LAND, TITLES AND DEEDS DIGEST COMPILATION several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.

being occupied or claimed by named persons. On November 10, 1978,

then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay
FOUNDATION AND VENUE Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones
and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801. Claiming that Proc. No.
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
FACTS: Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens hundredand twenty-eight
taxpayers, and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known andas disposable).
the Indigenous The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The on petitioners
each side ofassail
the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawfulshall deprivation
form partofofthe
the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and
other landowners in Boracay filed the Court an original petition for prohibition,
ISSUE: mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They
have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first-class resorts on their lots. They contended
HELD: that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land.
Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there ispursuant
nothing toin the law
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. LandOwnership
Act. Thus,overtheir possession in the concept of owner for the required period
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted entitled
by the IPRA the
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
Issue:
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the publicBoracay.
domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possessionHeld:
by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
No. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
The Secretary of DENR vs Yap that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
Facts: purposes. Absent such evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified
Also, private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the
occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island
into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public
domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. Hence, the
second requirement not being met. The Court is constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their
continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
Republic vs Lao
Facts:
On September 4, 1995, Alexandra Lao filed with the RTC Tagaytay City, an
application for the registration of title over a parcel of land consisting of 9,349
square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.
Lao alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Noguera
and Valenzuela, who inherited it from Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land
from her father, Jose, who acquired the same from Perido by transfer.
Lao prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based
on her and her predecessor’s open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious
and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more
than 30 years.
He presented Amoroso who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto
Perido in 1932; Laudato, who testified on Lao’s purchase of the property from the
siblings and So-Liwanag, who assisted in her application for registration. He also
presented the Deed of Absolute Sale, survey plan, technical description of the
property and tax declarations in her name as well as her predecessors-in-interest.
RTC- approved her application for registration under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Properly Registration Law.
CA- affirmed RTC’s ruling
Issue:
Whether or not the land may be registered under Lao’s name
Ruling:
No. Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 states that an application for registration of
title to land may be filed by “those who by themselves or through their predecessor-
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier”. Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of PD 1073, provides that the
provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant
must prove (1) possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The
earliest of the documents submitted by Lao pertained to the year 1948 only. There
was no proof of transfer from Medina to the siblings. He also failed to show that the
land subject of her application is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
The application for the registration of title is denied.
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004. *
FACTS:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order No.
[DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, executed by the
government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision granting
the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942,
DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and
WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the
1987 Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently
denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized
service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive
management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the
event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development;
nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products
discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of
extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII)
effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, respondents filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration.
Petitioner’s Contention:
The subject FTAA had been executed in violation of Section 2 of Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. According to petitioners, the FTAAs entered into by
the government with foreign-owned corporations are limited by the fourth
paragraph of the said provision to agreements involving only technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Furthermore, the foreign contractor is allegedly permitted by the FTAA in
question to fully manage and control the mining operations and, therefore, to acquire
“beneficial ownership” of our mineral resources.
The Decision merely shrugged off the Manifestation by WMPC informing
the Court (1) that on January 23, 2001, WMC had sold all its shares in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., 60 percent of whose equity was held by Filipinos; and (2)
that the assailed FTAA had likewise been transferred from WMCP to Sagittarius.
The ponencia declared that the instant case had not been rendered moot by the
transfer and registration of the FTAA to a Filipino owned corporation, and that the
validity of the said transfer remained in dispute and awaited final judicial.
The crux of this issue of mootness is the fact that WMCP, at the time it
entered into the FTAA, happened to be wholly owned by WMC Resources
International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of
Western Mining Corporation Holdings Ltd., a publicly listed major Australian
mining and exploration company. The nullity of the FTAA was obviously premised
upon the contractor being a foreign corporation.
Had the FTAA been originally issued to a Filipino-owned corporation, there
would have been no constitutionality issue to speak of. Upon the other hand, the
conveyance of the WMCP FTAA to a Filipino corporation can be likened to the sale
of land to a foreigner who subsequently acquires Filipino citizenship, or who later
resells the same land to a Filipino citizen. The conveyance would be validated, as the
property in question would no longer be owned by a disqualified vendee.
Petitioners claim, first, that the alleged invalidity of the transfer of the
WMCP shares to Sagittarius violates the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII
of the Constitution. The petitioners assert that paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII
permits the government to enter into FTAAs only with foreign-owned corporations.
Petitioners insist that the first paragraph of this constitutional provision
limits the participation of Filipino corporations in the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources to only three species of contracts—production
sharing, coproduction and joint venture—to the exclusion of all other arrangements
or variations thereof, and the WMCP FTAA may therefore not be validly assumed
and implemented by Sagittarius. In short, petitioners claim that a Filipino corporation
is not allowed by the Constitution to enter into an FTAA with the government.
ISSUE:
WON the allege transfer of the WMCP share to Sagittarius violates the
Constitution.
HELD:
No, it does not.
Section 2 of Article XII does not support petitioners’ argument. The
pertinent part of the said provision states: “Sec. 2. x x x The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. x x x.”
Nowhere in the provision is there any express limitation or restriction
insofar as arrangements other than the three aforementioned contractual schemes are
concerned.
ISSUE:
Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, would it still be proper to
resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-
40 and the WMCP FTAA?
HELD:
Yes, it is still proper.
In the case of Halili, in which the land acquired by a non-Filipino was
reconveyed to a qualified vendee and the original transaction was thereby cured.
Paraphrasing Halili, the same rationale applies.
Assuming arguendo the invalidity of a FTAA’s prior grant to a foreign-
corporation, where said Agreement has been transferred to, and is now held by, a
Filipino corporation, the FTAA can no longer be assailed—the objective of the
constitutional provision to keep the exploration, development and utilization of our
natural resources in Filipino hands would have been served.
ISSUE:
WON Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 is unconstitutional—which allows a
foreign contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit.
HELD:
Yes, it is unconstitutional.
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution does not allow foreign-owned
corporations to undertake mining operations directly. They may act only as
contractors of the State under an FTAA; and the State, as the party directly
undertaking exploitation of its natural resources, must hold through the government
all exploration permits and similar authorizations.
The objection, however, is not well-founded. While the Constitution
mandates the State to exercise full control and supervision over the exploitation of
mineral resources, nowhere does it require the government to hold all exploration
permits and similar authorizations. In fact, there is no prohibition at all against
foreign or local corporations or contractors holding exploration permits. The reason
is not hard to see.
Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 7942, an exploration permit merely grants to a
qualified person the right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified areas.
Such a permit does not amount to an authorization to extract and carry off the
mineral resources that may be discovered. This phase involves nothing but
expenditures for exploring the contract area and locating the mineral bodies. As no
extraction is involved, there are no revenues or incomes to speak of.
In short, the exploration permit is an authorization for the grantee to spend
its own funds on exploration programs that are preapproved by the government,
without any right to recover anything should no minerals in commercial quantities be
discovered. The State risks nothing and loses nothing by granting these permits to
local or foreign firms; in fact, it stands to gain in the form of data generated by the
exploration activities.
Hence, Section 3(aq), in permitting foreign-owned corporations to hold
exploration permits, is unconstitutional.
——o0o——
ALTERNATIVE DIGEST FROM SCRBD
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., ET AL. V. RAMOS
G.R. No. 127882
27 January 2004
Ponente: Carpio-Morales
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942
to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral
resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining
operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer
and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or
technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in
Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942
took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March
30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares
of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by
DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR
Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and
DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The
DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining
Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar
administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to
Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
In January 2001, MMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius’ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. WMCP contends that
the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources. – YES.
ISSUE: W/N the FTAA between WMCP and the Philippines is a service contract. –
YES.
RATIO:
First Issue:
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting
fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources. Article XII
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which states that
“All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State.” The same section also states that, “exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.”
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development or utilization of natural resources. Y such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license,
concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given
area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the
country’s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a
particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase “management or
other forms of assistance” in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows
only “technical and financial assistance.” The management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of service contracts was
precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is
an exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid insofar as
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
“financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service
contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the
mining operation, RA 7942 has in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the
nation’s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a
circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization
of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected
must fall with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned
corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State
for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.
2nd Issue:
The FTAA between WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a device contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP, a fully foreign owned corporation,
the “exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-
products that may be produced from the contract area.” Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that WMCP shall provide “all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.”
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken
together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly
belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations
are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.
SOTTO v. SOTTO
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a certain land, that he absented himself
from Cebu leaving respondent in charge of the said property. He later discovered that
the respondent had fraudulently obtained the registration of the said land in his own
name. Due to petitioner’s long absence in Cebu, he failed to appear in court to
defend his rights and that this action is the only remedy available for him.
Respondent contends that 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
decisions in land registration proceedings which are covered by a final decree and
this is the only question of importance raised by the demurrer.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 513 is applicable?
RULING:
No?
The final "decree of confirmation and registration" provided for in the Land
Registration Act is not a judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and that section is not applicable to decisions covered or confirmed
by such final decrees. 

The remedy provided for in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure may, in land
registration matters, be applied to judgments not confirmed by final decrees. 

A person who, through no fault of his own, has been deprived of his land through
registration proceedings is thus offered all the remedies which he, in justice and
equity, ought to have; to go farther and allow his claims to prevail against the rights
of a bona fide purchaser for value from the holder of a registered title is neither
justice nor common sense and is, as we have seen, subversive of the object of the
Land Registration Act. This would be the inevitable and logical consequence of
adopting the doctrine that final land registration decrees may be reopened; it is
inconceivable that a certificate of title can stand when the decree upon which it is
based fails.
Dismissed.
LEGARDA AND PRIETO vs. SALEEBY
GR NO. 8936, OCTOBER 2, 1915
FACTS:
Plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in Ermita,
Manila, where there exists for several years a stone wall between the said lots.
Plaintiff Legarda presented a Petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of their lot on March 2, 1906. After a consideration of said petition, the
Court decreed on October 25, 1906, that the title of the plaintiff should be registered
and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the WALL.
Later, the predecessor of the defendant presented a Petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25,
1912, the Court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
petition of the defendant included ALSO THE SAID WALL.
On December 13, 1912, the plaintiff discovered that wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant. They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including
said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court, however,
without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to
make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of
the defendant. That the land occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each
of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
ISSUE: WON the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it.
RULING: The Court ruled in negative. The decision of the lower court was revoked
and the wall and the land where the wall was located was awarded to the plaintiff.
The decision of the lower court would call for the plaintiff to be always
alert and see to it that no other parties will register the wall and its land. Else, if they
spotted someone registering such wall in their own name, plaintiff must immediately
oppose. Such will fail the whole scheme and purpose of the Torrens system of land
registration.
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land, to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time
of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being
the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered, the owner may
rest secure, without necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or sitting in the
“mirador de su casa”, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. It can not be denied
that the proceeding for the registration of land under the Torrens system is judicial. It
is clothed with all forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the
world. It is an action in rem.
Under our law, once a party registers the land, final and in good faith, no third parties
may claim interest on the same land. The registration under the Torrens system, does
not give the owner any better title that he had. The registration of a parcel of land is a
bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties. It is a notice to the
world and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. Adopting the rule which
we believe to more in consonance with the purpose and the real intent of the Torrens
system, in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name
of two different persons, the general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the
land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. This is irrebuttable. It cannot be overcome by proof of innocence
or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record
would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons must tale notice of the facts which
the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. v. PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. L-16257
January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Said Lot 378 is part of Hacienda Mandalagan consisting of Lots 378, 405, 407,410,
1205, 1452 and 1641 of the cadastral survey, originally registered in the name of
Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar. In 1920, the latter sold the hacienda to Jose
Benares who obtained Original Certificate Title in lieu thereof. In 1921, he
mortgaged the Hacienda, including Lot 378 to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. On
1926, Jose Benares again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the
Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental. The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently
foreclosed, and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, and had the title
in its name. However, Bank did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares
claimed to been titled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. On 1935, the Bank
agreed to sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares, son of Jose Banares. Thereafter,
Carlos P. Benares transferred his rights, under this contract with the Bank, to
plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in
1949. Hence, on 1949, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to
the plaintiff and Transfer Certificate of Title in plaintiff's name. When upon the
execution of the deed of absolute sale by the Bank, plaintiff took steps to take
possession the Hacienda, it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the
Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Defendant claims that it acquired Lot 378
through expropriation proceedings in 1924, it took possession of said lot and began
the construction thereon of the provincial hospital, which was completed in 1926. It
maintains that it paid to Jose Benares the assessed value of Lot 378.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant herein had acquired Lot 378 in the expropriation
proceedings.
HELD:
Several circumstances strongly indicate that the expropriation had not been
consummated. The mortgage to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., as well as the
subsequent mortgage in favor of the Bank was duly registered and annotated, inter
 alia, on Transfer Certificate of Title. Hence, Lot 378 would not have possibly been
expropriated without the intervention of the aforementioned mortgagees. What is
more, the deed executed by the Bank, among other evidences, promising to sell the
Hacienda to Carlos Benares explicitly states that portions of Lot 405, 407 and 410,
had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus
indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated. Upon
the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts
of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions relative thereto giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to dispense
with the of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry. In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an
established fact that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the
provincial hospital stood was Lot 378.
Thus, Lot 378, must be held, therefore, to be the exclusive property of plaintiff
herein.
2.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO
On September 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent
Maria O. Garcia in the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Bataan; a
copy of the application was forwarded to the Solicitor General thru the Director of
Lands. On February 19, 1974, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to this
application, and at the same time the Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearings of the same.
On January 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel
was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge and
adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent corporation.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure
of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable, and that the decision
was contrary to the facts and to law. The motion was, however, denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issues:
1. WON the judge is correct in declaring the petitioners in default. NO. (baka
matanong lang)
According to Sec. 34 of the Land Registration Act, and as adopted in Sec. 151 of the
Public Land Act:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear
and file an answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be
allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and
shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the
remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his
behalf.
On February 19, 1974, or prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, an
opposition was filed by the petitioner Director of Lands to the original application
for land registration of respondent Garcia which was precisely the answer referred to
in the above-quoted section. It was therefore improper for the respondent Judge
taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply
because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing. Had the law
intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing
would be a ground for default despite his having filed an answer, it would have been
so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of
default. True, an amended application was submitted but it is admitted by the
respondents themselves that no significant alterations were made therein, hence, the
opposition already filed should have been considered as the answer to the amended
application as well.
WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
respondent corporation’s application for registration, without sufficient proof that the
applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec.
48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. YES
nrobles.com : virtual law library
It appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent
corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications. As such sales
applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the
same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the
applications were submitted. Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as
required by law. Secondly the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the
first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin. For although tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of
title over the property.
Moreover, registration in this instance can not be granted on the basis of Section 48,
paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit: es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.cvirtual law library
As the above provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain.
The subject lands, were forest lands and only later declared as alienable or
disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The respondent
Garcia and Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because they
wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination of the dates will
show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was
done after the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED; the Order of
general default, dated January 23, 1975, as against the petitioner, and the Order dated
August 7, 1975 denying the Motion For New Trial, the Decision dated February 17,
1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all
declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporation’s subject application
for land registration is hereby DISMISSED.
Vda. de Barroga vs. Albano
Doctrine: A writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors
in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but
also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time
before and up to the issuance of the final decree.” It also pointed out that neither
laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case.
FACTS: In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating
a parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the
oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. However, for reasons
not disclosed by the record, the decree of registration did not issue except until after
the lapse of fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after
twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that an original
certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina Aquino’s name.
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but
before title issued in Delfina Aquino’s favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta
Pascual— appellants (petitioners) Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca— brought
suit in the same Court of First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina
Aquino—appellees Angel Albano, et al. (Respondents)
Said appellants alleged that they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in
possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they prayed
that Delfina Aquino’s title be voided and cancelled, that the defendants be
commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a new title be made out in their
names.
The trial court dismissed the Barroga’s and Padaca’s complaint, thereafter, judgment
became final and executory, the petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the CA and
Supreme Court having thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari.
After which, on August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an Order in Case
No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ
of possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of possession
dated August 28, 1975 was issued. However Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate
acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et al. They filed a “Motion to Nullify
Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued”.
Their argument was that as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be
ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.
The motion was denied by the trial court, hence they appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents Angel Albano, et al. are entitled to a writ of
possession?
RULING: YES
Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot
No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title
issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may
correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-
interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which
resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject
thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of
many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the
persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in- interest.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel
of land. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons—Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo
and Esteban—the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco.
He further manifested that he “also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the
testimony given by Mr. Velazco.”6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the application. Among the evidence presented by
Malabanan during trial was a Certification issued by the (CENRO-DENR), which
stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA reversed the RTC. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification
of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted
that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of
possession.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:
Petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure
converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section
14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long
as, at the time of the application, the property had already been “converted” into
private property through prescription.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to “patrimonial property,” while Section
14(2) speaks of “private lands.” It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the
30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The
OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run
against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?
RULING:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners
as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according
to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
- Wag ka ng choosy kung mahaba ang digest. 80 pages original case
nito. Oh ano laban ka? May admelec ka pa? ;) :p
- regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
- "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original
- Averia, Jr. vs. Caguioa
-
- FACTS:
- Petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the
registration proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as
a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under
Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration
Act." because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as
required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
-
- The petitioner cites Fojas v. Grey, where this Court, through Justice
Serafin Cuevas, declared:
-
- "In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112
of the Land Registration Act, it has been held that summary relief under
Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is
unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case
becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out in
an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly belongs. "
-
- ISSUE:
-
- Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of
a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract
to sell?
-
- RULING:
-
- Yes, the court has jurisdiction.
-
- The provision is not applicable to the instant case. The reason is
that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been
superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became
effective on June 11, 1979.
-
- In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and
the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting
merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions."
-
- Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is
no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to
 grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the
parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious
objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear
and decide not only such noncontroversial cases but even the
contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which
were beyond its competence before.
- Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed
- It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case
below notwithstanding the manifestation by the petitioner of his
intention to elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he had
raised. The trial court should have given him the opportunity to do so in
the interest of due process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As
it happened, it arrived at its decision after considering only the
evidence of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence
of the petitioner.
- HELD:
- WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September
23, 1983, is set aside.
ARCEO v. CA
FACTS:
Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of
unregistered land located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595,
3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed away
in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban had
five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia
Franco, with whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel,
Cesar, and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents
herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their children
are the petitioners. The Arceos executed a deed of donation inter vivos, in which the
spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since 1942, Jose had been paying
taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon, and
claimed them as owner thereof. Further, the spouses executed another deed of
donation inter vivos disposing of the properties in favor of Jose. 6
The Arceos supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa and giving away the
properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose. It seems
however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral
court 7 an application for registration in their names of 4 lots. Pedro, Antonio,
Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application. Pedro and Lorenzo specifically
contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them
were entitled to one-third thereof. 8
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession. 9
the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the Cadastral Court has jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of
property
Yes. Cadastral Court has jurisdiction.
Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it
was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law. 11 We said that the Decree
"has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional
trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring
upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications
or petitions.'"
At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land
registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit,
(1) where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting
controversial issues for determination;
(2) where they have been given full opportunity to present their evidence;
and
(3) where the court has considered the evidence already of record and is
convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial
issues.
 By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction,
but rather, of mere procedure, which may be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state
likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the
question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming
jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their
respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be
registered, in which case, registration would not be possible or would be unduly
prolonged unless the court first decided it.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is
ORDERED to distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated
October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J", according to the terms and conditions
set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SM PRIME HOLDINGS v MADAYAG
Facts:
In 2001, Madayag filed with the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 m2 located in Barangay Anonas,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. SM Prime opposed the application because the lot
encroached on the properties it has already allegedly recently purchased from several
lot owners. SM also filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the survey
plan. After which, SM filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceeding
in the land registration case alleging that the trial court should wait for DENR's
resolution of the petition. After the trial, the RTC suspended the registration
proceedings on the ground that the petition for cancellation of the survey plan filed
by SM with DENR is prejudicial to the determination of the land registration case
since a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in such proceedings. When
Madayag appealed to the CA, the latter ratiocinated that the survey plan, which was
duly approved by the DENR, should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and
that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising from an
application for registration.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over land registration proceedings and is it
affected if there is a petition filed in the DENR to cancel the survey plan, (which is
one of the mandatory requirements in such a proceeding.)
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that as an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the
title of the subject property, the land registration court may resolve the underlying
issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioner's properties without
necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void. Furthermore, It stated that a
land registration court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new
certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing
title, which is not allowed by law. However, the RTC need not wait for the decision
of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether
the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled property. The
court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent's survey plan vis-a-vis
the certifcates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a
survey plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it
does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous
land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be over lapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land
CASE: De los Angeles vs. Santos
FACTS:
Leonor de losAngeles and seven co-applicants filed an application for registration of
titles to 12 parcels of land in San Mateo, Rizal. Petitioner applicants contended that
as of November 21, 1959—the date they applied for registration—they were already
“owners pro -inidivisio and in fee simple of the aforesaid land
Julio Hidalgo, one of the private oppositors, filed their written opposition claiming
that they are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question for having
acquired homestead patents over said lots on June 12, 1961. The Director of Lands
also opposed claiming that the land “is a portion of the public domain”.
It appears that as regards to the lot included in the application, a homestead patent
was issued by the Director of Lands during the pendency of the registration
proceedings. The lower court dismissed the application with respect to said lot
“without prejudice on the part of the applicants to pursue the corresponding remedy
in any ordinary action.
ISSUE: WON the lower court grievously erred in dismissing the application for
registration.
RULING:
Yes, the court grievously erred in dismissing the application.
When Julio Hidalgo’s homestead patent was issued, said lot was no longer public.
The land registration court, in that event, would have to order adecree of title issued
in applicants’ favor and declare the aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which
vested no titlein the patentee as against the real owners
Since the existence or non-existence of applicants’registrable title to Lot 11 is
decisive of the validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued as af ore-stated on
said lot, the court a quo’s jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could
not have been divested by the homestead patent’s issuance
Bureau of Forestry v. CA
GR No. L-37995
August 31, 1987
FACTS:
 Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land (30ha) in
Iloilo in 1961 and alleged that she herself occupied the the said land having
bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his
lifetime bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934.
 The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that neither
the appliant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the
lands appled for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and
that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of
the said lands for at least 30 years. And that certain portions of the lands,
with an area of approximately 19ha are mangrove swaps and are within a
Timberland Block.
 Private respondent Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parels of land
from Diago, and moved to be substitued in place of the latter, attaching to
his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title.
 PH Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute petitioner Bureau of
Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and control of said portion have
been transferred from the Bureau to the PH Fisheries Commission
 RTC - Ordered the registration of the 4 parels of land in the name of private
respondent Gallo after excluding a portion which is the site if the municipal
hall.
 CA - Affirmed
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the
Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can
be changed or varied by the court depending upon the evidence adduced
before it.
RULING:
 No, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified and
certified by the Director of Forestry in 1956. Such lands are needed for
forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which
cannot be subject of registration proceedings.
 Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director
of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for
forest purposes than for agriculture. Be it remembered that said forest land
had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry on 1956, several years before the original applicant of the lands for
registration Mercedes Diago. filed it on 1961.
 As per Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts.
With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain but
the Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.
 Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription since the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain and
 cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is  Petitioners escalated the case to the SC contending the previous decree of
a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into registration of the Land registration courts (CFI) to the subject land is one
private ownership. that cannot be attacked under the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens title.

ISSUE: Whether the previous rulings of the CFI (Land registration court) were valid
and hence the subject land has been properly registered thereby the principle of
indefeasibility of Torrens title applies?
Case: Martinez and Suarez Spouses v Court of Appeals
RULING: No, the previous rulings of the CFI were not valid thus the indefeasibility
GR No. L-31271 – April 1974 of Torrens title in this case does not apply.
DOCTRINES: Land registration court may not adjudge title over non-
Although Sec 38 of RA496, Land registration act (LRA) , provides that a decree of
registerable land - Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-
registration through the Land registration court expressly makes a decree of
registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
registration absolute and indefeasible, it is subject to exemptions stated in Sec 39 of
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private
the said Act one of which is liens/claims/rights arising under laws of the
applicant.
Philippines.
Right of State to recover non-registerable land does not prescribe.—The right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently
In this case, the land was proven to be part of the public domain in the evidence
registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition
adduced by the Secretary, thus the right of the state to recover non-registerable land
does not prescribe.
exists. Thereby the indefeasibility of Torrens title does not apply in this case.
Further the SC held that Land registration courts cannot adjudge title over
FACTS:
non-registerable lands (i.e. Public navigable rivers, properties parts of the
 Petitioners Spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez (Petitioners) are public domain).
the present registered owners of 2 parcels of land in Lubao Pampanga. Both
are fishponds, the 2nd is the subject matter of controversy.
 The said fishpond was originally secured with a ‘titulo real’ in 1883 by a
certain Montemayor which was inherited by his successors-in-interest
who subsequently sold it to a certain Garcia in 1914 who enclosed it with
dikes. After the Pacific war in 1924, the dikes were re-opened and Garcia
subsequently applied for the registration of both parcels of land to the
CFI, it was granted. Eventually the said parcels of land were sold to other
persons until it reached Petitioner Spouses.
 Petitioners sought the help of the Committee on Rivers and Streams to rule
the subject property was not a public river but a private fishpond pursuant
to its registered Torrens title and to restore their exclusive possession to
it. Committee ruled in favor of Petitioners.
 4 years after, Secretary of Public Works and Communications (Secretary),
under the authority of R.A. 2056, ordered the petitioners to demolish the
dikes. Petitioners filed an injunction suit against the Secretary through the
CFI. Injunction granted.
 CA reversed the CFI, it held the subject property as a public river based on
the evidence showed that the said parcel of land has been covered with
water since time immemorial thus part of the public domain as adduced
by the evidence presented by the Secretary.