TORTS and DAMAGES c.

Owners and Managers of Establishment

3S/3B
Atty. Genevieve Nueve-Co ! Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Phil-American

Forwarders
Persons Liable
d. Employers
1. Tortfeasor/s
! LRTA v. Navidad
! Loadmasters Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage
! Spouses Jayme v. Apostol
Corporation
! Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC
2. Vicarious Liability
! Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez
a. Parents
! Reyes v. Doctolero
! Fuellas v. Cadano
! Nogales v. Capitol
! Rodriguez-Luna v. IAC
e. State
! Libi v. IAC
! Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman
! Cuadra v. Monfort
3. Public Officers
b. Teachers and Heads of Institutions
! Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
! St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda

! Amadora v. CA

! Palisoc v. Brillantes Defenses

! Pasco v. CFI
1. Plaintiff’s Negligence
! Salvosa v. IAC
! Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corporation
! Soliman v. Hon. Tuazon
! Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

! PLDT v. CA

! Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA

2. Fortuitous Event

! Real v. Belo

! Southeastern College v. CA

! Perla Compania De Seguros v. Spouses Sarangaya III

3. Assumption of Risk

! Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. CA

! Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company

! Palisoc v. Brillantes

4. Emergency Rule

! Valenzuela v. CA

5. Due Diligence

! Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.

6. Prescription

! Spouses Santos v. Hon. Pizardo

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 1: LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS
SERVICES VS GLODEL BROKERAGE
CORPORATION
FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No.
MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132
bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001,
the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from
Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila.They arrived on the same
date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and
withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its
warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for
the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias
warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by
Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its
employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be
delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were
destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City.Of the six (6) trucks en route to
Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1)
truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to
deliver its cargo.
Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered
but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed
with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B
Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance
indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both
Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila
(RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of
the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It
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claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover
from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss.
RTC Decision:
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable
for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters
counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance.
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the
CA.
CA Decision:
CA considered Loadmasters as an agent of appellant Glodel, that
whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation
as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by
Loadmasters
ISSUE/S:
1. Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to
Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the latter
respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it
(Loadmasters)?
2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case,
can petitioner Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent
of respondent Glodel?
HELD:
Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of
another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is
substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim,
including its remedies or securities.[9] Doubtless, R&B Insurance is
subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent of the amount it paid the
consignee under the marine insurance, as provided under Article 2207 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or
breach of contract complained of, the insurance company
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrong-doer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully
cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be
entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing
the loss or injury.
As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B
Insurance has the right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters or
Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort.
The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay
R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia.
At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and
Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the
subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common
carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land,
through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from
a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special
agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general
public. The distinction is significant in the sense that the rights and
obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed
principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in
the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in
character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively
rendered services to Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier
within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, it states that it is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering. It
cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz
Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs
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broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods
being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are
mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. Thus, in case of loss of the
goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently. This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be
rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary
diligence over the goods.
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both
Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance
for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code,
the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered
into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee,
is NOT A VALID DEFENSE. It may not have a direct contractual relation
with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176
of the Civil Code.
The Court also held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a
contractual relationship.
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the
custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were
instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer,
Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its
employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering
the goods safely to the warehouse.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the
undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated
destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to
Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to
accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be
held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against
Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the latter is primarily liable
for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in
seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose
that it did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did
not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may
be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a
compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.
Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent

relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the
CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: By the contract of agency a
person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
latter. The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or
implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as
a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of
his authority. Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between
the parties. Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever
authorized to make such representation.

What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and

Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B
Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party
is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the
negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would
not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that
the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.

The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect
from Loadmasters, it having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter.

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 2: AGAPITO FUELLAS vs. ELPIDIO
CADANO, ET AL.
NOTE: THIS IS A 1961 CASE.
FACTS:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito
Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City. In the afternoon of
September 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying his lessons in the
classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously
placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the
pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico,
who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a
teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went
ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the
schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in angry mood. Angelito Aba, a
classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico.
Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the
neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the
ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body,
whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken." Rico then got up and went
away. Pepito was helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito
was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment. An X-Ray taken
showed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right
forearm which necessitated plaster casting.
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of
plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two separate actions were instituted,
Civil Case No. 583, filed on October 1, 1954, for damages against Agapito
Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who caused the injuries, and
Criminal Case No. 1765, against Rico Fuellas, filed on November 11, 1954,
for serious physical injuries. They were tried jointly. On May 18, 1956, a
judgment of conviction in the criminal case was rendered, finding Rico
Fuellas guilty of the offense charged. No pronouncement as to his civil
liability was made, the trial judge having ruled that the same "shall be
determined in Civil Case No. 583 of this Court."
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On May 25, 1956, the same court rendered judgment in the civil case
making defendant therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas, liable under Art.
2180 of the new Civil Code for the following damages: —
For medicine, etc. P1,000.00

For moral damages 6,000.00

As exemplary damages 2,000.00

As attorney's fees 600.00

TOTAL P9,600.00 with 6% annual interest thereon until paid.
The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by reducing the moral
damages to P3,000. An appeal was taken to this tribunal solely on questions
of law.
ISSUE:
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner-
appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his
son; that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2, of Art.
2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that
according to the last article, the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault
or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or negligence on
the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the
above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of
deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of
fault or negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that
the appellate court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate
criminal act of his minor son.
HELD:
"The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the 'duty of supporting them, keeping them in
their company, educating them in proportion to their means', while on the
other hand, gives them the 'right to correct and punish them in
moderation' (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants
failed to prove".
And a noted Spanish commentator said: —"Since children and wards do not
yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the
parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts
of their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the
ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may
be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they
should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by
repairing the damage caused" (12 Manresa, 649-650). (See also Arts. 311
and 316, Civil Code).
It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be made
responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with deliberate
intent and with discernment, is an action based on the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of the parents; that the
minor-Fuellas having been convicted of serious physical injuries at the
age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 12, Revised Penal Code, could
have been applied, but having acted with discernment, Art. 101 of the
same Code can not include him.
minor children who lived in their company.' To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability
would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the
void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some
recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases."
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the
basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently
of the criminal case. And as responsibility for fault or negligence under
Article 2176 upon which the action in the present case was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability, arising from fault
or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the
reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the
minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment.

And as par. 2, of Art. 101, states that "the exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4
of Art. 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First, in cases of
subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by
an imbecile or insane person and by a person under nine years of age or by
one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence
on their part", the appellant concluded that this provision covers only a
situation where a minor under 15 but over 9 years old commits a criminal
act "without discernment."

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: 'The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 3: Rodriguez-Luna v. IAC
FACTS:
This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals. The
petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular
collision. The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart
practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were
the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car
driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis
dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the following judgment:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendants
Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the
plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto
Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P60,000.00 for the loss of
his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit."
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a
decision dated May 22, 1979, affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants-
appellants, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated June 19, 1981,
modified its judgment thus:
"WHEREFORE", the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified
insofar as the judgment ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
the sum of P1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest from July 5, 1973,
is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
whole amount shall have been totally paid.
"The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo
stand."
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's
decision.
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The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 - is the separate appeal of the Lunas.
On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. In the light of the
foregoing, the resolution stated:
ISSUE:
With respect to the award for unearned net earnings — should the award be
P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged; and
whether the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal
rate.
HELD:
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to
explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court
directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the
special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could
make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and this
Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in
enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount.
In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children,
and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is
said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no
assets of his own as yet."
1. On the amount of the award
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the
deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that
his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual
gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:
"According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the
life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years, and under the
Commissioner Standard Ordinary, used by our domestic insurance
companies since 1968 for policies above P5,000.00 his life expectancy was
38.51 years. Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San Miguel
Corporation, testified that he was the regular physician of Roberto Luna
since his marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He said that except for a
slight anemia which he had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna was of good
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
health. Allowing for this condition, he could reasonably expect to have a life
expectancy of 30 years."
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:
"We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion
that the deceased had a life expectancy of thirty years.
At the time of Luna's death, he was only thirty-three
years old and in the best of health. With his almost
perfect physical condition and his sound and, the
expectation that he could have lived for another thirty
years is reasonable, considering that with his
educational attainment, his social and financial
standing, he had the means of staying fit and preserving
his health and well-being. That he could have lived at
least until the age of sixty-three years is an assessment
which is more on the conservative side in view of the
testimony of Dr. Vicente Campa that the general life
expectancy nowadays had gone up to seventy years."
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of Luna's
annual income and expense. This is what the trial court said:
"Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was survived by his wife
Felina Rodriguez-Luna, and two children, Roberto Jr., 13 years, and Jose,
12 years. His wife was 35 years old at the time. He declared a gross income
of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 for 1968 (Exhibit H) and
P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had investments in various
corporations amounting to P136,116.00 and was the president and general
manager of Rodlum, Inc.; general manager of Esso Greenhills Service
Center; Assistant manager of Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of
Steadfast Investment Corporation; chairman and treasurer of Greenhills
Industrial Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation
Savings Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of National
Association of Retired Civil Employees.
". . . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in the short
period of three years. It is reasonable to expect that it would still go higher
for the next fifteen years and reach a minimum of P75,000.00 a year. The
potential increase in the earning capacity of a deceased person is recognized
by the Supreme Court . . . the court believes that the expected gross
earnings of Roberto Luna should be fixed in the sum of P75,000.00 a year
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for the period of his life expectancy of 30 years, but deducting his personal
expenses which, because of his business and social standing the court in the
amount of P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court."
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the
Court of Appeals took into account the fact "that the deceased Roberto
R. Luna had been engaged in car racing as a sport, having participated
in tournaments both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and
manner of life should be "one of the factors affecting the value of
mortality table in actions for damages;" and, consequently, concluded
that Luna could not have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the
30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled in
respect of Luna's annual personal expenses:
". . . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas
which is a key expenditure in Roberto R Luna's social
standing, We should increase that amount to P30,000.00
as the would be personal expenses of the deceased per
annum."
The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus:
P75,000.00 annual gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses
leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy and the product
is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its
resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to
10 years and increased his annual personal expenses from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10
years said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e.
that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That
Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record.
That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but
then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-
karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger
than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyance. It was error on the part of
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

the Court of Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial

court which it had previously affirmed.

Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual
income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but
without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands
to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because
of the "escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R.
Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it
would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also
increase considering the manifold sources thereof. cdrep
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.

2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.

The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum of
P50,000.00. This award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision
of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June 19, 1981, reaffirmed the award.
The two decisions as well as the resolution do not provide for interest at the
legal rate to be tacked to the award.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's less be with interest at
the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit in
this prayer. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a
quasi-delic case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As
with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the
date of the trial court's decision.

The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26, 1977; 77
SCRA 98, where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied. to
Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his
son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age
and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should be
subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to
do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond
the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property
either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to
support his family.

10 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 4: Libi v. IAC
FACTS
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until the girl
broke up, as she found Wendell to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell
continued to pursue Julie, even resorting to threats. Julie then stayed at the
house of her bestfriend just to avoid him. On January 14, 1979, both died,
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith
and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness, their parents posited their
respective theories. Private respondents, submitted that Wendell caused her
death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, turning the gun on
himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, petitioners, rejected the
imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may
have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and
thereby avoid identification.
The parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case in the CFI of Cebu
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but the complaint
was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. The IAC set aside the
judgment of the lower court, and decided against defendants-appellees who,
as petitioners in the present appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by
respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
RULING
Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime
committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record.
Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to
the bag of his mother where the other key was. The court cannot but
entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising
11 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the
fatal gun away.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a
parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction
and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of
Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Neither
was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a
handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding uptight
what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession
of that firearm.
In imposing sanctions for the so-called, vicarious liability of
petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al.which
supposedly holds that "(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses.The court does not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding
the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look
considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analyses.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of
their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if Article 2194 is applied, the persons
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
The court was also persuaded that the liability of the parents for
felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not
subsidiary.In both quasi-delicts and crimes, the parents primarily respond
for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both
codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with
his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former.
The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor
children contemplated in Article 2182 and in Article 101 of the RPC in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case
of FueIlas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
The issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with
the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. To hold that the civil
liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to
criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere
negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused
with criminal intent.
The parents are and should be held primarily liable for
the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.
That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101
of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children.
Under Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
as amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code ] However, under the
Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender.
Other cases cited:
! In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double
homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action
arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly
and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence
Of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and,
therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action
in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found
guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194
of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
! However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15
but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this
time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held
liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly
declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for
seriousphysical injuries committed by their 13-year old son.
12 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
! On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son
were adjudged solidarity liable for damages arising from his
conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code.
! Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide
charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled
that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be
solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity"
the father was only held subsidiarily liable.
Ruling on the other issue not connected to our lesson:
We have perforce to reject petitioners' effete and unsubstantiated
pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is
significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect
in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor
can we sustain the trial court's dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die
by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence -- testimonial,
documentary and pictorial -- the confluence of which point to Wendell as
the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his
persistent pleas for a reconciliation.


CASE # 5: Cuadra v. Monfort


FACTS
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were sixth
grade classmates at Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. The
teacher assigned them with three others, to weed the grass, when Monfort
found a plastic headband. Jokingly she shouted that she had found an
earthworm, and to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object to the latter which hit
her right eye. Due to the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with
some powder. The eye became swollen the next day, hence her parents took
her to the doctor. She underwent two surgical operations and stayed at the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

hospital for 23 days, amounting to P1,703.75. Unfortunately, Cuadra

completely lost her sight of the right eye.

An action for quasi delict was instituted against Monfort’s parents,

where they were ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE

Whether Monfort’s parents are liable

RULING

NO. The defendant could not have prevented the damage by the observance
of due care, or that he could exercise his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it, as his child was at school,
as his child is under the care and supervision of the teacher. As far as the act
which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not
unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor
did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which
the blame could be attributed to her parents.

Under Article 2180, when the act or omission is that of one person for
whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable.

The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted, as

inferred from its last paragraph. Since the fact thus required to be proven is
a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant.
There can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the
law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances
in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such
diligence the damage could have been prevented. The victim, no doubt,
deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell
her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral
compulsion of good conscience.

13 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 6: St. Joseph v. Miranda
FACTS
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon
inside St. Joseph Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class to which
respondent Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science
experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under
the Rosalinda Tabugo, petitioner, subject teacher and employee of
SJC. Estefania Abdan was the adviser.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment
when Jayson checked the result of the experiment by looking into
the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held
by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye
of Jayson. The compound spurted out and particles of which hit
Jayson’s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
group mates. As a result, his eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and
had to spend for his medication.
Upon filing of this case in the lower court, Jayson’s
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another
surgery. Jayson’s mother, who was working abroad, had to rush
back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994,
in the amount of at least P40,000.00. He and his parents suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result
of his injury due to petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the
degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them.
Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages, expenses and
other fees.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that before the
science experiment was conducted, [ayson and his classmates were
given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the
experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated
compound had cooled off. Jayson, however, a person of sufficient
age and discretion and completely capable of understanding the
English language and the instructions of his teacher, violated such
14 | Page
instructions. He was rushed by the school employees to the school
clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center for
treatment, where Jayson cried to his teacher for his violation of the
instructions given. He was pronounced ready for discharge and an
eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected.
SJC advanced the payment for the expenses.
However, the parents of Jayson, through counsel, wrote
SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses incurred arising from the accident caused by the science
experiment. SJC’s counsel explained that the school cannot accede
to the demand because the accident occurred by reason of Jayson’s
failure to comply with the instructions.
Since SJC did not accede to the demand, they sued
petitioners for damages, where the RTC held that petitioners are
jointly and solidarily liable to pay Jayson, Petitioners then
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE
Whether SJC and other petitioners should be held liable for
Jayson’s injury.
RULING
YES. Petitioners were negligent since they all failed to exercise the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students. Petitioners invoked the ruling in St. Marys
Academy v. Carpitanos, which absolved St. Mary’s Academy from liability
for the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity,
declaring that the negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident, but this could not be applied to this case, as
the lower court correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause
of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and
unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening
cause. In that case, respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits
establishing that the cause of the accident was a mechanical defect and not
the recklessness of the minor.
The court a quo correctly ruled that:
That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are
liable for negligence because all of them are
responsible for exercising the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students. The individual
[petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching
and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based
on the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and
lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.
[Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was
inside the classroom when the class undertook the
science experiment although [Jayson] insisted that
said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence,
however, was presented to establish that [petitioner]
Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole
duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the
ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought
to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by
[petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by
somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that
[petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside
the classroom at the time the accident happened. The
Court is also perplexed why none of the other
students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident)
testified in Court to corroborate the story of the
[petitioners]. The Court, however, understands that
these other students cannot testify for [Jayson]
because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school
and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of
school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at
fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge
because she exercised control and supervision over
[petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It
was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be
conducted safely and without any harm or injury to
the students. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is
likewise culpable under the doctrine of command
responsibility because the other individual
[petitioners] were under her direct control and
15 | Page
supervision. The negligent acts of the other
individual [petitioners] were done within the scope
of their assigned tasks.
xxxx
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a
family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will
not exculpate it from liability because it has been
shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid
screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance
of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts
of the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to
avert damage and injury to students. The fact that
there has never been any accident in the past during
the conduct of science experiments is not a
justification to be complacent in just preserving the
status quo and do away with creative foresight to
install safety measures to protect the students.
Schools should not simply install safety reminders
and distribute safety instructional manuals. More
importantly, schools should provide protective gears
and devices to shield students from expected risks
and anticipated dangers.
Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend
to the school or university itself, although an
educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also
been held that the liability of the employer for the
[tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is
primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse
against the negligent employee.[10]
That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil negligence. Petitioners, should be held liable only for the damages actually
Code, bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the caused by their negligence.
corresponding obligation.

Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree

of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:

! Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage

and injury to its students although it had full information on the
nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the
students during class;

! Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the

students who conduct experiments in class;

! Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices,

specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and
dangers; and

! Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her
class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the classfifty
(50) students conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.

Petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by

insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science
class not to look directly into the heated compound. Both the lower courts
similarly concluded that the mishap which happened during the science
experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This
neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its
administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the
damage and injury to Jayson.

As to the contributory negligence of Jayson: The proximate cause of

the injury was the explosion of the heated compound independent of any
efficient intervening cause. The negligence on the part of Tabugo in not
making sure that the science experiment was correctly conducted was the
proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and injured
not only Jayson but his classmates as well. However, Jayson is partly
responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his own
16 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 7: Amadora v. CA
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward for his graduation. These ceremonies
were scheduled on April 16, 1972. However, on April 13, 1972, while they
were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose- Recoletes, a
classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all
his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years
old. 
 regardless if the semester has already started or not.)
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose- Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
The respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in any
event the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the
semester had already ended.
It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr.,
the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but
later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking
any further action. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when
the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this
was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their
son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
17 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same
firearm that killed Alfredo.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades,- (Yes, academic or non-academic
schools) and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its
custody.” - (as long as the student is within the premises of the school
2. Whether or not the respondent school, rector, dean of the boys, and/or
physics teacher are liable? - No.
Held: Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both
parties in support of their conflicting positions. Three cases have so far been
decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno, Mercado v. Court of Appeals, and Palisoc v. Brillantes.

Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has
been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180;
and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following
the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable.

(The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision
would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades
liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort
were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the
teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the
teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
teacher and the head of the non- academic school would be held liable, and
simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.)
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised
by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective
schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing
such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury
subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is
it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where
he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself
by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
Why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or
non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof
instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master
who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of
their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and
so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision
and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the
teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head
of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his
closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students.
In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises
18 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company
of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of
the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents
are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-
charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative
superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or
sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him
as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the
teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority
could be validly exercised over him. In any event, it should be noted that the
liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all,
the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof
that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions (or DOGFaFa) to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. Unlike the
parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the
student's age.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:



1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody
of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the
fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his
physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of
his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in- charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required
to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established
that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student.
On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised
due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline. llcd
 avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who
should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence
on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that
the confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners'
son.
 blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
19 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the
tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student
or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the
light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is
liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that
resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they
seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
CASE # 8: Palisoc v. Brillantes
FACTS:
The deceased Dominador Palisoc (16 y/o) and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between
two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz
were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the
classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working
on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them.
Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman.
Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon,
in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to
until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face
downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the
substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the
incident. Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs,
contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and
slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain, and his testimony that these
internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-
officials of the Manila Technical Institute. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants as owner and president of MIT should
be solidarily liable with Daffon? - Yes.
Held: The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground
that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades . . . liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody," are not applicable to the case at bar, since
"there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal
fistblows lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-
officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made
responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon."
 teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and
squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students
against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the
student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was
already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either,
that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical
Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school.
 school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and
teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and
Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to
plaintiffs-parents for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of
defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to
defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors.
The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been
properly impleaded as party defendant.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350
and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that
the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
20 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves
may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180,
Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the
cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously
held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on
which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the
delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of
his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

21 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

CASE # 9: Pasco v. CFI
FACTS:
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner,
together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the
private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said
university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by
Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students
of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul
and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University
(MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life.
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a
complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private
respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as Civil Case
No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based on the
aforementioned provision of the Civil Code. On October 26, 1979,
respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ff. grounds: a. The
penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under which it
was sued applies only to vocational schools and not to academic
institutions;

"b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability in
this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant in University has
not committed; "c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been
made by the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an action for
damages against defendant University."
issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school
or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is
liable.
We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned
speaks only of "teachers or heads."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:



1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR
HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENT FOR DAMAGES CAUSE BY PUPILS
AND STUDENTS; EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION LIABLE AS
EMPLOYER. — As stated by Justice Sarmiento, my view is that while the
educational institution is not directly liable, yet the school, as the employer,
may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform
their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). 



2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE. — The school, however, may
exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family.
(Eto lang talaga ruling).

On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order granting said Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of Dismissal but the
motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient
justification to disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for Certiorari
praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order of May
12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against respondent school and the
order of July 17, 1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order CASE # 10: Salvosa v. IAC
of dismissal, with costs against respondent school. FACTS: Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution.
[However], it is also an institution of arts and trade. Its brochure (Exh. 2) shows that
Issue: Whether or not penultimate (2nd-to-the-last) paragraph of Article BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication,
2180 of the Civil Code is equally applicable to academic institutions. - No. 
 Broadcast and Telytype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and
Automotive
Held: We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to Mechanics courses . . . these courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being
educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the purely or exclusively an academic institution.
22 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the BCF Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. The ROTC Unit, pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of
1975 of the Department of Education and Culture, is provided by the BCF an office
and an armory located at the basement of its main building. The BCF ROTC Unit
had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, he
received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also
received his salary from the AFP.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon
shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted
of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B.
Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF),
Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of
BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc. as party defendants. After hearing,
the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon,
Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation,
Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro
On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification the
decision of the Trial Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of
temperate damages, and increasing the indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro
from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the
tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon
HELD:NO.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
23 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in
[Art. 2180] — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody' means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was still in the protective
and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot
Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:
"it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the
time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening;
but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property
custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes
and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him
or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the 'recess time' that the
trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra." (Emphasis
supplied)
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school"
cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call
of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not
include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or
being in the "protective and supervisory custody" of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot
be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Besides,
the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave
the office and [to keep the armory] well-guarded. Apart from negating a
finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he
committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this
circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a
school which offers both academic and technical vocational courses cannot
be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic
program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody
of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to
pass upon such other issue.

CASE # 11: Soliman v Tuazon

FACTS: On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for
damages against private respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants.

In the morning of Aug 1982, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and
premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is
still a regular enrolled student of said school taking his morning classes, the
defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the premises
of said school performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed security
guard under the employment, supervision and control of his employer-defendant
R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38
Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would
have caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to
him. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City,
and as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular
classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration
of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely healed."

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint
stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any
liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that private
respondent school was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy
Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
24 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code
did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts
and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
school.
Respondent Judge granted private respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding
that security guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the school which
accordingly could not be held liable for his acts or omissions
Issue: Whether or not the security guard is an employee of the school which could
be held liable for his acts or omissions
HELD: NO.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage
inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own
act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law
responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of
another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helper, acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody
Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer
of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the
client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the
security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. As a general
rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among
the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned
to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of
25 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client
whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a
client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to
it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the
security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.
Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests
commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the
security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between
the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose
vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or
an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the
Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for
damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such
substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy
Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to
petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central
Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's
claim as one based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was correct. However, it does
not follow that respondent Colleges could not be held liable upon any other
basis in law, for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to
entitle respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of
itself.
In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by
respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action
was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. As held in PSBA v CA, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in
character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other
legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have
granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation
ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
CASE # 12: Philippine Rabbit v Phil-American
Forwarders
26 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
Facts:Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure
questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing
their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit. The dismissal was based on the
ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which
together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against
Phil- American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on Nov 24,
1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the
bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of
earnings. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit
was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be
dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of
action against him. Lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit.
Issue: whether the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise” used in article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly
resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose
HELD:
NO.
Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from
the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, under the allegations of the
complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual
issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital
stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and
they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely,
Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25,
respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that
Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one
and the same civil personality. We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal.
It was not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit
spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is one
which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed by the
parties. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal because, to permit him to do so, would be unfair to the adverse party.
CASE # 13: LRTA v Navidad
Facts: Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad
was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that
led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the
fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell,
an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in.
Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
The widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
27 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent for the death of her husband.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs. Prudent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision
exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad
and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then
as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already
existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing
to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad
failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his
having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated
at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their
failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have
been foreseen or prevented. Respondents, contended that a contract of
carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the
LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all
the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in
failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Issue:
1. Whether or not LRTA can be held liable for the death of Nicanor
2. Whether or not Prudent should also be held liable
Ruling:
Issue No. 1
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its
exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The law employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. that has not been shown. The liability of the common carrier and an
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so independent contractor would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194
to the contract of carriage. he statutory provisions render a common carrier of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have
other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached
omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. Nevertheless, there is
at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.
of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is
injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman
presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
general rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In
either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under
the contract of carriage.
Issue No. 2
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be
for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180,of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for
the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 14: Sps. Jayme v Apostol
Facts: Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu
pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano
borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan
Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.
The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from
the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries with
subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion. He was initially treated
at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. Due to the seriousness of his
injuries, he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao
City for more intensive treatment. Despite medical attention, Marvin
expired six (6) days after the accident. Petitioners spouses Buenaventura
and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages
with the RTC against respondents.
All respondents denied liability for Marvins death. Apostol and Simbulan
averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise,
Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvins sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being
on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal
adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme declaring that the
defendant Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages
incurred by the other defendant, being an agency of the State performing
governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes Simbulan,
29 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
not being the owner of the subject vehicle, he is absolved of any liability.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando
Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and
severally to pay the plaintiff.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the
CA. Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was
Lozano’s employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latter’s negligent act.
Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver’s true
and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due
care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. The incident, although
unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him. The CA
granted the appeal. The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held
liable for damages for the death of Marvin Jayme because plaintiffs-
appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the employer of Lozano.
Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the Municipality of Koronadal
was the employer of both Mayor Miguel and Lozano. Not being the
employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel could not thus be held liable for the
damages caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the
Isuzu pick-up at the time of the accident.
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a
vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or
death sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issue: Whether or not Mayor Miguel is the employer of Lozano and thus
liable for the negligent acts of the latter
Ruling:
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application
in the present case. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is
not only liable for one’s own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the
acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1)
That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through
another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act
of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted
to him.
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was
committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence.
To determine the existence of an employment relationship, We rely on the
four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employers power of selection; (2)
payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employers right to control
the method of doing the work; and (4) the employers right of suspension or
dismissal.
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the
Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the
time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver
by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel
during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several
occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists even if
the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity
because control over the employee subsists. In the case under review, the
Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer
notwithstanding Lozanos assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving
of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control
over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This
Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, ruled in a similar vein, to wit: x x x The
fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security
guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts
and omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
30 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with
the security agency. x x x
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee
although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicles
operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing
vicarious liability, the driver’s negligence should not be attributed to a
fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.
A public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a
vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation.
The only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of, or
direct or encourage it. In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither
Lozano’s employer nor the vehicles registered owner. There existed no
causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will
make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere
passenger at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the
driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make
the passenger liable for the latter’s negligent acts. The driver’s duty is not
one that may be delegated to others.
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano
is the Municipality of Koronadal. Municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the
right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity
when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his
direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is
jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained
in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of whom the actual owner of
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and
primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation.

CASE # 15: Filamer Christian Institute v IAC

Facts: Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a
scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee
even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours
in the morning of each school day. Having a student driver's license,
Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over
the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is
significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his
father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house
where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer
Christian Institute.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a
road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was

31 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
clear. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision.
Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the
vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved
towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in
the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that
Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right.
Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard
of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for
him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the
afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the
same vehicle. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of
the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home
the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next
school day.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school.
Issue: Whether or not Filamer Christian Institute is solidarily liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability for the negligent acts committed by
Funtecha
Ruling:
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of
Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf
of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of
32 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by
an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit
from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at
the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official
appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.
The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
with whom the employer has relations through his employees.
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary
discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the
business and beneficial to their employer.
In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such
rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking
control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the
driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee
to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove
that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its
vehicles by persons other than the driver.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon
it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability
of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the
employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

CASE # 16: Castilex Industrial Corp v Vasquez

FACTS: Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around
Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal
flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles.
He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the
other hand, Benjamin Abad was the manager of Appellant Castilex
Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On
the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking
lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut
against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General
Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to
the Cebu Doctors Hospital.

Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever
hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may
incur.

A Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages
was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of
the deceased, against Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same
action, Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the
medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.

33 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
TRIAL COURT: In favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
Vasquez and ordered Abad and petitioner Castilex to pay jointly and
solidarily. CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
CA: affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX
liable but held that the liability of the latter is only vicarious and not
solidary with the former.
SPOUSES VASQUEZ: Their son’s death was caused by the negligence of
petitioner’s employee and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting
injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph
of Article 2180.
Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner
cannot escape liability therefor.
CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL: Maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is
indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo
Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks
after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred
when ABAD was not working anymore the inescapable fact remains that
said employee would not have been situated at such time and place had he
not been required by petitioner to do overtime work. Moreover, since
petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latter’s
employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by
the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
ISSUE: Whether the employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.
RULING: NO. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance.
Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not
vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in
34 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead,
the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be
liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of
his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
applicable. Both provisions apply to employers:
● the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment
or enterprise; and
● the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry.
Fourth Paragraph Fifth Paragraph
covers negligent acts of encompasses negligent acts
employees committed either of employees acting within
in the service of the the scope of their assigned
branches or on the occasion task
of their functions
The fifth paragraph is an expansion of the fourth paragraph in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether
or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so
long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even
though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion
of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different
hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer
was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
The CA cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of
was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting
within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a
quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within
the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked
by the CA in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABADs
negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was
not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor
vehicle mishap.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon
the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to
deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was
not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of
the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the
name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some
35 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for
the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee
is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so
as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employees action or
inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of
his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
WE DO NOT AGREE. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the
employer’s liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employer’s motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer’s Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
An employee who uses his employer’s vehicle in going from his work to a
place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is NOT
ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of
evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.
II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work
Travelling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer.
Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the
mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed,
the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though
he uses his employers motor vehicle.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special
benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers’ vehicle as
when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and,
presumably, spending more time at his actual duties.
Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with
no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use
in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the
special errand or roving commission rule, under which it can be found
that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually
reaches home.
NOTE HOWEVER: Even if the employee be deemed to be acting within
the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers
vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of
the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home
and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies
Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking
thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the
vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted:
Daddy, Daddy! This woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for
ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28
August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD’s working day
had ended; his overtime work had already been completed.

III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter’s
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employee;s negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of
permissive use.

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction

albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of
bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the
employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or
jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the
employee was acting in his employer’s business or within the scope of his
assigned task.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner’s office. Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente
Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven km away from petitioner’s place of
business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified
36 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE # 17: Reyes v Doctolero
FACTS: PETITIONER: John was driving a Toyota Tamaraw. As he was
approaching the entrance of the basement parking of MCS, Doctolero
stopped him to give way to outgoing cars. After a few minutes, Doctolero
gave John a signal to proceed but afterwards stopped him to allow the
opposite car to move to the right side. The third time that Doctolero gave
John the signal to proceed, only to stop him again to allow a car on the
opposite side to advance to his right, it almost caused a collision. John then
told Doctolero of the latter's mistake in giving him signals to proceed, then
stopping him only to allow cars from the opposite side to move to his side.
Infuriated, Doctolero shouted "PUTANG INA MO A" at John.
Then, as John was about to disembark from his vehicle, he saw Doctolero
pointing his gun at him. John tried to run towards Doctolero to tackle him.
Unfortunately, Doctolero was able to pull the trigger before John reached
him, hitting the latter's left leg in the process. Doctolero also shot at
petitioner Mervin when he rushed to John's rescue. When he missed, Mervin
caught Doctolero and pushed him down but was unable to control his speed.
37 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
As a result, Mervin went inside MCS, where he was shot in the stomach by
another security guard, respondent Romeo Avila.
GRANDEUR SECURITY AND SERVICES CORPORATION: The
version is one based on the Initial Report conducted by Investigator Cosme
Giron. While Doctolero was on duty at the ramp of the exit driveway of
MCS's basement parking, John took over the left lane and insisted entry
through the basement parking's exit driveway. Knowing that this is against
traffic rules, Doctolero stopped John, prompting the latter to alight from his
vehicle and confront Doctolero. With his wife unable to pacify him, John
punched and kicked Doctolero, hitting the latter on his left face and
stomach. Doctolero tried to step back to avoid his aggressor but John
persisted, causing Doctolero to draw his service firearm and fire a warning
shot. John ignored this and continued his attack. He caught up with
Doctolero and wrestled with him to get the firearm. This caused the gun to
fire off and hit John's leg. Mervin then ran after Doctolero but was shot on
the stomach by security guard Avila.
Petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for damages against
Doctolero and Avila and their employer Grandeur, charging the latter with
negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. They likewise
impleaded MCS on the ground that it was negligent in getting Grandeur's
services. In their complaint, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered,
jointly and severally, to pay them actual, moral, and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation costs.
Respondents Doctolero and Avila failed to file an answer despite service of
summons upon them. Thus, they were declared in default.
GRANDEUR: It exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. It likewise averred that the shooting incident
was caused by the unlawful aggression of petitioners who took advantage of
their "martial arts" skills.
MCS: It cannot be held liable for damages simply because of its ownership
of the premises where the shooting incident occurred. It further argued that
the carpark was, at that time, being managed by Park Asia Philippines and
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
MCS had no control over the carpark when the shooting incident occurred.
he trial thereafter continued with respect to Grandeur and MCS.
RTC (1999): Judgment against respondents Doctolero and Avila, finding
them responsible for the injuries sustained by petitioners.
RTC (2005): Dismissed the complaint against MCS. It, however, held
Grandeur solidarily liable with respondents Doctolero and Avila. According
to the RTC, Grandeur was unable to prove that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees because it
failed to prove strict implementation of its rules, regulations, guidelines,
issuances and instructions, and to monitor consistent compliance by
respondents.
RTC (Grandeur’s motion for reconsideration): orders the DISMISSAL of
the complaint filed against defendants Grandeur Security and Services
Corporation and [MCS]. RTC held that it re-evaluated the tacts and the
attending circumstances of the present case and was convinced that
Grandeur has sufficiently overcome the presumption of negligence.
CA: dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC's Order. It agreed
that Grandeur was able to prove with preponderant evidence that it observed
the degree of diligence required in both selection and supervision of its
security guards.
ISSUE: Whether Grandeur and MCS may be held vicariously liable for the
damages caused by respondents Doctolero and Avila to petitioners John and
Mervin Reyes.
RULING: NO. MCS is not liable to petitioners.
GENERAL RULE: One is only responsible for his own act or omission.
This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
EXCEPTION: An employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort
committed by his employee under paragraph 5 of Article 2180. Here,
although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him
38 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias
for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one's
subordinates to prevent damage to another.
NOTE HOWEVER: It must be stressed that the above rule is applicable
only if there is an employer-employee relationship.
This employer-employee relationship cannot be presumed but must be
sufficiently proven by the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as
employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.
In the absence of such relationship, vicarious liability under Article 2180
cannot apply. Similarly, we find no employer-employee relationship
between MCS and respondent guards. The guards were merely assigned
by Grandeur to secure MCS' premises pursuant to their Contract of Guard
Services. Thus, MCS cannot be held vicariously liable for damages caused
by these guards' acts or omissions.
Neither can it be said that a principal-agency relationship existed between
MCS and Grandeur.
On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code may be
applicable to Grandeur, it being undisputed that respondent guards were
its employees. When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantump
resumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The "diligence of a
good father" referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
To rebut the presumption of negligence, Grandeur must prove two things:
1. that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of respondents
Doctolero and Avila, and
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
2. that after hiring Doctolero and Avila, Grandeur had exercised due
diligence in supervising them.
Here, both the RTC and the CA found that Grandeur was able to
sufficiently prove, through testimonial and documentary evidence, that it
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
hiring of its security guards. As testified to by its HRD head Ungui, and
corroborated by documentary evidence including clearances from various
government agencies, certificates, and favorable test results in medical and
psychiatric examinations.
The evidence presented by Grandeur consists not only in the testimony of
its HRD head but also by documentary evidence showing respondents
Doctolero's and Avila's compliance with the above hiring and selection
process consisting of their respective:
1. private security licenses;
2. NBI Clearances;
3. Medical Certificates;
4. Police Clearances;
5. Certificate of Live Birth
6. Certificates issued by the Safety Vocational and Training Center
for satisfactory completion of the Pre-Licensing Training Course;
7. High School Diplomas
8. SSS Personal Data Records;
9. Barangay Clearances;
10. Court Clearance;
11. Neuro-psychiatric result issued by Goodwill Medical Center, Inc.
for Doctolero's pre-employment screening as Security Guard[/
Evaluation Report by Office Chief Surgeon Army, Headquarters,
Phil. Army, Fort Bonifactio Metro-Manila for Avila showing an
above-average result and no psychotic ideations;
12. Certification from Varsitarian Security and Investigation Agency,
Inc. that Doctolero has been employed with said agency;
13. Certificate issued by Cordova High School showing that Doctolero
had completed the requirements of the courts of Institution in
Citizen Army Training-1;
39 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
14. Certification by Grandeur that Doctolero has submitted the
requirements for his application for the post of Security Guard.
Thus, we agree with the RTC and CA's evaluation that Grandeur was able to
satisfactorily prove that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of
respondents Doctolero and Avila.
Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the
required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's
burden is overcome.
The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the
employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of
the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.
We agree with the CA that the document may be considered, as they are
related to the documents and testimonies adduced during trial to show
Grandeur's diligence in the supervision of the actual work performance of
its employees.
Considering all the evidence borne by the records, we find that Grandeur
has sufficiently exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
CASE # 18: Nogales v Capitol Medical Center
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
FACTS: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales, who was then 37
years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada
beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy. While Corazon was on her last
trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure
and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a
dangerous complication of pregnancy.
Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor
pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his
home. Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical
Center (CMC).
Upon Corazon’s admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales executed and
signed the Consent on Admission and Agreement and Admission
Agreement. Corazon was then brought to the labor room of the CMC. Dr.
Rosa Uy, who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an internal
examination of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify him of
her findings.
Based on the Doctors Order Sheet , Dr. Estrada ordered for 10 mg. of
valium to be administered immediately by intramuscular injection. Dr.
Estrada later ordered the start of intravenous administration of syntocinon
admixed with dextrose, 5%, in lactated Ringers solution, at the rate of eight
to ten micro-drops per minute.
According to the Nurses Observation Notes, despite Dr. Estrada’s refusal,
Dr. Enriquez stayed to observe Corazons condition. At 6:00 a.m., Corazon
was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the CMC. At 6:13 a.m., Corazon
started to experience convulsions.
At 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to
extract Corazons baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical
tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic, weak
and injured condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and
resuscitated by Dr. Enriquez and Dr. Payumo.
40 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which
rapidly became profuse. Corazon’s blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to
60/40 within five minutes. There was continuous profuse vaginal bleeding.
Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with bottled blood. It
took approximately 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory, headed by Dr.
Perpetua Lacson, to comply with Dr. Estradas order and deliver the blood.
At 8:00 a.m., Dr. Noe Espinola, head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology
Department of the CMC, was apprised of Corazon’s condition by telephone.
Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a
Consent to Operation.
Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from his
residence by an ambulance, arrived at the CMC about an hour later. He
examined the patient and ordered some resuscitative measures to be
administered. Despite Dr. Espinola’s efforts, Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The
cause of death was hemorrhage, post partum.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Manila against
CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr.
Espinola, and a certain Nurse J. Dumlao for the death of Corazon.
Petitioners mainly contended that defendant physicians and CMC personnel
were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon’s condition.
Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision
of defendant physicians and hospital staff.
The trial court declared Dr. Estrada, Dr. Enriquez, and Nurse Dumlao in
default. CMC, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Espinola, and Dr. Lacson filed their
respective answers denying and opposing the allegations in the complaint.
Subsequently, trial ensued.
RTC: After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court rendered judgment
finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the trial court.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

Meanwhile, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating that respondents Dr.
Estrada, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse Dumlao need no longer be
notified of the petition because they are absolutely not involved in the issue
raised before the [Court], regarding the liability of [CMC]. Petitioners
stressed that the subject matter of this petition is the liability of CMC for
the negligence of Dr. Estrada.
The Court stated that with the filing of petitioners Manifestation, it should
be understood that they are claiming only against respondents CMC, Dr.
Espinola, Dr. Lacson, and Dr. Uy who have filed their respective comments.
Petitioners are foregoing further claims against respondents Dr. Estrada, Dr.
Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor, and Nurse Dumlao.
The Court noted that Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of the CA
affirming the decision of the RTC. Accordingly, the decision of the CA,
affirming the trial court’s judgment, is already final as against Dr. Oscar
Estrada.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution
claiming that Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Villaflor and Nurse Dumlao were notified of
the petition at their counsels last known addresses. Petitioners reiterated
their imputation of negligence on these respondents. The Court denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Estrada.
Similarly, in the US, a hospital which is the employer, master, or principal
of a physician employee, servant, or agent, may be held liable for the
physician’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
In the present case, petitioners maintain that CMC, in allowing Dr. Estrada
to practice and admit patients at CMC, should be liable for Dr. Estrada’s
malpractice. Rogelio claims that he knew Dr. Estrada as an accredited
physician of CMC, though he discovered later that Dr. Estrada was not a
salaried employee of the CMC. Rogelio further claims that he was dealing
with CMC, whose primary concern was the treatment and management of
his wife’s condition.
Moreover, the fact that CMC made Rogelio sign a Consent on Admission
and Admission Agreement and a Consent to Operation printed on the
letterhead of CMC indicates that CMC considered Dr. Estrada as a member
of its medical staff.
On the other hand, CMC disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Estrada
was a mere visiting physician and that it admitted Corazon because her
physical condition then was classified an emergency obstetrics case.
CMC alleges that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor for whose
actuations CMC would be a total stranger. CMC maintains that it had no
control or supervision over Dr. Estrada in the exercise of his medical
profession.

RULING: Dr. Estrada’s negligence in handling the treatment and

management of Corazon’s condition which ultimately resulted in Corazon’s
death is no longer in issue. Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of the CA
which affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding Dr. Estrada solely liable
for damages. Accordingly, the finding of the trial court on Dr. Estrada’s
negligence is already final.

Petitioners maintain that CMC is vicariously liable for Dr. Estradas

negligence based on Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.

41 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
Consultants are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks
of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages.
In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the
control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the
foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the
question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is
solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s
condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which considers a person accountable not only for his
own acts but also for those of others based on the formers
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals
While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test, such test
essentially determines whether an employment relationship exists between a
physician and a hospital based on the exercise of control over the physician
as to details. Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the
right to control both the means and the details of the process by which
the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task.
After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, the
Court finds no single evidence pointing to CMC’s exercise of control
over Dr. Estrada’s treatment and management of Corazon’s condition.
It is undisputed that throughout Corazon’s pregnancy, she was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At the time of Corazon’s admission at
CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor,
who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in
diagnosing Corazon’s condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges
at CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. CMC
merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when Corazon was about to
42 | Page
give birth, which CMC considered an emergency. Considering these
circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an
independent contractor.
The question now is whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability
considering that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor-physician.
GENERAL RULE: A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician.
EXCEPTION: There is, however, an exception to this principle. The
hospital may be liable if the physician is the ostensible agent of the hospital.
This exception is also known as the doctrine of apparent authority.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to
determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.
1. The first factor focuses on the hospitals manifestations and is
sometimes described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in
a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital.
In this regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the
patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a
representation may be general and implied.
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel.
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its
medical staff. Through CMCs acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent
authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada
was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such
authority.
● First, CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended
its medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada.
That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
● Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC
letterhead. Prior to Corazon’s admission and supposed
hysterectomy, CMC asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the
contents of which reinforced Rogelio’s belief that Dr. Estrada was
a member of CMCs medical staff.
● Third, Dr. Estrada’s referral of Corazon’s profuse vaginal bleeding
to Dr. Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr.
Estrada as a member of CMCs medical staff was collaborating with
other CMC-employed specialists in treating Corazon.
1. The second factor focuses on the patient’s reliance. It is sometimes
characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in
reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived
employment relationship with CMC in accepting Dr. Estradas services.
Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to
handle Corazon’s delivery not only because of their friend’s
recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr. Estrada’s connection
with a reputable hospital, the [CMC].
Further, the Spouses Nogales looked to CMC to provide the best medical
care and support services for Corazon’s delivery. The Court notes that prior
to Corazon’s fourth pregnancy, she used to give birth inside a clinic.
Considering Corazon’s age then, the Spouses Nogales decided to have their
fourth child delivered at CMC, which Rogelio regarded one of the best
hospitals at the time.
CMC’s defense that all it did was to extend to [Corazon] its facilities is
untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals, such
as CMC, are in the business of treatment.
43 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
Likewise unconvincing is CMCs argument that petitioners are estopped
from claiming damages based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to
Operation. Both release forms consist of two parts.
1. The first part gave CMC permission to administer to Corazon any
form of recognized medical treatment which the CMC medical
staff deemed advisable.
1. The second part of the documents, which may properly be
described as the releasing part, releases CMC and its employees
from any and all claims arising from or by reason of the treatment
and operation.
The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do the
consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon’s death
due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms,
being in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against
hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals from any and all
claims, which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would
be contrary to public policy and thus void.
Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of
establishments like hospitals but may only mitigate liability depending on
the circumstances. When a person needing urgent medical attention rushes
to a hospital, he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the
terms of admission and operation. Such a person is literally at the mercy of
the hospital. There can be no clearer example of a contract of adhesion than
one arising from such a dire situation. Thus, the release forms of CMC
cannot relieve CMC from liability for the negligent medical treatment of
Corazon.
ON THE LIABILITY OF OTHER RESPONDENTS
DR. ELY VILLAFLOR
The court is not persuaded. Dr. Villaflor admitted administering a lower
dosage of magnesium sulfate. However, this was after informing Dr. Estrada
that Corazon was no longer in convulsion and that her blood pressure went
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

down to a dangerous level. At that moment, Dr. Estrada instructed Dr.

Villaflor to reduce the dosage of magnesium sulfate from 10 to 2.5 grams.

DR. ROSA UY
The routine internal examination did not ipso facto make Dr. Uy liable for
the errors committed by Dr. Estrada. Further, petitioners’ imputation of
negligence rests on their baseless assumption that Dr. Uy was present at the
delivery room. Nothing shows that Dr. Uy participated in delivering
Corazon’s baby. CASE # 19: Sps. Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman
Doctrine: The liability of the state has two aspects: (1) its public or
DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ
governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents
The Court is not convinced. Dr. Enriquez is an anesthesiologist whose field
only, and (2) its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
of expertise is definitely not obstetrics and gynecology. As such, Dr.
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.
Enriquez was not expected to correct Dr. Estradas errors
Notes: Private individuals may be agents if they are hired for special
governmental task.
DR. PERPETUA LACSON
As found by the trial court, there was no unreasonable delay in the delivery
FACTS:
of blood from the time of the request until the transfusion to Corazon. Dr.
On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup bearing Plate No. IN-65,
Lacson competently explained the procedure before blood could be given to
owned and operated by National Irrigation Administration, a government
the patient. agency, driven by Hugo Garcia, a regular driver of NIA, bumped a bicycle
ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto
DR. NOE ESPINOLA Deligo, along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Fontanilla
Dr. Espinola’s order to do hysterectomy which was based on the
and Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
information he received by phone is not negligence. The Court agrees with
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan
the trial courts observation that Dr. Espinola believed in good faith that
Provincial Hospital where he died. Thus, the filing for an action for
hysterectomy was the correct remedy. At any rate, the hysterectomy did not
damages against NIA for the death of Francisco, which the Trial Court
push through because upon Dr. Espinola’s arrival, it was already too late. At granted, ordering NIA to pay the Sps. actual damages and death benefits.
the time, Corazon was practically dead.
NIA filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court
which caused it to appeal to the CA.
NURSE J. DUMLAO
In the present case, there is no evidence of Nurse Dumlao’s alleged failure
Court:
to follow Dr. Estrada’s specific instructions. Even assuming Nurse Dumlao -The award of moral damages is specifically allowable under Art. 2206 (3)
defied Dr. Estrada’s order, there is no showing that side-drip administration
which allows the spouse, legitimate or illegitimate ascendants and
of hemacel proximately caused Corazon’s death. descendant to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. Should it be granted, the award should be made to
each of petitioners individually

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
- the granting of exemplary damages is also proper since NIA acted with
gross negligence because of the accident and its subsequent failure
including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to the, victims. Thus,
by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled
to exemplary damages
Sol Gen:
-to determine whether NIA should be made liable for damages, it must first
be resolved whether Garcia was negligent in his operation of the pick-up at
the time of the accident. There should first be a finding of negligence on the
part of respondent's employee-driver.
NIA:
- it avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an
agency of the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo
Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent who was
performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for
the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government agency but
by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act. Even
as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National
Irrigation Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence is not an issue in
this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver of
the vehicle.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
HELD: YES. (The court in resolving the issue at hand applied Art 2176 and
Art 2180.)
The SC has laid down the 2 aspects of the liability of the State, namely: 1.
Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of
special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in
private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.
In this jurisdiction, the State only assumes a limited liability for the
damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. And
under the Art 2180 (6), the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts
45 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not
only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task
must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's
agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-
governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary
employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special governmental
task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand,
a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and
particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.
Since NIA is an agency of the government performing proprietary
functions as expressly provided of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1. And
because it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it
now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from
the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated
upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The
negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
A government agency performing proprietary functions and as such,
assumes the posture of an ordinary employer and under Par. 5 of Art.
2180, an employer is responsible for the damages caused by its employees
provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the driver.
It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result
of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters
away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit
further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented
portion of the road. It should be emphasized that the accident happened
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City,
an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters
away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia
was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up
suffered substantial and heavy damage and the fact that the NIA group was
then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by
their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their
normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the
reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet
the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the
driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the
situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their
destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
The SC also ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the
selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein)
of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert
further damage, the employer would still be liable.
In another case, this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful
in anticipation of others who may be using the highway, and his failure to
keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be traversed
constitutes negligence. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co.)
CASE # 20: Vinzons-Chato v Fortune
Doctrine: It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a
duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of
particular individuals. The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an
individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a
46 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a
special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-
performance. An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury
which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which
he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. A
contrary precept will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an
action, all men might have the like.
FACTS:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which took effect on
July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion, Hope, and
More were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the
rate of 20-45%. However, two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected Hope, More, and Champion
cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1).
BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of
RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular.
Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC
37-93. It then filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter and the same letter also contained the
assessment for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00
(computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10
days from receipt thereof. It then filed a petition for review with the CTA,
which issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93.
CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable.
This was affirmed by the CA, and finally by SC in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC
37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative
issuance.
Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner
in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held
liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the
issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of
the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no
cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority.
She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore
the latter is the one responsible for her acts; and (2) the complaint states no
cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
Rulings:
- RTC denied petitioners motion
- CA dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public
officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs
the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the
complaint for damages.
-SC in its June 19, 2007 Decision, affirmed the disposition of the CA and
directed the trial court to continue with the proceedings
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion to Refer the case to the Court En Banc.
She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of
paramount importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send
a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the performance
of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-
making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain
from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in
Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for damages under Art. 32
for the issuance of RMC 37-93
HELD:
NO.
47 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing
to the public collectively (the body politic), and the duty owing to particular
individuals.
In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper
performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined
which of the two classes of duties is involved.
For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, the liability of a
public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-
extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the
other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability.
Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in
general, an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the
public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or
inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but
no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the
officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty
to him as an individual. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a
particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper
performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can
never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public
only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone
does not constitute a wrong. A contrary precept (that an individual, in the
absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a
public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance
of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if
one man might have an action, all men might have the like the complaining
individual has no better right than anybody else. If such were the case, no
one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual
cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular
injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions
are founded.
Juxtaposed with Article 32, the principle may now translate into the rule
that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on
account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it
results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
this Courts pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision that Article 32, in
fact, allows a damage suit for tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for
damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the
plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the
public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for RMC No. 37-93 which she
issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in
CIR v. CA, the SC declared as having fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuances. A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with
quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to
promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid
administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone,
but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly,
by the administrative rule.
Furthermore, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner,
respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on
account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. However, a
careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no
particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The
phrase financial and business difficulties mentioned in the complaint is a
vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a particular
injury. In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the
petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a
single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC
37-93.
With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no
delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would
violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious
48 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.
The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner.
Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondents
complaint for damages under Art. 32 would be premised on the findings of
this Court in CIR v. CA where the SC ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by
petitioner in her capacity as CIR, had fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance. This is a logical inference. Without the decision in
CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondents rights to
due process of law and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the
petitioners administrative issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not
hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional;
certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the
laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that RMC
37-93 was a legislative rule, requiring prior notice before RMCs could
become operative. However, the SC did not make an express finding of
violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal
protection, CIR v. CA said: Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have
likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation; a statement that does not
amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondents
constitutional right.
In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. this
Court declared that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint
as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer
of the complaint.
In an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on
violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code
provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those related
to taxation and tax collection. And because the respondents complaint does
not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the
Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State
CASE # 21: Ramos v. C.O.L
FACTS: On or about 10:40 oclock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along
Katipunan Ave., corner Rajah Matanda St. QC, a vehicular accident took
place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number XDN 210, owned
by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin, and
a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo, with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one
Estela Maliwat sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the
hospital for treatment.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the
Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah
Matanda and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when the
Ford Espedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and
fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards
the direction where it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found
probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. Petitioner
demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela.
Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of
Aquilino, which was the proximate cause of the accident. He maintained
that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda St.
despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
through the intersection. He further claimed that he was not in the vehicle
when the mishap occurred. He asserted that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.
49 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
MTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. Thus, he appealed the same
before the RTC.
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the CA which affirmed the view that Aquilino
was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda St. since,
as per Certification of the MMDA dated November 30, 2004, that the
crossing of vehicles at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to
Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has not been allowed since January
2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area.
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan
Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from
crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan
Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus
violating the MMDA rule.
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the
collision, Ramos vehicle was moving at high speed in a busy area that was
then the subject of an ongoing construction (the Katipunan Avenue-Boni
Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into the rear door and fender of
the passengers side of Aquilinos car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree
turn. It therefore found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence
for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.
CA held that respondent Ramos is solidarily liable with Ilustrisimo to pay
C.O.L. Realty Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his
driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo
HELD: NO.
There is no doubt in the appellate courts mind that Aquilinos violation of
the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda St. was the proximate cause of the accident. Respondent does not
dispute this, it even conceded that petitioner was guilty of mere contributory
negligence.
Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes
negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the
damages suffered by respondent from the accident. proximate result of the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan

Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This
specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the
vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to
expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed
Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account
of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of
Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. CASE # 22: Manila Electric v Remoquillo

As to Rodel’s contributory negligence: SC finds it unnecessary to delve
into the issue, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness
which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels
contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to
recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have
suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of
damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory
negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not
Facts: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Peñaloza, his stepbrother,
located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said
to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the window
of the 3rd story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his
son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking
portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came
into contact with the electric wire of the Meralco strung parallel to the edge
of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by

50 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!

 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the
company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor —
P10,000 as compensatory damages; P784 as actual damages; P2,000 as
moral and exemplary damages; and P3,000 as attorney’s fees, with costs.
On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight
modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with
costs. The electric company has appealed said decision to us.
CA’s Conclusive Findings of Fact:
The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire
stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It
was installed there some 2 years before Peñaloza’s house was constructed.
The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar
incident took place, although with much less tragic consequences. A piece
of wood which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with
the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith
complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as
a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by
means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
As revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the RTC,
the distance from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on which
the deceased was making repairs was only 2 1/2 ft. Regulations of the City
of Manila required that ‘all wires be kept 3 3 from the building.’ Appellant
contends that in applying said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning
should not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the side of the
house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 ft., or more then
the minimum prescribed. This contention is groundless, a ‘media agua’ an
integral part of the building to which it is attached and to exclude it in
measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of the regulation.
Appellant points out that even assuming that the distance, within the
meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from the edge of the
‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such
distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of
said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct a
‘media agua’ only 1 meter wide, but instead he built one having 17 3/8
inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing
51 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
the distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3
feet.
The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts.
There was, according to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, first, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such
kind of wire; and secondly, because the only insulation material that may be
effective is still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its
costs would be prohibitive.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Held: No. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause.
The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in
some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its
edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the
original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of the “media agua”. We fail to see how the Company could be
held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although the city
ordinance called for a distance of 3 ft of its wires from any building, there
was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side
of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet
as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof,
such as a “media agua”, had the house owner followed the terms of the
permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media agua”,
namely, 1 meter, the distance from the wires to the edge of said “media
agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
In fixing said 1 meter width for the “media agua” the city authorities must
have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and
any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner
disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8
inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua”
as illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the
house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot
lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of
breach of any ordinance or regulation.
The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any
illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced,
to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said
distance. Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the
construction of the “media agua” was not the direct cause of the accident. It
merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua” been only one meter wide
as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have
stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe
margin between the edge of the “media agua” and the yawning 2-story
distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the
fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of
Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media
agua” just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his
age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have
been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and
forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both
hands and at arms length, without prudence, he turned around swinging his
arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless
and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the
52 | Page
street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter’s length of 6 feet.
CASE # 23: PLDT v CA
Facts: Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson
Street where they resided, at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said
jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have
been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the
inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning
light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s
windshield was also shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses
were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent
contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed
a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their
agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it
was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied with
its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.
That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the
spouses’ complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set
aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not PLDT is negligent
Held:No.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action
has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
Findings of Fact in CA’s resolution proving Antonio’s negligence:
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street.
If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was
hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane.
What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident,
defendant cannot be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The
accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the
unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may
explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT
MOUND for which reason he ran into it.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit
the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture
showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had already been
covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was
located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of the
ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but not in such a way as
to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles.
The situation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT
53 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
MOUND for which reason no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing
south was taken.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 km/hr as plaintiff-husband
claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it
struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the
ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit
B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had been braked
at 25 km/hr, plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the windshield
and they would not have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite
fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve
suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then
plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run
on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should
have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running
on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his failure
to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence on
his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible, being 2
to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT
MOUND in time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew
of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it
many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his
jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT
MOUND
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban
was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to
the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining
factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have
avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that
there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner. The presence of
warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of
excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the
site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing
of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on
that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location
of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his
wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his
imprudence.
There was also insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of
PLDT. We have for consideration only the self-serving testimony of Antonio
Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of
the accident. The absence of a police report of the incident and the non-
submission of a medical report from the hospital where private respondents
were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily explained.
CASE # 24: Phil Bank Commerce v CA
Facts: Rommel’s Marketing Corp. maintained 2 separate current accounts
with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling
appliances. In the ordinary and usual course of banking operations, current
54 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
account deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis of deposit slips
prepared and signed by the depositor, or the latter's agent or representative,
who indicates therein the current account number to which the deposit is to
be credited, the name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of
the deposit, and the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks. The
deposit slip has an upper portion or stub, which is detached and given to the
depositor or his agent; the lower portion is retained by the bank. In some
instances, however, the deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by the
depositor. The original of the deposit slip is retained by the bank, while the
duplicate copy is returned or given to the depositor.
From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Lipana claims to have
entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his
secretary, Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current
accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out that these deposits were not
credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Yabut's husband’s
account, Cotas. During this period, petitioner bank had been regularly
furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current
accounts balances. Unfortunately, Lipana failed to check these monthly
statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on PBC.
Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish 2
copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed
the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On
the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad,
would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of
these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of
information on the duplicate slip. The 2nd copy was kept by Yabut allegedly
for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of
RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account
number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear
to be RMC's account number. With the daily remittance records also
prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to RMC together with the validated
duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number, she made her
company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being
credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. This went
on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge.
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner
bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a
collection suit before the RTC of Pasig. The RTC found petitioner bank
negligent and was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74,
suffered by the private respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or
that of private respondent's?
Held: Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do. Picart v. Smith provides the test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Mabayad, was
negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the
duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-
imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of
deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in
accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility.
The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital
information — that of the name of the account holder — should have
already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the
incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by
being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account
holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was
filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and
sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the
duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up
55 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
the blank space later on. A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would
not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that
the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately,
this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge
losses to the private respondent.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in the selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This
was shown in the testimony of Mr. Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig
Branch of the PBC and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he
ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank
deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation
procedures.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the
negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its
bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the
private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds
entrusted to her by plaintiff, she would not have been able to deposit those
funds in her husband's current account, and then make plaintiff believe that
it was in the latter's accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not
been for bank teller Mabayad's aforesaid gross and reckless negligence. The
latter's negligence was thus the proximate, immediate and efficient cause
that brought about the loss claimed by plaintiff in this case, and the failure
of plaintiff to discover the same soon enough by failing to scrutinize the
monthly statements of account being sent to it by appellant bank could not
have prevented the fraud and misappropriation which Yabut had already
completed when she deposited plaintiff's money to the account of her
husband instead of to the latter's accounts.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at
times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank
was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where
both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last Omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent under Article
chargeable with the consequences thereof. 19Stated differently, the rule 2179 of the New Civil Code. In view of this, we believe that the demands of
would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar
a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last
fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. 20Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it
cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Discussion on degree of diligence ought to be exercised by banks:

Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors,
banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest
degree of care.

Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. CA:

The depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity,
whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions.
The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last
centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to
reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose as
he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he
directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the failure to duly credit
him his deposits as soon as they are made, can cause the depositor not a
little embarrassment if not financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal
litigation.

The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. In the case before us, it is apparent that the
petitioner bank was remiss in that duty and violated that relationship.
56 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

CASE #25: Real v Belo
FACTS: Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at
the Food Center of the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) along Taft
Avenue, Malate, Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and
operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of
PWU.
Around 7:00 o’clock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at
petitioner’s Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood
stalls in the area, including respondent’s stall. An investigation on the cause
of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that
the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at petitioner’s stall. For the
loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded compensation
from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondent’s
demand.
Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila (MeTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 152822. Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due
diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well
as the selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioner’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls.
In her Answer dated September 23, 1996, petitioner denied liability on the
grounds that the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees.
MeTC: In favor of Respondent
The MeTC held that the investigation conducted by the appropriate
authority revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming
from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner’s fastfood stall; that
57 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
factual circumstances did not show any sign of interference by any force of
nature to infer that the fire occurred due to fortuitous event; that the
petitioner failed to exercise due diligence, precaution, and vigilance in the
conduct of her business, particularly, in maintaining the safety of her
cooking equipment as well as in the selection and supervision of her
employees; that even if petitioner passes the fault to her employees, Article
2180 of the Civil Code finds application; that in the absence of supporting
evidence, the amount of actual damages and unrealized profits prayed for by
respondent cannot be granted; that, nonetheless, respondent is entitled to
temperate damages since respondent sustained pecuniary loss, though its
true value cannot, from the very nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Petitioner: Appeal with RTC
RTC: Affirmed MeTC
Petitioner: Motion for Reconsideration
RTC: Denied MR
Petitioner: Petition for Review with CA
CA: Denied for being procedurally flawed
ISSUE: Whether or not the fire was a fortuitous event – NO
RULING: Jurisprudence defines the elements of a “fortuitous event” as
follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible
for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion
of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.
It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes
from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner’s fastfood stall and her
employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
fastfood stalls, including respondent’s fastfood stall. Such circumstances do
not support petitioner’s theory of fortuitous event.
Petitioner’s bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule
in her favor. It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere
allegations are not evidence.
The Civil Code provides:
“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.”
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a
quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.
58 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that
the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good
condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit
proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and
diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection
and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that
petitioner had been negligent.
As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount thereof
by the RTC is improper. The RTC could no longer examine the amounts
awarded by the MeTC since respondent did not appeal from the Decision of
the MeTC. It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the
decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other
than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is
brought up on appeal. While there are exceptions to this rule, such as if they
involve (1) errors affecting the lower court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors, none apply
here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
June 16, 2000 and November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated November 26, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the temperate damages awarded is reduced from
P80,000.00 to P50,000.00 as awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 24, Manila in its Decision dated April 5, 1999.
CASE # 26: Southeastern College Inc. v CA
FACTS: Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road,
Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four- storey school building along the
same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a
powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong
winds, the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown
away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
respondents’ house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of
the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the
city buildings official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter’s
Report5 dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
426
“5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the
formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind.
Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U- shaped formation of 4-storey
building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the
general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the
one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong
winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located on both ends
of the building, which remained intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of
the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses
to the roof beams. The 1/2” diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete
roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the
trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the
trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.”
It then recommended that “to avoid any further loss and damage to lives,
limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity,” the fourth floor of
subject school building be declared as a “structural hazard.”
In their Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that
the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to
stay temporarily in other’s houses. And so they sought to recover from
petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral
damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as
attorney’s fees; plus costs.
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood
several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its
roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its
responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is “in tip-top condition”; and
59 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
furthermore, typhoon “Saling” was “an act of God and therefore beyond
human control” such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect
that subject school building had a “defective roofing structure,” found that,
while typhoon “Saling” was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to
private respondents’ house “could have been avoided if the construction of
the roof of [petitioner’s] building was not faulty.”
ISSUE: (NO) Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school
building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling,” was,
within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event? If so, petitioner cannot
be held liable for the damages suffered by the private respondents. This
conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.”
RULING: The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in
the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and
could not have been foreseen.”9 Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected
event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.”10 Civilist
Arturo M. Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two
general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods,
epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion,
attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.”
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is
necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by
reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot
be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross
negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.
When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing
damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was
a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the
participation of man— whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or
failure to act—the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.
In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to
the finding of the investigating team that subject school building’s roofing
had “no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered
by strong winds.” Based on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence
to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.
After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court
believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding
and conclusive upon this Court.14 After a careful scrutiny of the records and
the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and
hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
foresight, diligence or care.15 In order to be exempt from liability arising
from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been
no human participation amounting to a negligent act.16 In other words, the
person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence.
Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something which a
prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do. From these premises, we
proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it were
not, the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been
avoided?
At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the
negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
60 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence,19 not
merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private
respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on
the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular
inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. As the term
imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing.
What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause
behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded
person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the
victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray
bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation
was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of
petitioner’s school building. Private respondents did not even show that the
plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient and
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the
approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that
the construction of such building was basically flawed.
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private
respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and
design of Reyna admitted that it was a legal requirement before the
construction of any building to obtain a permit from the city building
official (city engineer, prior to the passage of the Building Act of 1977). In
like manner, after construction of the building, a certification must be
secured from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of
the edifice. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of
occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular
and proper construction of subject school building.
Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by
typhoon “Saling,” the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs
—without any deviation from the original design—and subsequently,
authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. These only
prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect, contrary to the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

report that its “U-shaped” form was “structurally defective.” Having given
his unqualified imprimatur, the city building official is presumed to have
properly performed his duties23 in connection therewith.
In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and
administration who testified that an annual maintenance inspection and
repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was
even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of
such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his
testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice
president’s narration.
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the
pecuniary loss they actually incurred. It is not enough that the damage be
capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory damages are borne. Private respondents merely
submitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of their
subject building. What is more, whether the “necessary repairs” were
caused ONLY by petitioner’s alleged negligence in the maintenance of its
school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is
an essential question that remains indeterminable.

Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government
service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any
defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to
the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that
typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school
building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could
not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than
“Saling.”

In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to

sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has
not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon “Saling”
was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents’
house.

With this disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondents’ claim for
actual and moral damages as well as attorney’s fees must fail. Petitioner
cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. More so because no
bad faith or willful act to cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant
moral damages.

On damages:

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

Facts: In 1986, Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya

erected a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building
fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela, known as Super A
Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out.
The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third
doors of the building. On the left side of the commercial building stood the
office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita).

In 1988, Perla Compania De Seguros (Perla), through its branch manager

Bienvenido Pascaul, entered into a lease contract in first door of Super A
Building, abutting the office of Matsushita. Perla renovated the space and
turned the left part as office and right as garage for company provided car
with 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina.

On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga, but did not bring
the car with him. 3 days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking
his appointments the next day, decided to "warm up" the car. When he
pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made
an "odd" sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline
percolating into the engine, he again stepped on the accelerator and started
the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound.
He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it
off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when
suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole
garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and
arms.

Meanwhile, Spouses Sarangaya were busy watching television when they

heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline permeated the air and, in
no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings,
furniture and appliances.

City fire marshall concluded that fire is “accidental.” Despite that, Spouses
CASE #27: Perla Compania de Seguros v Sps. Sarangaya file a criminal complaint against Pascual charging him reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property. On the other hand, Perla was
Sarangya asked to pay the amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the
commercial building.
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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
Pascual moved for the withdrawal of the criminal complaint, which was
granted. Later, Spouses Sarangaya filed a civil complaint based on quasi-
delict against Perla and Pascual for a "sum of money and damages,"
alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-
corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
Pascual as its employee.
During the trial, contentions and testimonies are:
Respondent’s witness: Few days before the incident, Pascual was seen
buying gasoline in a container from a nearby gas station. He then placed the
container in the rear compartment of the car.
Pascual: Insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence,
he was not liable for damages; also denied putting a container of gasoline in
the car's rear compartment.
Perla: Refused liability for the accident since it exercised due diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pascual.
RTC: Perla and Pascual were solidary liable. Pasccual is negligent based on
res Ipsa loquitur. On Perla’s part, it failed to prove that it exercise proper
diligence required.
CA: Affirmed the RTC but modified the amount of damages. Nominal
damages set aside.
Hence, this petition.
Held: Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out
an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff's prima facie
case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of
the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
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The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening
of the accident alone to establish negligence.
The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a
defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised
to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendant's
responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent;
2. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge and
3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily
occur unless there is negligence. "Ordinary" refers to the usual course of
events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is
obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when
a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to
the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play
and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand,
someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act,
use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the
same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any
proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition
required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to that employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees.
damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the The liability is imposed on all those who by their industry, profession or
maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had other enterprise have other persons in their service or supervision. Nowhere
been negligent in the upkeep of the car. does it state that the liability is limited to employers in the transportation
business.
Claim of Caso Fortuito
The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a)
the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of
the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted
the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c)
the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an
obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the
obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that
aggravated the accident.

In fine human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or

contributory cause of the injury or loss.

Clearly, there was no caso fortuito here because of his want of care and
prudence in maintaining the car.

Vicarious liability
In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof.26 To fend off vicarious liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them. Here, petitioner-
corporation's evidence hardly included any rule or regulation that Pascual
should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not have any
guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the
vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic
reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on these
circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be
apprised of the condition of Pascual's car or its serviceability.
Petitioner-corporation's argument that the liability attached to employers
only applies in cases involving the supervision of employees in the
transportation business is incorrect. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states
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CASE #28: ILENCO v CA
Facts: In evening of June 28 until June 29, 196, strong typhoon "Gening"
buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent
flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after
the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede,
the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the
house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag
City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters
Emporium, of which she was the owner, to look after the merchandise
therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waistdeep flood on
Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five
Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo
Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the
deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5
and 6 meters behind the deceased.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The
two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because
on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from
a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto
tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to
seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or
five blocks away.
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When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had
been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with
Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request
the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or
INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house
on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the
house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The
body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967,
Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations
in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or
short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag
NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground.
Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the
INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As
he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric
wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the other end was
seeming to play with the current of the water." Finding the Office of the
INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the NPC
Compound.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another
inspection trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by
the house of the deceased at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar
streets to which the body had been taken. Using the resuscitator which was
a standard equipment in his jeep and employing the skill he acquired from
an in-service training on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the
deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to the INELCO
Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them about the grounded
lines of the INELCO. In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third
inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The dangling wire he
saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar
after learning that the deceased had been electrocuted. Among the
sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health Officer of Sarrat,
Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro
examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was
grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic which indicated death by
electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged
wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand
was a burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated
the cause of death as "circulatory shock electrocution"
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its
officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric engineer; Loreto
Abijero, collector- inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and Julio Agcaoili,
president-manager of INELCO. Through the testimonies of these witnesses,
defendant sought to prove that on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric
service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area
No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero
Street, did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life
and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in
Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a
public service operator and in line with its business of supplying electric
current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and
avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12
linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of
the areas respectively assigned to them.
Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the province of
Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets of Laoag City under water,
only a few known places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged
electric lines, namely, at the southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which
was washed away and where the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the
eastern part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the
far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of Segundo and
Castro Streets, Laoag City; and at the far northwest side, near the premises
66 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
of the Ilocos Norte National High School. Fabico Abijero testified that in
the early morning before 6 o'clock on June 29, 1967 he passed by the
intersection of Rizal and Guerrero Streets to switch off the street lights in
Area No. 9. He did not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity.
What he saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the
defense to show that the deceased could not have died of electrocution.
Substantially, the testimony of the doctor is as follows: Without an autopsy
on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even a medico-legal expert, can
speculate as to the real cause of death. Cyanosis could not have been found
in the body of the deceased three hours after her death, because cyanosis,
which means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the color
of the skin purplish, appears only in a live person. The presence of the
elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish
her death by electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are more or less
round in shape and with points of entry and exit. Had the deceased held the
lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm would have been
bigger and the injury more massive.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted
by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968.
After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed
the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and
attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued
the controverted decision.
Held: By a preponderance of evidence, private respondents were able to
show that the deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion which can be
primarily derived from the photographed burnt wounds on the left palm of
the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased had
clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This was corroborated by the
testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body of the
deceased a few hours after the death and described the said burnt wounds as
a "first degree burn" and that they were "electrically charged". Furthermore,
witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
deceased screamed "Ay" and sank into the water, they tried to render some
help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an electric wire dangling
from an electric post, moving in the water in a snake-like fashion.
However, The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that
petitioner be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are
fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered
Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. We subscribe to
the conclusions of the respondent CA when it found:
"On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the
electrocution and consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan, defendant
called to the witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief lineman, and
lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate the
charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a general way about their
duties and the measures which defendant usually adopts to prevent hazards
to life and limb. From these testimonies, the lower court found "that the
electric lines and other equipment of defendant corporation were properly
maintained by a well-trained team of lineman, technicians and engineers
working around the clock to insure that these equipments were in excellent
condition at all times." The finding of the lower court, however, was based
on what the defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they
actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the occasion
of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon.
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public". . . considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care
extends to every place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the
victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an
67 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for
his own negligent conduct or omission"
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds
no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testi ed by Linda Alonzo Estavillo
(see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept.
1972), the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to
the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As
such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property
from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that
a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an
emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril
(65A C.S.C. Negligence (174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown
and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's.
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in completely
reversing the trial court's findings of fact, pointing to the testimonies of
three of its employees — its electrical engineer, collector-inspector,
lineman, and president-manager — to the effect that it had exercised the
degree of diligence required of it in keeping its electric lines free from
defects that may imperil life and limb. Likewise, the said employees of
petitioner categorically disowned the fatal wires as they appear in two
photographs taken on the afternoon of June 29, 1967, suggesting that said
wires were just hooked to the electric post . However, as the CA properly
held, "(t)he finding of the lower court . . . was based on what the defendant's
employees were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

do on the date in question, and not on the occasion of the emergency

situation brought about by the typhoon". And as found by the CA, which We
have already reiterated above, petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like
manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of the several wires cannot stand
the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it held that "(t)he nature of
the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no
other conclusion than that they were 'burns', and there was nothing else in
the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn
except the dangling live wire of defendant company".

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires
prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines". The fact is that when
Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the
early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any
INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office (vide, CA
Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed,
confirming the negligence of petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:
. . . even before June 28 the people in Laoag were already alerted about the
impending typhoon, through radio announcements. Even the fire department
of the city announced the coming of the big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN,
March 13, 1975) At the INELCO irregularities in the flow of electric current
were noted because "amperes of the switch volts were moving". And yet,
despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request
that defendant's switch be cut off — but the harm was done. Asked why the
delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine tender of the
electric plant to switch off the current." )How very characteristic of gross
inefficiency!
CASE #29: Abrogar v Cosmos
FACTS: To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly
with Intergames, organized an endurance running contest billed as the "1st
Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980. The
organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through public roads and
streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle. Plaintiffs' son Rommel
applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and
after complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted
and he was given an o<cial number. Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the
designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other participants and
ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out, the plaintiffs' (sic)
further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and
precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of them by
the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate and protect the
participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the
marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running
along the route of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos Avenue (DMMA
for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng
Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.
On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) to recover various damages for the

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
untimely death of Rommel (i.e., actual and compensatory damages, loss of
earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation). Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been
the organizer of the marathon, but only its sponsor; that its participation had
been limited to providing financial assistance to Intergames; that the
financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer of the
marathon, had been in answer to the Government's call to the private sector
to help promote sports development and physical fitness; 7 that the
petitioners had no cause of action against it because there was no privity of
contract between the participants in the marathon and Cosmos; and that it
had nothing to do with the organization, operation and running of the event.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the conduct of the marathon, and if so,
was the negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel
2. Whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was
an efficient intervening cause;
3. Whether or not the doctrine assumption of risk is applicable.
4. Whether or not Cosmos is liable for the negligence of Intergames
as the organizer.
5. Whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of
earning capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no
gainful employment.
HELD:
1.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. "The
69 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and
Article 20. To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-
honored test has been set in Picart v. Smith: The test by which to determine
the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute
the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much
value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. A careful
review of the evidence presented, particularly the testimonies of the relevant
witnesses, in accordance with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to
the conclusion that the safety and precautionary measures undertaken by
Intergames were short of the diligence demanded by the circumstances of
persons, time and place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the
organizer was guilty of negligence. In staging the event, Intergames had no
employees of its own to man the race, and relied only on the "cooperating
agencies" and volunteers who had worked with it in previous races. The
cooperating agencies included the Quezon City police, barangay tanods,
volunteers from the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the Philippine National
Red Cross, the Citizens Traffic Action Group, and the medical teams of
doctors and nurses coming from the Office of the Surgeon General and the
Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan. The evidence presented undoubtedly
established that Intergames' notion of coordination only involved informing
the cooperating agencies of the date of the race, the starting and ending
points of the route, and the places along the route to man. Intergames did
not conduct any general assembly with all of them, being content with
holding a few sporadic meetings with the leaders of the coordinating
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
agencies. It held no briefings of any kind on the actual duties to be
performed by each group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not instruct
the volunteers on how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of danger in
manning the race, despite such being precisely why their assistance had
been obtained in the first place. Intergames had no right to assume that the
volunteers had already been aware of what exactly they would be doing
during the race. It had the responsibility and duty to give to them the proper
instructions despite their experience from the past races it had organized
considering that the particular race related to runners of a different level of
experience, and involved different weather and environmental conditions,
and traffic situations. It should have remembered that the personnel
manning the race were not its own employees paid to perform their tasks,
but volunteers whose nature of work was remotely associated with the safe
conduct of road races. Verily, that the volunteers showed up and assumed
their proper places or that they were sufficient in number was not really
enough. It is worthy to stress that proper coordination in the context of the
event did not consist in the mere presence of the volunteers, but included
making sure that they had been properly instructed on their duties and tasks
in order to ensure the safety of the young runners. It is relevant to note that
the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors
aged 14 to 18 years joining a race of that kind for the first time. The
combined factors of their youth, eagerness and inexperience ought to have
put a reasonably prudent organizer on higher guard as to their safety and
security needs during the race, especially considering Intergames' awareness
of the risks already foreseen and of other risks already known to it as of
similar events in the past organizer. There was no question at all that a
higher degree of diligence was required given that practically all of the
participants were children or minors like Rommel; and that the law imposes
a duty of care towards children and minors even if ordinarily there was no
such duty under the same circumstances had the persons involved been
adults of sufficient discretion. In that respect, Intergames did not observe
the degree of care necessary as the organizer, rendering it liable for
negligence.
2.
Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces an event, and without
70 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
which the event would not have occurred." The question of proximate cause
is said to be determined, not by the existence or non-existence of
intervening events, but by their character and the natural connection
between the original act or omission and the injurious consequences. An
examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts
supports the conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel; and that the negligence of the
jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause. First of all,
Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from
vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel
manning the marathon route effectively set the stage for the injury
complained of. The submission that Intergames had previously conducted
numerous safe races did not persuasively demonstrate that it had exercised
due diligence because, as the trial court pointedly observed, "[t]hey were
only lucky that no accident occurred during the previous marathon races but
still the danger was there."
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular
accident on the route was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames,
which could then have been avoided if only Intergames had acted with due
diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road, and if only
Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the race
through its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening
cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between
the negligence of Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by
Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one not
produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate
to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first
wrongful cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been
foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an efficient
intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury." In fine, it was the duty of Intergames
to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed to do so.
3.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
The doctrine of assumption of risk had no application to Rommel. Unlike
the RTC, the CA ruled that the doctrine of assumption of risk applied
herein; hence, it declared Intergames and Cosmos not liable. The CA
rendered the following rationalization to buttress its ruling, to wit: In this
case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel
Abrogar, surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing
before the race. Consequently, he was aware that the marathon would pass
through a national road and that the said road would not be blocked off from
traffic. And considering that he was already eighteen years of age, had
voluntarily participated in the marathon, with his parents' consent, and was
well aware of the traffic hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all the
risks of the race. This is precisely why permission from the participant's
parents, submission of a medical certificate and a waiver of all rights and
causes of action arising from the participation in the marathon which the
participant or his heirs may have against appellant Intergames were required
as conditions in joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the
waiver signed by Rommel Abrogar only involved risks such as stumbling,
suffering heatstroke, heart attack and other similar risks. It did not consider
vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the said waiver.
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a sport,
the doctrine of assumption of risk applies to any facet of the activity
inherent in it and to any open and obvious condition of the place where it is
carried on. We believe that the waiver included vehicular accidents for the
simple reason that it was a road race run on public roads used by vehicles.
Thus, it cannot be denied that vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a
track race which is held on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a
road race, there is always the risk of runners being hit by motor vehicles
while they train or compete. That risk is inherent in the sport and known to
runners. It is a risk they assume every time they voluntarily engage in their
sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game or
contest, he assumes the ordinary risks of such game or contest so as to
preclude recovery from the promoter or operator of the game or contest for
injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of amusements or of places
71 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
where sports and games are played are not insurers of safety of the public
nor of their patrons.
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980
was a race the winner of which was to represent the country in the annual
Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon Classic in Greece, if he equals or breaks
the 29- minute mark for the 19-km. race. Thus, Rommel Abrogar having
voluntarily participated in the race, with his parents' consent, assumed all
the risks of the race.
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes
himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of
injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured
has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward
him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the
former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it
is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a
known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk
arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume
risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate. As a defense
in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three
elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (2) he
must further understand its nature; and (3) his choice to incur it must be free
and voluntary. According to Prosser: 80 "Knowledge of the risk is the
watchword of assumption of risk."
Contrary to the notion of the CA, the concurrence of the three elements was
not shown to exist. Rommel could not have assumed the risk of death when
he participated in the race because death was neither a known nor normal
risk incident to running a race. Although he had surveyed the route prior to
the race and should be presumed to know that he would be running the race
alongside moving vehicular traffic, such knowledge of the general danger
was not enough, for some authorities have required that the knowledge must
be of the specific risk that caused the harm to him. In theory, the standard to
be applied is a subjective one, and should be geared to the particular
plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of the reasonable person of
ordinary prudence who appears in contributory negligence. He could not
have appreciated the risk of being fatally struck by any moving vehicle
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

while running the race. Instead, he had every reason to believe that the Article 2202 of theCivil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in a suit
organizer had taken adequate measures to guard all participants against any upon crimes and quasi-delicts can recover from the defendant, viz.: Art.
danger from the fact that he was participating in an organized marathon. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
Stated differently, nobody in his right mind, including minors like him, damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
would have joined the marathon if he had known of or appreciated the risk omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
of harm or even death from vehicular accident while running in the foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
organized running event. Without question, a marathon route safe and free Accordingly, Intergames was liable for all damages that were the natural
from foreseeable risks was the reasonable expectation of every runner and probable consequences of its negligence. The petitioners sufficiently
participating in an organized running event. showed that Rommel was, at the time of his untimely but much lamented
death, able-bodied, in good physical and mental state, and a student in good
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of
standing. It should be reasonable to assume that Rommel would have
express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of
finished his schooling and would turn out to be a useful and productive
risk. There is ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person
person had he not died. Under the foregoing jurisprudence, the petitioners
does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation because of his
should be compensated for losing Rommel's power or ability to earn. The
youth, or lack of information or experience, and thus will not be taken to
basis for the computation of earning capacity is not what he would have
consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does
become or what he would have wanted to be if not for his untimely death,
not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.
but the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death.
4.
Cosmos is not liable for the negligence of Intergames as the organizer.
Nonetheless, the CA did not err in absolving Cosmos from liability. The
sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race.
Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the
preparations for the actual conduct of the race.
We uphold the finding by the CA that the role of Cosmos was to pursue its
corporate commitment to sports development of the youth as well as to
serve the need for advertising its business. In the absence of evidence
showing that Cosmos had a hand in the organization of the race, and took
part in the determination of the route for the race and the adoption of the
action plan, including the safety and security measures for the benefit of the
runners, we cannot but conclude that the requirement for the direct or
immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship of Cosmos
and the death of Rommel simply did not exist. Indeed, Cosmos' mere
sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the efficient
and proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
5.

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE #30: Valenzuela v CA
FACTS:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542
from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street,
Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion,
Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A.
Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a
lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire
and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her
rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the
tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped
by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered
in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact
plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant,
which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from
under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her
thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found
to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)."
She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually
73 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by
defendants from the car insurance.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way
home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was
affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was
driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the
vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite
direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights."
He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was
protruding as it was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of
the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the
testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the car of the
plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless
or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found
defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held
Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants led an Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal
Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the
point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties'
cars, appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial
court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith led an appeal with the
respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the
Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of
record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked
at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."
Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly
parked, almost at the center of the road, the respondent court noted that
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at or near center of
the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision,
however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any
liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of
moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary
damages, the respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the
same, in addition to costs, attorney's fees and the other damages. The Court
of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants' counterclaims.
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing
two separate petitions before this court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944,
contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the
proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own
negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory
negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the
respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial,
Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar
as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the
trial court.
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Li was negligent in driving his company-issued
Mitsubishi Lancer.
2. Whether Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence and
whether emergency rule applies.
3. Whether Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable as employer of Li.
HELD:
1.
YES.
74 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
We agree that as between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the
observations of a witness who did not even know the accident victim
personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to
his testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's
testimony deserves greater weight. Against the unassailable testimony of
witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was
merely adroitly crafted to provide a version, obviously self-serving, which
would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident. Against
Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by
other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course of trial. He
claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph. when "out of
nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which was (the)
plaintiff's car." He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition" he put
on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's
disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist
alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of
the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare
like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the
changing conditions of the road if he were alert — as every driver should be
— to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.
Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident
could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1)
that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2)
that he was under the influence of alcohol. 12 Either factor working
independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road
conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching
Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply
his brakes.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which
is contrary to what he told the police immediately after the accident and is,
therefore, more believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes, but
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with
glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it. For, had
this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the plaintiff
which was properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was not
even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid
a collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double
lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is
plenty of space for both cars, since her car was running at the right lane
going towards Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane
going to Cubao."
2.
NO. Valenzuela is not guilty of contributory negligence.
YES. Emergency rule finds application in the case at bar.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for
her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a
no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The
law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful
and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this court in
Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence.
75 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought,
or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a at tire on a rainy night will not
be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so
and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the
entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for
her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length
of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant
case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to
A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and
other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As
narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where there
are people, to verify whether she had a at tire and to solicit help if
needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was
at and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." In fact, respondent
court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident
confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the sidewalk. The
sketch which he prepared after the incident showed Valenzuela's car partly
straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists
passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated
by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard
reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making,
and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is
commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

others." It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its
person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. The
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our
circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below
satisfaction that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi
family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to
Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00
whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was
unlimited use of a company car. 31 Not having been able to overcome the
under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting
effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly
its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
lessened.
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
the night of the accident was clearly of his own making.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by
3. the respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case
of moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich the
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not
plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be
based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable
commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the
for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence
P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
considering the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the
of the injury. As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent
respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed
a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's
above the knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the
employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the
full ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of
damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, (which was paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the stump from the process of
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal o ce healing.
hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the o ce,
visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company
clients. 30 These meetings, clearly, were not strictly con ned to routine
hours because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing
his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well
as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li — as well as the corporation —
76 | Page That in all things, God May be glorified!
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

CASE #31: Ramos v Pepsi-Cola Bottling

FACTS: Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.and
Andres Bonifacio in the CFI due to a collision involving the car of Placido
Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the
time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of
Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-
defendant Andres Bonifacio.

CFI found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI did not prove its
exercise of due diligence to prevent the damage and solidarily held it liable
for damages. CA Affirmed, but absolved PEPSI since it proved the exercise
of due diligence.

Appellants argued before the SCthat defendant PEPSI-COLA's evidence

failed to show that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of its
driver in question.

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Añasco, personnel manager of

defendant company before the CA was to the effect that defendant driver
was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department;
that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical
examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual
driver's examination. It is now contended that Añasco being PEPSI-COLA's
employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his testimony is not
believable.

ISSUE

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
Whether or not PEPSI exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver-
employee.
HELD
No. Añascos credibility is not for the SC to re-examine. And said witness
having been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his testimony, as
accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be assailed. Assignments of
error involving the credibility of witnesses and which in effect dispute the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, cannot be reviewed in these
proceedings. For a question to be one of law it must involve no examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.
PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio
as to his qualifications, experiences and record of service, taking all steps
mentioned by the Court of Appeals in its decision.1äwphï1.ñët
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the
required due diligence in the selection of its driver. In order that the
defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good
father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a
professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the
applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record
of service.
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to
due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180
of the Civil Code provides:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
xxx xxx xxx
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The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that the
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may
be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
As pointed out, what appellants here contend as not duly proved by PEPSI-
COLA is only due diligence in the selection of its driver. And,
parenthetically, it is not surprising that appellants thus confine their
arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since the record — as even
appellants' brief reflects in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's
witness — would show sufficient evidence to establish due diligence in the
supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers, including Bonifacio.
Moreover, the question of whether PEPSI- COLA violated the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law and rules and regulations related thereto, not having
been raised and argued in the Court of Appeals, cannot be ventilated herein
for the first time. And the matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did acts to
ratify the negligent act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA, in operating the tractor-truck and trailer,
violated the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law and the rules and regulations related
thereto.
Whether the principle of respondeat superior should be applied.
HELD: No. Affirmed CA decision.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

It now appears, however, that said question was raised in a motion to explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it
reconsider filed with the Court of Appeals which resolved the same against has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
petitioners. Due consideration of the matter on its merits, convinces Us that damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence consists of,
the decision of the Court of Appeals should still be affirmed in toto. namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.

Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of M.V.O. Administrative
Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951, in that at the time of the collision, the
trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven
at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was
not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the
driver.
Neither could We apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own
negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made responsible
for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring
employees.

It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the

night of the collision since he was found to be driving alone. However,
there is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To
be sure, the records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman
who went to the collision scene, testified that he saw the tractor-truck there
but he does not remember if it had any rear vision mirror. This cannot prove
lack of rear-vision mirror. And the cited provision is complied if either of
the two alternatives, i.e., having a rear-vision mirror or a helper, is present.
Stated otherwise, said provision is violated only where there is a positive
finding that the tractor-truck did not have both rear-vision mirror and a
helper for the driver.

It was incumbent upon petitioners-appellants to have proved lack of a

permit since the tractor-truck and the trailer were registered. Compliance
with law and regularity in the performance of official duty — in this case,
the issuance of proper registration papers — are presumed and prevail over
mere surmises. Having charged a violation of law, the onus of substantiating
the same fell upon petitioners-appellants. Hence, the conclusion that there
was a violation of the law lacks factual basis.

Petitioners would also have Us abandon the Bahia ruling. In its stead, We
are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We
cannot however, abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit
mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against
all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very

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 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
CASE #32: Santos v Pizardo
FACTS: In an Information, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged
with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace
Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to
five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted.
However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial
court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and
its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action.
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Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper
service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of
non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its
officers.
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that
the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years
reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As
there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint
which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the
prescriptive period.
RTC Dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
According to the RTC, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed
petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of
the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved
the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed
on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of
conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the
finality of the judgment. The trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on
quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code
because the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular
accident.
CA Dismissed.
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint
arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action
invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action
had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of
conviction.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)
Private respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of prescription was in order. They point out that the averments in the
complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4)
years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced
since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is
Viron Transit’s contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a
situation where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal
case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim has prescribed. — NO.
HELD: Petition granted.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party
expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second,
when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages
determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of
the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually
exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil
action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this
reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation
to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/
Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they
seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the
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complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners
cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought
within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent
with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability
arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the
part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that
petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict,
considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of
negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce
civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.[15] Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar
proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a
bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as
the latter action had been expressly reserved.
 Torts and Damages | Case Digests (3B/3S)

Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer

becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the
discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the
rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.

Hence, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in
their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this
rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out
of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action
for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no
more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex
delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double
recovery for obvious reasons.

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