1. The RTC of Sindangan appointed X as guardian of minor Y, in a special proceeding.

Y is allegedly the
son of a U.S. Veteran. X received the arrears of beneficiary Y. Later on, the U.S. Veterans Administration
filed a case in Washington D.C. for the refund of the benefits received by Y, on the ground of wrong
payment since it was found that the U.S. Veteran was a fake. Question: Does the court in Washington
D.C. have jurisdiction concerning the case of refund? Explain.

No, the point of contact here is the Philippines.

It was ruled: The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S.
Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims properly submitted to him for
resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a
judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which
must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act,
including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the veterans'
Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions
therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the
Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would
deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the
veterans' Administrator.

(In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian and oppositor-
appellee, vs.ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, G.R. No. L-9620 June 28, 1957petitioner-
appellant.)

In an analogous case, we have ruled:

By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has
submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order. He can not therefore now
dispute this power. (Brownell vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.)

From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee guardian, for the
ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof on the
sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies
upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine
courts' determination of the question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator as upon any
other litigant.

Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the
guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and the
proper administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the
property in the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate
proceeding.
2. Can Philippine courts recognize a foreign decree of adoption? Explain your answer.

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the
principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will
be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when
created by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the
proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its
inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in
Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains
subject to local law."

(JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, respondent-
appellee. G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967)

It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. We hold that
an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding
civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall
be governed by the laws of this country.

3. Ching Leng , a Chinese man was granted Philippine citizenship upon his marriage to a Filipina in 1950.
His wife filed an adoption to Ching's five illegitimate minor childen. The adoption was granted. Ching
then filed a petition to cancel the alien certificates of registration of said minors on the theory that they
have become Filipino citizens by virtue of the adoption. Is Ching Leng correct? Explain.

Cheng Leng is wrong. The Alien certificates of registration will not be cancelled because the adopted
children have not become Filipinos. Minor children refer to legitimate children only and not the
illegitimates.

4. Alvin, a natural born U.S. citizen and his wife Evelyn, a natural born filipina who in 1988 became a
naturalized citizen, jointly filed in 1990 a petition for adoption of Solomon, Evelyn's 12 year old brother.
Are Alvin and Evelyn qualified to adopt? Explain.

NO, an alien who may adopt a Filipino is one who is a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt a
relative by consanguinity, or one seeking to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, or
one who is married to a Filipino seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter. None of these requisites are present in the case at bar. (p. 308)

Section 4. Who may adopt. – The following may adopt:

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who is emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of a 16-year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived
when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;

(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to
adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted
child. Provided, further, that the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.

(3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Section 5. Who may be adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been voluntarily committed to the
Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or judicially declared available for
adoption;

(2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse;

(3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that of legitimacy;
(4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child since minority;

(5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

(6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be
initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parents.

(7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules.

5. In State X, all children whether born inside or outside wedlock are considered legitimate. In State Y, all
children born outside wedlock are illegitimate. Now then, a child is born outside wedlock of a father,
who is a citizen of State Y, and a mother, who is a citizen of State X. Questions: (a) Should the Philippine
courts consider the child legitimate or illegitimate? (b) What country's law shall govern the relationship
of parents and child?

The child shall be considered illegitimate since that is the characterization under the father’s law.
Inasmuch as the child is illegitimate, the relationship shall be governed by the mother’s law.

6. Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.

Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of
Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

Question: Does petitioner have the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? Why?

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We
note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship
and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

7. Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The
couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was
marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally
quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julia’s
parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she
and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In
1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately
tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a
case to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s
failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Question: As judge will you grant the nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity? Explain.

Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term “psychological
incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee, the provision adopted with less specificity than expected, has been
designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity”
defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the
alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not
come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

8. IN 1948, Pastor and Vicenta were married before the catholic church in Cebu City. On Oct. 22, 1950
Vicenta obtained an absolute divorce in Nevada U.S.A., after which she married John Nichols, an
American.They resided in Nevada since then, when she finally acquired her American citizenship in
1958.

Meanwhile, Pastor filed legal separation proceedings in the Philippines plus damages.

Questions :

(a) Will the petition for legal separation and the claim for damages prosper?

(b) State the "doctrines" laid in this case.

The petition for legal separation will not prosper.

THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves:

With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident
defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for
annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they
have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the
Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the
Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private
international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public
policy. Furthermore, Vicenta’s refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and
her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects
the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of
marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have
jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines,
45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings
and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them,
lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.
9. Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The
marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that
they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States
and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001,
Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

Question: Does Perez have a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be-intervenor
in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife? Why?

No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still
lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican
Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be,
he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to
his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize
such absolute divorce. Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was
celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which
her motion for intervention is based.

10. October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to
Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote
him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that
Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
Questions:

(1) Is the abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity to them automatically
constitute psychological incapacity?

(2) Do the requirements of psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages? Explain.

1. No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. In Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

2. The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological incapacity, no

distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.