A.M. No.
133-J May 31, 1982 On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then
Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on
October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a
complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and
Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased
Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and
defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola
alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales
was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only
legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being
the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with
Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children
of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the
properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of
the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were
acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there
was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should
first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated
solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased
mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the
deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.
Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds,
and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes
as the only children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to
have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as
belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot
No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco
Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common
partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184
as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only
legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras,
as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots
Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506;
and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581,
4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot
No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the
exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304
and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304
and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or
partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in
such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez,
as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a
hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the
whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in
relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and
 the remaining portion of the estate to be divided
among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the
extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of
any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the
latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary
estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528;
Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33);
(9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after
this judgment shall have become final to submit to
this court, for approval a project of partition of the
hereditary estate in the proportion above
indicated, and in such manner as the parties may,
by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable
to them taking into consideration the location,
kind, quality, nature and value of the properties
involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to
pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-
third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3)
by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all
other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal,
and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to
Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact
that the project of partition was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October
23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels,
presented to this Court for approval the following
project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in
the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506
shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49
square meters along the eastern part of the lot
shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be
awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55
square meters along the western part of the lot
shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-
Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided
equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot
No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under
item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal
shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to
Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the
Project of Partition indicated above which is made
in accordance with the decision of the Honorable
Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant
Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
 While the Court thought it more desirable for all
the parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of
the respective parties to this Court that the Project
of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made
after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs
and the defendant approving the above Project of
Partition, and that both lawyers had represented
to the Court that they are given full authority to
sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the
Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project
of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations
which were adjudicated to the respective parties,
as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated
to each one in view of said Project of Partition,
and to perform such other acts as are legal and
necessary to effectuate the said Project of
Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October,
1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on
November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the
corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective
adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh.
U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot
1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq.
meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive
property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in
said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto,
Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and
when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the
adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer
in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-
E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July
31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of
Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a
portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to
Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11),
which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation
purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to
"The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 &
16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation
were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa
Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion,
with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the
secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967
(Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint
dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent
Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise
violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3,
paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer
while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent
was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by
closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive
advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does portion of which reads as follows:
not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and
[4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the
reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the
October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing,
the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in
connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the
second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he (3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay
is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;
rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and
the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the (c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the
case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31,
1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the
MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND
ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil
FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and
GERARDO VILLASIN —
respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966
to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus (1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita
Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and
Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin
complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel. and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
(now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
 (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R.
Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT
BONIFACIO RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the
cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the
Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase
a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil
Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction
or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE
have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of
the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979],
Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered
on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an
appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order
dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition
made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was
no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely,
decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more
specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of
partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for
which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his
wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale
on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective
shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the
secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11,
1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case
No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving
the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances,
the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of
Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which
he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders
dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no
longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to
respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated
long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having
taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the
pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-
E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa
was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to
respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In
this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question
whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot
1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to
"TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife
the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent
approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the
transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning
Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to
show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E,
in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in
the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere
"dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses.
Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he
bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration
from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous
understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in
approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We
quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required
the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola
on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was
done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was
assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs.
Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said
project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969).
While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear
to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the
only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain
actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that
she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that
she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following
documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot
1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased
Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate
of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving
the project of partition was duly entered and registered on
November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by
Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to
Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated
that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the
same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of
her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed
of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT
19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be
noted that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which
 was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4
thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in
Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22,
1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter
sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in
Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is
clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-
fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in
other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-
fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-
4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot
1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if
Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no
other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of
the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is
also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted
during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92,
November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not
have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010
relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because
according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did
not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged
gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real
properties when she could have easily done so by presenting
evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market
value of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in
the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of
the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which
was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise
and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion
of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to
be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the
time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the
duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the
courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he
cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed
that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing
it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible
suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the
litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in
general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our
courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that
respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation
having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in
person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any
direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or
towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the
department of public prosecution in active service. This provision
shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
 5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not
engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in
the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it,
however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices
and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43
Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional
law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence,
political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of
Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de
Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines
by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on
December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from
the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one
nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ...
those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon
the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict
with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the
express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political
laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such
political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued
in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the
commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of
peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L.
Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356
Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief
Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has
never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change.
Their relations with their former sovereign are
dissolved, and new relations are created between
them and the government which has acquired
their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed,
although that which regulates the intercourse and
general conduct of individuals, remains in force,
until altered by the newly- created power of the
State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that:
"It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect
and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph
H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
 xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he
is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw
from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because
there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his
official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial
office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent
intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As
was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly
becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to
intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is
necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or
transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions
which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs.
Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino;
Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any
undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial
involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any
case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in
the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the
corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234
entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et
al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the
aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was
filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI
Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected
with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is
no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is
there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging
or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of
fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or
other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the
permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from
engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically
upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in
nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within
whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge
because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of
partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made
pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil
service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may
not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by
the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any
business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of
the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging
in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may
not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A.
No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section
12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section
12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the
Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then
vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service,
and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon
the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its
own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to
conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel
of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner
may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable
office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer
or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than
one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary."
Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action
against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or
employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil
Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department
to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil
Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the
Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution,
the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X,
1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be
considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize
the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the discipline
of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two
grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o
decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative
cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and,
except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal,
separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline,
and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines
and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied).
There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered
by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section
16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and
employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by
joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and
a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court;
and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to
enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable
that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial
attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their
respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as
there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation
on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual
withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such
disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only
22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent
realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid
Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation
for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it
became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that
respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial
decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice
that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are
groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as
follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that
respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador
Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact
said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of
Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to
in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was
an "impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that the
latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for
disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by
complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself
publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a
signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I
and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for
respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that
statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of
complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a
godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact
even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon
of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A.
Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge
where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible
convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges
in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in
his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or
that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the
other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to
refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly
relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to
avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship
constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30,
Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social
relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary
action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be
clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land
which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,
because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized
with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE
AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A.
SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL
OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches
52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent
judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court direct its Finance
Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the
Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief
Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Court
REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to
the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue
with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this
petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through
this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of
the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of
exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the
words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further
expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F.
Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that
the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text
of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8).
Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the
General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the
withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as
well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court
hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of
the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such
payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The
Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that
the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within
the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935
Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts) shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis
supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law,
which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office.
... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973
Constitution specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of
income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article
XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent
of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries
of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section
10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed
by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual
salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice
______________ pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two
Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax exemption,
thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary
of justices, does this not violate the principle of the uniformity of
taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is
levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when
the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income,
we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special
privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We
prohibit the increase or decrease of their salary during their term. This
is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the
independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to
respect tenure, but the special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be
a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal
protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor,
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest
respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a
whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and
legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the
citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might
say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the
fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic
of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights
accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest
degree by other employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of
economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to the entire executive
department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986,
Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed
to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so
as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary, defended the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court
in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the
amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the
amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not
be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman
will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs.
Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David,
etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I
would propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT
TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say
that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not
be subjected to income tax because they already gave up the income
from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people
who have accepted employment in the government involving a
reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are
not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in
government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment.
Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the
session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original
proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line
4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a
provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the
General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt
from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that
the salary of justices is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-
exemption from tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the
General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after
"DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto
vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally
approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding,
therefore, is that there will be a provision under the Article on General
Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that
the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional
officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment
proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is
deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution.11it may also be safely assumed that
the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.121avv phi 1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which,
for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
(Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another
rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher
than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would
be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of
the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and
so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs.
David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as
the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms
the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that
they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through
the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all
citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government
and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September
27, 1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering
the deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974,
he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the
Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old
Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez.
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests,"
stating inter alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs.
Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor children, MARINA,
2 years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian
citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their
family for the hospitality they have accorded me during the few
years that I have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my
employment thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty
their behavior while they are in the Philippines; I also guaranty
their support and that they will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination
of the authorized stay granted them by the Government (Rollo,
p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from
temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the
same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the
CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID
detention cell. She later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP
Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she
manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the
Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10).
However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the
deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino
citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public
respondents, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of
Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes
to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa
previously granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their
Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease
and desist from executing or implementing the Decision dated September 27,
1990 and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on
August 14, 1994 and that he and his mother were withdrawing their objection
to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D.
No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by
Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of
the Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged to live together and under
Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the husband is given the right
to fix the conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right
to order the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position
that the CID could not order petitioner's deportation because its power to do so
had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp.
57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the
law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless
of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved is the
question on petitioner's immigration status, particularly the legality of her
admission into the country and the change of her status from temporary visitor
to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully admitted into
the country and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next
question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's
entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary
visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration
authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent
residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a
matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the
immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less inclined to
allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a
Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v.
Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence
is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the
right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR
1286). this right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the
nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and
simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to
permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue
to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to
protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be
admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the
operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317,
70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165,
32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman
to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does
not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration
of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362
[1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID
to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the
country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the
law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified
to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and
their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of
public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of
the Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12
of paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall
not be effected under any clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the
cause for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and
4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when
sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of
Immigration that the alien be not deported (As amended by
Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities
at a designating port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date
of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is
convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one
year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years after his entry, is so convicted and sentenced
more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of
the law governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a
house of prostitution or is connected with the management of a
house of prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years
after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen
subsequent to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted a non-
immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who
disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government, or who
advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of
public officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or
who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who on
any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or
otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections
forty-five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action
which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case
of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to
suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first
serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually
deported: Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be
waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of
the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and
approved by the Department Head, and upon payment by the
alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix
and approved by the Department Head (as amended by R.A.
No. 144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry,
shall have been convicted of violating the provisions of the
Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-
three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act
of 1941 (now Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after
entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating
the provisions of the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-
marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be
brought against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-
three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of
the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or
alienating properties, to prevent them from being attached or
executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of
entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a
prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the
country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152
[1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we
held that under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of
an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of
deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the
broad statement of the law as follows:
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the
five (5) year limitation is applicable only where deportation is
sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other
than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where deportation or
exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses of Section
37(a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that to the
contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time
after entry."
Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than
2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had
gained entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of
a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The Court,
however, held that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that
more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13,
1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements in her application and in
the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities.
Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about
the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her
deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up
letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C.
Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more
than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation
on September 27, 1990.
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section
37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not
the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which
refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose
of carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings
to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public
respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they,
in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order
issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990
revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the
Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193993
VIVENNE K. TAN, Petitioner
vs.
VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, Respondent
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Vivenne K.
Tan (Tan) assailing the 20 April 2010 Decision2 and the 1 October 2010
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815. The CA
found that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City (RTC), exercised
grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 37, Quezon City (MeTC), to exclude Tan from the voter's
list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.
THE FACTS
On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America (US.A.).4
On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon
City.5 She indicated that she was a Filipino .Citizen by birth. Her application
was approved by the Election Registration Board (ERB) on 16 November 2009
making her a registered voter of Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.6
On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before a notary public in Makati City.7
The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of her Philippine
citizenship.8 She stated in her petition that she lost her Philippine citizenship
when she became a naturalized American citizen. However, Tan executed a
sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A.9 Thereafter, the BI
confirmed her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.10
On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010
National Elections to run as congresswoman for the First District of Quezon
City.11
On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bing bong"
Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a petition before the MeTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 37- 09-1292, seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because (1)
she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and (2) she
failed to meet the residency requirement of the law.12
In her answer, Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been
born to Filipino parents on 1 April 1968. Although she became a naturalized
American citizen on 19 January 1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she had
effectively renounced her American citizenship as she had been continuously
residing in the Philippines. She had also found employment within the country
and even set up a school somewhere in Greenhills.13
The Ruling of the Me TC
On 14 January 2010, the MeTC rendered a decision excluding Tan from the
voter's list.14 It held that she was not a Filipino citizen at the time that she
registered as a voter, viz:
Through her acts and deeds, [Tan] clearly manifested and unequivocally
admitted that she was not a Filipino citizen at the time of her application as a
registered voter. If indeed she was a Filipino citizen as she claimed and
represented, she would not have gone to the extent of re-affirming her Filipino
citizenship, by her act of applying for the same. If indeed she was a Filipino
citizen on October 26, 2009, the day she registered as a voter, she would not
have been allowed to apply for Filipino citizenship as she was already a
Filipino citizen. There is the act of [Tan] which would clearly manifest her lack
of Philippine citizenship upon her registration. Said act is her taking an Oath of
Allegiance on December 1, 2009. A Filipino citizen would not be required to
perform an Oath of Allegiance to affirm his or her Filipino citizenship, because
affirmation is no longer necessary because the citizenship has always been in
her possession.
When' she took her oath of allegiance on December 1, 2009, she renounced
any and all allegiance to the Government of the United States of America. This
act is again a clear showing that she was an American and not a Filipino
citizen at the time she registered as a voter on October 26, 2009.
xxxx
The foregoing manifest that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and deeds,
through the authoritative permission given to her by governmental agencies,
'and through her application for, and taking of an Oath of Allegiance for Filipino
citizenship, could not be considered as a Filipino citizen at the time that she
registered as a Philippine voter.
In view thereof, the petition for her to be excluded as a voter
is GRANTED. [Tan] is hereby to be excluded from the voter's list of Precinct
0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.15
The Ruling of the RTC
Aggrieved, Tan appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, where it was
reversed and Crisologo's petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The RTC's
position was that Tan's questioned citizenship was cured, to wit:
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that [Tan] upon registration as voter in the
First District of Quezon City was still a naturalized American Citizen. But her
questioned citizenship was cured when [Tan] made the following acts:
1) She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
November 30, 2009;
2) She filed a Petition for Reacquisition and/or Retention of Philippine
Citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 before the [BI];
3) On December 1, 2009, the [BI] has issued an Order granting the petition
and ordering the issuance of a Certificate of Retention/Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship in favor of [Tan]; and
4) Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that she make a formal
renunciation of her United States nationality; that she absolutely and entirely
renounce her United States nationality together with all rights and privileges
and all duties and allegiance and fidelity there unto pertaining before a notary
public on December 1, 2009.
With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino
citizenship.
xxxx
Clearly, the court a quo erred in concluding that [Tan], through her subsequent
acts and deeds, through the authoritative permission given to her by
government agencies, and through her application for, and taking an Oath of
Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could not be considered as a Filipino citizen
at the time she registered as a Philippine voter. [citation omitted]
[Tan] having re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
she is deemed not to have lost her Filipino citizenship and is, therefore, a valid
registered voter. In short, whatever defects [Tan] had in her nationality when
she registered as a voter should now be deemed cured by her re-acquisition of
her Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 14, 2010 of the [Me TC] is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered dismissing the
Petition For Exclusion Of A Voter From The List for lack of merit.16
Since the RTC decision became final and executory pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter's Registration Act of
1996,17 Crisologo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.18 He argued that
Tan should have been excluded from the list of registered voters for failure to
meet the citizenship and residency requirement to be registered as a voter.
The Assailed CA Decision
After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the CA came up with
a decision finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the
MeTC. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed disposition is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The MeTC decision dated January 14, 2010
excluding Vivenne K. Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay
Sto. Domingo, Quezon City, is REINSTATED. Costs against the Private
Respondent.19
In coming up with its conclusion, the CA gave the following reasons:
(1) The taking of the Oath of Allegiance is a condition sine qua non for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship by a natural-born Filipino
citizen who became a naturalized citizen of a foreign country;
(2) Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225,20 cannot be relied upon to declare that Tan
never lost her Philippine citizenship or that her reacquisition of such cured the
invalidity of her registration because the provision applies only to citizens of
the Philippines at the time of the passage of R.A. No. 9225;
(3) R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied
retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens
of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law; and
(4) Tan must have first taken her Oath of Allegiance before she can be validly
registered as a voter because R.A. No. 9225 itself says that individuals with
dual citizenships must comply with existing laws for them to enjoy full civil and
political rights.
Arguing on pure questions of law, Tan filed the present petition before this
Court.
OUR RULING
The pivotal question in this case is whether Tan can be considered a
Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
A natural-born Filipino citizen who
renounces his or her Philippine
citizenship, effectively becomes a
foreigner in the Philippines with no
political right to participate in
Philippine politics and governance.
The right to vote is reserved for Filipino citizens. The Constitution is clear on
this matter:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.21 (emphasis ours)
This constitutional provision is reflected in R.A. No. 8189 this way: "[a]ll
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least
eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least
six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register as a
voter."22 Although the Voter's Registration Act of 1996 does not contain a
similar provision like R.A. No. 918923 that disqualifies non-Filipino citizens from
voting, it does, however, provide that the ERB shall deactivate the registration
and remove the registration records of any person who has lost his or her
Filipino citizenship.24
Without any doubt, only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be
included in the permanent list of voters.25Thus, to be registered a voter in the
Philippines, the registrant must be a citizen at the time he or she .filed the
application.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration
application on 26 October 2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more than a month
after the ERB approved her application.
Tan argues that (1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No.
9225 has a retroactive effect, such that a natural-born Filipino citizen is
deemed never to have lost his or her Filipino citizenship,26 and that (2) the
reacquisition cured any and all defects, assuming any are existing, attendant
during her registration as a voter.27
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost
their Philippine citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to
expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.28 Under the procedure currently
in place under R.A. No. 9225, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions laid out by the law.29 The full implications of the
effects of R.A. No. 9225 can be fully appreciated in Section 3, which reads:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed hereby to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I _________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision alone, it would seem that the law makes a distinction
between Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and reacquired their citizenship under the same
law from those who lost their Philippine citizenship after R.A. No. 9225 was
enacted and retained their citizenship.30 On this point, Tan contends that this
distinction does not substantially affect her citizenship status because
reacquiring or retaining Filipino citizenship has the same effect.31 Moreover,
she points out that the framers of the law did not distinguish the difference;
hence, using the words "reacquire" and "retain" interchangeably.32
In the light of factual circumstances of this case and considering the plain
meaning of the words "reacquire" and "retain," we find it fitting to address the
seeming confusion brought about by Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225. In other
words, by declaring "deemed to have not lost their Philippine citizenship," does
this mean that once Philippine citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath of
Allegiance required in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on the citizenship status
retroacts to the period before taking said oath. We rule in the negative.
Borrowing the words of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes A. Serreno, "[t]he
renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship."33 The tenor of these words in Maquiling v. Comelec paved the way
for the Court to rule that Amado, the mayoral candidate who garnered the most
number of votes during the May 2010 Elections, was disqualified from running
for any local elective position.34 In that case, the Court found that Amado
effectively recanted his oath of renunciation because he used his U.S.
passport after taking the oath.35
While the facts and issue in the case at bar do not involve the same matters
discussed in Maquiling and in Arnado,the Court's position on renunciation and
its effect lead us to conclude that once Philippine citizenship is renounced
because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one a
Filipino citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply stated, right after a Filipino renounces
allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner.
Note that Tan's act of acquiring U.S. citizenship had been a conscious and
voluntary decision on her part. While studying and working in the U.S.A., Tan
chose to undergo the U.S. naturalization process to acquire U.S. citizenship.
This naturalization process required her to renounce her allegiance to the
Philippine Republic and her Philippine citizenship. This is clear from the Oath
of Allegiance she took to become a U.S. citizen, to wit:
I, hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty,
of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support
and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against
all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the
law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the
United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national
importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so
help me God.36(emphasis and italics ours)
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act
for it to produce any legal effect. This willingness to disassociate from a
political community is manifested by swearing to an oath. If we were to
consider the words in the Oath of Allegiance as meaningless, the process laid
out under the law to effect naturalization would be irrelevant and useless.
Thus, to give effect to the legal implications of taking an Oath of Allegiance, we
must honor the meaning of the words which the person declaring the oath has
sworn to freely, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January 1993, prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August 2003. If we were to effect as
retroactive Tan's Philippine citizenship to the date she lost her Philippine
citizenship, then the different use of the words "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A.
No. 9225 would effectively be futile.
An interpretation giving R.A. No. 9225 a retroactive effect to those who have
lost their Philippine citizenship through naturalization by a foreign country prior
to R.A. No. 9225 would cause confusion to what is stated in Section 3:
"natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic." To go beyond what the
law says and interpret it in its ordinary and plain meaning would be tantamount
to judicial legislation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis is the most basic of all statutory
construction principles. When the words or language of a statute is clear, there
may be no need to interpret it in a manner different from what the word plainly
implies.37 This rule is premised on the presumption that the legislature know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.38
Corollary to this rule is the holistic approach. There is no conflict between the
plain meaning rule and this approach as the latter does not espouse going
outside the parameters of the statute. It merely adopts a broader approach
towards the body of the law. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Urgello,39 we pronounced:
The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in
relation to the whole law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that a
statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the
statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.40
To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have "reacquired"
from those who "retained" Philippine citizenship,41 coupled with the legal effects
of renunciation of citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as
basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no
provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards natural-born
citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the
effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the law would
readily reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No.
9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be considered as not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship.
Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts
to the date it was lost would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino
would still be considered a Philippine citizen when in fact he had already
renounced his citizenship. We are not about to give a statute a meaning that
would lead to absurdity as it is our duty to construe statutes in such a way to
avoid such consequences. If the words of a statute are susceptible [to] more
than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong
argument against its adoption and in favor of such sensible interpretation as
would avoid such result.42
Finally, it is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only
a prospective operation, unless the legislature intended to give them a
retroactive effect.43 We must bear in mind that a law is a rule established to
guide our actions without no binding effect until it is enacted.44 It has no
application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that
the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions.45
During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was not yet
enacted and the applicable law was still Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under 1âwphi1
this law, both the renunciation of Philippine citizenship and the acquisition of a
new citizenship in a foreign country through naturalization are grounds to lose
Philippine citizenship:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
xxxx
Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became an American
citizen, the loss of her Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence.
As the applicable law at that time, Tan was presumed to know the legal effects
of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's Philippine
citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced her
Philippine citizenship as a requirement to acquire U.S. citizenship.
All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225,
we agree with the CA that Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she
registered as a voter and her inclusion to the permanent voter's list is highly
irregular.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED and the 20 April 2010 Decision and the 1 October
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815
is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from
looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as
Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the
issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to
conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the
petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends
was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00
only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the
kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond
the reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be granted
and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio
City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the
private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that
date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after
his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing
fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done
beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting
the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days
after the proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36,
Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course
without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three
Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as
required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of
the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He
cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court
of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of
time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed
his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of
Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the
COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as
SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It
was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition
as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving
him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that
date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the
COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time
for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed
suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he
says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the
petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after
publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule
44 thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed
his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did
not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No.
1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC,
promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To
this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for
the local elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988
local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned
resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988,
following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became
effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the
Commission. — The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the
petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that
the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the
petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation
proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach
this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of
the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record
that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took
effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February
25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions
became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so
provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary
under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever
delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or
neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment
of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case
itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking
into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event
of non-compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above
prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take
action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or
the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the
petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a
futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of
citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is
worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the
reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the
petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him.
However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering
the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly
and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this
same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant
case, it would appear that our sole function in this proceeding
should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of
the GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro forma.But
going over the extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is
immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be
timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a
technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the
allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and
comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and
unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve
the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry,
for as the record before us stands, we see that there is enough
basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties
here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps
which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their
respective claims. 6
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong
court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the
more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward
the case to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time
that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case
of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the
principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
(135 SCRA 37) which states:
... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this
Court to always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation. No useful purpose will be served if
this case is remanded to the trial court only to
have its decision raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to
this Court. (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated
that:
 ... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And
those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's
favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to
the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions
involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment.
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends
of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest.
(See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108
Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76
SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco
v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105
Phil. 162). Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory
lâwphî1.ñèt
which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the
parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the
disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592,
597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court
should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do
demand that this Court act, and act with finality. 7
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial
court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where,
to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent
COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's
repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen.
In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively
disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the
petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still
pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the
merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on
the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the
Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a
citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was rendered by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the
petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago,
Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and
Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without
prejudice to the issue of the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a
proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall
have been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the
petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam
Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in
the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein
petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This
conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact
that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and
registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official
statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its
Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of
that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is
reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a
certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of
Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response
to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and
do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December
1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen.
As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to
meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was
granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted
Australian citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make
an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of
affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This
need not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality
as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former
country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal
Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the
marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in
respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which
relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a
material nature in respect of an application for Australian
citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful, he could be
deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest
himself of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian
citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act,
or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by
a formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he would
automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of
the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY
HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA
IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988,
addressed to the private respondent by the Department of
Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to
inform you that inquiry made with the Australian Government
through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has
elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship
on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian
citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make
an affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all
other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD)
RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized
Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God
that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
 Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and
successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe
the laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian
citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely
promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I
will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties
as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence.
Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which
he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before
the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the change
of his status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was
granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn
statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction
of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as
"mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as
earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as
totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware
of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by
counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time
and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we
need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of
the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does
not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several
cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably
pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only
when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's comment.
Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not
present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976
did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is
no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of
that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as
such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he
was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he
formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance,
both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful
and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst
only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a
specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63,
which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable
to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article
IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in
Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian
citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore
his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not
concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What
we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by
Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It
does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point
to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied
with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they
shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his
application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is
also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of
the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on
January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42
of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on
election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the
barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to
be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and
write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality"
that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected
him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as
loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100
votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and
the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his
total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual
owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done
so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the
results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by
him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost
during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at
bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The
petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not
now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who
filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot.
The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three
dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on official
leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported
by ten members of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court
held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
 Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for
a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified,
or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his
status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred
other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he
must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that
may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit
and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But
having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once
his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as
an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered
after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade
makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he
solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen
of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the
same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and
executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is
LIFTED.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election
were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and,
under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second
Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for
the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the
Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the
respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with
the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered
in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that
respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In
other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is
disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those
holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the
respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The
motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998,
of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice
mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining,
the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared
private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship
by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under
the principle ofjus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the
1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were
Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his
parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him
as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was
issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age
of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced
his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law,
he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final.
Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering
one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853)
votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained
one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894)
votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine
(2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty
four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues
involving private international law which may well be settled
 before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES
the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of
candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of
Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City
Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to
reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios
Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati
City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice
mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of
the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold
the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen
when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he
attained the age of majority when he was
already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he
(merely) registered himself as a voter and voted
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office
of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of
the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final
so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner
even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene
granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right
to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling
denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene.
— Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may,
before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in
such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing
a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the
exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action
or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in
the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
 cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for
Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo
v. COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified
"from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If
Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had
been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage
of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of
1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in
filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with
the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive
issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of
dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
"disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with
dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of
Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor
General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the
Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines
to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
 (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides:
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the
instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as
follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is
not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the
Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and
I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening
than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional
and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the
accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I
do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country.
There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is
represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the People's Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein
all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several
years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-
Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this
unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are
already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be
bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I
also took close note of the concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta,
who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough
assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who
has always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to
Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already
happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital
outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee
kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section
5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their
concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a
double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of
us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution
and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
 elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and
obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of
course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave
of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China was made in
1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that
some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion
when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep
concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of
double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and
national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But
considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially
great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance,
will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the
proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to
"dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin
G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen
of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask
clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual
citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner
is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no
requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only
means that at the moment when he would want to run for
public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine
passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire
to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the
Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim
the citizenship.
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr.
President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not
renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her
in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes
an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law
is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality
were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it
wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or
intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be
resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people
of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the
doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national
both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American
law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as
the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37
years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the
age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced
his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election
in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the
power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by
filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27,
1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF
"NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
 11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR
IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN
TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY
OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the
Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for
any elective local position?" We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8,
1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he
was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner
Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988,
in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is
insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon
majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last
travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the
filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.
The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What
this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private
respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate staring he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is,
of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which
he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was
a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR
PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES
and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with
the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein
petitioner. 1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his
decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID,
respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2Counsel for the parties
were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to
submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7
November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November
1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of
the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino
citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order
dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny
with finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to
deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November
1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining
order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court
on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on
13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation
against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December
1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8
December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was
filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of
said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December
1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7
December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was
ordered to cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending
the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for
clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent
motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December
1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7
December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13and the vigorous opposition to lift
restraining order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give
petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which
to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the
Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20
December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22
December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating
her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply
thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period
upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his
naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N.
1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go
Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of
Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the
issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only
established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A
rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous.
Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the
Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he
has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the
insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether
or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves
adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions
mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from
detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining
order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.