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February 6, 2019 illimitable.

Especially is it so under a modern

democratic framework wherethe demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ et al G.R. No. almostunimaginable proportions; the field and
L-7995 May 31, 1957Ponente: Labrador, J. scope of police power hasbecome almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
FACTS: publicwelfare have become almost all-embracing
Republic Act No. 1180 known as, “An Act to and have transcended humanforesight.
Regulate Retail Business” was passed by the -x x x x x x x-
Congress. The said RA nationalizes the retail
trade business by prohibiting against persons Otherwise stated, as
notcitizens of the Philippines, as well as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
associations, partnerships or corporations the public interest and welfarein this constantly
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens changing and progressive world, so we cannot
of the Philippines, from engaging directly or delimit beforehand the extent orscope of police
indirectly inthe retail trade with the exception of power by which and through which the State
U.S. citizens and juridical entities. Aliens are seeks to attain or achieve interest orwelfare.
required topresent registration to the proper The Constitution do not define the scope or extent
authorities a verified statement concerning their of the police power of the State. The Statesets
businesses. forth the limitations. The most important
limitations are the due process clause and the
Now, petitioner Lao Ichong, was a Chinese equalprotection clause.
businessman in the markets of Pasay City who
seeksto declare the nullification of RA 1180 for it Due process clause – Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
violates the international and treaty obligations of Section 1(1). – No person shall be deprived of life,
the Republic of the Philippines. The said Act is liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law,
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of nor any person be denied the equal protection of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, the laws.
particularly city and municipal treasurers,
fromenforcing its provisions. He contends that RA Equal protection clause – The equal protection of
1180 denies to alien residents the equal the law clauseis against undue favor and
protectionof the laws and deprives of their liberty individual or class privilege, as well as
and property without due process of law. hostilediscrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It does not demandabsolute equality
ISSUES: among residents; it merely requires that all
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180 is a valid personsshall be treated alike,
exercise of police power. under like circumstances and conditions
both as toprivileges conferred and liabilities
HELD/RULING: YES. enforced.
There is no question that the Act was approved in
the exercise of the police power, but -x x x x x x x-
petitionerclaims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional The Court resumed holding that the disputed law
requirements of dueprocess and equal protection was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
of the laws. anddanger to national economy posed by alien
Police Power - It has been said the police power dominance and control of the retail business and
is so far -reaching in scope, and it is almost free citizensand country from dominance and
impossible to limit its sweep. Itderives its control. The enactment clearly falls within the
existence from the very existence of the State scope of the police powerof the State, thru which
itself, and doesnot need to be expressed or defined and by which it protects its own personality and
in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self- insures its security and future.The law does not
protection and survival, and as such it is the violate the equal protection clause of the
mostpositive and active of all governmental Constitution because sufficient grounds existfor
processes, the most essential,insistent and the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of
dueprocess of law clause, because the law is police power or eminent domain
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliensalready engaged in the Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between
occupation and reasonably protects their the police power and the power of eminent
privilege. domain that logically preclude the application of
both powers at the same time on the same subject.
Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such
as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or
Association of Small Landowners in the obscene materials, which should be destroyed in
Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
Agrarian Reform such property is not compensable, unlike the
taking of property under the power of
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines The cases before us present no knotty
Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian complication insofar as the question of
Reform compensable taking is concerned. To the extent
that the measures under challenge merely
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is
common legal, including serious challenges to the an exercise of the police power for the regulation
constitutionality of the several measures such as of private property in accordance with the
P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Constitution. But where, to carry out such
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
No. 6657. owners of whatever lands they may own in excess
G.R. No. 79777 of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and taking under the power of eminent domain for
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of which payment of just compensation is
separation of powers, due process, equal imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
protection and the constitutional limitation that no limitation of the use of the land. What is required
private property shall be taken for public use is the surrender of the title to and the physical
without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310 possession of the said excess and all beneficial
G.R. No. 79310 rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend not of the police power but of the power of
that taking must be simultaneous with payment of eminent domain.
just compensation as it is traditionally understood,
i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment
is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744 FACTS: This case involves an ordinance
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage
are violative of the constitutional provision that or participate in any position or occupation or
no private property shall be taken without due business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
process or just compensation. temporary or casual, without first securing an
G.R. No. 78742 employment permit from the Mayor of Manila
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
so far not issued the implementing rules required enforcement of such ordinance as well as to
under the above-quoted decree. declare the same null and void. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, one class can be treated and regulated differently
hence this case. from the others. Here, persons over 65 are
classified differently from younger employees to
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due promote emergence of younger blood. Persons
process of law and equal protection rule of the similarly situated are similarly treated. It does not
Constitution. forbid all legal classification, what is prohibited is
a classification which is arbitrary and
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
question violates the due process of law and equal violated by a reasonable classification is germane
protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
person before he can be employed to get a permit belonging to the same class.
from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse
it at his will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc
admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the
due process of law. This guarantee includes the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United
under the due process and equal protection clause States and other foreign countries. The company
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently
filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for
being unconstitutional.

DUMLAO v COMELEC Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal

protection clause.
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao is a former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar
certificate of candidacy for said position of produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co.
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
contrary to the equal protection and due process future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
guarantees of the Constitution which provides that should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
“…Any retired elective provincial city or any subsequently established sugar central, of the
municipal official who has received payment of same class as the present company, from the
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
under the law and who shall have been 65 years similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to
of age at the commencement of the term of office the tax because the ordinance expressly points
to which he seeks to be elected shall not be only to the company as the entity to be levied
qualified to run for the same elective local office upon.
from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges
that the provision is directed insidiously against
him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds,
therefore class legislation. Basco v. PAGCOR

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of equal GRN 91649, 14 May 1991)

Held: No violation of equal protection. It is FACTS:

subject to rational classification. If the groupings On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under
are based on reasonable and real differentiations, Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy
of the government, “ to regulate and centralize the municipal secretary certified a disbursement
through an appropriate institution all games of of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
chance authorized by existing franchise or program. However, the Commission on Audit
permitted by law.” This was subsequently proven disapproved said resolution and the disbursement
to be beneficial not just to the government but of funds for the implementation thereof for the
also to the society in general. It is a reliable following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
source of much needed revenue for the cash- connection to alleged public safety, general
strapped Government. welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati;
(2) government funds must be disbursed for
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly protection clause since it will only benefit a few
contrary to morals, public policy and public order, individuals.
among others.
ISSUES: Whether the resolution violates the equal
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because it protection clause
violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru Held:
PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and There is no violation of the equal protection
other vices; and clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment.
HELD: Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and
does not preclude classification of individuals benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
who may be accorded different treatment under farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the
the law, provided it is not unreasonable or urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted
arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
legislature from establishing classes of individuals Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of
or objects upon which different rules shall our government towards social justice. The Burial
operate. Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism,
though not complete. The loss of a member of a
Every law has in its favor the presumption of family is a painful experience, and it is more
constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very
of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the 'those who have less in life, should have more in
presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for law." This decision, however must not be taken as
lack of merit. a precedent, or as an official go-signal for
municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for
Binay v Domingo motives political or otherwise.


Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which FACTS:
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act
families whose gross family income does not Establishing the Philippine National Police Under
exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be a Reorganized Department of the Interior and
taken out of the unappropriated available funds in Local Government", took effect on January 2,
the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila 1991. RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, system for PNP members. Section 39 reads:
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces
"SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty
retirement, for officer and (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire
non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under
case of any officer with the rank of chief the AFP law.
superintendent, director or deputy
director general, the Commission may allow his Respondent judge De Guzman issued a
retention in the service for an restraining order followed by a writ of injunction.
unextendible period of one (1) year. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of
the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent Philippine National police, irrespective of the
notices of retirement to private original status of the present members of the
respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine National police before its creation and
Philippine Constabulary and have establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall
reached the age of fifty-six. become operative after the lapse of the four-year
transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction
Private respondents filed a complaint for issued is made permanent. Moreover, he
declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of observed, among others, that it may have been the
an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction intention of Congress to refer to the local police
before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to
of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of define who or what constituted the INP. The
RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are natural recourse of the court is to trace the source
also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides: of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to
prior laws on the same subject and to investigate
"Any provision hereof to the contrary the antecedents involved.
notwithstanding, and within the transition
period of four (4) years following the effectively ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP
of this Act, the following Law includes all members of the present
members of the INP shall be considered Philippine National police, irrespective of the
compulsorily retired: original status of its present members and that
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to
the first year of the effectivity petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year
of this Act. transition period.
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine
(59) on the second year of the HELD: From a careful review of Sections 23 and
effectivity of this Act. 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been
(58) on the third year of the otherwise, the statute could have just made a
effectivity of this Act. uniform reference to the members of the whole
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement
(57) on the fourth year of the purposes and not just the INP. The law itself
effectivity of this Act." distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be
construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes the members of the PC. Contrary to the
both the former members of the Philippine pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law
Constabulary and the local police force who were failed to define who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90
earlier constituted as the Integrated of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in
1975. "SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-
INP. — Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners National police Commisdion and the Philippine
that the 4-year transition period provided in Constabulary-Integrated National police shall
cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National police shall
cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces Himagan v People
of the Philippines. The Integrated National police,
which is the civilian component of the Philippine FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in
Constabulary-Integrated National police, shall Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for
cease to be the national police force and lieu the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to
thereof, a new police force shall be establish and Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
constituted pursuant to this Act.” suspension pending the murder case. The law
provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court information sufficient in form and substance
need not have belabored on the supposed dubious against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
with such a situation, courts are not without and one (1) day or more, the court shall
recourse in determining the construction of the immediately suspend the accused from office until
statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject
themselves of the actual proceedings of the to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to Himagan assailed the suspension averring that
the provision during the legislative deliberations Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that
may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal his suspension should be limited to ninety (90)
interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs days. He claims that an imposition of preventive
counter to the legislative intent. suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of his
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable
only to the local police force is clear. The question ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates
now is whether the classification is valid. The test equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
for this is reasonableness such that it must
conform to the following requirements:
HELD: No. The reason why members of the
(1) It must be based upon substantial PNP are treated differently from the other classes
distinctions; of persons charged criminally or administratively
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
the law; suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
(3) It must not be limited to existing weapons and the badge of the law which can be
conditions only; used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
(4) It must apply equally to all members them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally
[1939]). charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his
post while his case is pending, his victim and the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
respondent judge is REVERSED and SET and armed. The imposition of preventive
ASIDEIt is not altogether correct to state, suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
therefore, that the legislature failed to define who 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of constitutional right to equal protection of the
no moment that the legislature failed to laws.
categorically restrict the application of the
transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of
the local police forces for it would be a mere
superfluity as the PC component of the INP was
already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
Tablarin v Gutierrez on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the branches has long been recognized as a
Board of Medical Education and the Center for reasonable method of protecting the health and
Educational Measurement from enforcing a safety of the public.
requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT
as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with Lim v Pacquing
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 Facts: Sec 3 of the Presidential Decree No. 771
April 1987 and in the future. The trial court expressly revoked all existing franchises and
denied said petition and the NMAT was permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities
conducted and administered as scheduled. (including the jai-alai) issued by local
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an governments.
instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools Judge Pacquing had earlier issued the following
and its calculated to improve the quality of orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the
medical education in the country. The cutoff score City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim:
for the successful applicants, based on the scores
on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to
the Board of Medical Education after consultation issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in
with the Association of Philippine Medical favor of Associated Development Corporation
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, (ADC).
together with the other admission requirements as order directing mayor Lim to explain why he
presently called for under existing rules, shall should not be cited for contempt for non-
serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994.
certificate of eligibility for admission into the order reiterating the previous order directing
medical colleges. Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/
license to Associated Development Corporation
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of (ADC).
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. ISSUE:

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the Whether or not PD 771 is constitutional.
NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical HELD:
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition. Yes. PD No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote No. 771 included) are presumed valid and
all the important interests and needs — in a word, constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by
the public order — of the general community. An this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3
important component of that public order is the of the Constitution states:
health and physical safety and well being of the Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
population, the securing of which no one can deny orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort other executive issuances not inconsistent with
and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs this Constitution shall remain operative until
some consideration is whether there is some amended, repealed or revoked.
reasonable relation between the prescribing of There is nothing on record to show or even
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
medical school on the one hand, and the securing altered or amended by any subsequent law or
of the health and safety of the general community,
presidential issuance (when the executive still ISSUE:
exercised legislative powers). Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of
the continued existence of ADC's franchise by RULING:
reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision unconstitutional.
of the Court's First Division in said case, aside
from not being final, cannot have the effect of 1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution
nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
only the Court En Banc has that power under shall embrace only one subject which shall be
Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index
And on the question of whether or not the to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive
government is estopped from contesting ADC's as to cover every single detail of the measure. It
possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by general subject, and reasonably covers all the
the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
agents (see Republic v. Intermediate Appellate mislead the legislature or the people, there is
Court, 209 SCRA 90) sufficient compliance with the constitutional
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing We are convinced that the withdrawal of the
expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in franking privilege from some agencies is germane
contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be to the accomplishment of the principal objective
allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the efficient and effective postal service system. Our
exercise, not of its business or proprietary ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
functions, but in the exercise of its governmental clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
functions to protect public morals and promote included in the title of the said law.
the general welfare.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill
FACTS: No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. paragraph appeared only in the Conference
No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege Committee Report, its addition, violates Article
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners
the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
Registration Commission and its Registers of bill when the House and the Senate shall have
Deeds, along with certain other government differences thereon may be settled by a
offices. conference committee of both chambers.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid
No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
embraces more than one subject and does not upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays
required readings in both Houses of Congress and on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
distributed among the members before its Applying these principles, we shall decline to
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and look into the petitioners' charges that an
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. amendment was made upon the last reading of the
bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the
distributed among the members of each House. differentitation conforms to the practical dictates
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals of justice and equity, similar to the standards of
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in equal protection, it is not discriminatory within
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the the meaning of the clause and is therefore
Constitution. We are bound by such official uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into
assurances from a coordinate department of the different categories, such as recipients of
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a compensation income as against professionals.
becoming courtesy. Recipients of compensation income are not
entitled to make deductions for income tax
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of purposes as there is no practically no overhead
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing expense, while professionals and businessmen
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal have no uniform costs or expenses necessaryh to
protection of laws." produce their income. There is ample justification
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
Corporation, as a government-controlled compensation income, while continuing the
corporation, was created and is expected to system of net income taxation as regards
operate for the purpose of promoting the public professional and business income.
service. While it may have been established
primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the benefit
of the public in exchange for the franchise Telebap v. COMELEC
extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of
the services it should be prepared to extend is free B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes
carriage of mail for certain offices of the property without due process of law and without
government that need the franking privilege in the just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
discharge of their own public functions. television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess
of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the operation of media of
Sison v. Ancheta communication or information during the period
of election.
Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison,
as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to
unduly discriminated against him by the the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
imposition of higher rates upon his income as a operation of media of communication or
professional, that it amounts to class legislation, information during the period of election.
and that it transgresses against the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
Constitution as well as the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation. With the prohibition on media advertising by
Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
and equal protection clauses, and the rule on COMELEC Space are about the only means
uniformity in taxation. through which candidates can advertise their
Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive qualifications and programs of government. More
character as would lead to a conclusion that there than merely depriving candidates of time for their
was a violation of the due process and equal ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air
protection clauses. Absent such showing, the time unless paid by the government would clearly
presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III,
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable §7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of
articles or kinds of property of the same class the people to information on matters of public
shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6
has the authority to make reasonable and natural states that “the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and issuance fully complies with the requirements of a
operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the valid classification.
duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal
demands.” protection clause of the Constitution
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to
hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see Held: The Court held that the classification was
to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on based on valid and reasonable standards and does
issues in an election is maintained. For while not violate the equal protection clause.
broadcast media are not mere common The fundamental right of equal protection of the
carriers but entities with free speech rights, laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
they are also public trustees charged with the classification. If the groupings are characterized
duty of ensuring that the people have access to by substantial distinctions that make real
the diversity of views on political issues. This differences, one class may be treated and
right of the people is paramount to the autonomy regulated differently from another. The
of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, classification must also be germane to the purpose
therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right of the law and must apply to all those belonging
to information on matters of public concern. The to the same class.
use of property bears a social function and is
subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
common good. Broadcast media can find their substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the
just and highest reward in the fact that whatever purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
altruistic service they may render in connection conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
with the holding of elections is for that common members of the same class.

Tiu v. CA

Facts: The petitioners assail the constitutionality

of the said Order claiming that they are excluded
from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without
any reasonable standards and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
Court of Appeals upheld the validity and
constitutionality and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses
(1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of
Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly
occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO
97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area
within which the special privileges granted to the
entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base” only. It has thereby
excluded the residents of the first two components
of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by
the law. It has effectively discriminated against
them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO
97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly
vests in the President the authority to delineate the
metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the