February 6, 2019
Especially is it so under a modern
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ et al G.R. No.
L-7995 May 31, 1957Ponente: Labrador, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1180 known as, “An Act to
Regulate Retail Business” was passed by the
Congress. The said RA nationalizes the retail
trade business by prohibiting against persons
notcitizens of the Philippines, as well as
associations, partnerships or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens
of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly inthe retail trade with the exception of
U.S. citizens and juridical entities. Aliens are
required topresent registration to the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses.
Now, petitioner Lao Ichong, was a Chinese
businessman in the markets of Pasay City who
seeksto declare the nullification of RA 1180 for it
violates the international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines. The said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers,
fromenforcing its provisions. He contends that RA
1180 denies to alien residents the equal
protectionof the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1180 is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD/RULING: YES.
There is no question that the Act was approved in
the exercise of the police power, but
petitionerclaims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional
requirements of dueprocess and equal protection
of the laws.
Police Power - It has been said the police power
is so far -reaching in scope, and it is almost
impossible to limit its sweep. Itderives its
existence from the very existence of the State
itself, and doesnot need to be expressed or defined
in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self-
protection and survival, and as such it is the
mostpositive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential,insistent and
illimitable.
democratic framework wherethe demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to
almostunimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power hasbecome almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
publicwelfare have become almost all-embracing
and have transcended humanforesight.
-x x x x x x x-
Otherwise stated, as
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of
public interest and welfarein this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent orscope of police
power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest orwelfare.
The Constitution do not define the scope or extent
of the police power of the State. The Statesets
forth the limitations. The most important
limitations are the due process clause and the
equalprotection clause.
Due process clause – Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
Section 1(1). – No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without dueprocess of law,
nor any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Equal protection clause – The equal protection of
the law clauseis against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as
hostilediscrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It does not demandabsolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all
personsshall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions
both as toprivileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
-x x x x x x x-
The Court resumed holding that the disputed law
was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
anddanger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and
free citizensand country from dominance and
control. The enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police powerof the State, thru which
and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future.The law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds existfor
the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
dueprocess of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliensalready engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege.
Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines
Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve
common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as
P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend
that taking must be simultaneous with payment of
just compensation as it is traditionally understood,
i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment
is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
are violative of the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has
so far not issued the implementing rules required
under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between
the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of
both powers at the same time on the same subject.
Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such
as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in
the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the
taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent
that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the regulation
of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess
of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance
prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage
or participate in any position or occupation or
business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila
and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private
respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to
declare the same null and void. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner,
hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due
process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in
question violates the due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a
person before he can be employed to get a permit
from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse
it at his will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to
engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to
admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without
due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
DUMLAO v COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao is a former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January
30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution which provides that
“…Any retired elective provincial city or
municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law and who shall have been 65 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office
to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges
that the provision is directed insidiously against
him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds,
therefore class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of equal
protection.
Held: No violation of equal protection. It is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings
are based on reasonable and real differentiations,
one class can be treated and regulated differently
from the others. Here, persons over 65 are
classified differently from younger employees to
promote emergence of younger blood. Persons
similarly situated are similarly treated. It does not
forbid all legal classification, what is prohibited is
a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification is germane
to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.
Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City
Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc
City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all
productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal
tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United
States and other foreign countries. The company
paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently
filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for
being unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal
protection clause.
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co.
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only
sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to
be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as the present company, from the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to
the tax because the ordinance expressly points
only to the company as the entity to be levied
upon.
Basco v. PAGCOR
GRN 91649, 14 May 1991)
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under
Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy
of the government, “ to regulate and centralize
through an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law.” This was subsequently proven
to be beneficial not just to the government but
also to the society in general. It is a reliable
source of much needed revenue for the cash-
strapped Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to
annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and public order,
among others.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because it
violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru
PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices; and
HELD:
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution
does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under
the law, provided it is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the
legislature from establishing classes of individuals
or objects upon which different rules shall
operate.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds
raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
Binay v Domingo
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved
families whose gross family income does not
exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be
taken out of the unappropriated available funds in
the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter,
the municipal secretary certified a disbursement
of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit
disapproved said resolution and the disbursement
of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati;
(2) government funds must be disbursed for
public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
Issues:
Whether the resolution violates the equal
protection clause
Held:
There is no violation of the equal protection
clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers.
Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and
benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the
urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted
under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of
our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism,
though not complete. The loss of a member of a
family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very
words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as
a precedent, or as an official go-signal for
municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for
motives political or otherwise.
NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION)
vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act
Establishing the Philippine National Police Under
a Reorganized Department of the Interior and
Local Government", took effect on January 2,
1991. RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement
system for PNP members. Section 39 reads:

"SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory
retirement, for officer and
non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age
fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in
case of any officer with the rank of chief
superintendent, director or deputy
director general, the Commission may allow his
retention in the service for an
unextendible period of one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent
notices of retirement to private
respondents who are all members of the defunct
Philippine Constabulary and have
reached the age of fifty-six.
Private respondents filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of
an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction
before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age
of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of
RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are
also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
"Any provision hereof to the contrary
notwithstanding, and within the transition
period of four (4) years following the effectively
of this Act, the following
members of the INP shall be considered
compulsorily retired:
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on
the first year of the effectivity
of this Act.
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine
(59) on the second year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight
(58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven
(57) on the fourth year of the
effectivity of this Act."
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes
both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were
earlier constituted as the Integrated
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in
1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners
that the 4-year transition period provided in
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces
who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty
(60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire
Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under
the AFP law.
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a
restraining order followed by a writ of injunction.
He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of
the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the
original status of the present members of the
Philippine National police before its creation and
establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall
become operative after the lapse of the four-year
transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction
issued is made permanent. Moreover, he
observed, among others, that it may have been the
intention of Congress to refer to the local police
forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to
define who or what constituted the INP. The
natural recourse of the court is to trace the source
of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to
prior laws on the same subject and to investigate
the antecedents involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP
Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the
original status of its present members and that
Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to
petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year
transition period.
HELD: From a careful review of Sections 23 and
85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term
INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been
otherwise, the statute could have just made a
uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself
distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be
construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes
the members of the PC. Contrary to the
pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law
failed to define who constitutes the INP”, Sec. 90
of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-
INP. — Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present
National police Commisdion and the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National police shall
cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National police shall
cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Integrated National police,
which is the civilian component of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National police, shall
cease to be the national police force and lieu
thereof, a new police force shall be establish and
constituted pursuant to this Act.”
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court
need not have belabored on the supposed dubious
meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted
with such a situation, courts are not without
recourse in determining the construction of the
statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail
themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to
the provision during the legislative deliberations
may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal
interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs
counter to the legislative intent.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such
manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable
only to the local police force is clear. The question
now is whether the classification is valid. The test
for this is reasonableness such that it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial
distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of
the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing
conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members
of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
[1939]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of
respondent judge is REVERSED and SET
ASIDEIt is not altogether correct to state,
therefore, that the legislature failed to define who
the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of
no moment that the legislature failed to
categorically restrict the application of the
transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of
the local police forces for it would be a mere
superfluity as the PC component of the INP was
already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
Himagan v People
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in
Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for
the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to
Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law
provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until
the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject
to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that
Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that
his suspension should be limited to ninety (90)
days. He claims that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates
equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The reason why members of the
PNP are treated differently from the other classes
of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally
charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his
post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence
by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.
Tablarin v Gutierrez
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing a
requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT
as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26
April 1987 and in the future. The trial court
denied said petition and the NMAT was
conducted and administered as scheduled.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an
instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools
and its calculated to improve the quality of
medical education in the country. The cutoff score
for the successful applicants, based on the scores
on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by
the Board of Medical Education after consultation
with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant,
together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall
serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of eligibility for admission into the
medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the
NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote
all the important interests and needs — in a word,
the public order — of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the
health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort
and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs
some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing
of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public.
Lim v Pacquing
Facts: Sec 3 of the Presidential Decree No. 771
expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities
(including the jai-alai) issued by local
governments.
Judge Pacquing had earlier issued the following
orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the
City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim:
order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to
issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in
favor of Associated Development Corporation
(ADC).
order directing mayor Lim to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt for non-
compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994.
order reiterating the previous order directing
Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/
license to Associated Development Corporation
(ADC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 771 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. PD No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD
No. 771 included) are presumed valid and
constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by
this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3
of the Constitution states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even
suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still
exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of
the continued existence of ADC's franchise by
reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision
of the Court's First Division in said case, aside
from not being final, cannot have the effect of
nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
only the Court En Banc has that power under
Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the
government is estopped from contesting ADC's
possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled
rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by
the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or
agents (see Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing
expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in
contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be
allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The
Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the
exercise, not of its business or proprietary
functions, but in the exercise of its governmental
functions to protect public morals and promote
the general welfare.
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A.
No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government
offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is
constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is
unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index
to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It
has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from some agencies is germane
to the accomplishment of the principal objective
of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our
ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this
Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners
also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to
be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays
on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to
look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the
bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to
operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established
primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the benefit
of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among
the services it should be prepared to extend is free
carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
Sison v. Ancheta
Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison,
as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1)
unduly discriminated against him by the
imposition of higher rates upon his income as a
professional, that it amounts to class legislation,
and that it transgresses against the equal
protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution as well as the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the rule on
uniformity in taxation.
Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive
character as would lead to a conclusion that there
was a violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses. Absent such showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class
shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the
differentitation conforms to the practical dictates
of justice and equity, similar to the standards of
equal protection, it is not discriminatory within
the meaning of the clause and is therefore
uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into
different categories, such as recipients of
compensation income as against professionals.
Recipients of compensation income are not
entitled to make deductions for income tax
purposes as there is no practically no overhead
expense, while professionals and businessmen
have no uniform costs or expenses necessaryh to
produce their income. There is ample justification
to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the
system of net income taxation as regards
professional and business income.
Telebap v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of
B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes
property without due process of law and without
just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess
of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period
of election.
Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to
the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election.
Held: No. The petition is dismissed.
With the prohibition on media advertising by
candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
COMELEC Space are about the only means
through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government. More
than merely depriving candidates of time for their
ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air
time unless paid by the government would clearly
deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III,
§7 of the Constitution provides that “the right of
the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized,” while Art. XII, §6
states that “the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and
operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the
duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so
demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to
hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see
to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on
issues in an election is maintained. For while
broadcast media are not mere common
carriers but entities with free speech rights,
they are also public trustees charged with the
duty of ensuring that the people have access to
the diversity of views on political issues. This
right of the people is paramount to the autonomy
of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92,
therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right
to information on matters of public concern. The
use of property bears a social function and is
subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their
just and highest reward in the fact that whatever
altruistic service they may render in connection
with the holding of elections is for that common
good.
issuance fully complies with the requirements of a
valid classification.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
Held: The Court held that the classification was
based on valid and reasonable standards and does
not violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the
laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose
of the law and must apply to all those belonging
to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.
`

Tiu v. CA

Facts: The petitioners assail the constitutionality

of the said Order claiming that they are excluded
from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without
any reasonable standards and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
Court of Appeals upheld the validity and
constitutionality and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses
(1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of
Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly
occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO
97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area
within which the special privileges granted to the
entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base” only. It has thereby
excluded the residents of the first two components
of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by
the law. It has effectively discriminated against
them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO
97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly
vests in the President the authority to delineate the
metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the