CRUZ V SALVA

MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959

(chris capul)

NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio,
Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial.
Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got
confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions.
Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation
made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions.
Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was
implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz’ counsel
questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec
the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow him to appear
at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.

ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property

HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to appear at the
investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and appealed to a
higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva has justified his
reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de Guzman)
was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure conviction of the guilty
but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not be present.
His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall of
Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed and media people were present.
He should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC was disturbed and
annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

Bumanlag vs. Bumanlag

74 SCRA 92

FACTS

Atty Bumanlag filed his petition with the President by the fact that his motions for reconsideration "were
only denied by the Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever".

The petition is about promulgating a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court to be set
aside and allow him to become an active member of the New Society.

The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the Office of the
President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of September
24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a lesser penalty of two-year
suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of Justices Castro and Makasiar)
and of the Court's resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack of merit
respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated October 18, 1973 and December 12, 1973and further
resolved "to require respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be
subjected to further disciplinary action for making false statements and misrepresentations in his petition
to the President that he has been allegedly deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of record
as stated in the Court's decision, and for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in asking the
President to set aside by decree this Court's decision imposing upon him two-year suspension from the
practice of law".
:

Facts:

The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a petition praying that they be allowed to continue
using, in the name of their firm, the names of their partner who passed away. One of the petitioners’
arguments stated that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a
professional firm’s name in so far as Greater Manila Area is concerned. No custom exists which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm. They
also stated that the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world.

Issue:

Whether or not the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes” is allowed to sustain the
name of their deceased partner, Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of their firm.

Held:

NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar

Association stated the following:

“The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.”
No local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm
names of law partnerships. Firm names, under Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior
partners in a firm. Firm names in the Philippines change and evolve when partners die, leave or a new
one is added. It is questionable to add the new name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased
one since they have never been, technically, partners in the first place. When it comes to the arguments
of the petitioners stating that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partner’s name, this
is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned custom as stated in the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply in the Philippines. The petition filed herein is
denied and petitioner is advised to drop the name “OZAETA” from the firm name.

Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie

NATURE: Atty. Dacanay, in his verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and 9 other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

FACTS: Respondents are members of the Philippine bar practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres. They are likewise members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
 Torres, one of the respondents, made a letter using as letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”. Included
therein were the names of the other lawyer-respondents. Through the said letter, they asked Clurman for
the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to Gabriel, a client of the respondents.

Atty. Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie and the purpose of using the said letterhead. Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

ISSUE: W/N respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

HELD: YES.

RATIO: Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines. As admitted by
the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949
in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation they they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment". This is unethical because
Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law in the country.

Ouano v aleanor
Facts
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. (Mercantile) and petitioner
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. (OASI) for replacement of certain equipment imported by IPI which
were insured by Mercantile but were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegendy because of mishandling
by petitioner OASI.
Petitioner OASI’s answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (LSA) and
signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA. However, Atty. Fidel Manalo,
a partner from the Makati office of LSA filed to postpone the hearing stating that the case had just
been endorsed to him by petitioner OASI.
After trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the trial court rendered a decision holding
Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally liable for the cost of replacement of the
damaged equipment plust damages, totalling P435,000.00.
Only Mercantile appealed from the decision. When the IPI filed a motion for execution of the
decision against petitioner OASI which public respondent granted, the petitioner’s cousel, through
Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the LSA, filed a notice of appeal claiming that the decision was
“mistakenly sent” by the trial court to the law firm’s Head Office in Makati.
Petitioner, through the same counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the writ
of execution alleging that the failure to file an appeal was due to excusable neglect and slight
“oversight” claiming that there was miscommunication between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as
to who would file the notice of appeal. The respondent judge denied OASI’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and ordered that the writ of execution be enforced.
 On appeal, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that there had been a valid service of
the decision and that it was final and executor upon OASI.
Hence, petition for review to the Court.
Issue
Whether or not LSA having represented itself to the public as a single firm, be allowed to contend
that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law firms with separate and
distinct personalities and responsibilities.
Held
Petitioner’s counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not any particular
member or associate of that firm) which firm happens to have a main office in Makati and a branch
office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and branch offices operate under one and the
same name, Saludo Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public as comprising a
single firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to pretend that its main office and its branch
office in effect constitute separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities

In re Luis B. Tagorda (1929) (card and letter)

Doctrine: • The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust.

Facts: Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third member of the provincial board of
Isabela. He admits that prior to his election, he made use of a card2 written in Spanish and Ilocano,
which contains a list of tasks he may undertake as a notary public, and a lawyer, as well as a general
invitation to consult with him for free. Tagorda also admits that after he was elected into office, he
wrote a letter3 to one of his hometown”s barrio lieutenants. The letter basically informed the recipient
of Tagorda”s intention to continue residing in Echague, despite having to attend board sessions in
Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his hometown as a notary public and lawyer. The letter
subtly offered information regarding Tagorda”s office hours, together with an express request that the
recipient spread the word as to his willingness to accept land registration cases for a fee of P3.00 per
title. The government, through the provincial fiscal of Isabela, together with the Attorney-General,
brought this matter to the attention of the Court.

Issue: 1. W/N Tagorda”s actions constitute malpractice

Held/Ratio: 1. YES. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2828 expressly provides
that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. This is in accord with the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canon 27 of the said document provides that a well-
merited reputation serves as a lawyer”s most effective form of advertisement.

1. Khan v Simbillo
Facts:
i. Resp Atty. Rizalino Simbillo advertised in the PDI and MB his legal services for annulment
cases
ii. Upon investigation by the Pub Info Office, it was confirmed that Simbillo is offering his
services to interested clients.
iii. Ismael Khan, chief of the PIO, filed an administrative charge vs resp for improper advertising
and solicitation of his legal services in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
iv. Resp argues that advertising or solicitation is not per se a prohibited act:
a. Public interest is not served by the absolute prohibition
b. It’s time for the Court to promulgate a ruling that such advertisement is not contrary to
law, public policy and public order.
v. The IBP found the resp guilty and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year, writing
it in a resolution
Issues:
W/N resp’s act was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
Yes.
i. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code states that a lawyer is prohibited from performing acts
designed to solicit legal business and that he is not permitted to use self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
ii. Practice of Law is not a business. It is a profession with public interest as the primary
duty. It’s not a money-making venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The duty is to public service and the administration of justice. Elements
that distinguish it from business:
a. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
b. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
c. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
d. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
 - The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar

LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO

Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with
the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant
presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever
his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a
loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his defense,
denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind
of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented
substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and
referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact
with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court
adheres to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers
and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall
not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business
DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a
creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the
former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his
case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that
the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the
status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer
allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner
with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see
for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has
not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and
to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows:
“It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing
fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up
this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client relationship
with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendant’s counsel, gave him the
papers of the case and other information relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him
legal fees. “That respondent’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature
on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had
submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure
Attorney Francisco's professional services.” Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant
and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case
between her and defendant.

Issue:
Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?
Held:
YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one of principal and
agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or
defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds,
bills, contracts and the like.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a
person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established.
“An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating
his client's cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the
attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.”
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that,
this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary
the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and
private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that
the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by
him from his first client.
An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client
in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment
"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his
future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for
being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the
other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services
contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for
the services which he has retained him to perform."

Mercado vs. Vitriolo

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly maliciously filed
a criminal case for falsification of public documents against her thereby violating the attoyrney client
privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she apparently made false entries in
the certificate of live birth of her children. More specifically she allegedly indicated that she is married to
a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by
filing the complaint the attorney client privilege has been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos

disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney-
client when he filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant did not
even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.
Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine if there
was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is
placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES

A.C. No. 5280 : March 30, 2004

FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a
new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and
discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed
before the Regional Trial Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain
amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.
Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the
petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The letter-complaint
contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter
of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition
thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that there was no longer
any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification
of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were
culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

HELD:

No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the
land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to
their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily
involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from
instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CANON 13
A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance or
influencing the Court.
In prosecuting or defending cases, the lawyer must be guided by the principles of justice.
He must rely on the merits of his cases and should avoid using influence and connections to win
his cases. His cases must be won because they are meritorious and not because of connections,
clout, dominance or influence.

Rule 13.01. A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or

hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity
with Judges.
Canon 3, CPE
A lawyer should avoid marked attention and unusual hospitality to a judge, uncalled for by
the personal relations of the parties, because they subject him and the judge to misconceptions of
motives.

Report of IBP Committee, p. 70

In order not to subject both the judge and the lawyer to suspicion, the common practice of
some lawyers of making judges and prosecutors godfathers of their children to enhance their
influence and their law practice should be avoided by judges and lawyers alike.

Austria vs. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247

It is improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a
matter related to the case pending in the court of said judge.

Rule 13.02. A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for
or against a party.
Cruz v. Salva, 105 Phil 1151 (1951)
X x x Members of the court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such sensationalism,
which may be laid at the door of Salva. In this, he committed a grievous error and poor judgment.
His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion, and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by
the authorities, even when it is being tried in court; but when said publicity is encouraged when
the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this court, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent.

Marcelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106

33
In order to warrant a finding of “prejudicial publicity”, there must be an allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the “barrage”
of publicity.

In re: Gomez, 43 Phil. 376

If the counsel instigated or induced his client to make the public statement or publicity in
the media involving a pending case to arouse public opinion and to influence the judge, both the
client and the lawyer maybe subjected to contempt of court.
After the case had already been finished, the rule in progressive jurisdictions is that,
courts are subject to the same criticism as other people.

In re: Lozano, 54 Phil. 801

In a concluded litigation, a lawyer enjoys a wider latitude of comment on or criticize the
decision of s judge or his actuation. Thus, it has been held that a newspaper publication tending
to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending case
constitutes criminal contempt, but the rule is otherwise after the litigation is ended.

Rule 13.03. A lawyer shall not brook nor invite interference by another
branch or agency in the government in the normal course of
judicial proceedings.
Bumanglag vs. Bumanglag, 74 SCRA 92
When a case is already within the jurisdiction of a court, the lawyer should not cause or
seek the interference of another agency of the Government in the normal course of judicial
proceedings.

CHAPTER IV – THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938 (Sept. 20, 1996)
Historically, the nature of the lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts:
1. locatio conduction operarum (contract of lease of services) where one lets his services
for compensation and another hires them without reference to the object which the
services are to be performed; and
2. mandato (contract of agency) whereby a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes
a contract in his name but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who
requested him.
In a modern day understanding of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a
mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on
him by his client. He is also as independent as a judge, with powers entirely different from and
superior to those of an ordinary agent.

Rule 138, Section 21, Rules of Court

The relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained. The term
“retainer” may refer either of two concepts. It may refer to the act of a client by which engages the
services of the attorney:
1. to render legal advice, or
2. to defend or prosecute his cause in court.
It is general or special. A general retainer is one the purpose of which is to secure before
hand the services of an attorney for any legal problem that may afterward arise. A special retainer
has reference to a particular case or service.
The word “retainer” may also refer to the fee which a client pays to an attorney when the
latter is retained known as retaining fee. A retaining fee is a preliminary fee paid to insure and
secure his future services, to remunerate him for being deprived, by being retained by one party,
of the opportunity of rendering services to the other party and of receiving pay from him, and the
payment of such fee, in the absence of an agreement on the contrary, is neither made nor
received in consideration of the services contemplated; it is apart from what the client has agreed
to pay for the services which he has retained him to perform. Its purpose is to prevent undue
hardship on the part of the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule forbidding him
from acting as counsel for the other party has been retained by or has given professional advice
to the opposite party.
Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship
a. Documentary Formalism – NOT an essential element in the employment of an attorney,
contract may be EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED.
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b. Implied acceptance – it is sufficient that advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession; it is enough that a lawyer acceded to a
client’s request.

Rule 138, Section 21, Rules of Court

An attorney has no power to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court for a party without being employed unless by leave of
court.
There must be a contract of employment, express or implied, between him and the party
he purports to represent or the latter’s authorized agent. If he corrupt or willfully appears as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as
an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction. Moreover, neither the litigant
whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his
appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.

Dee vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651 (1989)

The absence of a written contract will not preclude a finding that there is a professional
relationship. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. It is sufficient, to establish the professional
relation, that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. If a person, in
respect to his business affairs or any troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesce in such consultation, as when he listens to his client’s
preliminary statement of his case or gives advice thereon, then the professional employment is
regarded as established just as effective as when he draws his client’s pleading or advocates his
client’s cause in court.

Termination of a Counsel’s Services

1. The withdrawal as counsel of a client or the dismissal by the client of his counsel must be
made in a FORMAL PETITION filed in the case (WITHDRAWAL OF RECORD)
2. Atty-client relationship does not terminate formally until there is withdrawal made of record.
3. Unless properly relieved, counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case.
Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949)
The employment of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of the member thereof even
though only one of them is consulted; conversely, the employment of one member is generally
considered as employment of the law firm.
B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 28 (1992)
The death of a partner, who was the one handling the case for the law firm, did not
extinguish the lawyer-client relationship; the responsibility to continue representation and file
required pleading devolve upon the remaining lawyers of the firm, until they have withdrawn from
the case, the negligence of the latter binds the client.
Seva vs. Nolan, 64 Phil. 374 (1937)
A wife in any of the instances where she may prosecute or defend an action without the
necessity of joining her husband as a party litigant has the authority to engage the services of
counsel even without her husband’s consent. She cannot, however, bind the conjugal partnership
for the payment of the fees of her lawyer without the husband’s authority, except in a suit between
her and her husband which she is compelled to institute or resist to protect her rights, to a
successful conclusion.
CANON 14
A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
The relation of attorney and client may be created not only by the voluntary agreement
between them but also by the appointment of an attorney as counsel de oficio for a poor or
indigent litigant, and the attorney so appointed has as high a duty to the indigent as to his paying
client.
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Rule 14.01. A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latter’s
1. race
2. sex
3. creed, or
4. status of life, or
5. because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person.
Rule 1138, S. 20(h). Duty of attorneys:
x x x never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed.
Rule 138, s.20 (i).
In the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion to the guilt of the accused to present every evidence that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.
Rule 14.01 however is not applicable in civil cases because of obvious reasons. It is the lawyer’s
duty –
“(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear o him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.” (Rule 138, section 20
(c), RRC)
when the lawyer signs a complaint or answer, his signature is deemed a certification by him
“that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support xxx” (Rule 7, Section 5, ROC). For violating this rule, the lawyer may be
subjected to disciplinary action.
Rule 14.02. A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient
cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus
curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
I. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO
Rule 138, s. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants:
A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party
in case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an
attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to
protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the
required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Rule 116, s.7 – Appointment of counsel de oficio
WHO:
1. members of the bar in good standing;
2. any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, in localities
without lawyers
WHAT CONSIDERED:
1. gravity of offense
2. difficulty of questions that may arise
3. experience and ability of appointee
II. AMICUS CURIAE
Rule 138, s. 36
Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the court to appear as amici
curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Definition: bystander; “friend of the court” whose function is “to remind the
court or tribunal of some matter which otherwise might escape its notice and
in regard to which it might be wrong. One who gives information upon some
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question of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken, or upon
a matter of which the court may take judicial cognizance.
Rule 14.03. A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an
indigent client unless:
a. he is no position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
b. he labors under a conflict of interest between him and
the prospective client or between a present client and
the prospective client;
The rule involves indigent clients who come to a lawyer for legal services. Under Rule
138, Section 31 of the Rules of Court, a judge may assign a lawyer to render a professional
service free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation, it appears that the party is
destitute and unable to employ an attorney. The lawyer assigned must render the required legal
service unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient of cause shown.
Rule 14.04. A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients.
Blanza vs. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1
If a lawyer volunteers his services to a client, and therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees,
nevertheless, he is bound to attend to a client’s case with all due diligence and zeal. By
volunteering his services, he has established a client-lawyer relationship.