CL1953 Laos Report

Report
of Independent Expert
Panel (IEP)
Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy Project

Failure of
Saddle Dam D

Final Report
Anton J. SCHLEISS / Jean-Pierre TOURNIER / Ahmed F. CHRAIBI

20 / 03 / 2019

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TABLE OF CONTENT
1 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5

2 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Purpose of the Panel and Terms of Reference .............................................................................. 8
2.2 Panel members ............................................................................................................................. 8
2.3 Organization of the Panel ............................................................................................................. 9
3 Panel activities ............................................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Missions ...................................................................................................................................... 10
3.2 Supporting information ............................................................................................................... 15
4 XPXN Project Features ................................................................................................................... 16
4.1 General Description of XPXN HPP according Detailed Design Report ........................................ 16
4.2 Saddle Dam D Design .................................................................................................................. 18
4.2.1 Basic design ................................................................................................................... 18
4.2.2 Detailed Design .............................................................................................................. 19
4.3 Saddle Dam D, As Built ................................................................................................................ 20
5 Failure of Saddle Dam D ................................................................................................................ 22
5.1 Chronology of Failure Incident .................................................................................................... 22
5.2 Rainfall and reservoir level .......................................................................................................... 23
5.3 Sequence of failure ..................................................................................................................... 24
5.4 Panel interpretation of failure sequence .................................................................................... 34
6 Investigated causes of failure ........................................................................................................ 35
6.1 General remarks on failure modes ............................................................................................. 35
6.2 Failure modes considered ........................................................................................................... 37
6.2.1 Overtopping ................................................................................................................... 37
6.2.2 Internal erosion and subsidence ................................................................................... 37
6.2.3 Foundation water tightness .......................................................................................... 38
6.2.4 Slope instabilities ........................................................................................................... 38
6.2.5 High pore pressure ........................................................................................................ 39
6.2.6 Soil collapse ................................................................................................................... 39
6.2.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 39
7 Post-failure geological and geotechnical site and laboratory investigations as recommended by
the Panel ........................................................................................................................................ 40
8 Panel observations ........................................................................................................................ 42
XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

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8.1 Design Changes from Basic Design to Detailed Design to As Built based on pre-failure geological
and geotechnical investigations .................................................................................................. 42
8.2 Slope stability analysis performed during Detailed Design ......................................................... 43
8.3 Construction ................................................................................................................................ 45
8.4 Monitoring system and follow-up during first filling .................................................................. 46
8.5 Panel interpretation of dam monitoring data ............................................................................. 47
8.6 Visual observations of the Panel made during the site visits ...................................................... 52
8.7 Conclusions on the characteristics of Saddle Dam D foundation based on visual site
observations ................................................................................................................................ 57
8.8 Comments on findings of post-failure geological and geotechnical site and laboratory
investigations .............................................................................................................................. 59
8.8.1 General .......................................................................................................................... 59
8.8.2 Main drilling results ....................................................................................................... 60
8.8.3 Identification testing ..................................................................................................... 61
8.8.3.1 Moisture Content – Atterberg limits ......................................................................... 61
8.8.3.2 Gradation ................................................................................................................... 63
8.8.3.3 Shear Strength ........................................................................................................... 64
8.8.3.4 Compressive testing (from EVN lab) .......................................................................... 65
8.8.4 Large scale permeability testing .................................................................................... 66
8.9 Conclusions on investigations and observations ........................................................................ 67
9 Analysis of breach incident of Saddle Dam D ................................................................................ 68
9.1 Causes of failure and its triggering .............................................................................................. 68
9.2 Numerical sensibility analysis of dam stability ............................................................................ 70
9.3 Prevention of failure ................................................................................................................... 71
10 Consequences for the other dams of XPXN ................................................................................... 73
10.1 Saddle Dam A ........................................................................................................................... 73
10.2 Saddle Dam E and F .................................................................................................................. 73
10.3 Xe-Pian Dam ............................................................................................................................. 78
11 General recommendations for the project of New Saddle Dam D ................................................ 84
12 Lessons learnt ................................................................................................................................ 85
13 Recommendations regarding dam safety in Laos PDR .................................................................. 87
14 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 90
15 Acknowledgement ......................................................................................................................... 93


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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Terms of Reference (ToR) of Independent Expert Panel (IEP)

Appendix B: Supporting information
Appendix C: Technical Note on CPT Testing

Appendix D: Abbreviations and selected definitions
Appendix E: Recent bibliography on residual soils

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1 Executive Summary
This final report on the failure of Saddle Dam D of Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower
project summarizes the findings of the Independent Expert Panel (IEP) based on the
available supporting information and the observations made by the IEP during the site
visits carried out in the beginning of October 2018 and end of November 2018.
Furthermore, it considers the results of the recommended geotechnical investigations,
made available in January 2019, and the numerical sensitivity analysis of the dam stability.
According to the available sequence of photographs and the reporting of the event, the
observed movements of the sliding mass are of complex geometry. Nevertheless, the IEP
is convinced that the main evidence of the incident at its beginning is a rotational sliding
involving the lateritic foundation. The most important weakness in the foundation
triggering deep sliding has developed along the deepest area of the saddle, respectively the
highest section of the dam. Thus, the foundation of the Saddle Dam D was without doubt
involved in its failure.
According to the site visit observations, the monitoring data analysis and the review of the
available photographs, before, during and after the failure, as well as the results of
geotechnical investigations, the IEP considers that the root cause of the incident is related
to the high permeability of the foundation. The high permeability was above all favored by
the presence of canaliculus interconnected path having high sensitivity to erosion. In fact,
the geotechnical investigations revealed, that the foundation of the Saddle Dam D is very
heterogeneous with a predominance of clayey sandy-silty soils. Numerous passages rich in
sand and even gravel leading to low core recoveries and higher permeability values have
been observed.
The mechanism of failure of the Saddle Dam D was most probably triggered by the
following successive sequences:
1. Due to the presence of high permeability horizons in the foundation, as confirmed

by the investigations, groundwater level at the downstream toe was close to the
surface generating resurgence in the vegetated area where topography declines
rapidly. This hypothesis is supported by the observation made downstream of the
very similar Saddle Dam E, where evidence of resurgence with some internal erosion
was observed.
2. With continuing resurgence in the vegetated area downstream of the dam toe,
regressive erosion has developed in the foundation resulting in the formation of
ducts that collapsed from time to time, especially in the deepest section of the saddle
where the highest seepage gradients occur. The resulting softening of the laterite
triggered the speeding up of the settlement and the appearance of the first cracks on
the dam crest.
3. When the erosion and softening in the foundation reached a certain extent, the static
dam stability was no longer ensured and a deep rotational sliding at the highest
section of the embankment developed. Simultaneously, converging embankment
movements occurred from the lateral border of the sliding mass towards the middle,

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resulting in a bumping up of the downstream embankment face and the subsidence

of the track in front of the dam toe.
4. When the remaining thin upstream edge of the embankment crest breached, the
embankment was overtopped and the catastrophic uncontrolled release of water
from the reservoir washed away the central section of the Saddle Dam D and its
foundation.
Even if July 2018 was the wettest month over the record since 2008, with some 1350 mm
falling up to the 29th of July, and the highest daily rainfall event occurring on July 22 with
438 mm, the flood event at the spillway operating with some 680 m3/s just before Saddle
Dam D failure was only in the range of a 10 to 20 years flood. Yet, the reservoir was still
well below the maximum operation level at the failure incident and the embankment has to
withstand safely the probably maximum flood event. Thus, the failure incident cannot be
considered as “force majeure”.
The failure could have been prevented by an appropriate treatment of the foundation
aiming at providing the required water tightness, filtration and drainage. Furthermore, an
early and correct interpretation of the monitoring data and a reinforced detailed visual
inspection in the downstream toe region of the embankment, would have allowed to take
actions trying to save the Saddle Dam D and/or at least trigger the warning earlier.
Since the bottom outlet has only a small capacity mainly for the release of environmental
flow, there was no immediate possibility to control or to lower the level of the reservoir
when the first signs of failure were observed. There remained only the possibility of
removing by blasting and breaching the spillway labyrinth wall reaching almost 6 m height.
Without having any control on the reservoir level during operation, at least in the most
upper part by spillway gates eventually together with the powerhouse, such a concept is not
acceptable according to the best international practice. In view of the catastrophic
consequences in case of failure, this is particularly important for reservoirs, which volume
is contained by several large embankment dams like for the Xe-Namnoy reservoir.
Saddle Dams E and F as well as the part of Xe-Pian Dam founded on lateritic soil, have
similar foundation conditions compared to the failed Saddle Dam D. From the monitoring
assessment, they already exhibit a comparable sudden acceleration of settlement and
increase in the downstream hydrostatic pressures which are linked to the foundation quality.
These dams have to be reviewed and appropriate rehabilitation measures have to be defined
to ensure the safety requirements preventing any undesirable behavior.
The evolution of the groundwater level in any topographical depression present in the near
downstream region of both Xe-Pian and Xe-Namnoy dam has to be monitored by
piezometers or at least included in the visual inspection program.
The timely (re-)construction of new Saddle Dam D and rehabilitation of the

aforementioned dams is of paramount importance in order to allow a safe reservoir filling
during the next rainy season. The concept and design of the new saddle dam has to be
robust in view of the very limited construction time, uncertainty of foundation and safety
requirements. Furthermore, the new Saddle Dam D should be equipped with two high-
capacity outlets which allow to control the reservoir level at least in its most upper 20 m

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during wet season. The reinforcement of Saddle Dams E and F as well as Xe-Pian dam
requires relevant information on the depth and the quality of their lateritic foundation.
Thus, prior to the detailed definition of the reinforcement works to carry out, specific and
thorough investigations are necessary.
Lessons learnt from the incident comprise, among others:
• The delicate and very heterogeneous nature of Lateritic soils: they may contain
highly permeable and erodible horizons, canaliculus conveying water on a long
distance, they soften when saturated and may be sensitive to significant settlement.
Since Laterite formations are residual soils, which may even have a potential of
collapse when they are not permanently saturated. Investigations in lateritic soil
should include large and deep open trenches. Positive cutoff is the most adapted
seepage control arrangement in this type of foundation;
• During the first reservoir filling, highly experienced dam engineers should be
mobilized on the site (or in permanent contact with) to carry out immediate
interpretation of monitoring data and to inspect the dam and its surroundings.
Experienced eyes are very important in early detection of undesirable behaviors;
• Easy access paths and vegetation-free space has to be ensured downstream of the
dam in order to allow a comfortable visual inspection and early intervention in case
of danger.
The IEP recommends that all large hydropower and dam projects are reviewed during the
design and construction phases by an independent international panel of experts.
Furthermore, a dam safety concept should be put into operation in Laos PDR by creating
a dam safety supervisory authority based on a legal framework in the country.

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2 Introduction
2.1 Purpose of the Panel and Terms of Reference
The purpose of the Independent Expert Panel (IEP) is to investigate into and report on
the failure of the Saddle Dam D at the Hydroelectric Power project Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy
(XPXN) which occurred on July 23, 2018. The Panel will report on the root cause of the
failure of the Saddle Dam D as well as give support on the evaluation of the review of the
main XPXN Dams and the other saddle dams. In addition, the Panel will make
recommendations to the Government of Laos PDR (GOL) on actions that could be taken
to ensure that a similar failure does not occur at other HPP projects in Laos PDR.
More in detail, upon the completion of the IEP's engineering / technical investigation, the
IEP shall prepare and submit to the National Investigation Committee NIC-XPXN a
report consisting of two parts I and II (the "Report"), which should
i) fully and reliably describe and relate the engineering / technical reason(s) for and/or
underlying physical root cause(s) of the failure of the Saddle Dam D of the XPXN
Project (Part I of Report);
ii) give support for the engineering / technical evaluation of the review of the main
dams of the XPXN Project, and of the other saddle dams comprised by the XPXN
Project (Part II of Report);
iii) provide the IEP's recommendations for technical risk to the GOL as to actions that
may be taken by the GOL to help to ensure that no similar dam failure will occur at
any other hydroelectric power project in the Laos PDR (Part I of Report).
The detailed Terms of Reference (ToR) are given in Appendix A.
2.2 Panel members
The GOL appointed the following individuals to act as independent engineering / technical
experts and members of the IEP:
• Prof. Dr. Anton J. Schleiss, Switzerland
• Mr. Ahmed F. Chraibi, Morocco
• Dr. Jean-Pierre Tournier, Canada.
The IEP is chaired by Professor Dr. Anton J. Schleiss.
None of the members of the Panel were involved in the project of XPXN dams or has any
connection whatsoever with the various parties involved in.

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2.3 Organization of the Panel
The Government of Laos (GOL) has installed a National Investigation Committee NIC-
XPXN regarding the Saddle Dam D failure of Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy project. The IEP shall
determine the process and procedures of its independent engineering / technical
investigations in collaboration with, and as supported by, the NIC-XPXN.
The organization of the IEP within NIC-XPXN is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Government of Laos
GOL
National Investigation
Independent Expert Panel Committee
Ministry of Energy and
IEP NIC Mines
Prof. Dr. Anton SCHLEISS (Head)
Mr. Ahmed CHRAIBI
Chair
Deputy Prime Minister
MEM
Dr. Jean-Pierre TOURNIER Dr. Bounthong Chitmany
Field Ministerial
Pöyry TEPCO NIC Secretariat
Investigations Investigation
Figure 1: Organization of the Panel (IEP) within the National Investigation Committee (NIC)
comprising members of the Government of Laos PDR (GOL) and Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM).

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3 Panel activities
3.1 Missions
A first mission for preparing the work of IEP was done by Prof. Anton Schleiss from
August 17 to 21, 2018. The schedule of the mission and the activities carried out was as
follows:
Fri. 17.08.2018: Arrival in Vientiane in the evening, Evening – meeting with Mr. Stephen
Moll, Pöyry;
Sat.18.08.2018: Morning – meeting with GOL-NIC; Afternoon – Flight to Pakse;
Sun. 19.08.2018: Site visit

Morning – Meeting of NIC and IEP with Project Owner and EPC
Contractor at XPXN site office
Project Presentations by Owner/ OE / EPC Contractor (SK):

• General project overview XPXN HPP
• Presentation of accident chronology (what happened when, what was
observed before, after dam failure), photo presentation of accident
• Presentation of Owner’s EPC Contractors views on cause of the
accident and preliminary ideas of reconstruction and general project
review
• General discussions, questions by IEP and NIC
• Detailed discussions with design und supervision engineers;
presentation of basis and final design and selected documents
Afternoon – Site visit Saddle Dam D; the abutments were not yet
accessible since the erosion process due to the reservoir outflow was still
ongoing
Evening – Preliminary root cause brain storming among IEP and
international experts (TEPCO)
Mon. 20.08.2018: Site visit

Morning – Meeting with Project Owner PNPC / OE / EPC Contractor
(SK) at XPXN site office:
• Transmission with explanation of official documentation
• Request of additional information
• Discussion and decision on geotechnical recognition campaign on
the remaining part of saddle dam D on left bank (four core drillings
across dam down to rock under foundation; analysis in certified
laboratory under supervision of international experts)
Afternoon – Technical discussion in Pakse on failure and possible root
causes between IEP, TEPCO and NIC
Evening: Flight from Pakse to Vientiane.

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Tue. 21.08.2018: Morning – Meeting with Mr. H.E Thongloun Sisoulith (Prime Minister)
Afternoon – Meeting between NIC and IEP: Report on findings from the
initial site visit; presentation of next steps for investigation
Evening – Departure of Prof. Anton Schleiss from Vientiane
After a Skype meeting of the IEP on August 27, 2018 there was daily mail exchange among
the IEP members as well as with GOL-NIC for the preparation and the detailed definition
of the site investigations at Saddle Dam D. Furthermore, the second mission of the full
IEP was prepared.
The second mission of the IEP involving all three panel members took place from
October 1 to 6, 2018. The schedule of the mission and the activities carried out was as
follows:
Mon. 01.10.2018: Arrival in Vientiane early afternoon, Afternoon – Meeting among IEP
members
Tue. 02.10.2018: Morning – Meeting between GOL-NIC and IEP; Afternoon –

Discussions between IEP and TEPCO regarding site investigations, travel
to Pakse
Wed. 03.10.2018: Site visit

Morning – Inspection of Saddle Dam D:
• Conditions after failure on right and left bank: geological and
geotechnical close inspection of the lateritic foundation
• Remaining part of Saddle Dam D: compacted layers, filters and riprap
• Ongoing drilling works on left bank
• Inspection of core boxes on left and right banks
• Inspection of investigation trenches on left and right banks
• Short visit on a boat of intended site of new saddle dam D
Afternoon – Inspection of Saddle Dams E and F
• Condition of crest and downstream faces
• Monitoring system
• Downstream foot drainage
• Resurgence of seepage water in vegetated area downstream of dam toe
Thu. 04.10.2018: Morning – Inspection of Xe-Pian dam:

• Condition of crest and downstream faces; zone of settlement
• Downstream foot drainage and drainage water measurement system
• Resurgence of seepage water on the downstream toe of the dam
• Spillway and bottom outlet
Morning – Inspection of Xe-Namnoy dam:
• Condition of crest and downstream faces
• Spillway

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• Downstream foot drainage and drainage water measurement system

• Bottom outlet
Afternoon – Technical discussion at XPXN site office between IEP and
SK, request for additional information
Afternoon – Meeting of NIC and IEP at XPXN site office with Project
Owner and EPC Contractor (SK): Presentation by SK and Mott
MacDonald (MM) comprising 1) Geotechnical Investigation for SD D, 2)
Geological Observations, 3) Aspect of the Other Dams (XP, XN, HMW,
SD-A, E&F), 4) Dam Monitoring Results, 5) Root Cause of Saddle Dam
D Failure (by MM), 6) Dam Safety Review (by MM), 7) New Dam Design
(by MM), 8) Time Schedule for the Remaining Work
Preliminary discussions between EPC Contractor (SK) and NIC/IEP
Fri. 05.10.2018: Morning – Meeting preparation among IEP and TEPCO

Afternoon – Meeting between NIC and IEP: Report on findings from the
second site visit; presentation of next steps for investigations; answering
questions of the observation delegations from South Korea and Thailand.
Evening – Flight to Vientiane
Sat. 06.10.2018: Morning – working meeting among IEP members, preparation of report
structure
Afternoon – working meeting among IEP members
Evening – Departure of Prof. Anton Schleiss and Dr. Jean-Pierre Tournier
Sat. 06.10.2018: Morning – Departure of Mr. Ahmed Chraibi
The third mission of the IEP involving all panel members took place from November 26
to December 1, 2018 with the following schedule activities:
Mon. 26.11.2018: Arrival in Vientiane between early and late afternoon, Afternoon –
Evening – Preparation work and meeting among IEP members
Tue. 27.11.2018: Morning – Travel to Pakse – Site visit

Inspection of site of New Saddle Dam E
• Geological conditions of left and right abutment
• Drilling campaign
• Intended dam axis
• Upstream and downstream cofferdam
Visit of left bank of the remaining part of Saddle Dam D
• Inspection of the two pits where two soakage tests have been carried
out
• Inspection of trench cut excavated in the remaining embankment
Owner, Observers, OE and EPC Contractor (SK): Presentation by SK
and Mott MacDonald (MM) regarding the project of the New Saddle
Dam D (RCC Construction Works) comprising 1) Overview: project
information, plan view, reservoir area, New Saddle Dam D, 2) Basic

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design: information, design parameter, 3) New Dam geology:

investigations, GI results.
Preliminary discussions between EPC Contractor (SK) and NIC/IEP
Evening – Travel back to Pakse and preparation of questions by IEP to
EPC Contractor (SK)
Wed. 28.11.2018: Morning – Meeting of NIC and IEP at hotel in Pakse with Project
Owner PNPC, Observers, OE and EPC Contractor (SK): Presentation
by SK and Mott MacDonald (MM) regarding Saddle Dam E and F:
Strengthening works concepts and design methodology comprising 1)
Ground investigations, 2) Reasons why cut-off wall and strengthening
works are proposed, 3) Seepage control options, 4) Strengthening
measure for D/S, 5) Design process, 6) Xe-Pian Dam
Preliminary discussions between EPC Contractor (SK) and NIC/IEP,
answering of questions to IEP regarding project of New Saddle Dam D
Afternoon – Preparation of the IEP presentation of Intermediate Report
as well as feedback on New Saddle Dam D project and reinforcement of
Saddle Dams D and F and Xe-Pian Dam
Evening – Travel back from Pakse to Vientiane
Thu. 29.11.2018: Morning – Afternoon – Meeting of NIC and IEP in Vientiane with
Project Owner, OE and EPC Contractor (SK) as well as Observers:
Presentation by IEP of the Intermediate Report on Failure of Saddle
Dam D comprising 1) Introduction, 2) Failure of Saddle Dam D, 3)
Investigated causes of failure: Panel observations, Design changes,
Stability analysis, Construction, Monitoring, Visual observations,
Conclusions, 4) Analysis of breach incident: Causes of failure and its
triggering, Numerical sensitivity analysis of dams stability, Prevention of
failure, 6) Consequences for other dams of XPXN, 7) Preliminary
recommendations for project of saddle Dam D, 8) Lessons learnt, 9)
Recommendations regarding dam safety in Laos PDR, 10) Conclusions.
Discussion and answering questions
Presentation by IEP: Comments on New Saddle Dam D;
Rehabilitation of SD E, F & XP Dams
Fri. 30.11.2018: Morning – Meeting between NIC and IEP: Discussions on Intermediate
Report of IEP; recommendations regarding New Saddle Dam D and
Rehabilitation of SD’s E, F & Xe-Pian Dam;
Afternoon – working meeting among IEP members, preparation of
structure of Final Report on Failure of Saddle Dam D and Intermediate
Note on New Saddle Dam D and Rehabilitation of SD E, F & XP Dams
Evening: Departure of Prof. A. Schleiss
Sat. 01.12.2018: Morning – Departure of Mr. Ahmed Chraibi and Dr. Jean-Pierre
Tournier

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The fourth mission of the IEP involving all panel members, mainly with the purpose to
present the final report as well as to visit the ongoing reconstruction and reinforcement
works took, place from February 25 to March 1, 2019 with the following schedule activities:
Mon. 25.02.2019: Arrival in Vientiane between early and late afternoon, Afternoon –
Evening – Preparation work and meeting among IEP members
Tue. 26.02.2019: Morning – Meeting between NIC and IEP at Prime Minister Office:
Feedback and discussions on Final Report of IEP; presentation of NIC
assessment field investigation.
Late morning – Meeting between IEP/NIC representatives and Korean
Government Expert Delegation at Ministry of Energy and Mines office;
feedback on IEP presentation (29.11.2018) of Intermediate Report.
Afternoon – Technical discussion Korean Government Expert
Delegation.
Evening – Travel to Pakse
Wed. 27.03.2019: Morning – Site visit

Inspection of excavation works of New Saddle Dam D
• Deepest, middle part of foundation; geological features after cleaning
of a slope slice by running water
• Right abutment with ongoing concrete slab for contact grouting tests
• Left abutment with ongoing concrete slab for contact grouting tests
Inspection of ongoing reinforcement works at Saddle Dam E.
Owner, OE, Observers and EPC Contractor (SK): Presentation by Mott
MacDonald (MM) regarding the project of the New Saddle Dam D, the
reinforcement of Saddle Dams E and F and Xe-Pian Dam and the Dam
Safety Review of XPXN project.
Preliminary discussions between EPC Contractor (SK) and NIC/IEP.
Evening – Travel back to Pakse.
Thu. 28.02.2019: Morning – Afternoon – Meeting of NIC and IEP at hotel in Pakse with
Project Owner, OE, Observers and EPC Contractor (SK): Presentation
by SK and Mott MacDonald (MM) regarding their view on the root cause
of Saddle Dam D failure. Answering of questions to NIC/IEP and
Observers regarding root cause analysis and consequences for
reinforcement works. Discussion on proposed reinforcement works for
Saddle Dams E and F and Xe-Pian Dam as well as on stability analysis
of New Saddle Dam D.
Evening – Travel back from Pakse to Vientiane.
Fri. 01.03.2019: Morning – Afternoon – Meeting of NIC and IEP in Vientiane with
Project Owner, OE and EPC Contractor (SK) as well as Observers:
Presentation by IEP of the Final Report on Failure of Saddle Dam D
comprising 1) Introduction, 2) Failure of Saddle Dam D, 3) Investigated
causes of failure, 4) Overview of post-failure geological and geotechnical
site and laboratory investigation, 5) Panel observations: Design changes,

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Stability analysis, Construction, Monitoring, Emergency action plan,

Visual observations, Comments on findings of post-failure geological
and geotechnical site and laboratory investigations, Conclusions on
investigations and observations, 6) Analysis of breach incident: Causes
of failure and its triggering, Numerical sensitivity analysis of dams
stability, Prevention of failure, Comments on SK-MM failure analysis,
Lessons learnt, 7) Conclusions.
Feedback discussion and answering questions.
Meeting of IEP with Deputy Prime Minister and representatives of
NIC.
Evening: Departure of Panel Members.
3.2 Supporting information
All supporting information and material made available for this Final Report on the failure
of Saddle Dam D is listed in Appendix B. The abbreviations as well as some selected
definitions of technical expressions used in the report are given in Appendix D.

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4 XPXN Project Features
4.1 General Description of XPXN HPP according Detailed Design Report
The XPXN HPP is located in southern Laos P.D.R. on the Bolaven Plateau, approximately
550 km to the southeast of the capital Vientiane, 80 km to the east of Pakse on the Mekong
River, and 35 km to the west of Attapeu, a town located on the Xe-Kong River below the
plateau.
The XPXN HPP consists of a main large storage reservoir impounded by a dam on the
Xe-Namnoy River. From that reservoir, the water is transported by a long underground
waterway in order to gain a head of some 650 m, used for hydroelectric generation in an
open-air powerhouse at the foot of the Bolaven Plateau. From the powerhouse, the water
is released into the Xe-Kong River by a tailrace channel.
In order to increase the inflow to the Xe-Namnoy reservoir and consequently the
hydropower generation in the powerhouse, the runoff from two neighboring watersheds,
Houay Makchan and Xe-Pian, is diverted into the main reservoir. The diversion is made in
cascade, namely from the Houay Makchan catchment to the Xe-Pian reservoir, which also
stores the water from the Houay Namliang River and from there to the Xe-Namnoy
reservoir. This diversion system comprises a bottom intake on the Houay Makchan and a
dam and intake on the Xe-Pian River. Two transfer conduits, one working under free flow
from Houay Makchan to Xe-Pian and the second one under both pressurized and free flow
conditions from Xe-Pian to Xe-Namnoy ensures the transfer of the water to Xe-Namnoy
reservoir.
From the Xe-Namnoy reservoir the water is conveyed to the powerhouse units by means
of a power intake, 13.6 km of low-pressure headrace concrete lined tunnel, 475 m of vertical
shaft, 1,590 m of high-pressure tunnel, 810 m of penstock including the units flow
distribution steel manifold.
The powerhouse with three Francis units and one Pelton unit has an installed capacity of
410 MW. The produced hydroelectricity is mostly exported to Thailand by a 230 kV
transmission line and partly distributed for local consumption by 500 kV line. From the
powerhouse, the water is released into the tailrace channel which restitutes the flow some
6.33 km downstream in the Xe-Kong River.
The overview of XPXN HPP is shown in Figure 2 together with a longitudinal profile
(Figure 3).

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Figure 2: Overview of XPXN HPP showing the main features of the project: Main reservoir created by
Xe-Namnoy Dam and Saddle Dams A, C, D, E and F; Xe-Pian Dam and reservoir and covered water
transfer channel to Xe-Namnoy reservoir; Houay Makchan weir for transfer
Figure 3: Longitudinal profile of XPXN HPP scheme
The Xe-Namnoy Dam and reservoir stores water from Xe-Namnoy River as well as the
diverted water from the Xe-Pian reservoir with total storage capacity of 1,043 million m3
and Full supply level (FSL) and Maximum water level (MWL) of respectively 788.5 m a.s.l
and 791.70 m a.s.l. The Xe-Namnoy Dam’s crest level is at elevation 794.0 m a.s.l. resulting
in a maximum height above foundations of 73.7 m. The crest length is ~1,600 m. The
spillway designed for a PMF of 4,000 m3/s consists of an arched labyrinth weir with crest
level at 788.5 m a.s.l. followed by chute and a flip bucket.
In addition to the main Xe-Namnoy Dam, five saddle dams are necessary to keep the
reservoir within the full supply level of EL. 788.50 m. The crest level of the saddle dams
corresponds with the crest level of the main Xe-Namnoy Dam, EL. 793.5 m. This leads to
maximum dam heights of 17 m above natural soil ground.

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4.2 Saddle Dam D Design
4.2.1 Basic design
The plan view of Saddle Dam D and highest section A-A as presented in the Basic Design1
is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. The design was based on the results of two
boreholes executed in 1997.
It consisted of 1:2.5 sloping homogeneous earth-fill dam founded on lateritic soil with crest
elevation at 793.5 m a.s.l.. The upstream slope of the dam is protected with a 2 m normal
thick riprap including a transition layer. The downstream slope is protected by 2 m normal
thick pervious fill. Drainage system is ensured by a toe drain consisting of rockfill and
transition layer founded on 1 m thick filter layer, which extended up to the cut-off trench.
As treatment of the laterite soil foundation at the vertical of the dam centerline is made of
a 5 m deep cut-off trench associated with consolidation grouting and a deeper grout curtain
reaching rock surface. According to the Basic Design report the combined consolidation
grouting and grout curtain should reduce differential settlement across the dam resulting
from differential loads between crest and embankment toes. For this, hybrid grouting five
rows were foreseen with the central row being the deepest grouted down to bedrock. The
depths of the rows immediately up and downstream of the central row were defined as
intermediate length with the outer row having a minimum depth (Figure 5). Angled grouting
into the abutments was also intended to reduce seepage at the abutments.
Figure 4: Plan view of Saddle Dam D as in the Basic Design
Figure 5: Section A-A (see Figure 4) of Saddle Dam D as in the Basic Design

1
Basic Design Report - Annex 6 – pages 39-41 and Drawing No. 71.22119.04.062

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4.2.2 Detailed Design
As in the Basic Design, also in the Detailed Design2 a 1:2.5 sloping homogeneous earth-fill
dam but with an increased crest elevation at 794.0 m a.s.l. was adopted as shown in Figure
6 and Figure 7. After removing 1 m of the top natural soil ground, Saddle Dam D is founded
directly on laterite soil-like formation reaching almost 20 m thickness.
Based on geotechnical surveys performed during the detailed design, consisting of the
permeability results obtained by falling head test from four additional boreholes in 2014, it
was concluded that the permeability coefficient of the laterite soil foundation of the saddle
dams “was so low as to form natural blanket”. Accordingly, grouting & cut-off trench works as
defined in the Basic Design were omitted.
Figure 6: Plan view of Saddle Dam D as in the Detailed Design
Figure 7: Section A-A and Detail A (see Figure 6) of Saddle Dam D as in the Detailed Design

2
Detailed Design Report: Chapter 13, pages 13-14 to 13-19 and Drawings PN.DD.0506.-C1.0110/0120

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As the safety factor against slope instability didn’t reach the required values (1.5), the
upstream and downstream toe at their highest section were loaded by a small counterweight
fills (see Figures 6 and 7).
The homogeneous earth-fill Saddle Dam D comprises the following zones in the Detailed
Design:
- Zone 1 consists of selected impervious lateritic material as used for the core material
of main Xe-Namnoy Dam.
- Zone 2C is a 0.5 m thick transition zone between the riprap (Zone 3C) and the
pervious fill (Zone 3D) respectively and the dam material (Zone 1).
- Zone 2A is a 1 m thick fine filter between laterite soil and the toe drain.
- Zone 3C protects the upstream face of dam by 1.5 m thick riprap against erosion by
wave action in the reservoir, rain and surface runoff.
- Zone 3D protects the downstream face by a 1.5 m thick pervious fill, “almost the
same as a rockfill”, against rain and surface runoff. The pervious fill is a dumped fill
with generally required but not specified compaction.
- Zone 3B at the downstream toe of the embankment was provided to control the
seepage through dam body and foundation. Toe drain consisted of the same rockfill
material as used for main Xe-Namnoy Dam.
4.3 Saddle Dam D, As Built
Finally, some minor changes occurred in the Construction Design3. The toe drain was
slightly shortened and the filter blanket’s thickness at the interface with the foundation
reduced to 0.5 m (Figure 8 and Figure 9).

3
Shop Drawings Saddle Dam D: PN.SD.05056-0110/0120

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Figure 8: Plan view of Saddle Dam D As Built
Figure 9: Section A-A and Detail A (see Figure 8) of Saddle Dam D as in As Built

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5 Failure of Saddle Dam D
5.1 Chronology of Failure Incident
Based on presentation made by SK E&C during the first meeting with NIC-IEP, the
chronology of the failure incident can be summarized as detailed in Table 14 of the
AECOM report4 (Table 1).
Table 1 : Chronology of the failure incident as given in Table 14 of the AECOM report

4
Contracts Engineer Special Report - Saddle Dam D Preliminary, Failure Investigation, 11 Sept. 2018, page 43


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No information is available on the actions taken following the view of the large settlements
observed since July 13, 2018.
5.2 Rainfall and reservoir level
In Figure 10, the evolution of rainfall and reservoir elevation from April 2017 to July 2018
is shown together with the intended impounding curve. According AECOM Report4, July
2018 was the wettest month with some 1,350 mm falling up to the 29th of July with two of
the highest daily rainfall events occurring within July, 438 mm on the 22nd and 140 mm on
the 15th. Also, within the month was 106 mm and 67.5 mm on the 23rd and 21st
respectively. July 2017 had the second highest monthly rainfall over the record since 2008
with 774 mm. When the reservoir reached the FSL 788.5, the spillway started spilling on
17th July and remained in operation until the Saddle Dam D failure on 23rd July.
Even if the rainfalls where quite heavy, the flood event at the spillway operating with some
680 m3/s just before Saddle Dam D failure was only in the range of 10 to 20 years flood
event according the Detailed Design Report2 (Chapter 5: Hydrology and Meteorology).
Figure 10: Evolution of rainfall and Xe-Namnoy reservoir elevation from April 2017 to July 2018
together with the intended impounding curve
Xe-Namnoy reservoir filling started in the 2017 wet season and reached EL~781 in
October 2017 and stayed near that level until the end of May 2018. Then in the 2018 wet
season the reservoir started to increase again reaching the maximum elevation 789.35 m
a.s.l. on July 23rd just before failure of Saddle Dam D (0.85m above the FSL).

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After the wet season 2017, the water level reached the upstream toe of Saddle Dam D at
the beginning of September 2017. Then the upstream counterweight rockfill was
submerged by about 3 meters in October 2017 remaining almost constant until May 2018.
At the observation of the first cracks on July 22, 2018 at 12:00-14:00 (according to
Table 1), the reservoir level was near El. 789.10 that means 4.90 m below the crest
level of Saddle Dam D. Just before failure on July 23, 2018 the reservoir level was still
4.65 m below the Saddle Dam D original crest level.
5.3 Sequence of failure
The sequence of failure presented here is based on a careful analysis of available photos of
the incident, provided mainly by the Contractor. Most of photos are of moderate quality as
they were taken during the evening or under rain or fog.
The first cracks were observed on July 22nd at ~12:00 pm. No detailed photographs of these
cracks are available even if a villager noticed the observation of these first cracks and came
back a few hours later (around 15:00 pm) with camera and together with the village chief
accompanied by several villagers. At the publication of this report, there is no credible visual
evidence regarding the observations made by the local population.
The IEP didn’t receive any rough survey (even a hand sketched drawing) of the
observed cracks, providing information on their location, development with time,
opening or offset. The photographs presented here-under along with monitoring data
constitute the main reliable information made available for the IEP review of the incident.

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Photo 1 (22 July 17:00): Initiation of large cracking on the dam crest and large offset in the top of the
upstream face (the yellow arrows on the left photo and the blue line on the right photo indicate the
upstream limit of the moving mass)
Photo 1 (22 July 17:00) corresponds to the situation where large cracking was observed
along the crest on more than 200 m length, with offsets on the upstream face, 1 to 2 meters
below the crest and crossing downstream at stations 400 and 500, approximately. The
reservoir was about at EL.789.10, which is still ~4.90 m below the crest level and less than
3 m below the offset. The crest movements impact the alignment of the colored blocs
placed on. The circled zone on the downstream track (on the top right of the left Photo 1)
is still undisturbed.
Photo 2 (22 July 17:00), shows the initiation of the downstream face protruding
concurrently with the crest upstream wedge sinking. This is called “secondary sliding”. The
photo on the right shows the first offset on the right-side limit of the moving mass. The
clockwise rotating movement is highlighted by the offset (red arrows) which increases
upstream. No upstream-downstream horizontal movement is observed. The downstream
track is still undisturbed.

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Photo 2 (22 July 17:00): (Left), view on the downstream face secondary sliding, the stairs in the
forefront correspond to the access to the piezometer GW3, and (Right) arrows show the right
abutment limit of the moving mass. The blue line corresponds to the dam axis
Photo 3 (23 July 04:30): Initiation of the failure
Photo 3 (23 July 04:30) corresponds to the situation almost 12 hours after Photo 1 and
clearly exhibits the kinematics movements of the failure. The triangle highlights the rotation
of the crest and the arrow shows the offset at station ~500, which is gradually decreasing
on the downstream slope in the zone where the rotational movement causes the lowest
displacements. On the track downstream, a new offset (circled in red) appeared along with
water ponding.
The area circled in yellow corresponds to the secondary sliding moving upwards along with
the sinking of the crest. It seems that there is a balance between the sinking of the upstream
edge of the crest and lifting of the downstream face. No evidence of movements is visible
on its continuity in the downstream track. This indicates that the moving mass must extend
deep into the foundation. The water begun to flow into the crest depression since the
remaining upstream part of the embankment, made of the pervious protections and very
thin clayey fill, could not withstand any more the hydrostatic pressure.

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Photo 4 (23 July 9:00): Progression of the movements while the alignment downstream edge of the
crest is almost maintained, along with the moving up of the protruding area.
Photo 4 (23 July 09:00), shows almost the same situation as Photo 3, with an increase of
the width of the upstream offset at station ~0+300 and offset’s crest height at the left side
sliding limit. The almost intact alignment of the blocs at the downstream edge of the crest
confirms again the rotational movement whereas the upstream blocs are sinking and some
of them are not visible any more. This is also confirmed by the attenuation of the offset in
the circled area on Photo 4. There is still no evidence of movements of the track in front
of the dam toe except in its continuity on the left side as marked by the arrow. This confirms
that the sliding surface must reach quite deep into the foundation ending downstream in
the vegetated area.
The offset of the protruding zone on the downstream face is still increasing while the sliding
mass is moving.

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Photo 5 (23-July, 10:35): This picture provides a clear evidence of the upward movement (lifting) of
the downstream dam face in the continuity of the sinking section of the crest.
Photo 5: (23-July, 10:35) provides a clear evidence of the upward movement or lifting of
the downstream face of the dam in the continuity of the sinking part of the crest. There is
no sign of any translational displacement in downstream direction of the secondary sliding
on the downstream embankment face. The circled area downstream of the toe track
indicates a falling tree.
Photo 6 (23 July 11:46): Beginning of water crossing the embankment
On Photo 6 (23 July 11:46) the movement of the sliding mass is speeding up and the water
begins to flow down to the secondary sliding area. The alignment of the downstream edge
of the crest is still almost preserved and the upstream sinking is exacerbated.

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Photo 7: (July 23 14:36): Dam breaching
On Photo 7 (July 23 14:36), the breaching of the dam is triggered, and the flow reaches the
track downstream of the dam toe. The washing out Saddle Dam D with full breaching has
started. At this stage, the offset at the left bank side has not affected the whole downstream
slope of the embankment. Rotational movement is still progressing. No evidence of a
significant translation (horizontal movement) is observed since at the left side limit of the
sliding mass the downstream slope is still undisturbed and not yet displaced compared to
the crest or the toe (circled area).
Photo 8 (July 23, 14:53): Aerial view at the beginning of the breaching

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Photo 8 (July 23, 14:53) provides an aerial view of the instable mass, just before the complete
breaching started. The circled zone corresponds to the secondary sliding which extension
is approaching that of the main sliding. Its continuity in the track in front of the dam toe is
well developed and corresponds mainly to a subsidence as shown in the Photo 9.
The light blue line on the crest highlights the preservation of the original alignment of the
crest. There is no evidence of any horizontal translational movement at the crest.
The zoom in the box at the top right of the photo reveals:
• The sliding of the crest at the left side limit of the moving mass toward the
saddle bottom. This movement is not affecting the whole downstream face
of the embankment;
• The secondary sliding extends into the track on front of the dam toe where
two offsets are visible. The first one conveys a small part of the water
overtopping the embankment and exhibits a bump in the vegetation area.
The other one, marked by the black arrows, indicate the most important
offset observed at the same time as the cracks developed on the left side of
the crest.
• Neither the offset of the crest nor that of the track do extend in the
downstream face of the embankment. The first reflects a rotational
movement of the crest while the latter mainly a subsidence of the track.
Photo 9 (23 July 15:01): Zoom on the offset developed in the track in front of the dam toe
Photo 9 (23 July 15:01) intends to show the vertical metric offset affecting the track and
the berm in front of the dam toe. The height of the offset is decreasing from downstream

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to upstream. This offset is open and corresponds to the section close to the maximum
height of the embankment where the breaching occurs.
Stairs to SD-GW3
Photo 10: On both left and right sides of the instable mass a trend of movement towards the center of
the deepest zone of the saddle is clearly visible.
On Photo 10 the left and right limit of the moving mass (only few minutes difference
between both photos) are shown. It can be seen clearly that the crest on both sides is mainly
moving laterally towards the deepest zone of the saddle, together with a rotational
movement as particularly visible at the left side (photo on the left). This may reflect a
significant weakening of the embankment/foundation near station 0+400, which is
fostering a convergence of the crest toward this area.
It is most likely that the center of the instable masse rotates towards downstream, while on
its both sides, a converging lateral movement along the dam centerline is developing.
Photo 11 (23 July 15:03): Aerial view of the downstream vegetated area.

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Photo 11 (23 July 15:03) corresponds to the situation several minutes before the breaching.
Downstream the wooded area, this photo reveals a more important flow with dirtier water
than the overtopping clear water flow reaching the dam toe. This may correspond to the
sum of the overtopping flow and the seeping flow leaving the foundation heavily loaded
with eroded materials.
Photo 12 (July 23 17:24): Total breaching at the highest section and on the left side
Photo 12 (July 23, 17:24) shows the downstream face of the dam, just at the beginning of
the total breaching. The right bank of the dam together with the track in front of the toe
(right side of the picture) is still unaffected with no evidence of cracking. The small
counterweight blanket (toe fill), justified by the stability analysis carried out during the detail
design, is still visible. The first large transversal breach reaching the downstream toe and
crossing the track is located almost at the section with the maximum dam height.
On the left side of Photo 12, in area circled in yellow, no translational movement in
downstream direction seems to have occurred since the downstream face of the dam is still
free of continuous cracks.
From that moment, when the water was flowing from the reservoir over the area affected
by the sliding, the erosion of the embankment resulting in total breaching occurred very
fast. On July 24th in the morning, the Saddle Dam D was totally breached as shown in
Photo 13. The maximum released volume was estimated to 500 Mm3 with a maximum flow
of approximately 17,000 m3/s.

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Photo 13 (July 24 07:26): Saddle Dam D breached completely.

Photo 14 (25 July 10:50): Erosion reaching the bedrock. View in direction left bank of Saddle Dam D.
Photo 14 (25 July 10:5009:04), corresponds to the situation when the erosion reached the
bedrock at the highest section of the dam. The photo on the left shows the movement of
the remaining embankment on the left bank. It highlights a combination of the crest
transversal rotational sliding (US/DS) together with the longitudinal movement towards
the saddle valley bottom.
Photo 14, after the breach formation, reveals a sequence of two stages ground movements
(see arrows 1 and 2 on left and right photo):
• 1st stage (left photo): The yellow arrow anticipates the moving landslide or a solifluxion
downwards the stream created by erosion (falling trees are clearly visible);
• 2nd stage (right photo): The blue bended arrow simulates the sliding occurring after the
embankment toe lost its support due to the soil moved downstream (the trees are lying
in the direction of first stage sliding).

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1 2
Photo 15: Remaining right side embankment
Photo 15 provides another illustration of the two stages of ground movements occurring
after breaching as discussed before with Photo 14.
The circled area shows the dirty water seeping out of the foundation under dewatering of
the material fully saturated before by the reservoir and the rain. This is not only an evidence
of the high permeability but also of the sensitivity of the lateritic foundation to erosion.
5.4 Panel interpretation of failure sequence
The IEP concludes that, according to the available sequence of photographs of the
event, the main expression of the incident at its beginning is a rotational sliding
passing just under the upstream edge of the crest and continuing through the
embankment and deep into the foundation. The rotational sliding most probably
extended to a certain distance downstream of the dam toe (see Chapter 9 below).
The foundation of the Saddle Dam D is without a doubt involved in the failure.
The most important weakness in the foundation, triggering deep sliding seems to
have developed in the area of the highest section of the dam, where the sinking of
the crest and the protruding and lifted area on the downstream embankment face
are the most important. The moving kinematics of the three-dimensional mass is
complex since there is no predominant direction of movements either horizontally
or vertically.
The sliding occurred concurrently with the reservoir raising by almost 8 m from
June 10th (781.18) to July 23rd (789.35), resulting from a rainy episode totalizing more
than 1 350 mm during the same period. On July 22rd, a total precipitation of 438 mm
was recorded.

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6 Investigated causes of failure
6.1 General remarks on failure modes
A Potential Failure Mode (PFM) is a sequence or a chain of events that can lead to an
uncontrolled release of water or to the failure of a dam. A failure mode describes how a
component failure occurs to cause loss of system function. Failure modes may be
interdependent and change in nature and significance at different stage of a dam’s life. PFM
descriptions should provide the information necessary to adequately assess the risk at a dam
in the design phase and implement dam safety surveillance and monitoring program (SMP),
risk reduction measures and provide a rational basis for the Emergency Action Plan (EAP).
All PFMs should be fully developed in the design phase and describe the complete potential
failure sequence. This starts with:
• the initial condition(s) (i.e. loadings, reservoir level, structural condition of the
component(s) involved in the failure mode, etc.) at the initiation of the failure mode;
• the steps necessary for the failure to continue and progress (including location, path,
other events during the progression that impact the progress of the failure mode
being studied, etc.);
• and finally, the failure mode’s impact on the particular structure (fast failure, slow
failure, full breach, partial breach, etc.) and how would the reservoir be released.
This process is shown visually in Figure 11 and an example in Figure 12 with a detailed step
by step description of how the dam will fail from the moment it starts until the moment it
fails.
Figure 11: Steps in the description of a Potential Failure Mode

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Figure 12: Typical steps for a typical Internal Erosion PFM
According to ICOLD (Bulletin 1545, 2017), a dam fails:
• by loss of strength due to:

o inadequate stability under applied loads
o inadequate durability/cracking resistance
o inadequate water tightness
• by overtopping due to:

o inadequate freeboard
o inadequate available discharge capacity
o inadequate installed discharge capacity
Concerning embankment dams, the main critical failure modes are as follows:
1. Overtopping due to inadequate spillway capacity, or malfunction or blockage of
spillway gates.
2. Excessive settlements (seismic or ground consolidation) causing overtopping.

5
CIGB-ICOLD Bulletin 154 (2017) Dam Safety Management: Operational phase of the dam life cycle.

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3. Internal erosion.
4. Sliding movements of slopes (rainfall, settlements) or formation of cracks in core
during earthquakes or due to settlements causing by internal erosion.
5. Damage of contact with concrete structures or conduits through the dam body (due to
settlements, poor compaction etc.) causing piping.
6. Large mass movements into reservoir causing impulse waves and overtopping of the
dam crest.
According to the specific conditions encountered at Saddle Dam D, the following potential
failure modes were analyzed.
6.2 Failure modes considered
6.2.1 Overtopping
The overtopping failure mode is a situation where inadequate freeboard leads to the flow
of water over the crest of the dam in an unintended manner that is not provided. For an
embankment dam, the overtopping will cause some erosion of the material which increases
with time and leads to an embankment washing out.
The maximum water level of the reservoir reached 789.35 m and the crest level, all along
the dam, was at least 4 m higher (see 5.2). Thus, the overtopping is not the initiator
cause of the failure.
6.2.2 Internal erosion and subsidence
According to ICOLD Bulletin 1646 (2017), “Internal erosion occurs when soil particles within an
embankment dam or its foundation are carried downstream by seepage flow. It starts when the erosive forces
imposed by the hydraulic loads exceed the resistance of the materials in the dam to erosion. The erosive forces
are directly related to reservoir water level.”
This phenomenon is linked to the quality of the embankment or the foundation

(permeability and erodibility) and to the gradient and velocities of flow, which depends on
the reservoir level. It is known under four mechanisms: erosion in concentrated leaks,
backward (regressive) erosion, contact erosion and suffusion.
Concentrated leaks may occur through cracks, or because of collapse settlement and also
due to holes in the dam or its foundation (tree roots or canaliculus). When concentrated
leakage occurs, the walls of the opening may be eroded by the leaking water.
Piping is used when backward erosion takes place along a pipe or progresses backward
forming a pipe. It is also more specific to the foundation than the embankment, but not
exclusively.

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CIGB-ICOLD Bulletin 164 (2017) Internal Erosion Of Existing Dams, Levees and Dikes, and their Foundations

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Internal erosion and piping prevention require efficient filtering and draining system. Water
tightness improvement may also be required, particularly when seepage flow is intolerable.
Internal erosion, in the embankment or in the foundation, initiates when fine particles can
move due to the lack of protection and the material starts eroding. Regressive erosion
occurs with formation of ducts or pipes which collapse from time to time and continues
upstream.
In the case of Saddle Dam D, the absence of an efficient filtering system in the foundation,
the presence of permeable to highly permeable horizons together with canaliculus and the
decline of the topography downstream, offer favorable conditions for the development of
a direct and backward erosion and suffusion.
It is likely, that before the dam failure, the water resurgences in the vegetated area
downstream the dam toe and seepage velocities increasing with the reservoir rising,
enlarged the water paths in the foundation. This resulted in some subsidence,
differential settlement and cracking of the embankment. So, initiated by the water
resurgences due to the foundation quality, internal erosion is likely an initiator
cause of the failure mode.
6.2.3 Foundation water tightness
As already mentioned (ICOLD Bulletin 154), a dam may fail by loss of strength. The failure
mode pertains to inadequate internal resistance to the gravity, hydraulic and others forces
applied to the dam, foundations and abutments, even though the hydraulic operation is in
accordance with the design intent. One of those cases may be the inadequate water tightness
of the foundation.
The site observations and investigations have clearly shown the high permeability
of the foundation. Piezometers SD-GW-3 and SD-GW-1 have clearly indicated the
highwater level in the foundation at the toe along with its sensitivity to the reservoir
levels. Ground water level at the downstream toe was so high that it probably
generated resurgences when the topography declined rapidly. An initial condition
may be involved in the failure mode by initiation of phenomena leading to a failure
mode. The high permeability of the foundation may certainly be an initiator cause
of the failure mode.
6.2.4 Slope instabilities
The failure mode by loss of strength, already mentioned at 6.2.3, includes also the
inadequate stability under applied load such as the slope instabilities. The description of the
sequence of the failure (5.3) indicates clearly that it was, at the beginning, a rotational mass
sliding movement with the upstream block sinking, the slopes remaining practically intact.
Thus, the slope instability (of the embankment itself) is not an initiator cause of the
failure.

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6.2.5 High pore pressure
Inadequate durability resistance is also a potential failure mode by loss of strength. A pore
pressure buildup during construction is observed in low permeability and highwater content
foundation and embankment. It may take long time to dissipate the pore pressure
depending on the permeability and the water content of the material. This could have
occurred only in the embankment itself as the permeability of the foundation is judged high
enough. It is therefore unlikely that a significant pore pressure in the foundation could
buildup. Furthermore, due to the relatively moderate height of the dam, any pore pressure
buildup would remain low with no significant incidence on the stability. This potential
failure mode is therefore unlikely to occur.
6.2.6 Soil collapse
Finally, inadequate stability under applied loads and/or change of soil state when subjected
to water lead to loss of support and foundation failure (soil collapse). The rapid decrease in
total volume of a soil due to wetting induced breakdown of its structure under constant
total vertical stress is commonly referred to “collapse” of that soil. Residual soils may have
a potential for collapse. Sudden changes of its characteristic occur while the water content,
overburden stress or both passed a threshold limit. The presence of the very loose soil
zones, as described in 8.6, implies softening, settlement and sliding movements in the
foundation which result in pushing the upper part which may protrude on the downstream
face. The acceleration of that movement leads to a mass sliding mechanism which lowers
the upstream zone permitting the starting of the embankment washing out. The nature of
the soil is likely to initiate a potential failure mode.
6.2.7 Conclusion
As already mentioned, a Potential Failure Mode is composed of a sequence or a

chain of events that can lead to an uncontrolled release of water and the failure of
the dam. For the Saddle Dam D failure, the initiator i.e. root cause seems likely to
be the high permeability of the foundation (6.2.3) which resulted in resurgence and
regressive erosion along with the softening of the lateritic foundation, triggering
sliding movements and ending with dam washing out.
It should be mentioned, that a deep and a long translational landslide in downstream

direction of the saddle area, due to low shear strength in relic shear plan and/or planar
failure of foundation as well as artesian pressure buildup, has been also suggested. Such a
hypothesis didn’t consider the erosion or softening of the foundation.
However, a careful analysis of the available photos as well as the foundation characteristics
cannot support any evidence of such large-scale transitional landslide together with the
absence of erosion or softening in the foundation.

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7 Post-failure geological and geotechnical site and laboratory investigations as

recommended by the Panel
After the first site visit in August 2018 by Prof. Anton Schleiss, the Panel recommended
and elaborated in collaboration with TEPCO and NIC detailed geological and geotechnical
site and laboratory investigations. The field campaign carried out at the Saddle Dam D site
is summarized in Figure 13. The Saddle Dam D investigations comprise:
• 9 boreholes with SPT, permeability tests and CPTu (6)

• 2 trench pits at left and right bank
• crack monitoring at 3 locations on left and right bank each
• soakage tests at left and right bank
• detailed visual inspection (high resolution pictures) on the remaining
riverside face of the embankment on left bank
• filter material sampling and grain size distribution test at remaining
embankment on left bank
• trench cut in the remaining embankment of Saddle Dam D on the left bank
(Photo 16).
The geotechnical laboratory investigations have been carried out in two independent
laboratories, namely:
• EVN: Power Engineer Consulting Joint Company 1 (PECC+), Hanoi City,

Vietnam
• AIT: Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand
Figure 13: Geological and geotechnical investigations at Saddle Dam D

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Photo 16: Trench cut still under excavation in the remaining embankment at the left abutment,
approximately 2 meters above the Laterite foundation
The detailed results of the geological and geotechnical site and laboratory investigations
have been documented in several reports and notes as listed in Appendix B. The main
results, as required for explaining the root cause of Saddle Dam D failure, are summarized
and discussed by the IEP in Section 8.8 below.

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8 Panel observations
8.1 Design Changes from Basic Design to Detailed Design to As Built based on pre-
failure geological and geotechnical investigations
The following observations can be made:
- The Basic Design took into account the uncertainty of the foundation by
implementing a cut-off trench and systematic consolidation grouting. However, on
one hand the IEP considers that a cut-off trench without connection to the sound
rock is not sufficient to reduce the risk of preferential seepage paths in the lateritic
foundation. On the other hand, grouting, in the proper sense of the word “grouting”
is not adapted to the soil like lateritic foundation. The feasible technical way to
connect the cut-off trench safely with the rock foundation would have been a
combination of a positive cutoff in combination with a grouting of the fractured
bedrock. The positive cutoff may be obtained either by excavation and backfill using
impervious compacted material or by a diaphragm wall made of plastic concrete.
Excavation and backfill along with the grouting of the bedrock corresponds to the
solution used in highest section of Xe-Pian dam.
- The results from the boreholes executed in 1997 and 2014 were derived only from
disturbed samples which couldn’t give a clear picture on the critical features of the
foundation. Important features like directional permeability, potential
interconnected flow paths, mechanical behavior and erosion risk were not detected.
- No investigation trenches or shafts were carried out in the Detailed Design.

However, and as mentioned hereafter, the numerous trenches carried out in the
borrow areas and the very larges trenches excavated for Xe-Pian dam or Houay
Makchan Weir, would have been very valuable in the assessment of the lateritic
heterogeneity, erodibility and permeability.
- Therefore, the change of the design from basic to detailed and as built, based on the
assessment of the low permeability of the foundation is questionable.
- In view of foundation uncertainty, highlighted by the large excavation carried out

on the other components of the project especially the main dams, the chosen
Construction Design for Saddle Dams E, F and D is highly risky.
- Even if construction, that means the compaction, has been done according to the
state of the art, it is well known that the embankment has a significant higher
horizontal permeability than vertical permeability, which should have been
considered in the design. However, this is not directly involved in the mechanism
of failure.

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8.2 Slope stability analysis performed during Detailed Design
The slope stability analysis during the detailed design7 were performed using SEEP/W for
seepage calculations and SLOPE/W for slope stability calculations. Four load cases were
considered, namely:
- End of the construction plus during the construction
- Impounding (Steady seepage)
- Impounding with Operation Basis Earthquake
- Rapid drawdown
Furthermore, a traditional seepage analysis was carried out in order to check the potential
of piping i.e. internal erosion.
The soil foundation was divided for the calculations in two layers having N values of 15
and 20. For the N=15 layer the material characteristics (unit weight, cohesion, internal
friction) was taken from literature (Dunham). For the N=20 it is indicated that the values
have been obtained by field test resulting in a very high and questionable cohesion of
25kN/m2. Such a high questionable cohesion (25 kN/m2) is also reported for the dam body
material. An internal friction angle ranging from f = 22,7° (N=5) to f = 26° (N=10 and
20) have been adopted. For the layer with N=15 a friction angle of f = 28,4° was used,
which is questionable in view of the adopted values for N=10 and 20.
The permeability of the laterite foundation soil was taken based on permeability test in the
boreholes with an isotropic value of 4.1E-07 m/s. For the dam body, a value of the same
range (4.8E-07 m/s) was considered based on laboratory tests.
The following observations can be made:
- The post-failure geotechnical investigations (Chapter 7 above and Section 8.8

below) indicate that the material characteristics used in the Detailed Design are
rather optimistic. Up to 10 m to 15 m depth the N-values are close or below 10.
Only approaching the rock surface N-values of 20 are reached. Based on the shear
tests, the friction angle may be rather close to f = 25° together with an effective
cohesion of 5 to 10 kPa (kN/m2). The permeability tests in the boreholes revealed
local high permeability reaching rather 10-6 m/s. The material characteristics are
discussed more in detail in Section 8.8.
- Even if the calculations have been performed correctly, they haven’t been done with
reasonable engineering judgement regarding the input parameters.
- In the lateritic foundation or embankment, the possibility of pore pressure buildup

during construction has not been discussed.

7
Detailed Design Report, Chapter 13, pages 13-13 to 13-19

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- Input parameters, especially internal friction, have been considered with high
“digital” precision without addressing the range of uncertainties to be considered
for any material.
- The apparent cohesion of the foundation based on SPT testing should be

considered with caution as it is known that lateritic soil-like formation softens when
saturated during a long period of time. This was revealed by the significant lower N-
values obtained by post-failure geotechnical investigations carried out under higher
moistening conditions.
- As already mentioned, permeability tests in boreholes in laterite are difficult to

perform and give misleading results since the walls of boreholes are smeared and
becomes tighter. More reliable permeability values are obtained from soaking tests
in-situ pits, particularly when dealing with coarse elements or low cohesion sandy
passages as mentioned hereafter.
- No real coring has been carried out during the basic and detailed design. All the core
boxes presenting the lateritic formation correspond to a soil packed in small
containers (Photo 17). Thus, the percentage of core recovery is missing. The main
parameter used in soil characterization was the SPT N value.
Photo 17: Example of core box of the investigations carried out during the detailed design.
- More reliable insight can be obtained from observation in open trenches and shafts,
particularly where the designer is experienced in lateritic formations.
- It is known, as already mentioned in section 8.2, that compacted embankment has

a significant higher horizontal permeability than vertical permeability (typically 10
times). This may also be applied to the natural laterite soils provided that more
permeable horizons are identified. Thus, an anisotropic permeability in the
embankment as well as in the laterite foundation should have been considered in

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the design. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to take for the foundation, in view of
its natural heterogeneity, a permeability value which is lower than for the compacted
embankment.
- In order to take into account the uncertainty of the material characteristics, as

discussed above and also to consider the possibility of pore pressure buildup during
construction, sensitivity analysis would have been required in the detailed design.
It may be concluded, that (1) the investigations carried out were not adapted to the lateritic
foundation and (2) the material parameters have been used without engineering judgement
in the slope stability and seepage calculations that means without questioning them. The
large heterogeneity, either in the soil type or the permeability, of the Laterite foundation
with the presence of voids and canaliculus, requiring foundation treatment, has not been
recognized. In principal, the problematic nature of Laterite foundation is well-known since
a long time and documented in ICOLD Bulletin 1518.
8.3 Construction
According to the available information, Saddle Dam D embankment seems to have been
adequately built, that means compacted and supervised during construction, according to
the common practice. However, it should be noted that the document “Method of
Statement for Saddle Dam D” is formulated somewhat too general and needs to be more
precise. For example: it is specified that “For earth-fill embankments and in particular the dam
sections with impervious cores, vertical and very steep slopes shall be avoided”. This is somewhat too
general, and it is an important point and risky zone in the design. Depending on the type
of material, the slope of the abutment must be specified as well as the remolding works if
required. Other examples can be found concerning the placement, the layer thickness, the
compaction….
On the remaining part of the embankment on the left bank, clear compaction layers with
different composition are visible as observed in the open trenches on the left and right sides
(Photo 18). This indicates that the laterite material has been transported from the borough
area, without mixing the fine and coarse nuances, directly to the construction site.

8
Besides ICOLD Bulletin 151, as an important reference published in 2009, in Appendix E some more recent
publications on Residual Soil Engineering are listed.

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Photo 18: Trench excavated in the left abutment through remaining embankment. Top left: the
interface between the embankment and the foundation is well materialized by the horizontal crack;
Top right and bottom: the layers of the embankment may be recognized by their different colors
and/or horizontal cracks development.
The cracks shown in Photo 18 are due to the desiccation of the cut. They were not present
on the fresh surfaces immediately after excavation. However, the horizontal cracks
represent a relative weakness surfaces presenting higher permeability although a tamping
drum has been used for compaction.
The heterogeneity of the clayey lateritic formation used in the embankments would have
required to organize a mixing process in the borrow area to prevent having “sandy” layers
leading to a higher contrast in the horizontal permeability. As said earlier, this also could
have attracted the attention on the presence of more permeable horizons, within the
foundation of the dams, made of same formation as the borrow areas.
8.4 Monitoring system and follow-up during first filling
The following general observations can be made:
- The monitoring system installed on the saddle dams is deemed insufficient for
structures of this importance. For example, the height of Saddle Dam F counted
from the downstream toe reaches 30.8 m. It is reminded that according to ICOLD,
any dam of more than 15 m height or controlling a storage capacity exceeding 3
Mm3, should be classified as a large dam, which requires a certain level of

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surveillance. Corresponding surveillance guidelines for large dams are developed in

ICOLD Bulletin 158.
- All the saddle dams were not considered in the Emergency Action Plan (August
2017) of the XPXN project prepared by the Contractor. This document focused
only on Xe-Pian, Xe-Namnoy dams and Houay Makchan Weir.
- On July 18th, the ground water level in the observation wells reached or even
exceeded the ground level, along with the acceleration of the settlements, for saddle
dams E, F and D, and no action was taken. At least a thorough inspection by a
specialist of the downstream area should have been conducted on each saddle dam.
Normally, it is a requirement to inspect regularly (at least every day) during the
impoundment the structure and particularly the toe of the dam. Vegetation should
have been removed to access easily the downstream zone subject to potential
resurgences development. Indeed, at the downstream toe of Saddle Dam E, seeping
flow along with an initiation of erosion was observed (section 10.2 below).
- Moreover, the first filling of a dam reservoir is commonly considered as a critical

situation where the specialized staff should be permanently mobilized to detect any
anomaly and react immediately. Even when the settlement exceeded the warning
threshold, nothing was done, not even increasing the frequency of the geodetic
survey or the water level reading in the piezometers.
8.5 Panel interpretation of dam monitoring data
Saddle Dam D monitoring system consists of 3 geodetic points located on the crest (ST.
200, 400 and 650) and 4 stand pipe piezometers (ground water observation wells) located
in two profiles (ST. 270 and 630), one at the toe and one approximately at 10 m downstream
of the dam axis for each profile. No geodetic survey is provided on the highest section of
the embankment.
The monitoring system has been installed only after the construction of the Saddle Dam
D. Thus, no information is available on the behavior of the foundation or the embankment
during the construction stage.
The frequency of the readings and the visual inspection is twice a week, either for the
topography or the piezometers. Visual inspection is carried out according to a checklist
since April 2017, corresponding to the beginning of the first impoundment.
The frequency of the readings and inspections remains the same during the 2018
impoundment stage even if the reservoir rising was a little faster and more critical for the
dam safety.
For all the geodetic survey, it is considered that the settlement remains acceptable (Level 1:
safe) up to 1% of the total height of the embankment. It becomes alarming (Level 3:
Warning) when it reaches 1.5%. No justification is given for these criteria which are
unusual. Normally, when an embankment is placed on a foundation, which is susceptible
to settlement, specific calculations should be carried out to estimate expected settlement

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and adapt accepted thresholds accordingly. More reliable geotechnical parameters should
be based on in-situ testing (CPT), considering the position of the ground water table.
Expected softening in lateritic formation after saturation due to the reservoir filling,
together with the settlement occurring during construction should have been considered.
Figure 14 is related to the geodesic survey at the crest of Saddle Dam D, station 0+400,
where the first signs of the failure were observed. It shows that:
• During the first phase of impoundment (2017), the settlements increased almost
uniformly with the rising of the reservoir level, reaching 0.14 m, and then stabilized
with the reservoir level. Horizontal movements were very small, in the range of the
measurements’ accuracy.
• During the second phase of the impoundment in 2018, the movements started
again, implying this time also the horizontal ones. On July 18, acceleration was
observed in all directions, with a settlement exceeding the “warning threshold”.
The horizontal displacement reaches 43 mm DS and 31 mm toward the right bank
(direction of the deepest point of the saddle).
The two other stations showed a similar acceleration in the movements, but in a smaller
range. However, it can be noted, as highlighted in Figure 15, that both stations 0+200 and
0+650 were moving towards the deepest area of the saddle, i.e. ST 0+200 towards the left
abutment (30mm) and ST 0+650 towards the right one (30mm). Both stations moved
upstream at the same rate.
Crest Settlement Point (Saddle Dam D STA.0+400, SD-CS-02)

0.400 820
X (U/S & D/S) Trigger Level (m)
Y (Dam Axis) Level 1. Safe : 0.17 810
0.300 Level 2. Cauion : 0.20
Z (Elevation) Level 3. Warning : 0.26
800
Reservoir Water Level (m)
Reservoir Water Level

Displacement (m)
0.200
790
0.100
780
0.000 770
760
-0.100
750
-0.200
740
-0.300
-0.29m/18-07 730
-0.400 720
17-03-30 17-06-28 17-09-26 17-12-25 18-03-25 18-06-23 18-09-21
Date
Figure 14: Geodetic movements recorded at Saddle Dam D at station 0+400

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Crest Settlement Point (Saddle Dam D STA.0+200, SD-CS-01) Crest Settlement Point (Saddle Dam D STA.0+650, SD-CS-03)
0.200 820 0.200 820
X (U/S & D/S) Trigger Level (m) X (U/S & D/S) Trigger Level (m)
0.160 Level 1. Safe : 0.17 810 0.160 Level 1. Safe : 0.17 810
Y (Dam Axis) Y (Dam Axis)
Level 2. Caution : 0.20 Level 2. Caution : 0.20

Z (Elevation) Z (Elevation)

0.120 Level 3. Warning : 0.26 800 0.120 Level 3. Warning : 0.26 800
Displacement (m)
Displacement (m)
Reservoir Water Level Reservoir Water Level
0.080 790 0.080 790
0.040 780 0.040 780
0.000 770 0.000 770
-0.040 760 -0.040 760
-0.080 750 -0.080 750
-0.120 740 -0.120 740
-0.160 730 -0.160 730
-0.200 720 -0.200 720

2017-03-30 2017-07-08 2017-10-16 2018-01-24 2018-05-04 2018-08-12 2018-11-20 2017-03-30 2017-07-08 2017-10-16 2018-01-24 2018-05-04 2018-08-12 2018-11-20
Date Date
Figure 15: Geodetic movements of the crest of saddle Dam D recorded at stations 0+200 (left) and
0.650 (right) (for horizontal movements, (+) corresponds towards upstream and towards left bank)
Figure 16 represents the variation of the water level in the piezometers installed on Saddle
Dam D. Both stand pipe piezometers GW1 and GW2 are crossing the soil foundation on
its entire depth with their bottom located on the rock, at el. 757.81 for GW1 and 764.73 in
GW2. At their installation in December 2016, they indicated a water level respectively of
764.79 and 773.43, slightly decreasing around 760 and 771 respectively. It is likely that these
levels correspond to the natural water table elevation as for both the water level was at a
similar depth compared to the natural ground.
In mid-April 2017, piezometers water level began rising probably in connection with the
precipitations as the reservoir was still very low. The fluctuations observed between June
and August 2017 are somehow surprising because they are not connected to the daily or
weekly rainfall variations. This might be related to the settlement of the foundation due to
its softening with the rising of the saturation level.
After the stabilization of the reservoir water level, during the dry season between October
2017 and May 2018, both piezometers stabilized but with an increase in the water table
elevation higher by ~6m for GW1 and ~4m for GW2, compared to the situation before
impoundment. A new equilibrium situation was reached after the strange behavior of the
piezometers described in the previous paragraph.
It is emphasized that the natural ground at GW2 (El. 783.73) is more than 2 m higher than
the reservoir water level which remains more than 50 m far from the upstream toe of the
dam and about 100 m from the piezometer. The slope of the groundwater water table is
around 5% which is very low.
The groundwater table downstream of Saddle Dam D is influenced by the rain and
also by the reservoir water level, even far downstream of the submerged area.

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Groundwater Observation Well (Saddle Dam D)

Reservoir Water \ Groundwater Level (m) 820 500
810 Rainfall Reservoir Water Level 450

SD-GW-01 (Sta.0+270) SD-GW-02 (Sta.0+630)
800 400
SD-GW-03 (Sta.0+270) SD-GW-04 (Sta.0+630)
790 350
Rainfall (mm)
780 300
770 250
760 200
750 150
740 100
730 50
720 0
03/30/17 06/10/17 08/21/17 11/01/17 01/12/18 03/25/18 06/05/18 08/16/18
Date
Figure 16: Piezometers water level variations with time at Saddle Dam D
During the second phase of the reservoir filling beginning in June 2018, GW1 and GW2
reacted probably to the rainfall but also to the reservoir rising. However, GW1 and to a
lesser extent GW2, exhibited a decline of few meters in the beginning of July and on July
20th.
While the first drop of the piezometer may be related to the lack of rain during the last days
of June, the second one, corresponding to the latest available reading, occurred after 9 rainy
days, totalizing more than 350 mm.
This type of behavior may be attributed to the development, by regressive erosion, of open
flow paths allowing for free water release and resulting in a drop of hydrostatic pressure.
At the collapse of the flow path, the piezometers water level increases and new flow paths
develop. The latest piezometers water level decline (drop) occurred on July 20, just 2 days
after the maximum water table level was reached (El. 775.01, 0.40m below the piezometer
head).
The saturation lines derived from the piezometers’ readings between the end of May and
the failure are given on Figure 17. This clearly reveals, that since July 13th the saturation line
was so high at the downstream toe of the dam, that surface seepage (resurgence) most
probably developed. As a result, erosion of the foundation is likely to occur. The
acceleration of the settlement recorded at station 0+400, 130 m from the profile, where the
piezometers are installed, witnesses this internal erosion of the foundation. The latter most
likely affected the whole foundation of the Saddle Dam D, with a concentration at the
highest section i.e. between stations 0+260 and 0+330, where the first cracks were
observed.

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Figure 18 presents the topography of the ground downstream of Saddle Dam D where
contour line at el. 765 is just 50 m downstream of the toe the of dam located 9 m above.
The slope of the ground, close to 20%, is much steeper than that of the saturation line
(Figure 17). Thus water resurgences have to be considered highly probable.
Figure 17: Saturation lines at Saddle Dam D derived from piezometer readings during the last
reservoir rising
Figure 18: Topography downstream Saddle Dam D
The analysis of available monitoring data together with observations made during the site
visit (section 8.6 below), show that the horizontal permeability of the foundation is much
higher than that considered in the detail design. With saturation line almost outcropping at
the downstream toe and a relatively steep declining topography downstream, water
resurgences are very likely to occur. As an immediate consequence, the silty-sand to sandy-
silt identified in the foundation is prone to erosion. This results in concentrated seepage
path which developed and collapsed from time to time. The distribution and the
dimensions of the seepage paths may vary depending on the sensitivity of the foundation
to erosion. There is an evidence that a similar phenomenon initiated in Saddle Dam E as
described in 10.2 below.
The stability of the embankment is jeopardized when the erosion of the foundation spreads
upstream (backward erosion) combined with a significant softening of the lateritic
formation never exposed before to water submersion, seepage or embankment loading.

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8.6 Visual observations of the Panel made during the site visits
As mentioned in the introduction the site visits took place respectively on October 3 and
November 27, 2018. During both visits, the weather was fair offering excellent conditions
for the inspection of the foundation and the remaining part of the dam. Unlike the right
bank, the left bank was easily and safely accessible and the lateritic foundation after erosion
was very well prepared for a thorough inspection.
Each relevant characteristic of the foundation or the embankment is highlighted by a

commented photo considered sufficient by itself to deliver the opinion of the IEP.
Photo 19: Investigation trench excavated on the IEP demand in the top of the left abutment. 1 to
1.5m below the surface the ground is made of coarse sandy and silty material with relatively high
permeability (estimated on site to around 10-5m/s).
Photo 20: Examples of singularities observed in the cuts visible on the top of the left abutment. On
the left picture, a hole of more than one centimeter diameter at more than 2 m depth is visible,
created probably by decomposed roots. In the middle and the right picture, the presence of roots
along with canaliculus well known in lateritic formations at almost 3m depth can be seen.

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Photo 21: On the left abutment, another type of void is present in the silty sandy gravel. This might be
the result of fines erosion within the lateritic formation.

Photo 22: Right abutment trench excavated on the request of the IEP. Under the topsoil of 1 to 1.5m
thickness, lateritic formation is made of very open gravelly material which is likely of high
permeability (Bottom right photo). An in-situ permeability test (type Matsuo) has been
recommended. The presence of consolidated blocks is highlighted on the top right photo. The left-side
photo shows a breccia like material exposed to intense water circulation

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Photo 23: Upstream of the Saddle Dam D location, the left bank washed by the outflowing water
after the failure is subject to water drainage. Resurgences are coming from canaliculus present in
some clayey horizons as presented in the following pictures.
A B
C D
Photo 24 : Examples of different nuances observed in the lateritic formation located more than 10 m
depth, few hundred meters upstream the Saddle Dam D location. (A) canaliculus and roots observed
deeply in this clayey horizon; (B) Laterite with canaliculus and coarse element, all very soft looking like
a colluvium deposit; (C) a canaliculus subject to water flow, confirming the aptitude of this type of
singularities to convey water; (D) another example of water resurging from this formation bringing
very fine particles.

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A B
Photo 25: Shearing surfaces observed in lateritic formation (A) and the transition zone (B) at the
interface with the sound bedrock.
A B
Photo 26 : Core boxes representing the left bank (A) and the right bank (B). The later focuses on
coarse and strong particles found in the right abutment. This type of material has not been found in
the left abutment recovered cores. Canaliculus as seen in the eroded zones are not detectable in the
silty clay cores.

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Photo 27: Sound basaltic bedrock. It is subject to fractures which opening may exceed a decimeter.
Photo 28: Left, the filter seems to be cohesive and finer than it supposed to be. Right, the material
above the filter is a random rockfill (named 3B in the drawings). Filter conditions are obviously not
fulfilled between the filter and the rockfill.

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Photo 29: A cut in the remaining clay embankment on the left abutment. It is made of layers of
different colors and different gradations and plasticity. It seems that no homogenization of the clayey
material has been carried out in the borrow area. Beside the higher horizontal permeability generally
considered in an embankment made of compacted horizontal layers, the coarser or sandy layers may
exhibit higher permeability (x100) than the finer material layers.
8.7 Conclusions on the characteristics of Saddle Dam D foundation based on visual

site observations
Regarding the Saddle Dam D foundation, the following can be concluded derived from the
visual observations as presented in Section 8.6 with commented photos:
• The foundation is made of residual formation (Laterite) sitting on a basaltic bedrock

which is sound but fractured. In its interface, weathered bedrock in the stage of
becoming lateritic soils is observed. Such geological profile is very common in
tropical regions. The boundaries between these formations are very variable
depending on the erratic development of the weathering.
• At the scale of the dam site, the laterite is very heterogeneous. It may take various
facies:
o Clayey silt to silty clay very often with canaliculus and vegetal roots up to
10 m deep. Canaliculus are prone to convey water and lead to permeability
values much higher than those obtained in boreholes as the walls of the hole
are smoothed by the drilling equipment;

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o Coarse to fine sandy silt in continuous layers of several meters thickness.

These facies, uncovered in the left abutment trench, seems to have relatively
high permeability. It exhibits a cohesion that decreased dramatically after
saturation and should be very sensitive to erosion;
o Open material made of millimetric to centimetric elements with voids and

silt in between, along with evidence of water seepage. Its permeability can be
high to very high. Suffusion is likely to occur in these facies;
o Passages containing large boulders or colluvium like zones are present.
Furthermore, shearing surfaces were observed either in the clayey formation or in the facies
under weathering. Dewatering of the left and right bank shaped by the new stream during
the Saddle Dam D collapse (see right bank Photo 15), indicates clearly that the actual
permeability of the lateritic foundation is much higher than considered in the final design.
Indeed, investigations carried out based on boreholes permeability testing were not
relevant. However, the observation of the large trenches excavated for the construction of
Xe-Pian dam or Houay Makchan Weir, (Photo 30), on one hand and the trenches carried
out in the borrow areas, on the other hand, could have been used to get more relevant
information on the quality and the permeability of the lateritic formations.
Photo 30: large trenches excavated in lateritic formation (left: Xe-Pian dam, right: Houay Makchan
Weir). Evidence of seeping water is observed in both trenches.
As far as the embankment itself is concerned, the IEP observed that:
• The material used to construct the dam body reflects somehow the heterogeneity of
the lateritic material on which it is founded. No homogenization has been conducted
in the borrow areas, aiming at mixing the sandy and more permeable horizons with
those more clayey and impervious. In addition, numerous pieces of wood are
observed in the exposed face of the embankment;
• The outcropping filter placed at the interface of the drainage system with the
foundation seems too fine and somehow cohesive. Gradation checking revealed that
the filter criteria are fulfilled regarding the lateritic dam body material;

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• The material placed above this filter is a random rockfill which is free draining but
does not respect the filter conditions regarding the filter material.
In order to check the quality of the Saddle Dam D more in detail, the IEP requested the
excavation of a trench crossing the remaining embankment on the left bank on its entire
height and length from US to DS, for inspection and sampling. During the second site visit
in the last week of November 2018, the trench was inspected (Photo 18) and provided
similar information compared to the exposed cut during the first visit (Photo 29) in October
2018. The embankment of Saddle Dam E and F, discussed later in this report, have been
built in the same way.
8.8 Comments on findings of post-failure geological and geotechnical site and

laboratory investigations
8.8.1 General
The post failure investigation program was defined in collaboration with the IEP. It
includes the following works (Figure 19 below; see also Chapter 7 above):
• Drilling with core recovery and water testing (9 boreholes, 3 on the right bank and 6 on
the left bank), totalizing 363.5 m;
• Sampling (undisturbed using triple barrel coring and disturbed) for laboratory testing
including identification (density, moisture content, gradation, Atterberg limits) and
mechanical properties (consolidation and shearing);
• In-situ testing: SPT while drilling at each 2 m depth, CPTu (4 on the left abutment and
2 on the right abutment), large scale permeability testing and pocket penetrometer and
shear vane.
Figure 19: Location of drilling and in-situ testing at Saddle Dam D
As already mentioned in Chapter 7 samples were sent to 2 different laboratories, namely in

Vietnam (EVN-PECC1) and in Thailand (Asian Institute of Technology - AIT). The test
results were synthetized in charts and graphs prepared by the Contractor to facilitate their
interpretation by the IEP. It has to be noted that this Section 8.8 intends to highlight only

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the most significant findings as required for explaining the root cause of Saddle Dam D
failure.
8.8.2 Main drilling results
The drilling results can be summarized as follows:
• The thickness of the soil like material varies from 20 to 26 m in the left bank and 34 to
40 m in the right bank.
• In the soil like material the recovery is often smaller than 100% although a triple barrel
core drilling was used. The lowest recovery was observed in the right bank SDBH A05
with an average of 26%9. It is likely that, beside the quality of the drilling, the low
recovery is linked to the low cohesion of the material. No information on the recovery
is available for the investigations carried out during the design stage (see Photo 17
above).
• In the soil like material the permeability varies mostly between to 5x10-7 to 2x10-6 m/s.
Only one value was below 1x10-7 m/s. These permeability values seem to be somehow
higher than those considered in the detail design report (2.5x10-8 to 8x10-7 m/s). It is
reminded that these values underestimate the actual permeability as they correspond to
a smoothed wall of the boreholes. In particular, the effect of the canaliculus, very
frequent in the laterite, is totally cleared i.e. smeared
• SPT N-values in the lateritic formation are ranging from 9 to 12, while the average was
around 20 according to the available data in the detailed design. In SDBH-A05, where
the recovery was the smallest, the average N-values is as low as 7 up to 26 m depth. The
new SPT N-values raise the following comments:
o In the embankment material crossed over 10 m in A02 and 5 m in A04, N values

remain relatively low, averaging 12;
o The effect of the moistening, due to the reservoir filling and the heavy rainfall,
responsible of the lateritic formation softening, may explain the observed
decrease in the N-values. Indeed, the analysis of the moisture content of the soil
like material obtained by the post-failure geotechnical investigations, as presented
below, is much higher compared to the situation during design stage. However,
some SPTs were carried during the design stage in a saturated ground below the
water table.
o Thus, the parameters derived from SPTs conducted under dry conditions are
questionable as they reflect a stiffer condition of the material.
• The results of the CPTu tests were submitted to Professor Antonio Gens, University
of Barcelona, who is a well-known expert in geotechnical engineering. On the demand

9 th
According to “Progress Report for borehole drills and tests as of 19 Oct. 2018”. However, in the “Report of
Boring Investigation for Saddle Dam D” (Second version revised 9 November 2018) nothing is said on the core
recovery in the soil like material.

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of the IEP, he prepared a note attached to this report (Annex C), which highlights the
following:
o The documented experience of CPT interpretation in this type of residual soils

(Laterite) is scarce, particularly in unsaturated conditions;
o Lateritic soils classified as clays, according to the CPT results, often turn out to
be silts;
o The concept of OCR (Over Consolidation Ratio) has no real meaning in the case
of residual soils as it is the case for sedimentary ones;
o The estimation of the friction angle of fine-grained soils of any kind from CPT
tests has a very low degree of reliability. This is also true for the SPT values;
o The geotechnical parameters obtained above the groundwater table should not
be used if the material may become saturated during the lifetime of the works;
o Available CPT information show quite consistently that the material lies within
the sandy silt to clay zones (ML and MH), indicating fine-grained materials;
o It would have been useful to separate in the classification charts of the Factual
Report the points corresponding to locations above the groundwater table from
those below the groundwater table;
o It should be remembered that dissipation tests are only performed in the zones
exhibiting a strong pore water pressure response. Thus, in zones where the CPT
test is largely drained (and no dissipation tests are performed), the permeability
will be correspondingly higher.
• The cone resistance qc given by the CPT is well correlated with the post failure N values
of the SPT. They are slightly higher in the embankment (2.5 to 5 MPa) compared to the
foundation (<2.5 MPa). The high qc values recorded in the right bank (CPTu-05)
probably correspond to the coarse material uncovered in the trench excavated in this
area.
8.8.3 Identification testing
8.8.3.1 Moisture Content – Atterberg limits
The moisture content was determined by oven and air drying. As expected, oven drying
results in higher values. Atterberg limits using only air drying gave low plasticity index in
the right bank investigation trench (TP-A02) and some spots deep in SDBH-A05 where
the recovery was so small. This may represent the coarser and more pervious horizons
(Figure 20 and Figure 21 below).
Except in the coarse or sandy passages, moisture content varies between 40% and 80%.
These relatively high percentages together with the observed low dry densities are very
common for lateritic soils.
The moisture content remains almost systematically below the liquid limit but above the
plasticity limit. The latter gives to the clayey nuances a plastic consistency, which may
explain the low penetration resistance as discussed before.

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Furthermore, the average moisture content obtained during the design stage (8 values) is
approaching 36%. It was most likely obtained by oven drying according to ASTM D2216,
as mentioned in the Dong AH Construction Industrial’s main report on site investigations.
Compared to the ~50% average moisture content obtained by the post-failure

investigations in 2018, it is obvious that the foundation was in much dryer conditions during
the previous pre-construction investigations. This may explain, on one hand to some extend
but not completely the inconsistency highlighted before regarding the SPT testing. On the
other hand, it confirms the remark made on the questionable relevance of the soil
parameters derived from in situ testing in dry conditions when used after saturation of the
soil.
Moisture Content LL(%) PI
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 30 60 90 120 150 0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0 0.0 0.0
SDBH-A01(AIR)
SDBH-A03(AIR)
SDBH-A05-A(AIR)
TP-A02(AIR)
5.0 5.0 5.0 2011year
1997year
1995year
SDBH-A04(AIR)
SDBH-A06 (AIR)
10.0 10.0 10.0 SDBH-A06(oven)
TP-A01(AIR)
Depth (m)
Depth (m)
Depth (m)
15.0 15.0 15.0
SDBH-A01(oven)
20.0 SDBH-A03(oven) 20.0 20.0
SDBH-A05-A(oven) SDBH-A01(AIR)
TP-A02(oven) SDBH-A03(AIR)
SDBH-A01(AIR) SDBH-A05-A(AIR)
SDBH-A03(AIR) TP-A02(AIR)
SDBH-A05-A(AIR) 2011year
25.0 TP-A02(AIR) 25.0 1997year 25.0
2011year 1995year
1997year
SDBH-A04(AIR)
1995year
SDBH-A06 (AIR)
SDBH-A04(AIR)
SDBH-A06(oven)
SDBH-A06 (AIR)
30.0 TP-A01(AIR)
TP-A01(AIR) 30.0 30.0
Figure 20: Moisture content and Atterberg limits (synthetic graphs prepared by the Contractor)

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100 SDBH-A01
SDBH-A03
SDBH-A05-A
80 CH or OH SDBH-A05-A(SM)
TP-A02(SM)
TP-A02(GM)
60 TP-A02(GC)
PI (%)
1997year(SM)
1995year(SM)
40 CL 1995year(CL)
2011year(MH)
SDBH-A04
MH ro OH
20 SDBH-A06
SDBH-A06(CH)
CL-ML SDBH-A06(oven)
ML
0 TP-A01(SM)
- 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
LL (%)
Figure 21: Atterberg limits graph including detail design available data (synthetic graph prepared by
the Contractor).
Figure 21 highlights the large heterogeneity of the foundation with a variation of the
plasticity index between 5% and 80% and the liquid limit between 20% and 140%
approximately. In comparison, the findings during the design stage showed a much
narrower range of variation due to the very limited investigation works carried out.
8.8.3.2 Gradation
The heterogeneity of the foundation is also highlighted in Figure 22 below related to the
gradation of the recovered samples.
SIEVE OPENING IN INCHES U.S.STANDARD SIEVE NUMBERS HYDROMETER
100.0
90.0
PERCENT COARSER BY WEIGHT
PERCENT FINER BY WEIGHT
PERCENT COARSER BY WEIGHT
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0 GRAVEL SAND

COBBLES SILT OR CLAY
COARSE FINE COARS MEDIUM FINE
0.0
1000 100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001
GRAIN SIZE MILLIMETERS
SDBH-A01 SDBH-A03 SDBH-A04 SDBH-A05-A
SDBH-A06 TP-A01 TP-A02
Figure 22: Sieve analysis of soil material recovered at Saddle Dam D site (see Fig. 19)

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The coarser material samples are coming mainly from the right bank either from the trench
or boreholes A05-A and A06. These boreholes contain also some very fine material, even
finer than those coming from the left abutment SDBH-A01 and A03.
The coarser gradations fulfill the conditions of internally instable materials, that means
sensitive to suffusion.
8.8.3.3 Shear Strength
Shear test results obtained in the EVN laboratory are summarized in Table 2 below.
Hole. No SDBH-A01 SDBH-A03 SDBH-A03

Depth(m) 14.0~15.0 9.1~10.1 17.0~17.8
Sampling Name MZ4, 21 MZ3, 34 MZ7, 36
Sample sign A B C A B A B
Dry density (g/cm3) 1.15 1.11 1.10 1.02 1.02 1.30 1.30
Moisture Content (%) 39.2 39.2 39.2 59.2 59.2 30.7 30.7
Liquid Limit (%) 56.7 56.7 56.7 90.9 90.9 48.6 48.6
Plasticity Index 24.7 24.7 24.7 39.1 39.1 23.30 23.30
8µ (%) 50.66 50.66 50.66 72.09 72.09 47.36 47.36
2µ (%) 16.09 16.09 16.09 25.86 25.86 20.06 20.06
Ｃcu(kPa) 52 39 53
Triaxial Φcu(o) 8.3 16.3 19.2
shearing
Ｃ'cu(kPa) 30 26 36
(CU+u)
Φ'cu(o) 20 24.6 27
Direct C(kPa) 12 39 30
Shearing Φ(o) 20 17 17
Table 2: Shear tests results performed by EVN
The three tested samples in Table 2 can be classified as a silty clayey high plasticity material.
They represent therefore the part of the foundation which may mobilize the weakest shear
strength governing the stability, particularly the most plastic sample (SDBH-A03, 9.1 m to
10.1 m). The effective parameters given by this sample are in the same range than those
considered in the detail design’s stability calculations, even if the assumed cohesion
(25kN/m2) may be questionable high.
The results of the triaxial tests carried out at AIT laboratory are presented in Table 3. The
obtained effective cohesion and friction parameters are varying in a far higher range than
those of the EVN tests.

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Hole. No SDBH-A02 SDBH-A02 SDBH-A04 SDBH-A04

Depth(m) 5.9~7.0 15.9~17.0 5.0~6.0 25.9~27.0
C’ (kPa) 20 81 30 40
Ø’ (°) 36.9 11.3 20.0 26.6
Table 3: Summary of results of triaxial tests performed by AIT
The sample SDBH-A02 (5.9~7.0) corresponds to the embankment material according to

the log of this borehole carried out from the crest of the remaining part of Saddle Dam D.
The obtained friction angle seems to be unrealistically high. On the other hand, for the A02
(15.9~17.0) sample, the friction angle is unrealistically low (11.3°).
Hole. No SDBH-A02 SDBH-A02 SDBH-A02 SDBH-A04 TP - A01 TP - A01 TP - A01

Depth(m) 3.0~4.1 15.9~17.0 24.0~25.0 3.0~4.0 2.0~2.3 4.0~4.3 6.0~6.3
C(kPa) 93.0 105.3 9.8 65.1 24.9 77.5 116.4
Φ(o) 19.4 23.9 28 21.2 39.6 33.7 28.5
Table 4: Summary of results of Direct Shearing tests performed by AIT Laboratory
Although not mentioned in the report of both laboratories, it seems that the direct shearing
tests have been carried out under a velocity enough high, to lead to undrained parameters,
unless the samples are permeable as it is the case for the samples taken below the topsoil
from left bank investigation trench (TP-A01).
Most of cohesions derived from the AIT laboratory direct shearing tests (Table 4) are too
high. This is particularly the case for the samples taken from the left abutment trench at 4m
and 6m depth, where the laterite is sandy and permeable. For these conditions, the reliability
of shearing tests carried out in AIT laboratory is questionable.
8.8.3.4 Compressive testing (from EVN lab)
Oedometer testing on 3 samples from boreholes A03 and A01 result in a compression
index (Cc) of 0.133, 0.215 and 0.235, corresponding to a moderate to highly compressible
material. This is consistent with the important settlement observed during the Saddle Dam
D impoundment, before July 2018.
A coefficient of consolidation (Cv), varying from 10-6 to 10-7 m²/s, is generally obtained for
clayey sand which reflects the reality. As the top 10 m of the foundation was not saturated
during construction, a pore pressure build-up could occur only in the deeper part.
Nevertheless, canaliculus and more sandy passages may dissipate at least partly the pore
pressure development in the deeper part of the foundation.

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It has to be noted that the results of the compressive tests for such residual soils have to
be considered with caution as the interpretation procedure is mainly relevant for
sedimentary soils. Moreover, it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to obtain, for the
compressive test, an undisturbed sample of 2 cm thickness in such material since the natural
particles’ bonding may break down during the preparation samples.
8.8.4 Large scale permeability testing
In view of the difficulty to obtain reliable results when measuring the permeability during
drilling, it was decided to carry out large-scale Matsuo permeability type testing (Photo 31)
on both banks of Saddle Dam D.
Photo 31: Large scale permeability testing (soakage tests according Matsuo) in the left bank
An excavation of almost 10 m depth was carried out in the left bank, reaching some sandy
clay where the Matsuo tests were carried out. In the right bank, testing was performed in a
platform prepared in the investigation trench TP-A02, where coarse elements were
observed.
The large-scale testing resulted in the following permeability values:
• Left bank: 6.5x10-7 to 1.5x10-6 m/s

• Right bank: 1.8x10-6 to 3.9x10-6 m/s
These permeability values are almost 10 to 100 times higher than those considered in the
detailed design (2.5x10-8 to 8.0x10-7 m/s). It is likely that even higher permeability could
have been measured at locations where canaliculus passages are present.

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8.9 Conclusions on investigations and observations
The main conclusions, derived from the post-failure geotechnical investigations and as
evidenced by visual observations, may be summarized as follows:
1. The foundation of the Saddle Dam D is very heterogeneous with a predominance of

clayey sandy-silty soils. Numerous passages rich in sand and even gravel leading to low
core recoveries and higher permeability have been observed. Therefore, sandy passages
are less represented in the sampling and accordingly in the laboratory test results;
2. The identification tests confirm the large variability in the plasticity and the gradation
of the samples coming either from core drillings or surface trenches. The coarse
passages as observed in the right abutment trench are susceptible to suffusion;
3. The foundation is rather soft according the recent SPT and CPT testing, along with the
plastic consistency of the material. This is inconsistent with the much higher SPT N-
values observed during the design stage. They may be partly attributed to the much
dryer conditions of the foundation during the pre-construction testing;
4. The large variability in the quality of the foundation is underlined in the effective or
total shear strength obtained in the EVN laboratory. Similar conclusion may be derived
from some of the AIT shearing strength results. However, most of the AIT results are
so questionable that they are considered unrealistic. An effective cohesion of 5 to 10
kPa along with a friction of 25° seems a reasonable assumption for the foundation of
Saddle Dam D. The higher effective cohesions found in the laboratory are likely linked
to the bonding effect characterizing residual soils. This bonding may be broken under
embankment loading and permanent moistening;
5. The compression tests confirm the high settlement potential of the foundation’s clayey
components.
These observations are also valid for the foundation of Saddle Dams E and F and should
therefore be considered in the design of their reinforcement.
It has to be emphasized that the coarse and sandy passages are not well represented in the
laboratory testing as the corresponding recovery was much lower than that in the silty clayey
formation.

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9 Analysis of breach incident of Saddle Dam D
9.1 Causes of failure and its triggering
According to the site visit observations, the monitoring data analysis and the review of the
available photographs during the failure as well as supported by the post-failure
investigations, the IEP considers that the root cause of the incident is the high permeability
of the foundation (particularly along canaliculus interconnected paths) and its sensitivity to
erosion.
The mechanism of failure is likely to follow the successive sequences as sketched in Figure
24 to Figure 26 below:
1. Due to the high permeability of the foundation, as confirmed by site inspection and
the geotechnical investigations, groundwater water level at the downstream toe was
so high that it generated resurgence where the topography declined rapidly in the
vegetated area (see Figure 17 and Figure 18 above). This hypothesis is supported by
the observation made downstream of Saddle Dam E, where initiation of erosion in
combination with seepage flow is observed (Photo 32 and Photo 33 below).
Resurgences were still running far downstream of Saddle Dam E during the IEP
visit in October 2018 due to the foundation dewatering;
2. Then, regressive erosion has developed resulting in the creation of ducts which
collapsed from time to time, especially in the most loaded areas under the
embankment. This resulted in a softening of the lateritic foundation knowing that
the laterites soften once saturated;
3. When the erosion and the softening reached a certain extent near the footprint of
the dam, the static stability was no longer ensured, and the first signs of instability
appeared;
4. The highest section of the embankment moved in rotation towards downstream and
the lateral boundaries converged toward the deepest area of the saddle (Figure 23
below). These movements generated such a high pressure that the downstream face
of the embankment was pushed upwards i.e. lifted. The protruding area in the
downstream face was lifted concurrently with the sinking and deformations of the
crest.
5. The remaining thin upstream portion of the embankment couldn’t any more
support the water pressure leading to its collapse followed by washing out of the
embankment by the overtopping flow.
Figure 23 represents the components of the moving mass including the dam and the track
in front of the dam toe. The sinking volume at the crest may have compensated not only
to some extent the eroded foundation but mainly in a significant proportion the bump up
of the downstream face.

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Figure 24 to Figure 26 provide a schematic representation of the 3 main stages of the Saddle
Dam D failure.
Figure 23: Synthetic representation of the failure scenario
Figure 24: Stage one: resurgence development downstream and regressive erosion starting

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Figure 25: Second stage: sliding triggering as the foundation beneath the downstream toe became
too loose and so weak that it couldn’t mobilize any shearing strength.
Figure 26: Final stage: acceleration of the sliding movements and breaching of the upstream small
remaining edge made of protections and clayey material. Embankment washing out took over sliding.
9.2 Numerical sensibility analysis of dam stability
In order to support the clear evidences of root cause of the dam failure based on the
observations described in Chapter 8, the Panel recommended TEPCO to perform some
numerical sensibility analysis of the stability of Saddle Dam D. With numerous simulations
at the highest, critical dam section, the influence of the extension and position of a
weakened zone below the dam toe and downstream of SD-GW1, where the topography
declines, in combination with internal erosion in the lateritic foundation has been examined.

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The extension of the weakened zone below the dam toe has been assumed with about 20 m
with a depth to El. 767. With significant resurgence, as occurring just before the dam
collapse, this region must have lost most of its cohesion and friction resistance.
Furthermore, this state has been combined with an internal erosion zone at several
elevations and with several lengths and thicknesses. In the zone with internal erosion the
cohesion is lost and the internal friction is reduced (values varying from φ’=0° to 20° have
been studied).
For all these cases, it was considered, for the embankment as well as for the laterite soil
foundation, that the horizontal permeability is 10 times higher as the vertical permeability
using the following geotechnical values:
• Embankment lateritic earth fill: Kv=5×10-7 m/sec; Kh= 10xKv; c’=10 kN/m²,
φ’=25°
• Laterite soil foundation: Kv=10-6 m/sec; Kh= 10xKv; c’=5 kN/m², φ’=25°
The saturation line in the dam body was assumed as observed in SD-GW1 and SD-GW3
just before the dam collapsed. A linear saturation line between the reservoir level and SD-
GW3 was considered, which is optimistic. In the dam crest region, the saturation line was
certainly on a higher level in the dam body as this linear connection.
The systematic stability simulations revealed the following main trends:
• As soon as resurgence occurs downstream of the dam toe due to high seepage and
starting internal erosion in the laterite foundation, the safety factor falls below 1 with
values close to 0.94. The rotational slide assumed as circular in the calculations, is
deep and reaches the transition to the rock surface.
• The safety factor further decreases when considering additionally the cohesion loss
and reduced friction in the zone with internal erosion and softening. For a friction
angle φ’=20° the safety factor approaches 0.9 or falls below depending on the
thickness of the internal erosion zone. For a friction angle of φ’=15° and φ’=10° in
the internal erosion zone close to the transition to the rock surface, the safety factor
becomes lower than 0.8 and 0.7 respectively.
As expected, it may be concluded, that the numerous simulations of dam stability confirm
the clear evidences of the root cause of the incident, which is the high permeability of the
foundation particularly along canaliculus interconnected paths and its sensitivity to internal
erosion and softening. The observed failure mechanism as described above (Section 9.1)
can be supported by the simulations indicating the prevailing safety factors.
9.3 Prevention of failure
All available information from the site visits, as well as the results of the performed
geotechnical investigations, indicate that the very heterogeneous foundation was involved
in the failure of Saddle Dam D. As the root cause of the incident is the presence in the
foundation of high permeability horizons combined with the existence of canaliculus

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interconnected paths and the laterite sensitivity to erosion and softening, the failure could
have been prevented by an adequate design of the foundation treatment. The most reliable
engineering solution would have been a combination of a positive cut-off along with
fractured bedrock’s grouting. A deep drainage system aiming at controlling the seepage
through the foundation is also recommended.
After the observation of the first cracks in the dam crest, or even before when the
settlements’ speeding up occurred (July 13), indicating that the failure may happen, the EPC
Contractor (SK) didn’t take any attempt to investigate the reasons of this behavior and try
to avoid the failure of Saddle Dam D.
A trial action would have been to start immediately to reinforce the deepest toe region by
dumping of permeable rock material. It seems that access during heavy rain was difficult,
but any embankment dam should be accessible even during extreme conditions at critical
location as toe regions not only for visual inspection but also for emergency measures.
Normally during impoundment, the contractor as well as the impoundment surveillance
team has to be prepared for such emergency measures.
There is no possibility to control or to lower the level of the reservoir when the failure was
announced by the cracks. The bottom outlet has only a small capacity mainly for release of
environmental flow. In principle, the size of the diversion tunnel (7 m Dia.), together with
a gate chamber, would have allowed to install a bottom outlet with two gates having a total
surface of about 15 m2. Such a bottom outlet would have had a significant higher capacity
(at least about 5 times) than the actual outlet. Nevertheless, even such a bottom outlet
capacity would probably not have had the capability to lower the reservoir. The spillway is
an ungated weir i.e. labyrinth weir. In the case of embankment dams, especially a reservoir
contained by a main dam and several saddle dams, an ungated spillway not allowing
controlling the reservoir level in the most upper critical part is a risky conception
considering the consequences after failure not only of the main dam but also of one of the
saddle dams. The only way to prevent the failure would have been to breach the labyrinth
weir by blasting when recognizing the potential failure announced by sudden settlement on
July 18 just after the spillway started to operate on July 18. This would have produced of
course a major flood in the main valley but only with a significantly reduced and controlled
volume released from the reservoir.

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10 Consequences for the other dams of XPXN
10.1 Saddle Dam A
Saddle Dam A is very wide and houses a large concrete gallery founded on bedrock. It
should therefore have a satisfactory behavior. However, the IEP recommends the
following:
1. Checking if the design is adequate and a filtering and draining system has been
provided in the contact of the gallery with the downstream part of the embankment
and any eventual lateritic foundation;
2. Reinforce the monitoring system by geodesic benchmarks on the crest each 20 m

and standpipe piezometers far in the abutments and downstream near the gallery.
10.2 Saddle Dam E and F
These both saddle dams are grouped in the same section as they have similar foundation
and the same design as Saddle Dam D and exhibited comparable behavior during reservoir
impounding.
Figure 27 and Figure 28 related to the saturation lines respectively for Saddle Dams E and
F, during impoundment confirm the high position of the water table at the downstream toe
of both dams, as it was the case at Saddle Dam D. In addition, uncontrolled seepage was
observed by local population downstream of the Saddle Dam E (Photo 32). Available aerial
photos of Saddle Dam E allow identification of another erosion spot on the right side as
shown in Photo 33. Furthermore, during the IEP visit in October, resurgence was still
active few tens of meters from the downstream track, in the wood.

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Saddle Dam E
Figure 27: Saddle Dam E, saturation lines during impoundment. The arrow points the area where
resurgence has been observed during the IEP site visit.

Photo 32: Saddle Dam E, the photo on the right corresponds to the identified seeping zone during
impoundment. On the left, the aerial photos taken on July 25th providing the location of this zone on
the downstream toe at the left side. (See also the next aerial view zone circled in yellow).

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Photo 33: Saddle Dam E, zoom on the downstream toe at the right bank, with evidence of seeping
flow from the foundation along with initiation of erosion. The aerial photo was taken on July 25th.
Saddle dam F
Figure 28: Saddle Dam F, saturation lines during impoundment. It is likely that the filter would have
trapped seeping water to be released in the rockfill. No downstream resurgence was observed during
the IEP visit. Only vegetation development was seen on the downstream berm (arrow) as shown in
the photo on the left. The wood downstream as seen in the photo didn’t allow for a visual inspection
looking for any signs of uncontrolled resurgences.

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These observations support the hypothesis of the erosion development in the foundation
of Saddle Dam D as the root cause of its failure.
Photo 34: Far in the abutment of Saddle Dam E, the topographical configuration may lead to the
development of seepage paths toward the downstream depression with possible erosion.
The topographical configuration highlighted in Photo 34, asks for additional investigations
in order to check any signs of seepage in the downstream depression. This recommendation
is applicable to all reservoir areas where short seepage paths may be identified. These areas
should be provided with permanent access and equipped hydrostatic monitoring system
(stand pipe piezometers). A visual inspection should cover potential resurgence areas to
detect any eventual seepage development.

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Crest Settlement Point (Saddle Dam E STA.0+400, SE-CS-02)

0.200 820
0.160 810
Y (Dam Axis) Level 1. Safe : 0.13
Level 2. Cauion : 0.16
0.120 Z (Elevation) 800

Level 3. Warning : 0.20
Displacement (m)
0.080 790
0.040 780
0.000 770
-0.040 760
-0.080 750
-0.120 740
-0.160 730
-0.200 720
30/03/17 08/07/17 16/10/17 24/01/18 04/05/18 12/08/18 20/11/18
Date
Crest Settlement Point (Saddle Dam F STA.0+170, SF-CS-01)

0.200 820
0.160 Level 1. Safe : 0.17 810
Y (Dam Axis)
0.120 Z (Elevation) Level 3. Warning : 0.26 800

Displacement (m)

0.080 790
0.040 780
0.000 770
-0.040 760
-0.080 750
-0.120 740
-0.160 730
-0.200 720
30/03/17 08/07/17 16/10/17 24/01/18 04/05/18 12/08/18 20/11/18
Date
Figure 29: Geodetic survey variations with time of Saddle Dam D and F.
Geodetic survey measurements, as represented in Figure 29 for both Saddle Dam E and F,
reflect a similar behavior as noticed before in Figure 14 related to Saddle Dam D.
According to the monitoring data interpretation and evidence of seepage flow in the
foundation of Saddle Dam E, the IEP considers that both Saddle Dams E & F have
suffered the same fate as Saddle Dam D. However, the very rapid drawdown of the
reservoir due to the failure of the latter spared them. Special attention should therefore be
paid to provide both Saddle Dams with the required safety, taking into account particularly
the quality of their foundation.
For this purpose and as first steps the IEP recommends the following:
1. Carrying out investigations aiming at (1) determining the position of the bedrock at
the vertical of both dam axes, extending far in the abutments and (2) checking

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whether water seepage during the impoundment caused any significant erosion in
their lateritic foundation. For this purpose, geophysical methods and in-situ testing
might be used;
2. Consider a positive cutoff (diaphragm wall made of plastic concrete) keyed in the
bedrock as the most adapted solution to get the required water tightness of the
foundation. The open cracks affecting the bedrock may require a treatment by
grouting. The extension of the cutoff on both abutments is to be determined based
on the result of the investigations aforementioned along with a numerical 3D
modeling of the seepage in the foundation;
3. In case the investigations reveal a severe disturbance of the lateritic foundation,

additional treatment should be envisaged;
4. Consider embankment dam stabilization by filtering and draining downstream of

the counterweight fill and check whether the upstream shell needs reinforcement.
5. Introduce an efficient drainage of the lateritic foundation at the downstream toe of

each dam. Relief wells reaching the bedrock regularly distributed might constitute
an appropriate solution;
6. Reinforce the monitoring system by (1) implementing new piezometers downstream

and in the abutments, (2) geodesic benchmarks distributed along the crest of the
dam and eventually on the downstream face, (3) create and maintain walking paths
for visual inspection at least 100 m far downstream from the toe and (4) gather and
monitor any eventual water seepage appearing downstream, including any eventual
water released by the relief wells;
7. At the end of the works, particularly the cutoff, reconstruct the crest introducing
upstream and downstream safety blocks and an asphalt coating. Finishing and
leveling should be as perfect as possible to detect any eventual deformations just by
visual inspection;
8. Review the topography of the reservoirs looking for any downstream depression
likely to favor a development of short path flows with a risk of erosion and failure
out of the manmade embankments (Photo 34);
9. Mobilize a highly-specialized team on the site during the subsequent reservoir

impoundment to check whether all the project components are behaving as
expected.
10.3 Xe-Pian Dam
The Xe-Pian Dam is provided with a cutoff made of clay material founded on the bedrock,
except on the left abutment where the embankment is sitting on the laterite formation as it
is the case for Saddle Dams E and F. Figure 30 shows the layout of Xe-Pian Dam. Figure
31 shows the cross sections which confirm that from the left abutment limit to station

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0+420 no cut off trench has been included in the final design (the circled zone in Figure
30).
Figure 30: Xe-Pian Dam layout, the section founded on lateritic formation with no cutoff is circled
Figure 31: Typical cross sections of Xe-Pian Dam.

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Compared to the other saddle dams, the cross section of Xe-Pian embankment is provided
with a fine filter covering the impervious zone on its entire height, including the
downstream slope of the cutoff. This is preferred to the toe filter and drain as implemented
in the Saddle Dams.
The left abutment of the dam, as can be seen in Figure 32, is monitored at station 0+400
by geodesic landmarks on the crest. At mid height of the downstream face as well as at the
downstream toe, a stand pipe piezometer and pore-pressure cells at the contact of the
embankment with the foundation and also a V-Notch at station 0+170 are installed.
Figure 32: Xe-Pian Dam / zoom on the left abutment – Monitoring system installed on ST 0+400
With the geodetic survey as synthetized in Figure 34 a sudden settlement exceeding 40 mm

at the crest and 20 mm at the downstream face was detected in 2017. No comments have
been provided on this behavior although the settlement warning level was exceeded at SS-
01 installed on the downstream face.
The topographical survey, carried out on the request of the IEP, revealed at ST 0+400, in
comparison with the as-build situation, a rebound of the downstream face reaching 0.40 m,
the largest recorded from ST 0+340 to 0+460. The survey showed also a crest settlement
of 0.20 m at ST 0+400, increasing with the height of the embankment.
Figure 33: topographical survey carried out at ST 0+400
The topographical survey was inconsistent with the settlement given by the crest and slope
landmarks movements as presented in Figure 34 below. It is not clear whether the above-
mentioned rebound occurred recently or existed already at the end of construction, i.e.
before the installation of the geodesic landmarks.
The settlement of the crest should reflect the reality if its leveling would have been carried
out properly. It is considered too high either at ST 0+400, where the embankment is of just
8 m height or at ST 0+460, where the lateritic core of about 32 m height is founded on the
bedrock (0.38 m settlement). It is likely that for both sections the foundation is involved in
the observed settlement. At ST 0+460, the deep trench excavated in the lateritic formation

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may influence the crest settlement. However, this should also occur at the shoulders which
is not the case.
More investigations should be carried out in order to clarify this situation, beginning by
checking the quality of the embankment using in-situ testing.
Crest Settlement Point (Xe-Pian Dam STA.0+400, XP-CS-04)

0.100 810
0.080 Y (Dam Axis) Level 1. Safe : 0.08 805
0.060 800

Displacement (m)
0.040 795
0.020 790
0.000 785
-0.020 780
-0.040 775
-0.060 770
-0.080 765
-0.100 760
20-4-17 29-7-17 6-11-17 14-2-18 25-5-18 2-9-18 11-12-18
Date
Slope Settlement Point (Xe-Pian Dam STA.0+400, XP-SS-01)

0.100 810
0.080 Y (Dam Axis) Level 1. Safe : 0.023 805
0.060 800
Displacement (m)

0.040 795
0.020 790
0.000 785
-0.020 780
-0.040 775
-0.060 770
-0.080 765
-0.100 760
20-4-17 29-7-17 6-11-17 14-2-18 25-5-18 2-9-18 11-12-18
Date
Figure 34: Xe-Pian Dam, Geodetic survey at PM 0+400
The analysis of Figure 35, related to groundwater monitoring of Xe-Pian dam, leads to the
following comments:
• The V-Notch flows appear to be higher in 2018, compared to 2017. Obviously, they
are influenced by the rainfall as they collect not only the seepage through the
foundation of the dam, but also the rainfall water collected by the downstream
drainage ditch. The IEP recommends a thorough review of the measured flow
particularly during the dry season;

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• Piezometers (ground water observation wells) are responding not only to the rainfall
but also to the reservoir variations. This seems to be the case of GW-01 located at
ST. 0+400 far from the contour line 785 (see Figure 32).
V-Notch (Xe-Pian Dam)

1500 810
XP-VN-01 (Sta.0+170) XP-VN-02 (Sta.0+620)
1350 XP-VN-03 (Sta.0+740) XP-VN-04 (Sta.1+107) 805
XP-VN-05 (Sta. 1+140) Rainfall

Rainfall (mm) / Leakage (L/min)
1200 800

1050 795
900 790
750 785
600 780
450 775
300 770
150 765
0 760
27/04/17 05/08/17 13/11/17 21/02/18 01/06/18 09/09/18
Date
Groundwater Observation Well (Xe-Pian Dam)

810 500
Reservoir Water / Groundwater Level (m)
805 Rainfall Reservoir Water Level 450

XP-GW-01 (Sta.0+400) XP-GW-02 (Sta.0+720)
800 400
XP-GW-03 (Sta.0+960) XP-GW-04 (Sta.1+120)
795 350
790 300
Rainfall (mm)
785 250
780 200
775 150
770 100
765 50
760 0
15/jui/2018
20/nov/2017
23/août/2018
28/jan/2018
31/oct/2018
27/avr/2017
05/juil/2017
07/avr/2018
12/sept/2017
Date
Figure 35: Xe-Pian Dam / V-Notch and piezometers variation with time
The IEP is concerned about the behavior of the section founded on the lateritic formation
of Xe-Pian Dam. Actions have to be taken with the purpose to prevent any disorder in this
section, even if the water head is moderate.

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Photo 35: Xe-Pian Dam drainage ditch, collecting water coming from the embankment (Left side of
the photos)
It has to be pointed out, that during the site visit in October 2018, water coming from the
embankment near the highest section of the dam was flowing into the drainage ditch (Photo
35). The corresponding flow should be collected and measured. In addition, its temperature
and electrical conductivity should be monitored and compared to the water of the reservoir
sampled at various depths. A topographical survey of the wet and seeping zones should be
carried out and followed up in order to detect any changes in their extension. The vegetation
that grows in favor of soil moisture should be regularly removed.
Seeping water is not alarming as long as the corresponding flows remain stable in time (for
the same reservoir elevation) and convey perfectly clean water. This should be checked over
a long period.

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11 General recommendations for the project of New Saddle Dam D
In view of the planning and design of the New Saddle Dam D, the IEP gives the
following general recommendations:
- Timely (re-)construction of new Saddle Dam D is very important to have a control

of the reservoir before the next rainy season;
- The concept of the new saddle dam has to be robust in view of the very limited
construction time, uncertainty of foundation and safety requirements. A
symmetrical profile in RCC would fulfil most probably these requirements;
- The arrangement of high capacity low-level outlets (at least 2 for safety operation)
in the new saddle dam is mandatory in order to control the reservoir during
construction of the new saddle dam, impoundment and to manage safely future
critical situations. The low-level outlets should be located at least 20 m below FSL
in order to have efficient control of the reservoir.
During the redaction of this Final Report on Saddle Dam D Failure, the contractor SK
E&C started the different design phases of the construction of the New Saddle Dam D as
well as the reinforcement of Saddle Dams E & F, which were commented by the IEP with
three separate Intermediate Notes in December 2018. As soon as the reports and drawings
of the Detailed Design and the Construction Design are available, the IEP is intended to
give more comments in separate review report (Part II).
During the site visit in February 2019, based on observations and presentations made by
the EPC Contractor, the IEP raised some issues regarding the construction of the New
Saddle Dam D as well as the foreseen reinforcement works on Saddle Dam E & F.
Furthermore, the Contractor made a presentation on the possible remedial works on Xe-
Pian dam, which were also orally commented by the IEP.

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12 Lessons learnt
Several lessons may be learnt from failure incident of the Saddle Dam D of the XPXN
project and are listed below. However, it should be noted that most of them should have
been known according to the ICOLD Bulletins, particularly on tropical soils10 and dam
surveillance11.
1) Laterite foundations especially on saddle topography are delicate and are likely to be
very heterogeneous and contain canaliculus involving high permeability with
occurrence of water resurgence and concentrated leaks, which may trigger internal
erosion. Furthermore, Laterite formations are residual soils, which may have a
potential of collapse if they are not permanently saturated.
2) In Laterite formations, observations and tests from boreholes alone cannot give the
full picture of the material characteristics required for a safe design, particularly
when the volume of investigations is insufficient and/or of non-adequate quality.
Observations and tests in open excavated exploratory trenches and shafts, along
with in-situ testing are mandatory.
3) When interpreting in-situ test results, the level of soil saturation should be
considered in comparison with the situation after impoundment. The problem arises
especially in the saddles where the ground is often kept dry for a long period during
the year.
4) The most adapted seepage control in this type of formation is a positive cutoff along
with efficient downstream drainage system.
5) Slope stability assessment has to take into account the uncertainties involved with
materials’ characterization. Sensitivity analyses are required in the design
calculations.
6) The first filling of the reservoir is among the most critical phase. Experienced dam
monitoring specialist have to be permanently on site, aiming at detecting and making
a correct interpretation of any anomaly of dam behavior during first impoundment
and take timely action in order to avoid catastrophic incidents.
7) Threshold values, which are critical in the assessment of the dam safety during its
operation, should be evaluated carefully taking into account all relevant parameters
governing the dam and its foundation behavior.
8) All scenarios of failure should be considered before the reservoir filling and
necessary actions, in case this eventuality became probable, should be listed. Among

10
Besides ICOLD Bulletin 151 “Tropical Residual Soils as dam foundation and fill material”, as an important
reference published in 2009, in Appendix E some more recent publications on Residual Soil Engineering are
listed.
11
ICOLD Bulletin 138 “General approach to Dam Surveillance” and Bulletin 158 “Dam Surveillance Guide”.

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them, threated areas in case of failure of any component of the project should be
determined.
9) The access to critical infrastructures like saddle dams retaining a major part of the
reservoir has to be ensured even during extreme meteorological events not only for
visual inspection but also technical intervention.
10) Saddle dams, which failure have catastrophic consequences by releasing

uncontrolled significant volume of the reservoir, have to be treated with the same
level of safety requirement from design to operational phase like the main dam.
Saddle dams are even more critical than the main dam as a failure would drain in
areas with no steam, highly endangering the unaware population located
downstream the saddle.
11) Any reservoir, especially contained by several embankment dams, must have water
release structure which is not only able to control the level of the reservoir during
first impoundment but also has the capacity to lower the level in case of subsequent
danger.
12) Large hydropower and dam projects have to be accompanied by an independent

panel of experts, which ensures the required high safety standards according to
international best practice from early design stages to the construction phase and
first filling.

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13 Recommendations regarding dam safety in Laos PDR
According to the ICOLD12 “Dams should be constructed and operated only if they yield an overall
benefit to society” and “The fundamental dam safety objective is to protect people, property and the
environment from harmful effects of misoperation or failure of dams and reservoirs”.
Hydropower projects with large dams and reservoirs are complex and critical infrastructures
which have to be closely followed by a comprehensive safety concept from design to
construction and operation phases.
For the design and construction phase, it is recommended that any project, independently
of its financial structure (private or public), is regularly reviewed by an independent panel
of experts covering all the interdisciplinary fields ensuring that it is “built and operated safely,
efficiently, economically, and it is environmentally sustainable and socially equitable” according to
ICOLD. Dams and reservoirs for hydropower production are, as already mentioned, critical
water infrastructures which require a high level of international safety standard. Already
from the early design stages, an independent panel of expert can detect deficiencies and can
help to select the most optimal alternative which offers besides other criteria above all the
required safety in view of the potential risks. During the detailed design and construction
phase the independent panel can detect critical safety issues in time to take the right
decisions avoiding future incidences with catastrophic consequences.
For the operational phase, the public supervisory authority has to ensure that the dams and
hydropower projects are not only built but also monitored strictly according to a dam safety
concept which corresponds to international standards. It is therefore recommended that
the Government of Laos PDR set up a dam safety department which has the legal bases to
control the safety of the projects from the very beginning up to its operation during the
whole life time. This dam safety department, together with the dam professional
community in Laos, could set up a National committee on Dams in order to become
member of ICOLD, which would enhance exchange of experience in best practice and thus
increase competencies in Laos.
A dam safety concept has to be based on three components namely structural safety,
surveillance and maintenance, and emergency planning (Figure 36 inspired by Swiss Dam
Safety Concept).

12
ICOLD Bulletin 154 (2017) Dam Safety Management: Operational phase of the dam life cycle.

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Figure 36: Dam safety concept comprising structural safety, surveillance and monitoring and
emergency planning
Structural safety calls for sound engineering and construction practices, plus compliance
with minimum performance requirements (e.g. dam stability and prevention of
uncontrolled release of reservoir water during the safety assessment regarding earthquake
or safe passage of the probable maximum flood). It has to be implemented at all dams that
have certain level of risk which has to be defined in the legislation. Every person who could
be affected in the event of a dam incident or accident is thus assured on a minimum level
of protection, which may be regarded as the enforcement of a limit on individual risk. The
structural requirements are kept in-line with the development of scientific and technical
knowledge. They are formulated in the form of performance targets with certain
quantitative requirements for example related to the natural hazards of flood and
earthquakes.
Surveillance and maintenance activities should be divided into three to four levels of
responsibility. The first level calls for periodical visual inspections and measurements, as well
as maintenance by the operator’s personnel on site. This includes an annual functional test
of the gated discharge works at full reservoir, though with limited water discharge (full
opening as dry tests only).
The second level calls for an experienced engineer to carry out an initial assessment of the
inspection and measurement results as soon as they are obtained, to conduct an annual
inspection and prepare an annual safety report in which the findings of the first level are
integrated. Predictive behavior models are being used for assessing the behavior of the dam
at an early stage, particularly their deformations for identifying eventually irreversible
developments due to creep, swelling, valley deformation, etc.), and separate them from
reversible issues resulting from changes in the reservoir water level and temperature (or
season).
The third level concerns the performance of an in-depth safety review every 5 years for dams
with a height of at least 40 m, or of at least 10 m if the reservoir contains more than 106 m3.
This review is carried out by an experienced civil engineer and a geologist, independent
from the operator or owner, for the purpose of evaluating the findings of the past 5 years
and assessing them over a long-term perspective, as well as addressing any specific safety
issues that may arise.

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The content and structure of these three levels for each dam are specified in a document
that has to be approved by the supervisory authority. The fourth level involves the supervisory
authority itself, which means the recommended dam safety department. Here its specialists,
eventually supported by independent international experts, have to ensure that all safety
requirements are complied with, carry out their own site inspections and evaluate the annual
and 5-year (sometimes 10-years) safety reports (including results of the functional tests of
water release devices, hydrology updating…), as well as other special reports (for example
earthquake analysis). In the process, they check the content of the technical documents for
plausibility, and carry out their own assessments. If necessary, they ask the owners,
engineers or experts to carry out special additional studies.
Emergency plan. If a threatening situation develops that could culminate in the

uncontrolled release of large masses of water, emergency countermeasures need to be taken
both to prevent such an uncontrolled release (as far as possible), as well as to warn, alarm
and, if necessary, evacuate the population at risk before the arrival of the flood wave.
Surveillance supports this process by permitting the early identification of a threat, thus
providing additional time for taking the necessary countermeasures or ultimately for
evacuating the population at risk. Emergency planning addresses the key issues of «whom
to alarm» (based on dam breach analyses), «when to alarm» (as soon as an uncontrolled
release of large masses of water is detected or feared), «how to alarm» (with the aid of
suitable systems) and «how to evacuate» (on the basis of evacuation maps). This requires
the involvement of several institutions at the planning stage, a clear assignment of
responsibilities and duties during an event, as well as effective alarm systems. Emergency
planning may take several years to be implemented and operating.
The supervisory authority, that means the recommended Dam Safety Department, is
normally authorized to ask the dam owners and operator for remuneration of his services.
Thus, the supervisory authority is partially financed by the hydropower and dam industry.

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14 Conclusions
The panel has obtained a clear view on the failure incident of Saddle Dam D based on the
following observations, namely:
- Review of the Detailed Design and assessment of the construction;

- Panel site visits and investigations’ review;
- Analysis and interpretation of the post-failure geological and geotechnical site
investigations;
- Analysis of available pictures before, during and after the failure
- Analysis of available monitoring data;
- Hearings and discussions with the involved parties during site visits and meetings.
Regarding the characteristics of the Saddle Dam D foundation, based on visual

observations, analysis of available data and the review of the post-failure geotechnical
investigations, it can be concluded, that the foundation of the Saddle Dam D is very
heterogeneous with a predominance of clayey sandy-silty soils. Numerous passages rich in
sand and even gravel leading to low core recoveries and higher permeability values have
been observed. As a whole, the foundation is composed of a heterogeneous residual
formation (Laterite) sitting on a basaltic bedrock sound but fractured. In the transition
between both formations weathered bedrock in the process of laterization is present, which
is very common. At the scale of the dam site, the laterite is very heterogeneous and has
many features among others like canaliculus, which are potential seepage paths, and coarse
to fine sandy silt in continuous layers with probable high permeability and low cohesion
after saturation. Furthermore, shearing surfaces where observed either in the clayey
formation or in the facies under weathering.
The observed dewatering of the left and right bank, shaped by the erosion of the outflowing
reservoir after the Saddle Dam D collapse, is a clear sign that the real permeability of the
lateritic foundation is much higher than considered in the detailed design. According to the
post-failure geotechnical investigations the permeability values are 10 to 100 times higher
than those assumed in the design.
In addition, the lateritic formation present in saddles is not permanently soaked. Thus, they
are likely to experience softening and ability to collapse after saturation in contact with the
reservoir.
Thus, the IEP considers that the root cause of the incident is related to the presence
of high permeability and erodibility horizons combined with the existence of
canaliculus interconnected paths in the foundation. Such conditions can lead to
internal erosion and softening of the lateritic soil, if no efficient filtering and
draining system is installed.

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The mechanism of failure of the Saddle Dam D was most likely triggered by the following
successive sequences:
1. Due to the presence of high permeability horizons in the foundation, as confirmed

by the investigations, groundwater water level at the downstream toe was close to
the surface generating resurgence in the vegetated area where topography declines
rapidly. This hypothesis is supported by the observation made downstream of the
very similar Saddle Dam E, where evidence of resurgence with some internal erosion
was observed.
2. With continuing resurgence downstream of the dam toe, regressive erosion in the
foundation has developed resulting in the formation of ducts that collapsed from
time to time, especially in the deepest section of the saddle where the highest seepage
gradients occur. The resulting softening of the laterite triggered the speeding up of
the settlement and the appearance of the first cracks on the dam crest.
3. When the erosion and softening in the foundation reached a certain extent, the static
dam slope stability was no longer ensured and a deep rotational sliding at the highest
section of the embankment developed. Simultaneously, converging embankment
movements occurred from the lateral border of the sliding mass towards the middle,
resulting in a bumping up of the downstream face and the subsidence of the track
in front of the dam toe.
4. When the remaining thin upstream edge of the embankment crest breached, the
embankment was overtopped and the catastrophic uncontrolled release of water
from the reservoir washed away the central section of the Saddle Dam D and its
foundation.
The IEP considers that a risk of such failure existed and still exist also for Saddle Dams E
and F as well as the left bank section of the Xe-Pian Dam not founded on rock since they
have a similar problematic design and foundation. Special attention should therefore be
paid to upgrade them with the required safety, taking into account particularly the quality
of their foundation. This also applies, to a lesser extent, to any topographic decline enough
close to the reservoir that short seeping paths may develop in the lateritic formation.
The IEP recommends carrying out investigations with the purpose of determining the
position of the bedrock at the vertical of the center lines of the both Saddle Dams E and F
as well as the concerned section of Xe-Pian. Furthermore, it has to be checked whether
water seepage during the impoundment had caused any significant damage in their lateritic
foundation. For this purpose, geophysical methods and in-situ testing are preferred. For
the rehabilitation work, positive cutoff (diaphragm wall made of plastic concrete) keyed in
the bedrock is considered as the most adapted solution to reach the required water tightness
of the foundation. The open cracks affecting the bedrock may require a treatment by
grouting. The extension of the cutoff on both abutments has to be determined based on
the result of the aforementioned investigations, combined with a numerical 3D modeling
of the seepage in the foundation. An efficient drainage should be provided to control any
residual seepage trough the foundation.

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The monitoring system of all the components of the project, including the concerned Xe-
Pian section and both Saddle Dams E and F, has to be reinforced by implementing new
piezometers downstream and in the abutments as well as geodesic benchmarks distributed
along the crest of the dams and eventually on the downstream face. Furthermore, a walking
path for visual inspection at least 100 m far downstream from the toe, after removing the
small vegetation, has to be implemented in order to ensure proper visual inspection.
The existing Emergency Action Plan has to be updated and should address all the
components of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy project, especially including all the saddle dams.
After the rehabilitation, the impoundment process has to be clearly established,

implemented and followed by a highly-specialized team on the site in order to check if all
the project components are behaving as expected.
The timely (re-)construction of the new Saddle Dam D, together with the reinforcement of
Saddle Dams E and F and the left abutment section of Xe-Pian Dam, is very important in
order to have a safe control of the reservoir before the next rainy season. The concept and
design of the new saddle dam has to be robust in view of the very limited construction time,
uncertainty of foundation and safety requirements. In this view, the IEP has given general
recommendations and commented the ongoing design of the rehabilitation works in more
detail already with separate intermediate notes.
Finally, many lessons can be learnt from the failure incident of Saddle Dam D which are
not only relevant for existing or future dam projects in Laos PDR but also worldwide. The
risk of such incidents can be significantly reduced in similar projects by an independent
review panel involved from the beginning of the project (design, construction and
operation phases). Furthermore, an up-to-date dam safety concept, ensured by a
supervisory authority based on a legal framework in the country, is the sound basis for
residual risk minimization.

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15 Acknowledgement
The IEP thanks the Government of Laos for the strong support through the National
Investigations Committee (NIC) and the excellent organization of the site visits as well as
for the fruitful collaboration. The geological and geotechnical site and laboratory
investigations as recommended by the IEP have been planned, organized and supervised
by TEPCO supported by Pöyry, which was involved also in the preparation of the IEP
framework and the first mission of Prof. Anton Schleiss. The IEP appreciates the efficient
and timely collaboration of the EPC Contractor (SK) with the Panel and the cooperative
communication towards the requests of IEP.

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Appendix A
Terms of Reference (ToR) of Independent
Expert Panel (IEP)

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Terms of Reference

for International Independent Expert Panel for
Engineering/Technical Investigation and Review
I. Establishment of the Independent Expert Panel (IEP)
With reference to: (i) Prime Minister Decision No. 54/PM dated 8 August 2018, and (ii) the discussion
and consent by the Prime Minister of the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic ("GOL")
on 16 August 2018, and acting in my dual capacity as the Chairman of the Government Inspection
Authority and Chairman of the National Investigation Committee for the Dam Break Incident of Saddle
Dam D of Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy ("NIC-XPXN"), I hereby direct that:
• an Independent Expert Panel (the "IEP") shall be established under and in accordance with these
Terms of Reference ("ToR");
• the IEP shall be authorized:
o to carry out an independent engineering / technical investigation and review (the

"Investigation & Review") regarding the failure on 23 July 2018 of Saddle Dam D
at the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy Hydroelectric Power Project (the "XPXN Project"), pursuant to
and in accordance with this ToR;
o to report the results of such Investigation & Review to the NIC-XPXN as required by this
ToR, in accordance with the timeframe set forth in Part VIII below;
o to include in the IEP's report any comments as to what actions -- concerning design, risks,
requirements, construction methods and/or quality control -- might reasonably and
foreseeably have been taken by the XPXN Project owner, construction contractor or
others, that could have prevented the failure of Saddle
o to identify international dam design construction and the risk for best practices that could
be considered by the GOL for possible implementation in the Lao PDR.

To enable the IEP to duly conduct the Investigation & Review, I confer upon the IEP (and through and
in support of the duties of the IEP, confer upon each of the members of the IEP) the powers and
authorities required in order for the IEP to carry out its independent Investigation & Review, and
thereby to identify, insofar as possible, the engineering / technical reason(s) for and/or underlying
physical root cause(s) of such dam failure.
The IEP will be supported by the NIC-XPXN and by its Secretariat in accordance with Parts V, VI and VIII
and below.

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II. Purpose of the IEP
The purpose of the IEP shall be to independently investigate and to report to the NIC-XPXN and the
GOL on the engineering / technical reason(s) for and/or underlying physical root cause(s) of the failure
on 23 July 2018 of Saddle Dam D of the XPXN Project.
Upon the completion of the IEP's engineering / technical investigation, the IEP shall prepare and submit
to the NIC-XPXN a report consisting of two parts I and II (the "Report"). The Report shall be prepared
by the IEP in accordance with safety international standards of engineering professionalism, care,
accuracy, completeness and transparency, and shall:
i) fully and reliably describe and relate the engineering/technical reason(s)s for and/or underlying
physical root cause(s) of the failure of the Saddle Dam D of the XPXN Project (Part I of Report);
ii) give support for the engineering/technical evaluation of the review of the main dam of the XPXN
Project, and of the other saddle dams comprised by the XPXN Project (Part II of Report);
iii) provide the IEP's recommendations for technical risk to the GOL as to actions that may be taken
by the GOL to help to ensure that no similar dam failure will occur at any other hydroelectric power
project in the Lao PDR (Part I of Report).

III. Scope of Investigation & Review Work
III.1. The Report (Part I) of the IEP regarding the failure of Saddle Dam D of the XPXN Project will be
prepared by the IEP based upon its engineering/technical investigation and review activities, including:
i)
conducting site visits as deemed necessary by the IEP;
ii) familiarization with the XPXN Project and with the timeline/sequence of events comprising the
incident;
iii) familiarization with the prevailing XPXN Project conditions at the time of the incident;
iv) study of XPXN Project documents related to and relevant (or potentially relevant) for the failure
of Saddle Dam D;
v) describing the design and construction, and its technical risks of Saddle Dam D;
vi) commenting upon the adequacy of the basic design, detailed design, and design modifications,
construction methods and results of Saddle Dam D, and highlighting any potential risks,
weaknesses or/and areas of engineering / technical concern that may be identified;
vii) describing and analysing general potential failure modes that are relevant / potentially relevant to
dams of the type represented by Saddle Dam D;
viii) identifying and providing engineering / technical comments on any XPXN Project conditions which
could have triggered failure modes involved in the failure of Saddle Dam D;
ix) describing in detail any failure mode(s) found by the IEP to have caused the failure of Saddle Dam
D;
x) the empirical findings or/and evidences of technical investigation by IEP shall be shared with and
presented to NIC-XPXN;
xi) all the information, findings or/and evidences of technical investigation by IEP shall be disclosed
to NIC-XPXN; and
xii) responding under the ToR to any additional questions or requests of the NIC-XPXN concerning the
failure of Saddle Dam D that may be communicated to the IEP in writing.


4/7

III.2. In Part II of the Report, the IEP will give support in the validation of the review of XPXN Project
submitted by the project company ("PNPC") with a focus on: (a) the main dam of the XPXN Project, (ii)
all other saddle dams / Embankment Dams comprising the XPXN Project, and (iii) PNPC's project to
complete a New (replacement) Saddle Dam D, including:
i) validating the Review of the design and construction of the other saddle dams/
embankment dams of the XPXN Project;
ii) assessing:
a. whether each of the other saddle dams/embankment dams of the XPXN Project and the main
dam of the XPXN Project is currently designed and constructed in accordance with safety
international standard, applicable laws of the Lao PDR and the requirements of the
concession agreement for the XPXN Project;
b. the concept and design of the reconstruction of New (replacement) Saddle Dam D, to verify
that New (replacement) Saddle Dam D is designed such that it can be constructed in
accordance with safety international standard, applicable laws of the Lao PDR and the
requirements of the concession agreement for the XPXN Project;
c. what further actions, if any, should be taken with regard to any saddle dams/ embankment
dams of the XPXN Project, the main dam of the XPXN Project and/or the New (replacement)
Saddle Dam D, in order to ensure that all such infrastructure, upon completion, will be
considered to be safe, and to identify and propose any measures that should reasonably and
prudently be taken in order to improve, achieve and ensure dam safety at the XPXN Project;
and
iii) requesting specific investigations (e.g., in-situ statistic control) aiming at checking
/confirming the quality of the already constructed embankments.

IV. IEP Members
The IEP shall determine the process and procedures of its independent engineering / technical
investigations in collaboration with, and as supported by, the NIC-XPXN.
The individuals who are initially appointed to act as independent engineering / technical experts and
members of the IEP are:
• Prof. Dr. Anton J. Schleiss, Switzerland

• Mr. Ahmed F. Chraibi, Morocco
• Dr. Jean-Pierre Tournier, Canada

The IEP will be chaired by Prof. Dr. Anton J. Schleiss.
Based on relevant factors (including, e.g., the progress of the IEP's work, the availability and degree of
professionalism exhibited by the members of the IEP, the ability of the members of the IEP to work
together effectively and cooperatively, the timeline for completion of the Investigation & Review, the
timing for preparation of the Report and other aspects of the performance of the duties of the IEP
pursuant to the ToR), the NIC-XPXN expressly reserves the right to add, substitute and/or remove
members of the IEP if it believes that it is necessary to do so in order to achieve the purpose of this
ToR.

No member of the IEP shall acquire any legal rights vis-a-vis the NIC-XPXN or the GOL by reason of
having been appointed as a member of the IEP, and nor shall any member of the IEP have any claim

5/7

against the NIC-XPXN or the GOL for any reason related to the implementation of the duties of the IEP
under this ToR or in regard to any substitution or removal of any member of the IEP by the NIC-XPXN
or the GOL for any reason.
V. Liaison with National Investigation Committee (NIC-XPXN)
Representative(s) of the NIC-XPXN will accompany the members of the IEP on any site or other
investigations conducted by the IEP. Relevant data, information and knowledge derived by the IEP in
connection with its actions under the ToR shall be shared by the IEP with the NIC-XPXN.
The role of the NIC-XPXN shall be to:
i) observe the process and activities of the IEP;

ii) review and provide comments and recommendations on the draft of the Intermediate and Final
Report to be prepared by the IEP;
iii)
accept or to reject the Final Report of the IEP;
iv) establish a workable framework for the confidential exchange of technical information between
the IEP and the NIC-XPXN;
v) appoint or otherwise provide engineers from relevant agencies of the GOL to assist the IEP in
response to written requests of the IEP, to help ensure that the IEP will be able to timely complete
its duties under the ToR; and
vi) support the IEP at all times, and to act as the liaison between the IEP and the GOL;

Each of the IEP and the NIC-XPXN shall keep any information received from the IEP strictly confidential
until such time as: (i) the IEP's Investigation & Review has been completed, (ii) the IEP’s final Report
has been accepted by the NIC-XPXN, and (iii) the GOL has authorized in writing the release of such final
Report.
Communications between the IEP and the NIC-XPXN will be in English.
VI. Contact of focal points to be provided to the IEP
The focal points shall be contacted as follows:

- Mr. Anouparb Vongnorkeo, Director General of International Organization Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: overall and administrative aspects;
- Mr. Chanthaboun Souk Aloun, Acting Director General of The Department of Planning and
Cooperation of Ministry of Energy and Mines: coordination and support in the technical
aspects. Each of the coordination shall be copied to Mr. Anouparp Vongnorkeo for reference.


6/7

VII. Information to be provided to the IEP
The IEP will be supplied with all information that is available to the NIC-XPXN and the GOL, which is
relevant and necessary for the IEP to achieve its purpose and to perform its functions under and in
accordance with the ToR.
The IEP shall make no use of any information provided to or obtained by the IEP pursuant to the ToR
except for the express purposes of the ToR, and will not disclose or disseminate any such information
to any person other than the NIC-XPXN and the secretariat, except with the prior written authorization
of the NIC-XPXN.
VIII. Steps, Sequence and Timeframe
Based on the information and investigations available after the IEP site visit early October, the IEP shall
prepare a draft Intermediate Report (Part I) on the engineering/technical reason(s) for and/or
underlying physical root cause(s) of the failure on 23 July 2018 of Saddle Dam D of the XPXN Project,
not later than mid of November 2018 (to be confirmed during site visit early October) and shall submit
that draft Intermediate Report to the Chairman of NIC-XPXN for its review and comment. The IEP shall
consider professionally and in good faith any and all comments that may be provided by the NIC-XPXN
to the IEP in his Final Report (Part I) with regard to the draft Intermediate Report.
Assuming that all necessary information has been timely obtained by the IEP, including any eventual
requested additional investigation, the IEP will submit its draft Final Report (Part I) on the
engineering/technical reason(s) for and/or underlying physical root cause(s) of the failure on 23 July
2018 of Saddle Dam D of the XPXN Project to the Chairman of NIC-XPXN on or before January 31, 2019
for its review and comment. The IEP shall consider professionally and in good faith any and all
comments that may be provided by the NIC-XPXN to the IEP with regard to the draft Final Report. The
IEP shall adjust the final version of the Final Report to reasonably reflect such comments, to the extent
that the IEP believes the NIC-XPXN's comments are reasonable and relevant to the nature and purpose
of the Final Report.
The Report (Part II) on the validation of the review of XPXN Project with focus on: (i) the main dam, (ii)
all other Embankment Dams/saddle dams, and (iii) the New (replacement) Saddle Dam D, will be
submitted to the Chairman of NIC-XPXN not later than three (3) months after the review report has
been received by the IEP from the project company (PNPC).
IX. Limitations and Further Matters
The IEP (as an entity that is independent of the GOL and the NIC-XPXN), and each individual member
of the IEP, agrees and shall at all times ensure that:
i) The IEP shall perform its duties solely and strictly in accordance with the provisions of this ToR.
The IEP may request an adjustment of this ToR by the NIC-XPXN if at any time the IEP determines
that it will be unable to complete the scope of work due to an unanticipated constraint that has
not been covered in this ToR. Whether, and the extent to which, any adjustment of this ToR shall
be made shall be a matter for the NIC-XPXN to decide.
ii) The IEP shall at no time exceed the engineering / technical parameters of its scope of work as set
forth in this ToR.

7/7

iii) In any and all communications relating to or produced under this ToR, including without limitation
the draft and final Report, the IEP shall not reference, incorporate or otherwise express any
assumption, conclusion or recommendation of any type regarding any potential civil or criminal
liability of any person or organization, or the existence or non-existence of any legal or commercial
condition (including, by way of example and without limitation, whether an event or consequence
will legally constitute force majeure, negligence, or otherwise, or whether an event or
circumstance may or may not be compensable under applicable insurance cover, etc.).
iv) The IEP shall ensure that the conduct of the Investigation & Review and the preparation and
finalization of the Report, and all other duties to be implemented by the IEP under the ToR, shall
not in any way impede or conflict with any other ongoing investigation or proceeding related to
the collapse of Saddle Dam D at the XPXN Project or to any aspects of any other hydroelectric
power projects in the Lao PDR.
v) All papers, work product and intellectual property of every type that is generated by the IEP in
connection with the scope of work under the ToR shall be the exclusive property of the GOL, and
shall be transferred to the NIC-XPXN upon the completion and submission of the final report, or at
any other time if the NIC-XPXN makes a written request therefor.
vi) No member of the IEP shall at any time make any comment concerning the engineering/ technical
reason(s) for and/or underlying physical root cause(s) of the failure of Saddle Dam D or on any
matters covered by this ToR to any third party (other than the NIC-XPXN and the Secretariat),
except with the prior written permission of the NIC-XPXN.
vii) No member of the IEP shall at any time hereafter accept any assignment or become retained or
engaged by any third party in any legal action or proceeding that may be or become contrary to or
in conflict with the interests of the GOL, or act as a witness against the GOL in any action that may
be brought in any jurisdiction, except with the prior written permission of the Chairman of the NIC-
XPXN.
viii) Neither the IEP nor any member of the IEP has any right or authority to make any decisions or
conclusions or to take any actions on behalf of the NIC-XPXN or the GOL. The IEP is wholly
independent of, and is not a representative or agent of, the NIC-XPXN and the GOL.
ix) The IEP shall ensure that the final Report is professionally reliable and shall be responsible for its
reliability and correctness.

Original issued September………
Chairman of the Government Inspection Authority

Chairman of NIC-XPXN
Dr. Bounthong Chitmany

1/5

Appendix B:
Supporting information

2/5

Documentation received from EPC Contractor (SK) (by date 17.8.2018)

17.août.18
Date Type Data

Ref Document/Data Author
Requested Received Hard Copy Soft Copy From To
1 Construction non-conformances 14.08.18 MEM NIC
2 Detailed Design Drawings SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
3 Shop Drawings SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
4 As-Built drawings SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
5 Technical Specification SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
6 DD Report Geological and SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Geotechnical Engineering
7 Embankment Fill Method Statement 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
8 XN and XP reservoir levels 2018 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
9 XN dam spillway hydraulic 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

report/rating curves
10 Detailed design hydrology report 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
11 Site rainfall data 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
12 XP-XN transfer conduit design 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

hydraulic report/rating curves
13 XP-XN transfer conduit operation 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

record 2018
14 XN gate chamber/bottom outlet 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

operation/hydraulics report
15 XN reservoir elevation-area-storage 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

curve
16 Saddle Dam D embankment filling 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

QC data
17 Saddle Dam D borrow laboratory test 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

data
18 Calibration records for all soil and 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
test equipment for duration of project
19 Basic Design - Annex 6 Dam Design 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Report
20 Construction photographs Saddle 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Dam D
21 Record of construction sequence of 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Saddle Dam D
22 OE Approval of Foundation 14.08.18 MEM NIC

Documentation
23 Photographic record of dam from 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

construction to failure (including
drone, video, still)
24 Incident Report of Saddle Dam D PNPC 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
25 Photographs and videos and drone SK 14.08.18 MEM NIC

taken between 18 July and present


3/5
25 Photographs and videos and drone
taken between 18 July and present
SK 14.08.18 MEM NIC
26 Technical Specification 2-6 EPC 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Embankment Construction and Fill
27 QC Plan for embankment works CSC 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

(Rev 00)
28 Geotechnical data 1995 and 1997 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

(Reports, pit/hole logs, test results)
29 Dam DD Report including stability 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

and permeability
30 Construction Schedule 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
31 Visual monitoring records SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

(construction completion to date)
32 XPXNHPP Instrumentation SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

monitoring during impounding report
(weekly report)
33 XPXNHPP Instrumentation SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
monitoring during impounding report
(monthly report)
34 EAP (latest revision) SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
35 RIP (latest revision) SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
36 Geotechnical investigation data for SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Saddle Dams A, C, E, and F
37 Detailed Design Drawings, Shop SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Drawings and As-built Drawings for
Saddle Dams A,C, E and F
38 Dam DD Report including stability SK 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
and permeability Saddle Dams A, C,
E, and F
39 Laboratory Testing of Samples from SK 14.08.18 MEM NIC
Drill holes for Saddle Dams A, C, D,
E and F
40 Incident Report of Saddle Dam D in SK 14.08.18 MEM NIC
Soft Copy
41 Drill hole logs and core box 14.08.18 MEM NIC

photographs for all drill holes for the
project
42 Piezometer data sheet SK 14.08.18 MEM NIC
43 Details of GW monitoring wells SD- 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

GW-01 - 04 including coordinates
and elevation of collar and base of
well,photos
Any and explanation of of the
or video taken
44 14.08.18 17.08.18 MEM NIC
dam or area surrounding the dam on
21 July
45 Any further photos or video taken of 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
the dam between and including 13
and 24 July
46 Testing undertaken on foundation 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
after preparation.
47 Ground Survey topo data including 14.08.18 MEM NIC

Topographic plan o f Saddle Dam A
area covering as large an area as
available Report
"Incident 300m upstream
of Saddleand
Dam D",
48 14.08.18 MEM NIC
SK E&C
49 Specification GTS 2.02 Surface 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC

Excavation
50 Records of Trial Embankment for 14.08.18 MEM NIC

impervious filling at Saddle Dam D
51 Laboratory Testing and Field Density 14.08.18 MEM NIC

Testing of Fine Filter and Transition
materials used in saddle dams.
Please ensure laboratory grading
52 Construction Survey Report for set 14.08.18 17.08.18 P MEM NIC
out of saddle dam D
53 Ground Survey topo data including 14.08.18 MEM NIC

Topographic plan o f Saddle Dam D
area covering as large an area as
available
Please at least
advise 1000m
time on forupstream
the
54 14.08.18 MEM NIC
monitoring on and photos supplied
55 Please advise which direction is 14.08.18 MEM NIC
negative for suvey monument X and

4/5

Further documentation received from EPC Contractor (SK)
• Presentation 1st NIC visit “Incident & Recovery Plan (GOL NIC) R1 (20180819)”
• Presentation 2nd NIC visit “1. PPT for NIC 2nd Visit (20181004) Rev0F”
• Pictures of Saddle Dam D – Sequence of failure
• Complete General Detailed Design Report
• Cone Penetration Test Factual Report – Saddle Dam(D) (26.11.18)
• Report of Boring Investigation for Saddle Dam D (Second revised 9 November 2018)
• Crack Monitoring data of Saddle Dam D (20181108).
• Field Permeability Test (Matsuo Method) Record sheets (12.11.18).
• Filter material distribution test Results (12.11.18).
• XP Survey for leakage location at downstream (12.11.18).
• XP seepage monitoring (20181109).
• Designer Report on XN Riverbed V-notch 5 (20181014)
• XP dam survey for cross section 0+340 to 0+460_20181107
• Lab Test Result Sheet_EVN_181112: Bieu ASTM P%, Ip Lao (01-36)-2018;
Consolidation (9-21-34) R01; Moisture contents_R01; Cu-21 3 TRUC SN_01-34 2 thoi
SN_36 2 thoi SN; Qu-21-34; Shear Cat1-9_01-Cat1-21_01-Cat1-34_01.
• EVN: Report on Test Results of Undisturbed Soil Samples of Dam (Nov. 2018)
• AIT: Report on the Laboratory Specimen: Soil samples from Xe-pian Xe-Nam Noy
Hydro Power (21.12.2018)
• Attach_#1. Gradation_(AIT); Attach_#1. Gradation_(EVN_AIT); Attach_#2.
Atterberg limits_(AIT); Attach_#2. Atterberg limits_(EVN_AIT); Attach_#3.
Consolidation Test_(AIT); Attach_#3. Consolidation Test_(EVN, AIT); Attach_#4.
Shearing Test_(AIT); Attach_#4. Shearing Test_(EVN_AIT); Attach_#5. Unconfined
compressive tests(AIT); Attach_#5. Unconfined compressive tests(EVN_AIT)
(7.1.2019)
• A1. Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy HPP Saddle Dam D Geology and Geotechnics (Mott
MacDonald, 2018. 11)
• A2. Geology survey report for Saddle Dam D area (Korea Institute of Geoscience and
Mineral Resources, 2018. 09)
• B1. Report of boring investigation for saddle dam D (Lamson Geotechnical Co. Ltd,
2018. 11)
• Factual Field Report SDBH-A03-B (Soiltech, 2018.12)
• B3. Borehole log (Lamson Geotechnical Co. Ltd, 2018. 11)
• B4. Modified borehole log (Soiltech, 2018.12)
• B5. Result sheet of field permeability test (Lamson Geotechnical Co. Ltd, 2018. 11)
• B6. Photographs of core boxes and site activities (Lamson Geotechnical Co. Ltd, 2018.
11)
• B7. Factual Field Report: Cone Penetration Testing (Soiltech, 2018.12)
• B8. Result sheet of field permeability test with Matsuo method (SK E&C, 2018. 11)
• C1. Report on test results of undisturbed soil samples of dam (EVNPECC1, 2018. 11)
• C2. Report on the laboratory (Asian Institute of Technology, 2019. 01)
• C3. Result sheet of Crumb test (Asian Institute of Technology, 2019. 01)

5/5

• C4. Result sheet of Pinhole test (Alfa Geotech, 2018. 12.)

• C5. Result sheet of XRD (Suranaree University of Technology, 2018. 12.)
• D1. Result Sheet of Gradation Tests for dam filter materials
• D2. Crack Monitoring Sheet - Saddle Dam D
• D3. Visual Inspection Report - Saddle Dam D (Soilteh, 2018.12) – Trench in remaining
embankment on left bank

Documentation received from NIC
• XPXN - Documentation prepared by NIC (20.8.2018).

• AECOM Report “XPXN Special CE Report Saddle Dam D Failure Prelim Final Rev
0 11 Sept”
• XPXN Saddle Dam D - Additional photos from Ministry Pakse 23-7-18 and from
village 22_23-7-18
• Report on NIC Field Observation and Investigation (26.2.2019)

Documentation received from TEPCO
• Dam Stability Analysis Calculation Sheets (several simulations)

• Geotechnical Investigation Schedule (several revisions – Rev06)
• Progress Reports for borehole drills and tests (latest version 21.10.2018)
• Several E-mail information from the site and laboratory geotechnical investigations
• List of sampling for Laboratory test_1005_Rev01
• Soakage Test Guidance Note 20181006_from MM
• Soakage Test_Pictures_20181020
• Trench pic_D_23Oct

1/8

Appendix C:
Technical note on CPT Testing by
Prof. Antonio Gens

2/8


3/8


4/8


5/8


6/8


7/8


8/8


1/3

Appendix D:
Abbreviations
Selected Definitions

2/3

Abbreviations
CPTu Cone Penetration Test, (u) with pore pressure monitoring
FSL Full Safety Level (Normal water level)
GOL Government of Laos
GW Pipe piezometer for groundwater observation
HPP Hydro Power Project
IEP Independent Expert Panel
MEM Ministry of Energy and Mines
NIC National Investigation Committee
OE Owners Engineer
PNPC Project Owner (SK E&C, Western Power, RATCH, LHSE)
SD Saddle Dam
SDBH Saddle Dam Borehole
SK E&C SK Engineering & Construction
SPT Standard Penetration Test (called also Dynamic Penetrometer)
ToR Terms of Reference
XN Xe-Namnoy Dam
XP Xe-Pian Dam
XPXN Xe-Pian & Xe-Namnoy project

3/3

Selected Definitions
Millimetric to centimetric canals or tubular passages creating a network
Canaliculus
that may develop particularly in lateritic formation
Internal erosion is the formation of voids within a soil caused the removal
Internal erosion
of material by seepage
A gap that create a step or a discontinuity in a line or a surface (the

Offset
amount or distance by which something is out of line)
Piping is a related phenomenon and is defined as the progressive
Piping development of internal erosion by seepage, appearing downstream as a
hole discharging water.
The proportion of the drilled rock or soil column recovered as core in
Recovery rate
core drilling
Regressive erosion Soil erosion progressing backwards
Resurgence Location where the groundwater table reaches the surface with outflow
Rotational slide A ground movement with rotation
Applies to materials internally instable (possibility of migration of fine soil

Suffusion
particles passing between the coarse particles)

1/2

Appendix E:
Recent references
Residual Soil Engineering

2/2

ASTM 5333-03, “Standard Test method for Measurement of Collapse Potential of Soils”, American
Society for Testing and Materials, Annual Book of ASTM Standards 2007, Volume 04.08,
Baltimore, USA
G. E. Blight; E. C. Leong, “Mechanics of Residual Soils, Second Edition” CRC Press, 2012.
B. K. Bujang Huat; D. G. Toll “Handbook of Tropical Residual Soils Engineering” CRC Press,
2013
M. M. Futai; M. S. S. Almeida; W. A. Lacerda, “Yield, Strength, and Critical State Behavior
of a Tropical Saturated Soil”, Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering,
Vol. 130, Issue 11 (November 2004)
A. C. Gonzaga Pires; G. M. Alelvan, K. M.; Wingler Rebelo, “Study of the Collapsible
Potential of the Lateritic Soil of the City of Uberlândia (MG) – Brazil – Using Physical Characterization
and Oedometer Tests”, Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Soil Mechanics
and Geotechnical Engineering, Seoul 2017, 373-376
M. Goutte-Lima; J. Camapum de Carvalho; R. M. Macedo Santos, “Méthodologie pour
l’étude de l’érosion interne sur les sols tropicaux”, 24èmes Rencontres Universitaires de Génie Civil,
La Grande Motte ; 1 et 2 juin 2006.
K. Grimes; A. Spate, “Laterite Karst”, ACKMA Journal, v.73: pp.49-52. (2008)
R. Haselsteiner; H.-G. Schuetz; C. Osan and B. Somdalen, “Lateritic Soils for Dam
Foundations and Dam Cores -Two Case Studies and Their Typical Properties”, Proc. Second
International Conference on Long Term Behaviour of Dams (LTBD09) 12th-13th October
2009, Graz, Austria. ISBN: 978-3-85125-070-1.
ICOLD Bulletin 151, “Tropical Residual Soils as Dam Foundation And Fill Material”, January
2009
B. Kalantari, “Foundations on collapsible soils: a review”, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil
Engineers - Forensic Engineering, Volume 166 Issue 2, May 2013, pp. 57-63
K. J. Northmore; M. G. Culshaw; P. R. N. Hobbs, “Engineering Geology of Tropical Red
Clay Soils”, British Geological Survey / Overseas Development Administration, 1993.
B. P. Rocha; R. A. dos Santos; R. C. Bezerra; R. A. Rodrigues; H. L. Giacheti,
“Characterization of unsaturated tropical soil site by in situ tests”, Geotechnical and Geophysical
Site Characterization 5, Australian Geomechanics Society, Sydney, Australia, 2016.
B. P. Rocha; H. L. Giacheti, “Site characterization of a tropical soil by in situ tests”, DYNA,
85(206), pp. 211-219, September 2018.
Y. H. Wang; W. M. Yan, “Laboratory Studies of Two Common Saprolitic Soils in Hong Kong”,
Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol. 132, Issue 7 (July 2006)
L. Wesley, “Behaviour and geotechnical properties of residual soils and allophane clays”, Obras y
Proyectos 6, 5-10; 2009
L. Wesley, “Residual Soils and the Teaching of Soil Mechanics”, Proceedings of the 18th
International Conference on Soil Mechanics and Geotechnical Engineering, Paris 2013, pp
3479-3482

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Report

Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy Project

Anton J. SCHLEISS / Jean-Pierre TOURNIER / Ahmed F. CHRAIBI

1 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Appendix A: Terms of Reference (ToR) of Independent Expert Panel (IEP)

Appendix C: Technical Note on CPT Testing

Appendix E: Recent bibliography on residual soils

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

1. Due to the presence of high permeability horizons in the foundation, as confirmed

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

resulting in a bumping up of the downstream embankment face and the subsidence

The timely (re-)construction of new Saddle Dam D and rehabilitation of the

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Lessons learnt from the incident comprise, among others:

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

2.1 Purpose of the Panel and Terms of Reference

The detailed Terms of Reference (ToR) are given in Appendix A.

2.2 Panel members

• Prof. Dr. Anton J. Schleiss, Switzerland

• Mr. Ahmed F. Chraibi, Morocco

• Dr. Jean-Pierre Tournier, Canada.

The IEP is chaired by Professor Dr. Anton J. Schleiss.

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

2.3 Organization of the Panel

The organization of the IEP within NIC-XPXN is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Sat.18.08.2018: Morning – meeting with GOL-NIC; Afternoon – Flight to Pakse;

Sun. 19.08.2018: Site visit

Project Presentations by Owner/ OE / EPC Contractor (SK):

Mon. 20.08.2018: Site visit

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Tue. 02.10.2018: Morning – Meeting between GOL-NIC and IEP; Afternoon –

Wed. 03.10.2018: Site visit

Thu. 04.10.2018: Morning – Inspection of Xe-Pian dam:

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

• Downstream foot drainage and drainage water measurement system

Fri. 05.10.2018: Morning – Meeting preparation among IEP and TEPCO

Sat. 06.10.2018: Morning – Departure of Mr. Ahmed Chraibi

Tue. 27.11.2018: Morning – Travel to Pakse – Site visit

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

design: information, design parameter, 3) New Dam geology:

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Wed. 27.03.2019: Morning – Site visit

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Stability analysis, Construction, Monitoring, Emergency action plan,

3.2 Supporting information

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

4 XPXN Project Features

4.1 General Description of XPXN HPP according Detailed Design Report

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

Figure 3: Longitudinal profile of XPXN HPP scheme

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

4.2 Saddle Dam D Design

4.2.1 Basic design

Figure 4: Plan view of Saddle Dam D as in the Basic Design

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

4.2.2 Detailed Design

Figure 6: Plan view of Saddle Dam D as in the Detailed Design

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report

4.3 Saddle Dam D, As Built

XPXN-Saddle Dam D failure - IEP Final Report