San Juan, Rogelio C Conflicts of Laws

17-0188 JD Atty. Victor Tulalian

CASE # 1

CHIQUITA BRANDS vs. GEORGE E. OMELIO

G.R. No. 189102
June 7, 2017

FACTS:

On Aug 1993, thousands of banana plantation workers instituted a class suit in US

for damages against 11 foreign corporations, Chiquita brands being one of those 11
companies. The claimants claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane
(DBCP) while working in the plantation. As a result, these workers suffered serious and
permanent injuries to their reproductive system.

However, US courts dismissed the complaint based on forum non conveniens.

On May 1996, the claimants filed a complaint on the same 11 corporations in the RTC of
Panabo City, Davao. Before pre-trial the petitioner and the claimants entered into a
compromise agreement with the claimants. The agreement states that; the petitioner shall
be release from all or their obligation after they deposited an escrow amount in favor of
the claimant which would be administered by a third person/ mediator. The RTC of
Panabo approved the compromised agreement and dismissed the petition of the
claimant. After dismissal of the civil claim the claimants moved for the execution of the
compromise agreement.

The petitioner opposed the execution on the ground of mootness; they argued that
they had already complied with their obligation by depositing the settlement amount into
an escrow account. However, RTC of Panabo granted the motion for execution because
there was no proof that they have fulfilled their obligation.

On May 2003 petitioner filed a motion to suspend the execution and be allowed to
present evidence on their behalf. During the hearing of the case, the claimants picketed
outside the court room and accused the RTC judge of Panabo as a corrupt official who
delayed the execution. Petitioner requested for change of venue and was granted. The
case was transferred and now under the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao city.
On July 2009, the RTC of Davao city through Judge Omelio ordered the execution of the
compromised agreement.

Aggrieved by the RTC’s decision, the petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari even
without a prior appeal to the CA. Petitioner allege that the respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution and ordering them to directly pay
each of the claimant contrary to the compromise agreement between petitioner and
claimant.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the hierarchy of courts was violated when the petitioner filed for
certiorari without appealing first to the CA.
Whether or not Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

1. No. Under the principle of hierarchy or courts, direct recourse to the SC is

improper because SC is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to
satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions.
Nonetheless, the invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, 1. When dictated by public welfare and
advancement of public policy, 2. When demanded by broader interest of justice, 3. Where
the challenged orders were patent nullities or 4. When analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the
case.
In the case at hand, it was clearly stated that the case is in need of a broader
interest of justice, as it may prejudice any or both parties when delayed.

2. Yes. Courts can neither amend nor modify the terms and conditions of a
compromise validly entered into by the parties. A writ of execution that varies the
respective obligation of the parties under a judicially approved compromise settlement is
void. Hence Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion.

CASE # 2

INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL v. JOSE G. DE VERA

GR No. 205703
March 7, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal
of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business interests in several countries. On the other
hand, respondent... is a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines.
Arriola was offered by SNC-Lavalin... the position of Safety Officer... in
Madagascar.
Arriola was then hired... and his overseas employment contract was processed
with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment in the Philippines.
Arriola started working in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of
pre-termination of employment... due to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise
and the unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently, Arriola was repatriated.
SNC-Lavalin deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay amounting to Two Thousand Six
Hundred Thirty-Six Dollars and Eight Centavos (CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor
law.
Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter
(LA). He claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-
month unexpired portion of his contract, amounting to, more or less, One Million Sixty-
Two Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,062,936.00). He asserted that SNC-
Lavalin never offered any valid reason for his early termination and that he was not given
sufficient notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted that the petitioners must prove
the applicability of Canadian law before the same could be applied to his employment
contract.

ISSUES:

When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract?

RULING:

R.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers Act, was enacted to institute the policies on
overseas employment and to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of
the welfare of migrant workers.
It emphasized that while recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant
workers to the national economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State
does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and
achieve national development.
Although it acknowledged claims arising out of law or contract involving Filipino
workers, it does not categorically provide that foreign laws are absolutely and
automatically applicable in overseas employment contracts.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since
a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is
not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the
contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient,
"provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy." Thus, counterbalancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the
equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to
matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable
provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed
with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and
parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of
labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment
contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that
the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the
OFW has his employment abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work and a living wage under our Constitution.
As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the
employment contract. A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence reveals that this
exception is subject to the following requisites: That it is expressly stipulated in the
overseas employment contract that a specific foreign law shall govern; That the foreign
law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine rules on
evidence; That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines;
and, That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.The
Court is of the view that these four (4) requisites must be complied with before the
employer could invoke the applicability of a foreign law to an overseas employment
contract.
With these requisites, the State would be able to abide by its constitutional
obligation to ensure that the rights and well-being of our OFWs are fully protected.
If the first requisite is absent, or that no foreign law was expressly stipulated in the
employment contract which was executed in the Philippines, then the domestic labor laws
shall apply in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus.
If the second requisite is lacking, or that the foreign law was not proven pursuant
to Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, then the international
law doctrine of processual presumption operates. The said doctrine declares that "[w]here
a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours."
If the third requisite is not met, or that the foreign law stipulated is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, then Philippine laws govern. This
finds legal bases in the Civil Code, specifically: (1) Article 17, which provides that laws
which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws of a foreign country; and (2) Article 1306, which states that
the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions in a contract must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Finally, if the fourth requisite is missing, or that the overseas employment contract
was not processed through the POEA, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is violated. Article
18 provides that no employer may hire a Filipino worker for overseas employment except
through the boards and entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor. In relation thereto,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, declares that the State shall only allow the
deployment of overseas Filipino workers in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant
workers are protected. Thus, the POEA, through the assistance of the Department of
Foreign Affairs, reviews and checks whether the countries have existing labor and social
laws protecting the rights of workers, including migrant workers.
Unless processed through the POEA, the State has no effective means of
assessing the suitability of the foreign laws to our migrant workers. Thus, an overseas
employment contract that was not scrutinized by the POEA definitely cannot be invoked
as it is an unexamined foreign law.
In other words, lacking any one of the four requisites would invalidate the
application of the foreign law, and the Philippine law shall govern the overseas
employment contract.
 CASE # 3

TRANSIMEX CO. vs MAFRE ASIAN INSURANCE CORP

G.R. No. 190271
September 14, 2016

PARTIES:

Transimex Co, ship agent of the common carrier – Petitioner (SC case)
Respondent (Original Case)
Mafre Asian Insurance Corp, insurer of Fertiphil – Respondent (SC case)
Petitioner (Original Case) Fertiphil – the consignee of a shipment of Prilled Urea Fertilizer
transported by M/V Meryem Ana
.
FACTS:

On May 21, 1999, M/V Meryem Ana received a shipment consisting of

21,857 metric tons of Prilled Urea Fertilizer from Helm Duengemittel GMBH at Odessa,
Ukraine. The shipment was covered by two separate bills of lading and consigned to
Fertiphil for delivery to two ports - one in Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union; and the
other in Tabaco, Albay. Fertiphil insured the cargo against all risks under Marine Risk
Note Nos. MN-MAR-HO-0001341 and MN-MAR-HO-0001347 issued by respondent. M/V
Meryem Ana arrived at Poro Point, La Union, and discharged 14,339.507 metric tons of
fertilizer under the first bill of lading. The ship sailed on to Tabaco, Albay, to unload the
remainder of the cargo. The fertilize run loaded at Albay appeared to have a gross weight
of 7,700 metric tons. The present controversy involves only this second delivery.

As soon as the vessel docked at the Tabaco port, the fertilizer wasbagged and st
ored inside awarehouse. When the cargo was subsequently weighed, it was discovered
that only 7,350.35 metric tons of fertilizer had been delivered. The present controversy
involves on the second delivery because of the alleged shortage of 349.65 metric tons.
Fertiphil filed a claim with respondent for P1,617,527.37. After payment, respondent
MAFRE Asian Insurance demanded reimbursement from petitioner on the basis ofthe
right of subrogation. The claim was denied, prompting respondent to file a Complaint with
the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay the claim of P1,617,527.37 was affirmed by the CA
and denied petitioner’s appeal. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

CAUSE OF ACTION:

Recovery of sum of money filed by Mafre Insurance Co. against Transimex

Cobecause when it demanded reimbursement from petitioner on the basis of the right of
subrogation, the latter denied the claim.
 RULING OF RTC:

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the claim of
P1,617,527.37. In its Decision, the trial court found that there was indeed a shortage in
the cargo delivered, for which the common carrier must be held responsible under Article
1734 of the Civil Code. The RTC also refused to give credence to petitioner's claim of
overage and noted that the presumption of fault and/or negligence on the part of the
carrier remained unrebutted.

RULING OF CA:

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and denied petitioner's appeal. After
evaluating the evidence presented during trial, the appellate court found no reason to
disturb the trial court's conclusion that there was indeed a shortage in the shipment. The
CA also rejected the assertion that petitioner was not a common carrier. Because the
latter offered services to the public for the transport of goods in exchange for
compensation, it was considered a common carrier in accordance with Article 1732 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUES:
Whether the transaction is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers or by the provisions of COGSA, and petitioner is liable for the loss or
damage sustained by the cargo because of bad weather.

HELD:
The Court upholds the ruling of the CA with respect to the applicable law. As
expressly provided in Article 1753 of the Civil Code, "[t]he law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss,
destruction or deterioration." Since the cargo in this case was transported from Odessa,
Ukraine, to Tabaco, Albay, the liability of petitioner for the alleged shortage must be
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers.

CASE # 4

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA v. MA. JOPETTE M.

REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A. CRISTOBAL
AND LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ
G.R. No. 198587
January 14, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and

existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine office.
Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with
the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
After undergoing seminars, the respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They
then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia. Sometime in 2006 respondents
were terminated and they contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.
Respondents alleged that they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and
had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially,
Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required
respondents to file their resignation letters. Respondents were told that if they did not
resign, Saudia would terminate them all the same. The threat of termination entailed the
loss of benefits, such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. Saudia
anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their
resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified
Contract). Under the contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes
pregnant is rendered void. Respondents emphasized that the Unified Contract took effect
on September 23, 2006 and they filed their maternity leaves before the contract took
effect.
On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its
officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay
for holiday, rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation
pay, night shift differentials, medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal
deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. The case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Hermino V. Suelo.
However, the complaint was denied for lack of jurisdiction. Respondents filed an appeal
before the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC rendered decision that the
respondents-appellees are hereby directed to pay complainants-appellants the aggregate
amount of SR614,001.24 corresponding to their back wages and separation pay plus ten
(10%) percent thereof as attorney's fees. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
it was denied by the NLRC. The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA but the Court of
Appeals denied petitioners' Rule 65 Petition and modified the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission with respect to the award of separation pay and backwages
and the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this
Appeal was filed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
may exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in
adjudicating the present dispute.
2. Whether or not the respondents were illegally terminated

HELD:

1. The considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals as

outlined in Bank of America, NT&SA100 have been satisfied. First, all the parties are
based in the Philippines and all the material incidents transpired in this jurisdiction. Thus,
the parties may conveniently seek relief from Philippine tribunals. Second, Philippine
tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. Third,
Philippine tribunals are in a position to enforce their decisions. There is no compelling
basis for ceding jurisdiction to a foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public
policy considerations attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals to not shy away
from their duty to rule on the case.
2. Yes, the respondents were illegally terminated. The termination of respondents'
employment happened when they were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on account
of child delivery and infant rearing. As noted by the Court of Appeals, pregnancy is a time
when they need employment to sustain their families. Indeed, it goes against normal and
reasonable human behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a time of great financial need.
It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. All they did was
avail of their maternity leaves. Evidently, the very nature of a maternity leave means that
a pregnant employee will not report for work only temporarily and that she will resume the
performance of her duties as soon as the leave allowance expires. It is also clear that
respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia. Each of them repeatedly
filed appeal letters asking Saudia to reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be
terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of them even went to Saudia's
office to personally seek reconsideration.

CASE # 5

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. ASIAVEST

MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD
GR No. 172301
August 19, 2015

FACTS:

This case stemmed from an action for recovery of sum of money filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig by respondent Malaysian corporation against petitioner
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC).
PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the
incorporation of an associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-
CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for
the State of Pahang, Malaysia.
In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees
and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due
performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due
performance by PNCC of its construction contracts . . . and the repayment of the
temporary advances given to PNCC[.] "These contracts were understood to be governed
by the laws of Malaysia.
 There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract,
prompting the State of Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad's performance bonds. It "entered into a compromise agreement with the State
of Pahang by paying . . . the reduced amount of [Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)] 3,915,053.54[.]
"Consequently, the corporation demanded indemnity from PNCC by demanding the
amount it paid to the State of Pahang.
On April 12, 1994, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for
recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It
based its action on Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 98 of the Malaysian
Contracts Act of 1950 and Section 11 of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956. PNCC filed
Motions for extension of time to file its Answer on May 18, 1994, June 2, 1994, and June
17, 1994. The trial court granted these motions, with the last one set to expire on July 3,
1994. On July 4, 1994, PNCC filed a Motion for another five-day extension. The trial...
court denied this Motion on July 13, 1994.
On July 27, 1994, the trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any
responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its
evidence ex parte.
The Regional Trial Court, in its Decision dated November 29, 1994, rendered
judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. The trial court found that
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad complied with the requisites for proof of written
foreign laws. The Malaysian laws invoked were found to be similar with Articles 2066 and
2067 of the Civil Code... the trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default... it
also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case
before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals... dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of law
exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, PNCC
filed this Petition.

ISSUES:

Whether our courts have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for recovery of
sum of money filed by a Malaysian corporation against a Philippine corporation involving
a contract executed and performed in Malaysia, and the applicability of the forum non
conveniens principle.

RULING:

On the jurisdiction issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
is one such law that provides for the jurisdiction of our courts. A plain reading... of Section
19 shows that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of trial courts:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
....
 (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property
in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where... the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000).
These jurisdictional amounts were adjusted to P300,000.00, and P400,000.00 in
the case of Metro Manila. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over
respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.
"Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient.’” This
doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not assuming
jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the... parties may
seek redress in another one. It is a device "designed to frustrate illicit means for securing
advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation
(or dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim... of either party."
On the other hand, courts may choose to assume jurisdiction subject to the
following requisites: "(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law... and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision."
The determination of whether to entertain a case is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, which must carefully consider the facts of the particular case. A
mere invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens or an easy averment... that
foreign elements exist cannot operate to automatically divest a court of its jurisdiction. It
is crucial for courts to determine first if facts were established such that special
circumstances exist to warrant its desistance from assuming jurisdiction.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11,
1995 that "[o]n the contrary[,] to try the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be
more convenient to defendant corporation as its principal office is located in the
Philippines, its... records will be more accessible, witnesses would be readily available
and entail less expenses in terms of legal services.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe
to assume that all of its pertinent documents in relation to its business would be available
in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees who were involved in the...
construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus,
it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before
Malaysian courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and,
ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner.
Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another
jurisdiction commenced litigation and the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.
Principles:
ART. 2066. The guarantor who pays for a debtor must be indemnified by the latter.
The indemnity comprises: (1) The total amount of the debt; (2) The legal interests thereon
from the time the payment was made known to the debtor, even though it did not earn
interest for the creditor; (3) The expenses incurred by the guarantor after having notified
the debtor that payment had been demanded of him; (4) Damages, if they are due.
ART. 2067. The guarantor who pays is subrogated by virtue thereof to all the rights which
the creditor had against the debtor.
If the guarantor has compromised with the creditor, he cannot demand of the debtor
more than what he has really paid.
Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 enumerates the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. This section includes the proviso: "except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court[.]" This court's appellate jurisdiction is found
in Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
....
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
A question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts[,]"while a question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts[.]"Questions of fact require the
examination of the probative value of the parties' evidence.
Puyat v. Zabarte enumerated practical reasons when courts may refuse to entertain a
case even though the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law:
1. The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because
the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses
have their residence there;
2. The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum
shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the
defendant;
3. The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or aliens when the
docket may already be overcrowded;
4. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be
maintained; and
5. The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation and
undermine a litigant's capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by engaging in forum
shopping on an international scale. It is also grounded on principles of comity and...
judicial efficiency.
Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising
jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals
of another sovereign. It is a measure that prevents the former's having to interfere in
affairs which... are better and more competently addressed by the latter. Further, forum
non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals elsewhere are better suited
to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better positioned...
to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice. Forum non conveniens prevents
the embarrassment of an awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent in
the face of the greater capability — both analytical and practical — of a tribunal in...
another jurisdiction.