DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.

STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Caltex vs Palomar
G.R. No. L-19650
29 September 1966

Facts:
In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest". It calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a
specified period. For the priviledge to participate, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were
required.

Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster General opined that the
scheme falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined
to grant the requested clearance.

Issues:
W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions of the Postal Law

Held:
Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in
a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding
the meaning and intention of the author's of the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the
present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning
of the words therein. This is as much as question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked
to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies
that the law is seeking to prevent.

Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential elements of a lottery are:
(1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which
goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present case, the element of
consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a merchandise was required for the priviledge to
participate.

Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419
12 April 1982

FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla
Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to
Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation,
which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission.
Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead,
appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent
appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.
ISSUE:
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent,
sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an
insurance agent is within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to
be imposed for its violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word
“agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as
to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the
first paragraph of the aforesaid section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of
the crime must be alleged and proved.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Chinabank v Ortega
GR. L-34964

Facts:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B
Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the
plaintiff, the court declared the defendants in default for not answering within the prescribe period. To satisfy the
judgment, the plaintiff sought for the garnishment of the bank deposits of the defendants with the China Banking
Corporation. Consequently, a notice of garnishment was issued by the deputy sheriff of the trial court and served on
the bank’s cashier. The bank cashier, replied in the negative. In the reply, he invited the attention of the sheriff to
RA 1405. The plaintiff then filed a motion to cite the cashier for contempt of court. The trial court, despite having
denied the motion, ordered that the cashier confirm whether or not the defendants have existing deposit in their
bank. The cashier moved to reconsider but was denied and, subsequently, he was ordered to comply with the order
of the court within 10 days, otherwise, he would be arrested. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not china bank may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of the
debtor by invoking the provisions of RA 1405.
Held:
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. In the present case, there was no inquiry as to how much the
actual deposits are, the only inquiry that the court had was whether or not there are deposits of the then defendants
in China bank.

Board of Administrators, Phil. Veterans Adm. V. Bautista, GR No. 37867

Facts:
Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last world war that took active participation in the liberation
drive against the enemy. But due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans
Administration, formerly known as Philippine Veterans Board, now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, is a
government agency charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of the Veterans
and their orphans, widows or parents.
On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of R.A. 65 with the Philippines Veterans
Board, alleging that he was suffering from PTB. Due to his incomplete supporting documents, his application was
not approved.
On August 8, 1968, petitioner was able to complete his supporting papers and the board found out that his disability
was 100%. Thus, he was awarded the full benefits of Section 9, R.A. 65.
R.A. 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969 providing for an increase in the basic pension to P100 a month and the
additional pension to P30 a month for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children.
Petioner claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from October 19, 1955 to June 21, 1957.
The lower court’s decision was in favor of Gasilao. However, the Philippine Veterans Board insisted that the lower
court erred in ordering the board to retroact the effectivity of the award to Gasilao.

Issue:
Whether or not Gasilao pension benefits shall start from 1955, the year he filed his first application.

Rulings:
Yes. Pension / veteran statutes shall be construed liberally in favor of the pensioners / veterans. Veterans and
pension laws are enacted to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured
and the dangers they encountered in the line of duty. They are expression of gratitude to and recognition of those
who rendered service to the country. For these reasons, such statues are construed liberally to the end that their
noble purpose is best accomplished.

PCFI v. National Telecommunications Commission

G.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983

FACTS:
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which,
however, was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that “there was a necessity of a
hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT”. On November 22, 1982, the
NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT’s new and increased SIP rates. It is the
submission of the petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and
baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 217.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential
Decree No. 217.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

HELD:
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to promulgate rules and
regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a simple problem of
statutory construction – that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision sustained the petitioner’s
contention that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to
the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary
meaning; the word used is the permissive “may” and not the mandatory “shall.” The non-unanimous resolution thus
relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est
recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication
knows that canons of statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we
have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more subservient
to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word “may”
in a statute is permissive while the word “shall” is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal
interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the
legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative
intention. In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as
mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of
PLDT’s SIP. It is untimely, considering the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate
defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the
decision of NTC is annulled and set aside.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm,
alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment
of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The strike
began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union, for
“damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The
union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance.
The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do
not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of
the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original
wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the
jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article
217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for
explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now,
certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages,
arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by
the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf
in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]),
except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Leonardo Paat vs Court of Appeals, et. Al.

GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167

FACTS: truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan
sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the
case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against
petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter
alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not
legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the
issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there
is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11)
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin
suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

People v Mapa
GR No. L-22301
30 Aug 67

Facts: On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed firearm. The
defendant admitted before the trial court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a
permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor of Batangas and that
he is exempt from the requirement of securing a license of firearm. The defendant also showed a certification that
he was appointed as such.

Issue: whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary

Held: In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction because the law is clear. The law
provides for the class of people who are not covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was provided for secret
agents. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."

PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C. VASCO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988 ]

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (RP) through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) entered into a lease
contract (Contract A) on April 2, 1965 with Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502
square meters, for 25 years.

On May 21, 1965, another lease contract (Contract B and in effect a sublease) was entered into by and between
Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000
square meters for 25 years.

On June 1, 1968, a new lease contract (Contract C) was entered into, by and between CAA and MOPI over the same
parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years, without the approval of the secretary of the Public
Works and Communications (PWC).

Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts between CAA, Leveriza and MOPI, the CAA seeks the rescission
or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and
depends has already been cancelled by the CAA and maintains that Contract C with the CAA is the only valid and
subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. On the other hand,
Leverizas' claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and
subsisting; that it is Contract C between MOPI and CAA which should be declared void.

The lower court and Intermediate Appellate Court ruled in favor of CAA, hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrator of CAA had the statutory authority, without the approval of the then
secretary of the PWC, to enter into or cancel a lease contract over a real property owned by the RP.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court upheld CAA’s authority to enter into and cancel a contract of lease over a property
owned by the RP without the approval of the secretary of the PWC.

Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), such contract of lease must be executed: (1) by the President
of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly vested by law. It is readily
apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under
the third category.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

As provided in Section 32 of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and
existence, administers properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on these properties that the
Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any
kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any
personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary.

The basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation
on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are
not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefore specially should prevail.

Roderick Daoang and Rommel Daoang vs The Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
(GR No. L-34568, 28 March 1988) 159 SCRA 369

Facts: On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. On 22
April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners
herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1 March 1971,
and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt
under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

HELD: The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot
adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant”, found
in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children”. The children thus mentioned
have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be subjects of interpretation. In the present case,
Roderick and Rommel Daoang , the grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
judgement of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy
and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective
parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for
Wilson Marcos and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with “Agonoy”, which is the family name
of the petitioners, without pronouncements as to costs

PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169

Facts: Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to
approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC
deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place,
the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary
hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date
January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The
petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set
on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue: Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.

Held:It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with
the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence,
it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled.

PERFECTO VS. MEER

FACTS:
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his
salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court
of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9
that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may
be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution.

HELD:
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution thereof. The
prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for
one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as
otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that
could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the
Constitution.

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID

G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953

Facts:
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of
which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” According
to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers
the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of
the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution? Is Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
constitutional?
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Ruling: On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather exhaustive and well
considered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and
Justice Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. On
the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional, the court believes that this is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is
recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was
before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term. The court reiterates the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to
the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution. Further, the court holds that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes
is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case
by the highest court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in
so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered “not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law”, constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the
judiciary. In this sense, the court is of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the
fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on
judges salaries, dissenting opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected to
the Income Tax Law prevailing. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. Hence, court affirms
judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judges’ salaries.

Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to prohibit the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court from making deductions of withholding taxes from
their salaries. According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers is a violation
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased”. In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted
that their salaries are being decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis. In particular,
since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution,
petitioners claimed that the intent of the framers was to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of
salaries. The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response to representations that the Court
direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. While the
question has been resolved, the Court decided to settle the legal issues through a judicial pronouncement.

ISSUE/HELD: Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
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RULING: Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax. This payment of income tax does not fall
within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. Further, the
deletion of the grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary was a way of ensuring
the equality of the three branches of government. Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of
the framers was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable, as is applicable to all income earners. The
course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII further clarified
the issue: Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the
word “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted, was accepted. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by
putting a period after “decreased”, it is with the understanding that the salaries of justices are subject to tax. He
cited that this is based on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which states that no salary of any public officer shall be
exempt from payment of income tax. Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and
Dencia vs David were not applicable anymore.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)

FACTS: Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June
28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased
claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in
the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the
protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex
insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the
worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING: The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they
became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules
and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case
should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should
be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Sarmiento Vs. Mison

156 SCRA 549

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the
appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions
of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and
confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987
Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on
Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was
filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the
floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives,
acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
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the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got
through the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S: 1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD: 1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going.
As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or
facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the
Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an
impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice
following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In
compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from
the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members,
an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC –
one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During
the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission
on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of
having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in
the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would
deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC
does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress
will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.

Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is
violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously
discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of
Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind,
that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one
(1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company
of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must
be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the
foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of
the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed
to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to
resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records
thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the
Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are
still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism
is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government
would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one
full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus,
any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not
be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount
law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply
made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions
are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

FACTS: Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal of our Decision in
G.R. No. 191618 dated November 23, 2010, dismissing his petition and declaring the establishment of respondent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional.

Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET:

[1] He has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a concerned citizen.
[2] He is not estopped from assailing the constitution of the PET simply by virtue of his appearance as counsel of
former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before respondent tribunal.
[3] Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET.
[4] The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).
Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which
cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner
submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court,
likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
On the other hand, in its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains
that:
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

[1] Petitioner is without standing to file the petition.

[2] Petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET.
[3] The constitution of the PET is "on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be
the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution."

ISSUE: Is PET unconstitutional?

HELD: We reiterate that the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the
unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and
tenable.

Petitioner is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the provision itself was the only basis
for this Court to sustain the PET's constitutionality.

We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as
supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present
Constitution.

The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is
not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by
petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect. DENIED.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts: Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz,
the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect
or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held: The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate
any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not
violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed
that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine
Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died
a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employedtherein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put
it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at
bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinctionbetween public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming
arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Imbong Vs. Ochoa

G.R No. 204819

Facts: The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the legislative’s
decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law
is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and
population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile,
the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the
RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

Issue: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

Ruling: NO. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country’s population.
While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These
family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For
said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH
Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court
has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germaneto the overriding objective to control the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to certain provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012

Facts: The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million
shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s
common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional
provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which
limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the
case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision
filed by the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision?

Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an
economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve,
that is – to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In
the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with
voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Court’s
interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. vs Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation
G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014

Facts: Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the
province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), it learned
that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Petitioner McArthur,
through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA and Exploration
Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 covering an area of over 1,782
hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-IVB-44 which includes an
area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and EP were then transferred to
Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6, 2006, assigned to petitioner McArthur. Petitioner Narra
acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & Development
Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an application for an MPSA with the MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on January
6, 1992. Through the said application, the DENR issued MPSA-IV-1-12 covering an area of 3.277 hectares in barangays
Calategas and San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or
assigned its rights and interests over the MPSA application in favor of Narra. Another MPSA application of SMMI was
filed with the DENR Region IV-B, labeled as MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47) over 3,402 hectares in
Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja, Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan. SMMI subsequently conveyed,
transferred and assigned its rights and interest over the said MPSA application to Tesoro. On January 2, 2007,
Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3) separate petitions for the denial of
petitioners’ applications for MPSA designated as AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 and MPSA IV-1-12. In the petitions,
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by
MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable
stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by
applications since it knows that it can only participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed
Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were
likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner corporations are Filipino and can validly be issued MPSA and EP.
DAYANGHIRANG, ALEXA DANIELLE C.
STAUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Held: No. The SEC Rules provide for the manner of calculating the Filipino interest in a corporation for purposes,
among others, of determining compliance with nationality requirements (the ‘Investee Corporation’). Such manner
of computation is necessary since the shares in the Investee Corporation may be owned both by individual
stockholders (‘Investing Individuals’) and by corporations and partnerships (‘Investing Corporation’). The said rules
thus provide for the determination of nationality depending on the ownership of the Investee Corporation and, in
certain instances, the Investing Corporation.

Under the SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the Investee Corporation. The first case
is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the Control Test in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion
in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ‘(s)hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the
liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of
the Investing Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino.

The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of
the 1967 SEC Rules which states, “but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is
less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine
nationality.” Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and
the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., “grandfathered”) to determine the total percentage of Filipino
ownership. Moreover, the ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing
Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation.

In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the second part of the SEC
Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture
corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other
joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the
60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.