BRILLANTE vs.
CA and People the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
FACTS: This case was about Jejomar Binay who filed a libel case
against Roberto Brillante for circulating an open letter which described
in detail the plot to assassinate Augusto Syjuco, another mayoralty
candidate in Makati City.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of
Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports
Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the
press conference, Brillante accused Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente
(Prudente), then President of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused
Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati
electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an
open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges
against Binay.
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news
articles about the same. The open letter was subsequently published
under the title "Plea to Cory--Save Makati" in newspapers.
Brillante was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4) counts,
as author or writer, of LIBEL by the RTC. Brillante appealed to the CA
contending that informations were filed by the prosecutor on January
16, 1989, the offense had already prescribed because more than one
year had elapsed since the publication of the open letter on January
10, 11 and 12, 1988.
The appellate court held that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed
because the one-year prescription period should be reckoned from
the time that the private complainant Prudente filed his complaint with
the fiscal’s office on January 15, 1988 and not when the Informations
were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of
Appeals added that under Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect
during the pendency of the cases against Brillante, the institution of
the complaint before the fiscal’s office or the courts for preliminary
investigation interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense charged.
It held that being a procedural rule, Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the
cases against Brillante.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office
interrupted the period of prescription of criminal responsibility
HELD: Yes.
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the "crime of libel
or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." In determining
when the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference
must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the rule
on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses. It expressly
states that prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase “shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information” in Article 91
has been settled in People v. Olarte, where the Court settled divergent
views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
for purposes of preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of
the offense. The court therein held that the filing of the complaint for
purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of
prescription of criminal responsibility.
Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. CA clarified that the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal’s office also suspends the running of the
prescriptive period of a crime. It held that like the proceedings in the
court conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the
fiscal’s office, may terminate without conviction of acquittal.
There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in Olarte and
Francisco as Brillante erroneously suggests. Olarte laid down the
doctrine that a complaint filed for purposes of preliminary investigation
tolls the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. The
criminal complaint for libel in that case was filed, for the purpose of
preliminary investigation, with the justice of the Peace Court in
Pozzorubio, Pangasinan. Hence, in setting the doctrine, the Court
referred to the “filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court.” The
question of whether the doctrine laid down in Olarte also applies to
criminal complaints filed with the prosecutor’s office was settled in
Francisco. Specifically, the Court in Francisco amplified the Olarte
doctrine when it categorically ruled that the filing of a complaint with
criminal offense.
Thus, the CA was correct in ruling that the offense of libel had not yet
prescribed when the informations against Brillante and his co-
accused where filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.
PEOPLE vs. CLEMENTE BAUTISTA
PRINCIPLE:
It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with
the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period
FACTS:
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-
accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant
Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against
herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the
preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a
Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of
an Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City
Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot
be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June
20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the
ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of
prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on
June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense
had not yet prescribed.The RTC denied said petition and concurred
with the opinion of the MeTC.
The CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the 60-day
prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a
Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless,
the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the
Information was filed with the MeTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal
information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.
HELD:
NO. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago.
The Court does not agree with the CA and respondent that upon
approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the
filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription
began to run again.
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the
City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The
prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent
is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
 SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED vs. LIM
Doctrine: In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The Factual
Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary Investigations Will Not Be
Disturbed
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of
discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. For this
reason, courts generally do not interfere with the results of such
proceedings. By way of exception, however, judicial review is
appropriate only when the prosecutor has exercised his discretion in
an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.
Facts:
Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese corporation, is the copyright
owner of various animated characters sold locally by its exclusive
distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated, which allowed local entities to
manufacture petitioner’s products. On May 30, 2000, a search warrant
was issued against respondent Lim alleged to be selling imitations of
petitioner’s products. As a result thereof, various Sanrio Products
were seized.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on April 4, 2002 for copyright
infringement with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy
(TAPP) of the DOJ. TAPP, however, found that the items in the
possession of herein respondent are not infringing copies of herein
petitioner’s products. Thus, the complaint was dismissed.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an appeal in the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor (OCSP) of the DOJ. It was however dismissed for lack of
reversible error.
Upon appeal with the CA, it affirmed the ruling of the OCSP and
further held that the offense had already prescribed. According to the
CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the
commission of the alleged violation, the offense had already
prescribed. The same court further ruled that the DOJ did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition for Review .26 To
be criminally liable for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the
following requisites must be present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the
genuine article.
The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent knew that the merchandise he sold was counterfeit.
Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show that he obtained
these goods from legitimate sources.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the action had prescribed
(2) Whether or not there is copyright infringement
Ruling:
(1) NO, the action had not yet prescribed
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation
of special laws starts on the day such offense was committed and is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e.,
the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002
or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI searched
respondent's premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom.
Although no information was immediately filed in court, respondent's
alleged violation had not yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,31 we affirmed that
the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility.32 Thus,
the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of
the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit
before the TAPP.
(2) NO, there is no copyright infringement
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause that
the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable cause is defined as such
facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.34Because a public prosecutor is
the one conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the
existence of probable cause.35Consequently, the decision to file a
criminal information in court or to dismiss a complaint depends on his
sound discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of
discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. For this
reason, courts generally do not interfere with the results of such
proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of
evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a
criminal information against the respondent.37 By way of exception,
however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.38 Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when
the prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.39
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable
cause existed against respondent for violation of the IPC. They were
in the best position to determine whether or not there was probable
cause. We find that they arrived at their findings after carefully
evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their
conclusion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
MIAQUE vs. PATAG
Facts
This is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City.
Five Informations for libel were filed in the RTC of Iloilo City, These
Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction over the offenses
charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to allege either that
private respondent actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offenses or that the alleged libelous remarks were
printed or first published in Iloilo City.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution recommending
the filing of new amended Informations for libel against petitioner and
his co-accused. Accordingly, five new Informations for libel were filed
against petitioner and his co-accused in the RTC of Iloilo City,
presided by respondent Judge Patag.
Petitioner filed his motions not to issue warrants of arrest and, if
already issued, to recall them and remand the Informations to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office for preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge denied petitioner's motions on the ground that
petitioner was beyond the court's jurisdiction as he was not under the
custody of the court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the quashed
Informations were merely amended, A new preliminary investigation
was therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of arrest, the OSG alleges
that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner in view of the
filing of his August 8, 2005 motions. The filing of the motions
supposedly was tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction
of the court
Issue:
Authority of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office over Informations for
offenses to have been committed in the City.
Ruling:
Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275 provide:
SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals' Staffing. --
There shall be in each province and each subprovince; one provincial
fiscal and such number of assistant provincial fiscals as may
hereinafter be provided for.
There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number of
assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.
xxx
SEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and Functions. -
The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:
a) Xxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against the persons
accused. xxx
The Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:[14]
[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city
ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and in the
Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in
respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial
fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary
informations or complaints prepared against the persons accused.
city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal
prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have the necessary
informations or complaints prepared against the persons accused.
Xxx
The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly lodged
with the Iloilo City Prosecutor's Office. The Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutor's Office was clearly bereft of authority to file the new
Informations against petitioner. An Information, when required by law
to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August 25, 2005
and September 19, 2005 are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of new Informations by an
authorized officer. The warrants of arrest issued are likewise
QUASHED.
NELSON CHUA vs. PADILLO
COBARRUBIAS vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
• Petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was charged with:
Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5036),
Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038),
Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392),
and Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866 (Criminal Case No. 94-5037).
• Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges and trial
followed.
• Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
charges of frustrated homicide and Illegal possession of firearms
because the prosecutor failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
• Criminal cases of homicide and violation of sec. 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code was set for trial.
• Petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion for Correction of
Clerical Error,4 alleging that in the dispositive portion of the Order,
Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide) should have been dismissed
instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms), which should have been the case set for further trial.
• Petitioner maintained that there was a typographical error
in the dispositive portion considering that in the body of the Order, the
trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide.
• Respondent Acting Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda5 denied
the motion, holding that the alleged error was substantial in nature
which affected the very merit of the case.
• Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals to set aside the
orders of respondent Judge
• The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to
submit with the petition a clear duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed Order and for failure of petitioner’s counsel to
indicate his current official receipt number and date of payment of the
current Integrated Bar of the Philippines membership dues, pursuant
to SC Bar Matter No. 287.
• Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA
granted. Petitioner was directed to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent, but failed to do so, which resulted to the
dismissal of his petition once more.
Issues:
• Whether or not the dismissal of Cobarrubias’ petition on
grounds of technicality, despite subsequent compliance, was valid;
• Whether or not the clerical error in the dispositive portion of
decision by judge respondent was substantial in nature
Held:
1. No. Although petitioner’s failure to implead the Republic
of the Philippines may fall under Sec. 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which provided that manifest delay is a ground for dismissal, Sec. 6
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court also provided that rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective in securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
In this case, the Court finds the petitioner’s failure to implead the
People of the Philippines as respondent not so grave as to warrant
dismissal of the petition. After all, petitioner rectified his error by
moving for reconsideration and filing an Amended Petition,
impleading the People of the Philippines as respondent. Furthermore,
the Court of Appeals should have granted petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and given due course to the petition in view of
petitioner’s subsequent compliance by filing an Amended Petition,
impleading the People of the Philippines as respondent.
Technicalities may be set aside when the strict and rigid application
of the rules will frustrate rather than promote justice
2. No. The trial court inadvertently designated the wrong criminal case
numbers when they were cited in the decision. In the dispositive
portion, the trial court erroneously dismissed Criminal Case No. 94-
5037 which refers to the charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms
under Presidential Decree No. 1866, while Criminal Case No. 94-5038
which refers to the charge for Homicide was set for further trial.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or
the dispositive part, and the body of the decision or order, the fallo
prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order and becomes the
subject of execution, while the body of the decision merely contains
the reasons or conclusions of the court ordering nothing.
However, where one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from
the body of the decision that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail, as is in this case. The
body discussed the prosecution’s failure to prove accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide. Hence, it is only just and proper to correct the dispositive
portion to reflect the exact findings of the lower court
GO vs. LOOYUKO
Facts:
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Respondent Alberto T. Looyuko were
business associates. Respondent Looyuko is the registered owner of
Noah’s Ark Merchandising, a sole proprietorship, which includes other
field of businesses that are collectively known as the Noah’s Ark
Group of Companies. Petitioner Go was the business manager or
chief operating officer of the group of companies.
Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out that
spawned numerous civil law suits. Among these actions are Civil
Case No. 67921 – an action for specific performance, accounting,
inventory of assets and damages and Criminal Case No. 98-1643 – a
case for estafa.
However, the criminal case has been dismissed by reason of the
death of the respondent Looyuko without prejudice to the filing of a
separate civil action. The Court of Appeals explained that the petition
was initiated solely by the petitioner and was dismissible for it did not
implead nor have the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General.
Issue:
Whether or not the case reflects conformity of the trial prosecutor
assigned to said criminal case.
Held:
No. It can be observed from the two petitions that they do not reflect
the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned to the said criminal
case. This is in breach of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
which states that:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal
actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available,
the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with
the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This
authority ceases upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon
elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
Although in rare occasions, the offended party as a “person
aggrieved” was allowed to file a petition under Rule 65 before the CA
without the intervention of the Solicitor General, the instant petitions
before the CA, as a general rule, should be filed by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the State and not solely by the offended party.
For it must observed that for non-compliance with the rules, the twin
petitions could have been rejected outright.
However, in view of the death of the respondent Looyuko, these
procedural matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.
PEOPLE vs. DUCA
FIRAZA vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI Caraga and
was issued a firearm and a mission to gather and report to the NBI
such information as may be relevant to investigations undertaken by
it. In his private capacity, he is a manager for RF Communications.
On August 11, 2000, he met with Rivas at his restaurant for a business
matter. A heated exchange ensued. Firaza pointed a gun at Rivas.
The information however contained a description to the Crime:
Expired license or permit to carry outside residence renewed from the
government authority concerned. The lower court however convicted
him of Unauthorized Carrying of Licensed Firearm outside Residence.
Firaza appealed the case contending that the lower court convicted of
an offense different from that charged in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the information/complaint was sufficient?
RULING:
The allegations in a Complaint or Information determine what offense
is charged. The alleged acts or omissions complained of constituting
the offense need not be in the terms of the statute determining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment
Petitioner cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated. For the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings
before the trial court shows that the, through his counsel, was duly
informed of the nature of the case against him.
The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry
firearms “In connection with confidential(illegible) cases assigned to
him.” Admittedly, petitioner was at Rivas’ restaurant in connection with
a private business transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not
authorize petitioner to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his
residence.
MALTO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997
up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, Michael John. Z.
Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral
ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption
College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him
as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant
City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an Information a violation of
Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to
sustain petitioner’s conviction and rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III,
Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced him to
reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it
found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by
paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE:
WHETHER the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the
grounds that there was no rape committed since their sexual
intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart”
relationship.
RULING:
NO. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or
omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner
was changed from "violation of Section 5(b), Article III" of RA 7610 to
"violation of Section 5(a), Article III" thereof.
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining
to or connected with child prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was
abused for profit. What it charged was that petitioner had carnal
knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was
her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
and AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge
for violation of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article
III, RA 7610.
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure
to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific
provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged. What controls is not
the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital
of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the
offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner
correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA
7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong
designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense
on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven
during trial.
PEOPLE vs ARMANDO RODAS and JOSE RODAS, SR.
FACTS:
• For the death of one Titing Asenda, accused-appellant Jose
Rodas, Sr., together with his sons Charlito, Armando, and Jose Jr., all
surnamed Rodas, were charged with murder.
• When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
• By agreement of the parties, pre-trial conference was
terminated on 6 December 1996. Thereafter, trial on the merits
commenced.
• The prosecution presented five witnesses.
• Before the prosecution could rest its case, accused Charlito
Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr. withdrew their previous pleas of "NOT
GUILTY" and entered their respective pleas of "GUILTY" for the lesser
crime of Homicide. Both were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and were each
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim).
• On 9 July 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision
finding accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr.
guilty of the crime of Murder.
• In finding accused-appellants guilty, the trial court gave
credence to the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alberto Asonda and
Ernie Anggot. It found accused-appellants and the other two accused
conspired in the killing of the victim and that treachery attended the
same. It gave no weight to accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and
denial arguing that they were positively identified as the perpetrators
and that they failed to adduce evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to be present at the crime scene when the killing
happened. It added that their unsubstantiated denial will not be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters.
• Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision
ISSUE:
• WON they are guilty of homicide and not murder
RULING:
• We find no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We affirm appellants’ conviction.
• In this case appellants argue that assuming arguendo they
are guilty, they are liable only for the crime of homicide, not murder.
They contend that treachery was absent since they, together with
Charlito and Jose Jr., met the victim casually in the dance hall.
• In People v. Aquino, we have held that even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
"qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense.
• Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall
"state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." Section 8 merely requires the
Information to specify the circumstances. Section 8 does not require
the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" to refer to the
circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use
of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher
category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance
which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher
category.
• Hence, appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr.
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, qualified by treachery.
PO3 SOMBILON vs. PEOPLE
PEOPLE vs. CHING
Facts: CA affirmed with modification the RTC conviction of accused-
appellant William Ching from three counts of rape committed against
his minor daughter, AAA who was only 12 years old when the alleged
crime was committed. CA reduced the penalty from death penalty to
reclusion perpetua. The prosecution presented AAA, AAA's mother,
BBB, among others as witnesses. The AAA was the third child in eight
children born to appellant and BBB. Sometime in the year 1996, the
appellant instructed AAA's four other siblings to play outside, while
AAA was cooking inside then Ching instructed AAA to go in his
bedroom and thereafter inserted his penis to the victim's vagina after
removing her shorts and panty. The victim screamed for help but to
no avail as the appellant also threatened the girl of killing her. AAA did
not reported the incident to anybody. For the second time and third
time in 1998, Appellant had carnal knowledge with the girl when her
sibling was asleep. Meantime, Ching was arrested from June 1998 to
February of 2009 for drug pushing. When he was subsequently
released he went to the place where AAA was employed and asked
for money, AAA refused and reported not just the commotion caused
by Ching but the times when she was raped. In the petition for review
before the Supreme Court, the appellant asserted that CA erred in not
considering the information filed against accused-appellant as to the
approximate date of the commission of the alleged rapes.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant constitutional right to be inform
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated?
Held: The contention was devoid of merit. An information is an
accusation in writing, to be valid and sufficient, an information must
state the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts
complained of as constituting an offense and the approximate date
and time of its commission and the place. With respect to the time, It
is expressed in Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure that it is not necessary to state in the information the
precise date of the offense. Especially in rape cases, where failure to
specify the exact dates and times does not ipso facto make the
information defective. As held in People vs. Purazo, date is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense
is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of
commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. The
allegations in the informations which stated that the three incidents of
rape were committed in the year 1996 and in May 1998 are sufficient
to affirm the conviction of appellant in the instant case. The imposition
of death penalty was proper, however due to RA 9346, CA was just
proper in reducing the said penalty. Hence, CA decision AFFIRMED
in toto. No costs.
Side notes:
The first rape incident in 1996 was covered by Article 335 of the Penal
Code amended by RA 7659
The subsequent rape incidents were covered by the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997 which states that death penalty shall be imposed where a
victim is a minor and the offending party is a parent.
PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ
Facts:
Appellant Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco was charged with three counts of
Rape committed sometime in June 1997 (AAA then 12 years old), in
January to December 1998 (AAA then 13 years old) and in April 1999
(AAA then 14 years old) against his own daughter.
AAA testified that on several occasions in the above-mentioned dates,
her father raped her in their house while her mother was at work. She
did not tell her mother because she was afraid of appellant. After the
rape incident sometime in April 1999, she told a cousin what
happened and the latter brought her to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where her complaint-affidavit was executed.
The NBI’s medical examination revealed that AAA’s hymen had an
old-healed laceration at the four o’clock position and that the hymenal
orifice admitted a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that he was
often away from home and usually returned only four days after
because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He would usually
return home in the morning after his wife had gone to work to avoid
quarrels. By then, AAA would already be in school. He admitted being
in a rehabilitation center for sometime, but continued to take drugs
upon his release. He also admitted that he would beat and threaten
his wife if she did not give him money for drugs.
When found guilty by the lower court of the crime of rape in charged
under two criminal cases, appellant contends that he should have
been acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 7197-99 and 7199-99. He
avers that the informations are not explicit and certain as to the dates
of the rape. He argues that such uncertainties run afoul of the
constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits
that the two criminal informations filed against appellant are sufficient
to inform appellant of the accusations against him. The OSG contends
that Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that the
information state "the approximate time of the commission of the
offense." Further, Section 11 of the same rule provides that the
precise date of the commission of the offense needs to be alleged in
the information only when "it is a material ingredient of the offense."
Issue:
Whether or not the precise dates of the commission of the rape be
alleged in the information.
Ruling:
No, the precise dates of the commission of the rape need not be
alleged in the information.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of
the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact
date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the
crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the
time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no
substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential
that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision.
The allegation in the informations that the appellant committed the
rape "sometime in June 1997" and "sometime in April 1999" was
sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of qualified
rape committed against his daughter. The allegation adequately
afforded appellant an opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus,
appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
At any rate, it is now too late for appellant to question the sufficiency
of the criminal informations regarding the dates of the commission of
the offense. Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars
before his arraignment or a motion to quash on the ground that the
informations alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea.
However, he did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case, appellant
has waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of an
error as to the time of the alleged rape.
Also, the Supreme Court is not persuaded by apellants’s allegation
that AAA filed the rape cases to have him imprisoned because of his
failure to fulfill his paternal obligations. When a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to constitute the commission of the crime that has been
inflicted on her. This doctrine applies with more vigor when the culprit
is a close relative of the victim, and her father at that. Besides, no
woman, least of all a minor, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial
or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled
to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals finding appellant Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death meted out on the appellant is reduced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, for each count of rape, without eligibility
for parole as provided under Rep. Act No. 9346; and
(2) the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages against appellant are set at P75,000, P75,000, and
P25,000, respectively, for each count of rape, or a total of P150,000
as civil indemnity, another P150,000 as moral damages, and P50,000
as exemplary damages, for the two counts of rape, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. JALBUENA
FACTS: Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa was charged and convicted with
rape of his daughter, AAA, who is a minor. On appeal, Jalbuena
contends that the testimony of his daughter was inconsistent. He also
questions as fatally defective the information for failure to allege the
date and time of the commission of the offense charged, thus violating
his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him and depriving him of the
opportunity to prepare for his defense.
Appellant questions as fatally defective the information for failure to
allege the date and time of the commission of the offense charged,
thus violating his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him and depriving him of
the opportunity to prepare for his defense.
ISSUE: Whether his argument is tenable
RULING. No.
Prior to its substantial incorporation in the Revised Rules of Court in
2000, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, reads:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not necessary
to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the
offense was committed except when the time is a material ingredient dastardly acts committed in 1993. The Court therein held that the
of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at victim’s Sworn Statement which categorically stated that she had
any time as near to the actual date at which offense was committed been raped by the accused in 1993 when she was in grade three
as the information or complaint will permit. substantially cured the vagueness in the information and considered
accused to have been sufficiently informed thereby. Thus, a
In rape, the gravamen of the offense, being the carnal knowledge of statement of the year of the commission of the offense, as in the
a woman, the date is not an essential element, hence, the instant case, would suffice. Furthermore, it is too late in the day for
specification of the exact date or time of its commission is not Rafon to raise this issue. He should have made his objection before
important. he was arraigned. Sec. 9, Rule 117 provides, to wit: “The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file
information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years of a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her. deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in par (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Sec. 3 of this Rule.”
If accused-appellant found the information defective as it bears only
Rafon cannot be said to have been deprived of his right to be
the month and year of the incident complained of, he should have filed
informed. He did not timely object to the alleged defects in the
a Motion for Bill of Particulars, as provided for under Rule 116,before
Informations and he actively participated in the trial, defending himself
he entered a plea. His failure to do so amounted to a waiver of the
and confronting the witnesses against him. Hence, there was no
defect or detail desired in the information.
denial of due process.
Indeed, in the case at bar, the criminal complaint states that the rape
was committed "on or about the month of August 1996." Such an
allegation in the criminal complaint as to the time of the offense was
committed is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Besides, if the
appellant was of the belief that the criminal complaint was defective,
he should have filed a motion for a bill of particulars with the trial court
before his arraignment. The appellant failed to do so. It was only when
the case was brought to this Court on automatic review that he raised
the question of the supposed insufficiency of the criminal complaint,
which is now too late by any reckoning.

At all events, accused-appellant participated in the trial and never

objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution that the
rape was committed "on or about the month of August 1996."

Appellant likewise never objected to the presentation of evidence by

the prosecution to prove that the offenses were committed "on or
about sometime (sic) 1987, prior and subsequent thereto." He cannot
now pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the
vagueness of the allegation in the Information as to when the crimes
were committed, as it was shown to the contrary that he participated
in the trial and was even able to give an alibi in his defense.

PEOPLE vs. LAMBERTO RAFON

Rule 110 Sec. 11: Date of the commission of the offense

Facts:

Lamberto Rafon was found guilty of raping his minor daughter and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

Rafon challenges the two Informations filed against him for being
ambiguous as they did not specify the date or at the very least the
month as to when the rape incidents allegedly took place. This, so he
stresses, is a denial of due process as no less than the Constitution
guarantees that the accused must be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The allegations that he
committed two counts of rape, one in 1994 and another in 1998,
deprived him of the chance to interpose the defense of alibi, he
concludes.

Issue:

Were the informations filed against Rafon sufficient?

Held:

Yes. It is unnecessary to state in the information the precise date that

the offense was committed, except when it is an essential element of
the offense. The date of commission is not an element of the offense
of rape. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the circumstances provided by law. When the time given in the
complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven
as alleged and x x x the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows
that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.” In
said case, Rafon was charged with raping his stepdaughter several
times before and until 15 October 1994 but was convicted of his