DE CASTRO VS.

JBC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found
in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily
and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.
OBRA vs SPS. BADUA et al
G.R. No. 149125
August 9, 2007
FACTS: Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot
commonly owned by them situated in La Union, were located west of the
properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the
national highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of
petitioners property and the southern portion of the properties of the
Bucasases and Baduas. The pathway was more than one meter wide and
sixteen meters long. They claimed that this pathway had been established
as early as 1955.In 1995, however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on
the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents access
to the national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the
fence, but petitioner refused. (The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file
an answer; consequently, they were declared in default.)
On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint. It held that respondents were not able to satisfy all the
requisites needed for their claim of an easement of right of way. It observed
that when petitioner fenced the northern portion of her property,
respondents were able to use another pathway as ingress and egress to the
highway. It stated further that the new pathway is more than adequatefor
respondents use .Thus, the applied easement of right-of-way on the
northern portion of petitioners property was not allowed. The said Decision
became final and executory.
It must be noted that the new pathway used by respondents, however,
traversed the southern portion of petitioners property. Sometime in 2001,
petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again
restricted the use of respondents new pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced
by petitioners action, respondents filed a Motion to Enforce the July 7,
2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the RTC
dismissing the case was based on the existence of a new pathway which
they had been using since 1995. Thus, they asserted that petitioner was
prohibited from closing said passage.
On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said motion. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was rejected by the trial courts.

Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001
Order, held that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioners
representation that she was allowing respondents to use the southern
portion of her property as an alternative pathway. Since the southern
portion was an agreed pathway, petitioner could not reduce its width; thus,
the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking the passage.
Hence, we have this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45
ISSUE:
1. WON the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a
property not the subject of a pending case.
2. WON there was a voluntary easement over the southern portion of
Obra’s property

HELD: the petition is GRANTED.The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001
Orders of the RTC are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
1. NO; Essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial courts
issuance of an order clarifying its final and executory decision and
effectively establishing an easement on petitioners property without proper
adjudication.

An order of execution must conform to the terms of the dispositive portion

of the decision.

[A court that issues an order of execution in contravention of its final

judgment exceeds its jurisdiction and renders its order invalid.

The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or

dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties. Thus, where there is a conflict between
the fallo and the ratio decidendi or body of the decision,
the fallo controls.This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. The
rule applies when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite,
clear, and unequivocal, and can wholly be given effect without need of
interpretation or construction.
The amended complaint filed by respondents revealed that their cause of
action was the recognition of their easement of right-of-way of more than
one (1) meter wide and more than sixteen (16) meters in length [which]
traversed the northern portion of the property of defendants spouses
Obra. As prayer, respondents asked for the demolition of the concrete fence
constructed by petitioner and her spouse, that closed the pathway on the
northern portion of Obras lot; the declaration of right-of-way over said area
in favor of respondents; and the payment of damages and attorneys fees.
When the RTC dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it ruled that
respondents had no cause of action against petitioner and her husband
because they failed to satisfy one of the four requisites for the entitlement of
a right-of-way, namely that the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway. The trial
court took note of the fact that the new pathway which incidentally
traversed the southern portion of petitioners lot is an adequate outlet to a
public highway. While its body mentioned the existence of an alternative
pathway located south of petitioners lot, such was made only
to emphasize that respondents failed to satisfy the requirements for an
easement of right-of-way. As held by the trial court:
The insistence of the plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore
without basis considering that there is another outlet adequate enough as
an access route for them in their passage to the public highway and the
alleged inconvenience cannot be a ground for the opening of said old
pathway.

xxxx

Apparently, no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and

legality of this new pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the
Court on petitioners’ property. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the
southern portion had no basis.

The parties and even the trial court were confined to the averments of the
complaint, and the answer and the issues joined by the major pleadings .It
could not be disputed by respondents that there was no mention at all of
any right-of-way on the southern portion of petitioners lot in the complaint
nor any claim or prayer for the declaration of respondents entitlement to a
right-of-way over the said area. Thus, there was no joinder of issue on this
matter and, therefore, the dismissal of the case cannot, by any stretch of
imagination, be construed to encompass any grant of right-of-way to
respondents relating to the southern portion owned by petitioner.

Moreover, the construction of the fence on the southern portion was done
by petitioner after the rendition and finality of the July 7, 2000 Decision
dismissing the case. It is plain to see that such act of constructing the fence
was subsequent to the Decision and could not have been covered by said
judgment. The dispute that arose from the blockade of the pathway on the
southern portion could be the subject matter of another complaint but
definitely was not an issue in the case. In the new case, respondents are
obliged to prove all the essential elements of the easement of right-of-way a
requirement which they failed to satisfy in the prior civil case.

2. NO; The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the
legality of an easement of right-of-way over the pathway located south of
petitioners property, nevertheless, concluded that the said passage was an
agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way which petitioner should
respect.
The trial court was in error.

It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes

immutable and unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend,
modify, or alter a final judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it. Any amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
To recapitulate, the dismissal of the Civil Case meant that no easement was
ever established on petitioner’s property. However, the trial court, by
issuing its March 20, 2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence
that limited respondents passage, effectively created a right-of-way on
petitioners property in favor of respondents allegedly on the basis of a
voluntary agreement between the parties. This directive was in
contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for
having been issued outside of the courts jurisdiction.

Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of
right-of-way, subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper,
relevant, and material to the issue of right-of-way as averred in the
complaint in the Civil Case, still, the conclusion that there was an agreed or
voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis. The records of the Civil
case do not reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the claimed
right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not
agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper
indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion
that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern
portion.

More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement

creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a
deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in writing. No written
instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.
 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146486
DIGEST BY: Reynaldo R. Badulis Jr.
Submitted: November 25, 2016

FACTS OF THE CASE

 The employees if Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, filed a formal complaint with
the OMB requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman, private
respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the Sexual harassment; Mulcting money from confidential
employees; and Oppression against all employees in not releasing the benefits of OMB-Visayas employees
on the date the said amount was due for release.
 The Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and
investigation on the matter. The FFIB found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of
extortion, sexual harassment and oppression.
 The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful
study, and following the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen
and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment.
 In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers (COP) to evaluate the merits
of the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and criminal investigation(s)
immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the complaint as
criminal and administrative cases.
 Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying that a
resolution be issued: issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin and restrain the respondents,
from suspending the petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica); thereafter, converting said TRO into a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction; after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the act of the Ombudsman of
authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which is equivalent to
authorizing the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against the petitioner, who is an
impeachable official, null and void ab initio.
 The CA held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the commentaries of noted
jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official, it was nevertheless
constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Courts past rulings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the the CA erred in declaring private respondent, a deputy ombudsman, in an impeachable official.

HELD
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states that: The President, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an office, reference was
made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading
commentators in constitutional law. Thus: It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have
made reference only to the Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies

Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the
Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in
unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In
their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XI, Section 2

DIZON vs. LOPEZ
DIZON V JUDGE LOPEZ
A complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay
City, with violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification
in connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon."
FACTS:
 April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of
private document. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive
portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the
decision on him.
 The judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision
sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him. The
accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision,
but although petitioner and his father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the
decision they were not able to do so.
 Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of
the decision until almost one year and eight months after the promulgation of its
dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, Sec.14 of the
Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and Sec.15 of the same
Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within
three months from the date of their submission.
 Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated
with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although
to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until
the day of its promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion
had been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker
II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the
decision. The court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of
private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent states
that the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was unintentional.
 The Deputy Court Administration believes that Judge Lopez should be given
admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for
violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack
of merit.

ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not the respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution. YES.

RATIO:
 The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which
provides:

 All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution

must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.
 It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the
accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts
and the law on which such judgment is based. However, the Court finds the other
charges against respondent to be without merit.
 First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by
reason of respondent's failure to furnish him with a copy of the decision until after one
year and eight months is without basis. Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a
copy of the complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for
reconsideration. Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judge's culpability.
Except for this incident, respondent's record of public service as legal officer and agent
of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State
Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for
more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing.
 In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that
repetition of the same acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
 PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. vs FELIX PARAS AND INLAND
TRAILWAYS, INC., AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012

Facts:

Felix Paras is engaged in the buy and sell of fish products. Sometime on his way home
to Manila from Bicol Region, he boarded a bus owned and operated by Inland Trailways, Inc.
and driven by its driver Calvin Coner.

While the said bus was travelling, it was bumped at the rear by another bus owned and
operated by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. As a result of the strong and violent impact,
the Inland bus was pushed forward and smashed into a cargo truck parked along the outer right
portion of the highway and the shoulder. Consequently, the said accident bought considerable
damage to the vehicles involved and caused physical injuries to the passengers and crew of the
two buses, including the death of Coner.

Paras was not spared from the effects of the accident. He was taken for an emergency
treatment in the nearby hospital and thereafter taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital in
which underwent several operations.

In view of financial constraints, Paras filed a complaint for damages based on breach
of contract of carriage against Inland to which it denied responsibility, by alleging, among
others, that its driver Coner had observed an utmost and extraordinary care and diligence to
ensure the safety of its passengers. In support of it, Inland invoked the Police Investigation
Report which established the fact that the Philtranco bus driver, Apolinar Miralles was the one
which violently bumped the rear portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and
proximate cause of Paras’ injuries.

The RTC ruled in favor of Paras and held that Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles jointly
and severally liable for actual and moral damages including attorney’s fees.

On appeal to the CA, it affirmed the RTC’s ruling that no trace of negligence at the
time of the accident was attributable to Inland’s driver, rendering Inland not guilty of breach
of contract of carriage.

Issue:

1. Whether or not moral damages is availing in view of the fact that the complaint had been
anchored on a breach of contract of carriage

2. Whether or not the award of temperate damages is proper

Held:

1. The SC held that Paras can recover moral damages based on a quasi-delict. As a general
rule, moral damages are not recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract.
 This is because such action is not included in Article 2219 of the Civil Code as one of the
actions in which moral damages may be recovered. By way of exception, moral damages
are recoverable in an action predicated on a breach of contract: (a) where the mishap results
in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206, (3) of
the Civil Code; and (b) where the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

2. In awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, the CA did not err, because Paras
and Inland were definitely shown to have sustained substantial pecuniary losses.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to award temperate damages
despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages. When the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be
allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot
be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.
 Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. 167330 (September 18, 2009)

Corona, J.:

Facts: On January 27, 2000, the respondent CIR sent petitioner assessment of
deficiency taxes, both Value-Added Tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) in
the total amount of P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997.
Petitioner protested such assessment in a letter, but the respondent did not act on the
protest which led the petitioner to file a petition in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
seeking the cancellation of said assessments. CTA partially granted the petition
wherein the petitioner is ordered to pay the deficiency VAT and set aside the DST
deficiency tax.
Respondent appealed in Court of Appeals (CA) with regard to the cancellation of DST
assessment. CA granted the petition. The Court affirmed CA’s decision. Hence,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the DST on its health care
agreement pursuant to Sec.185 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997

Held: Petition granted. Petitioner is not contemplated to be included in “or other branch
insurance” covered by Section 185 of NIRC because it is a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) and not an insurance company. HMOs primary purpose is
rendering service to its member by lowering prices and reducing the cost rather than
the risk of medical health. On the other hand, insurance businesses undertakes for a
consideration to indemnify its clients against loss, damage or liability arising from
unknown or contingent event. The term “indemnify” therein presuppose that a liability
or claim has already been incurred. In HMOs, there is no indemnity precisely because
the member merely avails of medical services to be paid or already paid in advance
at a pre-agreed price under the agreements.
Moreover, HMOs play an important role in society as partners of the State in achieving
its constitutional mandate of providing citizens with affordable health services.
Also, the DST assessment of the petitioner for the years 1996 and 1997 became moot
and academic since it availed tax amnesty under RA 9480 on December 10, 2007.
Thus, petitioner is entitled to immunity from payment of taxes for taxable year 2005
and prior years.

THIRD DIVISION
ATTY. ALICE ODCHIGUE-BONDOC, petitioner, vs. TAN TIONG BIO A.K.A. HENRY TAN, respondent.

1. Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Words and Phrases; A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since
the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; A preliminary investigation thus
partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may
be taken.-
—A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since “the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused.” x x x [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable
the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor]
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the [prosecutor]. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power
for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.
2. Same; Same; National Prosecution Service (NPS) Rule on Appeal; When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review
does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in Section 7 of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) Rule on Appeal, he can decide what
action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12-
—in other words, Sections 7 and 12 are part of a two-step approach in the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary’s review power.—
Respecting the action of the Secretary of Justice on respondent’s petition for review under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, respondent
posits that “outright” dismissal is not sanctioned thereunder but under Section 7. Respondent’s position similarly fails. That the DOJ
Secretary used the word “outright” in dismissing respondent’s petition for review under Section 12 of the Rule which reads: SEC. 12.
Disposition of the appeal.—The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion,
dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds: x x x x That there is no showing of any reversible error; x x x x (italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) does not dent his action. To be sure, the word “outright” was merely used in conjunction with
the motu proprio action. Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright dismissal of a petition for review. These are (a)
when the petition is patently without merit; (b) when the petition is manifestly intended for delay; (c) when the issues raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration; and (d) when the accused has already been arraigned in court. When the Secretary of Justice is
convinced that a petition for review does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in Section 7, it can decide what action to take (i.e., reverse,
modify, affirm or dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12. In other words, Sections 7 and 12 are part of a two-step
approach in the DOJ Secretary’s review power.
3. Same; Same; Judgments; Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not extend to resolutions issued by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) Secretary.-
—Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, 562 SCRA 184 (2008), in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a
prosecutor’s order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is not a
quasi-judicial body.” Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates,
a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the
lot, despite repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the purchase price.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent, later learning that the lot "sold" to him was inexistent,2cra1aw filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including
its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and other employees.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner alleged that, inter alia,

xxxx

5. I had no participation at all in the acts or transactions alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. As a Corporate Secretary, I have never been
involved in the management and day-to-day operations of [Fil-Estate]. x x x

x x x x.

7. x x x. [Herein respondent] alleges:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"The letter showed that the request was approved by [herein petitioner], provided that the transfer fee was paid, and that there be payment
of full downpayment, with the balance payable in two years."

8) The handwritten approval and endorsement, however, are not mine. I have never transacted, either directly or indirectly, with Mrs. Ona
or [herein respondent]. x x x4cra1aw (emphasis partly in the original, partly supplied; underscoring supplied)

On the basis of petitioners above-quoted allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner,
docketed as I.S. No. PSG 03-07-11855 before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 20045cra1aw
for insufficiency of evidence, and denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by Resolution of July 20, 2005 signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary
of Justice,7cra1aw motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error, following Section 12(c)
of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule on Appeal).

Respondents motion for reconsideration having been denied8cra1aw by Resolution of January 23, 2006, he filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008,9cra1aw set aside the DOJ Secretarys Resolution, holding that it
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly
and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of disposing the petition outright is clearly delineated, not under Section 12 but, under
Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal which categorically directs the Secretary to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed
after arraignment; and that under Section 7, the Secretary may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit,
or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of "courts of justice"12cra1aw
; that, citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,13cra1aw the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive
departments such as the DOJ; and that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the DOJ to dismiss a petition for review motu
proprio, and the use of the word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution simply means "altogether," "entirely" or
"openly."14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Comment, respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,15cra1aw as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary
investigations conducted by these tribunals.

Further, respondent, citing Adasa v. Abalos,16cra1aw argues that the DOJ "muddled" the distinction between Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS
Rule on Appeal and that an "outright" dismissal is not allowed since the DOJ must set the reasons why it finds no reversible error17cra1aw
in an assailed resolution.

The petition is impressed with merit.

A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused."18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination,
he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
[prosecutor].19cra1aw (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future
action of a judicial nature may be taken.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Balangauan v. Court of Appeals21cra1aw in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body."22cra1aw Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Respondent posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the present case for, as the Supreme Court stated, the DOJ "rectified
the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved [the therein] respondent[s] . . . motion for
reconsideration."23cra1aw Respondents position fails.

Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution in resolving the therein respondents motion for reconsideration is immaterial.
The extended resolution did not detract from settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.

Respondents citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is misplaced as the Ombudsman dismissed the
therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman merely evaluated the complaint pursuant to Section 2,
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SEC. 2. Evaluation.Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;

c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;

d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;

e) referred for administrative adjudication; or

f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (emphasis supplied)

Respecting the action of the Secretary of Justice on respondents petition for review under Section 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, respondent
posits that "outright" dismissal is not sanctioned thereunder but under Section 7. Respondents position similarly fails.

That the DOJ Secretary used the word "outright" in dismissing respondents petition for review under Section 12 of the Rule which
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SEC. 12. Disposition of the appeal.The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon
motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxxx

(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;

x x x x (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

does not dent his action. To be sure, the word "outright" was merely used in conjunction with the motu proprio action.

Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright dismissal of a petition for review. These are (a) when the petition is
patently without merit; (b) when the petition is manifestly intended for delay; (c) when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration; and (d) when the accused has already been arraigned in court.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review does not suffer any of the infirmities laid down in Section 7, it can
decide what action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12. In other words,
Sections 7 and 12 are part of a two-step approach in the DOJ Secretarys review power.

As for respondents reliance on Adasa, it too fails for, unlike in the case of Adasa, herein petitioner has not been arraigned as in fact no
Information has been filed against her.

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will
establish probable cause in filing a criminal information,25cra1aw courts will not interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be
swamped with petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal complaint is dismissed or given due
course.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 and January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Facts:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part
of the National waters of the Philippines... is considered as the most important fishing area in
the Pacific side of the Bicol region.
Sometime in 1950, trawl1 operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this
region most of them settling at Sabang,... Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using
this particular method of fishing in said bay
On account of the belief of sustenance p fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear
caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor...
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in
San Miguel Bay.
League of
Municipal Mayors prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel
Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein
In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order
No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz., 1421) prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive
order was amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954 (50 Off. Gaz.,
4037), apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur...
recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2,
1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50 Off. Gaz., 5198) was issued reviving Executive Order
No. 23, to take effect after December 31, 1954;
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance
of Manila... to declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in
their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an
action against them;
Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive
Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in
other words,... Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance
thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.
But does the exercise of such authority by the President constitute an undue delegation of the
powers of Congress?
Ruling:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are declared invalid; the
injunction prayed for is ordered to issue; no pronouncement as to costs".
Passing upon the question involved in the second proposition, the trial judge extending the
controversy to the determination of which between the Legislative and Executive Departments
of the Government had "the power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters"... instead
of limiting the same to the real issue raised by the enactment of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66
and 80, specially the first and the last "absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all
the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay", ruled in favor of
Congress, and as the closing of any definite area of the Philippine waters is, according to His
Honor, primarily within the fields of legislation and Congress had not intended to abdieate its
power to legislate on the matter, he maintained, as stated before, that "until the... trawler is
outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive
proclamation", and that "the remedy for respondents and population of the coastal towns of
Camarines Sur is to go to the Legislature," and thus declared said Executive Orders Nos.
22, 66 and 80 invalid".
We are of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of
trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the
Secretary... of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even
cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or
orders are caught fishing with trawls in Philippine waters.
For the foregoing reasons We do not hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and
80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.
From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
471, which have been aforequoted, We find that Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or
catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines;
In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs and
small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to
prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and...
deplete our supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order
to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. Consequently, when the President, in response...
to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80
absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said...
coastal-province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C) which were in
consonance and strict conformity with the law.
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY VS.
JOSE LEIDO, JR., digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # L-49109 December 1, 1987 (Law on Natural Resources)
FACTS: Presidential Decree No.1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining
claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease of application within one (1)
year from the approval of the Decree. To protect its rights, petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company files a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition confronting the said Decree as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law. Subsequently, three (3) days after, petitioner filed a mining
lease application, but “under protest”, with a reservation that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until
the validity of the Decree shall have been passed upon by the Court.

The respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition and question the Decree as it
failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional, even assuming arguendo that petitioners was not
bound to exhaust administrative remedies for its mining claims to be valid in the outset. It is a valid exercise of
the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over the lands of the public domain, of which petitioner’s mining
claims still form a part. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art XIV of the 1937
Constitution.