G.R. No.

132988 July 19, 2000

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA
BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him
to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation
in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He
may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments
legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat.

The Case

Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as
it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.

On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for
Intervention,1 attaching thereto his Petition in Intervention2 joining petitioner in the reliefs sought. At the time, intervenor was the provincial
governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local
Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said Motion and Petition.

The Facts and the Arguments

On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as follows:

"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998

WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal
management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby order and direct:

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled
corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by
at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following:

a. Operationalization of new agencies;

b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;

c. Filling of positions; and

d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source.

2. Suspension of the following activities:

a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out;

b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;

c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants;

d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments
in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet;

e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the performance of
their regular functions and those that are funded by grants;

f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and
those involving regular competitions/events;

g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received by the person
concerned;

h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis;

i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and

j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities.

3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs

4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities

5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems

6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves

SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of cost-savings, provided the 25% minimum savings under
Section 1 is complied with.

SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall be submitted to the Office of the President, through the
Department of Budget and Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format.

SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the
amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.

SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a monthly review of the fiscal position of the National
Government and if necessary, shall recommend to the President the imposition of additional reserves or the lifting of previously imposed
reserves.

SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven."

Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent
(5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.

Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in
the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further
argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.

The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties
brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly
does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA does not violate the
statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."

The Issues

The Petition3 submits the following issues for the Court's resolution:

"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in
violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy

"B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"

In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b)
Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power
of general supervision over local governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus standi to bring this suit, despite respondents' failure to
raise the issue.4 However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any further discussion on this matter.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

Main Issue:

Validity of AO 372

Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned

Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy.

Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision. It reads as
follows:

"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x"

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,5 the Court contrasted the President's power of
supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:

"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s]
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."6

In Taule v. Santos,7 we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments,
so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over
an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"8 we said.

In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,9 the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the
rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or
redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising
officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.10 The members of the Cabinet and other executive
officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.11 In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are
elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat,
they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local
autonomy.12

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,13 we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government
over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the
purpose of enhancing self-government.14

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable
to the central government as the law may provide.15 The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was
explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin16 as follows:

"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'17 and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.'18 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general
supervision'19 over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.'20 He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.21

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."22

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.23

The Nature of AO 372

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order
was a "cash management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with available resources," which were presumably
depleted at the time due to "economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the President
deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as
well as local governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.

Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with
their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They
are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not.
Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,24 who in any case
are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure
that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of
the economic and planning agency of the government,25 primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs26 for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and
the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors,
and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:27

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized,
upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the
necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the
national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%)
of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the
very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did
they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no
authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since
it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of
Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the
directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The
language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic
difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is
understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light
that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.

Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.28 The Local Government Code29 specifies further that the
release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien
or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."30 As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that
must be given a compulsory meaning.31 The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld,
often temporarily."32 Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is
prohibited.

In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity
at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was
well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.

Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls
within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs’ IRA is implied in the President's authority to
adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.

First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been
adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the
executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial
function."

This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal
or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372,
not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara,33 this Court held that when an
act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this
Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:

"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'34 Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation
of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide.'35

xxx xxx xxx

"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,36 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority
to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality or department of the government."

In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:37

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute
violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process
really prevents its use against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the
opportunity to refute it.38

Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the
President's role as chief fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and
auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory
mandates."39 He cites instances when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs.

Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have not been challenged as violative of the
Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC)
and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO
372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.

Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in
striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make
necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section
284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such
reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the
leagues of local governments.

Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order
to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation
was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. This is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at the same
time president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) have protested
and instituted this action. Significantly, respondents do not deny the lack of consultation.

In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 28740 of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its
compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It
directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive
power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from implementing
Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.

Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J. Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 48-55.

2 Ibid., pp. 56-75.

3 This case was deemed submitted for decision on September 27, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of respondents' 10-page Memorandum,
which was signed by Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez and Sol. Ofelia B. Cajigal. Petitioner's Memorandum was filed earlier, on September
21, 1999. Intervenor failed, despite due notice, to submit a memorandum within the alloted time; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
filing of one.

4 Issues of mootness and locus standi were not raised by the respondents. However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan, as explained
in the main text, has stopped any further discussion of petitioner's standing. On the other hand, by the failure of respondents to raise
mootness as an issue, the Court thus understands that the main issue is still justiciable. In any case, respondents are deemed to have waived
this defense or, at the very least, to have submitted the Petition for resolution on the merits, for the future guidance of the government, the
bench and the bar.

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In striking down as unconstitutional and illegal Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 ("AO No. 372"), the majority opinion posits that the
President exercised power of control over the local government units ("LGU"), which he does not have, and violated the provisions of Section
6, Article X of the Constitution, which states:

SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.

and Section 286(a) of the Local Government Code, which provides:

SEC. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. - (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action,
directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of
each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.

The share of the LGUs in the national internal revenue taxes is defined in Section 284 of the same Local Government Code, to wit:

SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on
the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:

(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);

(b) On the second year, thirty-five (35%) percent; and

(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).

Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga," to make
the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year: Provided, further,
That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue
allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the
cost of devolved personal services.

xxx
The majority opinion takes the view that the withholding of ten percent (10%) of the internal revenue allotment ("IRA") to the LGUs pending
the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation as called for in Section 4
of AO No. 372 transgresses against the above-quoted provisions which mandate the "automatic" release of the shares of the LGUs in the
national internal revenue in consonance with local fiscal autonomy. The pertinent portions of AO No. 372 are reproduced hereunder:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998

WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal
management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country’s growth momentum;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby order and direct:

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including x x x local government units will identify and implement measures in FY
1998 that will reduce total appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:

xxx

SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation the
amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.

xxx

Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 43 ("AO No. 43"), amending Section 4 of
AO No. 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the IRA to be withheld from the LGUs, thus:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 43

AMENDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 DATED 27 DECEMBER 1997 ENTITLED "ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN
GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998"

WHEREAS, Administrative Order No. 372 dated 27 December 1997 entitled "Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998" was
issued to address the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation in 1997;

WHEREAS, Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 provided that the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local
government units shall be withheld; and,

WHEREAS, there is a need to release additional funds to local government units for vital projects and expenditures.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
do hereby order the reduction of the withheld Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units from ten percent to five percent.
The five percent reduction in the IRA withheld for 1998 shall be released before 25 December 1998.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety eight.

With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the majority opinion.

Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on its face,
the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the
idea that the withholding is merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality, especially in
light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies act in conformity with the law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has
not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative
order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too
remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function. Petitioners have not shown that the alleged 5% IRA share of LGUs
that was temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) has refused and
continues to refuse its release. In view thereof, the Court should not decide as this case suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional
issues.

The President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately responsible for the collection and distribution of public money:

SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national
resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.1

In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal officer is directed towards "the nation's efforts at economic and social upliftment"2 for which more
specific economic powers are delegated. Within statutory limits, the President can, thus, fix "tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government,"3 as he is
also responsible for enlisting the country in international economic agreements.4 More than this, to achieve "economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations," the President is empowered to create appropriation reserves,5 suspend expenditure
appropriations,6 and institute cost reduction schemes.7

As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in the local government units and ensures that laws are
faithfully executed.8 For this reason, he can set aside tax ordinances if he finds them contrary to the Local Government Code.9 Ordinances
cannot contravene statutes and public policy as declared by the national govemment.10 The goal of local economy is not to "end the relation
of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units,"11 but to make local governments
"more responsive and accountable" [to] "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress."12

The interaction between the national government and the local government units is mandatory at the planning level. Local development plans
must thus hew to "national policies and standards"13 as these are integrated into the regional development plans for submission to the
National Economic Development Authority. "14 Local budget plans and goals must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with "national
development goals and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and physical
resources."15

Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only of his power of general supervision, but also in conformity with
his role as chief fiscal officer of the country in the discharge of which he is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of
safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the
constitutional16 and statutory17 mandates.

However, the phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the funds is mechanical, spontaneous,
self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be determined, and the money for their payment collected.18 In this regard, administrative
documentations are also undertaken to ascertain their availability, limits and extent. The phrase, thus, should be used in the context of the
whole budgetary process and in relation to pertinent laws relating to audit and accounting requirements. In the workings of the budget for
the fiscal year, appropriations for expenditures are supported by existing funds in the national coffers and by proposals for revenue raising.
The money, therefore, available for IRA release may not be existing but merely inchoate, or a mere expectation. It is not infrequent that the
Executive Department's proposals for raising revenue in the form of proposed legislation may not be passed by the legislature. As such, the
release of IRA should not mean release of absolute amounts based merely on mathematical computations. There must be a prior
determination of what exact amount the local government units are actually entitled in light of the economic factors which affect the fiscal
situation in the country. Foremost of these is where, due to an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President may make the necessary
adjustments in the IRA of LGUs. Thus, as expressly provided in Article 284 of the Local Government Code:

x x x (I)n the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby
authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga," to make the
necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year. x x x.

Under the aforecited provision, if facts reveal that the economy has sustained or will likely sustain such "unmanageable public sector deficit,"
then the LGUs cannot assert absolute right of entitlement to the full amount of forty percent (40%) share in the IRA, because the President
is authorized to make an adjustment and to reduce the amount to not less than thirty percent (30%). It is, therefore, impractical to
immediately release the full amount of the IRAs and subsequently require the local government units to return at most ten percent (10%)
once the President has ascertained that there exists an unmanageable public sector deficit.

By necessary implication, the power to make necessary adjustments (including reduction) in the IRA in case of an unmanageable public
sector deficit, includes the discretion to withhold the IRAs temporarily until such time that the determination of the actual fiscal situation is
made. The test in determining whether one power is necessarily included in a stated authority is: "The exercise of a more absolute power
necessarily includes the lesser power especially where it is needed to make the first power effective."19 If the discretion to suspend
temporarily the release of the IRA pending such examination is withheld from the President, his authority to make the necessary IRA
adjustments brought about by the unmanageable public sector deficit would be emasculated in the midst of serious economic crisis. In the
situation conjured by the majority opinion, the money would already have been gone even before it is determined that fiscal crisis is indeed
happening.

The majority opinion overstates the requirement in Section 286 of the Local Government Code that the IRAs "shall not be subject to any lien
or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose" as proof that no withholding of the release of the IRAs
is allowed albeit temporary in nature.

It is worthy to note that this provision does not appear in the Constitution. Section 6, Art X of the Constitution merely directs that LGUs "shall
have a just share" in the national taxes "as determined by law" and which share "shall be automatically released to them." This means that
before the LGU’s share is released, there should be first a determination, which requires a process, of what is the correct amount as dictated
by existing laws. For one, the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code allows deductions from the IRAs, to wit:

Article 384. Automatic Release of IRA Shares of LGUs:

xxx

(c) The IRA share of LGUs shall not be subject to any lien or hold back that may be imposed by the National Government for whatever
purpose unless otherwise provided in the Code or other applicable laws and loan contract on project agreements arising from foreign loans
and international commitments, such as premium contributions of LGUs to the Government Service Insurance System and loans contracted
by LGUs under foreign-assisted projects.

Apart from the above, other mandatory deductions are made from the IRAs prior to their release, such as: (1) total actual cost of devolution
and the cost of city-funded hospitals;20 and (2) compulsory contributions21 and other remittances.22 It follows, therefore, that the President
can withhold portions of IRAs in order to set-off or compensate legitimately incurred obligations and remittances of LGUs.

Significantly, Section 286 of the Local Government Code does not make mention of the exact amount that should be automatically released to
the LGUs. The provision does not mandate that the entire 40% share mentioned in Section 284 shall be released. It merely provides that the
"share" of each LGU shall be released and which "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." The provision on automatic release of IRA share should, thus, be read together with Section 284,
including the proviso on adjustment or reduction of IRAs, as well as other relevant laws. It may happen that the share of the LGUs may
amount to the full forty percent (40%) or the reduced amount of thirty percent (30%) as adjusted without any law being violated. In other
words, all that Section 286 requires is the automatic release of the amount that the LGUs are rightfully and legally entitled to, which, as the
same section provides, should not be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the national revenue taxes. So that even if five
percent (5%) or ten percent (10%) is either temporarily or permanently withheld, but the minimum of thirty percent (30%) allotment for the
LGUs is released pursuant to the President's authority to make the necessary adjustment in the LGUS' share, there is still full compliance with
the requirements of the automatic release of the LGUs' share.

Finally, the majority insists that the withholding of ten percent (10%) or five percent (5%) of the IRAs could not have been done pursuant to
the power of the President to adjust or reduce such shares under Section 284 of the Local Government Code because there was no showing
of an unmanageable public sector deficit by the national government, nor was there evidence that consultations with the presiding officers of
both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the various leagues had taken place and the corresponding recommendations of the Secretary
of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the Budget Secretary were made.

I beg to differ. The power to determine whether there is an unmanageable public sector deficit is lodged in the President. The President's
determination, as fiscal manager of the country, of the existence of economic difficulties which could amount to "unmanageable public sector
deficit" should be accorded respect. In fact, the withholding of the ten percent (10%) of the LGUs' share was further justified by the current
economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation as shown by one of the "WHEREASES" of AO No. 372.23 In the absence of any
showing to the contrary, it is presumed that the President had made prior consultations with the officials thus mentioned and had acted upon
the recommendations of the Secretaries of Finance, Interior and Local Government and Budget.2 4

Therefore, even assuming hypothetically that there was effectively a deduction of five percent (5%) of the LGUs' share, which was in
accordance with the President's prerogative in view of the pronouncement of the existence of an unmanageable public sector deficit, the
deduction would still be valid in the absence of any proof that the LGUs' allotment was less than the thirty percent (30%) limit provided for in
Section 284 of the Local Government Code.

In resume, the withholding of the amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the IRA to the LGUs was temporary pending determination by
the Executive of the actual share which the LGUs are rightfully entitled to on the basis of the applicable laws, particularly Section 284 of the
Local Government Code, authorizing the President to make the necessary adjustments in the IRA of LGUs in the event of an unmanageable
public sector deficit. And assuming that the said five percent (5%) of the IRA pertaining to the 1998 Fiscal Year has been permanently
withheld, there is no showing that the amount actually released to the LGUs that same year was less than thirty percent (30%) of the national
internal revenue taxes collected, without even considering the proper deductions allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING,
ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT,
and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brevity).

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on
March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the
district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the
Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives,
invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly,
Region XII, in a letter which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and
traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as
envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at
the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence
over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the
following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY
MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE
DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO
SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING
BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat
of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8.
On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the
session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position
of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr.
Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-

(a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session
to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and
void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid
and subsisting, and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING
ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among
other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who
was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11,
elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that
"such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation
of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting
to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the
petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first
place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set
foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted
him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed
wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing
contemplated by law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need
only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had
in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut
their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.

In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising
from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by
the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which
some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot
possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is
enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due
process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless
subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their
affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao,
as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to
the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25,
1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to
"act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;

(6) Air and sea transport

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

(12) General auditing. 21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions ..." 22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government
unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since
no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. 31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of
the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But
if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that
is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."33 In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within
the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and
5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since
the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides
likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the
protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals"
referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess"
as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally
and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short
intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene
on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any
session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that
a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing
about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be
validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order
recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can
do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them. 39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the
petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.

G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CECILIA ALMAJOSE, respondents.

Legal Services Division for petitioner.

Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal,
prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No.
90-150 dated February 9, 1990.

The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo
San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)

The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the private respondent's appointment by denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain
Henedima del Rosario.

In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner
who further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms.
Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.

In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of
the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included
three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public
Accountant among the contenders.

On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal
upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.

In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos
to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.

On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not
meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not
through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of
Rizal for evaluation and processing.

On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting
against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the
private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive
Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the
position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a
Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly exercised its
prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.

On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.

On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating
his position regarding the matter.

Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which prompted the petitioner to submit before us the following
assignment of errors:

A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF
RIZAL.

B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.

C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.

D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO
COULD MEET THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)

All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of
Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of
DBM Region IV.

The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO
and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which
provides that:

Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management
upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed
under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in derogation of the provision so
that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment.

There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications
prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of
the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.

In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the
issue before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216,
subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of
the same code states that:

(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a
degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil
service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.

The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him before,
then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees to the position of Provincial Budget Officer
is to make his recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the
1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated
by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's
nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9,
1988.

The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:

As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus
qualified and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is
merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise
would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into consideration that said
officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized
representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit, only on another area or concern,
to that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local
government unit, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered
or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by
the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the
nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)

The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the
Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the
application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of
constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go
of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations.

President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their
attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural
communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject
to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show
to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.

In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and legislative powers was directed to give top
priority to making local autonomy effective.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as
follows:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)

the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The
President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is
both general and circumscribed by statute.

In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:

. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as the ponente, clarified matters. As was
pointed out, the presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not
thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in
an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justice in his opinion in the
Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would follow
then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that he could rightfully
exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken.

Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264,
"An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed.
It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local
governments governments."

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned, towards greater
autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle of government:

Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local government code defining more responsive
and accountable local government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in
accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was
specifically settled upon local governments.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.

Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local
autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units.

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the
letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers
and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful
local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:

Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the
prescribed requirements.

is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor.
If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local
level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review.
They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums
of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for
this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and
national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of
government.

It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges.1âwphi1 Under Article VIII
of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The President makes the appointments from
the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint
another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing
power's personal choice.

The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at
least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the
private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected.
The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and
discretion are manifest.

In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is
measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength
of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the
spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of
liberty upon which these provisions are based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment
of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of
Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and
SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.

Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or
remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No.
93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials
sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the
city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor;
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and
Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals.2 We
quote:

xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political
reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service
and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that
should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose
duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments
aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause
since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance
with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out
from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner.
Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and
decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.
Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom
Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the
area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988,
without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo
City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following
day.3

The Mayor thereafter answered4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding
events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of
Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the
petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel
Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings
but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings
and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to
postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988
for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On
September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a
postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11,
1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the
parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel
discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to
come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of
transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.

On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December
15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted
for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered
the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension
was not enforced.5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local
Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently,
he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days,
the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon
commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants,
and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated
a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary
Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and
restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course
thereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had
denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him7 arising from his
(Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the
last congressional and local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.10 He also alleges that he requested the
Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988),11
notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.12 He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the
Secretary rejected his request.13 He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable"14 grounds, among them, that he was
suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital"15 witness was also hospitalized16 but that the latter unduly denied
his request.17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any
authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).

As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been
deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his
"persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he,
Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore
that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration
party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face value,
much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say
so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is
presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban
prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the
Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the
Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a
matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has
been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove
local officials.

It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to
exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to
strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the
power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities
and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the
President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific
legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned,
as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and
commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be
held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so
warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided
by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest
the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against
local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however,
intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United
States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small
republics."26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative
responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence
on the central government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of
a local government code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a national representation law,30 and measures31
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government
code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units.32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to
strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local
legislation.33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary
of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
"supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,34 thus:

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the
power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials
of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the
other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...35

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."36 "Supervision" on the other hand means
"overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated
by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and possibly, a
fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may
be provided by law,"43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an
elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board."44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus,
according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and
suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional
limitations.45

In Hebron we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to
strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ...46

In Mondano, the Court held:

... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are
serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board,
if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds
nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed
that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.47

xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board
pursuant to the Administrative Code.48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the
President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the
law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's
powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would
exclude the power of removal from the President,50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not.51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said,
"supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local
autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of
Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments,
under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance
self- government.

As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed
looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which
is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this
information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all
this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has
been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as
in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of
time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people
of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo,
the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons,58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary
to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,59 is simply "to prevent the accused from
hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses"60 or to keep him off "the records
and other evidence.61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code,
it can not exceed sixty days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which
is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both
cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a
longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to
make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for
naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly
any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather
the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent
Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the
respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the
opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact
remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is
arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions
intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the
State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.

As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary
Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government,
upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or
administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on
those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain
accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local
governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein,
impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not
have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he
was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which
proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1âwphi1 The
suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. The sixty-day suspension
against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990

LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR.,
respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of
Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera
Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation
of' the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution, in Article X, provides:

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.

Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass
the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.

A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete Without reference to its historical background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on ideological grounds from the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the New People's Army. (NPA).

After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She called on all
revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and
some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As
Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA a
ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. 220).

The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle
but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the Cordillera
people shall have been substantially granted.

On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement,
flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs 2
and 3 of which state:

Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the
Cordillera people.

On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of
the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The
CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs.
7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is
established and organized [sec. 17].

Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:

WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an
urgent need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative
structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without
attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis.

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region,"
was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory
nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all offices and agencies created under Execute Order No.
220 shall cease to exist immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.

All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly shall automatically be transferred to
the Cordillera Autonomous Government.

It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as
faithful adherence to the principle of separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. Thus,
in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon
the challenger. Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge.

We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions.

In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have
come to the conclusion that petitioners' assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this
conclusion.

1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services
of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the
grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show
later.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative
commission shall first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act
shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into
law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the
plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created.

Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened,
saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been
passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No. 220. The steps taken by the President are obviously
perceived by petitioners, particularly petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army
(CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken by the President, We can only inquire into
whether or not the measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do not.

2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the
interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].

The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature
and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main
objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a
representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of
Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations as regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officio members and
headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the
existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and
appropriate national departments and agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development programs and projects
recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the appropriate executive departments and agencies of
the National Government to assist the CAR [sec. 24].

3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted Republic Act No. 6658 which created the
Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which
became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act
for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be
conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.

In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras is still to be created, showing the lack of basis of petitioners' assertion. Events have shown that petitioners' fear that
E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.

Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has failed.

II

A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial and political subdivision. The Constitution
provides in Article X:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.

We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now address
petitioners' assertion that E. 0. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.

After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision.

1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality,
unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the
power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier,
the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing new.1âwphi1 The Integrated
Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11)
regions, later increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the
National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan
are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide
economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and
agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided
by law. [See Part II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].

We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O.
No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but
also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.

2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and
considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more
than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the
President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional
development council.

III

Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept of local autonomy.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973
Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local
Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further
enlargement of local autonomy in the country [Villegas v. Subido, supra.]

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for
an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of
the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the
invalidation of E.O. No. 220.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result because with the enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220 has been
superseded. The basic issues have become moot and academic. The Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and the Cordillera
Autonomous Region have taken over the functions of the Cordillera Administrative Region. The latter office has become functus oficio.
Moreover, there can be no question about the validity of its acts because if it is not de jure, at the very least it is a de facto office.

I make these observations because I have grave doubts about the authority of the President to create such an office as the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) by mere executive fiat. The office has to be created by statute. To me, the functions of CAR go beyond ordinary
planning and preparation for the real office. In fact, Congress had to pass Republic Act 6658 for this purpose. CAR was an agency which
accelerated economic and social growth in the Cordilleras, coordinated the implementation of programs, accepted projects and activities in
the Cordilleras, and discharged basic administrative functions. It was a de facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully valid
creation.

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal,
HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO,
REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO,
respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel
S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio
M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the
same Barangay and Municipality.

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign
the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay,
Rizal;

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited
from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3
of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and
shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for
being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in
office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of
replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a
policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X
of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent,
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the
Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of
this Petition. Without costs.

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South
Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division,
Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District,
Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT
(Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of
the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY
LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734),
authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the
Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of
Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29,
1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question.

The facts are as follows:

Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of
Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on
November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734
provides,

That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429,
"providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 —

(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.

(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.

(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of Congress representing various legislative
districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then
President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that

There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions — some of which did not even
take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and
restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that
"the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South
Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This
can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus

Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field services of
government agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge
does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be
construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory construction.

The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this
reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not valid under
the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the
House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities.1

As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991,
petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of
taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to
the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the
exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the
President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to
transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally
lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec,2 and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments
and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, §16 and Art. VII, §17, respectively, of the Constitution.

He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation
because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of
Binangonan,3 in which the power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that —

[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created,
and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might
require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title
of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.

He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are
located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.

Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority,
the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive national government, including but not
limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework:

(a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions;

(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process;

(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping of purposes, functions, activities, and programs;

(d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate organizational structures;

(e) Further development of the regionalization process; and

(f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative relationships among government entities.

For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the President to reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass all
agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, including all government owned or controlled corporations as well
as the entire range of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, acid related aspects pertaining to these agencies,
entities, instrumentalities, and units.

2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:

xxx xxx xxx

f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as
well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or
controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters.

g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree.

Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:

(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in
character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
President's discretion;

(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and

(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the
plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and

(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to
Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No.
5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and
corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government."4 The
Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31,
1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of its next regular session.
The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress.5

Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven administrative
regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended
in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No.
773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No.
1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.

Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him
by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to
the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country
into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which
the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and
political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes."7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries8 which has been described in Pelaez
v. Auditor General9 or as "administrative in nature."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the
power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.

First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found
in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the
President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the
government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve
the service in the transaction of the public business."12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance
with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in
view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was
to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.

Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that
"every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to that subject. 14
Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the
provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, §13 provides that those which did not vote for
autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims:

The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring
certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is
EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized
action of the President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental,
formerly of Region X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis,
Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region
IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from
Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities voted "NO",
and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15

The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by
administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the
regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming
other regions as the exigency of administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for
the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that
a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all
have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized
that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
are located, can be "merged" by the President.

To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited
without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions
in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based
on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and
language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.

What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the
determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere
"groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To
the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the
power to determine the regional center.

It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums
of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of
the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation. In any event
this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 92649 February 14, 1991

SPOUSES LEONOR and ROSA BADUA, petitioners, vs. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION, CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY, MANUEL TAO-IL, AMOGAO-EN KISSIP, DALALO ILLIQUES, JUANITO GAYYED, PEDRO CABANTO,
VICENTE DAYEM and DAVID QUEMA, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute is the legal issue
presented by this petition.

The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra. In July 1989, they were
forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Cordillera Bodong Administration in Case No. O, entitled "David Quema vs.
Leonor Badua."

The factual background of the case, as recited in the undated "decision" (Annex A, translation is Annex A-1) is as follows:

In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997 and
4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years later, on
August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir,
Jessie Macaraeg.

On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa could not
produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.

As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the
dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of
the Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19, 1989 and rendered the following decision:

9. The Maeng Tribal Court, therefore, decides to give the land to DAVID QUEMA and ROSA BADUA and her husband must pay the persons
to whom they mortgaged the said land. The Maeng Tribal Court also decides that ROSA BADUA and her husband must reimburse the
expenses of DAVID QUEMA in following-up the land case amounting to P2,000.00. The Maeng Tribal Court further decides to penalize ROSA
BADUA and her husband in the amount of P5,000.00 for telling the lie that they bought this land from the late DRA. EROTIDA VALERA; for
misleading the Maeng Tribal Court which handled the continuation of this case here in Bangued, CBA Provincial Office where they failed to
make an appearance; and their illegal acquisition of the said parcel of land. This decision is based on the "PAGTA." (pp. 16-17, Rollo.)

When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land, they received on June 30, 1989 a "warning order" from Ka Blantie, Zone
Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, thus:

WARNING ORDER

Mr. & MRS. LEONOR BADUA

A last warning from the armed CPLA of the CBA reiterates the order that you not to interfere any longer with the parcels of land decided in
favor of DAVID QUEMA as per "Court Order" of the Maeng Tribal Court. You are also to pay back the expenses he incurred for the case
amounting to P2,000.00 and your fine of P5,000.00.

Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bring this case to another Court will force the CPLA to settle the matter,
in which case, you will have no one to blame since the case has been settled. (p. 20, Rollo.)

Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the Cordillera People's Liberation Army
and detained for two days.

On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" (which may be treated as a petition for certiorari and
prohibition) praying that:
1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents from enforcing the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration
during the pendency of this case;

2. the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing cases; and

3. the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Cordillera People's Liberation Army be clarified.

Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because:

1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and

2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the private respondent as
neither of them are members of the Maeng Tribe.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court on April 5, 1990 required the respondents to comment, but, unable to serve said resolution on the
respondents, the court requested the Philippine Constabulary Commander of the Cordillera Region to do it.

Respondents through counsel, Atty. Demetrio V. Pre, filed their comment on October 26, 1990. They alleged that: the Maeng Tribe is a
cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong
Association or Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The tribal court, or council of elders, is composed
of prominent and respected residents in the locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular courts, without
the intervention of lawyers.

Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected and obeyed by the parties, the municipal and
barangay officials, and the people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for disobedience of, or non-compliance with, the decisions of the
council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate.

Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a part of the judicial system.

Respondents concede that if the petitioners "want to test the wisdom of the decision of the council of elders," the petitioners should file the
necessary suit, not in the Supreme Court, but in the trial courts where evidence can be presented. Respondents pray that the decision of the
tribal court be maintained and the petition for certiorari and prohibition be dismissed.

After deliberating on the petition and the comment thereon of the respondents, which the Court decided to treat as the latter's answer, the
Court finds the petition to be meritorious, hence, resolved to grant the same.

In Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 93054, December 4,
1990, the Court en banc, found that in the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city * of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the
Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.

Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly
repealed or amended.
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under Section 13 of Executive Order No.
220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and
the Cordillera People's Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and
4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.

Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or
special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an
indigenous cultural community.

Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been
established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created
by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a
dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.

An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of
a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary
of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D.
1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or set aside,
in and through the regular courts today.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision rendered on February 18, 1989 by the Maeng
Tribal Court in Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs. the Leonor Badua," is hereby annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents
Cordillera Bodong Administration, Cordillera People's Liberation Army, Manuel Tao-il, Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques, Juanita Gayyed,
Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem and David Quema, are hereby ordered to cease and desist from implementing said decision, without prejudice
to the filing of an appropriate action by the parties in the proper competent courts of the land as provided by law. Costs against the
respondents.

G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI
MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other
taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE,
DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989

ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget,
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.

Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.

CORTES, J.:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the
Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional .

After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was
deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave
to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and

(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and
Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of
Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and
enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2

In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter
provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."

To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:

Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.

Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses,
pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.

1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734
conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international
agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic
of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international
agreement.

We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the
Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would
therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the
Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it
would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter
[SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet.
253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by
this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3

2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.

In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created
composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions
necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly
indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a
specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements
embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days
or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote
for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].

As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this
majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the
constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated.
Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the
will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of
the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units
and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under
Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view,
share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be
properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces
of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share
the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common
attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of
the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil
139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view
that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas,
its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies
said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.

Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what
areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such
determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized
legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.

Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M.
Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another where the
groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification
having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.

Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion
[Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the
Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah
courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran,
which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by
enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law
might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.

As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first
exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no
actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential
conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution
upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict
with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National
Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which
was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict
between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of
local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, not to administrative regions.

Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the
autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3
and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the regional government shall
be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years
from the organization of the regional government.

It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with
supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.

Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by
majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect
delay the creation of the autonomous region.

Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by
majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect.
The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of
effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such
is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot
be sustained as there is no bases therefor.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No.
L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those
who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. otherwise,
their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO
TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO
ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO
SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA, ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN
MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN, ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN
TABANG, ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO
A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAI, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MECHOR J. LAYSON, MELANIE AMANTE, CLARO E.
YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASETA, JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY,
RONALD VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILFREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN
ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN,
FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO MODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG,
NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILFREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO,
TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAÑEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL,
DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO
CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YBAÑEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO,
NESTOR SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN, JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO
SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN, petitioners,

vs.

HON. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN, namely,

VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO,
NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUNA, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA,
GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN,
MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND METROPOLITAN, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners caption their petition as one for "Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order" and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts 1 and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The following is petitioners' summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition:

1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on
January 1, 1993 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF", the full
text of which reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Title of the Ordinance. — This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.
Sec. 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. — To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance[s], and
shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are (sic) directly or indirectly in the
business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. — For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby defined:

A. SEA BASS — A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP;

B. CATFISH — A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO;

C. MUDFISH — A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG;

D. ALL LIVE FISH — All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use[d] for food and for aquarium purposes.

E. LIVE LOBSTER — Several relatively, large marine crusteceans [sic] of the genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily
moving.

Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of
destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.

Sec. 5. Penalty Clause. — Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than
P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or
all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.

Sec. 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found violating the provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership,
the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager,
as the case maybe [sic].

Sec. 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed repealed.

Sec. 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx xxx xxx

2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22,
1993 which reads as follows:

In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD 426-14-74, otherwise known as "AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY
PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS
POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYOR'S PERMIT" and "City
Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes
containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction
of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this Office and the
shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance
with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.

Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for proper disposition.

In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other
offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in
the conduct of the inspection.

Please be guided accordingly.

xxx xxx xxx

3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: "A
RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL
DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS
(PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRIDACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA
(MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER),
EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5)
YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS", the full text of which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in
excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;

WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing
activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the
devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;

WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others.

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of all the members present;

Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance
No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:

ORDINANCE NO. 2

Series of 1993

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED:

Sec. 1. TITLE — This Ordinance shall be known as an "Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno) 3.
Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera
(Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus
(Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (T[r]opical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan
Waters.

Sec. II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a] more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.

2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units. "Any fair and reasonable
doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned."

3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government
units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.

4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Sec. III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine
resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective and
consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is (sic) shall be unlawful
for any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;

Sec. IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. — Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of the Court;

Sec. V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. — If for any reason, a Section or provision of this Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid,
it shall not affect the other provisions hereof.

Sec. VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified,
amended or repealed.

Sec. VII. EFFECTIVITY — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes "A" and "C" hereof thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole
province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of
Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even
charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon
copy of the criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex "D"; while xerox copies are attached as Annex "D" to the
copies of the petition;

6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of
Puerto Princess City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex "E";

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutor's office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original
jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that:

First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied; in other words,
the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.

Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping
of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method," the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline
Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper,
necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion."

Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and
the others have to be dismissed.

In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with
a copy thereof.

In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare
clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section
447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the
Province of Palawan had "the right and responsibility . . . to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory
remain healthy for the future generation." The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms
which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the
prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.

Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful
purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed "between a fisherman who catches live fish
with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live," i.e., "the former uses sodium
cyanide while the latter does not." Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.

On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, claiming that despite the
pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against
petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Linijan and Angel de Mesa for violation of
Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary restraining
order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No.
11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed by said office in its
Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.

The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.

In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 2

On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latter's motion of 9 July 1997 for an
extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further delay, we dispensed with said comment.

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, and on 22 July 1997, assigned it to the
ponente to write the opinion of the Court.

There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano,
Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged
with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case
No. 93-05-C of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; 3 and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating
City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. 4 All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and
Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. 5

The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan — an alleged private association of several marine merchants — are natural persons who claim to be
fishermen.

The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until
the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim
that being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinance's.

As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action.
There is no showing that said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and that
the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the
ordinances in question are unconstitutional. 6 It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if
petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go
to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 7 And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the
subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity
to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. 8 Finally, even if a motion for
reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in
Section 1 thereof. 9 For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have, alleged any of such grounds.

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances
in question are a "nullity . . . for being unconstitutional."10 As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved,11 it being settled that the Court merely exercises
appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.12
II

Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why
direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma.13

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not . . . to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court's docket. . . .

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a
growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. . . .

In Santiago v. Vasquez,14 this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must
be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated "the judicial policy that
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction."

III

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering
that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1
January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides,
these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the
environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised.

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. 15 To
overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.16 Where doubt exists, even if
well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.17

After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find
petitioners' contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable
laws.

Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having been transgressed by the
Ordinances.

The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:

Sec. 2. ...
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and
self-reliance.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology
and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan is self-described as "a private association composed of Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim and
Virginia Lim, as "merchants;" while the rest of the petitioners claim to be "fishermen," without any qualification, however, as to their status.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal" fishermen,18 they should be
construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in
his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish,19 while a
subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.20 Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160)
defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or
exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears repeating that nothing in the record
supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only
provision of law which speaks of a preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC, which pertinently provides:

Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. — . . .

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the
municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall
have the preferential right to such fishery privileges . . . .

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3 dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed guidelines concerning the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the
fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development
and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the
end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come.

The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance
with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their "exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, their
mandated protection, development and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions
on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal
fishermen, the following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the
plenary session of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. RODRIGO:

Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How
will this be implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that government officials will know that one is really a marginal
fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he is one.

MR. BENGZON:

Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this particular question could be tackled when we discuss the
Article on Local Governments — whether we will leave to the local governments or to Congress on how these things will be implemented. But
certainly, I think our congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this mandate.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO:

So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.

MR. BENGZON:

Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be existing or will be passed.21 (emphasis supplied)

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. 22 On this score, in Oposa v.
Factoran, 23 this Court declared:

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill
of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed
by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. . . .
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the
community."

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.24 Further, the sangguniang bayan, the
sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and
its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological

imbalance."25

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization26 as expressly mandated by the Constitution.27 Indispensable to
decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned."28 Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.29

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves.30 This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws
within the municipal waters.

The term "municipal waters," in turn, includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of
private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also
marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from

it.31 Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the
above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.

These "fishery laws" which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b)(2)(i) in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2)
P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a "closed season" in any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or
ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A.
No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell,
offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or "ipon" during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451
which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR.

To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment
are concerned, must be added the following:

1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;

2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;

3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;

4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters;

5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;

6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;

7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and

8. Establishment of "closed season" in municipal waters.

These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Interior and Local Government.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government
units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental
Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of
Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province," which "shall serve to
guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs
and projects affecting said province."32

At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the
environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted
earlier.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish
or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa
and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015,
which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of
Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to
cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.33

The destruction of coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among nature's life-support
systems.34 They collect, retain and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide
food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic organisms.35 It is said that "[e]cologically, the reefs are to
the oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear without
them."36

The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade which entails the catching of
so-called exotic species of tropical fish, not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for "the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually
insatiable in ever more affluent Asia.37 These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them by "diving in shallow water with
corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized
[merely stunned] and then scooped by hand."38 The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff.
Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the
cyanide from their system and are ready to be hauled. They are then placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater
for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish.39 While the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former
home as "[a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral
starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The
reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the
waves."40 It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated application.41

The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious.
In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.

As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein
violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the
Mayor's Permit.

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility
of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in
any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in
accordance with P.D. No. 704.

The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P.D. No. 704, over the management,
conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing.
First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city
government concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal centers are concerned. This section provides, however,
that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval.42

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural Resources (now Department of
Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the
Minister (formerly Secretary) Of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency
thereof, integrating its functions with the regional offices of the MAF.

In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And
under the Administrative Code of 1987,43 the BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the Department of Agriculture.44

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not
approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture. However, the requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances
affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:

(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Sections 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 70445 insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC.

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances
to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges
in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of
applicable fishery laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan
the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication
of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."47

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby
sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused
from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the
repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.

G.R. No. 112243 February 23, 1995

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, DR. ORLANDO PUA and DR. JOSE CABRERA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGER
A. DOMAGAS and FE SIBBALUCA, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

Petitioners seek the reversal of respondent court's decision dated July 21, 1993 dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition in
CA-G.R No. 28361 assailing the decision and orders of respondent Presiding Judge the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Tuguegarao Cagayan
restraining petitioners from enforcing the order of preventive suspension issued against respondent Fe Sibbaluca, former Administrative
Officer of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan.

The antecedent facts of the case as found by respondent court are as follows:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners stemmed from the administrative complaint filed against private respondent Fe
Sibbaluca, the Administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan, for grave misconduct, dishonesty; etc. The case was
docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 of the Department of Health, Manila.

As a consequence of the administrative case, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension for ninety [90] days per order
dated December 17, 1991, issued by herein petitioner Secretary of Health.

Private respondent sought the lifting of her suspension thru a motion dated January 8, 1992.

Pending resolution of her said motion, private respondent instituted an action for prohibition, mandamus, and injunction with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao (Branch 1), docketed as
Civil Case No. 4379 and 4397, seeking the nullification of the order of preventive suspension and of the entire administrative proceedings. Her
action is anchored on her contention that when the New Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had
lost his disciplinary power and authority over her, considering that such power to discipline the personnel of the Provincial Health Office is
now vested in the Provincial Governor.
Finding merit to the ancillary remedy sought by private respondent, the Regional Trial Court, thru the herein respondent Judge, issued a
temporary restraining order on January 15, 1992, restraining the Secretary of Health and his representatives from enforcing the preventive
suspension order and from conducting further proceedings in the administrative case against private respondent.

On February 3, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed an omnibus motion to dismiss private respondent's action and to quash the temporary
restraining order, with opposition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, contending inter alia that private respondent had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and that the New Local Government Code did not divest the Secretary of Health of his disciplinary
jurisdiction over the private respondent.

During the hearing of the omnibus motion as well as the application for a preliminary injunction, the counsel for the Secretary of Health
manifested that they are not participating in the proceedings. Thus, private respondent presented her testimony, who was then
cross-examined by the counsel for the other two petitioners herein, Dr. Orlando Pua, the Director of the Regional Health Office No. 2, and Dr.
Jose Cabrera, the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan.

After the hearing, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda.

In a decision dated March 25, 1992, the respondent Judge rendered judgment in favor of private respondent and against petitioners, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

The Court is aware that ordinarily it should not interfere with in the prosecution of administrative complaint as in the case at bar based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum shopping. Considering, however, that with the enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992, the provincial health board headed by the governor is empowered to create
committees which shall advise local health agencies on matters of grievance and complaints, personal discipline, it is clear that the Secretary
of Health ceases to have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and consequently the power and authority to issue the order of
suspension (Sec. 102 of the Local Government Code of 1991).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents restraining immediately the latter from
enforcing the order of preventive suspension dated December 17, 1991 until the administrative case is investigated and resolved by the
provincial health board.

For insufficiency of evidence the contempt charge is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (p. 39, Rollo)

The private respondent, in a motion dated April 3, 1992, sought clarification of the decision. She also moved for the execution of the same.
Acting on the motion, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 14, 1992, ordering the issuance of a writ of execution "to implement
the decision of the Court dated March 25, 1992." The order further states: "On the motion for clarification, considering the finding of this
Court that the Secretary of Health ceases to have jurisdiction to discipline the petitioner (now private respondent, necessarily, the order of
suspension and all other orders emanating thereafter are null and void and of no further effect" (Annex "B", Petition; p. 40, Rollo).

Copies of the decision dated March 25, 1992 and the order dated April 14, 1992 were received by petitioners on April 10, 1992 and April 15,
1992, respectively.

On April 27, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 25, 1992 decision and of the April 14, 1992 order, insisting that
the Secretary of Health has jurisdiction over the administrative case. Petitioners also contended, among other things, that respondent Judge
has no jurisdiction to nullify all orders issued by the secretary of Health, "they being of equal rank."

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated May 28, 1992 (Annex "A", Petition; p. 58, Rollo).
On the same date of May 28, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed a Notice of Appeal with the court a quo, giving notice that he is appealing the
decision dated March 25, 1992 to the Court of Appeals on both questions of fact and law (pp. 13 and 103, Rollo).

On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed another motion to stay the execution of the assailed decision.

Both the notice of appeal and the motion to stay execution were denied upon the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time and
that the assailed decision had already become final and executory. The denial was contained in a decision dated June 26, 1992 which
convicted co-petitioner Dr. Jose Cabrera of indirect contempt of court for refusing to comply with the writ of execution (Annex "C", Petition;
p. 41, Rollo).

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision dated March 25, 1992, the
order dated April 14, 1992 and the decision dated June 26, 1992. (Rollo, pp. 32-35)

Respondent court dismissed the petition filed by petitioners and ruled that an ordinary appeal by mere notice of appeal is the plain and
adequate remedy of petitioners against the three assailed processes of the lower court (Rollo, p. 35). The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners was also denied (Rollo, p. 54).

The petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION FILED BY PETITIONERS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 28361.

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TOUCHING ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)

We find merit in this petition.

At the outset, it should be noted that petitioners' notice of appeal was filed out of time. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before respondent court.

Respondent court, believing that the said petition was made as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, held that where the proper remedy
is appeal, the action for certiorari will not entertained. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners was dismissed.

In a long line of cases we held that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not lie as a substitute for an
available or lost appeal (Sy v. Romero, 214 SCRA 187 [1992]). Nevertheless, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this
Court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (PNB v.
Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]).

In the present case, the petition for certiorari filed before respondent court was not filed as a mere substitute for appeal. The facts and
circumstances of this case warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition. The lower court issued a writ of execution of its
March 25, 1992 decision. The motion to stay execution of the said decision filed by petitioner Secretary of Health was denied. Likewise, the
notice of appeal filed by the said petitioner was also denied. In the same order, petitioner Dr. Jose Cabrera was found guilty of indirect
contempt and a penalty of three months imprisonment was imposed upon him for allegedly refusing to comply with the writ of execution.
Most importantly, petitioners question the jurisdiction of the lower court in enjoining the order issued by the Secretary of Health preventively
suspending and subsequently dismissing private respondent and declaring that the said department does not have the jurisdiction to issue
the said order.

On the merits, petitioners' main contention is that the court a quo erred in finding that the Secretary of Health has ceased to have
administrative jurisdiction over the person of private respondent in view of the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which took
effect on January 1, 1992 (Rollo, p. 19).

The resolution of the main issue raised by the petitioners calls for the determination of the date of effectivity of the Local Government Code
of 1991.

The pertinent provision of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Sec. 536. Effectivity Clause. — This code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred ninety-two, unless otherwise, provided herein,
after its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation. (Emphasis Supplied)

It is explicit in the abovestated law that the local Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on January 1, 1992. It is an elementary principle
of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the
legislature should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993]).

Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action (Philippine
Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993]).

In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before petitioner department in 1991. The case was docketed as
Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the
time of the commencement of the administrative action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119.
Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and supervision over his subordinates, which include private
respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continues until the final disposition of the administrative case.

This Court already ruled in a number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until the full termination
of the case, unless a law provides the contrary (Bueno Industrial and Development Corporation v. Enage, 104 SCRA 600 [1981]).

At this juncture, it bears stressing that private respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice as a shield to prevent the
implementation of administrative sanctions of executive against erring public servants.

WHEREFORE, respondent court's decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The challenged decision and orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch I, of Tuguegarao, Cagayan are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994

GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA, BATAAN; SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF BALANGA, BATAAN; HON. MELANIO S. BANZON, JR.; HON. DOMINGO D. DIZON; HON. AGRIPINO C. BANZON;
HON. EDUARDO P. TUAZON; HON. GABRIEL J. NISAY; HON. LORENZO P. TAPAN; HON. FEDERICO S. BUSTAMANTE; HON.
ROLANDO H. DAVID; HON. EDILBERTO Q. DE GUZMAN; HON. ALFREDO C. GUILA; and HON. GAVINO S. SANTIAGO,
respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte and Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.:

This a a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to annul Executive Order No. 1, s-88
and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issued, respectively, by the Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga, Bataan.

This case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 of the subdivision plan Psd 03-007623, situated in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of
Balanga, Province of Bataan. The lot has an area of 8,467 square meters. It is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 120152 issued
on January 11, 1988 by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bataan in the name of petitioner Greater Balanga Development Corporation.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family, which donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present
site of the Balanga Public Market. The lot in dispute lies behind the Balanga Public Market.

In 1987, petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area. It discovered that certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped
and invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga, which had "allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shanties and market stalls while
charging market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area. A portion of the lot had also been utilized as an
unloading site ("bagsakan") of transient vegetable vendors, who were charged market and entrance fees by the municipality.

On January 11, 1988, petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business in the said area.
On the same day, Mayor Melanio S. Banzon, Jr. issued Mayor's Permit No. 2729, granting petitioner the privilege of a "real estate
dealer/privately-owned public market operator" under the trade name of Balanga Public Market. The permit was to expire on December 31,
1988. Petitioner likewise registered "Balanga Central Market" as a trade name with the Bureau of Trade Regulations and Consumer
Protection.

On February 19, 1988, however, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88 annulling the Mayor's permit issued to
petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit "to operate a public market."

Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor Banzon, on March 7, 1988, issued Executive Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized
the operation of a public market.

On July 13, 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction or restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the curtailment of the municipality's collection of market
fees and market entrance fees. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs prayed for.

Respondent asserted that as the local chief executive, the Mayor may issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. They contended
that Resolution No. 12, s-88 of the Sangguniang Bayan, the basis of Executive Order No. 1, s-88, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative
authority and, as such, the revocation of petitioner's permit was not tainted with any grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner replied that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no reason for respondents to revoke the Mayor's permit issued
to it. On the contrary, petitioner asserted that the executive order and the resolution in question were quasi-judicial acts and not mere
exercises of police power. It questioned respondents' failure to observe due process in revoking the permit and challenged the legality of the
collection of the market and entrance fees by the municipality.

In their Rejoinder, respondents pointed out that petitioner had violated an existing municipal ordinance when it failed to disclose the true
status of the area involved in the permit and when it did not secure separate permits for its two businesses, i.e., one as "real estate dealer"
and another as "privately-owned public market operator." Respondents referred to Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code which,
inter alia, enjoins an applicant for a Mayor's permit from making a false statement in his application and provides for the penalties for violation
of any existing ordinance regulating business establishments.

II

Mayor's Permit No. 2729 was revoked by Executive Order No. 1, s-88, which reads as follows:

By virtue of the authority vested upon me by law as Mayor of the Municipality of Balanga, and as per Resolution No. 12, s-88 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga, the Mayor's Permit in the latter portion of its purpose, i.e., "to operate a public market," issued to the Greater
Balanga Development Corporation, is hereby REVOKED, effective immediately.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto have set my hand this 7th day of March 1988, at Balanga, Bataan.

(SGD.) MELANIO S. BANZON, JR.

Municipal Mayor

(Rollo, p. 36)

The authority of the Mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit
had been granted. Respondents claimed that petitioner had violated the provisions of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it
failed to inform the Mayor that the lot in controversy was the subject of adverse claims for which a civil case was filed.

Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code reads:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The application for a Mayor's permit shall state the name, residence and citizenship of (sic) the applicant's full description of the
business, the particular place where (sic) the same shall be conducted, and such other pertinent information and date (sic) as any (sic) be
required. If the applicant deliberately makes a false statement in the application form, the Municipal Mayor may revoke the permit and the
applicant may be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the pertinent provisions of penal laws.

In case a person desires to conduct the same kind or line of business in another place within the Municipality, in addition to or aside from the
establishment specified in his permit, he shall secure a separate permit for each business and pay the corresponding fee imposed in this
article. If a person desires to engage in more than one kind or line of business, he shall pay the fee imposed on each separate business,
notwithstanding the fact that he may conduct or operate all distinct business (sic), trades or occupation in one place only.

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Revocation of Permit. — The Municipal Mayor may revoke a permit, in effect close the establishment, upon a violation of existing
ordinance regulating business establishments or any provisions of this article, in addition to the fine and imprisonment that they (sic) may be
imposed by the court for violation of this article (Memorandum of the Solicitor General, pp. 16-17; Rollo, p. 322).

Respondents claim that petitioner (1) deliberately made a false statement in the application form when it failed to provide the information
that their place of business is the subject of adverse claims; and (2) failed to apply for two separate permits for the two lines of business it
proposed to engage in.
The application for Mayor's permit in the case at bench requires the applicant to state what type of "business", profession, occupation and/or
calling privileges" is being applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form (Rollo, p. 324). It is only in the Mayor's permit itself
that petitioner's lines of business appear, which in this case are two separate types, one as real estate dealer and another as public market
operator.

The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application form itself. Revoking the permit, however,
because of a false statement in the application form cannot be justified under the aforementioned provision. There must be proof of willful
misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed, and as it happened, petitioner did not
make any false statement in the pertinent entry.

Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does
not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each
business. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against
the municipality (City of Ozamiz v. Lumapas, 65 SCRA 33 [1975]). Granting, however, that separate permits are actually required, the
application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

Respondents insinuated bad faith on the part of petitioner in failing to supply the pertinent information in the application form and for taking
advantage of the fact that Mayor Banzon was then newly installed as Mayor of Balanga. The absence of the material information in the
application form was nonetheless supplied in the face of the permit signed and issued by Mayor Banzon himself (Rollo, p. 17).

Under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to provide for the establishment and maintenance of public markets in the municipality
and "to regulate any business subject to municipal license tax or fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license may be
revoked" (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [f & r]). It was this authority which respondent Sangguniang Bayan invoked when it issued Resolution
No. 12, s-88.

The said Resolution stated that the land subject of this case was earmarked for the expansion of the Balanga Public Market; that this land was
owned not by petitioner but by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 entitled "Leoncia Dizon, et. al. v. Aurora B. Camacho"; that the Municipality
of Balanga was not apprised of the existence of the civil case; that the decision awarding the lot to the plaintiffs and the issuance of the
Mayor's permit to petitioner who was not the rightful owner had caused "anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness" among the stallholders and
traders in the subject lot; and that the Sangguniang Bayan therefore resolved to annul the said Mayor's permit insofar as it concerns the
operation of a public market.

As may be gleaned from said Resolution, the main reason for the revocation of the Mayor's permit was the controversy engendered by the
filing of Civil Case No. 3803 before the Regional Trial Court, Balanga, Bataan involving the ownership of certain portions of Lot 261-B, the land
from which Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was derived.

Lot 261-B was originally owned and registered in the name of Aurora T. Banzon Camacho, who subdivided the land into nine lots under LRC

Psd-277050 and designated them as Lots 261-B-1 to 261-B-9. She denoted some of the lots to the Municipality of Balanga which now
comprise the Balanga Public Market, and sold others to third persons.

On January 30, 1974, five buyers of certain portions of Lot 261-B filed Civil Case No. 3803 against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.
Camacho was declared in default and the plaintiffs forthwith presented their evidence. On December 20, 1974, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering the defendant to segregate the definite portions sold to the plaintiffs and deliver to them the corresponding titles thereto.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 59148-R (G.R. No. 62223, Rollo, pp. 50-58).

The defendant elevated the matter to this Court. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1983, we denied the petition for lack of merit (G.R. No.
62223, Rollo, p. 100).

The question now is whether Lot 261-B-6-A-3 is a part of the land adjudged by the trial court in Civil Case No. 3803 to the plaintiffs, or any
one of them.
Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was originally registered in the name of Camacho under TCT No. T-104438. She denoted the land to her daughter, Aurora Fe
(Rollo,

p. 329). TCT No. 104438 was then cancelled and TCT No. T-104461 issued in the donee's name, who in turn, transferred the land to herein
petitioner. TCT

No. 104461 of Aurora Fe was cancelled and TCT No. 120152 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1988. On the same day, the
Mayor's permit to operate the lot as a public market was also granted.

It is the position of respondents that the series of transfers of the subject lot reveals a scheme to avoid the application of the decision in Civil
Case

No. 3803.

There is no question that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 is a portion of Lot 261-B-6, and the claims of the plaintiffs in the civil case were on Lots 261-B-6 and

261-B-7 (Rollo, p. 327). As to whether plaintiffs' claims embraced specifically Lot 261-B-6-A-3 could not be determined from the face of the
decision in the civil case. There is no showing that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was awarded by the court to one of the plaintiffs therein. There is no proof
either that the judgment in said case had already been executed and the titles delivered to the plaintiffs.

The question of ownership over Lot 261-B had already been settled with finality by the Supreme Court in 1983 in G.R. No. 62223. Entry of
judgment was likewise, made in the same year. When the Mayor's permit was revoked on February 19, 1988, five years had already elapsed
since the case was decided. Petitioner was able to survey the land and have the survey approved on March 21, 1984 (Rollo, pp. 15-16), and
on January 11, 1988, petitioner obtained in its name TCT No. 120152 "without any memorandum of encumbrance or encumbrances
pertaining to any decision rendered in any civil case" (Rollo,

p. 199). Clearly, for all intents and purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when respondents revoked its
permit to engaged in business on its own land.

Assuming arguendo that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was actually one of those awarded to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 and the Transfer
Certificate of Title of petitioner is spurious, this still does not justify the revocation of the Mayor's permit.

A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The
resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation proceedings
are instituted in court, the

landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land (Province of Rizal v. San Diego, 105 Phil. 33 [1959]; Republic v. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461
[1955]). Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal
license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]). But
the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After
all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal government. Indeed, the claim that the
executive order and resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and order and protect the general welfare of the people of
Balanga" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts (Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986]).

Moreover, we find that the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process (Gordon v. Veridiano
II, 167 SCRA 51 [1988]). The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation,
and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation until the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case. In fact, with all the more reason
should due process have been observed in view of the questioned Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.

The knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3803 could not ipso facto nullify any claim petitioner had on the lot. This necessitated first
and foremost a determination of the exact parameters of the lot and a finding that petitioner is not the true owner thereof. The finding that
Civil Case No. 3803 was already settled by the Supreme Court should have apprised respondents of the possibility that the decision therein
may have already been executed.

Indeed, the cases of Austin Hardware Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 564 (1976) and Enriquez v. Bidin, 47 SCRA 183 (1972) are in
point. In these cases, the revocation of the Mayor's permit was upheld by this Court because the grounds for revocation were admitted and
not disputed.
If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from Executive Order No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88, the Mayor's arbitrary
action can be annulled.

In view of the undisputed fact that the respondent Municipality is not the owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3, then there is no legal basis for it to
impose and collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right to do so.

Be that as it may, the Mayor's permit issued on January 11, 1988 cannot now be reinstated despite the nullity of its revocation. The permit
expired on December 31, 1988.

WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED and Executive Order No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88 issued,
respectively, by respondents Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga, Bataan are NULLIFIED for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion; and (2) the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 94010 December 2, 1991

FELIPE EVARDONE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALEXANDER APELADO, VICTORINO E. ACLAN and NOEL A.
NIVAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 95063 December 2, 1991

ALEXANDER R. APELADO, VICTORINO E. ACLAN and NOEL A. NIVAL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MAYOR FELIPE EVARDONE, respondents.

Zosimo G. Alegre for Felipe Evardone.

Elmer C. Solidon for petitioners in G.R. No. 95063.

PADILLA, J.:

These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin in en banc Resolution No. 90-0557 issued by the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated 20 June 1990 which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct
the signing of the petition for recall of the incumbent Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990.

G.R. No. 94010 is a petition for prohibition with an urgent prayer for immediate issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the holding of the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990.

G.R. No. 95063 is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of the respondent COMELEC
nullifying the signing process held on 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar for the recall of Mayor Evardone of said municipality and en banc
Resolution No. 90-0777 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, on the basis of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on 12 July 1990 in G.R. No. 94010.

Felipe Evardone (hereinafter referred to as Evardone) is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the
position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation.

On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival (hereinafter referred to as Apelado, et al.) filed a petition for
the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat.
In a meeting held on 20 June 1990, the respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557, approving the recommendation of Mr. Vedasto
B. Sumbilla, Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar, to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall against incumbent Mayor
Evardone of the said Municipality.

On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. 94010.

On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from the Court, ordering the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990, pursuant to
respondent COMELEC's Resolution No. 2272 dated 23 May 1990.

On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July
1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing
process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.

In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern
Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No. 94010. Apelado, et al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29
August 1990, the respondent COMELEC denied said motion holding that:

. . . The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission on
Election, and not upon its agent in the field. 1

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 95063 which seeks to set aside en banc Resolution No. 90-0660 of respondent
COMELEC.

In G.R. No. 94010, Evardone contends that:

I. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar
to hold the signing of the petition for recall without giving petitioner his day in court.

II. The COMELEC likewise committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating Resolution No.
2272 on May 22, 1990 which is null and void for being unconstitutional. 2

In G.R. No. 95063, Apelado, et al., raises the issue of whether or not the signing process of the petition for recall held on 14 July 1990 has
been rendered nugatory by the TRO issued by this court in G.R. No. 94010 dated 12 July 1990 but received by the COMELEC field agent only
on 15 July 1990.

The principal issue for resolution by the Court is the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC on 23 May
1990 by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code). The resolution embodies the
general rules and regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal officials.

Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by
Congress. Said Section 3 provides:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization operation of the local units.
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010) avers that:

The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the
amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did not abrogate the
provisions of BP No. 337, unless a certain provision thereof is clearly irreconciliable with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. In this case,
Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, they are operative. 3

We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious.

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall
remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by
the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to
the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in
the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thus—

MR. NOLLEDO. Besides, pending the enactment of a new Local Government Code under the report of the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions, the former Local Government Code, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 shall continue to be effective until repealed by
the Congress of the Philippines. 4

Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes
the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations.

The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall
be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections, unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. 5 Thus,
pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.

We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.

The next issue for resolution is whether or not the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall
held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.

In Governor Zosimo J. Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary to the President of the Philippines, et al., 6 this Court held:

. . . What is sought in this suit is to enjoin respondents particularly respondent Commission from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 86,
specifically "from conducting, holding and undertaking the plebiscite provided for in said act." The petition was filed on December 5, 1980.
There was a plea for a restraining order, but Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for such plebiscite on December 6, 1980 had been issued
as far as back as November 11, 1980. Due this delay in to this suit, attributable solely to petitioners, there was no time even to consider such
a plea. The plebiscite was duly held. The certificate of canvass and proclamation of the result disclosed that out of 2,409 total votes cast in
such plebiscite, 2,368 votes were cast in favor of the creation of the new municipality, which, according to the statute, will be named
municipality of Aguinaldo. There were only 40 votes cast against. As a result, such municipality was created. There is no turning back the
clock. The moot and academic character of this petition is thus apparent.
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, et al. on or about 21 February 1990 as
evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone
alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of respondent COMELEC setting the signing of the
petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on
10 July 1990.

Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date
through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality
of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election
Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in
Parades vs. Executive Secretary 7 there is no turning back the clock.

The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the
electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is
"burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people
with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. 8

Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. 9 "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. 10 The constituents have made a judgment and
their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing
process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal
effect.

However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states:

Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.— . . .

(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a
regular local election.

The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article
XVIII, Sec. 5 — on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the
regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)

ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.