandizement. Her power and influence
as a public official had indeed come into play which she had abused by not using it
properly. Hence, we cannot make any other conclusion except that the presence of
the SWAT was purposely intended to brag of her clout in the military to possibly
bring about fears and apprehension on the part of complainant and the latter's
employees.6
The respondent moved to reconsider this decision, but the Ombudsman denied her
motion in its Order7dated July 14, 2003.
Proceedings before the CA
The respondent filed a petition for review before the CA challenging the May 6,
2003 decision and July 14,2003 order of the Ombudsman. In its February 13, 2006
decision, the CA modified the Ombudsman's ruling, and found the respondent liable
for simple misconduct only.
The CA held that the Ombudsman's suspension order was not merely
recommendatory. It also ruled that the respondent was not denied due process
since she submitted a counter-affidavit where she refuted, among others, Emily's
claim that she went to the premises of KD Surplus on board a PNP-SWAT vehicle.
The CA also held that the respondent was not suspended for her act of calling for
police assistance, but for abusing her position as the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Cebu City. According to the CA, the respondent used her office's influence, prestige
and ascendancy to use the PNP-SWAT for a purely personal matter.
The CA thus found the respondent liable for simple misconduct only, and reduced
the penalty of suspension imposed on her to one (1) month and one (1) day. It
held that the respondent's acts were not characterized by the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules.
The respondent and the Ombudsman filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. In its resolution of May 2, 2006, the CA denied these motions for
lack or merit.
The Present Petition and the Respondent's Comment
In the present petition for review on certiorari,8 the Ombudsman essentially argued
that the respondent's act of using her office's influence to use the PNP-SWAT for a
purely personal matter constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. It argued that the respondent exhibited irresponsibility and corruption, and
showed her lack of integrity when she took advantage of her position as Assistant
City Prosecutor to summon the assistance of the elite SWAT Team in order to
pressure and harass Emily.
In her Comment,9 the respondent countered that she had been denied due process
since the act of calling for police assistance was not one of the specific acts cited in
Emily's complaint as constituting abuse of authority.
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we modify the assailed CA decision and resolution.

We agree with the Ombudsman's ruling that the respondent is guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but modify the
imposed penalty.
No denial of due process
We clarify at the outset that contrary to the respondent's claim, her act of seeking
police assistance and riding on a PNP-SWAT vehicle when she went to the premises
of KD Surplus formed part of Emily's allegations. In Emily's affidavit-complaint, she
mentioned that she saw the respondent on board the SWAT vehicle twice: first,
when the respondent first arrived at the premises of KD Surplus; and second,when
she returned there after photocopying the company's security logbook.
We emphasize that the respondent refuted these allegations in her counter-

affidavit: she admitted that she asked for police assistance while on her way to KD
Surplus, but maintained that she was on board a Revo car owned by one Jojo
Obera. According to the respondent, she sought police assistance because of a
possibility that a trouble might ensue between the parties. The respondent also
stated that the police arrived at KD Surplus ahead of her.
To us, the respondent would have found no need to state that: (1) she was on
board a Revo vehicle when she went to KD Surplus; (2) point out that the police
arrived ahead of her; and (3) explain why she sought the help of the police, if Emily
did not allege that she (respondent) was on board a SWAT vehicle when she went
to KD Surplus on two occasions.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. Due process is simply the opportunity given to explain one's side,
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.10
As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emily's allegations in her counter-affidavit.

The respondent cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act of calling for
police assistance vis-a-vis riding on board the SWAT vehicle, was not among those
included in the charge against her. In addition, the security guard on duty, Guia,
stated in his affidavit11 (which was attached to Emily's affidavit-complaint) that the
respondent "arrived riding in a SWAT PNP vehicle with Body No. 240, x x x she
signed the logbook as a witness on the inserted entry."12 Since these allegations
formed part of Emily's affidavit-complaint, the Ombudsman has the power to
determine the respondent's administrative liability based on the actual facts recited
in this affidavit complaint.
The Court's ruling in Avenido v. CSC13 is particularly instructive:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted
with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he
is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as the

respondent was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with; what the law abhors is
an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.14
Notably, when the case was called for a preliminary conference, the respondent
opted to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record.
The respondent's liability
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt

is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.15 The standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for
the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant.16
In the present case, the respondent's acts of seeking out the assistance of the
SWAT and riding on their vehicle on two occasions en route to KD Surplus are
factual matters that the Ombudsman and the CA have passed upon. It is settled
that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported
by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when
they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts
and it is not its function to review evidence on record and assess the probative
weight thereof.17 The task of this Court in an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari is limited to the review of errors of law that the CA might have
committed. The issue that remains to be resolved, therefore, is whether the CA
correctly found the respondent liable for simple misconduct.
To our mind, the respondent's acts of involving an elite police team like the SWAT
in a matter purely personal to her and riding on their vehicle in going to and from
the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for: these were a haughty and an
excessive display of the influence that she could wield, ultimately aimed at helping
Mariven and Rosefil to compel Emily to accept the "depreciated" vehicle, and to
return the bum checks issued by Mariven. These send the wrong impression that
public officials could use and exploit the police force for their personal interests.
While it may be true that the respondent merely wanted to ensure the safety of the
parties in the event that an untoward incident may happen between Emily and
Rosefil, the calling of the SWAT was clearly an overkill; there was also no
justification for her to ride in a SWAT vehicle. By calling out the SWAT to the
premises of KD Surplus and by riding on their vehicle, she clearly wanted to project
an image of power and influence meant to intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat Emily.
How the respondent managed to convince an elite police force like the SWAT to
accompany her, and to allow her to use their vehicle in a matter purely personal to
her, does not favorably reflect on her as well as on the police.
However, we do not agree with the CA that the respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct.
Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."18 In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be
manifest and established by substantial evidence. Grave misconduct necessarily
includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. Thus, a person charged with grave
misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not
involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.19
We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct

should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.20 The respondent in the present case
summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and
sister-in-law. There was no link between the respondent's acts and her official
functions as a city prosecutor. In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr.,21 the Court
explained that:
x x x Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon

in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-
understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as
affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his
character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is
necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x
x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal
from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x."
The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the
respondent's official functions.22 In Pia v. Gervacio,23 we explained that acts may
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they
tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. Additionally and contrary to
the CA's ruling, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service may or
may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules.24
In Manhit v. Office of the Ombudsman (Fact Finding & Intelligence Bureau),25 the
Court had the occasion to define "gross" and "prejudicial" in connection with the
offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as follows:
The word "gross" connotes "something out of measure; beyond allowance; not to
be excused; flagrant; shameful" while "prejudicial" means "detrimental or
derogatory to a party; naturally, probably or actually bringing about a wrong
result."26
In Mariano v. Roxas,27 the Court ruled that the offense committed by a CA

employee in forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations, was
not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because
her acts had no direct relation to or connection with the performance of her official
duties." We similarly ruled in Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform28 that the
offense committed by the employee in selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume
Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours was not grave
misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Notably, the Court has also considered the following acts or omissions, among
others, as constituting conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service:
misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to
work without prior notice, failure to safekeep public records and property, making
false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders.29
In these lights, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent's
acts of seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT vehicle
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and not
misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and her official functions.
As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her
public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer
or employee.30
With regard to the other acts alleged by Emily in her affidavit-complaint, the
Ombudsman and the CA already ruled that the respondent is not administratively
liable for her acts of taking the company logbook outside of the premises of KD
Surplus; and for handing a yellow paper containing a list of the checks issued by
Mariven to Emily for the latter's signature. We see no reason to overturn their
findings and conclusions in the absence of any showing that these had been arrived
at arbitrarily.
We additionally note that Guia, stated in his affidavit that the respondent
"borrowed the security logbook for the purpose of securing a photocopy" and later
returned it to him. We thus find unpersuasive Emily's claim that the respondent
took the security logbook outside of the company's premises without permission.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense
with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second
offense. Since this is the first time that the respondent had committed these acts,
we deem it proper to impose on her the penalty of suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78933. Respondent Mary Ann. T. Castro is declared guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is suspended from service for six
(6) months and one (1) day.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., Concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2022 : June 27, 2007]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE REYNALDO

M. ALON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Silay City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative charge against Judge Reynaldo M. Alon

(respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Silay City for Gross
Misconduct and Gross Negligence.
The present administrative case is an offshoot of the administrative complaint of

Lina Lim Tan against Homero L. Robles, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 69, Silay City and
docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1167-P.
In its Resolution of July 1, 2002, the Court referred the said administrative
complaint to respondent for investigation, report, and recommendation within 60
days from receipt of the records. Respondent submitted his investigation, report,
and recommendation on May 13, 2005 or almost three years from the date of the
Resolution requiring him to do so. The Court directed respondent to explain the
unreasonable delay in rendering his report.
Explaining the delay in the submission of his report, respondent avers that he has
not given much thought about the case and among several causes of such delay
was his being replaced as executive judge in 2003 and being re-appointed only in
April 2005, in addition to his tasks as judge designate of Branch 63, La Carlota City.
The Court, in its Resolution in A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1167-P dated September 13,
2006 resolved, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Homero L. Robles, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 69,
Silay City is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, is DIRECTED to show cause within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for Gross Misconduct
and Gross Negligence. Let the case against Judge Alon be given a regular
administrative docket number and raffled for assignment.1
In his Compliance dated October 11, 2006, respondent avers: He had been in the
service for 31 years. The delay in the disposition of the administrative case was not
done on purpose but by reason of the delay on the part of the complaining party
who requested that the same be held in abeyance until such time as the affidavit of
retraction shall have been available. He admits that he failed to submit a partial
report to the Honorable Court about the status of the case. Upon discovery of the
fact that the original record of the administrative case was misplaced, he went out
of his way and took pains to locate the same and even reconstituted the documents
just to comply with the requirement of the Honorable Court. The RTC of Silay has
two branches, Branch 40 and Branch 69, and one Administrative Office of the Clerk
of Court with only three rooms inclusive of the court rooms and staff room. The
court personnel from the two branches and the staff of the OCC commonly occupy
the room where court records are usually filed. There is therefore the possibility
that said rollo might have been misplaced unintentionally. Having in mind his duty
to swiftly dispose cases referred to him, he immediately prepared his report and
proper documentations after the affidavit of retraction was executed. The delay in
the submission of the original records was not intentional on his part. It was a
result of some facts not attributable to him, not only by reason of the loss of the
original records, but more importantly, the delay of the parties to the case who
failed to submit their persons for investigation until such time as the affidavit of
retraction shall have been filed. He could not possibly ignore all directives of this
Honorable Court. He had religiously complied with all orders and directives of this
Honorable Court to the best of his ability and in utter respect of the Rules of Law.
Not even for a single time did he neglect his duty as a judge.
We find respondent's explanation unacceptable.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that a judge shall dispose of
the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that any delay in the rendition of
judgments diminishes our people's faith in the judiciary. If, for some valid reason, a
judge cannot comply with the required deadline, he should seek an extension to
avoid administrative sanctions.2 In this case, respondent admitted his failure to
submit a partial report on the status of the case. Moreover, he failed to ask for any
extension within which to submit his investigation, report and recommendation.
Records show that the administrative case was forwarded to respondent on July 1,
2002 with specific instruction to submit his investigation, report, and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the same. However, respondent
submitted his investigation, report and recommendation only on May 13, 2005 or
almost three years after the same had been assigned to him and after the OCA
required him to submit a status report on April 12, 2005.
Respondent's asseveration that the delay in the disposition of the administrative

case was due to the request of the complainant that the investigation be held in
abeyance until the affidavit of retraction shall have been filed, is untenable.
Respondent should have known that an affidavit of desistance does not operate to
divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in
the complaint.3 The Court's disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or
frustrated by private arrangements between parties. An administrative complaint
against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a
complainant who suddenly claims a change of mind.4Respondent should have,
therefore, met the issue head-on without any further delay. The delay of almost
three years in the submission of his report and recommendation clearly shows that
respondent was remiss in his obligation to act promptly and expeditiously on his
official duties.
As for the loss of the original records of the case, the Court held in Bernardo v.
Fabros,5 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Villanueva,6 to wit:
A judge x x x is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on
them promptly without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow
of cases and their speedy disposition. x x x Proper and efficient court management
is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.7
Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the
cases and official documents in their custody are intact. They must adopt a system
of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business.8 There is no justification for missing records,
save fortuitous events.9 The loss of records in his office indicates gross negligence
on his part.10
We find respondent judge administratively liable for gross negligence in misplacing

the records of the case for his investigation, report, and recommendation. It is of
no moment that respondent reconstituted the records of the case just to comply
with the requirement of the Court because it is his duty to ensure that records of
such nature be properly kept and disposed of promptly and expeditiously, bearing
in mind that the Court prescribed a 60-day period within which to comply; and
absent any request for an extension, the investigation, report, and recommendation
must be submitted on time together with the original records of the case. It was
bad enough that respondent failed to submit his investigation, report, and
recommendation within the prescribed period, but to also lose the records of the
case is unjustifiable.
As administrative officers of the courts, judges should organize and supervise court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all
times.11 Respondent should have adopted a system of records management, so that
files are kept intact despite the cramped situation in Branches 40 and 69, and
failure to do so makes him administratively liable for infidelity in the custody of
official documents. There are cases on record where court personnel like the clerk
of court have been called to task and penalized for their failure to safely keep court
records.12 Judges should be no exception.
Judges are called upon to comply with the directives of the OCA, which is mandated
to assist this Court in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision over all
courts.13 When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law
and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.14
In Tugot v. Coliflores,15 the Court found respondent judge guilty of negligence and
violation of a Supreme Court Rule and imposed a fine of P20,000.00. Likewise,
in Imbang v. Del Rosario,16 the Court finds respondent liable for violation of
Supreme Court directives and was fined P21,000.00.
Respondent's gross negligence and violation of a Supreme Court Rule and directive
are less serious charges that may be sanctioned by suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months,
or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.17
As this is respondent's first offense of this nature and taking into account his 31
years of service in the judiciary, the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Reynaldo M. Alon of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40, Silay City GUILTY of gross negligence and violation of a Supreme Court
Rule and directive, for which he is FINEDP10,000.00, with stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
.
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ], February 02,
2016
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE

JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI
CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City.
This administrative case traces its roots to the Informations for violation of Section
3(e)1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and malversation of public funds2 filed by the
People of the Philippines against the respondent judge before the Sandiganbayan.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68.
The Informations essentially alleged that the respondent, then the City Mayor of
Dapitan City, had conspired with Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Pepe Nortal to facilitate
the latter's withdrawal of P1 million from the Confidential and Intelligence Fund
(CIF) and, thereafter, used this amount for his (the respondent's) personal benefit.
In its decision3 dated April 29, 2013, the Sandiganbayan's First Division found the
respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution successfully proved that the
respondent "instigated" Nortal's withdrawal of a P1 million cash advance from the
CIF allotted for the Mayor's Office, and that he (the respondent) received and used
this amount for his personal benefit. The court found that the respondent directed
Nortal's request for the cash advance because he (the respondent) already had four
(4) unliquidated cash advances as of December 31, 2006, and that three of these
cash advances (with a total of PI,3 84,280.00) already came from the CIF. The
testimonies of the city treasurer, the city accountant, and the city budget officer
supported the conclusion that the respondent actively worked for the approval of
the P1 million cash advance.
The Sandiganbayan also found that the respondent acted in bad faith since the cash
advance was made five (5) days after he had lost his bid for re-election, and that
the proposed withdrawal covered the CIF appropriations for the entire year. The
court likewise found no merit in the respondent's defense of denial.
The Sandiganbayan accordingly imposed the following penalties on the respondent:

(a) the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to
eight (8) years, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. 27467 for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; (b) the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, in Criminal Case No.
27468 for malversation; and (c) perpetual special disqualification. The court also
ordered him to pay a P950,000.00 fine; and P950,000.00 as indemnity to the City
of Dapitan.
The respondent moved for the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction and
likewise moved for a new trial, but the Sandiganbayan denied these motions in its
resolution4 of August 28, 2013.
The OCA received a copy of the Sandiganbayan's April 29, 2013 decision in Criminal
Case Nos. 27467 and 27468, and in its Report5 of October 4, 2013, made the
following recommendations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this Honorable Court are the
following recommendations:
1. that the instant report be considered a formal complaint against Joseph

Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge, Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and that the same
be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. that Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz be FURNISHED a copy of this report and
that he be required to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice;
and
3. that Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz be SUSPENDED without pay and other
monetary benefits effective immediately from his receipt of this Court's
resolution, pending resolution of the instant administrative matter, or until
lifted by this Honorable Court.6
x x x x (emphasis in the original)

The OCA reasoned out that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is
classified as a serious charge under Section 8(b) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
It likewise explained that the Court's power to preventively suspend judges,
although not clearly -delineated under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, is inherent in
its power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel, and that
a judge can be preventively suspended until a final decision is reached in an
administrative case against him,.
The records also showed that on October 18, 2013, the respondent filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing his convictions by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468. This case was docketed
as G.R. Nos. 209073-74.7
In its November 20, 2013 minute resolution,8 the Court's Third Division resolved:
(1) to re-docket the OCA report dated October 4, 2013, as a regular administrative
matter, and to consider it as a formal complaint against the respondent for having
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) to furnish the respondent a
copy of the OCA's Report, and to require him to file a comment; and (3) to suspend
the respondent from office without pay and other monetary benefits, effective
immediately from his receipt of "this Court's Resolution, pending resolution of the
instant administrative matter, or until lifted by this Court."
In his comment dated January. 24, 2014, the respondent posited that the
administrative complaint against him is premature because his Sandiganbayan
convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468 are not yet final. The
respondent also stated that he went on leave of absence after his Sandiganbayan
conviction, and had submitted his application for optional retirement on May 27,
2013 (to take effect on December 31, 2013). The respondent thus argued that
there was no more need to suspend him from office because he should be
considered already retired from government service" when he received on January
9, 2014, a copy of the Court's November 20, 2013 Resolution.
THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the respondent from the service he has dishonored and to
bar him from the ranks of legal professionals whose standards he has likewise
transgressed.
I. The Court's disciplinary powers over justices and judges
We find no merit in the respondent's claim that the present administrative case
against him is premature because his criminal convictions by the Sandiganbayan
are not yet final.
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. This grant empowers
the Supreme Court to oversee the judges' and court personnel's administrative
compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations,9 and to take administrative actions
against them if they violate these legal norms.10
In the exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated rules of procedure in the
discipline of judges. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A. M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint,
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon
an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The
complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and
omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by
law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.cralawlawlibrary
Based on this rule, disciplinary proceedings against sitting judges and justices may
be instituted: (a) motu proprio, by the Court itself; (b) upon verified complaint,
supported by the affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of the facts alleged,
or by documents substantiating the allegations; or (c) upon anonymous complaint
supported by public records of indubitable integrity.11
It was pursuant to this power that the Court - on its own initiative -ordered the re-
docketing of the OCA's report as a formal complaint against the respondent and as
a regular administrative matter for the Court's consideration.
The Court likewise possesses the power to preventively suspend an administratively

charged judge until a final decision is reached, particularly when a serious charge is
involved and a strong likelihood of guilt exists. This power is inherent in the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel as a
measure to allow unhampered formal investigation. It is likewise a preventive
measure to shield the public from any further damage that the continued exercise
by the judge of the functions of his office may cause.
In the present case, we placed the respondent under preventive suspension

because he is alleged to have committed transgressions that are classified as
serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law

(R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a

competent court in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending

before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10.Partisan political activities; and
11.Alcoholism and/or vicious habits, (emphasis supplied)
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of

R.A. No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds confirm that the administrative
charges for which he may be found liable are serious charges under Section 8(2) of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Malversation is likewise considered as
a serious charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.
While the term moral turpitude does not have one specific definition that lends itself
to easy and ready application,12 it has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness,
or the depravity in the performance of private and social duties that man owes to
his fellow man or to society in general.13
Notably, jurisprudence has categorized the following acts as crimes involving moral
turpitude: abduction with consent, bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape,
attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, intriguing
against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of
income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling, embezzlement, extortion,
forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of
public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury,
seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document,
and estafa thru falsification of public document.
To our mind, malversation - considering its nature - should not be categorized any
differently from the above listed crimes. The act of embezzling public funds or
property is immoral in itself; it is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted
standards of justice, honesty, and good morals.14
The preventive suspension we impose pending investigation is not a penalty but

serves only as a preventive measure as we explained above. Because it is not a
penalty, its imposition does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent. It also matters not that the offenses for which the respondent had been
convicted were committed in 2001 when he was still the Mayor of Dapitan City.15As
explained below, it is likewise immaterial that his criminal convictions by the
Sandiganbayan are still on appeal with this Court.
Optional early retirement
The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a letter on May 27, 2013 (or
soon after his Sandiganbayan convictions), requesting that he "be allowed to
optionally retire effective November 30, 2013."16 He later requested, in another
letter,17 that the effectivity date of his optional retirement be changed from
November 30, 2013 to December 31, 2013.
The Court has not acted on the respondent's request for optional early retirement in
view of his standing criminal convictions; he stands to suffer accessory penalties
affecting his qualification to retire from office should his convictions stand.18 The
OCA records19 also show that he is currently on "on leave of absence" status. In any
case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service
does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed
while he was still in the service. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:20
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications x x x If innocent, respondent public official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has
served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.cralawlawlibrary
Nor does separation from office render a pending administrative charge moot and
academic.21
II. Administrative Liability
In the present case, our task is not to determine the correctness of the
Sandiganbayan's ruling in Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68, a case that is separately
pending before us and which we shall consider under the evidentiary rules and
procedures of our criminal laws.
In the present proceedings, our function is limited to the determination of whether

substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent administratively liable for acts he
is alleged to have committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City.
In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of
the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be
disciplined for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules
itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the
Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the
judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent continued to do the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s
against the respondent through proof that the respondent committed the imputed
act/s violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Court.22
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sardido,23 the Court definitively ruled
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a
criminal act and an administrative offense. Whether the criminal case against
Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after he became a
judge is of no moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an
RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney or judge is
distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the
criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from
the same set of facts, x x x (emphases supplied)cralawlawlibrary
We reiterate that only substantial evidence is required to support our
conclusions in administrative proceedings.24 Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. The standard of substantial is satisfied when there is reasonable ground
to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,
even if such might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.25 That the
respondent committed acts constituting malversation or violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act should be adjudged in the same manner that other acts
classified as serious charges under Rule 140 (such as bribery, immorality, gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and partisan political activities) should be weighed —
through substantial evidence.26 Expressed from the point of view of criminal law,
evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary in an
administrative proceeding like the present case.
The Sandiganbayan, in considering the respondent's guilt in the criminal case

before it, gave full probative value to the testimonies of Fatima Ruda (OlC-City
Budget Officer), Jose R. Torres (OlC-City Treasurer), Glendora Deloria (City
Accountant), and Pepe Nortal (Police Inspector of the Dapitan City Police). These
conclusions and approach do not mean that we shall not examine, on our own in
the present proceedings, the evidence on record before us.
For purposes of the original administrative proceeding before us and to fully

accord the respondent the due process owed him in these proceedings, we shall
examine all the evidence adduced and apply to these pieces of evidence the
substantial evidence rule that the present proceedings require. This approach is
only proper, as the present proceeding is not an appeal from the Sandiganbayan
ruling but is an original one for purposes of establishing or negating the claimed
administrative liability on the part of the respondent.
What do the evidence on record show?
Torres testified that when his office received a Request for Obligation Allotment
(ROA)27 and a Disbursement Voucher (DV)28 on May 16, 2001, for a P1 million cash
advance payable to Nortal, he immediately sent a letter to the respondent (through
the City Budget Officer) informing him that he could not accommodate the request
because the CIF appropriation covered the whole of 2001, and that Nortal was not
properly bonded.
On the same day, Torres' letter was returned with the respondent's handwritten
notation asking him to reconsider his position. Torres eventually signed the ROA
after the respondent prevailed upon him to reconsider,29 although he still noted his
objection to the payment of the claim when he received the disbursement voucher
from the accounting office, on the belief that the disbursement should only cover
two quarters, not the whole year.
In his affidavit, Torres stated that the CIF could not be released without the
respondent's approval because this fund was an appropriation under the Office of
the City Mayor.
Ruda declared on the witness stand that right after the May 11, 2001 elections, the
respondent directed her to release the whole appropriation (totalling P1 million) for
the CIF. Ruda hesitated to do as told considering that the respondent's term would
end on June 30, 2001, while the amount to be released corresponded to the
appropriation for the entire 2001. Ruda gave in to the respondent's request after
the latter stressed to her that he (respondent) was still the mayor until the end of
June 2001.
In her affidavit, Ruda stated that it was not customary for her office to release, in
the middle of the year, the whole intelligence fund appropriation for the year.
Deloria testified that when she received a ROA and a DV for a P1 million CIF cash
advance, she informed the respondent that the amount requested covered the
appropriations for the entire 2001. The respondent informed her that the city
government needed the money badly. Ruda reviewed the request and found out
that the payee, Nortal, had not yet posted a fidelity bond. The respondent told
Ruda that he had already applied for Nortal's bond.
In her affidavit, Deloria stated that it was the first time that her office processed a
request for funds intended for the entire year.
Nortal, for his part, narrated that the respondent asked him on May 16, 2001, to
withdraw P1 million from the CIF on his (respondent's) behalf. Nortal initially
refused since he might not be able to liquidate this amount as the respondent had
lost in the elections. Instead, Nortal suggested that the Chief of Police be asked to
make the withdrawal. The respondent, however, assured Nortal that one of his men
would help him liquidate the requested amount. Nortal thus yielded to the
respondent's request and proceeded to the City Budget Office to sign the covering
ROA and DV.
Nortal added that the respondent's private secretary picked him up at his house on
May 30, 2001, informing him that the check of P1 million was already at the
Treasurer's Office. After securing the check, they proceeded to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Dipolog City to encash it. Thereafter, they went to the
respondent's office where Nortal handed him the P1 million. Nortal asked the
respondent for a receipt, but the latter refused to issue one; instead, the
respondent gave him P50,000.00 to be used in the city's drug operations.
In his affidavit, Nortal stated that the respondent told him that he (respondent)
could no longer make any cash' advances since he had unliquidated cash advances.
Leonilo Morales, State Auditor of the City Auditor's Office from 1997 to 2000,
corroborated NortaPs affidavit when he testified that the respondent had not
liquidated his cash advances from the CIF.
Aside from the testimonies of these witnesses and their respective affidavits, the
records before the Sandiganbayan are replete with documentary proof showing that
the respondent committed the acts attributed to him. The respondent failed to
refute these pieces of evidence before the Sandiganbayan or in the comment he
filed with this Court.
The respondent's signature on the following documents showed that he facilitated

Nortal's withdrawal of P1 million from the CIF: (a) Disbursement Voucher No.
105.0105.3888; (b) Request for Obligation Allotment; and (c) PNB Check No.
0001097358.
The respondent's signature, as approving officer, on Disbursement Voucher No.

105.0105.3888, proved that he authorized the disbursement of a P1 million cash
advance "to defray Confidential and Intelligence Expenses."30 The respondent's
signature on the ROA also showed that he (and Nortal) requested P1 million to be
used for confidential expenses. Finally, the respondent's signature on the PNB
check established that he allowed Nortal to withdraw the requested amount.
Considering that the CIF was an appropriation under the Mayor's Office, it is
unlikely that Nortal would attempt to withdraw the P1 million CIF cash advance
without the respondent's imprimatur. In other words, Nortal — even if he wanted to
— could not have withdrawn any amount from the CIF without the approval and
authority of the respondent City Mayor.
That the respondent authorized the withdrawal of the entire CIF for the year 2001
after he lost in his reelection bid (and less than two months before the expiration of
his term) is indicative of his bad faith. We note that several of the city's financial
officers, no less, made known to him their objections to the request due to its
patent irregularity.
Indeed, if the request for cash advance request had been legitimate, there would
have been no need for Nortal's intervention in effecting a withdrawal as the
respondent was the City Mayor and the CIF was a fund under his office. This reality
validates Nortal's claim that the respondent could no longer withdraw from the CIF
because he already had existing unliquidated advances.
Significantly, the records show that the withdrawn amount was never liquidated as
shown by the Commission on Audit's schedule of unliquidated cash advances as of
January 31, 2013. No evidence also exists showing that the withdrawn fund had
been used for its intended purposes, i.e., for confidential or intelligence activities.
Viewed against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which are
supported by the documents on record, the respondent's denial cannot stand. The
respondent even failed to substantiate his claim that the charges against him had
been politically motivated. Thus, by substantial evidence, we consider it fully
established that the respondent actively worked for the approval of the P1 million
cash advance from the CIF; that he facilitated the withdrawal of the P1 million by
Nortal; and that he received and used this withdrawn amount for his personal
benefit.
III. The Appropriate Penalty
Section 11 of Rule 140, as amended, states that [i]f the respondent is guilty of a
serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: (a) dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (c)
a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's transgressions, we find the
imposition of the supreme administrative penalty of dismissal to be appropriate.
The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
competence and diligence of the members of the bench, but also on their integrity
and moral uprightness.31 We would violate this standard and unduly tarnish the
image of the Judiciary if we allow the respondent's continued presence in the
bench. We would likewise insult the legal profession if we allow him to remain
within the ranks of legal professionals.
We emphasize that judges should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and

independence, and their conduct should be above reproach. They must adhere to
exacting standards of morality, decency, and probity. A magistrate is judged,
not only by his official acts, but also by his private morality and
actions. Our people can only look up to him as an upright man worthy of judging
his fellow citizens' acts if he is both qualified and proficient in law, and equipped
with the morality that qualifies him for that higher plane that standing as a judge
entails.
In Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,32 we ruled
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no
dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. (emphasis
ours)cralawlawlibrary
The conduct of judges, official or otherwise, must always be beyond reproach and
must be free from any suspicion tainting him, his exalted office, and the Judiciary.
A conduct, act,- or-omission repugnant to the standards of public accountability and
which tends to diminish the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary, must
invariably be handled with the required resolve through the imposition of the
appropriate sanctions imposed by law33 and by the standards and penalties
applicable to the legal profession.
Administrative Matter No. 02-9-02-SC (which took effect on October 1, 2002)

provides that an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on
grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the
Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a
member of the Bar. It also states that judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, among others, for
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court on what grounds.
— A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.cralawlawlibrary
In Bengco v. Bernardo,34 we ruled that it is not sound judicial policy to await the
final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted
upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on
admission to, and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the
two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and to save courts of justice from persons
unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court.cralaw-red
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz is

hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in the Government or
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies including government-owned
and -controlled corporations. As a consequence of this ruling, Judge Ruiz is likewise
declared DISBARRED and STRICKEN FROM the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be (1) attached to the records of Judge Ruiz with the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court and with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and (2) posted at the Supreme Court website for the information of the
Bench, the Bar, and the general public.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. Bersamin.
Peralta, J., No part.
Bersamin, J., Please see Dissent.
Perez, J., I join J. Bersamin in his Dissent.
Leonen, J., See separate Concurring.
Caguioa, J., On official leave.

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha

- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:

b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary

c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's

3. To pay the costs.

The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership.

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review

The Petition is meritorious.

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is

Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private

The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the

In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB

3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating

The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include

That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to

In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac

Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Theft is likewise committed by:

Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and

In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISA YAS AND EMILY ROSE KO LIM

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Office of the

Sometime in 2001, Mariven Castro (Mariven) purchased on credit a Fuso Canter

On September 26, 2002, Emily filed an administrative complaint for violation of

The Ombudsman's Rulings

Proceedings before the CA

The Present Petition and the Respondent's Comment

After due consideration, we modify the assailed CA decision and resolution.

No denial of due process

We emphasize that the respondent refuted these allegations in her counter-

As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emily's allegations in her counter-affidavit.

The Court's ruling in Avenido v. CSC13 is particularly instructive:

We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as the

The respondent's liability

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt

We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct

x x x Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon

The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best

In Mariano v. Roxas,27 the Court ruled that the offense committed by a CA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the decision and resolution of the

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., Concur.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2022 : June 27, 2007]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE REYNALDO

Before the Court is an administrative charge against Judge Reynaldo M. Alon

The present administrative case is an offshoot of the administrative complaint of