BRILLANTE vs. CA and People Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v.
CA clarified that the filing
FACTS
This case was about Jejomar Binay who filed a libel case
against Roberto Brillante for circulating an open letter which
described in detail the plot to assassinate Augusto Syjuco,
another mayoralty candidate in Makati City.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position
of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati
Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the
course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay and
Dr. Nemesio Prudente (Prudente), then President of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines of plotting the
assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of
terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati
electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists
copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed
in detail his charges against Binay.
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote
news articles about the same. The open letter was
subsequently published under the title "Plea to Cory--Save
Makati" in newspapers.
Brillante was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4)
counts, as author or writer, of LIBEL by the RTC. Brillante
appealed to the CA contending that informations were filed by
the prosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense had already
prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since
the publication of the open letter on January 10, 11 and 12,
1988.
The appellate court held that the offense of libel had not yet
prescribed because the one-year prescription period should
be reckoned from the time that the private complainant
Prudente filed his complaint with the fiscal’s office on January
15, 1988 and not when the Informations were filed by the
prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals added
that under Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect during the
pendency of the cases against Brillante, the institution of the
complaint before the fiscal’s office or the courts for preliminary
investigation interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense
charged. It held that being a procedural rule, Section 1, Rule
110, applies to the cases against Brillante.
ISSUE
WON the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office
interrupted the period of prescription of criminal responsibility
HELD
Yes.
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the "crime
of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year."
In determining when the one-year prescriptive period should
be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the
same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of
prescriptive periods of offenses. It expressly states that
prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase “shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information” in
Article 91 has been settled in People v. Olarte, where the
Court settled divergent views as to the effect of filing a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of
preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of the
offense. The court therein held that the filing of the complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period
of prescription of criminal responsibility.
of the complaint with the fiscal’s office also suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a crime. It held that like
the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary
investigation, a proceeding in the fiscal’s office, may terminate
without conviction of acquittal.
There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in
Olarte and Francisco as Brillante erroneously suggests.
Olarte laid down the doctrine that a complaint filed for
purposes of preliminary investigation tolls the running of the
prescriptive period of a criminal offense. The criminal
complaint for libel in that case was filed, for the purpose of
preliminary investigation, with the justice of the Peace Court
in Pozzorubio, Pangasinan. Hence, in setting the doctrine, the
Court referred to the “filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court.” The question of whether the doctrine laid down in
Olarte also applies to criminal complaints filed with the
prosecutor’s office was settled in Francisco. Specifically, the
Court in Francisco amplified the Olarte doctrine when it
categorically ruled that the filing of a complaint with the fiscal’s
office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.
Thus, the CA was correct in ruling that the offense of libel had
not yet prescribed when the informations against Brillante and
his co-accused where filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-
Makati.
PEOPLE vs. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA
PRINCIPLE
It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint
with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive
period
FACTS
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and
his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private
complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical
injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica
Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8,
1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein
respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be
found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only
on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on
the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-
day period of prescription from the date of the commission of
the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The
MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.The RTC
denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the
MeTC.
The CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the
60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended
party filed a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August 16,
1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had
prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the
MeTC.
ISSUE
Whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper
criminal information against respondent was approved by the
City Prosecutor.
HELD
NO. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period
of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
The Court does not agree with the CA and respondent that
upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation for the filing of an information against
respondent, the period of prescription began to run again.
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon
the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with
the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time
the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until
such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by
the proper court.
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED vs. LIM
DOCTRINE
In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The
Factual Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary Investigations Will
Not Be Disturbed
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a
wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not interfere
with the results of such proceedings. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is appropriate only when the
prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.
FACTS
Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese corporation, is the
copyright owner of various animated characters sold locally by
its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated, which allowed
local entities to manufacture petitioner’s products. On May 30,
2000, a search warrant was issued against respondent Lim
alleged to be selling imitations of petitioner’s products. As a
result thereof, various Sanrio Products were seized.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on April 4, 2002 for
copyright infringement with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual
Property Piracy (TAPP) of the DOJ. TAPP, however, found
that the items in the possession of herein respondent are not
infringing copies of herein petitioner’s products. Thus, the
complaint was dismissed.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an appeal in the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor (OCSP) of the DOJ. It was however
dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Upon appeal with the CA, it affirmed the ruling of the OCSP
and further held that the offense had already prescribed.
According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court
within two years after the commission of the alleged violation,
the offense had already prescribed. The same court further
ruled that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Petition for Review .26 To be criminally liable
for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following
requisites must be present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of
the genuine article.
The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent knew that the merchandise he sold was
counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show
that he obtained these goods from legitimate sources.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the action had prescribed
(2) Whether or not there is copyright infringement
HELD
(1) NO, the action had not yet prescribed
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for
violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was
committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April
4, 2002 or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI
searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio
merchandise therefrom. Although no information was
immediately filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had
not yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,31 we
affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription
of criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the prescriptive period for
the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled
by petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the
TAPP.
(2) NO, there is no copyright infringement
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable
cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.34Because a public prosecutor is
the one conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines
the existence of probable cause.35Consequently, the
decision to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a
complaint depends on his sound discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not interfere
with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone
determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information
against the respondent.37 By way of exception, however,
judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.38 Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate
only when the prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.39
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no
probable cause existed against respondent for violation of the
IPC. They were in the best position to determine whether or
not there was probable cause. We find that they arrived at
their findings after carefully evaluating the respective
evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their conclusion was
not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office over
Informations for offenses to have been committed in the City.
HELD
Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275 provide:
SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals' Staffing.
-- There shall be in each province and each subprovince; one
provincial fiscal and such number of assistant provincial
fiscals as may hereinafter be provided for.
There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number
of assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.
xxx
SEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and
Functions. - The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:
a) Xxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all
charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal
laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and
have the necessary information or complaint prepared or
made against the persons accused. xxx

The Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:[14]

MIAQUE vs. PATAG
[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge
FACTS of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations
of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC)
This is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the orders
and in the Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.
discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions
Five Informations for libel were filed in the RTC of Iloilo City, enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
These Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction over
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of
the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and
allege either that private respondent actually held office in
have the necessary informations or complaints prepared
Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offenses or that
against the persons accused. city, and shall discharge all the
the alleged libelous remarks were printed or first published in
duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law
Iloilo City.
upon provincial fiscals.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of
recommending the filing of new amended Informations for libel
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and
against petitioner and his co-accused. Accordingly, five new
have the necessary informations or complaints prepared
Informations for libel were filed against petitioner and his co-
against the persons accused. Xxx
accused in the RTC of Iloilo City, presided by respondent
Judge Patag. The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly
lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor's Office. The Iloilo
Petitioner filed his motions not to issue warrants of arrest and,
Provincial Prosecutor's Office was clearly bereft of authority to
if already issued, to recall them and remand the Informations
file the new Informations against petitioner. An Information,
to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for preliminary
when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting
investigation.
officer, cannot be filed by another
Respondent judge denied petitioner's motions on the ground
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders
that petitioner was beyond the court's jurisdiction as he was
of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated
not under the custody of the court. Petitioner's motion for
August 25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 are hereby
reconsideration was denied.
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the to 05-61411 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the
quashed Informations were merely amended, A new filing of new Informations by an authorized officer. The
preliminary investigation was therefore unnecessary. On the warrants of arrest issued are likewise QUASHED.
warrant of arrest, the OSG alleges that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8,
2005 motions. The filing of the motions supposedly was
tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court
 NELSON CHUA vs. PADILLO
FACTS
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the
owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money
lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-
Chua, served as the firm’s manager. Marissa is married to
Wilson Chua. One of Marissa’s functions was to evaluate and
recommend loan applications for approval by respondents.
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It
was found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some
of the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended
for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks
were spurious. Marissa’s modus operandi was to alter the
name of the payee appearing on the check by adding another
name as an alternative payee. The cash amounts received
were turned over to Marissa or her husband for deposit on
their personal account. The total amount embezzled reached
₱7 million. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners
with the NBI. NBI, then, forwarded their complaints to the
Office of the City Prosecutor for preliminary Investigation.
After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor filed and
information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson and Renita.
Believing that a more serious offense should have been
charged against petitioners, respondents interposed an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice
modified the resolution of the City Prosecutor. SOJ directed to
file the information of complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. The SOJ also found
that the participation of Wilson Chua was not clearly
established by the evidence and as to Renita Chua, the SOJ
found no proof of conspiracy. Respondents then filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding
that there was no conspiracy among the petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration.
The motion was granted by the CA. The Court of Appeals, on
motion for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
resolving that only Marissa should be charged.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the
Information Wilson and Renita.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals eered in ruling that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
resolving that only Marissa should be charged.
HELD
Yes.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, partly provides that "All criminal actions either
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor."
We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s
exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject
to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control
and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the
Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public
prosecutor’s decision may even be reversed or modified by
the Office of the President.9
Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the
ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.10
The Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable
cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of Appeals
identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa’s consistent practice
of depositing checks with altered names of payees to the
respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2)
considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it
can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other;
and (3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful activities of
Marissa.
COBBARUBIAS vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
 Petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was
charged with:
Frustrated Homicide (Criminal
Case No. 94-5036),
Homicide (Criminal Case No.
94-5038),
Violation of Section 261(Q) of
the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No.
24-392),
and Illegal Possession of
Firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case
No. 94-5037).
 Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the
charges and trial followed.
 Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court dismissed the charges of frustrated
homicide and Illegal possession of
firearms because the prosecutor failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
 Criminal cases of homicide and violation
of sec. 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code was set for trial.
 Petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion
for Correction of Clerical Error,4 alleging
that in the dispositive portion of the Order,
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide)
should have been dismissed instead of
Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms), which should
have been the case set for further trial.
 Petitioner maintained that there was a
typographical error in the dispositive
portion considering that in the body of the
Order, the trial court ruled that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in
 the charges for Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide.
 Respondent Acting Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda5 denied the motion, holding that
the alleged error was substantial in nature
which affected the very merit of the case.
 Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals to
set aside the orders of respondent Judge
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for failure to submit with the
petition a clear duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the assailed Order
and for failure of petitioner’s counsel to
indicate his current official receipt
number and date of payment of the
current Integrated Bar of the
Philippines membership dues, pursuant
to SC Bar Matter No. 287.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
which the CA granted. Petitioner was
directed to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent, but failed to do
so, which resulted to the dismissal of his
petition once more.
ISSUES
 Whether or not the dismissal of
Cobarrubias’ petition on grounds of
technicality, despite subsequent
compliance, was valid;
 Whether or not the clerical error in the
dispositive portion of decision by judge
respondent was substantial in nature
HELD
1. No. Although petitioner’s failure to implead the
Republic of the Philippines may fall under Sec. 8, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which provided that manifest delay is a
ground for dismissal, Sec. 6 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
also provided that rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective in securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
In this case, the Court finds the petitioner’s failure to
implead the People of the Philippines as respondent not so
grave as to warrant dismissal of the petition. After all,
petitioner rectified his error by moving for reconsideration and
filing an Amended Petition, impleading the People of the
Philippines as respondent. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
should have granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
and given due course to the petition in view of petitioner’s
subsequent compliance by filing an Amended Petition,
impleading the People of the Philippines as respondent.
Technicalities may be set aside when the strict and rigid
application of the rules will frustrate rather than promote
justice
2. No. The trial court inadvertently designated the
wrong criminal case numbers when they were cited in the
decision. In the dispositive portion, the trial court erroneously
dismissed Criminal Case No. 94-5037 which refers to the
charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential
Decree No. 1866, while Criminal Case No. 94-5038 which
refers to the charge for Homicide was set for further trial.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict
between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of the
decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo
is the final order and becomes the subject of execution, while
the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or
conclusions of the court ordering nothing.
However, where one can clearly and
unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that
there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the
decision will prevail, as is in this case. The body discussed
the prosecution’s failure to prove accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide. Hence, it is only just and proper to correct the
dispositive portion to reflect the exact findings of the lower
court
GO vs. LOOYUKO
FACTS
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Respondent Alberto T. Looyuko
were business associates. Respondent Looyuko is the
registered owner of Noah’s Ark Merchandising, a sole
proprietorship, which includes other field of businesses that
are collectively known as the Noah’s Ark Group of Companies.
Petitioner Go was the business manager or chief operating
officer of the group of companies.
Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out
that spawned numerous civil law suits. Among these actions
are Civil Case No. 67921 – an action for specific performance,
accounting, inventory of assets and damages and Criminal
Case No. 98-1643 – a case for estafa.
However, the criminal case has been dismissed by reason of
the death of the respondent Looyuko without prejudice to the
filing of a separate civil action. The Court of Appeals explained
that the petition was initiated solely by the petitioner and was
dismissible for it did not implead nor have the participation of
the Office of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE
Whether or not the case reflects conformity of the trial
prosecutor assigned to said criminal case.
HELD
No. It can be observed from the two petitions that they do not
reflect the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned to the
said criminal case. This is in breach of Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court which states that:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial
Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor
assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended
party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This
authority ceases upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or
upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
Although in rare occasions, the offended party as a “person
aggrieved” was allowed to file a petition under Rule 65 before
the CA without the intervention of the Solicitor General, the
instant petitions before the CA, as a general rule, should be
filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State and not
solely by the offended party. For it must observed that for non-
compliance with the rules, the twin petitions could have been
rejected outright.
However, in view of the death of the respondent Looyuko,
these procedural matters are now mooted and rendered
insignificant.
PEOPLE vs. DUCA
FACTS
Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were
charged of the crime of Falsification of Official Document.
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’.
MCTC finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification. RTC affirmed.
CA, via petition for review, ruled that “However, the
prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly
authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the
contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca
was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax
declaration on the house erected on the land registered under
their mother’s name.
ISSUE
WON prosecution was denied due process when the CA
resolved the respondent’s appeal without notifying the People
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the
pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor
General to file his comment.
HELD
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested
in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor
General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of
the Philippines and as such, should have been given the
opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records
show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file
his Comment on Duca’s petition.
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent
without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his
comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State
of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition
filed before the CA.
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the
filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.
FIRAZA vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI
Caraga and was issued a firearm and a mission to gather and
report to the NBI such information as may be relevant to
investigations undertaken by it. In his private capacity, he is a
manager for RF Communications. On August 11, 2000, he
met with Rivas at his restaurant for a business matter. A
heated exchange ensued. Firaza pointed a gun at Rivas.
The information however contained a description to the Crime:
Expired license or permit to carry outside residence renewed
from the government authority concerned. The lower court
however convicted him of Unauthorized Carrying of Licensed
Firearm outside Residence.
Firaza appealed the case contending that the lower court
convicted of an offense different from that charged in the
complaint.
ISSUE
Whether the information/complaint was sufficient?
HELD
The allegations in a Complaint or Information determine what
offense is charged. The alleged acts or omissions complained
of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the
statute determining the offense, but in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment
Petitioner cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated. For the transcript of stenographic notes of
the proceedings before the trial court shows that the, through
his counsel, was duly informed of the nature of the case
against him.
The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry
firearms “In connection with confidential(illegible) cases
assigned to him.” Admittedly, petitioner was at Rivas’
restaurant in connection with a private business transaction.
Additionally, the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to
carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.
MALTO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS
That on or about and sometime during the month of November
1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce
and/or seduce his student at Assumption College,
complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him
as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother lodged
a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City.
Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an
Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient
to sustain petitioner’s conviction and rendered a decision
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and
sentenced him to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even
if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but
by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and
thereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE
WHETHER the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction
on the grounds that there was no rape committed since their
sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their
“sweetheart” relationship.
RULING
NO. The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
The designation of the offense in the information against
petitioner was changed from "violation of Section 5(b), Article
III" of RA 7610 to "violation of Section 5(a), Article III" thereof.
The information against petitioner did not allege anything
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It did not aver
that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that
petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was
induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor
to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and
AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a
charge for violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of
Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The designation in the information of the specific statute
violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
However, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an
erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. What controls is not the title of
the information or the designation of the offense but the actual
facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital
of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being
charged in the information.
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner
correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b),
Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts
followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could
be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in
the information and duly proven during trial.
PEOPLE vs ARMANDO RODAS and JOSE RODAS, SR.
FACTS
• For the death of one Titing Asenda, accused-
appellant Jose Rodas, Sr., together with his sons Charlito,
Armando, and Jose Jr., all surnamed Rodas, were charged
with murder.
• When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.
• By agreement of the parties, pre-trial conference was
terminated on 6 December 1996. Thereafter, trial on the
merits commenced.
• The prosecution presented five witnesses.
• Before the prosecution could rest its case, accused
Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr. withdrew their previous
pleas of "NOT GUILTY" and entered their respective pleas of
"GUILTY" for the lesser crime of Homicide. Both were
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty (17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years and were each ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim).
• On 9 July 1998, the trial court promulgated its
decision finding accused-appellants Armando Rodas and
Jose Rodas, Sr. guilty of the crime of Murder.
• In finding accused-appellants guilty, the trial court
gave credence to the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alberto
Asonda and Ernie Anggot. It found accused-appellants and
the other two accused conspired in the killing of the victim and
that treachery attended the same. It gave no weight to
accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial arguing that
they were positively identified as the perpetrators and that
they failed to adduce evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to be present at the crime scene when the
killing happened. It added that their unsubstantiated denial will
not be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
• Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision
ISSUE
• WON they are guilty of homicide and not murder
HELD
• We find no reason to reverse the findings of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We affirm
appellants’ conviction.
• In this case appellants argue that assuming
arguendo they are guilty, they are liable only for the crime of
homicide, not murder. They contend that treachery was
absent since they, together with Charlito and Jose Jr., met the
victim casually in the dance hall.
• In People v. Aquino, we have held that even after the
recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive
words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify
an offense.
• Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information
shall "state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances." Section
8 merely requires the Information to specify the
circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the
words "qualifying" or "qualified by" to refer to the
circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not
the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a
crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an
attendant circumstance which adds the essential element
raising the crime to a higher category.
• Hence, appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas,
Sr. are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery.
 PO3 SOMBILON vs. PEOPLE
PEOPLE vs. CHING
PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ
FACTS
Appellant Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco was charged with three
counts of Rape committed sometime in June 1997 (AAA then
12 years old), in January to December 1998 (AAA then 13
years old) and in April 1999 (AAA then 14 years old) against
his own daughter.
AAA testified that on several occasions in the above-
mentioned dates, her father raped her in their house while
her mother was at work. She did not tell her mother because
she was afraid of appellant. After the rape incident
sometime in April 1999, she told a cousin what happened
and the latter brought her to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where her complaint-affidavit was
executed.
The NBI’s medical examination revealed that AAA’s hymen
had an old-healed laceration at the four o’clock position and
that the hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed
that he was often away from home and usually returned only
four days after because he was hooked on gambling and
drugs. He would usually return home in the morning after his
wife had gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA would
already be in school. He admitted being in a rehabilitation
center for sometime, but continued to take drugs upon his
release. He also admitted that he would beat and threaten
his wife if she did not give him money for drugs.
When found guilty by the lower court of the crime of rape in
charged under two criminal cases, appellant contends that
he should have been acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 7197-
99 and 7199-99. He avers that the informations are not
explicit and certain as to the dates of the rape. He argues
that such uncertainties run afoul of the constitutionally
protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that the two criminal informations filed against
appellant are sufficient to inform appellant of the accusations
against him. The OSG contends that Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court merely requires that the information state
"the approximate time of the commission of the offense."
Further, Section 11 of the same rule provides that the
precise date of the commission of the offense needs to be
alleged in the information only when "it is a material
ingredient of the offense."
ISSUE
Whether or not the precise dates of the commission of the
rape be alleged in the information.
HELD
No, the precise dates of the commission of the rape need not
be alleged in the information.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
elements of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a
crime is not an essential element of the crime charged. Thus,
in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to
be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of
its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not
essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate
precision.
The allegation in the informations that the appellant
committed the rape "sometime in June 1997" and "sometime
in April 1999" was sufficient to inform appellant that he was
being charged of qualified rape committed against his
daughter. The allegation adequately afforded appellant an
opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus, appellant cannot
complain that he was deprived of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
At any rate, it is now too late for appellant to question the
sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding the dates of
the commission of the offense. Appellant could have filed a
motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a
motion to quash on the ground that the informations alleged
erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea. However, he did
not. Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case,
appellant has waived his right to object to the informations on
the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.
Also, the Supreme Court is not persuaded by apellants’s
allegation that AAA filed the rape cases to have him
imprisoned because of his failure to fulfill his paternal
obligations. When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to constitute the commission of the crime that has
been inflicted on her. This doctrine applies with more vigor
when the culprit is a close relative of the victim, and her
father at that. Besides, no woman, least of all a minor, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if
she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to
seek justice for the wrong done to her.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals finding appellant Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death meted out on the appellant is
reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, for each count of rape,
without eligibility for parole as provided under Rep. Act No.
9346; and
(2) the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages against appellant are set at P75,000,
P75,000, and P25,000, respectively, for each count of rape,
or a total of P150,000 as civil indemnity, another P150,000
as moral damages, and P50,000 as exemplary damages, for
the two counts of rape, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. JALBUENA
FACTS
Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa was charged and convicted with
rape of his daughter, AAA, who is a minor. On appeal,
Jalbuena contends that the testimony of his daughter was
inconsistent. He also questions as fatally defective the
information for failure to allege the date and time of the
commission of the offense charged, thus violating his
constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him and depriving him of
the opportunity to prepare for his defense.
Appellant questions as fatally defective the information for
failure to allege the date and time of the commission of the
offense charged, thus violating his constitutionally protected
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and depriving him of the opportunity to prepare for
his defense.
ISSUE
Whether his argument is tenable
HELD
No.
Prior to its substantial incorporation in the Revised Rules of
Court in 2000, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
reads:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
time at which the offense was committed except when the time
is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which offense was committed as the information
or complaint will permit.
In rape, the gravamen of the offense, being the carnal
knowledge of a woman, the date is not an essential element,
hence, the specification of the exact date or time of its
commission is not important.
In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that
the information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve
years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of
her.
If accused-appellant found the information defective as it
bears only the month and year of the incident complained of,
he should have filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, as
provided for under Rule 116,before he entered a plea. His
failure to do so amounted to a waiver of the defect or detail
desired in the information.
Indeed, in the case at bar, the criminal complaint states that
the rape was committed "on or about the month of August
1996." Such an allegation in the criminal complaint as to the
time of the offense was committed is sufficient compliance
with the provisions of Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Besides, if the appellant was of
the belief that the criminal complaint was defective, he should
have filed a motion for a bill of particulars with the trial court
before his arraignment. The appellant failed to do so. It was
only when the case was brought to this Court on automatic
review that he raised the question of the supposed
insufficiency of the criminal complaint, which is now too late
by any reckoning.
At all events, accused-appellant participated in the trial and
never objected to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution that the rape was committed "on or about the
month of August 1996."
Appellant likewise never objected to the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution to prove that the offenses were
committed "on or about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and
subsequent thereto." He cannot now pretend that he was
unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the
allegation in the Information as to when the crimes were
committed, as it was shown to the contrary that he participated
in the trial and was even able to give an alibi in his defense.
PEOPLE vs. RAFON
Rule 110 Sec. 11: Date of the commission of the offense
FACTS
Lamberto Rafon was found guilty of raping his minor
daughter and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
Rafon challenges the two Informations filed against him for
being ambiguous as they did not specify the date or at the
very least the month as to when the rape incidents allegedly
took place. This, so he stresses, is a denial of due process
as no less than the Constitution guarantees that the accused
must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The allegations that he committed two counts
of rape, one in 1994 and another in 1998, deprived him of
the chance to interpose the defense of alibi, he concludes.
ISSUE
Were the informations filed against Rafon sufficient?
HELD
Yes. It is unnecessary to state in the information the
precise date that the offense was committed, except
when it is an essential element of the offense. The date
of commission is not an element of the offense of rape.
The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the circumstances provided by law. When the
time given in the complaint is not of the essence of the
offense, it need not be proven as alleged and x x x the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations and before the commencement of the
action.” In said case, Rafon was charged with raping his
stepdaughter several times before and until 15 October 1994
but was convicted of his dastardly acts committed in 1993.
The Court therein held that the victim’s Sworn Statement
which categorically stated that she had been raped by the
accused in 1993 when she was in grade three substantially
cured the vagueness in the information and considered
accused to have been sufficiently informed thereby. Thus, a
statement of the year of the commission of the offense, as in
the instant case, would suffice. Furthermore, it is too late in
the day for Rafon to raise this issue. He should have made
his objection before he was arraigned. Sec. 9, Rule 117
provides, to wit: “The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in par (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of Sec. 3 of this Rule.” Rafon cannot be said to have been
deprived of his right to be informed. He did not timely object
to the alleged defects in the Informations and he actively
participated in the trial, defending himself and confronting the
witnesses against him. Hence, there was no denial of due
process.
 RICARZE vs CA

FACTS
Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City
Service Corporation. He was assigned to collect checks
payable to Caltex. He then opened a bank account in the
name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular customer of caltex. He did
so by forging the signatures of the dorsal portions of the stolen
check and deposited it in that same bank account. Upon
knowledge of his crimes, he was charged by the officers of
Caltex with estafa through falsification of commercial
documents.

In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex

appeared to be the only offended party because the
prosecutor was not informed that PCI Bank credited certain
amount to Caltex.

After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank

appeared as the complainant. Then, Ricarze averred that the
information can no longer be amended because he had
already been arraigned under the original information, and
that doing so would place him in double jeopardy.

PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to

Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had
been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant.

ISSUE

Whether or not an information can be amended even after the

accused had been arraigned and had entered his plea.

HELD

Yes, because the amendment in the name of the

complainant is one of form. Before the accused enters his
plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the
entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but
with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the

amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.

In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as

private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The
documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks
remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.