UPDATES OF CASES ON

PERSONS AND FAMILY

RELATIONS 2013-2017
(JULY)

Prof. AMPARITA STA. MARIA, LL.B., LL.M.

GRADUATE LEGAL STUDIES INSTITUTE
ATENEO SCHOOL OF LAW
—  Publication —  Conjugal Partnership of Gains Arts.
—  Abuse of Right/Right to Privacy 116,117, 121, 122, 124, 129 &
130,
—  Abuse of Right Art. 19
—  Co-ownership with Impediment Art.
—  Privacy Art. 26
148
—  Civil Liability Art. 30
—  Family Home Arts. 152, 155, 160
—  Family Code:
—  Proof of Filiation Arts. 172 &175
—  Absence of Essential Elements of
—  Illegitimate Children (and Surnames)
Marriage Art. 4
Art. 176
—  Marriage with Foreigners Art. 26
—  Support Arts. 194 & 198
—  Void ab initio Marriages Arts. 34, 35,
—  Demand and Payment of Support
38, 39 & 40
Art. 203
—  Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 FC
—  Designation of Parental Authority
—  Absence or Disappearance of Spouse Art. 213
Arts. 41 & 42
—  Interlocutory Orders on Support
—  Improvements on Paraphernal Property pendente lite
Art. 92
—  RA 7610
—  Sale of ACP without consent Art. 96
Art. 2 PUBLICATION
NMSMI v. Military Shrine (G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013)

FACTS:
—  In 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476,
amending Proclamation No. 423 by excluding certain
barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from forming part of the military reservation.
—  At the bottom of Proclamation President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum: “P.S.—This includes Western
Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos.”
—  That same year, Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette without the addendum.
HELD: The “Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.”
Citing Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, the SC also reiterated that
requirement of publication is indispensable in order to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to
a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days
following the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette.
It is important to note that publication “must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws”
 Article 19: Abuse of Right

CCI v. Quiñones (G.R. No. 175822, October 13, 2013)

—  FACTS: Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu
Pacific in Lapu-Lapu went inside the Guess Boutique at the
second floor of Robinsons’ Department Store. She purchased
a black jeans worth P2,098 and paid the cashier duly
evidenced by a receipt.
—  While walking through the skywalk, a Guess employee
approached and informed her that she failed to pay the
item she got. She insisted that she paid showing the
employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested
to talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office where she
worked.
—  When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess
employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of
the clients of Cebu Pacific; repeatedly demanded payment
and even searched her wallet to check how much money she
had, followed by another argument. Afterwards, Quinones
went home.
—  Guess employees gave a letter to the director of Cebu
Pacific narrating the incident. The Human Resource
Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter
and the latter conducted an investigation for purposes of
canceling Quiñones’ Robinson’s credit card.
—  Quiñones claimed she was not given a copy of the
damaging letter.  
—  Quiñones filed a case for Damages.
—  Petitioners claim good faith in trying to find out whether
Quiñones paid for the merchandise and argued that it
was within their right to verify from respondent whether
she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did
not.

—  RULING: It is evident that petitioners went overboard and

tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were
demanding. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough
evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and
good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. In this
case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
BDO v. GOMEZ, (G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015)
—  FACTS:
—  Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the PCIB when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account in January
1985. The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine
bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New
Zealand. On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual
representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of
P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. PCIB discovered that the person who
made the withdrawals was an impostor, so they had to pay
Harrington P50,600.00.  
—  The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for having accepted
the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a new
teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the
job. On November 14, 1985, the PCIB had started to deduct
amounts from Josephine’s salary while the investigation was pending.
—  Eventually, PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. The PCIB did
not any give basis for this memorandum. Josephine filed a complaint
for damages claiming that PCIB had abused its right by gradually
deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay
Harrington.
—  HELD:
—  PCIB’s actions were contrary to Articles 19 and 21 of the CC. While it
had a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right
must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. PCIB made deductions on
Josephine’s salary even if the investigation was still pending.
Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and requiring her to pay the amount. When Josephine
asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, PCIB
refused to give any. PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine’s
salary, allowances, and bonuses. Josephine was penalized while other
employees of the bank involved in the subject transactions were not.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. SPS. Bernardo
(G.R. No. 190667, November 7, 2016)
FACTS
—  In 1987, Coca-Cola (petitioner) designated respondents (doing
business under the name “Jolly Beverage Enterprises”) as its
distributor. The parties formally entered into an exclusive dealership
contract for three years where respondents undertook to sell
petitioner’s products exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases
per month, and assist petitioner in its marketing efforts.

—  Before the contract expired, petitioner required respondents to

submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it would formulate
a policy defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City. It assured
respondents that their contract would be renewed for a longer
period, provided that they would submit the list. However, despite
their compliance, the promise did not materialize.
—  In reality, petitioner reached out to the persons on the list, trailed
respondents’ delivery trucks and as soon as the trucks left, approach
the respondents’ customers. Petitioner also employed different pricing
and marketing schemes designed strategically to overrun respondents’
business and takeover the customers of its wholesalers.
—  Respondents filed a Complaint for damages, alleging that the acts of
petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud,
and unfair competition in commercial enterprise.
—  HELD:
—  Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock
for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever
another person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or
an act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law,
nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party
aggrieved. The use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business
methods resulting in unfair competition gives a right of action to the
injured party.
 BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. Atty. Roberto "Argee" C.
GUEVARRA, Respondent (A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016)
—  HELD:
—  Respondent’s Facebook remarks were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant
and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor,”  "Reyna ng
Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," 
and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy
respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to
besmirch the name and reputation of complainant and BMGI.

—  Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant

and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his
client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling
out a boycott of BMGI's services despite the pendency of the
criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant.
—  He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal
negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation
"to act with justice."·

—  Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously
protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising
them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
—  As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression
may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult
others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute.
Art. 26: PRIVACY Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.
(G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
FACTS: Respondents are the owners of the lot adjacent to the
petitioners. ALDO (owned by Respondents) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO
on the ground that petitioners were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and that said construction was going to destroy the
wall of ALDO. The court denied Aldo’s application for
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations.
Thus, in order to get evidence, respondents set-up and installed
on the building of Aldo two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners’ property. Respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction. Petitioners filed an action for
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO claiming that the
acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.
Petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove
the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surveillance.

HELD: Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, xxx, protects an

individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy
against abuses that may be committed against him by other
individuals. It states:
The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence,"
however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled
to privacy.
This provision includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping
or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter." 
— Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s
residence," therefore, covers places, locations,
or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right
is recognized by society, other individuals
may not infringe on his right to privacy. 
 Art. 30 Gloria Dy v. People of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016)
—  HELD:
—  Our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil component.
Thus, while an act considered criminal is a breach of law against the
State, our legal system allows for the recovery of civil damages
where there is a private person injured by a criminal act. It is in
recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our Revised Penal
Code provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
—  This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it recognizes acts or
omissions punished by law as a separate source of obligation in Art.
1157 and by Art. 30.
—  Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
 ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
ART. 2(2) Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc., (G.R. No. 187417, February 24, 2016)
—  FACTS:
—  Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent
Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite
suspension from employment in 2006. Cadiz was suspended for
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed
Pregnancy. Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent
imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her
boyfriend in accordance with law. Cadiz then filed with the Labor
Arbiter a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive
Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement. 
—  ISSUE:
—  Whether or not the condition requiring Cadiz to first enter into
marriage before she can be admitted back to employment.
—  HELD:
—  Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. It forces Cadiz to marry for economic
reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her
status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an
intangible and inalienable right. Brent must prove two
factors necessitating its imposition: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there
is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job. Brent has not
shown the presence of neither of these factors. Perforce,
the Court cannot uphold the validity of said condition.
ART. 4, 35 (3)
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 18396, January 30, 2013)
FACTS:
The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony
between Syed and Gloria on January 9, 1993. The
marriage contract stated that the couple was issued a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar
to secure a copy of the marriage license in relation to a
bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification declaring that the office has
not issued a marriage license to Syed and Gloria. It further
verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and
Gloria’s marriage contract was issued to a different couple.
The RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that
there was a valid marriage license because the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a
diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not
be accorded probative value.
HELD:
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013)
HELD:
The purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid
marriage license because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that
the Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the
Marriage License series issued for the month of February 1982.
The Civil Registrar also said that it did not issue Marriage License
No. N-07568 to the couple.

Such certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to

prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, xxx "shall be void from the beginning." 
Vitangcol v. People, (G.R. No. 207406, Jan. 13, 2016)

Not sufficient proof that there was no marriage

license.
Ruling: In this case the Supreme Court ruled that the
Certification of the Local Civil Registrar was not sufficient
proof of absence of marriage license.
“[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on
Application for Marriage License and License Issuance
available in this office, no record could be found on the
alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No.
8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and
MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.”
•  This Certification does not prove petitioner’s first marriage
was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519
does not exist.
•  To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.
•  The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that
it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming
that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was
no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar.
Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines and
Veronica B. Kho, (G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016)
 
Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G.
Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972. Based on the
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was, in fact, issued.
Abbas v. Abbas Go-Bangayan Vitangcol v. People Kho v. Republic
1. M/L # issued to 1. M/L was not 1.  No record could be 1. No record of
another couple issued to found on the alleged any M/L ever
2. No M/L issued to parties issuance of M/L xxx issued to parties
parties 2. M/L# not part 1. [A]fter a diligent
of series of search on the files of 1. The Local Civil
1. Marriage License Feb. 1982. Registry Book on Registrar "has no
No. 9969967 was Application for record nor copy
issued in favor of 1. The purported Marriage License and of any marriage
Mr. Arlindo Marriage License License Issuance license ever
Getalado and Miss No. N-07568 available in this office, issued in favor of
Myra Mabilangan was not issued to no record could be Raquel G. Kho
on Jan. 19, 1993. Benjamin and
found on the alleged [petitioner] and
2. No Marriage Sally.
issuance of this office Veronica M.
2. Only Marriage
License appear [sic] of Marriage License Borata
License Series
to have been issued Nos. 6648100 No. 8683519 in favor [respondent]
to Mr. Syed Azhar to 6648150 of Mr. Norberto A. whose marriage
Abbas and Miss were issued for Vitangcol and Ms. Gina was celebrated
Gloria F. Goo on the month of M. Gaerlan dated July on June 1,
January 8, 1993. February 1982. 17, 1987. 1972."
ART. 26 David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras
(20 August 2014, G.R. No. 188289)
FACTS:
David and Leticia Noveras were married in the year
1988 in QC. They resided in California, USA and
eventually acquired US citizenship. They had 2 children.
In 2003, upon learning that David had an affair Leticia
divorced him in California. The Superior Court of
California granted Leticia custody of both children and all
the US properties. With respect to the properties in the
Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation
of conjugal properties.
The trial court ruling adopted the California Court’s ruling.
The CA modified the decision on appeal by directing the equal
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. With
respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the
appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children
the amount of P520,000.
Whether or not the spouses divorce is valid in our jurisdiction.
Whether or not the petition for separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
Whether or not the distribution of the properties ordered by the CA
correct?
HELD:
NO, the divorce is not valid and the trial court should not have
acknowledged the divorce decree.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. 
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact. Under Section 24 of
Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority
or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof
or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof.
Based on the Records only the divorce decree was presented. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
California law on divorce were not presented. Even if we apply
the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did
with respect to the property regime of the parties, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in
the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree,
it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines.
The petition for separation of absolute community of
property should be granted. The records are replete
with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation
is highly improbable. More significantly they filed for
Divorce in California. These facts show that
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over
the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation
shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
 Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee (G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012)
Under the principle of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce must first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
or her office.
Norma A. Del Socorro, for and in behalf of her minor child, Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem v. Ernst Johan Brinkham Van Wilsem
(10 December 2014, G.R. No. 193707)
FACTS:
Norma and Ernst, a Dutch national, married in 1990. In 1994,
they had a son, Rodrigo. Then the marriage ended and a Divorce
Decree was issued by the Court of Holland. Norma and Rodrigo
returned to the Philippines. According to the petitioner, respondent
pledged monthly support to their son, but this never happened.
Ernst eventually came to the Philippines again and remarried in
Cebu. He received a demand letter for support, but refused to
answer it. Hence, the petitioner filed a complaint affidavit for
violation of Sec. 5 para. E(2) of R.A. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with the petitioner.
The lower court ruled that since respondent is a foreign national,
the law on support and R.A. 9262 have no application.
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code,
contending that notwithstanding the divorce decree,
respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis for financial support. Respondent
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated to petitioner for any financial support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his failure to support his
minor child.
HELD:
Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the
same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same.
 

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of

the Netherlands, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. Thus, the law in the Netherlands is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary
to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
 
R.A. 9262 also applies to the petitioner. Since the
respondent is living in the Philippines, there is basis for the
claim of the petitioner that the territoriality principle in
criminal law, in relation to article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the case.
 Doreen Grace Parilla Medina v. Michiyuki Koike
(G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016)
—  HELD:
—  Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce. However,
Article 26 of the Family Code, which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

—  In order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to

be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the
divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. (citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001).
—  Since the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen
and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws
of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls
for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before
the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of
a Rule 45 petition for review.

—  However, because the rule 56 of the Rules of Court

denotes discretion on the part of the Court to either
dismiss the improper appeal or refer the case to the CA,
the question of fact involved in the  instant appeal and
substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be
referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings.
 Void ab initio Marriages [Art. 26, 35 ]
Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26, 2013)

FACTS: Fujiki a Japanese National married Marinay in the

Philippines. Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and
they eventually lost contact. Marinay remarried another Japanese
national but claimed she was being maltreated. She contacted
Fujiki and they reestablished their relationship. Fujiki sought
judgment from the Japanese courts for nullity of Marinay’s second
marriage on the ground of bigamy which was granted.
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment and Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The RTC dismissed the petition based on the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages which
provides that it is only the husband or wife who can file a
declaration of nullity of marriage.
HELD: The Rules on Declaration of Nullity do not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. The rules also do not apply if the ground is Bigamy. The
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment
only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Fujiki has the
personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court.
 Santiago v. People (G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015)
Article 34
Four months after Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor Santos were
married, they were charged with bigamy. Santiago pleaded not
guilty while Santos died during the pendency of the suit.
 

The prosecution presented evidence that Santos had been married

to Estela Galang when he asked Santiago to marry him. Santiago
argued that she could not be accused for bigamy because she
believed that Santos was still single when they married. She
argued that (1) her marriage to Santos was void to the lack of a
marriage license; and (2) the prosecution had to prove that her
second marriage was valid for her to be convicted of bigamy.
 

The RTC convicted Santiago of bigamy, and said that her

marriage with Santos did not need a marriage license as per
Article 34 of the Family Code because they cohabited long
before their marriage.
Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming her
conviction was misplaced because of the absence of a marriage
license. She added that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they did
not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for
at least five years. She alleged the records showed that she
married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in
1993. The CA affirmed her conviction.
HELD:
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted
of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. After a careful perusal of facts, it
is clear that the second marriage was void because the
cohabitation of Santiago and Santos were less that the five-year
requirement. Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact
opposite of this demonstrable fact.  
However, despite such flaw in the second marriage,
we chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what
is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution.
 
The State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to
“deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment (Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals).”
Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)

In this Administrative case, the Supreme Court,

(in ruling against judges who irregularly
solemnized marriages from 2003 to 2007),
made a statement that for the exception
under Art. 34 to apply, “the parties should
have been capacitated to marry each other
during the entire period [of five years of
cohabitation] and not only at the time of
the marriage.”
Art. 35 Void ab initio Marriages
Montañez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On
January 24, 1983, while the first marriage has not yet been
judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a
petition in 2001 to nullify her marriage with Socrates for
psychological incapacity. The first marriage was declared null
and void in 2003
In a case for bigamy filed against her, Lourdes alleged
that since her marriage was declared void ab initio in 2003,
there can be no bigamy. RTC ruled that bigamy was not
committed by the respondent. The subsequent marriage was
solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family Code;
hence, the existing law at that time did not require judicial
declaration of nullity as a condition to remarry.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of respondent's
first marriage justifies the dismissal of the action for bigamy filed
against her.
HELD: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not
justify the dismissal of the bigamy case. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no judicial
declaration, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore,
he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage can be prosecuted for
bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
 Castillo v. Castillo, (G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016)
—  In 1972, respondent Lea married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). In
1979, Lea married petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). In
May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to
Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Lea opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured
any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. In
2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first marriage to
Baustista void. In 2003, the RTC declared Lea's first marriage to
Bautista null and void ab initio. In 2004, Lea filed a Demurrer to
Evidence  claiming that the proof adduced by Renato was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground that it was bigamous.
—  The RTC denied respondent's demurrer stating that
the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato in1979, makes
her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it
void  ab initio.  The RTC stressed that so long as no
judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid
and existing; that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled,
since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity
for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting
her second marriage with Renato.
—  Ruling: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must
be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.  In this case, the law in force at the
time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The
children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code
was in effect  i.e.  in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the
Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the
Civil Code on void marriages.
—  This Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza,
People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. This Court
clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, that
the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not
apply to marriages that were celebrated before the
 effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of
the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty,
this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-
prevailing rule:
—  Since the second marriage took place and all the children
were born before the xxx effectivity of the Family Code, there
is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
—  The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of
the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before
the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not
a requirement under the Civil Code.
 Void ab initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]

People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)

FACTS: Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in

1980. Thirteen years after, he married Eleanor. However,
his first marriage was declared void ab initio because it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Meanwhile, the
second spouse died. Respondent was charged with
bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the
information do not charge an offense of bigamy since his
first marriage was void ab initio; hence, there is an
absence of an essential element in the crime of bigamy.

ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of bigamy.

—  HELD: Yes, what makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy is when s/he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no declaration, the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, s/he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Montañez v. Cipriano
M1(1976) = CC
M2 (1983) = CC
2001 = case filed v.
M1under FC, Art. 36
At the time M2 was contracted,
there was no ground yet that
made M1 null and void. By the
time a case under Art. 36, FC
was filed v. M1, Art. 40, FC
was also already in effect. Thus,
a petition for nullity v. M1
should have been filed first
before M2 because Art. 40
already made a declaration of
nullity a requirement before a
person with a prior void
marriage can validly contract a
second marriage.
People v. Odtuhan Castillo v. Castillo
M1(1980) = CC M1 (1972) = CC
M2 (1993) = FC M2 (1979) = CC
1994 = case filed v. M1 2002 = case filed v.
under FC, no valid M/L M1under FC, no valid
M/L and not member
At the time M2 was
of rel. denomination of
contracted, Art. 40, FC
Solemnizing Officer.
was already in effect.
Thus, a petition for At the time M2 was
nullity v. M1 should have contracted, the Civil
been filed first before Code was the law. There
M2 because Art. 40 was no requirement yet
already made a to secure a declaration
declaration of nullity a of nullity before a
requirement before a person who entered into
person with a prior void a void marriage on the
marriage can validly ground of absence of a
contract a second valid marriage license
marriage. can validly remarry.
 Salgado v. Anson (G.R. No. 204494, September 5, 2016)
—  In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and
the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the marriage
contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious.
—  Under Art. 77, the parties are exempted from complying with the
required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent
religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be
applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious
ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance
with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely
religious in nature.
—  It is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other
prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the
only date of marriage appearing on the records.
 Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen (G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
FACTS:
—  Eliseo Quiazon died, leaving behind his wife, Amelia Garcia-
Quiazon, two legitimate daughters, Jenneth and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon, his common-law wife, Maria Lourdes
Belen, and their daughter, Elise Quiazon. After his death,
Elise, represented by her mother, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC.
—  Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on her claim, she
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito).
—  A marriage certificate issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
was presented as proof of the previous marriage.
—  To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, attached to
the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left her real and
personal properties.
—  To preserve the estate of her father and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.

ISSUE:
—  Whether or not Elise may impugn the ‘void marriage’
between Eliseo and Amelia Quiazon.
—  HELD:
—  YES. The existence of the previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by the Certificate of
Marriage. In the absence of any showing that such marriage
had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage
was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
—  In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage has taken place.
Thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally and may be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father.
ART. 36 Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)

•  HELD:
•  Psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
•  For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling to constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging
the essential marital obligations. Otherwise, the alleged
sexual infidelity and abandonment are merely grounds for
legal separation.
Republic v. Pangasinan (G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016)
—  HELD:
—  Although, it is not necessary that a physician examine a person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated, it is important to
present evidence that can adequately establish a party’s
psychological incapacity. In the case, there was no reliable or
independent evidence to establish Josephine’s psychological
incapacity.
—  The evidence of respondent failed to establish psychological
incapacity. Dr. Dayan’s findings were based on generalities and
lacking in factual bases. The findings were mostly based on the
psychological examination on Danilo, his sister, and their son Jay
and not from Josephine herself. Dr. Dayan even testified that she
merely interviewed Josephine through a phone call. This
undermines the credibility of the psychological evaluation of
Josephine.
 Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 203284,
—  HELD: November 14, 2016)
—  For psychological incapacity to be established, it is important that the
presence of the evidence can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
—  Petitioner’s judicial affidavit and testimony fail to show gravity and
juridical antecedence. His earlier testimonies were contradicted by his
own claims that he and respondent were happily married and that the
only reason for his filing was respondent’s complete abandonment of
their family when she left to work abroad.
—  Maricel’s testimony could not be regarded because she was only two
years old when her mother left. Dr. Tayag’s supposed expert findings
were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon
respondent and were merely based on the personal accounts of
petitioner which makes her findings fail as well.
—  Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after; and it must be incurable or, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved."
—  'Psychological incapacity,’ should refer to no less than a mental – not
merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and
discharged by the parties as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
Castillo v. Republic & Impas (G.R. No. 214064, Feb. 6, 2017)
—  HELD:
—  Although the evaluation report of clinical psychologist Montefalcon
expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
Felipe's personality disorder, she evaluated respondent's
psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from
Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which
brought about his personality disorder as painted in the evaluation
was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner.
—  This Court cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to
information on Felipe's pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue
of antecedence in this case because we only have petitioner's words to
rely on. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side,
as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (G.R. No. 222541, Feb. 15, 2017)

—  HELD:
—  An expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of the evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. That
the evidence can come from persons intimately related to
the spouses i.e., relatives and close friends, who could
clearly testify on the alleged incapacitated spouse’s
condition at or about the time of marriage. However, the
totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics
that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence.
—  Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of the marital obligations; it is not
enough that a party prove that the other failed to
meet the responsibility and duty of a married
person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an
adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage - which must be
linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
Maria Dela Fuente v. Rodolfo Dela Fuente (G.R. No. 188400,
March 8, 2017)
—  FACTS
—  Petitioner Maria and Rodolfo met while they were still students. Maria
observed that Rodolfo was introvert, prone to jealousy, and did not
have any ambition in life because of his insecurity towards his siblings
who were successful in their careers.

—  On June 21, 1984, they got married and eventually had two children
During their marriage, Rodolfo’s attitude worsened. He was suspicious
of his wife and even resorted to stalking just to confirm if she was
having an affair with another man. He even poked a gun to his 15-
year old cousin who he suspected was Maria’s lover. Maria also
alleged that she was Rodolfo’s sex slave. That they had sex five times
a day. Rodolfo would even fetch her from the office during lunch
break just to have sex. It bothered her that her husband even
suggested to invite another man to share their bed.
—  In1986 Maria and her children left their family home because
Rodolfo poked a gun to her head after they had an argument.
—  On June 3, 1999, Maria filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC. Maria’s counsel presented Dr. Lopez as
their expert witness who said that Maria was not suffering from any
severe mental disorder but she had an emotionally disturbed
personality which is not severe enough to constitute psychological
incapacity. On the other hand, Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with
paranoid personality disorder which was caused by pathogenic
parental model-that his family background showed that his father
was a psychiatric patient. Therefore, his disorder was serious and
incurable.
—  The RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
They opined that while Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine
Rodolfo, the findings based on information from credible informants
were enough. CA reversed the decision of the RTC. They ruled that
the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay.
—  HELD:
—  Testimony of Dr. Lopez plus corroboration of petitioner proved that
respondent has psychological incapacity. The root cause of his
paranoid personality was hereditary since his father suffered from a
similar disorder. It started during his late childhood years and
progressed as he reached his adolescent years.
—  Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and
friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof
of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage
and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to
decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she
had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong
in their marriage. This shows that respondent could not comprehend
and perform his marital obligations. This is persuasive enough for this
Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.
Art. 36 & 147 Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato
(20 October 2014, G.R. No. 176492)
Held:
Article 147 is applicable, not Article 129. The marriage
between Nonato and Barrido was declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36. Article 147 states
that if the marriage is void, wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares, and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. This particular kind
of co-ownership applies when the following elements are
present: must be capacitated to marry each other; live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void.
ART. 40 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. AZOTE
(G.R. 209741, April 15, 2015)

FACTS:
Edgardo and Edna Azote married on 1992, and their union
produced six children. Edgardo, a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) submitted to the SSS two E-4 forms in
1994 and 2001designating Edna and their six children as
beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away in January 2005.
Edna filed her claim for death benefits as Edgardo’s wife,
but the Social Security Commission (SSC) denied this
because records showed that Edgardo had previously
submitted E-4 forms in 1982 designating Rosemarie Azote,
his spouse and son Elmer as beneficiaries. 
The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition stating that (1) Edgardo
did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-
beneficiary; (2) Rosemarie was still presumed to be
Edgardo’s legal wife; and (3) the NSO records revealed that
Edgardo and Rosemarie wed in 1982 thus making Edna’s and
Edgardo’s marriage as not valid without showing that his first
marriage was annulled or dissolved.
 

ISSUES:
Whether or not the SSS can determine the validity of Edna’s
marriage to Edgardo considering Rosemarie or Elmer did
not appear or contest Edna’s claim.
Whether or not Edna is entitled to Edgardo’s SSS death
benefits as his legitimate wife.
 
 
HELD: 
Yes. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered
to determine the validity of marriages, Section 4(b)
(7) of R.A. 8282 (Social Security Law) requires the
SSC to examine available statistics ensure that
benefits go to the right beneficiaries.
No. Edna is not qualified to be Edgardo’s legitimate
wife, thus she is not entitled to SSS death benefits.
She could not adduce evidence to prove that
Edgardo’s earlier marriage was either annulled or
dissolved, or whether there was a declaration of
Rosemarie’s presumptive death before Edna’s
marriage to Edgardo.
ART. 41 Republic v. Narceda
(G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)
HELD:
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. Hearing of a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding. Article 247 of the Family
Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately
final and executory. Thus, by the express provision
of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.
Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., (G.R. No. 199194, Feb.10, 2016)
HELD: By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As
a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC’s decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final
and executory. The CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of
appeal pertaining to such judgment. The correct remedy to
challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule 45.
•  The degree of diligence and reasonable search
required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to
present the persons from whom the present spouse
allegedly made inquiries especially the absent
spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when
there is failure to report the missing spouse’s
purported disappearance or death to the police or
mass media, and (3) when the present spouse’s
evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily
that the latter was indeed dead. Because of this,
Jose’s efforts to locate the missing Netchie are below
the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed
by jurisprudence.
REPUBLIC v. Tampus, (G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016)
•  FACTS:
•  Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to
Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975.
Three days after, Dante, as member of the AFP, was
assigned to a combat mission in Jolo, Sulu. Since then,
Nilda heard no news from Dante. In a petition for the
declaration of resumptive death which she filed 33
years after, Nilda testified that she exerted efforts to
find Dante by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and
neighbors, who also did not know his whereabouts; and
that after 33 years without any kind of communication
from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
•  HELD: Other than making inquiries with Dante’s parents,
relatives, and neighbors, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She never called or proceeded to the
AFP headquarters to request information about her
husband. She did not even seek the help of the authorities
or the AFP itself in finding him. Nilda did not present
Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who
could have corroborated her asseverations that she
earnestly looked for Dante.
•  Because of this, Nilda failed to actively look for her
missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find
him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did
not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief' of his death.
 Celerina J. Santos v. Ricardo T. Santos
ART. 42 (8 October 2014, G.R. No. 187061)
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
Celerina and Ricardo were married in 1980. According to
Ricardo, when the family business did not prosper, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work abroad as a domestic
helper. She left the Philippines and was never heard from
again. He also exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He claimed
that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about the petition only in
October 2008. She filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. She claimed that her residence was Quezon City,
which was also the conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left
in 2008. She also claimed that she never resided in Tarlac and
worked as a domestic helper. She referred to a joint affidavit
executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo
made false allegations. She also argued that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.
The CA issued the resolution dismissing Celerina’s petition for
being a wrong mode of remedy. CA ruled that filing of a sworn
statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance
under Article 42 of the Family Code to be the proper remedy.
HELD:
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and
the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.” An affidavit of reappearance is not
the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively
dead has never been absent. The choice of remedy is
important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of
the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of
children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband
or wife.” This means that even if Celerina is a real
party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured
by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage, this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the

subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of
the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of
reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file
an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
 ART. 121 PNB v. Venancio Reyes (G.R. No. 212483, Oct. 5, 2016)
FACTS
—  Spouses Reyes contracted a loan amounting to P3,000,000 from PNB.
A real estate mortgage was also executed but there is a dispute
whether it was executed solely by Lilia (W) or with Venancio (H).
—  The Spouses failed to pay for the loan obligations which resulted to
PNB foreclosing the mortgaged real properties. Venancio filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate
Mortgage against PNB, claiming that his wife undertook the loan and
mortgage without his consent and his signature.
—  HELD:
—  The real estate mortgage over the conjugal properties is void for
want of consent from Venancio. The Family Code, Article 124 is clear:
written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is
necessary before any disposition of conjugal property can be valid.
—  The principal obligation to pay the loan remains valid despite
the declaration of a void mortgage. The conjugal partnership
should be made liable to the extend that it redounded to the
benefit of the family. Article 122 of the Family Code applies to
debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to the
benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that Lilia
contracted, but not to the mortgage. A mortgage is merely an
accessory agreement and does not affect the principal contract
of loan. The mortgages, while void, can still be considered as
instruments evidencing the indebtedness.
—  If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the liability,
Article 121 holds that the spouses shall be  solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance  with their separate properties. If the
conjugal properties are not enough to answer for the loan,
petitioner can recover the remaining unpaid balance from the
separate properties of either respondent or his wife Lilia. 
 Art. 147 VIRGINIA OCAMPO V. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO
(G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015)
In a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides that in the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. Properties acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry should, therefore, be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court
and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to
prove that the properties were acquired solely on her
own efforts.
Attempts to establish respondent as an
irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as
well as family man were made but the
testimonies adduced towards that end,
failed to fully convince the Court that
respondent should be punished by depriving
him of his share of the conjugal property
because of his indiscretion. Thus, the
presumption remains that said properties
were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by them in equal shares.
UY V. SPOUSES LACSAMANA (G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015)

FACTS: Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaration of

Nullity of Documents against his alleged wife Rosca and the
spouses Lacsamana to whom his wife sold two parcels of land.
Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca; that they
lived together from the time they were married in 1944 until
1973 when they separated. Uy alleged that he and his wife
acquired two parcels of land in 1964, but in bad faith, Rosca
executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale in
favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
Rosca argued that she was never married to Uy. She testified
that during World War II, she and Uy cohabited and settled in
Batangas. They attempted to formalize their marital union
but the marriage ceremony never happened because of the
bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony.
ISSUE: The validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage.
HELD:
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage
contract itself. Uy was not able to present any copy of the
marriage certificate. The presumption of marriage has been
sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of
evidence showing that Uy and Rosca were never actually married
to each other. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code. The provision
states that properties acquired during cohabitation are
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We
agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was
able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is
paraphernal.
ART. 148 Ventura v. Spouses Paulino
(G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013)

In unions between a man and a woman who are

incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence
of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties.
In Borromeo v. Descallar, it was held that it is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.
 Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna
(23 July 2015, G.R. No. 171914)
FACTS:
JLL obtained a divorce from Eugenia from the Dominican Republic,
and on the same day, contracted another marriage, with Soledad
Lavadia, the respondent. JLL and Soledad returned to the Phils.
where they lived as husband and wife. JLL organized a law firm
and bought a condominium unit to be used as the office of the law
firm. When JLL died, the firm was dissolved. The condominium unit
was partitioned, and the pro-indiviso share of JLL was determined
to be 25/100. This was claimed by his son from his first marriage,
Gregorio.
The property, including law books, office furniture, and equipment,
is subject to the complaint by Soledad against the heir of JLL.
The RTC ruled that the property was acquired through JLL’s sole
industry, and that Soledad has no right as owner. She was,
however, declared as the owner of the law books.
HELD:
The divorce did not dissolve the marriage between JLL and Eugenia.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of JLL and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until JLL’s death.
JLL’s marriage to Soledad, being bigamous, was void, and the
properties acquired during their marriage are governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
Soledad failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to
purchase the condominium unit. Also, it is logical that Soledad, not
being a lawyer, had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase
of books for the law firm.
Salgado v. Anson (G.R. No. 204494, September 5, 2016)
—  HELD:
—  In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148. As there is no showing
that the parties were incapacitated to marry each other at the time
of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from
the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 in
relation to Article 147 of the Family Code are the pertinent
provisions of law governing their property relations.

—  Although Respondent Luis alleges that he was married to the

deceased Severina, he also acknowledged that he was in a common-
law relationship with Severina as evidenced by a Partition Agreement
they executed and which formally terminated said relationship. Thus,
he had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue
of the said agreement.
ART. 160 Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, July 8, 2015)

In a 1998 decision, the RTC ruled that the mortgage cannot

bind the property in question which was owned by the
Bells for violating Article 160 of the Family Code since the
mortgage was not consented to in writing by a majority
of the beneficiaries of the family home.
In 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon the Bells’
family home. The Bells claimed that the property cannot be
sold because it is a family home and that the Eulogios ploy
to re-litigate the issue had long been settled with finality
(res judicata) by the 1998 RTC decision. The CA ruled that
the RTC decision in 1998 only declared their house and lot
as a family home, not the issue of whether it may be sold in
execution.
HELD:
Respondents’ family home cannot be sold on execution under Article
160 of the family Code. The issue of whether the property in
dispute exceeded the statutory limit of Php300,000 has already
been determined with finality by the trial court. Its findings
necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under
Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there
was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the
persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157.
There was no proof presented by petitioners that its value had
increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary
improvements by respondents.
 Onstott v. UTNAI (G.R. No. 221047, September 14, 2016)
— HELD:
—  Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
—  However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.
—  The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to
when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover,
this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with
strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
—  As petitioner invokes the presumption of
conjugality, he must first establish that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage of
Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the
presumption cannot stand. Records are bereft of
any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the subject property can be
ascertained. Considering that the presumption of
conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired, the subject property is therefore
considered to be Albert's exclusive property.
Art. 172
Salas v. Matusalem (G.R. No. 180284 April 10, 2013)
HELD:
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not
sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity.
A baptismal certificate considered as public documents but
only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child’s paternity.
Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat (28 January 2015,
G.R. 200169)
Facts:
Spouses Aguilar died, intestate and without debts. Their estate include
two parcels of land which is the subject of the controversy. Petitioner
Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC a civil case for mandatory
injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat, alleging
that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses;
that he discovered that the subject titles were missing, and he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan had stolen the same.
In her Answer,  respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of
heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar
spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former;
that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and
sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

To prove filiation, petitioner presented school records stating that

Alfredo Aguilar is petitioner’s parent; ITR indicating that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother and Alfredo Aguilar’s
Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957,
a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo
Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks indicating that petitioner, who was
born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. Respondent
offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar announcing that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that
she is the sole heir to Alfredo’s estate.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s SSS E-1 Form, a public document, is
sufficient to establish legitimate filiation with his father,
Alfredo Aguilar and W/N respondent has personality to
impugn legitimacy of the petitioner.

HELD:
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship of petitioner to the
Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code.
Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such
due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required.  
As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality
to impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his
legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has
already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, the Court has held before that –
Article 263 (Old Civil Code provision of Art. 170 of the FC)
refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a
child of Jose at all.
Nevertheless, since the petitioner has shown that he is the
legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses, then he is also the heir
to the latter's estate.
Eugenio San Juan Geronimo v. Karen Santos
(G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015)

In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein

respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that
respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased
brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner
alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. When petitioner alleged
that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence
shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling
on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such
proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not
being a direct action to prove one's filiation.
HELD:
The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities
consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth
and the name of the informant made the document
questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries
on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are
alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent
herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities
and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding
the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth
certificate.
 ART. 175 San Agustin v. Sales
(G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016)
—  FACTS
—  Ernesto Sales (respondent) and Teodoro Sales (now deceased) are
brothers who are claiming that they are the illegitimate children of
the late Louis Fernandez and Epitacia Sales, Louis’ common-law wife,
who was a house helper in the Fernandez household Respondent
presented two public documents namely; (1) a notarized document
dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia
formally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a
document solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980,
denominated as Acknowledgement of Children. These documents
bears Louis’ thumbmark.
—  Petitioner alleged that both documents are spurious and that the
thumbmark was irregular considering that Louis was still able to write
at an old age.
—  Petitioner claims that the brothers are children of Corpus, the
house boy, by showing evidence that the brothers used the
surname of Corpus in their report cards.

—  HELD:
—  Petitioner’s claim that a thumbmark is not sufficient, as Louis was
still able to write during old age, is without merit. A thumb mark
has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of signature.

—  A notarized document is a public document and as such it

enjoys the presumption of regularity which can only be
overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. It serves as a
prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and
a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.
The bare allegations of the petitioner cannot qualify as clear
and convincing evidence to overturn such presumption.
 Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia v. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro
and Henry Rossi (G.R. No. 187273, Feb. 15, 2017)
—  FACTS
—  In a case involving partition of properties of Josefa Ara, petitioners
and respondents all claim to be the children of Josefa Ara, who died
on November 18, 2002. Respondent Pizarro claims that she is the only
child of Josefa. Petitioners Garcia and Ara make the same claim
although Garcia is recorded as a son of a certain Carmen Bucarin
and Pedro Garcia, evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July
19, 1950; and Ara is recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and
Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth.
—  ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have proven their illegitimate
filiation with Josefa A. Ara.
—  Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
—  The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
—  Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the
death of a putative parent must do so via a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
legitimate filiation.
—  Petitioners submitted:
— Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate listing Josefa as the mother;
— His Certificate of Marriage indicating the same, a picture of the
wedding including Josefa;
— A Certificate of Marriage between Alfredo and Josefa;
— Garcia’s Certificate of Birth (late registration) after Josefa’s death, a
group picture;
 —  A comment of Rossi which stated that Josefa did not register all of her
children so she wouldn’t lose her pension;
—  Ara’s testimony that he was the son;
—  Nelly Alipio’s, a first degree of Josefa, testimony stating the same.
—  HELD:
—  The evidence of pictures, testimonies, and marriage certificates are
insufficient as there were no acts, declarations, or omissions which
attributed directly to Josefa, much less ones pertaining to the filiation
of the petitioners.
—  Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of
Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration
all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act,
declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did not
participate in making any of them.
—  Petitioner Garcia submitted late registration of his birth dated
October 23, 2003, showing he was born on June 23,1951 to Alfredo
and Josefa.
—  True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To
overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a
high degree of proof is needed.
—  However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration
prevent us from according it the same weight as any other birth
certificate.
—  There is a reason why birth certificates are accorded such high
evidentiary value.
—  Generally, the rules require that facts of the report be certified by
an attendant at birth, within 30 days from birth.
—  The attendant is not only an eyewitness to the event, but also
presumably would have no reason to lie on the matter.
—  The immediacy of the reporting, combined with the participation of
disinterested attendants at birth, or of both parents, tend to ensure
that the report is a factual reporting of birth.
—  In other words, the circumstances in which registration is made obviate
the possibility that registration is caused by ulterior motives. The law
provides in the case of illegitimate children that the birth certificate
shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. This ensures that individuals
are not falsely named as parents.
—  Garcia submitted evidence of delayed registration of birth and
pointed out that a hearing on the delayed registration, no one
appeared to oppose the delayed registration, despite a notice of
hearing posted at the Office of the Civil Registrar.
—  This is analogous to cases where a putative father's name is written on
a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child, without any showing
that the putative father participated in preparing the certificate.
—  A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public instrument.
To evidence acknowledgment, a birth certificate must, under Section 5
of Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of the acknowledging
parent or parents. (Citing Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System, 213 Phil. 48 [1984])
SURNAMES and 176 Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248
February 18, 2014)
FACTS:
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick. The children were
not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.

The parties’ relationship eventually turned sour, and Grande left for
the United States with her 2 children. This prompted Antonio to file
a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/ Change
of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Appending the petition was a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
ISSUE: W/N Antonio may compel the use of his surname for
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother (Art 176 of the Family
Code). In case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on
the mother; hence, Antonio’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
As to the matter of the change of surname of the
illegitimate children. There is no legal basis for
the court to change the surname of the children. To
do otherwise would be to contravene the explicit
and unequivocal provision of the law.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to

decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
 Correction of Entries Emelita Gan v. Republic (G.R. No.
207147, September 14, 2016)
FACTS
—  Petitioner Emelita Basilio Gan was born out of wedlock to father Pia
Gan, a Chinese national, and mother Consolacion Basilio, a Filipina.
Her birth certificate indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio.
—  Petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name with the Regional
Trial Court, seeking to change the full name indicated in her birth
certificate from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio Gan.” She claimed
that she had been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in her school
records from elementary until college, employment records, marriage
contract, and other government records.
—  The RTC issued an order which noted that the petition sought not only
a correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of name.
RTC ordered petitioner to make the necessary amendment to her
petition.
—  Petitioner obliged, and after due proceedings, the RTC issued an
order granting the change of petitioner’s name.
—  Respondent Republic sought a reconsideration of the RTC order,
alleging that the petitioner, an illegitimate child, failed to adduce
evidence that she was duly recognized by her father, which would
allow her to use the surname of her father. RTC denied the
respondents motion for reconsideration.
—  HELD:
—  Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she
indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's
evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by her mother,
school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of
baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a
natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still
not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on
the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner to change her
name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan.”
 In re: Petition for Correction of Entry v. Republic
(G.R. 214064, August 24, 2016)

—  FACTS
—  For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname
"Almojuela." However, when he requested for a copy of his birth
certificate from NSO, he was surprised to discover that he was
registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus,
he filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 in his NSO
birth certificate before the RTC.
—  Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan,
Catanduanes and is the acknowledged natural child of Jorge V.
Almojuela (Jorge), former governor of the said province, and
Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred that
while his parents did not marry each other, he has been known to his
family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said
surname in all of his official and legal documents.
—  In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his
birth certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing that "Felipe
Almojuela" appears as his registered full name.

—  RTC granted the petition. The CA reversed the RTC because

of failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108,
stating that his failure to implead and notify the Local Civil
Registrar and his half­siblings as mandated by the rules
precluded the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case;
and that the correction of entry sought by petitioner was
not merely clerical in nature, but necessarily involved a
determination of his filiation.
—  HELD:

—  In Republic v. Coseteng­Magpayo, the Court emphasized that

in a petition for a substantial correction or change of entry
in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the
civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim
to have any interest that would be affected thereby be
made respondents for they are indispensable parties.
—  The CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead
both the Local Civil Registrar and his half­ siblings. Although
he claims that his half­siblings have acknowledged and
accepted him, the procedural rules mandate compliance
with the requirements in the interest of fair play and due
process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity
to protect his interest if he so chooses.
Republic v. Sali
(G.R. No. 206023, April 3, 2017)
FACTS
—  Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition for Correction of Entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC.
—  Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and
Almarina A. Albay. Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth,
the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, thru
inadvertence and mistake, erroneously entered in the records the
following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY"
instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the
petitioner as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968.
—  RTC granted the petition for correction.
—  The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the RTC Decision. The CA denied the appeal.
—  HELD:

—  Sali's petition is not for a change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she
seeks is the correction of clerical errors committed in the
recording of her name and birth date. Not all alterations
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and
corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
—  The remedy should have been to file a petition with the local
civil registrar under RA 9048. For failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the
petition to correct Sali's first name.
—  On the other hand, considering that Sali filed her petition to
correct her birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968,”
in 2008, Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy. (RA 10172
amending 9048 took effect in 2012).
 Support (Art. 194 ) Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for
support pendent lite amounting to P500,000. Respondent on the
other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give
as much as 75,000 as support. The RTC ruled that based on the
evidence presented the proper amount to paid should be
115,000. This was not assailed by any party thus, it became final
and executory. Issues once again arose, when respondent in
complying with its obligation, deducted from the amount of
support in arrears, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner representing the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses and purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods.
HELD:
The amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.

Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for

his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses, etc.,
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
 Art. 198: Interlocutory Orders on Support

Calderon, Ma Carminia v. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA

(G.R. No. 185595, Jan 9, 2013)

FACTS: Complaint of declaration of nullity of marriage was filed

by Calderon against husband Roxas. Trial court granted support
pendente lite, ordering Roxas to support minor children. Upon
motion, the support was reduced. The order to reduce support
was appealed from, but was denied by CA.
ISSUE: Whether orders on the matter of support pendente lite are
interlocutory or final.
HELD: Orders on matters of support pendente lite are
interlocutory. It decides an incidental matter but is not a final
decision on the main issue of the case. The proper remedy is a
special civil action, not an appeal of the interlocutory order. Thus,
CA properly dismissed the appeal.
 Designation of Parental Authority (Art. 213)
Beckett v. Sarmiento(A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30, 2013)
FACTS:
Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to
Eltesa, a Filipino citizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr.
The couple were subsequently divorced and by virtue of a
compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was granted
to Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to
yearly Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits,
Geoffrey consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even
after the holidays, provided she return the child on January 9,
2011. However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey
Jr., hence, this prompted Geoffrey to file a petition for violation
of RA 7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ of Habeas
Corpus.
During the conference on the application for habeas
corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed
inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying,
not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the
father, was a total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst,
Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directing Eltesa to return
Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of
did not materialize.
Hence, Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of
the Order. But instead of enforcing said order, Judge
Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional
custody over Geoffrey, Jr. . It is Geoffrey’s main contention
is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional
custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on
compromise agreement.
HELD:
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable
[and] can always be re-examined and adjusted. The
situation of the parents and even of the child can change,
such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no
longer be to the latter’s best interest.

Under, the Family Code, in parental authority the Court shall

take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he
persistently refused to be turned over to his father, was
already over 7 years of age. As such, he was very much
capable of deciding, based on his past experiences, with
whom he wanted to stay.
RA 7610 People v. Caballo (G.R. No. 198732, Jun 10, 2013)
Facts:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old.
The two became sweethearts. Sometime in 1998, Caballo
persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This
was followed by several more incidents of sexual congress.
Issue: W/O Caballo is guilty of Section 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610.

Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether

male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
 

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or

lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; xxx
 

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of

RA 7610 are the following:
  1.  The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
2.    The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3.       The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age
(Jojit Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20,
2011)
—  Held:

—  Section 5 thereof provides a definition of who is

considered a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse." The final version of this provision was a
product of various deliberations to expand its original
coverage to cases where the minor may have been
coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, xxx

—  The law covers not only a situation in which a child is

abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.
Interpretation was criticized as early as in Olivarez v. CA, G.R. No. 163866,
July 29, 2005
—  J. Carpio, dissenting: The Information failed to allege the second
essential element of the crime as defined in Section 5 of RA 7610
[The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse], thus, Olivarez cannot be convicted
for violation of RA 7610.   The Information is void to charge Olivarez
for violation of Section 5 of RA 7610. Otherwise, Olivarez would be
deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge
against him.
This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs
acts of lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness
that the accused performs on the child are separate and different
from the child’s exploitation in prostitution or subjection to “other
sexual abuse.”  
 George Bongalon v. People, (G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013)

—  Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC

and CA that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with
their holding that petitioner’s acts constituted child abuse
under RA 7610. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended
to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.

—  With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent

to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in
the crime of child abuse. Crime is slight physical injuries.
Felina Rosaldes v. People, (G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014)
—  Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child
as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
—  The petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard
Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the boy fell down, his
body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead]
of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further
held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."
—  Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly
discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the
physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive.
The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.
She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake
of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was
precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by
a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child
care exercising special parental authority.
—  Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds
that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Michael Ryan as a human being.
 Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron v. People, (G.R No. 195224, June 15, 2016)

—  Jabalde is guilty of slight physical injuries only and not child abuse
under R.A. 7610. Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin,
but Jabalde did not intend to debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human being. The laying of
hands on Lin was an effect of Jabalde’s emotional outrage after
being informed that her daughter’s head was punctured which made
her think that she was already dead. Dr. Munoz stated that the
abrasions may have been mildly inflicted. This runs contrary to the
accusation that she intended to abuse or maltreat Lin, because if she
did, she could have easily hurt the 7 year old boy with heavy blows.
As a mother, the idea of her child’s death caused an instinctive
reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger in
the form of the mild abrasions inflicted on Lin. Having lost the
strength of her mind, she lacked the intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that is essential in the child of crime abuse.
THE END
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