VOTE AT LARGE – NATIONAL VOTING
PRESIDENT – ONLY ONCE BY “ELECTION”; BUT PWEDE TWICE BY
“SUCCESSION” LIKE PRESIDENT DUTERTE RUNS FOR VP AFTER HIS
TERM
Pormento v. Estrada (TOPIC: Presidential Term Limit)
(ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, PRESIDENT CANNOT BE
REELECTED. COMELECE EN BANC SAID THAT IT WAS RE-ELECTION
FOR “INCUMBENT” PRESIDENTS ONLY. HOWEVER, ESTRADA RAN
AGAIN ON MAY 10. ATTY PORMIENTO OPPOSED. PWEDE? SC DID
NOT RULE KY IT HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC DUE TO HIS
DEFEAT.)
SIR: INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED IN THE MAIN PETITION.
FACTS: Respondent was elected President of the Republic in the
general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency
again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty.
Evillo C. Pormento opposed respondents’ candidacy and filed a
petition for disqualification.
His petition was denied by the COMELEC en banc. As such,
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010.
However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would
not stay the execution of the judgment of the COMELEC that is
sought to be reviewed.
Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a
candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections
where he garnered the second highest number of votes. Private
respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
ISSUE: WON respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the
ban on the President from any reelection.
RULING: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase
“any reelection” will be premised on a person’s second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights
exists.
As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result
as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to
the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the
May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following
the results of that elections, respondent was not elected President
for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply
be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose. DISMISSED. Moot and academic.
Walay principle gi-discuss. Ambot nganong gi-apil ni ni sir.
Fornier vs COMELEC (TOPIC: Definition of natural born Filipino)
(PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT FPJ IS NOT FILIPINO. MOTHER WAS
AMERICAN. FATHER WAS A SPANISH SUBJECT. THE COURT TRACED
BACK HIS ROOTS TO LORENZO POU, HIS GRANDFATHER, WHO DIED
IN SAN CARLOS, PANGASINAN IN 1954. IT WAS PRESUMED THAT
THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE AT TIME OF DEATH IS ALSO PLACE OF
RESIDENCE BEFORE DEATH. THUS, HE WAS MOST LIKELY TO BE
FILIPINO DUE TO THE “EN MASSE” FILIPINIZATION BROUGHT ABOUT
BY THE PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. HENCE,
PASSED ON TO FPJ VIA JUS SANGUINIS. SO, HE NEED NOT PERFORM
AN ACT TO PERFECT HIS CITIZENSHIP.)
GR: NATURAL BORN CITIZEN – NO NEED TO PERFORM ANY ACT TO
PERFECT CITIZENSHIP:
EXCEPTION: JANUARY 17, 1973 ELECTION AND REPATRATION RA
9225 (RA 9225 IS A MERE FORMALITY)
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, represented himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.
Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify FPJ upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners.
According to petitioner, FPJ’s mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother.
The COMELEC dismissed the case hence the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen - YES
RULING: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines xxx xxx
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Among
the modes of acquiring citizenship, only jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines.
 With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, jus sanguinis
or blood relationship became the primary basis of citizenship by
birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend
to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was
his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of
San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on
11 September 1954.
Also, the birth certificate of FPJ would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939. (Daghan pa kayo tong mga documentary
evidence gi-submit pero wa na nako apila kay taas na kayo and
because these two are the most crucial)
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou and the birth certificate of FPJ constitute prima facie proof of
their content.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954
at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of he Omnibus Election Code. DISMISSED.
POE V COMELEC
FACTS: (Facts not very important, you can skip directly to Ruling on
foundlings)
(WHEN POE FILED HER COC, ELAMPARO OPPOSED ON THAT
GROUND THAT THERE WAS MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION SINCE
SHE IS NOT A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN SINCE SHE WAS A
FOUNDLING, AND WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE RESIDENCY. SC RULED
THAT: SHE WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN BECAUSE OF HER PHYSICAL
FEATURES. AND THAT HER ADMISSION THAT SHE WAS A
FOUNDLING DID NOT TRANSFER TO HER THE BURDEN OF PROVING
OTHERWISE. SC RULED THAT FOUNDLINGS ARE CITIZENS SINCE FOR
ONE, IT WAS THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE 1935
CONSTITUTION TO INCLUDE SUCH FOUNDLINGS AS CITIZENS, AS
ALSO APPLIED IN THE SPANISH CODE. HOWEVER, SUCH PROVISION
WAS LEFT TO STATUTORY LEGISLATION. MOREOVER, ARTICLE 14 OF
THE 1930 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY
LAWS STATES THAT FOUNDLING IS PRESUMED TO HAVE THE
NATIONALITY OF THE COUNTRY OF BIRTH. MOREOVER, THERE WERE
STATISTICS FROM PSA THAT SHOW 99% FOUNDLINGS ARE
FILIPINOS. Though the Rafols amendment (THE PROVISION THAT
FOUNDLINGS ARE CITIZENS IN 1935 CONSTITUTION) was not carried
out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because
their number (THE NUMBER OF FOUNDLINGS) was not enough to
merit specific mention. 10 YEAR RECKONING PERIOD: GENERAL RULE
AND EXCEPTION)
DOMESTIC ADOPTION LAWS – “FILIPINO CHILDREN” ARE ALWAYS
REFERRED IN LAWS, HENCE IT IMPLIES THAT YOU CAN’T BE
ADOPTED IF YOU AREN’T FILIPINO
SHE WAS ADOPTED AT AGE OF 5, HENCE IT WAS NOT HER WHO
PERFORMED AN ACT. IT WAS HER PARENTS. SHE “DID NOT DO
ANYTHING TO PERFECT HER CITIZENSHIP”, SHE DID NOT PERFORM
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS.
INTERNATIONAL LAWS – YOU DON’T NEED TO SIGN A TREATY TO
ADOPT AN INTERNATIONAL LAW
SC: THERE WAS REALLY DOUBT AS TO WHO HER PARENTS WERE. SO
IS THERE A “CITIZEN OF PROBABILITY”. SO THEY LET THE PEOPLE
DECIDE.
A day after Grace Poe filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC.
Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to
the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued:
1. petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.
Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer
natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.
Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified
to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
begin with.
2. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-
born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when
she became a naturalized American citizen (after she
married her husband and moved to USA). According to
Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous
from birth.
Issue on residency (omitted)
Petitioner filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
xxx
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in
the COC regarding her citizenship and residency
qualifications for:
 a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations Sr. Rafols:
show that foundlings were considered citizens;
For an amendment. I propose that after
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to subsection 2, the following is
have been born of citizens of the place where inserted: "The natural children of a
they are found; foreign father and a Filipino mother
not recognized by the father.
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225; xxx xxx xxx
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American President:
citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for
[We] would like to request a clarification from
President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that
the proponent of the amendment.
the same is in full force and effect and has not
The gentleman refers to natural
been withdrawn or recanted;
children or to any kind of illegitimate
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did children?
not possess natural-born status;
Sr. Rafols:
COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
petitioner's COC
includes natural children of unknown
contained material representations which are false. parentage, natural or illegitimate
children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
ISSUE: For clarification. The gentleman said "of
1. WON Poe is a Filipino citizen unknown parents." Current codes
consider them Filipino, that is, I refer
2. WON Foundlings are considered Natural-born citizens. to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born
in Spanish territory are considered
RULING: Spaniards, because the presumption
is that a child of unknown parentage
1. YES
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a
applied in the Philippines in that a
Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE. She has typical Filipino
child of unknown parentage born in
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
the Philippines is deemed to be
shaped eyes and an oval face.
Filipino, and there is no need. . . .
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Sr. Rafols:
Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole
There is a need, because we are relating the
chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than
conditions that are [required] to be
sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
Filipino.
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not Sr. Montinola:
a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown
that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission But that is the interpretation of the law,
that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because therefore, there is no [more] need
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents for amendment.
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high Xxx
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
2. Yes. Basis: Intent of the Framer; International law;
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. Sr. Busion:
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, Mr. President, don't you think it would be
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude better to leave this matter in the
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the hands of the Legislature?
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine
Sr. Roxas:
the intent of the framers.
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that
[Intent of the Framers] these cases are few and far in
between, that the constitution need
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor [not] refer to them. By international
General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional law the principle that children or
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be people born in a country of unknown
covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is parents are citizens in this nation is
recorded: recognized, and it is not necessary to
 include a provision on the subject
exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it
was not because there was any objection to the notion that
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number (THE NUMBER OF FOUNDLINGS) was not
enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate
and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this
provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens
the illegitimate children with a foreign
father of a mother who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily
because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
international law were already clear to the
effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
[International Law]
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under
the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations
The principles found in two conventions (1930 Hague Convention
and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness), while yet
unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
"nationality of the country of birth," The second is the principle that
a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is
found.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from
the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is
at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
MARCOS v COMELEC
(IMELDA MARCOS FILED A COC FOR REP OF FIRST DISTRICT OF
LEYTE. HER OPPONENT, CIRILO MONTEJO FILED A PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION ON THE GROUND THAT MARCOS DID NOT MEET THE
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT SINCE THE COC STATED THAT HER
RESIDENCY IS “7 MONTHS”. SHE THEN AMENDED IT TO “SINCE
CHILDHOOD”. HE CONTENDED THAT SHE VOTED IN MANILA, STAYED
IN RIZAL, AND MARRIED IN ILOCOS. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. [Presumption of
Continuity or Residence and Changing of Domicile] As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; (Animus Manendi) 2. A bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (Animus non revertendi) 3. Acts which
correspond with the purpose. Mere absence of an individual from
his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does
not result in a loss or change of domicile. COC NOT CONCLUSIVE.)
DOMICILE BY ORIGIN
DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW
DOMICILE BY CHOICE
THE EVIDENCE OF RESIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN THE FOUR
CORNERS OF THE COC. SHE CONTINUALLY RESIDED IN THAT PLACE
THOUGH SHE WAS NOT PHYSICALLY PRESENT.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I
SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency
of 1 year.
NOTE: Leyte has 1st district and 2nd district; When Marcos showed his
interest in running for election, Montejo told her that she is not a
resident of Tacloban (place where Marcos grew up) but of Tolosa
(present place where she live) hence, Marcos registered as a voter in
Tolosa. Montejo then filed a petition to Comelec to move the city of
Tolosa to 2nd district such was not achieved, a very clear intention of
Montejo to remove Marcos from being his opponent.
Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" of the
amended certificate. The Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte
denied such as it is filed out of time. Consequently,
Marcos filed the Amended CoC to the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence." She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to
which she could have responded "since childhood."
COMELEC’s Ruling: against Marcos. It held:
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been
considered as synonymous with 'domicile' which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil
294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro
Manila. Thus, her animus revertendiis pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.
Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she
lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a
registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where
she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of
the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when
she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the
President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay (animus manendi) there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a
resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned
Tacloban City (animus non revertendi), where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
ISSUE:
1. WON the statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitution's residency qualification requirement.
2. WON Marcos has complied the 1 year residency requirement in
Leyte. (MAIN TOPIC)
RULING:
1. No. The said statement becomes material only when there
is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. (Own note: Estoppel) It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification. Honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the
fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
2. Yes
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been considered as
synonymous with 'domicile' which imports not only the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. (Basis: Intent of
framer – Constitutional Deliberation) Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
[WHEN DOMICILE IS NOT LOST EVEN IF A PERSON IS IN OTHER
PLACE]
Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law
that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that
the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile.
[DOMICILE VS RESIDENCE]
"There is a difference between domicile and residence.
'Residence' is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. His place of residence
is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without
intention of remaining will constitute domicile."
(Uytengsu vs. Republic)
[CONCLUSION]
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile
for election law purposes.
Respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in Tacloban.
She pursued her college studies in Tacloban
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban
City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin she
married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When
her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. In February 1986
(she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila.
In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she
is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC,
what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the past four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
[Presumption of Continuity or Residence and Changing of Domicile]
As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(Animus Manendi)
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (Animus non revertendi)
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Domino vs. COMELEC
(DOMINO FILED HIS COC AS REPRESENTATIVE IN SARANGANI
INDICATING THAT HE HAS LIVED FOR 1.2 YEARS. HE WAS FORMERLY
FROM QC. RESPONDENT FILED A PETITION TO CANCEL COC BECAUSE
HE IS NOT A RESIDENT. DOMINO CONTENDED THAT HIS ACTUAL
PHYSICIAL PRSENCE IS ESTABLISHED BY A LEASE CONTRACT.
CONTETION: FALSE! NEW DOMICILE = ACTUAL PHYSICAL PRESENCE
+ INTENT TO MAKE IT PERMANENT ABODE. The lease contract may
be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it
does not prove abandonment of one's original domicile. Being a
voter of QC shows Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his
residence in QC. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does
give rise to a strong presumption of residence. IMPORTANT: SEE
EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS The proceedings for the exclusion or
inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character.
Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant
conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the
right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not
conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or
exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to
decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and
residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the
inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries
with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to
the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to
remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the
particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been
held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final
and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.[13]
In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a
party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.[14] Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would
neither be conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in
any other election..)
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative in Sarangani indicating that he had
resided in the constituency for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the 1991 election.
Private respondents, however, filed with the Comelec a petition to
cancel the certificate of candidacy because he is neither a resident
nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani. The Comelec
disqualified Domino as candidate for the position and ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
Issue: WON DOMINO was a resident of Sarangani for at least one
year immediately preceding the 1991 election?
Ruling: No.
Preamble: In Election Law, the term "residence," means the same
thing as "domicile.” Therefore, when respondents questioned the
residency requirement of Domino, they were actually questioning his
domicile requirement.
How to establish/change domicile
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Ilocos Sur and
that he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City. Petitioner
is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in
Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice in
Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.
DOM: In other words, there must be animus manendi (in the
new “domicile” - Sarangani) coupled with animus non
revertendi (to the old “domicile” – Quezon City)
Domicile requires not only bodily presence but also an intent to
make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in
Sarangani was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot
in 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the
residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family
residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical (presence) is not in itself
sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily
presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to
make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
DOM: To establish domicile, actual/physical presence must be
coupled with intention to acquire domicile; Also, “domicile” is a
term broader than “residence,” since the latter only requires
actual/physical presence.
Lease Contract not indicative of abandonment of one’s original
domicile
The lease contract entered into in 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative
of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not prove
abandonment of one's original domicile.
Being a voter of QC shows Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his
residence in QC
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a
strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay. The fact that a party
continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in
assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
Torayno vs. COMELEC
(EMANO RAN AND WAS ELECTED AS GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL. IN HIS COC FOR GOV, HIS RESIDENCE IS TAGOLOAN,
MISAMIS. HE THEN RAN FOR MAYOR OF CDO. TORAYNO OPPOSED
ON THE GROUND THAT HE FAILED TO MEET THE 1 YEAR
REQUIREMENT SINCE HIS RESIDENCE IN THE COC LAGI IS
TAGOLOAN. Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as
provincial governor, private respondent remained a resident of the
province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that
an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus, private
respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro
City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental. AKA GI-CHANGE
ANG RESIDENCE DURING INCUMBENCY. SAKTO? FALSE DAW.
Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for
seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates
the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare
of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to
evaluate the seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they
aspire for. SINCE CDO IS THE SEAT OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVT, DIDTO
GA-RESIDE SI EMANO HENCE KYBAW SIYA SA CONCERNS DIDTO.
HENCE, BY INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIO, RESIDENT SIYA. Laws
governing Election Contests are liberally construed to favor Popular
Mandate since Election cases are matters of public interest. CITING
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC: “To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles”)
Facts: During the 1995 elections, Emano ran for, was elected, and
proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third
consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of
Candidacy, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental.
In 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano
executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City
(geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), in
which he claimed 20 years of residence. In 1998, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City, stating
therein that he resided there for two years and five months.
Petitioners Torayno Sr., et al, sought the disqualification of Emano as
mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to
meet the one-year residence requirement.
Issue: WON respondent Emano's acquired a bona fide domicile of
choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City prior to 1998
elections
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent Emano had been residing in CDO since 1973
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the province.
Not only is it at the center of the province; more importantly, it is
itself the seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the
provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot
avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its
concerns and interests. Emano, having been the governor of
Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in
Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a
stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term,
when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.
Private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan
de Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis
Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together
with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered
as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution
and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to
run for mayor thereof
Thus, for all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law,
private respondent is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible
to run for mayor because he was actually residing in Cagayan de Oro
City while he was discharging his duties as Governor of Misamis
Oriental.
Laws governing Election Contests are liberally construed to favor
Popular Mandate
There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming
choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City. He won by a margin of
about 30,000 votes. Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle
that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot
must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
In Frivaldo vs. Comelec:
“To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is
so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote.”
Election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
Residency Rationale
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for
seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates
the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare
of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to
evaluate the seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they
aspire for.
MAQUERA VS BORRA
(That Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to "post a surety bond
equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to
which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the
national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the
candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10%
of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of
candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the
same office;" 2. That, in compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421,
the Commission on Elections had, decided to require all candidates
for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good
reputation, acceptable to the Commission, in the sums of
P60,000.00 and P40,000.00 for President and Vice-President,
respectively, and P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House
of Representatives. UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE CONTRARY TO
SOCIAL JUSTICE SINCE RIGHT TO VOTE AND BE VOTED WILL BE
DEPENDENT ON WEALTH. MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO REPUBLICAN
SYSTEM, AND ARBITRARY AND OPPRESSIVE.)
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO (3 topics)
(SENATOR TEOFISTO GUINGONA IN A PRIVILEGED SPEECH ACCUSED
ESTRADA THAT HE WAS RECEIVING P200M FROM JUETING LORDS.
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY INVESTIGATED IT AND SOME
CONGRESSMEN SPEARHEADED TO IMPEACH. IN AN 11-10 RULING,
THE SENATE RULED AGAINST OPENING AN ENVELOPE CONTAINING
THE EVIDENCE OF A BANK ACCOUNT UNDER “JOSE VELARDE”. THIS
SPARKED AN OUTBURST OF ANGER IN THE STEETS. The negotiations
consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice
Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high
noon at the EDSA Shrine. HIS ALLIES, THE PNP, AFP AND SOME
CABINET MEMBERS RESIGNED. At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice
Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace. ESTRADA IN A PRESS STATEMENT STATED THAT
HE WAS LEAVING AND IS THANKING THE PEOPLE. HOWEVER, HE
CLAIMS THAT HE DID NOT RESIGN AND THAT HE WAS ONLY ON
LEAVE. THE HOUSE OF REPS AND SENATE PASSED RESOLUTION
RECOGNIZING ARROYO AS THE NEW PRESIDENT. LATER, PGMA
APPOINTED SEN TEOFISTA GUINGONA AS THE NEW VP TO WHICH
BOTH HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS CONFIRMED SEPARATELY. IS
ARROYO THE PRESIDENT? CAN SC REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE
CONGRESS? YES, ARROYO IS THE NEW PRESIDENT. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear,
it must be given legal effect. Using this TOTALITY TEST, we hold that
petitioner resigned as President. In sum, we hold that the resignation
of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency,
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude
to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people
as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on
this supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.SC CANNOT REVISE
THE DECISION SINCE IT WAS A POLITICAL JUDGMENT OF THE
CONGRESS, IT BEING A CO-EQUAL BODY OF THE GOVT. BONUS: SC
TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ANGARA DIARY BECAUSE IT WAS
SERIALIZED BY THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER.)
VACANCY AT START OF TERM – FAILURE TO QUALIFY (FAILS TO TAKE
OATH OF OFFICE), NOT YET CHOSEN (NOT YET DONE IN
CANVASSING BOTH), DEATH AND PERMANENT DISABLITIY
IN FIRST TWO INSTANCES – VP IS ACTING PRESIDENT
THE OTHER TWO VP BECOMES THE PRESIDENT. ANALYZE!
VACANCY AT MIDTERM – RESIGNATION, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE,
DEATH AND PERMANENT DISABILITY
PRES AND VP-ELECT = HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES BUT NOT YET
ASSUMED THE OFFICE
HERE, VP BECOMES PRESIDENT JUD. IF VP SUFFERS PRRD, SENATE
PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT. ELSE, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AS
ACTING PRESIDENT.
IF ALL FOUR DIES, SPECIAL ELECTION CALLED BY CONGRESS
IF PRESIDENT ADMITS THAT HE CANNOT DO THE JOB: LETTER TO
SENATE PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
IF THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT ADMIT: MAJORITY OF THE CABINET IN
WHICH THE VP BECOMES THE ACTING PRESIDENT
IF PRES DENIES THE ALLEGATION OF THE CABINET: THE CONGRESS
WITH 2/3 VOTE, VOTING SEPARATELY  NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW KY POLITICAL JUDGMENT
IF SC ABUSES ITS DISCRETION: REMEDY  IMPEACHMENT
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO:
1. RESGNATION IS NOT A HIGH LEVEL LEGAL ABSTRACTION BUT A
FACTUAL QUESTIONS, AND ITS ELEMENTS ARE BEYOND QUIBBLE:
INTENT TO RESIGN COUPLED WITH ACTS OF RELINQUISHMENT (AKA
NO LETTER IS REQUIRED BY THE LAW)
2. TOTALITY TEST: TOTALITY OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS AND
POSTERIOR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEARING
MATERIAL RELEVANCE ON THE ISSUE
3. RESIGNATION  CONFIRMED BY LEAVING MALACANANG AND
HIS PRESS RELEASE
4. ESTRADA’S RESIGNATION CANNOT BA A SUBJECT OF CAPRICE OR
WHIMSICAL WILL SINCE IT IS THE RESULT OF HIS REPUDATION BY
THE PEOPLE
5. RA 3019 – A PUBLIC OFFICIAL HAS THE RIGHT NOT TO SERVE IF HE
WANTS TO RETIRE OR RESIGN, BUT HIS RETIREMENT WILL NOT
CAUSE THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
6. SEC 12 OF RA 3019 – CONTEMPLATES CASES WHOSE
INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION DO NOT SUFFER FROM ANY
INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLE LIKE THE IMMUNITY OF SUIT
7. IMPLICITLY CLEAR IN THE RECOGNITION OF BOTH HOUSES OF
CONGRESS THAT ARROYO AS PRESIDENT IS THE PREMISE THAT THE
INABILITY OF FORMER PRESIDENT IS NO LONGER TEMPORARY
8. THE DECISION BY CONGRESS RECOGNIZING ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT IS A POLITICAL ISSUE WHICH CANNOT BE DECIDED BY
THE COURTS
9. THE NATURE OF THE IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS IS DEBATABLE
(E.G. WHETHER AMDINISTRATIVE OR NOT) BUT IT WAS BROKE
DOWN WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS WERE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY
10.THE CASES UNDER THE OMBUDSMAN WILL NOT BE DECIDED BY
THE MOB WHOSE JUDGMENT IS DICTATED BY RAGE. THE
DOGMATISM OF THE MAJORITY IS NOT THE DEFINITION OF THE
RULE OF LAW.
11. THE CABINET COULD NOT REPORT THE INABILITY OF THE
PRESIDENT SINCE AFTER ALL THERE WAS NO MORE CABINET TO
BEGIN WITH.
SNAP ELECTIONS – NOT SANCTIONED BY THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IT
WAS ALLOWED DUE TO ABNORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES
WHAT ESTRADA DID WAS “CONSTRUCTIVE RESIGNATION”
VP GUINGONA  NOMINATED BY PRESIDENT, CONFIRMED BY
CONGRESS (BOTH HOUSES)
IF ONE OF THE CONGRESS REJECTS, PICK ANOTHER FROM THE
CONGRESS AND NOMINATE AGAIN, UNTIL YOU SATISFY BOTH
HOUSES
SO TWO-FOLD PROCESS: NOMINATION BY PRESIDENT AND
CONFIRMATION BY CONGRESS
GR: FILL UP THE VACANCY BY SUCCESSION:
EXC: BY SPECIAL ELECTION
FACTS: From the beginning of his term, petitioner was plagued by a
plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity.
His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Governor
Chavit Singson went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day,
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader,
took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech accusing the
petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000.
The House Committee on Public Order and Security, decided to
investigate the exposé of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-
10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name
"Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President. The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous
outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
On January 19, the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first
round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
started at Malacañang's Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution."
ISSUE: whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave
while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
RULING:
RESIGNATION of the PRESIDENT
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8,
Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office or resignation
of the President, the Vice President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
then act as President until the President or
Vice President shall have been elected and
qualified.
xxx xxx xxx."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or
should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when
respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear,
it must be given legal effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving
the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to
the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters
to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give
up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
DISABILITY of the PRESIDENT
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has
no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII."
This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
President.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the
claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Tañada
v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot "exercise its judicial power
for this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government."
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court
without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
VACANCY in the OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, HOW FILLED
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as her VP. The next day, February 7, the Senate
adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr. The House of Representatives also approved Senator
Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178. Senator Guingona, Jr.
took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
(Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each,
were due to be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further
provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.
HONASAN WAS THE 13TH SENATOR. VOID DAW KY DID NOT NOTIFY
THE ELECTORATE OF THE POSITION TO BE FILLED, SAKTO? SAYUP. In
a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the
election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer
the election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a
statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall
be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed
is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the
duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right
and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not
from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus
charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice
and COMELEC's failure to give the additional notice did not negate
the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. More
than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan. We
simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan. THERE
WAS STATUTORY NOTICE. NO STATUTORY NOTICE AS TO LOCAL
OFFICIALS KY IN THE LAW, THERE IS NO SPECIFIC DATE.)
FACTS: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January
2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-
President.
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each,
were due to be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further
provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13
candidates as the elected Senators. Respondents Ralph Recto and
Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners as voters and taxpayers, filed the
instant petition for prohibition. Petitioners contend that COMELEC’s
provisional proclamation is without jurisdiction because it failed to
notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special
election as required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 and it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections.
ISSUE: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term
Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
RULING: YES!
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may
be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of
Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law”.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and
place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or
by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the
election's validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the
date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the
body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that
expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at
the next general elections fixes the date at which the special
election is to be held and operates as the call for that election.
Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not
invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty
of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and
duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from
any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges
voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in
case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such
vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy
in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-
President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but
must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with
knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC's failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election,
much less invalidate it.
Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's failure
to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special senatorial election or led
them to believe that there was no such special election.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan. We
simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the
absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the
exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the
special election.
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means
and methods to conduct the special election within the confines
of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's proposal, as
embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently
acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion
in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly,
and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
PIMENTEL VS COMELEC
(SEC 36 OF RA 9165 AND COMELEC RESO # 6486 REQUIRING THE
MANDATORY DRUG TESTING OF SENATORIAL CANDIDATES WERE
HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT EXPANDED THE
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.)
CAVEAT: (Three consolidated cases ni siya: SJS vs PDEA, Laserna vs
PDEA and Pimentel vs Comelec – Pimentel lang ta focus kay didto
ang about sa senatorial qualifications. Ang two other cases were
about if pwede i-drug test ang students and ang private ug public
officials.)
FACTS: On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution
read as follows:
Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
“SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”
Also, the COMELEC Resolution provides:
“SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and
accredited by the Department of Health. Xxx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug
test certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the
drug test certificate herein required.”
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a
candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks
(1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486. He invoked the provisions of the Constitution:
Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least
thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum
of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and
be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds
that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
RULING: The provisions are unconstitutional. Hence, SC said that:
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
“Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of
the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. Xxx
However, the Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which
it cannot leap.10”
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power.
The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug
- testing requirement.
BONUS – NOT ABOUT SENATORIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
As to drug test sa students: justifiable ra because of the safety and
interest of the student population
As to drug test sa public and private officials: petitioners tried to
invoke the right to privacy, but failed to prove it sa court. The drug
test was considered justifiable for private officials because there is
“reduced expectation of privacy in the work office”. It was
considered justifiable pud for public officials due to “high
requirement of ethics in the public service”.
As to the drug test sa criminals: it was declared unconstitutional
since the accused persons “are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves”.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS COMELEC (3 consolidated cases)
(MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS COMELEC PROCLAIMED 14 REPS FROM 13
PARTIES. PAGASA FILED A "Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution” SINCE THE
20% REQUIREMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION IS MANDATORY.
COMELEC 2ND DIVISION GRANTED, COMELEC EN BANC AFFIRMED.
HENCE, THE OTHER PARTY LISTS WHO WERE ALREADY PROCLAIMED
FILED THIS INSTANT PETITION. RULING: 20% WAS ONLY THE
CEILING. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage
of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved
for party-list representatives. TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD: The two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation” AKA MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION.
SUMMARY OF FOUR PARAMETERS: First, the twenty percent
allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party
list. Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation — the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes.")
FACTS: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation
was held simultaneously with the national elections. COMELEC then
proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA Party (People's Progressive Alliance for
Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and
Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution."
It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and
the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional
provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House. Thereafter, other party list organizations also filed their
respective motions to intervene in the case.
COMELEC 2ND Division, via Resolution, granted PAG-ASA’s petition. It
also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941. COMELEC En banc affirmed such ruling via another resolution.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been
proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least two
percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and assailed the two resolutions.
ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling? NO.
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat
limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? YES.
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the
additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
RULING:
1. No. The twenty per cent allocation in the house for party-list
lawmakers is a mere ceiling and not mandatory. We rule that a
simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with
the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets
down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. And, in the
exercise of this constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA
7941.
2. Yes to both. TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD: In imposing a two
percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the
proposed bill. . . The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but
with the very essence of "representation”. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people.
THREE-SEAT LIMIT: An important consideration in adopting the
party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system
of representation ...Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each
qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.
3. How the additional seats of a qualified party be determined:
1. Rank all the parties according to the votes each obtained
2. Compute the ratio for each party by dividing its votes by
the total votes cast for the party-list
3. All those who garnered at least 2% shall have a guaranteed
seat. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats
4. The party having the highest number of votes is referred
to as the “first party”
5. Determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other
parties. (4% - additional 1; -6% - additional 2)
6. The number of seats allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled to.
SUMMARY OF THE FOUR PARAMETERS OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
ACCORDING TO SC:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-
list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes."
LIST OF FORMULAS (WARNING: SC REVISITED THIS FORMULA IN
BANAT VS COMELEC):
 BANAT (GR 179271) - filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC). The reason for filing
is the implementation of the Veterans Federation Party v Comelec
ruling using the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.

Comelec, as the NBC, proclaimed 13 parties as winners.

Then in allocating the additional seats, it reiterated its ruling in
Veterans Federation Party v Comelec.

For those obtaining 2% above – Guaranteed 1 seat

Formula in Veterans for additional seats for the “FIRST

PARTY”: (BUHAY ang number 1 nga party-list)
Number of Votes Proportion of votes of first
Of first party party relative to total
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - = votes for party-list system
Total votes for
Party-list system

The resulting Proportion of Votes received by the first

party (w/o rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

If Equal to or at least 6% = 2 additional seats

BAYAN MUNA V COMELEC (APRIL 21, 2009) EN BANC DECISION Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% = 1 additional
Less than 4% = no additional

Formula for Additional seats for the OTHER QUALIFIED

PARTIES in the Veteran’s ruling:

No. of Votes of
Concerned Party No. of additional Additional
------------- x seats allocated to = seats for a
No. of Votes of first party concerned
First Party party

NBC nevertheless declared said petition of BANAT as moot and

academic and it implemented the Veteran’s formula.

BAYAN MUNA, ABONO, and A TEACHER (GR 179295) –

asked the Comelec acting as NBC should not use the Veteran’s
formula as it violates the Constitution and RA 7941. This was
nevertheless denied.

ISSUES:
1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives in Sec. 5(2) Art.
TOTAL VOTES: 15, 950, 900 VOTES VI of the Consti mandatory or merely a ceiling? MERELY A CEILING
2.79 = 7.33% X (55-17)
FACTS: 2) Is the 3-seat limit in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? YES
(BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the National 3) is the 2 % threshold prescribed in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
Board of Canvassers (NBC). The reason for filing is the for one seat constitutional? CONSTITUTIONAL FOR GUARANTEED
implementation of the Veterans Federation Party v Comelec ruling SEAT, UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS
using the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. Comelec,
as the NBC, VIA RESOUTION, proclaimed 13 parties as winners. Then 4) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
in allocating the additional seats, it reiterated its ruling in Veterans
Federation Party v Comelec. BANAT QUESTIONED THE 5) can major political parties be barred from participating in the
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 20% THRESHOLD, 2% THRESHOLD (IT party-list elections? YES
SUBMITTED TWO INTERPRETATION FOR SUCH, ONE WHICH
ASSUMES THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 2% AND THE OTHER
WHICH ASSUMES ITS UNCONSTITUTIONALITY, AND QUESTIONS
HOW THE PARTY-LIST IS REALLY TO BE ALLOCATED. COURT RULED
THAT THE 2% ALLOCATION OF THE ADDITIONAL SEATS IS RULING:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. SEE TABLE FOR THE COMPUTATION.)
PARTY-LIST SEATS (1ST TOPIC)

4 INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS OF THE PHILIPPINE PARTY-LIST
ELECTION:
1) combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Rep,
including those elected under the party list
2) only those garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat
3) each qualified party is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats
(one qualifying seat) ( 2 additional seats)
4) additional seats shall be in proportion to the party-list’s
total number of votes
Sec. 5 Art V - Composition of House of Rep:
 250 members elected from
o Legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area
o Party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or orgs.
 For the Party-list Representatives:
o Constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list
(This is also found in Sec 11 RA 7941)
o Term – 3 consecutive
FOR COMPUTING THE NUMBER OF SEATS AVAILABLE TO PARTY-
LIST REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS: (SC followed Veteran’s formula)
Number of seats available
To legislative districts Number of seats
------------------- x .20 = available to PLR
.80
14th Congress of the Phil has 220 district reps. So substitute lang, and
you get 55 available seats.
TAKE NOTE: There is no disagreement on the Computation of the
available seats as well as the formula to determine the guaranteed
seats to party-list candidates garnering at least 2% of the total PL
votes.
The problem here is THE ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL SEATS
USING THE VETERAN’S FORMULA.
INTERPRETATIONS OF BANAT:
Deviating from the Veteran’s formula, BANAT presents 2
interpretations:
1st (44 seats will be awarded)
1.a) composition of PL is 20% x x x
1.b) 1 seat for every 2% of the total PL votes; then not more than 3
seats
1.c) the remaining seats shall be proportionately allocated to the PL
candidates who have not secured the max 3 seats under the 2%
threshold, after deducting the seats obtained by the PL groups and
after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those
seats
2nd (34 seats will be awarded)
Take note: It is assumed in this interpretation that the 2% threshold
will be declared unconstitutional
2.a) tally all the votes on a nationwide basis
2.b) rank them
2.c) allocate PL reps proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each candidate as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the PL system
ARGUMENT OF BAYAN MUNA, ABONO, and A TEACHER:
They criticize that the 2-4-6 formula and the Veteran’s
formula make it impossible to fill all the PL seats. Both formulas do
not factor in the total number of seats. They reject the 3 seat cap,
but accept the 2% threshold.
SC SAYS:
There is no problem with the 2% threshold to be
guaranteed 1 seat. However, the Veteran’s formula erroneously
interprets the clause in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 “in proportion to their
total number of votes” to be in proportion to the votes of the first
party. This is contrary to the language of RA 7941.
Pursuant to this, the 2% threshold for allocating the
ADDITIONAL SEATS is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it
would mathematically and physically prevent the filling up of the
available PL seats. (2% applies lang sa guaranteed seats)
THE PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED NOW:
1. rank the PL candidates from the highest to the lowest
2. those receiving at least 2%, guaranteed 1 seat (1st ROUND OF
SEAT ALLOCATION)
 Votes obtained / Total Votes Cast in PL = percentage
3. those qualified shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated (2nd to 3rd ROUND DEPENDING ON THE AVAILABLE SEATS
LESS GUARANTEED SEATS)
4. not more than 3 seats
AND FOR COMPUTING THE ADDITIONAL SEATS:
(2nd round)
Take Note: the GUARANTEED SEATS FOR 2% THRESHOLD is NO
LONGER included because they have already been allocated. So ang
additional seats refer to the MAXIMUM SEATS RESERVED LESS THE
GUARANTEED SEATS
 Percentage x Remaining Available seats (in this case, 38 coz
there are 55 max seats then in the 1st round, 17 seats were
allocated – if ganahan mo mu.view sa table, aron mas
maka.visualize, refer lang sa case)
o The whole integer of the product corresponds to a
party’s share in the remaining available seats.
 Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed.
CAN MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATE? - YES
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party
system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings.
QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEES (2ND TOPIC)
1) natural born citizen of the Phil
2) registered voter
3) resident of the Phil for a period of not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the elections
4) able to read and write
5) bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election
6) at least 25 years of age on the day of election
 FOR A NOMIBEE OF THE YOUTH SECTOR
o Must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age
on the day of the election
o It attains 30 years of age during his term, continue
until the expiration of his term
TAKE NOTE: not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as there is no financial
status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Diba major political parties can participate, but by virtue of 8-7 vote,
ruling in Veterans with respect to non-participation of said parties is
upheld.
2% threshold in distributing additional seats is unconstitutional
Veteran’s formula for additional seats is not controlling.
BAYAN MUNA V COMELEC (JULY 8 2009) EN BANC RESOLUTION
(THE HOUSE OF REPS WERE CLARIFYING SOME THINGS SUCH AS TO
THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF HOUSE REPS BEYOND 250 AS
MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION, THE CLARIFICATIONS AS TO THE
EXTENT OF “UNCONSTITUTIONALITY” OF THE 2% THRESHOLD AND
AS TO THE ABSOLUTE PROPORTIONALITY OF PARTY LIST AND
REPRESENTATIVES. READ BLUE HIGHLIGHTS KY MUBO RA MAN PUD)
The House of Rep filed a motion for clarification for the following
issues:
1) There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly,
the allotted seats for party-list representation should only be 54 and
not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of
the party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of
Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-
list representatives.
2) The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it
should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named party-list
representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of
representatives that would complete the 250 member maximum
prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event
that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-
cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members
would now rise to 270.
3) The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in
relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats
to party-list groups which did not attain the minimum number of
votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore,
sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd
seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the
House of
Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more
minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
4) For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is
sought as to whether the principle laid down in Veterans that "the
filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not
mandatory," has been abandoned.
CLARIFICATIONS MADE BY THE SC:
1) It is provided under Sec 5 (1) Art VI of the 1987 Consti that the
max number of members of the House of Rep shall be at 250.
Nevertheless, an increase in the number of members is allowed
which is clear from the phrase “unless otherwise provided by
law”.
 Increase may be done by the legislature through Piecemeal
legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general
increase.
2) The formula to determine the number of seats available for party
list allows a corresponding increase in the number of seats
available whenever a legislative district is created by law.
 This means that there is no need for the legislature to create an
additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative
districts (four is entitled to 1 rep) are created by law.
 Moreover, the actual count of legislative districts in the 2007
election was not 220 but 219, following the declaration that
rendered void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan,
thus only 54 seats were available, not 55.
 The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory.
Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the
number of participants in the party-list election
3) The 2% threshold is constitutional with respect to the allocation
of the guaranteed seats (1st round)
 In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no
minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because
the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold
in the allocation of additional seats.
 However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient
number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is
dependent upon the circumstances of each election
 In the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the
preference in the distribution of seats should be in accordance
with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting
the distribution to parties receiving two-percent of the votes. 6
To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would
mathematically prevent the filling up of all the available party-
list seats
4) In response to Roa-Borje’s (lain nga intervenor ni sya) position
claiming the perceived need for ABSOLUTE proportionality in the
allocation of PL seats. . .
 the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT require absolute
proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats
 Section 5 (1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall
be apportioned according to proportional representation.
However, this principle of proportional representation applies
only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The
allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by
the last phrase of Section 5 (1), which states that the party-list
representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature
wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list
seats.
5) Again, nag provide nasad ug FOUR PARAMETERS IN A PHIL STYLE
PL ELECTION SYSTEM:
1. 20% of the total number of the House of Rep
membership is the maximum number of seats
available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four
existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering 2 % of the total votes means 1 guaranteed
seat in the 1st round of allocation
3. Additional seats, total seats less guaranteed seats,
shall be distributed even to those receiving less than
2% for the 2nd round. Otherwise, it would be
mathematically impossible if the 2% threshold would
still be observed in allocating the additional seats.
4. 3 seat cap is constitutional. This is intended to
prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system.
TOPIC: Succesion, Effect on term continuity
Borja vs Comelec, GR No. 133495
(CAPCO WAS ELECTED VICE MAYOR. HE SUCCEEDED AS MAYOR
UPON DEATH OF THE MAYOR. HE THEN RAN FOR THE NEXT TWO
SUCCEEDING TERMS AS MAYOR ENDING 1995 AND 98. HE RAN
AGAIN IN 1998. BORJA, ALSO A CANDIDATE, OBJECTED KY 3 TERMS
NA DAW. FALSE! The three consecutive term limit rule contemplates
of a term wherein a candidate was elected in that position. It does
not include a term of office wherein an official merely succeeded in
the position of a higher official due to permanent vacancy unless
there is an election held for such vacancy like in the case the house
of representatives. In other words, succession that occurs by
operation of law is not included, while succession that occurs via
special election is included in the consecutive term. “To
recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply”)
Facts: Respondent Capco was elected vice mayor for a term ending
in 1992. He succeeded as Mayor in 1989 upon the death of the
Mayor. Thereafter, he ran and was elected as Mayor for the next
two succeeding terms ending in 1995 and 1998 which in effect
allowed him to serve 3 consecutive terms as Mayor.
He ran again as Mayor during the 1998 elections, but this time,
petitioner Borja, who was also running for the position of Mayor,
questioned his eligibility arguing that respondent has already served
three consecutive terms thereby disqualifying him for the position of
mayor.
Eventually, respondent won in the elections and was proclaimed as
the Mayor but petitioner appealed COMELEC’S decision in upholding
respondent’s eligibility to run.
Issue: WON respondent should be disqualified from running.
Held: No, the court here delved into the debates and deliberations
in the constitutional commissions wherein it was revealed that the
three consecutive term limit rule contemplates of a term wherein a
candidate was elected in that position. It does not include a term of
office wherein an official merely succeeded in the position of a higher
official due to permanent vacancy unless there is an election held for
such vacancy like in the case the house of representatives. In other
words, succession that occurs by operation of law is not included,
while succession that occurs via special election is included in the
consecutive term.
Hence, the term of office during which respondent succeeded as
Mayor should not be included in the count of the three consecutive
term rule because it took effect by operation of law. Therefore, in
effect respondent is still eligible to run for one more term.
*mao ni ruling sa SC:
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position
for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply”
Latasa vs COMELEC
(LATASA WAS MAYOR OF MUNICIPALITY OF DIGOS FOR THREE
TERMS. LATER, BY VIRTUE OF A PLEBISCITE, PUBERTY STRUCK THE
MUNICIPALITY HENCE IT BECAME A CITY. OYEAH! HENCE, HE IS
RUNNING FOR THE FIRST TIME AS A CITY MAYOR SINCE AFTER ALL,
THE CITY AND MUNICIPALITY ARE TWO DIFFERENT CORPORATIONS
(HE CITED THE DIFFERENCE VIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AS TO
THE REQUISITES OF A CITY AND MUNICIPALITY). True, the new city
acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that
of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office
of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated
earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as
that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the
municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are
the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their
municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the
same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their
chief executive for nine years. The framers of the Constitution, by
including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms.)
Montebon vs Comelec, GR No. 180444
(FIRST DIGEST: Petitioners, who were candidates for municipal
councilor sought the disqualification of respondent in 2007
ELECTIONS. Respondent has already been elected as municipal
councilor for three terms from 1988 to 2007. But during the term of
2001-2004, he succeeded as Vice Mayor upon the retirement of the
incumbent vice mayor. Petitioners argued that respondent’s
assumption as Vice Mayor should not be considered as an
interruption and that it amounts to a voluntary renunciation. WAS
THERE INTERRUPTION? YES. Yes, there was an interruption because
succession in the case of local government officials takes effect by
operation of law and hence, is NOT a voluntary renunciation. What
is considered under law as not interrupting the three consecutive
term rule is only voluntary renunciation which is one where it takes
effect through the CONDUCT of the official and NOT by operation
of law. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term, provided by law, amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service. SECOND DIGEST: In this case respondent
was the highest ranking sanggunian member thus it is clear that
there was no voluntary renunciation of his office in his part since the
interruption of his service was made by operation of law.)
Facts: Petitioners, who were candidates for municipal councilor
sought the disqualification of respondent in the election who was
also running for a position in the municipal council during the 2007
elections. Respondent has already been elected as municipal
councilor for three terms from 1988 to 2007. But during the term of
2001-2004, he succeeded as Vice Mayor upon the retirement of the
incumbent vice mayor.
Petitioners argued that respondent’s assumption as Vice Mayor
should not be considered as an interruption and that it amounts to a
voluntary renunciation. Respondent counters that his succession as
Vice Mayor served as an interruption to the three consecutive term
rule and hence, he is not disqualified.
Issue: WON there was interruption.
Held: Yes, there was an interruption because succession in the case
of local government officials takes effect by operation of law and
hence, is NOT a voluntary renunciation. What is considered under
law as not interrupting the three consecutive term rule is only
voluntary renunciation which is one where it takes effect through
the conduct of the official and not by operation of law. Hence,
respondent is still qualified to run as municipal councilor.
* SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. —
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined herein. . .
* Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and
no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Ruling SC:
“Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January
2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal
councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-
2004 term.”
Montebon v. COMELEC
(MUNICIPAL COUNCILOR SUCCEEDED THE VICE MAYOR DUE TO
RETIREMENT. ISSUE: WON IF YOU SUCCEEDED INTO ANOTHER
POSITION, WOULD YOU CONSIDER IT AS 3-TERM LIMIT. Succession
in local government offices is by operation of law. In this case
respondent was the highest ranking sanggunian member thus it is
clear that there was no voluntary renunciation of his office in his
part since the interruption of his service was made by operation of
law.)
Facts: Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso
Jr. were candidates for Municipal councilors in the municipality of
Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local
elections. Petitioners filed a disqualification case against Potencioso
alleging that he had already served for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor 1998-2001, 2001-2004, & 2004-2007 thus he is
proscribed from running again for the same position. Respondent
contended that his second term (2001-2004) was interrupted when
he succeeded the vice mayor due to retirement thus he is not
disqualified. Petitioners contended that there was no interruption
during the second term as such was a voluntary renunciation.
Issue: WON respondent is disqualified from running for a 4th
consecutive term?
Ruling: Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
Sec. 44 of the LGC provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member shall become vice mayor.
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may
be.Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined herein
In this case respondent was the highest ranking sanggunian member
thus it is clear that there was no voluntary renunciation of his office
in his part since the interruption of his service was made by
operation of law.
Aldovino v. COMELEC
(ASILO WAS ELECTED AS CITY COUNCILOR FOR THREE TERMS. HE
WAS PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED FOR 90 DAYS IN HIS SECOND TERM.
RULING: PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION, THOUGH INVOLUNTARY, NOT
DEEMED AN INTERRUPTION. Temporary inability or disqualification
to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary,
should not be considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining
title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a
reason provided by law. What the law contemplates when it comes
to interruption of office is that there is a loss of title to the office.)
THERE IS NO LOSS OF TITLE IN PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. THE BEST
EVIDENCE: NO PERMANENT REPLACEMENT TO THE POSITION.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS NOT A PENALTY
IF IT WERE AS A PENALTY, WOULD IT BE AN INTERRUPTION? NO,
STILL NO LOSS OF TITLE.
EVIL WANTED TO BE AVOIDED: THE POLITICIAN MIGHT SIMULATE
AN ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE SO IT COULD “INTERRUPT” THE THREE
TERM LIMIT.
IF SICK, DOES NOT ALSO INTERRUPT THE TERM SINCE NO
REPLACEMENT AND NO LOSS OF TITLE
Preventive suspension an interim remedial measure to
address the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for
eventual guilt or liability.
It is given when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity
of the offense charged. The purpose of which is to prevent the
public officer influence or pose a threat against to the witness or to
the integrity of the record or witness.
A public officer under such is prevented from exercising the
functions of his office as well as from receiving salary nonetheless,
he does not lose title to hold office.
LONZANIDA VS COMELEC
(LONZANIDA WAS ELECTED TWO TERMS. ON THIRD TERM, HE WON
BUT THERE WAS PROTEST. IN THE MIDTERM, A DECISION WAS
MADE WHICH ORDERED HIM TO VACATE. IN 1998 ELECTION, HE
RAN AGAIN. HENCE PROTEST AGAIN KY THREE TERM RULE NA DAW.
SC: THERE WAS AN INTERRUPTION SINCE HIS PROCLAMATION WAS
NULL AND VOID. THERE WAS AN ORDER: WRIT OF EXECUTION BY
COMELEC, HENCE HE HAD NO CHOICE.)
ONG VS. ALEGRE
(ELECTION PROTEST WAS FOR THAT TERM, THE DECISION BECAME
FINAL ON THE NEXT TERM. SC: SERVED THE THREE TERMS. THOUGH
DURING HIS TERM HE WAS DE FACTO ELECTED, YOU STILL SERVED
THE FULL PERIOD TERM AND EXERCISED THE RIGHT AND DUTIES.
ONE LINER: IF FINAL AND EXECUTORY AFTER THE TERM, THE THREE
TERM LIMIT WILL APPLY)

HENCE, DISEASES, PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION, FORCE MAJEURE

THOUGH INVOLUNTARY, STILL NO LOSS OF TITLE

Facts: Respondent Asilo was elected as city councilor of Lucena for

three consecutive terms (1998-2001, 2001-2004, & 2004-2007).
During his second term, the Sandiganbayan ordered for a 90 days
preventive suspension by reason of a criminal case he was facing at
that time. Subsequently, it was lifted and thus he was able to
resume his office. During the 2007 election, he filed for his
certificate of candidacy for the same position. This prompted the
petitioners to file for a disqualification case against him for violation
of the three term limit.

Issue: WON the preventive suspension issue against the respondent

constituted as an interruption in view of the 3 term limit?

Ruling: Temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the

functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply
barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.

What the law contemplates when it comes to interruption

of office is that there is a loss of title to the office. In this
there was no actual loss of title to hold office but merely
the person is prevented in exercising such function.

(Additional just in case)