[G.R. NO.
156847 : January 31, 2007] On January 28, 1997, the trial court granted respondent's
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPO4 EMILIANO
ANONAS, Respondent.
DECISION
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated October 11, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531.
On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent,
assigned at the Western Police District, was apprehended by
his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other
persons were sniffing methamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug; and that he was
in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver
On December 9, 1996, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, same city, two
separate Informations against respondent, one for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-154398, and another for illegal
possession of firearm, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-
154399, reproduced as follows:
Criminal Case No. Case 96-154398
That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by law
to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control white crystalline substance
separately contained in five (5) plastic bags marked "AJ" to
"AJ4" weighting two hundred twenty and .2462 (222.2462)
grams known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
license or prescription thereof.
Criminal Case No. 96-154399,
That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under
his/her custody and control .38 caliber revolver without serial
number with six (6) live ammos and carrying the same outside
his residence without first having secured from the proper
authorities the necessary license therefore.
No bail was recommended in Criminal Case No. 96-154398.
On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the trial court a
motion for reinvestigation on grounds that he was
apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no
preliminary investigation was conducted.
motion.
On April 14, 1998, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag, designated to
conduct the reinvestigation, was appointed judge of the RTC in
Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform the prosecutor who took
his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile,
respondent has remained in detention.
On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a
motion to dismiss the Informations, contending that the delay
in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process.
On January 12, 2001, the trial court heard the motion to
dismiss. It turned out that Prosecutor Danilo Formoso, who
took over the case, was not aware of the pending
reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate
the reinvestigation within thirty (30) days.
On February 16, 2001, Prosecutor Formoso manifested before
the trial court that the reinvestigation had been terminated
and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the
Informations against respondent.
On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying
respondent's motion to dismiss the Informations. His motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated
September 7, 2001.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67531, contending that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to dismiss
both Informations.
On October 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition
and set aside the Order of the trial court dated August 9, 2001
and dismissed the criminal charges against respondent.
The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for
the resolution of his motion for reinvestigation for almost five
years while being detained, violated his right to due process.
The Court of Appeals then ordered that respondent be
released from custody.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved
for reconsideration, but in its Resolution dated January 10,
2003, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
The only issue before us is whether the appellate court erred
in holding that respondent's right to due process has been
violated.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy his right to
a speedy trial. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." This is reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which requires that "the investigating officer shall resolve the
case within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the
investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases
before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Republic Act No.
8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998) was enacted on February
4, 1998. To implement its provisions, the Court issued SC
Circular No. 38-98 dated September 15, 1998 setting a time
limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the
date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
The earliest rulings of the Court on speedy trial were rendered
in Conde v. Judge of First Instance,[2]Conde v. Rivera, et
al.,[3] and People v. Castañeda.4 These cases held that
accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of
Rights and that such right is denied when an accused person,
through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting
officers, is forced to wait many months for trial. Specifically
in Castañeda, the Court called on courts to be the last to set
an example of delay and oppression in the administration of
justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the courts to
see to it that the criminal proceedings against the accused
come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from
the custody of the law.
In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,5 the Court found the delay of
six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a speedy disposition of cases. Similarly, in Roque v.
Office of the Ombudsman,6 the Court ruled that the delay of
almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act
promptly on complaints before him. In Cervantes v.
Sandiganbayan,7 it was held that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in not quashing the Information filed six
years after the initiatory complaint, thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case.
The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to
due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan,8 the Court,
restating the pronouncement in Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan,9 held:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by
the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of
due process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be
due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan
as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official." In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his
sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic
Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and
factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of]
unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or
justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan
to resolve the case. (Emphasis supplied).
The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the
offenses charged took more than four years. He was
apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996.
Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not
having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for
reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated
January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was
terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the
Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City
Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation.
There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by
the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive
years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply
with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the
Court of Appeals, respondent's right to due process had been
violated.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 168827 : April 13, 2007]
BENJAMIN P. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 and
the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
25436, affirming with modification the trial court's judgment
finding Benjamin P. Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of frustrated homicide.
The Antecedents
Dean Dongui-is was a teacher at the Tubao National High
School, La Union. Petitioner Benjamin Martinez was the
husband of Dean's co-teacher, Lilibeth Martinez. Petitioner
eked out a living as a tricycle driver.
On October 28, 1998, Dean and his wife Freda filed a complaint
for damages against the spouses Martinez in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tubao, La Union. They alleged that
in March 1998, petitioner, a suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had been
peddling false reports that Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations;
he even told Freda that Elvisa was Dean's mistress. This led to
a quarrel between Dean and Freda, and the latter was
hospitalized for her heart ailment. Dean requested Lilibeth to
stop her husband from spreading lies, and she replied that
Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. They prayed that they
be awarded moral and exemplary damages and litigation fees
in the total amount of P100,000.00.3 The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 226.
For her part, Elvisa also filed a complaint against the spouses
Martinez in the MCTC of Tubao for damages anchored on
Article 26 of the New Civil Code. She alleged that on several
occasions, petitioner went to the Shaltene Pawnshop and
Pharmacy where she was employed and accused her of having
an illicit affair with Dean; on one occasion, he held her hand
and forcibly pulled her outside, which caused her to scratch his
face and run after him with a knife; he also told her husband's
cousin, Willy Ordanza, that she had an illicit affair with Dean;
Willy, in turn, told her mother-in-law about it; petitioner
relayed the same rumors to her co-worker, Melba Dacanay,
and his wife spread to people in the Municipality, including
Ramil Basallo, her brother-in-law. Elvisa also prayed for
damages in the total amount of P100,000.00. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 227.4
The spouses Martinez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
in Civil Case No. 226 which was heard in the morning of
February 3, 1999. The court denied the motion.
At about 1:40 p.m. that day, Dean went to the Tubao Credit
Cooperative (TCC) office to pick up the dividend certificate of
his wife who was a member of the cooperative. He left the
building and walked to his car which was parked in front. As he
did, he read the dividend certificate of his wife. Dean was
about a step away from an L-300 van which was parked in front
of the building when petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly
emerged from behind the vehicle and stabbed him on the left
breast. Dean instantly moved backward and saw his assailant.
Dean fled to the bank office and was able to gain entry into the
bank. Petitioner ran after him and upon cornering him, tried to
stab him again. Dean was able to parry the blow with his right
hand, and the bolo hit him on the right elbow. Dean fell to the
floor and tried to stand up, but petitioner stabbed him anew
on his left breast.5 Dean managed to run to the counter which
was partitioned by a glass. Unable to get inside the counter,
petitioner shouted at Dean: "Agparentomeng ka tatta ta talaga
nga patayen ka tatta nga aldawen (You kneel down because I
will really kill you now this day)."6
Meantime, SPO1 Henry Sulatre was at the Tubao Police
Station, about 100 meters away. He was informed that a fight
was going on in the bank. He rushed to the place on board the
police car. When he arrived at the scene, he saw Barangay
Captain Rodolfo Oller and his son Nicky Oller.7 Nicky handed to
him the bolo which petitioner had used to stab Dean.8 He and
Rodolfo brought petitioner to the police station. On the way,
they passed by the loading area of tricycles, about 40 meters
away from the police station. Petitioner shouted: "Sinaksak
kon pare, sangsangaili laeng isuna saan isuna to agari ditoy
Tubao (I stabbed him, he is just a visitor so he should not act
like a king here in Tubao)." SPO1 Sulatre placed Benjamin in
jail. Benjamin kept on shouting: "Napatay kon, napatay kon (I
killed him, I killed him)."9
In the meantime, PO3 Valenzuela brought Dean to the Doña
Gregoria Memorial Hospital in Agoo, La Union. The victim was
transferred to the Ilocos Regional Hospital (IRH) in San
Fernando, La Union where Dean was examined and operated
on by Dr. Nathaniel Rimando, with the assistance of Dr. Darius
Pariñas.10 Dean sustained two stab wounds in the anterior
chest, left, and a lacerated wound in the right elbow, forearm.
Had it not been for the blood clot that formed in the stab
wound on the left ventricle that prevented the heart from
bleeding excessively, Dean would have died from profuse
bleeding.11
On February 7, 1999, Dean gave a sworn statement to SPO1
Sulatre.12 However, he deferred swearing to the truth of his
statement before the Public Prosecution because SPO1 Sulatre
was waiting for the permanent medical certificate to be issued
by the hospital. SPO1 Sulatre deferred the execution and
submission of an arrest report also pending the issuance of the
medical certificate.
Instead of issuing a permanent medical certificate, the IRH
issued on February 8, 1999 the following Temporary
Certificate:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
According to hospital record, DEAN N. DONGUI-IS, 30 years
old, male, married, a resident of Francia West, Tubao, La
Union, was examined/treated/confined in this hospital
on/from February 3-20, 1999.
WITH THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND DIAGNOSIS:
'Stab Wound (L) Chest with Hemothorax (L), (L) Ventricular
Perforation;
OPERATIONS:
'Exploratory Thoracotomy (L); Evacuation of Retained Blood
Clots; Ventriculorrhaphy Decortication 2/11/99
and would need medical attendance for more than thirty (30)
days barring complications.13
On March 10, 1999, SPO1 Sulatre filed a criminal complaint for
frustrated murder against petitioner in the MCTC.14 The MCTC
opted not to act on the crime pending the arrest report and
SPO1 Sulatre's submission of Dean's sworn statement.
The IRH issued a medical certificate on February 28, 1999,
stating that Dean's wounds would need medical attendance of
more than 30 days.15 Barangay Captain Oller and SPO1 Sulatre
executed an affidavit on petitioner's arrest. 16 Dean had his
affidavit sworn before the Public Prosecutor on March 30,
1999.
On September 13, 2000 the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union
indicted Benjamin for frustrated murder before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, of the same province. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of February 1999, in the
Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery and
evident premeditation, being then armed with a small pointed
bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one DEAN DONGUI-IS y Manalo, hitting
him on his left breast and right elbow, and thereby inflicting on
him injuries that would have produced the crime of Murder as
a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
mainly the timely rendition of medical assistance of on the said
offended party, which prevented his death, to his damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.17
On October 13, 2000, the accused, assisted by counsel, was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for Petitioner
Petitioner declared that he merely defended himself against
Dean's assault. Dean was so jealous of him because his
mistress, Elvisa, had also been his mistress. Unknown to Dean,
he had already terminated his relation with Elvisa sometime in
March 1997 when his wife Lilibeth discovered the illicit
relationship.18 Dean also suspected that he (petitioner) had
been sending letters to his (Dean's) wife relative to the illicit
relationship with Elvisa. Dean also suspected that he was
responsible for the raid conducted by the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) of his house for possession of a
gun.19 As a result, Dean filed a civil complaint against him for
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 266. Before and after the
filing of the civil case, Dean had hurled invectives at him in the
presence of Joselito Madriaga and other tricycle
drivers.20 Dean even attempted to sideswipe him with his
car.21
Petitioner declared that the criminal charge against him was
Dean's concoction, and intended solely to harass him. He
narrated that he went to the TCC office at about 1:30 p.m. on
February 3, 1999. His wife had earlier received a note from the
cooperative to get the interest on her deposit.22 He parked his
tricycle in front of the building on the left side of the railing
going to the entrance of the cooperative.23 Dean's car was
parked on the right side of the railing.24 On his way, he met his
82-year-old uncle, Godofredo Sarmiento, who was also on his
way to the cooperative to update his passbook because he was
intending to apply for a loan.25 He told Godofredo that they
could go to the TCC together. When they were about to pass
through the entrance door, Dean was about to exit from the
cooperative. Dean thought that he was blocking his way and
shouted invectives at him and his uncle; Dean also spat on his
breast and face; and threw a punch which he was able to parry
with his left elbow.26 Dean kept attacking him, forcing him to
move backward through the railing and towards his tricycle.
Dean punched him again but he managed to parry the blow
with his bolo which he took from his tricycle. He stabbed Dean
on his right elbow.27 He swung his bolo at Dean which forced
the latter to run back into the office. He entered the office and
stood by the entrance door to see if Dean would get a weapon.
Dean continued hurling invectives at him but was later pacified
by Patricio Alterado, an employee of the cooperative. 28 When
Barangay Captain Oller arrived, he surrendered, along with his
bolo.29 He never boasted on the way to the police station that
he had killed Dean.30
Godofredo partially corroborated the testimony of petitioner.
He declared that Dean spat on the face of petitioner. 31 By the
time Dean and petitioner reached the place where the latter's
tricycle was parked, he had left; he was afraid of being
involved.32 He did not report the incident to the police
authorities.
Joselito Madriaga testified that he and petitioner were bosom
buddies with a long history of friendship. Dean had an axe to
grind against petitioner because the two maintained a
common mistress, Elvisa.33
The Trial Court's Decision
On April 30, 2001, the trial court rendered
judgment34 convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide. The
fallo of the decision reads'
WHEREFORE, this Court, after a consideration of the evidence
adduced in this case, finds accused BENJAMIN MARTINEZ
guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as principal. Neither
aggravating circumstance nor mitigating circumstance has
been appreciated. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused Benjamin Martinez is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS OF PRISION
CORRECTIONAL MEDIUM as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR MEDIUM as maximum. He is
also ordered to pay DEAN DONGUI-IS the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, broken into
the following:
(a) Ninety-Two Thousand (P92,000.00) Pesos for medical
expenses;
(b) Twenty-Six Thousand (P26,000.00) Pesos, representing his
salaries for two (2) months when he could not attend to teach
due to his injuries;
(c) Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages; and
(d) Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as complainant's
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.35
The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the
testimony of Dean, Dr. Rimando, SPO1 Sulatre, and the
documentary evidence of the prosecution. The court rejected
petitioner's twin defenses of denial and self-defense. It
declared that his version lacked strong corroboration, and that
his witnesses (a close relative and a friend) were biased.
Finding that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying
circumstances of treachery, the trial court convicted petitioner
of frustrated homicide. The court declared that the crime
involved a "love triangle,"36 and considered the protagonists'
history of personal animosity. There was no evident
premeditation because Dean had been "forewarned" of the
attack.37
On appeal before the CA, petitioner raised the following
issues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS WHEN IT
WRONGFULLY GAVE CREDENCE TO THE FABRICATED CLAIMS
OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
WRONGFULLY GAVE CREDENCE TO THE FALSE AND SPECIOUS
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
CONVICTED THE ACCUSED FOR FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE FOR
INJURIES NOT ATTESTED BY ANY COMPETENT MEDICAL
CERTIFICATE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
CONVICTED THE ACCUSED FOR FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
WITHOUT ANY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
WHICH COMPLETELY NEGATED ANY PROOF FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND WHICH DEFINITELY WARRANTED THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED.38
Maintaining his innocence, petitioner claimed that he had
merely acted in self-defense when Dean insulted him, spat on
his face and assaulted him with fist blows on a mere suspicion
that he (petitioner) was blocking Dean's way through the exit
door of the cooperative.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 21, 2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
assailed decision of the RTC with modification. The fallo reads'
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 30, 2001 of
the trial court is affirmed, subject to the afforested
modification of the minimum period of the sentence. Loss of
earnings in the amount of P26,000.00 and attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000.00 are deleted, and the award of actual
damages is increased to P92,715.68.
SO ORDERED.39
The CA ruled that the case is more of a "retaliation" rather than
a case of self-defense. It declared that Dean sustained two
fatal stab wounds in his left chest, a fact which belied
petitioner's defense and confirmed the prosecution's theory
that he purposely and vigorously attacked the victim. The CA
ruled that when an unlawful aggression which has begun no
longer exists, the one making the defense has no more right to
kill or even wound the aggressor. The appellate court pointed
out that in the case before it, the supposed unlawful
aggression of Dean ceased from the moment he retreated
inside the cooperative building; there was no need for
petitioner to follow Dean inside the building and stab him with
his bolo. Petitioner should have simply stood his ground and
walked away.
In discounting the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, the CA simply adverted to the
stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order dated
December 20, 2000 issued by the RTC, stating "[t]hat the
accused stabbed the private complainant when the latter
assaulted and boxed him (accused)."40Petitioner's plea of
voluntary surrender was not appreciated in his favor.
However, the appellate court modified the minimum sentence
imposed by the trial court to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correctional, as minimum.
As to damages, the CA deleted the RTC's award of loss of
earning capacity and attorney fees, holding that they lack
factual and legal basis. It, however, increased the award of
actual damages from P92,000.00 to P92,715.68 reasoning that
latter amount was duly receipted. The CA denied the
appellant's motion for reconsideration.41
Before this Court, petitioner assigns the following errors
allegedly committed by the CA '
I. THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION HAVE TO BE SET
ASIDE, AS THEY AROSE FROM MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
THAT PROVE THAT THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE FINDINGS
MADE IN THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS WELL AS IN
THE ASSAILED DECISION ITSELF, WERE BASED ON A FALSE
CHARGE WHICH IS PATENTLY FABRICATED BY A POLICE
INVESTIGATOR AND WHICH COMPRISES MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION.
II. THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION HAVE TO BE SET
ASIDE, AS THEY ARE BASED ON THE FABRICATED STATEMENT
AS WELL AS ON THE SOLE, SELF-SERVING, CONTRADICTORY
AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT,
WHICH ARE MANIFESTLY CONCOCTED AND CANNOT
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III. THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION HAVE TO BE
SE[T] ASIDE, AS THERE IS TOTAL ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THE VACUOS CHARGE AS WELL AS THE SAID DECISION
AND RESOLUTION, FOR WHICH REASON THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT DULY PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT[.]
IV. THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION HAVE TO BE SET
ASIDE, AS THE SAME WERE RENDERED IN ALL GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
COMPETENT AND UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY FOR THE
DEFENSE, WHICH NEGATE ANY REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED.
V. THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION HAVE TO BE SET
ASIDE, AS THE INFERENCES MADE ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND CANNOT
JUSTIFY ANY FINDING OF ANY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.42
Petitioner insists that the criminal complaint filed by SPO1
Sulatre was a fabrication because the latter never conducted a
formal investigation of the stabbing incident or of any witness
to the incident. The police officer filed the criminal complaint
against petitioner on the basis of a sworn statement by Dean
which was taken only on March 10, 1999, long after the
criminal complaint was filed in the MCTC. Worse, when he
testified on cross-examination, Dean admitted that he did not
see the questions prepared by SPO1 Sulatre at the hospital, nor
his answers to the policeman's questions. The affidavit dated
March 10, 1999 was not typewritten in the hospital, and he
was not present when the affidavit was typewritten in the
police station. Thus, the testimony of the victim was self-
serving and uncorroborated, tailored solely to support the
charge filed by SPO1 Sulatre.
In its comment on the petition, respondent, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the issues raised by
petitioner are factual, hence, inappropriate in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari in this Court.
The OSG maintains that the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require that the affidavit of the offended
party or the witnesses to the crime charged be appended to
the criminal complaint filed in court. Moreover, the issue of
the validity of the criminal complaint in the MCTC had became
moot and academic after the Information was filed in the trial
court, and when petitioner was arraigned, assisted by counsel,
and entered a plea of not guilty.
It insists that Dean's testimony, by itself, is sufficient to
warrant the conviction of petitioner for frustrated homicide.
Petitioner's conviction may be anchored on Dean's testimony
since the trial court found it credible and entitled to full
probative weight. Petitioner failed to prove his plea of self-
defense by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court's Decision
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Section 3(a) and (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure43 provide:
Sec. 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be
conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground
to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents.
It bears stressing that the officer conducting the preliminary
investigation has to determine whether to dismiss the
complaint outright based on the averments of the complaint
and the appendages thereof if it finds no ground to continue
with the investigation. If he finds ground to continue with the
investigation of the accused, a subpoena should be issued to
the accused, appending thereto a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits. Unless the affidavits of the witnesses
named in the complaint and supporting documents are
appended to the complaint, the investigating officer may not
be able to determine whether to dismiss the complaint
outright or to conduct an investigation and issue a subpoena
to the accused.44
We agree with petitioner that the criminal complaint filed by
SPO1 Sulatre with the MCTC on March 10, 1999 was defective.
As gleaned from the RTC records, the criminal complaint was
not accompanied by any medical certificate showing the
nature and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the
affidavits of any of the witnesses listed at the bottom of the
criminal complaint (particularly the victim himself), and the
arrest report of SPO1 Sulatre, Brgy. Capt. Rodolfo Oller, and his
son Nicky.
The MCTC had the option not to act one way or the other on
the criminal complaint of SPO1 Sulatre because the latter
failed to comply with Section 3(a) and (b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; or to order SPO1 Sulatre
to comply with the aforequoted rule; or to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice to its refiling with the requisite
documents. However, the MCTC opted not to act on the
complaint until after SPO1 Sulatre shall have submitted the
requisite affidavits/medical certificate/arrest report. When
SPO1 Sulatre filed with the MCTC, on March 10, 1999, the
permanent medical certificate issued by the IRH, the affidavit
of Dean and his and Brgy. Capt. Oller's affidavit of arrest of
petitioner, the MCTC forthwith issued a subpoena to
petitioner appending thereto the said medical certificate,
affidavit of Dean and the affidavit of arrest of SPO1
Sulatre.45 Hence, SPO1 Sulatre had complied with Section 3(a)
and (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Moreover, petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit without
any protest. Neither did he assail the validity of the criminal
complaint or the tardy submission by SPO1 Sulatre of the
medical certificate, the affidavit of Dean and the affidavit of
arrest of SPO1 Sulatre. Aside from this, petitioner was
arraigned in the RTC, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea
of not guilty.
On the second issue, the rulings of the trial court and the
appellate court are correct. Whether or not petitioner acted in
self-defense whether complete or incomplete is a question of
fact,46 the well-entrenched rule is that findings of fact of the
trial court in the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of the evidence on record affirmed,
on appeal, by the CA are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by the Court and in the absence of any
justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings.47
In this case, the trial court gave no credence and probative
weight to the evidence of petitioner to prove that he acted in
self-defense, complete or incomplete. Petitioner failed to
establish that the trial court and the appellate court
misconstrued, misappropriated or ignored facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would
warrant a modification or reversal of the decision of the CA
that petitioner failed to establish clear and convincing
evidence that he acted in self-defense, complete or
incomplete.
Like alibi, petitioner's claim of self-defense is weak; it is also
settled that self-defense is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. Such a plea is both a confession and
avoidance.48 One who invokes self-defense, complete or
incomplete, thereby admits having killed the victim by
inflicting injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on
the accused to prove the confluence of the essential elements
for the defense as provided in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code:
x x x (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. x x x49
The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because even
if the evidence of the prosecution is weak, the same can no
longer be disbelieved.50 The accused cannot escape conviction
if he fails to prove the essential elements of complete self-
defense.
In Garcia v. People,51 the Court defined unlawful aggression:
x x x Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person - a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
sufficient. There must be actual physical force or a threat to
inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive
and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined,
intent to cause injury. Aggression, if not continuous, does not
constitute, aggression warranting self-defense.52
Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression
warranting self-defense.53 When unlawful aggression ceases,
the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound
the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-
defense but in retaliation against the original aggressor. 54
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless
the accused proves unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.55 Unlawful aggression is a sudden and unexpected
attack or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or an intimidating attitude.56
Petitioner failed to discharge his burden.
First. Petitioner failed to surrender himself to the responding
authorities who arrived at the situs criminis, as well as the bolo
he used in stabbing the victim. One who acted in self-defense
is expected to surrender, not only himself, but also the weapon
he used to kill or inflict physical injuries on the victim.57
Second. The victim sustained three stab wounds on different
parts of his body. Two were fatal stab wounds at his left chest.
The presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the
victim, their nature and location disprove self-defense and
instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim. 58
Third. Petitioner testified that he was punched by the victim.
However, there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that
petitioner suffered even a scratch as a result of the alleged fist
blows.
Neither can the RTC nor the CA be faulted for giving credence
to the testimony of SPO1 Salutre. No evidence was adduced by
the defense to show that he harbored any ill-motive against
petitioner to charge him with such a crime. Absent any proof
of improper motive, the prosecution witness who is law
enforcer is presumed to have regularly performed his duty in
arresting and charging petitioner.59 His testimony is thus
entitled to full faith and credit. Moreover, the conviction of
petitioner was not based solely on the testimony of the SPO1
Salutre. The unimpeached testimony of Dean categorically
established the crime; this was corroborated by the testimony
of Dr. Nathaniel Rimando.
Petitioner's argument that he should be acquitted because the
criminal complaint against him was not supported by the
victim's sworn statement or by an affidavit of any witness is
totally untenable. This issue should have been raised during
the preliminary investigation. It is much too late in the day to
complain about this issue after a judgment of conviction has
been rendered against him.
Contrary to petitioner's stance, the testimonies of his
corroborating witnesses are unimpressive. For one,
Godofredo's testimony was limited only to the alleged fact that
happened outside of the cooperative building. He himself
admitted that when the protagonists started fighting each
other, for fear for his life, he hurriedly flagged and boarded a
tricycle which revved up to the highway; it was from there that
he saw petitioner slumped on his tricycle. In other words, he
did not witness what transpired thereafter or how the fight
ended.
Joselito's testimony did not fare any better. It was given
neither credence nor weight by the trial court. And even if it
had been proved that the victim was rabid against petitioner,
such evidence would only have established a probability that
he had indeed started an unlawful assault on petitioner. This
probability cannot, however, overcome the victim's positive
statement that petitioner waylaid and assaulted him without
any provocation. The theory that Dean may have started the
fight since he had a score to settle against petitioner is flimsy,
at best. Furthermore, Joselito admitted that he was
petitioner's best friend; hence, his bias cannot be discounted.
The Crime Committed by the Petitioner
Petitioner next argues that should he be convicted of any
crime, it should be of less serious physical injuries only,
absence the element of intent to kill. He advances the
argument that the single wound suffered by the victim was not
life threatening and that the latter was transferred to undergo
operation in another hospital only because the medical staff
where he was first rushed bungled their job. He makes much
of the fact that Dr. Darius R. Pariñas who issued the Medical
Certificate never testified for the prosecution.
Again, the Court is not swayed.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter
survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical
injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of the following: (a)
motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the
commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was
committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time
the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.60
Petitioner insists that he had no intent to kill Dean. However,
the physical evidence belies petitioner's pose.
To begin with, as between petitioner and the victim, the
former had more hatred to harbor arising from the fact that
the victim filed a lawsuit against him and his wife. Petitioner
thus had more motive to do harm than the victim. By his own
account, he and Dean had a history of personal animosity.
Secondly, petitioner was armed with a deadly 14' -inch bolo.
Thirdly, if it were true that petitioner stabbed Dean merely to
defend himself, it defies reason why he had to stab the victim
three times. Petitioner's claim that Dean suffered only a single
non-life threatening wound is misleading. Dr. Rimando, who
attended to and operated on Dean, testified that the victim
sustained three (3) stab wounds, two (2) of which penetrated
his heart and lung, causing massive blood clotting
necessitating operation; the other lacerated Dean's his right
elbow. The presence of these wounds, their location and their
seriousness would not only negate self-defense; they likewise
indicate a determined effort to kill.61 Moreover, physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.62
Neither does the non-presentation of Dr. Darius R. Pariñas, the
doctor who signed the medical certificate, would dent a bit the
evidence for the prosecution. This is so because Dr. Pariñas,
who assisted Dr. Rimaldo during the operation of Dean, would
merely corroborate Dr. Rimaldo's testimony. As such, his
testimony is not indispensable.
Fourthly, from the manner the crime was committed, there
can hardly be any doubt that intent to kill was present. It has
been clearly established that petitioner ambushed Dean and
struck him with a bolo. Dean was defenseless and unarmed,
while petitioner was deadly armed.
Lastly, the words of the petitioner while he was assaulting
Dean were most revealing:
Atty. Atitiw:
Q: When you were in the counter, what was accused Benjamin
doing?
A: When I was inside the counter and he's outside and
between us is a glass and there he shouting at me telling in
Ilocano that AGPARENTONG KA TATTA TA TALAGA NGA
PATAYEN KA TATTA NGA ALDAWEN "You kneel down because
I will really kill you now."63
x x x
Atty. Atitiw:
Q: While passing through the loading area of the tricycle, do
you remember anything that transpired there at the loading
area?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What is that, Mr. Witness?
A: While Benjamin Martinez, Barangay Captain Oller and I were
walking proceeding to our Police Station and when we were
near the area, at the loading area if the tricycle, Benjamin
Martinez shouted and I quote: "SINAKSAK KON PARE,
SANGSANGAILI LAENG ISUNA SAAN NGA ISUNA TI AGARI
DITOY TUBAO," that was the utterance, Sir.64
x x x
Q: After bringing him to the Police Station, what did you do
next?
A: We put him in jail, Sir.
Q: And while in jail do you remember whether accused
Benjamin Martinez did anything while in jail?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What is that, Mr. Witness?
A: He kept on shouting words, Sir.
Q: What are those words if you can remember?
A: He kept on shouting "NAPATAY KON, NAPATAY KON," Sir. 65
Anent the allegation of negligence on the part of the medical
staff of Doña Gregoria Memorial Hospital where Dean was
rushed, suffice it to say that this is a new theory being foisted
by petitioner. It was never raised in the two courts below and
thus it will not be entertained here. At any rate, this allegation
finds no support in the records of the case.
It cannot be denied that petitioner had the intention to kill
Dean. Petitioner performed all the acts of execution but the
crime was not consummated because of the timely medical
intervention applied on the victim.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review
on any question including one not raised by the parties.66 In
this regard, we find ample evidence to establish treachery. The
CA's advertence to the stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-
Trial Order dated December 20, 200067 is misplaced. This
alleged stipulation was stricken off the record on motion of the
prosecution on the ground that no stipulation of such fact was
made.68
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might take.69
In the present case, the prosecution had met the requisites for
alevosia to be appreciated: (1) at the time of the attack the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method,
or form of the attack employed by him.70 Dean lived to tell
about the swiftness of the attempt against his life:
Q : After getting the dividend certificate where did you
proceed next?
A: I went out from the bank, sir. I was able to go to school.
Q: Where you able to go to the school?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Why were you not able to reach the school?
A: Because I was suddenly stabbed by Benjamin Martinez.
Q: Where did Benjamin Martinez stab you?
A: In front of the bank, Sir.
Q: And how did Benjamin Martinez stab you? A: I was about to
go to my car, Sir. I was reading the dividend certificate that I
got from the bank but when I was about one step away from
the back of the L300 van that was parked in front of the bank,
I was suddenly stabbed by him.
Q: Where was Benjamin Martinez at that time when he was
stabbed you?
A: Probably he was hiding at the back of the L300 van, Sir.71
When Dean was attacked he was unarmed. He had just exited
the cooperative building and had no inkling that he would be
waylaid as he made his way towards his car. Upon the other
hand, petitioner was armed with a deadly 14' -inch bolo. The
attacked on Dean was swift and unannounced; undeniably,
petitioner's attack was treacherous.
Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in
relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code
which reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a
consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.72
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which should result in the consummation of
the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the
commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete.
Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the
subjective phase. He did all that is necessary to consummate
the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by
reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of
the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on
the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
barring medical intervention or attendance.73
The penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion
temporal.74 The latter penalty has a range of 12 years and 1
day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken
from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime, taking into
account any modifying circumstances in its commission. The
minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the
full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower
than reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying
circumstance in the commission of frustrated murder, the
appellants should be meted an indeterminate penalty of from
nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its
medium period as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
Petitioner, likewise, insists that he voluntarily surrendered to
Barangay Captain Rodolfo Oller. He faults the trial and
appellate courts for relying on the prosecution's Affidavit of
Arrest, arguing that the same is inadmissible as hearsay, the
affiants not having testified to affirm their declarations.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following
requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender
was voluntary. The surrender must be spontaneous, made in
such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledged his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble
and expenses that would necessarily be incurred in the search
and capture.75
In the case at bar, SPO1 Salutre testified that petitioner did not
voluntarily surrender but was forcibly apprehended by
Barangay Captain Oller, and thereafter turned over to him.
Petitioner however insists that said testimony is hearsay
inasmuch as SPO1 Salutre was not the person who actually
arrested him. We disagree. During SPO1 Salutre's testimony,
petitioner failed to object to the questions propounded to
SPO1 Salutre regarding his apprehension. Consequently, he
cannot now claim that SPO1 Salutre's testimony on the arrest
was hearsay. Petitioner's assertion of having voluntarily
surrendered to Barangay Captain Oller was not corroborated
by any competent and reliable evidence. Considering the
damning averments in the Affidavit of Arrest, petitioner should
have at least called Barangay Captain Oller to the witness stand
just to shed light on his alleged voluntary surrender.
We agree with the trial court that the qualifying circumstance Petitioner is ordered to pay Dean Dongui-is the amount
of evident premeditation has not been adequately shown. To of P56,275.48 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral
properly appreciate the same, it is necessary to establish: (1) damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P10,000.00
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; as attorney's fees.
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to this
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the SO ORDERED.
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.76 Since there is dearth of evidence
on when petitioner first conceived of killing Dean and that he
was afforded sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of
his contemplated crime before its final execution, the
circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.

Civil Liabilities of Petitioner

The trial court awarded Dean the amount of P92,000.00

representing his hospitalization and medical expenses which
was increased by the CA to P92,715.68. To be entitled to actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to the
injured party.77 For Dean's hospitalization and medical
expenses, the receipts submitted to support said claim
amounted only to P56,275.48; hence, Dean is entitled only to
the said amount.

The Court awards exemplary damages in the amount

of P25,000.00, inasmuch as the qualifying circumstance of
treachery attended the commission of the crime. In People v.
Catubig,78 we emphasized that insofar as the civil aspect of the
crime is concerned, exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 is recoverable if there is present an aggravating
circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the
commission of the crime.

The CA is correct in deleting Dean's claim for lost salary while

recuperating, since this was not supported by evidence.
However, the trial court's award of P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees should be reinstated, Dean having hired a private
prosecutor to prosecute his case.

Lastly, for the suffering Dean endured from petitioner's

felonious act, the award of P22,000.00 moral damages is
increased to P25,000.00, in keeping with the latest
jurisprudence.79

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is

hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder
under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B.
ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C. CASAMBRE,Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO,
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE
PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR
MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the
Department of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S.
Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police,
P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA
G. TANIGUE, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 172074-76 June 1, 2007
LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO,
TEODORO A. CASIÑO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, in his capacity as
Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
composed of EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C.
MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA
and MERBA A. WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his
capacity as Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for
Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA
G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting Executive Officer of
DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175013 June 1, 2007
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and
overall superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE
ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and
HONORABLE ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
150,Respondents.
DECISION
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition
and certiorari to enjoin petitioners’ prosecution for Rebellion
and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the
investigation and prosecution of petitioners’ cases.
The Facts
Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G.
Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A.
Casiño (Casiño), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are
members of the House of Representatives representing
various party-list groups.2Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72
are private individuals. Petitioners all face charges for
Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC
Makati.
G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006
declaring a "State of National Emergency," police
officers3 arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was
en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant
and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime
for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was
subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for
Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in
Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the
20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was
based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who
claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest
prosecutor4indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding
Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(MeTC).5
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where,
on 27 February 2006, he was subjected to a second inquest,
with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for
Rebellion. A panel of State prosecutors6 from the DOJ
conducted this second inquest. The inquest was based on two
letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue
(Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue is the
Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP),
while Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The
letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of
the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders
and promoters" of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the
Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be carried out
jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which
have formed a "tactical alliance."
On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San
Juan as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed
an Information with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged
that Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals "conspiring and
confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance
between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng
Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng
Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas
(MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the
duly constituted government, x x x."7 The Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch
137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino
(Judge Delorino).
Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination
of probable cause against him.8 Before the motion could be
resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which
was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-
Moya (Judge Moya).
In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the
finding of probable cause against Beltran.9 Beltran sought
reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the
case without resolving Beltran’s motion. Judge Elmo M.
Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re-raffled,
issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltran’s motion.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders
dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltran’s
prosecution.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims
that Beltran’s inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC
Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such
felony.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad
Petitions)
Based on Tanigue and Mendoza’s letters, the DOJ sent
subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to
appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of
the complaint and its attachment." Prior to their receipt of the
subpoenas, petitioners had quartered themselves inside the
House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected
to warrantless arrest.
During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the
counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified
as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness
against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before
respondent prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave
copies of the affidavit to media members present during the
proceedings. The panel of prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10
days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Petitioners
were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting
the CIDG’s letters only on 17 March 2006.
Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence,
considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated, the statements that the President and the
Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners’
case,11 and the manner in which the prosecution panel
conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ panel of
prosecutors denied petitioners’ motion on 22 March 2006.
Petitioners sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for
the dismissal of the cases. However, the panel of prosecutors
denied petitioners’ motions on 4 April 2006.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22
March 2006 and 4 April 2006.
Acting on petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of an injunctive
writ, the Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior
to this, however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006,
issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioners and 46 others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed
the corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC
Makati, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 (later
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146),
charging petitioners and their co-accused as "principals,
masterminds, [or] heads" of a Rebellion.12Consequently, the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 filed a supplemental
petition to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.
In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor
General submits that the preliminary investigation of
petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor
General also claims that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944
has mooted the Maza petition.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding
against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there
is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and
2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent
prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has
been lawfully arrested without warrant.14 Section 5, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the
instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
xxxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that
the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant, 16 for Inciting
to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor
could only have conducted – as he did conduct – an inquest for
Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another
group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority
rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting
officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion,
sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had
committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in
their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an
allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006. 17
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993,
the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the
arrest of the detained person was made "in accordance with
the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule
113."18 If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest
officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which
provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected.— Should the Inquest
Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with
the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or
detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral
document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the
reasons for the action taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the
case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained
person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the
evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer
having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer
to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of
preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the
charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of
the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to
comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule
113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest
void.19 Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary
investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial
determination of probable cause, which effectively took the
place of such proceeding.
There is No Probable Cause to Indict
Beltran for Rebellion.
Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted."20 To accord respect to the discretion granted
to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as
a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination
of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped
with petitions to review the prosecutor’s findings in such
investigations.21 However, in the few exceptional cases where
the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable
cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and
procedural due process, we have not hesitated to intervene
and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the
prosecutor’s findings.22 This exception holds true here.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed –
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or
other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking
arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is
either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines
or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers and prerogatives.23
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or
multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end.24
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted
the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits
and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have
gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran’s
contention that the same are insufficient to show probable
cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents
consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a
notary public, executed by members of the military and some
civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel
Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and Raul Cachuela
(Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits
mentions Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in
the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo,
Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on
board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre
Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they
were met by another individual who looked like San Juan. For
his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the
CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP’s "10thPlenum" in 1992
where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities;
and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional
members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups
affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof
needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public
uprising against the government. What these documents
prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was
present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits
stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting,
maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ
Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged
that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged
presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically
make him a leader of a rebellion.
In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the
1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)."
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran
does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not
constitute rebellion.29 As for the alleged funding of the CPP’s
military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds,
Cachuela’s affidavit merely contained a general conclusion
without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela
merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay
galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN
MUNA – pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN
BELTRAN, x x x."30Such a general conclusion does not establish
probable cause.
In his Comment to Beltran’s petition, the Solicitor General
points to Fuentes’ affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,31 as basis
for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes
provided details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran
and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which
plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were
allegedly discussed, among others.
The claim is untenable. Fuentes’ affidavit was not part of the
attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February
2006. Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have
Fuentes’ affidavit in their possession when they conducted the
Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Indeed, although
this affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first
presented it only during the preliminary investigation of the
other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which Fuentes
subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor
Velasco.
Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect
by motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati
Fuentes’ affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltran’s motion
for judicial determination of probable cause. Such belated
submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against
Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecution’s
case. Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in
Fuentes’ affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal
Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings
to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is
a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting
Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution
acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information
against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal Case No. 06-452 is
Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The
Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others
conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion.
Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found
probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the
evidence before it.
The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in
Batangas between members of MKP and CPP, including
Beltran, also do not detract from our
finding.1a\^/phi1.net Nowhere in the minutes was Beltran
implicated. While the minutes state that a certain "Cris"
attended the alleged meeting, there is no other evidence on
record indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan, from whom
the "flash drive" containing the so-called minutes was
allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is
promoting, maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make
such allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information
validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation
in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the
Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely charges
Beltran for "conspiring and confederating" with others in
forming a "tactical alliance" to commit rebellion. As worded,
the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but
with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.34
On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions
The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted
With Irregularities.
As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is
similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice
rooted on public interest as the speedy closure of criminal
investigations fosters public safety.35 However, such relief in
equity may be granted if, among others, the same is necessary
(a) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner36 or (b) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights.37The case of the petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these
exceptions.
The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day is
outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:
Procedure.—The preliminary investigation shall be conducted
in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the
respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as
well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies
for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed
and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each
of whom must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the
complaint, the investigating officer shall either
dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the
investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent
attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may
not have been furnished and to copy them at his
expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which
he intends to present against the respondent, and
these shall be made available for examination or
copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but
shall be made available for examination, copying, or
photographing at the expense of the requesting
party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena
with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-
affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense.
The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to
file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating
officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there
are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a
witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but
without the right to examine or cross-examine. They
may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness
concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from
submission of the counter-affidavits and other
documents or from the expiration of the period for
 their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5)
days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the
investigating officer shall determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for
trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this
Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage,"38 respondent
prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent
prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112
which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent
prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and
Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the
affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them
were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a
prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as
required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the
prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if
there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there
is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a
subpoena to the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG
letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued
subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ
office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints
and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent
prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes
who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor
Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes’
affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of
the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent
prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-
affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March
2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the
attachments to the CIDG letters.1a\^/phi1.net
These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors’
statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary
investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules
o[f] Criminal Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainant’s antics
during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness’
affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners
have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against
them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the
investigation but also lent credence to petitioners’ claim that
the entire proceeding was a sham.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal
justice system which spells for an individual the difference
between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the
other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a
preliminary investigation as not "a mere formal or technical
right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due process in
criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may
be non-bailable for those accused as principals.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General,
respondent prosecutors’ filing of the Information against
petitioners on 21 April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati
does not moot the petitions in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and
172074-76. Our power to enjoin prosecutions cannot be
frustrated by the simple filing of the Information with the trial
court.1a\^/phi1.net
On Respondent Prosecutors’ Lack of Impartiality
We find merit in petitioners’ doubt on respondent
prosecutors’ impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice,
who exercises supervision and control over the panel of
prosecutors, stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day
of the preliminary investigation, that, "We [the DOJ] will
just declare probable cause, then it’s up to the [C]ourt to
decide x x x."42 Petitioners raised this issue in their
petition,43 but respondents never disputed the veracity of this
statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination
to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause.
A Final Word
The obvious involvement of political considerations in the
actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent
prosecutors brings to mind an observation we made in another
equally politically charged case. We reiterate what we stated
then, if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the
integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary
investigations in particular, thus:
[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should
not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their
noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or
favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak
or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may be public’s perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.44 1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we
SET ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628 June 8, 2007
dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent
prosecutors. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, P/SUPT. ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, PCI ANTONIO RICAFORT,
Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944. SPO4 RICARDO G. ONG, and SPO1 ARNULFO
MEDENILLA, complainants,
SO ORDERED. vs.
JUDGE GODOFREDO G. HERNANDEZ, SR., respondent.

DECISION

This administrative case stems from a joint complaint-

affidavit1 dated April 18, 2005 filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by complainants P/Supt. Alejandro
Gutierrez, PCI Antonio Ricafort, SPO4 Ricardo G. Ong, and
SPO1 Arnulfo Medenilla, all of the Criminal Investigation and
Detective Division (CIDD) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), against then (now retired) Judge Godofredo G.
Hernandez, Sr. of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro charging the latter with:

1. Gross ignorance of the law;

2. Impropriety;

3. Grave misconduct;

4. Conduct unbecoming of a judge; and

5. Lack of integrity to continue as a member of the

judiciary.

The joint complaint-affidavit alleged that on August 9, 2004,

Gus Abelgas of ABS-CBN's "Private Eye" TV program
accompanied one Ernesto Cruz to Camp Crame, Quezon City
to file a complaint involving Cruz's minor daughter who was
allegedly recruited in Malabon, Metro Manila to work in a KTV
bar in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.

The next day, August 10, 2004, complainants, as CIDD officers

and agents, conducted a rescue operation accompanied by
Ernesto Cruz, Gus Abelgas and other ABS-CBN TV crew
members who took footage of the operation. The CIDD team
was able to rescue five (5) young girls, namely, Joahna Cruz
(daughter of Ernesto Cruz), Imelda De Vera, Amylene De Vera,
Jackielou Garcia, and Rosalyn Payawal, from the house of a
certain Salvador Napolitano in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
who claimed that PO2 Jose Ringor, allegedly a member of the
Provincial Mobile Group of the PNP, Oriental Mindoro,
brought the women to him for safekeeping.

As a result of the rescue operation, a complaint for violation of

Republic Act (RA) 9208 in relation to RA 7610 was
subsequently filed before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Malabon against PO2 Ringor, his recruiter wife Imelda and a
certain Bebang. Thereafter, the rescued minors were brought
and turned over to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. Later, the corresponding Information was filed
and warrants of arrest with no bail recommended were then
issued against PO2 Ringor, et al.
Several weeks thereafter, complainants were surprised to
discover that cases for grave coercion and qualified trespass to
dwelling had been filed against them, Gus Abelgas and Ernesto
Cruz in the MTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, before the
sala of the respondent judge. Apparently, the rescued girls,
except Joahna Cruz, had retracted their complaint against PO2
Ringor, et al. and had, instead, filed charges of grave coercion
and qualified trespass to dwelling against the members of the
CIDD rescue team.
It was in connection with said charges, docketed in respondent
judge's court as Criminal Case Nos. 6149 to 6156, that the
instant administrative complaint arose. In their joint
complaint-affidavit, complainants sought to hold the
respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law in –
1. Issuing warrants of arrest in inordinate haste,
forgoing the mandatory conduct of preliminary
examination and personal determination of probable
cause in contravention of the provisions of the Rules
of Court and in denial of complainants' constitutional
rights to due process; and
2. Setting the said criminal cases for arraignment
without the requisite Informations having yet been
filed in court.
The same complaint-affidavit also contains factual allegations
which, if true, would constitute impropriety, grave misconduct
and conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, to wit:
x x x On August 17, 2004, Rosalyn Payawal, Amylyn de
Vera, Imelda dela Rosa, and Jackielou [four of the
rescued girls] were taken by SPO2 Arnulfo Balacana,
PO2 Jose Ringor and a certain Atty. Cabugoy with two
others at their respective residences and brought to
Pasig City, and thereafter to La Taberna beach resort
at Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro where they were
threatened and coerced to sign a complaint for grave
coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling against
herein complainants including Gus Abelgas and
Ernesto Cruz. They were likewise threatened and
coerced into signing a retraction of their complaint
against PO2 Ringor, et al.
[At the said beach resort,] Judge Godofredo G.
Hernandez arrived and conferred with PO2 Ringor,
SPO2 Balacana and Atty. Cabugoy relative to the
retraction of the complaint of the minors against PO2
Ringor, et al. and the filing of the case against herein
[complainants], Ernesto Cruz and Gus Abelgas for
qualified trespass to dwelling and grave coercion. The
conference was allegedly followed by a drinking spree
with the group of SPO2 Balacana, PO2 Ringor, Atty.
Cabugoy, and Judge Hernandez who was seen being
entertained by two (2) GROs given by SPO2
Balacana.2 [Words in brackets added]
In his Comment3 dated May 31, 2005, the respondent judge
denies the accusations against him and dismisses the same as
pure harassment calculated to cast doubt on his character and
integrity as a retiring judge. He then puts forth his
unblemished record in the government service since 1956.
To respondent judge, there was nothing anomalous nor
irregular in the procedural steps he undertook relative to the
subject criminal cases. He maintains that his act of setting said
criminal cases for the arraignment of the complainants, as
accused therein, even without any information having yet
been filed, and issuing warrants of arrest despite the absence
of any such information, were all "pursuant to a valid exercise
of his judicial function as the presiding judge of Pinamalayan."
He asserts that, contrary to the complainants’ allegation, he
conducted a preliminary investigation and then issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest there being a motion filed by
the private offended parties for the early issuance thereof. He
further claims that the determination of probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest is his sole prerogative as
a judge.
As for the imputation of his having coerced and manipulated
the private offended parties, the respondent judge counters
that there is no showing that he has a personal interest in
those cases. He vehemently denies his purported participation
in a drinking spree while being entertained by two GROs,
stressing that he had never set foot in La Taverna Beach Resort
which has apparently been non-operational since 2003 as
attested to by the Certification issued by the Municipal
Treasurer of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. In any event,
respondent points to the lack of evidence substantiating the
alleged entertainment accorded him.
To bolster his assertion of good moral standing in the
community, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment4 on
June 16, 2005, therein attaching a recent recognition of his
good character, and the various honors and citations
conferred upon him.
In its report of October 19, 2005, the OCA came out with its
findings that the respondent judge was guilty of gross
ignorance of procedural rules. Seeing, however, that this is the
only administrative complaint filed against the respondent and
that he had compulsorily retired last July 15, 2005, the OCA
recommended that respondent be merely fined in the amount
of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), to be deducted from
his retirement benefits.
We agree with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court requires preliminary
investigation in cases cognizable by the municipal trial courts
for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard
to the fine.
Section 3 of Rule 112 explicitly provides for the
procedure to be followed in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation
shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the
respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as
well as other supporting documents to establish the
probable cause. x x x
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the
complaint, the investigating officer shall either
dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the
investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent
attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena
with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-
affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense.
The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of his
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall be allowed to file
a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
xxx xxx xxx
It is apparent from the facts on record that the complainants
were never issued any subpoena to accord them the
opportunity to file their counter-affidavits to adduce evidence
controverting those alleged in the criminal complaints against
them before the respondent judge issued the warrants of
arrest. Moreover, the warrants of arrest were issued without
complying with the requisite conditions therefor.
It was on August 23, 2004 that the complaints for qualified
trespass to dwelling and grave coercion were filed against
"Ernesto Cruz and five (5) John Does" before the sala of
respondent judge. On August 24, 2004, a motion for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Ernesto Cruz was filed.
Respondent immediately granted said motion and issued a
warrant for his arrest that same day.
On September 8, 2004, a Motion to Amend Criminal
Complaint was filed by Amylene, Imelda and Jackielou
identifying the names of the members of the CIDD rescue team
including Gus Abelgas. Again, on the very same day, warrants
of arrest were hastily issued against herein complainants and
Gus Abelgas.
Indubitably, there was no preliminary investigation conducted
as required by the rules since no subpoena was issued to
herein complainants for them to file counter-affidavits.
Furthermore, the inordinate haste attending the issuance of
the warrants of arrest against complainants, Ernesto Cruz, and
Gus Abelgas belies the conduct of preliminary examination and
personal determination of probable cause, in contravention of
the provisions of the Rules of Court, and constituting a denial
of due process.
Section 6, par. (b) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - When required
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of this
Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be
conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. x x x
When the investigation is conducted by the judge
himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in
section 3 of this Rule. If his findings and
recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or
city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy,
and the corresponding information is filed, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting
for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may
issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. [Emphasis supplied]
From the foregoing provision, there are three (3) conditions
that must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by
the municipal judge during a preliminary investigation. The
investigating judge must:
1. Have examined in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses by searching questions
and answers;
2. Be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and
3. That there is a need to place the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest in this case was clearly
irregular since, not only did it lack a preliminary investigation,
but the order granting
such issuance did not show any finding of a need to place
complainants under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.5
Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory for
him to issue a warrant of arrest. He must further determine
the necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 6 It is
improper for a municipal judge to issue a warrant of arrest
without any finding that it was necessary to place the accused
in immediate custody to prevent frustration of the ends of
justice.7
Be that as it may, compassion works in respondent’s favor,
what with the fact that this is his first administrative case after
more than a decade of judicial service, let alone the
circumstance that he has already compulsorily retired. OCA’s
recommended penalty of FINE appears in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr.
is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure
and is ordered to pay a FINE of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

The procedure described in Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the

Rules of Court is mandatory and failure to follow the same
would amount to a denial of due process.8 Thus, in the case
of Sps. Arcilla v. Judge Palaypayan and Clerk of Court Bajo,9 the
Court held:

While respondent judge conducted a preliminary

investigation on the same day the complaint for
estafa was filed, however, he did not notify the
accused to give him an opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits and evidence in his defense. Worst,
on the same day, respondent judge issued the
warrant of arrest. Clearly, his actuations manifest his
ignorance of procedural rules and a reckless disregard
of the accused's basic right to due process.

Worse still, in a clear display of gross ignorance, respondent

set Criminal Case Nos. 6149 to 6156 for arraignment and
hearing knowing fully well that no preliminary investigation
had been conducted and no informations had yet been filed
before his court. This clearly violates complainants' right, as
accused in those cases, to due process, to be informed of the
accusation against them and to have a copy of the Information
before arraignment. As record shows, complainants, as
accused in those cases, had already received subpoenas way
back on February 11, 2005, commanding them to appear
before the court on March 4, 2005 for arraignment without the
corresponding Informations having as yet been filed.

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office

to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 10 Newly appointed
judges are required to have a working knowledge of the Rules
of Court before they assume their judicial post. And after years
of service in the judiciary, judges are expected to have become
already conversant with the Rules, which they apply and rely
on everyday in court. Years of service in the bench simply
negate any notion that a judge could be grossly ignorant of
procedural laws. It is thus completely inexcusable for the
respondent who had been with the judiciary for the last twelve
(12) years to have acted the way he did in this case.
G.R. No. 164673 January 15, 2010 On 17 March 1998, KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand
verifying the validity of Confirmed Purchase Order Nos. MTC-
SAMUEL U. LEE and MAYBELLE LEE LIM, Petitioners, 548 and WC-128. On 19 March 1998, Otto Versand sent a
vs. facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that (1) it did not issue
KBC BANK N.V., Respondent. the purchase orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items
covered by the purchase orders, and (3) it would not pay MDEC
DECISION any amount.

The Case In a complaint-affidavit5 dated 21 April 1998, Liza M. Pajarillo,

manager of the corporate division of KBC Bank, charged Lee
and Lim of estafa. In his Resolution6 dated 27 November 2001,
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia (State Prosecutor Subia)
Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 10 February 2004
found the existence of probable cause and recommended that
Decision2 and 27 July 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
two counts of estafa be filed against Lee and Lim. State
in CA-G.R. SP No. 78004. The Court of Appeals set aside the 26
Prosecutor Subia stated that:
March 2003 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 58, Makati City, in Criminal Case
Nos. 02-344-45. After a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the
Bank, as well as of the respondents, we find the existence of a
probable cause to indict respondents Samuel Lee and
The Facts
Maybelle Lee Lim.
Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a
It is an established fact that the confirmed purchase order nos.
$1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank). KBC Bank is a
MTC-548 and WC-128 presented with the Bank by the Midas
Belgian corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.
thru respondents Samuel Lee and Maybelle Lee Lim were false
On 12 August 1997, Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer
and spurious, having been unequivocably repudiated and/or
and director of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of
disowned by Otto Versand, Germany, the foreign buyer who
KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s
allegedly issued the same, as evidenced by a telefax message
rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC
sent to the Bank by Otto Versand. Evidently, respondent
Bank. Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 was allegedly
Samuel Lee signed the following documents, to wit: the
dated 15 July 1997, issued by Otto Versand, a company based
"conforme" portion of the US$2.0 million short-term trade
in Germany, and covered a shipment of girl’s basic denim jeans
facility, the promissory note and the corresponding deed of
amounting to $1,863,050.
assignment both dated August 12, 1997, covering the
confirmed purchase order no[.] MTC-548, while respondent
MDEC obtained another loan, amounting to $65,000, from KBC
Maybelle Lee Lim signed in the promissory note and the
Bank. On 14 November 1997, Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer corresponding deed of assignment both dated Nov. 14, 1997,
and assistant secretary of MDEC, executed a promissory note
the renewed promissory note and the notice of renewal and
in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all
drawdown certificate both dated Dec. 23, 1997. Respondents
of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC-128
Samuel Lee and Maybelle Lee Lim, thus cannot escape
to KBC Bank. Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC-128 was
indictment, aside from signing those relevant loan documents,
allegedly dated 1 October 1997, issued by Otto Versand, and
as they also clearly helped one another in fraudulently
covered a shipment of boy’s bermuda jeans amounting to
representing to the Bank that indeed said confirmed two (2)
$841,500.
purchased [sic] orders does [sic] exists [sic] and that Midas
have [sic] their [sic] rights, titles and interests thereto. With
On 23 December 1997, Lim renewed the 12 August 1997 their fraudulent representation, they were able to entice or
promissory note and issued a notice of renewal and drawdown induce the Bank to extend [to] them the loan of USD$1.4
certificate to KBC Bank. On 29 December 1997, Lim executed million and USD$ 65,000 under the short-term trade facility
an amended deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s previously granted to them.7
rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC
Bank.
Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim
were filed with the RTC. After finding probable cause, Judge
MDEC was considered in default in paying the $65,000 loan on Winlove M. Dumayas (Judge Dumayas) of the RTC issued
30 January 1998. Under a facility agreement between KBC warrants of arrest against Lee and Lim.
Bank and MDEC, any default in payment of any obligation
under the agreement would render MDEC in default with
Lee and Lim filed a petition8 for review dated 26 April 2002
regard to the $65,000 loan — MDEC defaulted in paying two
with the Department of Justice. Lee and Lim challenged State
other obligations under the agreement. MDEC also failed to
Prosecutor Subia’s 27 November 2001 Resolution and 17 April
pay the $1,400,000 loan when it became due on 9 February
2002 Order denying their motion for reconsideration. They
1998.
claimed that:
 I. THE RESOLUTIONS OF 27 NOVEMBER 2001 AND 17
APRIL 2002 MERELY RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE
WHICH CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR A FINDING OF A
PROBABLE CAUSE.
II. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS WERE ISSUED BASED
ONLY ON THE UNCORROBORATED ALLEGATIONS OF
PAJARILLO THAT LEE AND LIM MADE FRAUDULENT
REPRESENTATIONS TO [KBC BANK].
III. THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ERRED IN HOLDING
LEE AND LIM TO BE CRIMINALLY LIABLE DESPITE THE
TWO LOANS CREATING MERELY CIVIL LIABILITY ON
THE PART OF MIDAS.9
In his Resolution10 dated 12 July 2002, Secretary Hernando B.
Perez (Secretary Perez) directed the withdrawal of the
informations filed against Lee and Lim. Secretary Perez held
that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence:
The twin charges of estafa are primarily anchored on
respondents’ alleged fraudulent representations to [KBC Bank]
that the two purchase orders were fake or sham. To prove this
point, Ms. Pajarillo of [KBC Bank] claims that she received a fax
message from a representative of Otto Versand, stating that
the latter company did not issue the purchase orders
mentioned. There was no sworn statement from a responsible
officer of Otto Versand presented to attest to the allegation
that the subject purchase orders were fake. Since Ms. Pajarillo
did not have personal knowledge of the fact that the subject
purchase orders were in fact fake, her testimony cannot be the
basis for finding probable cause against respondents. Ms.
Pajarillo can testify only to those facts that she knew of her
personal knowledge. Admittedly, she derived knowledge of
the supposed spurious character of the purchase orders from
a mere fax copy of a message that [KBC Bank] received from a
certain representative of Otto Versand in Germany, someone
who she did not even know personally. Unfortunately, this fax
copy is hearsay evidence and therefore, inadmissible to prove
the truth of what it contains (Pastor vs. Gaspar, 2 Phil
592).11 (Emphasis supplied)
KBC Bank filed a motion12 for reconsideration dated 2 August
2002 with the Department of Justice.
Lee and Lim had not been arraigned. In a motion13 dated 18
October 2002 and filed with the RTC, Assistant City Prosecutor
Nora C. Sibucao (Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao) prayed for
the withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim.
Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao stated that:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Trial Prosecutor,
unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully moves and prays
for the withdrawal of Information filed in the above-entitled
cases in view of the resolution of the Department of Justice
promulgated on July 12, 2002 reversing the resolution of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City.14
The RTC’s Ruling
In his one-page Order15 dated 26 March 2003, Judge Dumayas
granted Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao’s motion to
withdraw the informations against Lee and Lim. Judge
Dumayas held that:
This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments raised
by the prosecution and private complainant, finds the
contentions of the prosecution to be sufficient and
meritorious.
Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the
Prosecution is hereby granted and the two (2) informations for
the crime of Estafa penalized under par. 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code are hereby withdrawn from the docket of this
court.16
KBC Bank filed with the Court a petition17 for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. KBC Bank
claimed that:
I.
The court a quo committed reversible error in issuing
the questioned Order without specifying its legal
basis.
II.
The court a quo committed reversible error in
prematurely acting upon the Makati Prosecutor’s
Motion to Withdraw of Information.
III.
The court a quo committed reversible error in finding
that no probable cause exists to hold respondents for
trial for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) and in
granting the Makati Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw
Information.18
In a Resolution19 dated 23 June 2003, the Court referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 6, 20 Rule
56 of the Rules of Court. In his Resolution21 dated 19
November 2003, Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong denied KBC
Bank’s 2 August 2002 motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In its 10 February 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside
Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003 Order. The Court of Appeals
held that:
It has long been established that the filing of a complaint or
information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing
of the complaint or information, a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
xxxx
The trial judge practically concurred with the findings of the
Secretary of Justice that the "fax copy is hearsay evidence and
therefore, inadmissible to prove the truth that it contains",
contrary to the well-reasoned findings of the investigating
prosecutor. It is emphasized that a preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
The issue of admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence is a
matter of defense that is best ventilated in a full-blown trial;
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the exhaustive
display of presentation of evidence.22
Hence, the present petition.
The Issues
In their petition, Lee and Lim raised as issues that:
I 12 July 2002 Resolution. The Court of Appeals held that Judge
THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN PASSING
UPON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF ESTAFA AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS, AN ISSUE THAT WAS PENDING BEFORE
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
xxxx
II
QUESTION IS NOT ONE OF ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE BUT THE NEED IN PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION FOR EVIDENCE OF VALUE TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
xxxx
III
RESPONDENT COURT DID NOT PREMATURELY ALLOW
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATIONS
xxxx
IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABDICATE ITS DUTY TO
DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
PROSECUTION’S REASON FOR WITHDRAWING THE
INFORMATIONS.23
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it
reviewed the findings of Secretary Perez. They stated that:
[T]he Court of Appeals cannot indirectly review the findings of
the Secretary under the pretext of correcting the actuation of
the trial court. x x x
[T]he only ruling before the Court of Appeals is the ruling of
the trial court x x x.
But the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the case before
it is not one for the review of the final order of the Secretary
of Justice, acting as a quasi-judicial officer, which is governed
by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The actual case filed with it
was rather a petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal
order of the trial court under Rule 45.24
The Court is not impressed. The Court of Appeals reviewed
Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003 Order, not Secretary Perez’s
Dumayas erred when he failed to make his own evaluation and
merely relied on Secretary Perez’s recommendation that there
was no probable cause. The Court of Appeals stated that:
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that:
"A judge acts with grave abuse of discretion when he grants a
prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges against an
accused on the basis solely of the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice — his reliance on the prosecutor’s
averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the
dismissal of the case against the petitioner is an abdication of
the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case in blatant violation of the Court’s pronouncement in
Crespo vs. Mogul."
When the trial judge issued its Order of February 14, 2002
directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
respondents, he clearly found probable cause to sustain the
filing of criminal complaints against the latter. The issuance of
a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of the court —
it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the
issuing magistrate.
If the trial court judge finds it appropriate to dismiss the
Informations, the same should be based upon his own
personal individual conviction that there is no case against the
accused/respondents. To rely solely on the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice, to say the least, is an abdication of
the judge[’]s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie
case. What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s own
assessment of just evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid
and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the
prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency.25
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled
that the admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter best
ventilated in a full-blown trial. They stated that:
At any rate, the Court of Appeals also said in its decision that
the issue of admissibility of evidence assailed as hearsay is a
matter of defense to be ventilated in a full blown trial. It held
that preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
exhaustive display of evidence and the issue of admissibility or
inadmissibility of evidence is a matter of defense to be
ventilated at the trial.
But the Secretary of Justice’s rejection of the "fax copy" of Otto
Versand’s letter as hearsay evidence merely affirmed
petitioners’ right to due process in a preliminary investigation.
xxx
xxxx
Ms. Pajarillo authenticated it by stating under oath that she
received it. The cause for its rejection is the fact that its
contents are purely hearsay since Ms. Pajarillo who testified
about them had no personal knowledge of the fact that the
purchase orders were false. The author of the fax message did
not swear under oath to the truth of the statement in the
document contrary to what section 3 (e) of Rule 112 mandates.
The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the petitioners.
In the comment dated October 28, 2003 that it filed with the
Court of Appeals, it said:
xxxx
20. In this case, the Secretary of Justice’s realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of petitioner’s complaint-affidavit show
that its evidence of estafa is insufficient for lack of proof of the
requisite element of deceit. So much so that if the case were
tried, the trial court would be bound to order an acquittal. 26
The Court is not impressed. Whether the facsimile message is
admissible in evidence and whether the element of deceit in
the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a
full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation. In Andres
v. Justice Secretary Cuevas,27 the Court held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Lee and Lim claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled
that Judge Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation and
merely relied on Secretary Perez’s recommendation that there
was no probable cause. They stated that:
Contrary to the Court of Appeals[’] ruling, the trial court made
an effort to evaluate the merit of the prosecution’s motion to
withdraw the informations. It evaluated the merits of both the
prosecution’s motion and respondent bank’s opposition to the
motion. x x x
Clearly, it cannot be said that the trial court abandoned its
responsibility of making an independent assessment of the
sufficiency of the prosecution motion [sic]. Indeed, it
scrutinized the arguments of respondent bank just as it did the
arguments of the prosecution in order to determine for itself
whether or not the withdrawal of the informations was
warranted.29
The Court is not impressed. Judge Dumayas failed to make his
own evaluation in granting the motion to withdraw the
informations. Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003 Order states in
full:
This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments raised
by the prosecution and private complainant, finds the
contentions of the prosecution to be sufficient and
meritorious.
Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the
Prosecution is hereby granted and the two (2) informations for
the crime of Estafa penalized under par. 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code are hereby withdrawn from the docket of this
court.
In Co v. Lim,30 the Court held that:
Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on
the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound
to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of
the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
alone would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case based on
the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence
appended to the Information; the records of the public
prosecutor, which the court may order the latter to produce
before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the
court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the
public prosecutor.
xxxx
[T]he trial judge did not positively state that the evidence
presented against the respondents was insufficient for a
prima facie case, nor did the aforequoted Order include a
discussion of the merits of the case based on an evaluation or
assessment of the evidence on record. In other words, the
dismissal of the case was based upon considerations other
than the judge’s own personal individual conviction that there
was no case against the respondents. Thus, the trial judge
improperly relinquished the discretion that he was bound to
exercise, and the Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June
2004 are invalid for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion. (Emphasis supplied)
In Baltazar v. Chua,31 the Court held that:
Considering that the trial court has the power and duty to look
into the propriety of the prosecution’s motion to dismiss, with
much more reason is it for the trial court to evaluate and to
make its own appreciation and conclusion, whether the
modification of the charges and the dropping of one of the
accused in the information, as recommended by the Justice
Secretary, is substantiated by evidence. This should be the
state of affairs, since the disposition of the case — such as its
continuation or dismissal or exclusion of an accused — is
reposed in the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the case under consideration, the City Prosecutor indicted
Jaime and Jovito for the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder. However, upon review, the Secretary of Justice
downgraded the charges to homicide and frustrated homicide.
The Secretary also dropped Jaime from the charges. This
resolution prompted the City Prosecutor to file a
Manifestation and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder and for the
Admission of New Informations for Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide against Jovito only, which was granted by Judge Cruz
in his Order dated 18 November 1997. Judge Cruz, however,
failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of
the cases and the evidence on record or in the possession of
the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public
prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
never made any assessment whether the conclusions arrived
at by the Secretary of Justice was supported by evidence. It
did not even take a look at the bases on which the Justice
Secretary downgraded the charges against Jovito and
excluded Jaime therefrom.32 (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
In Ark Travel Express v. The Presiding Judge of Makati, 33 the
Court held that:
It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw
an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based
on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice,
the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial and should embody such assessment in
the order disposing the motion.
The subject MTC Orders do not show that the MTC made an
independent assessment of the merits of the Motion to
Withdraw Informations. x x x
The MTC should have made an independent evaluation and
embodied its assessment in at least one of its assailed
orders.34 (Emphasis supplied)
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court held that:
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation
rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are thus
required to make their own assessment of whether the
secretary of justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting or denying the appeal, separately and independently
of the prosecution’s or the secretary’s evaluation that such
evidence is insufficient or that no probable cause to hold the
accused for trial exists. They should embody such assessment
in their written order disposing of the motion.
xxxx
The trial court’s order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls
for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s)
presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked
to evaluate the secretary’s recommendation finding the
absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable
for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with
the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the
secretary’s recommendation.36(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, Judge Dumayas, in his 26 March 2003
Order, did not (1) positively state that the evidence against Lee
and Lim is insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of
the case, (3) assess whether Secretary Perez’s conclusion is
supported by evidence, (4) look at the basis of Secretary
Perez’s recommendation, (5) embody his assessment in the
order, and (6) state his reasons for granting the motion to
withdraw the informations.
Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the
merits of the case violates KBC Bank’s right to due process and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Dumayas’ 26
March 2003 Order granting the motion to withdraw the
informations is void.37
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS the G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010
10 February 2004 Decision and 27 July 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78004. The case HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner,
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital vs.
Judicial Region, Branch 58, Makati City for evaluation on PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. (BSP), PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
(PDIC), PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C.BUAN, and STATE
SO ORDERED. PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R. FONACIER, Respondents.

DECISION

A bank officer violates the DOSRI2 law when he acquires bank

funds for his personal benefit, even if such acquisition was
facilitated by a fraudulent loan application. Directors, officers,
stockholders, and their related interests cannot be allowed to
interpose the fraudulent nature of the loan as a defense to
escape culpability for their circumvention of Section 83 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 337.3

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari4 under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, assailing the September 26, 2003
Decision5 and the February 5, 2004 Resolution6 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for

certiorari is hereby DENIED.7

Factual Antecedents

Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of

the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its
officers,8 transmitted a letter9 dated March 27, 2000 to
Jovencito Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The letter attached as annexes five
affidavits,10 which would allegedly serve as bases for filing
criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1689,11 and for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended
by PD 1795,12 against, inter alia, petitioner herein Hilario P.
Soriano. These five affidavits, along with other documents,
stated that spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have
an outstanding loan of ₱8 million with the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor
received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was then
president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received
the proceeds of the loan; and that the ₱8 million loan had
never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no
report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of
Rural Banks, Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP.
The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath,
ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be
conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed
against petitioner at his last known address.

Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor

Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary
investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses’
affidavits and supporting documents attached, and required
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit. In due course, the
investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause
and correspondingly filed two separate informations against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan.13
The first Information,14 dated November 14, 2000 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001, was for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, under Article
315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in
relation to Article 172 of the RPC and PD 1689. It basically
alleged that petitioner and his co-accused, in abuse of the
confidence reposed in them as RBSM officers, caused the
falsification of a number of loan documents, making it appear
that one Enrico Carlos filled up the same, and thereby
succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan proceeds
for their personal gain and benefit.15 The information reads:
That in or about the month of April, 1997, and thereafter, in
San Miguel, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and
ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation, with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their position as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel
(Bulacan), Inc. and Branch Manager of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel – San Miguel Branch [sic], a duly organized banking
institution under Philippine Laws, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully
and feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of undated
loan application/information sheet, credit proposal dated April
14, 1997, credit proposal dated April 22, 1997, credit
investigation report dated April 15, 1997, promissory note
dated April 23, 1997, disclosure statement on loan/credit
transaction dated April 23, 1997, and other related
documents, by making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled
up the application/information sheet and filed the
aforementioned loan documents when in truth and in fact
Enrico Carlos did not participate in the execution of said loan
documents and that by virtue of said falsification and with
deceit and intent to cause damage, the accused succeeded in
securing a loan in the amount of eight million pesos
(PhP8,000,000.00) from the Rural Bank of San Miguel – San
Ildefonso branch in the name of Enrico Carlos which amount
of PhP8 million representing the loan proceeds the accused
thereafter converted the same amount to their own personal
gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural
Bank of San Miguel – San Ildefonso branch, its creditors, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
The other Information17 dated November 10, 2000 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001, was for violation
of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795. The said
provision refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI
loans. The information alleged that, in his capacity as President
of RBSM, petitioner indirectly secured an ₱8 million loan with
RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the written
consent and approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without
entering the said transaction in the bank's records, and
without transmitting a copy of the transaction to the
supervising department of the bank. His ruse was facilitated by
placing the loan in the name of an unsuspecting RBSM
depositor, one Enrico Carlos.18 The information reads:
That in or about the month of April, 1997, and thereafter, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, in his capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc., did then and there, willfully and
feloniously indirectly borrow or secure a loan with the Rural
Bank of San Miguel – San Ildefonso branch, a domestic rural
banking institution created, organized and existing under
Philippine laws, amounting to eight million pesos
(PhP8,000,000.00), knowing fully well that the same has been
done by him without the written consent and approval of the
majority of the board of directors of the said bank, and which
consent and approval the said accused deliberately failed to
obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking
institution and to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising
department of the said bank, as required by the General
Banking Act, by using the name of one depositor Enrico Carlos
of San Miguel, Bulacan, the latter having no knowledge of the
said loan, and one in possession of the said amount of eight
million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00), accused converted the same
to his own personal use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the
said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
Both cases were raffled to Branch 79 of the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.20
On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash21 these
informations on two grounds: that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense.
On the first ground, petitioner argued that the letter
transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint
and hence was defective for failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and
oath and subscription.22 Moreover, petitioner argued that the
officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-
complaint," were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much
less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to
petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18,
pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
On the second ground, petitioner contended that the
commission of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of
the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI
law (as set out in Section 8323 of RA 337, as amended by PD
1795),24 hence a person cannot be charged for both offenses.
He argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires the offender
to obtain a loan from his bank, without complying with
procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the other
hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires
the offender to misappropriate or convert something that
he holds in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to return the
same.25
Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the characterization
of possession is different in the two offenses. If petitioner
acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and
therefore, cannot misappropriate or convert it as
contemplated in the offense of estafa. Conversely, if petitioner
committed estafa, then he merely held the money in trust for
someone else and therefore, did not acquire a loan in violation
of DOSRI rules.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In an Order26 dated August 8, 2001, the trial court denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of merit. The lower court
agreed with the prosecution that the assailed OSI letter
was not the complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply
with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court
held that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter,
comprised the complaint-affidavit in the case. Since these
affidavits were duly subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public, there was adequate compliance with the Rules. The
trial court further held that the two offenses were separate
and distinct violations, hence the prosecution of one did not
pose a bar to the other.27
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in
an Order dated September 5, 2001.28
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari29 with the
CA, reiterating his arguments before the trial court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA denied the petition on both issues presented by
petitioner.
On the first issue, the CA determined that the BSP letter, which
petitioner characterized to be a fatally infirm complaint, was
not actually a complaint, but a transmittal or cover letter only.
This transmittal letter merely contained a summary of the
affidavits which were attached to it. It did not contain any
averment of personal knowledge of the events and
transactions that constitute the elements of the offenses
charged. Being a mere transmittal letter, it need not comply
with the requirements of Section 3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court.30
The CA further determined that the five affidavits attached to
the transmittal letter should be considered as the complaint-
affidavits that charged petitioner with violation of Section 83
of RA 337 and for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents. These complaint-affidavits complied with the
mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of Court – they
were subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and
subsequently certified by State Prosecutor Fonacier, who
personally examined the affiants and was convinced that the
affiants fully understood their sworn statements.31
Anent the second ground, the CA found no merit in petitioner's
argument that the violation of the DOSRI law and the
commission of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents are inherently inconsistent with each other. It
explained that the test in considering a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, is
whether the facts alleged, when hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of the offense charged. The appellate
court held that this test was sufficiently met because the
allegations in the assailed informations, when hypothetically
admitted, clearly constitute the elements of Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents and Violation of DOSRI
law.32
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration33 was likewise denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Restated, petitioner raises the following issues34 for our
consideration:
I
Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory
requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA
7653.
II
Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law
(violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended) could also be
the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.
III
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy
against an Order denying a Motion to Quash?
IV
Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
First Issue:
Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory
requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of
Republic Act No. 7653
Petitioner moved to withdraw the first issue from the instant
petition
On March 5, 2007, the Court noted35 petitioner's
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the
Petition36dated February 7, 2007. In the said motion,
petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a
Decision entitled Soriano v. Hon. Casanova,37 which also
involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the DOJ.
According to petitioner, the said Decision allegedly ruled
squarely on the nature of the BSP letters and the validity of the
sworn affidavits attached thereto. For this reason, petitioner
moved for the partial withdrawal of the instant petition insofar
as it involved the issue of "whether or not a court can legally
acquire jurisdiction over a complaint which failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements provided under Section
3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs
(c) and (d) of RA 7653".38
Given that the case had already been submitted for resolution
of the Court when petitioner filed his latest motion, and that
all respondents had presented their positions and arguments
on the first issue, the Court deems it proper to rule on the
same.
In Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, the Court held that the affidavits
attached to the BSP transmittal letter complied with the
mandatory requirements under the Rules of Court.
To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon.
Casanova39 are not the same as the BSP letter involved in the
instant case. However, the BSP letters in Soriano v. Hon.
Casanova and the BSP letter subject of this case are similar in
the sense that they are all signed by the OSI officers of the BSP,
they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained
summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested
the conduct of a preliminary investigation and the filing of
corresponding criminal charges against petitioner Soriano.
Thus, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling
in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova be applied in the instant case –
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 40
We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of
the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were
not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the
Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge
of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The
letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the
affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of
petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters
transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation.
Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the
witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then
there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112
of the Rules of Court.
Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP
Governor or the Monetary Board to file a criminal case against
Soriano, we held that the requirements of Section 18,
paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653 did not apply because the
BSP did not institute the complaint but merely transmitted the
affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ.
We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was
charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be
initiated by "any competent person" with personal knowledge
of the acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses
who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of
"any competent person" who may institute the complaint for
a public crime.
The ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova has been adopted and
elaborated upon in the recent case of Santos-Concio v.
Department of Justice.41 Instead of a transmittal letter from
the BSP, the Court in Santos-Concio was faced with an NBI-NCR
Report, likewise with affidavits of witnesses as attachments.
Ruling on the validity of the witnesses’ sworn affidavits as
bases for a preliminary investigation, we held:
The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all
allegations in one document denominated as "complaint-
affidavit." It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one
approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of
one’s personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of
details material to the alleged offense. The private offended
party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed
the fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has
to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in
fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal letter
similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova,
the Court held:
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC
to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to
be the complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly
inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely
intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to
the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any
averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of personal
knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the
criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused.
In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP
and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal
knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them
before a notary public. Since the affidavits, not the letters
transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary
investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court was substantially complied with.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court
of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the
offended party. The rule has been that, unless the offense
subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation
purposes, by any competent person. The crime of estafa is a
public crime which can be initiated by "any competent
person." The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on
their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the
petitioner fall within the purview of "any competent person"
who may institute the complaint for a public crime. x x x
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the
basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the
referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been
sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To
require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case
of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not appear to dent this
proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the
evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw
information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the
preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient
evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant
the eventual prosecution of the case in court.42
Following the foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova
and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we hold that the
BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto,
comply with the requirements provided under Section 3(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c)
and (d) of RA 7653.
Second Issue:
Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law
(violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended) could be the
subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code
The second issue was raised by petitioner in the context of his
Motion to Quash Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. 43 It is settled that in
considering a motion to quash on such ground, the test is
"whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation
contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or
information. Facts that constitute the defense of the
petitioner[s] against the charge under the information must be
proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not
constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the material averments do not
constitute the offense". 44
We have examined the two informations against petitioner
and we find that they contain allegations which, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime of DOSRI violation and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of DOSRI rules,
the information alleged that petitioner Soriano was the
president of RBSM; that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan
from RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico
Carlos; and that he did this without complying with the
requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling
requirements.
In Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, the information alleged that
petitioner, by taking advantage of his position as president of
RBSM, falsified various loan documents to make it appear that
an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of ₱8 million from RBSM; that
petitioner succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds; that he
later converted the loan proceeds to his own personal gain and
benefit; and that his action caused damage and prejudice to
RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC.
Significantly, this is not the first occasion that we adjudge the
sufficiency of similarly worded informations. In Soriano v.
People,45 involving the same petitioner in this case (but
different transactions), we also reviewed the sufficiency of
informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, which were almost identical, mutatis
mutandis, with the subject informations herein. We held
in Soriano v. People that there is no basis for the quashal of the
informations as "they contain material allegations charging
Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents".
Petitioner raises the theory that he could not possibly be held
liable for estafa in concurrence with the charge for DOSRI
violation. According to him, the DOSRI charge presupposes
that he acquired a loan, which would make the loan proceeds
his own money and which he could neither possibly
misappropriate nor convert to the prejudice of another, as
required by the statutory definition of estafa. 46 On the other
hand, if petitioner did not acquire any loan, there can be no
DOSRI violation to speak of. Thus, petitioner posits that the
two offenses cannot co-exist. This theory does not persuade
us.
Petitioner’s theory is based on the false premises that the loan
was extended to him by the bank in his own name, and that he
became the owner of the loan proceeds. Both premises are
wrong.
The bank money (amounting to ₱8 million) which came to the
possession of petitioner was money held in trust or
administration by him for the bank, in his
fiduciary capacity as the President of said bank.47 It is not
accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the ₱8
million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have
been correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to
petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to
the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for
another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through
falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied
for the loan when in fact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through
such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds
and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot
be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8
million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s fiduciary with
respect to that money, which makes it capable of
misappropriation or conversion in his hands.
The next question is whether there can also be, at the same
time, a charge for DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein
the accused bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name,
but was alleged to have used the name of another person in
order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank. We answer this
in the affirmative. Section 83 of RA 337 reads:
Section 83. No director or officer of any banking institution
shall, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as the
representative or agent of others, borrow any of the deposits
of funds of such bank, nor shall he become a guarantor,
indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or in any
manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the bank or
loaned by it, except with the written approval of the majority
of the directors of the bank, excluding the director concerned.
Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of the
corporation and a copy of such entry shall be transmitted
forthwith to the Superintendent of Banks. The office of any
director or officer of a bank who violates the provisions of this
section shall immediately become vacant and the director or
officer shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one
year nor more than ten years and by a fine of not less than one
thousand nor more than ten thousand pesos. x x x
The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various
modes of borrowing.[48] It covers loans by a bank director or
officer (like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1)
directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the
representative or agent of others. It applies even if the director
or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for someone
else's loan or is in any manner an obligor for money borrowed
from the bank or loaned by it. The covered transactions are
prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and ceiling
requirements under Section 83 are complied with. The
prohibition is intended to protect the public, especially the
depositors,[49] from the overborrowing of bank funds by bank
officers, directors, stockholders and related interests, as such
overborrowing may lead to bank failures.[50] It has been said
that "banking institutions are not created for the benefit of the
directors [or officers]. While directors have great powers as
directors, they have no special privileges as individuals. They
cannot use the assets of the bank for their own benefit except
as permitted by law. Stringent restrictions are placed about
them so that when acting both for the bank and for one of
themselves at the same time, they must keep within certain
prescribed lines regarded by the legislature as essential to
safety in the banking business".51
A direct borrowing is obviously one that is made in the name
of the DOSRI himself or where the DOSRI is a named party,
while an indirect borrowing includes one that is made by a
third party, but the DOSRI has a stake in the transaction.52 The
latter type – indirect borrowing – applies here. The
information in Criminal Case 238-M-2001 alleges that
petitioner "in his capacity as President of Rural Bank of San
Miguel – San Ildefonso branch x x x indirectly borrow[ed] or
secure[d] a loan with [RBSM] x x x knowing fully well that the
same has been done by him without the written consent and
approval of the majority of the board of directors x x x, and
which consent and approval the said accused deliberately
failed to obtain and enter the same upon the records of said
banking institution and to transmit a copy thereof to the
supervising department of the said bank x x x by using the
name of one depositor Enrico Carlos x x x, the latter having no
knowledge of the said loan, and once in possession of the said
amount of eight million pesos (₱8 million), [petitioner]
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit".53
The foregoing information describes the manner of securing
the loan as indirect; names petitioner as the benefactor of the
indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were
not complied with. It contains all the required elements 54 for a
violation of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the
loan in his own name.
The broad interpretation of the prohibition in Section 83 is
justified by the fact that it even expressly covers loans to third
parties where the third parties are aware of the transaction
(such as principals represented by the DOSRI), and where the
DOSRI’s interest does not appear to be beneficial but even
burdensome (such as in cases when the DOSRI acts as a mere
guarantor or surety). If the law finds it necessary to protect the
bank and the banking system in such situations, it will surely
be illogical for it to exclude a case like this where the DOSRI
acted for his own benefit, using the name of an unsuspecting
person. A contrary interpretation will effectively allow a DOSRI
to use dummies to circumvent the requirements of the law.
In sum, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate
each other.
Third Issue: Given this Court's findings in the earlier issues of the instant
case, we find no compelling reason to grant the injunctive
Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the proper remedy against relief sought by petitioner.
an Order denying a Motion to Quash?
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September
This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our ruling in 26, 2003 Decision as well as the February 5, 2004 Resolution of
Soriano v. People,55 where we held: the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action
for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a SO ORDERED.
motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such
a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits,
an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the
special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are
no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case
that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition
for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible
error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition.56

Fourth Issue:

Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction

The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (1) the right of

the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial;
and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. A clear legal right means one
clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a
matter of law." Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right,
the issuance of an injunctive writ would constitute grave abuse
of discretion.57 Caution and prudence must, at all times, attend
the issuance of an injunctive writ because it effectively
disposes of the main case without trial and/or due
process.58 In Olalia v. Hizon,59 the Court held as follows:
It has been consistently held that there is no power the
exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous
in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the
strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to
cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation
upon the freedom of action of the [complainant] and should
not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted
only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and
the emergency demands it.
[G.R. No. 190569 : April 25, 2012]
P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, PETITIONER, VS. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN; BERNABE D. DUSABAN, PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF
ILOILO; EDITO AGUILLON, BRGY. CAPT., BRGY. LANJAGAN,
AJUY, ILOILO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private
Inspector Ariel S. Artillero (petitioner)
against Barangay Captain Edito Aguillon (Aguillon) for
violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1866[1] as amended
by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8249.
Petitioner is the Chief of Police of the Municipal Station of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Ajuy, Iloilo.[2] According to
him, on 6 August 2008, at about 6:45 in the evening, the
municipal station received information that successive gun
fires had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy Iloilo. Thus,
petitioner, together with Police Inspector Idel Hermoso
(Hermoso), and Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Arial Lanaque
(Lanaque), immediately went to the area to investigate. [3]
Upon arriving, they saw Paquito Panisales, Jr.
(Paquito)[4] standing beside the road, wearing a black sweat
shirt with a “Barangay Tanod” print.[5] They asked Paquito if he
had heard the alleged gunshots, but he answered in the
negative.
Petitioner, Hermoso, and Lanaque decided to investigate
further, but before they could proceed, they saw that Paquito
had “turned his back from us that seems like bragging his
firearm to us flagrantly displayed/tucked in his waist whom we
observed to be under the influence of intoxicating
odor.”[6] Then, they frisked him to “verify the firearm and its
supporting documents.”[7] Paquito then presented his Firearm
License Card and a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence
(PTCFOR).
Thereafter, they spotted two persons walking towards them,
wobbling and visibly drunk. They further noticed that one of
them, Aguillon, was openly carrying a rifle, and that its barrel
touched the concrete road at times.[8] Petitioner and Hermoso
disarmed Aguillon. The rifle was a Caliber 5.56 M16 rifle with
Serial Number 101365 and with 20 live ammunitions in its
magazine.
According to petitioner and Hermoso, although Aguillon was
able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not able to
present a PTCFOR.
Petitioner arrested Paquito, Aguillon and his companion Aldan
Padilla, and brought them to the Ajuy Municipal Police
Station.[9]
Paquito was released on the same night, because he was
deemed to have been able to comply with the requirements to
possess and carry firearm.[10] Thereafter, Aguillon was
detained at the police station, but was released from custody
the next day, 7 August 2008, after he posted a cash bond in the
amount of P80,000. The present Petition does not state under
what circumstances or when Padilla was released.
On 12 August 2008, petitioner and Hermoso executed a Joint
Affidavit[11] alleging the foregoing facts in support of the filing
of a case for illegal possession of firearm against Aguillon.
Petitioner also endorsed the filing of a Complaint against
Aguillon through a letter[12] sent to the Provincial Prosecutor
on 12 August 2008.
For his part, Aguillon executed an Affidavit swearing that
petitioner had unlawfully arrested and detained him for illegal
possession of firearm, even though the former had every right
to carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had
surrendered to petitioner. Aguillon further claims that he was
duly authorized by law to carry his firearm within his
barangay. [13]
According to petitioner, he never received a copy of the
Counter-Affidavit Aguillon had filed and was thus unable to
give the necessary reply.[14]
In a Resolution[15] dated 10 September 2008, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City recommended the dismissal
of the case for insufficiency of evidence. Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rodrigo P. Camacho (Asst. Prosecutor) found that
there was no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that Aguillon was probably guilty of the offense charged.
The Asst. Prosecutor also recommended that the rifle, which
was then under the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory, be
returned to Aguillon. Petitioner claims that he never received
a copy of this Resolution.
Thereafter, Provincial Prosecutor Bernabe D. Dusaban
(Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban) forwarded to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman the 10 September 2008 Resolution
recommending the approval thereof.[16]
In a Resolution[17] dated 17 February 2009, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C.
Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro), approved the
recommendation of Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban to dismiss
the case. It ruled that the evidence on record proved that
Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal possession of
firearm since he has a license for his rifle. Petitioner claims that
he never received a copy of this Resolution either. [18]
On 13 April 2009, Provincial Prosectuor Dusaban received a
letter from petitioner requesting a copy of the following
documents:
1. Copy of the Referral letter and the resolution
if there is any which was the subject of the
said referral to the Office of the
Ombudsman, Iloilo City; and
2. Copy of the counter affidavit of respondent,
Edito Aguillon and/or his witnesses
considering that I was not furnished a copy
of the pleadings filed by said respondent.[19]
On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR)[20] of the 17 February 2009 Resolution, but it was denied
through an Order dated 23 July 2009.[21] Thus, on 8 December
2009, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari[22] via Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
According to petitioner, he was denied his right to due process
when he was not given a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit,
the Asst. Prosecutor’s 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the
17 February 2009 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner also argues that public respondents’
act of dismissing the criminal Complaint against Aguillon,
based solely on insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the
provisions of P.D. 1866 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR).[23] He thus claims that the assailed
Resolutions were issued “contrary to law, and/or
jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.”[24]
The present Petition contains the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered petitioner most
respectfully prays:
1. That this Petition for Certiorari be given due course;
2. That a Decision be rendered granting the petition by issuing
the following:
a. Writ of Certiorari nullifying and setting aside the Order
dated July 23, 2009 and dated February 17, 2009 both of the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB V-08-0406-J and the
Resolution dated September 10, 2008 of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo in I.S. No. 2008-1281 (Annexes A,
C and D, respectively);
b. To reverse and set aside said Orders and Resolution
(Annexes A, C and D, respectively) finding PROBABLE CAUSE of
the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as
amended by R.A. 8294 and other applicable laws and to direct
the immediate filing of the information in Court against private
respondent EDITO AGUILLON.
Such other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed
for.[25] (Emphasis in the original.)
In his Comment,[26] Aguillon submits that the present Petition
should not be given due course based on the following
grounds:
a. The Deputy Ombudsman found that there
was no sufficient evidence to warrant the
prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1866 as
amended;
b. The present Petition is “frivolous and
manifestly prosecuted for delay;”[27]
c. The allegations raised are too unsubstantial
to merit consideration, because “Petitioner
failed to specifically allege the manner in
which the alleged Grave Abuse was
committed by Respondent Deputy
Ombudsman;”[28] and
d. The Deputy Ombudsman’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner claims that Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban should
have given him a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit. In
support of this claim, petitioner cites Section 3(c), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn
to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section,
with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The
respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in
lieu of a counter-affidavit.
Petitioner faults the Asst. Prosecutor and the Office of the
Ombudsman for supposedly committing grave abuse of
discretion when they failed to send him a copy of the 10
September 2008 and 17 February 2009 Resolutions.
A perusal of the records reveal that in both the 10 September
2008 and 17 February 2009 Resolutions, the PNP Crime
Laboratory and petitioner were included in the list of those
who were furnished copies of the foregoing
Resolutions.[29] Even though his name was listed in the “copy
furnished” section, petitioner never signed to signify receipt
thereof. Thus, none of herein respondents raise this fact as a
defense. In fact, they do not even deny the allegation of
petitioner that he never received a copy of these documents.
Aguillon does not deny that he never sent a copy of his
counter-affidavit to petitioner. For his part, Provincial
Prosecutor Dusaban explained in his Comment,[30] that he was
not able to give petitioner a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-
affidavit and the 10 September 2008 Resolution, because
“when petitioner was asking for them, the record of the case,
including the subject Resolution, was sent to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the required approval.”[31]
As further proof that petitioner was not sent a copy of the 10
September 2008 Resolution, it can be seen from the document
itself that one Atty. Jehiel Cosa signed in a “care of” capacity
to signify his receipt thereof on behalf of petitioner, only on 23
June 2009 or after the latter’s 12 April 2009 letter-request to
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban.
Nevertheless, the provincial prosecutor is of the opinion that
petitioner was never deprived of his due process rights, to wit:
8. Even granting that private respondent Edito Aguillion failed
to furnish the petitioner with a copy of his counter-affidavit as
required of him by the Rules, petitioner was never deprived of
anything. As aptly said by the Office of the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman in its Order dated 23 July 2009, “Complainant
added that he was never furnished copies of the Counter-
Affidavit of respondent nor of the Resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Posecutor, Iloilo City.”
“Anent the claim of the complainant that he was not furnished
with a copy of the Resolution dated 10 September 2008 of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Iloilo City, said Resolution
did not attain finality until approved by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Nevertheless, complainant was not deprived of
due process, he can still avail to file a Motion for
Reconsideration, which he did, to refute respondent’s
defense.”[32]
We agree.
Petitioner insists that Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, was created “in order not to
deprive party litigants of their basic constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
them.”[33]
Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro contradicts the claim of
petitioner and argues that the latter was not deprived of due
process, just because he was not able to file his Reply to the
Counter-affidavit. The constitutional right to due process
according to the Deputy Ombudsman, is guaranteed to the
accused, and not to the complainant.[34]
Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that
no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without
due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.[35] This is a right that
cannot be invoked by petitioner, because he is not the accused
in this case.
The law is vigilant in protecting the rights of an accused. Yet,
notwithstanding the primacy put on the rights of an accused in
a criminal case, even they cannot claim unbridled rights in
Preliminary Investigations. In Lozada v. Hernandez,[36] we
explained the nature of a Preliminary Investigation in relation
to the rights of an accused, to wit:
It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation
is not properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely
preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. (U.S. vs.
Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 716). The right
to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by
the constitution. At most, it is statutory. (II Moran, Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., p. 673). And rights conferred upon accused
persons to participate in preliminary investigations concerning
themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such
rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase
"due process of law". (U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil.,
122).[37]
It is therefore clear that because a preliminary investigation is
not a proper trial, the rights of parties therein depend on the
rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights they believe they are entitled to or those that
may be derived from the phrase “due process of law.”
A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a
vested right to file a Reply—this right should be granted to him
by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor to
observe the right to file a Reply to the accused’s counter-
affidavit. To illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a
Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112
gives the prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve
the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz:
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed,
does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day
period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint
based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban correctly claims that it is
discretionary on his part to require or allow the filing or
submission of reply-affidavits.[38]
Furthermore, we agree with Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban
that there was no need to send a copy of the 10 September
2008 Resolution to petitioner, since it did not attain finality
until it was approved by the Office of the Ombudsman. It must
be noted that the rules do not state that petitioner, as
complainant, was entitled to a copy of this recommendation.
The only obligation of the prosecutor, as detailed in Section 4
of Rule 112, was to forward the record of the case to the
proper officer within five days from the issuance of his
Resolution, to wit:
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.—
If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that
he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he
shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the
record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within
ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately
inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Even though petitioner was indeed entitled to receive a copy
of the Counter-affidavit filed by Aguillon, whatever procedural
defects this case suffered from in its initial stages were cured
when the former filed an MR. In fact, all of the supposed
defenses of petitioner in this case have already been raised in
his MR and adequately considered and acted on by the Office
of the Ombudsman.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard. “What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard.”[39] We have said that where a party
has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latter’s
motion for reconsideration there is sufficient compliance with Guidelines, the PNP Chief revoked all PTCFOR previously
the requirements of due process.[40] issued, thereby prohibiting holders of licensed firearms from
carrying these outside their residences, to wit:
At this point, this Court finds it important to stress that even
though the filing of the MR cured whatever procedural defect 4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the
may have been present in this case, this does not change the Carrying of Firearms:
fact that Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban had the duty to send
petitioner a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c), a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked.
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a Authorized holders of licensed
complainant this right, and the Provincial Prosecutor has the firearms covered with valid PTCFOR
duty to observe the fundamental and essential requirements may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in
of due process in the cases presented before it. That the accordance with the conditions
requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the hereinafter prescribed.
present case because of the filing of an MR by Complainant
was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the b. All holders of licensed or
Provincial Prosecutor. government firearms are hereby
prohibited from carrying their
It is submitted by petitioner that in dismissing Aguillon’s firearms outside their residence
Complaint, public respondents committed grave abuse of except those covered with
discretion by failing to consider Memorandum Circular No. mission/letter orders and duty
2000-016, which was supposedly the IRR issued by the PNP for detail orders issued by competent
P.D. 1866.[41] authority pursuant to Section 5,
IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the
Petitioner fails to persuade this Court. said exception shall pertain only to
organic and regular employees.
The original IRR[42] of P.D. 1866 was issued by then Lieutenant
General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Fidel V.
Ramos on 28 October 1983. The IRR provides that, except Section 4 of the IRR lists the following persons as those
when specifically authorized by the Chief of Constabulary, authorized to carry their duty-issued firearms outside their
lawful holders of firearms are prohibited from carrying them residences, even without a PTCFOR, whenever they are on
outside their residences, to wit: duty:

SECTION 3. Authority of Private Individuals to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence. —
a. As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms
(regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or
M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of
residence.
b. However, the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious
cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he
may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearm
outside of residence.
SECTION 4. Authority of Personnel of Certain Civilian
Government Entities and Guards of Private Security Agencies,
Company Guard Forces and Government Guard Forces to
Carry Firearms. — The personnel of the following civilian
agencies commanding guards of private security agencies,
company guard forces and government guard forces are
authorized to carry their duty issued firearms whenever they
are on duty detail subject to the specific guidelines provided in
Sec. 6 hereof:
a. Guards of the National Bureau of Prisons, Provincial and
City Jails;

c. Except as otherwise provided in Secs. 4 and 5 hereof, the
carrying of firearm outside of residence or official station in
pursuance of an official mission or duty shall have the prior
approval of the Chief of Constabulary.
By virtue of R.A. 6975,[43] the PNP absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary. Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the
Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s
licensing authority.[44]
On 31 January 2003, PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane issued
Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying
of Firearms Outside of Residence (Guidelines). In these
b. Members of the Bureau of Customs Police, Philippine Ports
Authority Security Force, and Export Processing Zones
Authority Police Force; and x
c. Guards of private security agencies, company guard forces,
and government guard forces.
Section 5 of the guidelines, on the other hand, enumerates
persons who have the authority to carry firearms outside their
residences, viz:
5. The following persons may be authorized to
carry firearms outside of residence.
 1. All persons whose application for a
new PTCFOR has been approved,
provided, that the persons and
security of those so authorized are
under actual threat, or by the
nature of their position, occupation
and profession are under imminent
danger.
2. All organic and regular employees
with Mission/Letter Orders granted
by their respective agencies so
authorized pursuant to Section 5,
IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such
Mission/Letter Orders is valid only
for the duration of the official
mission which in no case shall be
more than ten (10) days.
3. All guards covered with Duty Detail
Orders granted by their respective
security agencies so authorized
pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866,
provided, that such DDO shall in no
case exceed 24-hour duration.
4. Members of duly recognized Gun
Clubs issued Permit to Transport
(PTT) by the PNP for purposes of
practice and competition, provided,
that such firearms while in transit
must not be loaded with
ammunition and secured in an
appropriate box or case detached
from the person.
5. Authorized members of the
Diplomatic Corps.
It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims,
a barangay captain is not one of those authorized to carry
firearms outside their residences unless armed with the
appropriate PTCFOR under the Guidelines. [45]
However, we find merit in respondents’ contention that the
authority of Aguillon to carry his firearm outside his residence
was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but,
rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local
Government Code (LGC).
In People v. Monton,[46] the house of Mariano Monton—the
Barrio Captain of Bacao, General Trias, Cavite—was raided,
and an automatic carbine with one long magazine containing
several rounds of ammunition was found hidden under a
pillow covered with a mat. He was charged with the crime of
illegal possession of firearm, but this Court acquitted him on
the basis of Section 88(3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337(B.P.
337), the LGC of 1983, which reads:
In the performance of his peace and order functions,
the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the
necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to
existing rules and regulations on the possession and carrying
of firearms.
Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It
retained the foregoing provision as reflected in its Section 389
(b), viz:
CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY
SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the
punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the
necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to
appropriate rules and regulations.
Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban’s standpoint on this matter is
correct. All the guidelines and rules cited in the instant Petition
“refers to civilian agents, private security guards, company
guard forces and government guard forces.” These rules and
guidelines should not be applied to Aguillon, as he is neither
an agent nor a guard. As barangay captain, he is the head of a
local government unit; as such, his powers and responsibilities
are properly outlined in the LGC. This law specifically gives him,
by virtue of his position, the authority to carry the necessary
firearm within his territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner does not
deny that when he found Aguillon “openly carrying a rifle,” the
latter was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain of
the barangay.
In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, this Court
will give credence to the finding and determination of
probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary
investigation.[47]
This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-
interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's investigatory
powers.[48] It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such
discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant this Court’s
reversal of the Ombudsman’s findings.[49] This, petitioner has
failed to do.
The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman
Casimiro did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding
that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon
for trial.
The Dissent contends that probable cause was already
established by facts of this case, which show that Aguillon was
found carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence without
a PTCFOR. Thus, Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal Complaint.
However, even though Aguillon did not possess a PTCFOR, he
had the “legal authority” to carry his firearm outside his
residence, as required by P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294.
This authority was granted to him by Section 389 (b) of the LGC
of 1991, which specifically carved out an exception to P.D.
1866.
Following the suggestion of the Dissent, prosecutors have the
authority to disregard existing exemptions, as long as the
requirements of the general rule apply. This should not be the
case. Although the Dissent correctly declared that the
prosecutor cannot peremptorily apply a statutory
exception without weighing it against the facts and evidence
before him, we find that the facts of the case prove that there
is no probable cause to charge Aguillon with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm.
In interpreting Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, the Dissent
found that the factual circumstances of the present case show
that the conditions set forth in the law have not been met.
Thus, the exemption should not apply.
Contrary to the allegation of the dissent, there is no question
as to the fact that Aguillon was within his territorial jurisdiction
when he was found in possession of his rifle.
The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary
firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is necessary to
enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within
the barangays. Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep
peace and order, this Court deems that, like police
officers, punong barangayshave a duty as a peace officer that
must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer,
a barangay captain may be called by his constituents, at any
time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of
his barangay.[50] As long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he
cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangay—to
maintain peace and order.
Indeed, petitioner’s mere allegation does not establish the fact
that Aguillon was drunk at the time of his arrest. This Court,
however, is alarmed at the idea that government officials,
who are not only particularly charged with the responsibility to
maintain peace and order within their barangays but are also
given the authority to carry any form of firearm necessary to
perform their duty, could be the very same person who would
put their barangays in danger by carelessly carrying high-
powered firearms especially when they are not in full control
of their senses.
While this Court does not condone the acts of Aguillon, it
cannot order the prosecutor to file a case against him since
there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for
imbibing liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither is there any
law that restricts the kind of firearms that punong
barangays may carry in the performance of their peace and
order functions. Unfortunately, it also appears that the term
“peace and order function” has not been adequately defined
by law or appropriate regulations.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition. We AFFIRM the
Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dated 10
September 2008, as well as the Resolution and the Order of
the Office of the Ombudsman dated 17 February 2009 and 23
July 2009, respectively.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for
whatever appropriate action they may deem warranted by the
statements in this Decision regarding the adequacy of laws
governing the carrying of firearms by local chief executives.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As to the last phrase in Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991,

stating that the exception it carved out is subject to
“appropriate rules and regulations,” suffice it to say that
although P.D. 1866 was not repealed, it was modified by the
LGC by specifically adding to the exceptions found in the
former. Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified by Section 389
(b) of the LGC as the latter provision already existed when
Congress enacted the LGC. Thus, Section 389 (b) of the LGC of
1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of P.D.
1866, which enumerated the persons given the authority to
carry firearms outside of residence without an issued permit.
The phrase “subject to appropriate rules and regulations”
found in the LGC refers to those found in the IRR of the LGC
itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866 and not those that it has
already amended.
G.R. No. 190969 : January 30, 2013
BARON A. VILLANUEVA and the SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, Petitioners, v. EDNA R. CAPARAS,Respondent.
DECISION
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 tiled by
petitioner Baron A. Villanueva (Villanueva) to nullity the
decision2 dated May 28, 2009 and the resolution3 dated
January 11, 20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 102128 insofar as it reversed the disposition 4 of the
Secretary of Justice (Secretary) in I.S. No. 05-3813 (docketed
before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97,
as Criminal Case No. Q-06-143768 ). The Secretary set aside
the resolution5 of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(prosecutor) and directed tile withdrawal of the information
for homicide filed against Villanueva.
The Factual Antecedents
As the CA summarized in its decision, an altercation occurred
between Renato Caparas, husband of respondent Edna R.
Caparas, and Villanueva in the morning of August 24, 2005,
which altercation led to the death of Renato. On September 7,
2005, Edna filed a criminal complaint for murder against
Villanueva.
During the preliminary investigation, Edna submitted her
affidavit; the affidavit of her neighbor, Fernando Gonzales,
who witnessed the incident; and the autopsy report of the
Philippine National Police-Central Police District Crime
Laboratory.6 Villanueva, for his part, submitted his affidavit;
the affidavit of Joan Miguel, Villanuevas girlfriend and the
niece of Edna; the affidavit of Lourdes Miguel, Renatos sister;
and the affidavit of Jovita Caparas, Renato and Lourdes
mother, who were all witnesses to the incident. Villanueva
submitted as well as the opinion of Dr. Valentin T. Bernales of
the National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Division
(NBI opinion) as to the cause of Renatos head injuries.7?r?l1
Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal
information for homicide8 against Villanueva on October 3,
2006.9 Villanueva sought reconsideration of the prosecutors
resolution, but the prosecutor denied the motion on March 22,
2007. Before he could be arraigned,10 Villanueva filed a
petition for review before the Department of Justice.
The DOJ Secretarys Resolution
On July 27, 2007, the Secretary set aside the prosecutors
resolution and directed the prosecutor to move for the
withdrawal of the information. The Secretary found the
evidence against Villanueva insufficient to support a prima
facie case. With the Secretarys denial of Ednas motion for
reconsideration on January 4, 2008, Edna sought recourse with
the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.11?r?l1
The Ruling of the CA
The CA reversed the Secretarys resolution and ordered the
reinstatement of the prosecutors resolution and the
corresponding information. It held that the Secretary
exceeded the functional requirements of a preliminary
investigation in passing upon the validity of matters essentially
evidentiary in nature; grave abuse of discretion intervened
when he passed upon the merits of Villanuevas defenses, a
matter best ventilated in the trial proper. The CA concluded
that the facts and the pieces of evidence presented sufficiently
supported the finding of probable cause to indict Villanueva
for Homicide.
The CA also denied Villanuevas motion to dismiss, based on the
order dated February 16, 2009 of the RTC 12 granting the
motion for the withdrawal of the information. The CAs denial
of Villanuevas motion for reconsideration gave rise to and
prompted the present recourse.
The Petition
Villanueva argues in the petition before us that the CA decided
questions of substance in a way not in accord with law and
jurisprudence, and it departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings when the CA:
1. ordered the reinstatement of the information; and
2. reversed and set aside the resolution of the Secretary that
was fully in accord with law and the facts established by the
evidence.13?r?l1
The Case for the Respondents
Edna, in her response,14 argues that, first, the issue raised
before the CA is whether the Secretary committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing his resolution which was cited as basis
for Villanuevas motion to withdraw the information; thus,
after setting aside the Secretarys resolution and finding
probable cause, the CA correctly ordered the reinstatement of
the information; and second, the CA correctly ruled that the
Secretary gravely abused his discretion when he reversed the
finding of probable cause as he relied on the unconfirmed
affidavit of Jovita and on the NBI opinion, and disregarded the
testimony of Edna and her witness and the autopsy report.
The Courts Ruling
The petition poses to us the issue of whether the CA correctly
ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of his
jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutors resolution
finding probable cause to indict Villanueva for homicide and,
pursuant to this conclusion, ordered the withdrawal of the
resolution.
The petitioner posits that: (1) the CA passed upon the findings
of the RTC although the latters findings were not in issue
before the CA; (2) the Secretary is specifically granted the
power, among others, to reverse the findings of the prosecutor
when, as in this case, they are contrary to the evidence; and
(3) the CA completely disregarded the affidavits of Lourdes and
Jovita, and the NBI opinion, among others.
We find the CA decision and resolution in accord with law and
jurisprudence in finding that the Secretary acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors
resolution finding probable cause to charge Villanueva with
homicide.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information,
pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.15 Only such facts sufficient
to support a prima facie case against the respondent are
required, not absolute certainty.16 Probable cause implies
mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction.17 The strict validity and merits of a party's
accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies
and pieces of evidence, are better ventilated during the trial
proper of the case.18?r?l1
The determination of probable cause is essentially an
executive function,19 lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation 20 on
the offended partys complaint.21 The prosecutors ruling is
reviewable by the Secretary22 who, as the final determinative
authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or
affirm the prosecutors determination.23 As a rule, the
Secretarys findings are not subject to interference by the
courts,24 save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; 25 or when he
grossly misapprehends facts;26 or acts in a manner so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when
he acts outside the contemplation of law.27?r?l1
In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime
charged, homicide in this case, should be
present.28 Jurisprudence laid out the elements of homicide as:
(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him without any
justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to
kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by
any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.29 All of these elements are present in this case, as
adequately shown by the affidavits of Edna and her witness,
and by the autopsy report.
We agree with the CA that the Secretary, in this case,
calibrated the evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis-a-vis
the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis-à-
vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went into the
strict merits of Villanuevas defenses. We note that the NBI
opinion was procured at Villanuevas instance and was based
on the documents and in response to the questions Villanueva
posed,30 while Jovita was unable to recall the events that
transpired relative to Renatos death when asked during the
preliminary investigation. Whether the alternative scenario on
the cause of Renatos injuries and death (as supported by
Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and which Villanueva
proposed by way of defense) is more credible and more likely
than the narrations of Edna in her complaint-affidavit, in the
affidavit of her witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best
be left for the trial court to determine after a full-blown trial
on the merits. When the Secretary made a determination
based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for
and against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the function of
a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and,
thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
Finally, while the CA may have discussed the propriety of the
RTC's order granting the withdrawal of the information - a
matter not directly raised in the petition before the appellate
court - the discussion was done only in response to
Villanueva's own manifestation and motion for the dismissal of
the petition by reason of the order of the RTC. 31 In this light,
the CA's discussion of the matter is fully justifiable and
understandable. We agree with the CA that the order of the
RTC for the withdrawal of information simply relied on the
Secretary's resolution granting the withdrawal of the
information.32 Since the Secretary's resolution is void, the
consequent order of the RTC, made on the basis of this void
resolution, should likewise be void and of no effect. 33?r?l1
In sum, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it
nullified and set aside the resolution rendered by the Secretary
with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the C A also did
not err in ordering the reinstatement of the prosecutor's
resolution of probable cause and its accompanying
information.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for
lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated May 28, 2009 and its resolution dated
January 11, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102128. Costs against
petitioner Baron A. Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 191567 : March 20, 2013
MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, Petitioner, v. PHILIP RONALD P.
ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN, Respondents.
DECISION
The determination of probable cause to file a criminal
complaint or information in court is exclusively within the
competence of the Executive Department, through the
Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such
determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary
of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Case
Under review is the decision promulgated on November 20,
2009,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the
resolution dated April 16, 2009 issued by the Secretary of
Justice dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint for
murder filed against the respondents.2
Antecedents
The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani
"Chase" Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied body was
discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between
vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house located at
No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly,
Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald
P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour before the discovery of his
lifeless body.
Based on the petition, the following are the background facts.
Around 5:30 p.m. of February 27, 2007, Chase returned home
from visiting his girlfriend, Ramonna Liza "Monnel" Hernandez.
Around 7:00 p.m., Chase's sister Ariane was sitting at the porch
of their house when she noticed a white Honda Civic car
parked along the street. Recognizing the driver to be Philip,
Ariane waved her hand at him. Philip appeared nonchalant and
did not acknowledge her gesture. Ariane decided to stay
behind and leave with their house helpers, Marivic Guray and
Michelle Corpus, only after Chase had left on board the white
Honda Civic car.
In the meanwhile, Chase exchanged text messages with his
girlfriend Monnel starting at 7:09 p.m. and culminating at 7:31
p.m. Among the messages was: Ppnta n kunin gulong yam
iniisip k prn n d tyo magksma. sbrang lungkot k ngun (On the
way to get the tires' I still think about us not being together I
m very sad right now)
Security Guard (SG) Rodolph Delos Reyes and SG Henry Solis,
who were stationed at the main gate of Ferndale Homes,
logged the arrival at 7:26 p.m. on February 27, 2007 of Philip
on board a white Honda Civic bearing plate CRD 999 with a
male companion in the passenger seat. It was determined later
on that the white Honda Civic bearing plate CRD 999 was
owned by one Richard Joshua Ulit, who had entrusted the car
to Philip who had claimed to have found a buyer of the car.
Ulit, Pamela Ann Que, and car shop owner Edbert Ylo later
attested that Philip and Chase were friends, and that they were
unaware of any rift between the two prior to the incident.
Marivic Rodriguez, a house helper of Shellane Yukoko, the
resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, was with her
co-employee nanny Jennylyn Buri and the latter's ward, Joei
Yukoko, when they heard somebody crying coming from the
crime scene: Help! Help! This was at about 7:30 p.m. Even so,
neither of them bothered to check who had been crying for
help. It was noted, however, that No. 10 Cedar Place, which
was owned by one Mrs. Howard, was uninhabited at the time.
Based on the initial investigation report of the Megaforce
Security and Allied Services, Inc.,3 the Estebans were illegally
parking their cars at Mrs. Howard's carport. The initial
investigation report stated that the SGs would regularly
remind the Estebans to use their own parking garage, which
reminders had resulted in heated discussions and altercations.
The SGs kept records of all the illegal parking incidents, and
maintained that only the Estebans used the carport of No. 10
Cedar Place.
Around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban
(Teodora) arrived at Ferndale Homes on board a vehicle
bearing plate XPN 733, as recorded in the subdivision SG's
logbook. At that time, three cars were parked at the carport of
No. 10 Cedar place, to wit: a Honda CRV with plate ZAE 135
parked parallel to the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999, and
another Honda Civic with plate JTG 333, the car frequently
used by Philip, then parked diagonally behind the two cars.
Some witnesses alleged that prior to the discovery of the
Chase's body, they had noticed a male and female inside the
car bearing plate JTG 333 engaged in a discussion.
At around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while
patrolling around the village, noticed that the side of the
Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which
prompted him to move towards the parked cars. He inspected
the then empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still
turned on. He checked the cars and discovered that the rear
and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were smeared
with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone
covered with blood. It was then that he found the bloodied and
lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. The body
was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt
on the chest, and with only the socks on. SG Sarmiento called
for back-up. SG Rene Fabe immediately barricaded the crime
scene.
Around 7:55 p.m., SG Solis received a phone call from an
unidentified person who reported that a "kid" had met an
accident at Cedar Place. SG Solis later identified and confirmed
the caller to be "Mr. Esteban Larry" when the latter entered
the village gate and inquired whether the "kid" who had met
an accident had been attended to. Moreover, when SG Fabe
and SG Sarmiento were securing the scene of the crime, they
overheard from the radio that somebody had reported about
a "kid" who had been involved in an accident at Cedar Place.
SG Fabe thereafter searched the village premises but did not
find any such accident. When SG Fabe got back, there were
already several onlookers at the crime scene.
The Scene-of-the-Crime Operations (SOCO) team arrived. Its
members prepared a sketch and took photographs of the
crime scene. They recovered and processed the cadaver of
Chase, a bloodstained t-shirt, blood smears, green nylon cord,
fingerprints, wristwatch, and a bloodied Nokia N90 mobile
phone.
According to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Medico-Legal Report No N-07-163 signed by Dr. Valentin
Bernales, Acting Medico-Legal Division Chief, and Dr. Cesar B.
Bisquera, Medico-Legal Officer, the victim sustained two stab
wounds, to wit: one on the left side of the lower chest wall
with a depth of 9 cm., which fractured the 4th rib and pierced
the heart, and the other on the middle third of the forearm.
The findings corroborated the findings contained in Medico-
Legal Report No. 131-07 of Police Chief Insp. Filemon C.
Porciuncula Jr.
Resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint in its resolution dated December 18,
2007.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and
circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge Philip with
homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence
could not link Philip to the crime; that several possibilities
would discount Philip's presence at the time of the crime,
including the possibility that there were more than one
suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase; that Philip was not
shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their common
friends attested that the two had no ill-feelings towards each
other; that no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora
with the crime, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory;
and that the allegation that Teodora could have been the
female person engaged in a discussion with a male person
inside the car with plate JTG 333 was unreliable being mere
hearsay.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal,
but the OCP denied the motion on December 15,
2008.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Resolution by the Secretary of Justice
On petition for review,6 the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint on April 16, 2009
The Secretary of Justice stated that the confluence of lack of
an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient circumstantial
evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of
Philip by the witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause
to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged.
The Secretary of Justice held that the only circumstantial
evidence connecting Philip to the crime was the allegation that
at between 7:00 to 7:30 o'clock of the evening in question,
Chase had boarded the white Honda Civic car driven by Philip;
that the witnesses' positive identification of Philip as the driver
of the car was doubtful, however, considering that Philip did
not alight from the car, the windows of which were tinted; and
that the rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions, and
did not indicate that Philip had been with Chase at the time of
the commission of the crime.
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on May 21, 2009, 8 the petitioner elevated
the matter to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43,
Rules of Court.
Ruling of the CA
In her petition for review in the CA, the petitioner assigned to
the Secretary of Justice the following errors, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MANIFESTLY ERRED
IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THEREOF FILED BY PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS AGAINST
RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER UNDER ARTICLE
248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE NUMEROUS PIECES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST RESPONDENTS TO HOLD
THEM LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER AS EXTANT IN THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE.
III. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
ARE PRESENT IN THE INSTANT CASE.9c
On November 20, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision,10 dismissing the petition for review.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion for its lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner prays that Philip and Teodora be charged with
murder on the strength of the several pieces of circumstantial
evidence; that the qualifying aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery be appreciated in the
slaying of her son, given the time, manner, and weapon used
in the commission of the crime and the location and degree of
the wounds inflicted on the victim.
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the
decision of the Secretary of Justice finding that there was no
probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for
the killing of Chase.
authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of
the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the
Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will
not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. x x x

Ruling Secondly, even an examination of the CA's decision indicates

that the CA correctly concluded that the Secretary of Justice
did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming the
We deny the petition for review, and sustain the decision of
finding of probable cause by the OCP.
the CA.

A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of

We note, to start with, that the petitioner assailed the
the Rules of Court, is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine
resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing in the CA a
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
grave mistake that immediately called for the outright
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." The
dismissal of the petition. The filing of a petition for review
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet
under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justice's resolution on
to be followed by the trial proper in a court of law. The
the determination of probable cause was an improper
occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
remedy.11Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis
evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may
the Secretary of Justice.
engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be
offense.16 The role and object of preliminary investigation
taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by
were "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. 12 In the matter before
public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and
us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from
performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings
useless and expensive prosecutions."17
of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause,
the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive
In Arula vs. Espino,18 the Court rendered the three purposes of
function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1) to inquire concerning
respondents was committed, and whether there was probable
the commission of a crime and the connection of the accused
cause to believe that the respondents were guilty
with it, in order that he may be informed of the nature and
thereof.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
character of the crime charged against him, and, if there is
probable cause for believing him guilty, that the State may take
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary
the necessary steps to bring him to trial; (2) to preserve the
of Justice's determination of probable cause only through a
evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the
special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the
State; and (3) to determine the amount of bail, if the offense
Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial is bailable. The officer conducting the examination investigates
officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
or inquires into facts concerning the commission of a crime
those of a court of law.14 But the requirement for such
with the end in view of determining whether an information
intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly
may be prepared against the accused.
that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless
The determination of the existence of probable cause lies
such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is
within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting
disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of
a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended
powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank &
party.19 Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal
Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III:
information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed, and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence
justifying a conviction, demands more than bare
suspicion.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of
evidence that establishes the probable cause justifying the
filing of a criminal information against the respondent because
the determination of existence of a probable cause is the
function of the public prosecutor.21 Generally, the public
prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, it is a
sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct
of preliminary investigations, and to just leave to the
Department of Justice the ample latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse
the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the
matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse
of discretion.22 By way of exception, however, judicial review
is permitted where the respondent in the preliminary
investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when the public
prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law.23 Moreover, the trial court may
ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary
investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of
justice.24 Although policy considerations call for the widest
latitude of deference to the public prosecutor's findings, the
courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when
the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the public
prosecutor's findings are supported by the facts, and by the
law.25chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct
the CA's determination that no prima facie evidence existed
that sufficiently indicated the respondents' involvement in the
commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no
eyewitness of the actual killing of Chase; or that there was no
evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many
persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or
perpetrators of his killing. There was also nothing that directly
incriminated the respondents in the commission of either
homicide or murder.
Admittedly, the petitioner relies solely on circumstantial
evidence, which she insists to be enough to warrant the
indictment of respondents for murder.
We disagree.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one
another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one
fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the
crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.26 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient,
therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven,
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking
Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare
recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and
Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the
household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase
board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of February
27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic.
But there was nothing else after that, because the
circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even
be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. To be
sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn.28 The statements
subscribed and sworn to before the officers of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths
upon matters connected with the performance of their official
duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the
effect that such administering officers had personally
examined the affiants, and that such administering officers
were satisfied that the affiants had voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.29chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of
most of the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly
Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be
conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
xxx
The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications
under the aforecited rule was designed to avoid self-serving
and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of
the preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do
not require a confrontation between the parties and their
witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory, to wit:
In Oporto, Jr. vs. Monserate, it was held that the requirement
set forth under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is mandatory. This is so because the rules
on preliminary investigation does not require a confrontation
between the parties. Preliminary investigation is ordinarily
conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting
documents, through submission of affidavits and supporting
documents, through the exchange of pleadings. Thus, it can be
inferred that the rationale for requiring the affidavits of
witnesses to be sworn to before a competent officer so as to
ensure that the affidavits supporting the factual allegations in
the Complaint have been sworn before a competent officer
and that the affiant has signed the same in the former's
presence declaring on oath the truth of the statement made
considering that this becomes part of the bases in finding
probable guilt against the respondent. Well-settled is the rule
that persons, such as an employee, whose unsworn
declarations in behalf of a party, or the employee's employer
in this case, are not admissible in favor of the latter. Further, it
has been held that unsworn statements or declarations are
self-serving and self-serving declarations are not admissible in
evidence as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose by
implication from acts and conduct or were made orally or
reduced in writing. The vital objection to the admission to this
kind of evidence is its hearsay character.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits
accompanying the complaint shows that out of the total of 16
statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective
witnesses, only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a
competent officer. These were the affidavits of the following:
(1) SG Sarmiento; (2) SG Solis; (3) SG Fabe; (4) SG Marivic
Rodriguez; (5) Jennylyn Buri; (6) Richard Joshua Sulit; (7)
Marites Navarro; (8) Pamela-Ann Que; and (9) Edbert Ylo,
which were sworn to or subscribed before a competent officer.
Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the
victim was last seen in the company of respondent Philip must
be established by competent evidence required by the rules in
preliminary investigation. Here, it was allegedly Chase's sister,
Ariane, and their two household helpers, Marivic Guray and
Michelle Corpus, who saw respondent Philip pick up Chase at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Yet,
such fact from which the inference is derived was not duly
proven. The statements of Marivic and Michelle both executed
on February 28, 2007 were not sworn to before the proper
officer. Neither was the affidavit dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane
Claridad duly notarized nor is there any explanation why the
same was belatedly executed.
It cannot thus be used to prove the circumstance that it was
respondent Philip who drove the white car parked in front of
their house at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February
27, 2007 and that the factual allegation that the car used bore
the Plate no. CRD-999. Further, since their affidavits were not
in the nature of a public document, it is incumbent upon the
complainant to prove its due execution and authenticity
before the same is admitted in evidence. It is a well-settled rule
that private documents must be proved as to their due
execution and authenticity before they may be received in
evidence.
Likewise, the circumstance that the victim sent a text message
to his girlfriend Monet that he was on his way to get the tires
at around 7:09 o'clock in the evening of February 27, 2007 is
likewise inadmissible in evidence because Monet's affidavit
was not sworn to before a competent officer. There was also
no evidence of the alleged text message pursuant to the law
on admissibility of electronic evidence. Besides, it cannot be
inferred therefrom who the victim was with at that time and
where he was going to get the tires.
Neither can the handwritten unsworn statement dated
February 28, 2007 of SG Rodolph delos Reyes and handwritten
sworn statement dated March 8, 2008 of SG Henry Solis be of
any help in claiming that the victim was in the company of
respondent Philip when the latter entered the village at
around 7:26 o'clock in the evening of February 27, 2007.
Suffice it to state that their statements only identified
respondent Philip driving the white Honda Civic bearing Plate
No. CRD-999. However, both were unsure if they saw
respondent Philip with a passenger because it was already dark
and the car was tinted.30chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Also, the CA cited in its decision the further consequences of
not complying with the aforequoted rule, to wit:
It also follows that the succeeding pieces of circumstantial
evidence relied upon by complainant are not admissible for
either being incompetent or hearsay evidence, to wit:
(a) that at around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn
Esteban, on board a vehicle bearing plate no. XPN-733 entered
Ferndale Homes is inadmissible because it is not supported by
any sworn affidavit of a witness
(b) that at around the same time, two unidentified persons, a
male and female were heard talking inside Honda Civic bearing
plate no. JTG-333 allegedly belonging to respondent Philip,
which was one of the vehicles parked at the carport of #10
Cedar Place, inside Ferndale Homes is inadmissible because it
is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(c) that the Esteban family was temporarily using the carport
of #10 Cedar Place as a carpark for their vehicles at that time
is inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn
affidavit of a witness;
(d) that when the guards went to the house of the Esteban
family, the same was unusually dark and dim is inadmissible
because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(e) that while the crime scene was being processed, Mr.
Esteban sought assistance from the police and requested that
they escort his son, respondent Philip Esteban, to St. Luke's
Medical Center, as the latter also allegedly suffered injuries is
inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit
of a witness;
(f) that during the investigation, Philip, Mrs. Teodora Alyn
Esteban and their family refused to talk and cooperate with
the authorities and that they neither disclosed the extent of
Philip's alleged injuries nor disclosed as to how or why he
sustained them is inadmissible because it is not supported by
any sworn affidavit of a witness; and
(g) Mrs. Edith Flores, speaking for respondents' family,
reportedly communicated with the family of the deceased on
numerous occasions and offered to pay for the funeral
expenses is inadmissible because it is not supported by any
sworn affidavit of a witness.
This now leaves this Court with the remaining pieces of
circumstantial evidence supported by the sworn statement
dated March 6, 2007 of Marivic Rodriguez, handwritten sworn
statement dated March 8, 2007 of SG Abelardo Sarmiento, Jr.
and handwritten sworn statement dated March 8, 2007 of SG
Rene Fabe as follows:
(a) at around 7:30 p.m., Marivic Guray and Jennylyn Buri heard
a commotion (loud cries saying "Help! Help!) at No. 10, Cedar
Place inside Ferndale Homes;
(b) at around 7:50 p.m., the body of the deceased was
discovered lying in a pool of blood in the carport of #10 Cedar
Place;
(c) there was blood inside and outside the white Honda Civic
bearing plate no. CRD-999;
(d) that at around 7:55 p.m., respondent Philip Esteban's
father, Lauro Esteban, who was then outside the village, called
the security guard at the entrance gate of the village to report
the incident through his mobile phone;
(e) that at around 9:09 p.m., Mr. Esteban entered the village
and admitted that he was the one who called for assistance
regarding an incident that transpired at Cedar Place; and
(f) as per Autopsy Report, the cause of Chase's death was a
stab wound in the chest and that the said wound was 9
centimeters deep, or around 3.6 inches and cut the descending
aorta of his heart.
The above pieces of circumstantial evidence, though duly
supported by sworn statements of witnesses, when taken as a
whole, do not, however, lead to a finding of probable cause
that respondents committed the crime charged.
The factual allegations of the complaint merely show that at
around 7:30 o'clock in the evening of February 27, 2007,
Marivic Rodriguez heard a male voice, coming from the front
of their employer's house, shouting "Help! Help!"; that at
around 7:50 p.m., the body of the deceased was discovered
lying in a pool of blood in the carport of #10 Cedar Place; that
there was blood inside and outside the white Honda Civic
bearing plate no. CRD-999; and, that as per Autopsy Report,
the cause of Chase's death was a stab wound in the chest and
that the said wound was 9 centimeters deep, or around 3.6
inches and cut the descending aorta of his heart. However, all
of these do not prove the presence of respondents at the
scene of the crime nor their participation therein.
We likewise agree with the DOJ Secretary that there was no
motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim. This
was supported by the sworn statement dated March 1, 2007
of Richard Joshua Ulit; the sworn statement dated March 10,
2007 of Pamela-Ann Que; and, the sworn statement dated
March 10, 2007 of Egbert Ylo, who all knew the victim and
respondent Philip and claimed that the two were good friends
and that they were not aware of any misunderstanding that
occurred between the concerned parties. Jurisprudence is
replete that motive becomes of vital importance when there is
doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator.
In Preferred Home Specialties, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., the Supreme Court held that while probable cause
should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need
to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage
to a potential accused's constitutional right to liberty, the
guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State
from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false,
fraudulent or groundless charges.31chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is clear from the foregoing disquisitions of the CA that the
Secretary of Justice reasonably reached the conclusion that
the dismissal by the OCP of Quezon City of the complaint for
murder had been based on the lack of competent evidence to
support a finding of probable cause against the respondents.
Accordingly, such finding of probable cause by the Executive
Department, through the Secretary of Justice, could not be
undone by the CA, in the absence of a clear showing that the
Secretary of Justice had gravely abused his discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion means that the abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.32 That showing was not made herein.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012
on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 20, 2009. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the
SO ORDERED. Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, .JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and
the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199085

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice;
HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as COMELEC
Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in their capacity
as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO,
GEOUGE C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND
MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND
MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITEE ON THE 2004 AND
2007 ELECTION FRAUD,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No.199118

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented
by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR
AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING
TEAM, Respondents.

DECISION

The Court is vested with the constitutional mandate to resolve

justiciable controversies by applying the rule of law with due
deference to the right to due process, irrespective of the
standing in society of the parties involved. It is an assurance
that in this jurisdiction, the wheels of justice turn unimpeded
by public opinion or clamor, but only for the ultimate end of
giving each and every member of society his just due without
distinction.

Before the Court are three (3) consolidated petitions and

supplemental petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Jose Miguel T. Arroyo
(Mike Arroyo) in G.R. No. 199082, Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.
(Abalos) in G.R. No. 199085 and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) in G.R. No. 199118 assailing the following: (1)
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 9266 "In
the Matter of the Commission on Elections and Department of
Justice Joint Investigation on the Alleged Election Offenses
Committed during the 2004 and 2007 Elections Pursuant to
Law"1 dated August 2, 2011; (2) Joint Order No. 001-2011
(Joint Order) "Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-Comelec
Preliminary Investigation Committee [Joint Committee] and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
Electoral Fraud and
Manipulation Cases"2 dated August 15, 2011; (3) Rules of
Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the
Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
(Joint Committee Rules of Procedure)3 dated August 23, 2011;
and (4) Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team dated October
20, 2011.4 The consolidated petitions and supplemental
petitions likewise assail the validity of the proceedings
undertaken pursuant to the aforesaid issuances.
The Antecedents
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the
surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of
massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in
the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011, the
Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of
a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004
and 2007 elections.5
On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
Order No. 6406 naming three (3) of its prosecutors to the Joint
Committee.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint
Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The
Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of the Joint
Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee, to wit:
Section 2. Mandate. – The Committee shall conduct the
necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the
evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-
Finding Team created and referred to in Section 4 hereof.
Resolutions finding probable cause for election offenses,
defined and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code and
other election laws shall be approved by the Comelec in
accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. For other
offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws, the corresponding criminal
information may be filed directly with the appropriate courts.7
The Fact-Finding Team,8 on the other hand, was created for the
purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial
evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation
to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Its specific duties and
functions as enumerated in Section 4 of the Joint Order are as
follows:
a) Gather and document reports, intelligence
information, and investigative leads from official as
well as unofficial sources and informants;
b) Conduct interviews, record testimonies, take
affidavits of witnesses, and collate material and
relevant documentary evidence, such as, but not
limited to, election documents used in the 2004 and
2007 national elections. For security reasons, or to
protect the identities of informants, the Fact-Finding
Team may conduct interviews or document
testimonies discreetly;
c) Assess and evaluate affidavits already executed and
other documentary evidence submitted or may be
submitted to the Fact-Finding Team and/or
Committee;
d) Identify the offenders, their offenses and the
manner of their commission, individually or in
conspiracy, and the provisions of election and general
criminal laws violated, establish evidence for
individual criminal and administrative liability and
prosecution, and prepare the necessary
documentation, such as complaints and charge
sheets for the initiation of preliminary investigation
proceedings against said individuals to be conducted
by the Committee;
e) Regularly submit to the Committee, the Secretary
of Justice and the Chairman of the Comelec periodic
reports and recommendations, supported by real,
testimonial and documentary evidence, which may
then serve as the Committee’s basis for immediately
commencing appropriate preliminary investigation
proceedings, as provided under Section 6 of this Joint
Order; and
f) Upon the termination of its investigation, make a
full and final report to the Committee, the Secretary
of Justice, and the Chairman of the Comelec.9
Pursuant to Section 710 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011,
the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.
The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed
that the subject of the Initial Report would be the electoral
fraud and manipulation of election results allegedly
committed during the May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its
Initial Report11 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. 12 The
Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner Abalos and
ten (10) others13 be subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election
results in North and South Cotabato. Twenty-six (26)14persons,
including petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise
recommended for preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for manipulating the election results in
Maguindanao.15 Several persons were also recommended to
be charged administratively, while others,16 including
petitioner Mike Arroyo, were recommended to be subjected
to further investigation.17 The case resulting from the
investigation of the Fact-Finding Team was docketed as DOJ-
Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III
(Senator Pimentel) filed a Complaint-Affidavit18 for Electoral
Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others19 and several
John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-
Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two
subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-
2011 and 002-2011.20 On November 3, 2011, petitioners,
through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee. 21 On
that preliminary hearing, the Joint Committee consolidated
the two DOJ-Comelec cases. Respondents therein were
likewise ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits by
November 14, 2011.22
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint
Panel.23The petitions were eventually consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion
to Defer Proceedings24 before the Joint Committee, in view of
the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same
day, petitioner GMA filed before the Joint Committee an
Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam25 to require Senator Pimentel to
furnish her with documents referred to in his complaint-
affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis
for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA contended that for
the crime of electoral sabotage to be established, there is a
need to present election documents allegedly tampered which
resulted in the increase or decrease in the number of votes of
local and national candidates.26 GMA prayed that she be
allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from
receipt of the requested documents.27 Petitioner Abalos, for
his part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante
Ad Cautelam),28 in view of the pendency of his petition brought
before the Court.
In an Order29 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee
denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. 30
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a
Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec.31On
November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the
Comelec en banc issued a Resolution32 approving and adopting
the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The dispositive
portion of the Comelec Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Joint
DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee in DOJ-
COMELEC Case No. 001-2011 and DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 002-
2011, upon the recommendation of the COMELEC’s own
representatives in the Committee, is hereby APPROVED and
ADOPTED, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. That information/s for the crime of ELECTORAL
SABOTAGE under Section 42 (b) of R.A. 9369,
amending Section 27 (b) of R.A. 6646, be filed against
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, BENJAMIN ABALOS,
SR., LINTANG H. BEDOL, DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN,
SR. and PETER REYES;
2. That the charges against MICHAEL C. ABAS,
NICODEMO FERRER, REUBEN BASIAO, JAIME PAZ and
NORIE K. UNAS be subjected to further investigation;
3. That the charges against JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO,
BONG SERRANO, ALBERTO AGRA, ANDREI BON
TAGUM, GABBY CLAUDIO, ROMY DAYDAY, JEREMY
JAVIER, JOHN DOE a.k.a BUTCH, be DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause;
4. That the recommendation that ESTELITA B.
ORBASE, ELIZA A. GASMIN, ELSA Z. ATINEN, SALIAO S.
AMBA, MAGSAYSAY B. MOHAMAD, SALONGA K.
EDZELA, RAGAH D. AYUNAN, SUSAN U. CANANBAN,
RUSSAM H. MABANG, ASUNCION CORAZON P.
RENIEDO, NENA A. ALID, MA. SUSAN L. ALBANO,
ROHAIDA T. KHALID, ARAW M. CAO, JEEHAN S. NUR,
ALICE A. LIM, NORIJEAN P. HANGKAL, CHRISTINA
ROAN M. DALOPE, and MACEDA L. ABO be
administratively charged be subjected to further
review by this Commission to determine the
appropriate charge/s that may be filed against them;
5. That the findings of lack of probable cause against
LILIAN S. SUAN-RADAM and YOGIE G. MARTIRIZAR be
REJECTED by reason of the pendency of their
respective cases before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay (Branch 114) and this Commission for the same
offense under consideration.
In the higher interest of justice and by reason of manifest
attempts to frustrate the government’s right to prosecute and
to obtain speedy disposition of the present case pending
before the Commission, the Law Department and/or any
COMELEC legal officers as may be authorized by this
Commission is hereby ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY PREPARE
and FILE the necessary Information/s before the appropriate
court/s
SO ORDERED.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the
Comelec’s Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA,
Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for
violation of Section 42 (b)(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369,
amending Section 27 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, docketed as Criminal
Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.34 The case was raffled to Branch
112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which
was served on GMA on the same day.35
On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an
Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam36 with leave to allow the
Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration
filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a
Hold Departure Order, and to proceed to judicial
determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the
Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam37 praying that its
Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC
nonetheless issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly
served. GMA thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which was
granted.
Issues
In G.R. No. 199082, petitioner Arroyo relies on the following
grounds:
A. THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE VIA THE
JOINT ORDER IS AT WAR WITH THE DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, HAVING BEEN CREATED WITH THE
SOLE END IN VIEW OF INVESTIGATING AND
PROSECUTING CERTAIN PERSONS AND INCIDENTS
ONLY, SPECIFICALLY THOSE INVOLVING THE 2004
AND 2007 ELECTIONS TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS,
IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN BIRAOGO V.
TRUTH COMMISSION AND COMPANION CASE.
B. NO LAW OR RULE AUTHORIZES THE JOINT
COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.
C. THE CREATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, WHICH
FUSES THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - A
CONSTITUTIONALLY INDEPENDENT BODY - WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE – A POLITICAL AGENT OF
THE EXECUTIVE – DEMOLISHES THE INDEPENDENCE
OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS PROVIDED IN
ARTICLE IX(A), SECTIONS 1 AND 2 AND IX(C) OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
D. IN VIEW OF THE NUMEROUS AND PERSISTENT
PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, HIS
SPOKESPERSONS, THE HEADS OF THE DOJ AND THE
COMELEC, AND MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
THAT CASES SHOULD BE FILED AGAINST PETITIONER
AND HIS FAMILY AND ALLEGED ASSOCIATES BY THE
END OF 2011, THE PROCEEDINGS THEREOF SHOULD
BE ENJOINED FOR BEING PERSECUTORY, PURSUANT
TO ALLADO V. DIOKNO AND RELATED CASES.
E. THE CREATION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE TRAMPLES UPON PETITIONER’S RIGHT
TO A FAIR PROCEEDING BY AN INDEPENDENT AND
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.
F. THE COMELEC, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THE RTC OF
PASAY CITY, HAVE ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER SOUGHT TO BE INVESTIGATED BY
THE JOINT COMMITTEE, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY
BODY, INCLUDING THE JOINT COMMITTEE.38
In G.R. No. 199085, petitioner Abalos raises the following
issues:
I.
DOES JOINT ORDER NO. 001-2011, CREATING THE
JOINT DOJ-COMELEC FACT-FINDING TEAM AND
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATON COMMITTEE VIOLATE
PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW?
II.
DID THE CONDUCT AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT
DOJ-COMELEC FACT-FINDING TEAM AND
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE VIOLATE
PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW?
III.
DID THE DOJ AND COMELEC VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY CREATING THE JOINT
DOJ-COMELEC FACT-FINDING TEAM AND
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE WHICH
ENCROACHED UPON THE POWERS OF THE
LEGISLATURE AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT?
IV.
DOES THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC FACT-FINDING TEAM
AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
HAVE THE POWER AND LEGAL AUTHORITY TO
 CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE
SAME ELECTORAL SABOTAGE CASES WHICH THE
COMELEC HAD ALREADY TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF?39
In G.R. No. 199118, petitioner GMA anchors her petition on the
following grounds:
I. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, THROUGH THE DOJ,
OSTENSIBLY ACTING "JOINTLY" WITH THE COMELEC,
HAS ACTED BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT IT HAS COMPROMISED THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMELEC.
II. THE COMELEC HAS EFFECTIVELY ABDICATED ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE "TO INVESTIGATE AND,
WHERE APPROPRIATE, PROSECUTE CASES OF
VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION LAWS, INCLUDING ACTS
OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUTING ELECTION FRAUDS,
OFFENSES, AND MALPRACTICES" (ARTICLE IX-C,
SECTION 26, 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES) IN FAVOR OF THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENT
JUSTICE SECRETARY DE LIMA.
III. DOJ-COMELEC JOINT ORDER NO. 001-2011 AND
THE JOINT COMMITTEE RULES HAVE NOT BEEN
PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO TAÑADA V. TUVERA, G.R.
No. L-63915 (29 DECEMBER 1986). AFTER ALL, AS THE
HONORABLE COURT LIKEWISE DECLARED IN
REPUBLIC V. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 173918 (08 APRIL 2008),
(SIC)40
We deferred the resolution of petitioners’ Motion for the
Issuance of a TRO and, instead, required the respondents to
comment on the petitions.41
We likewise scheduled the consolidated cases for oral
argument for which the parties were directed to limit their
respective discussions to the following issues:
I. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 "Creating and
Constituting a Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation Cases" is
constitutional in light of the following:
A. The due process clause of the 1987 Constitution
B. The equal protection clause of the 1987
Constitution
C. The principle of separation of powers
D. The independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body
II. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law
to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with the DOJ.
A. Whether or not due process was observed by the Joint DOJ-
COMELEC Fact-Finding Team and Preliminary Investigation
Committee, and the COMELEC in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and approval of the Joint Panel’s
Resolution.42
The Court, thereafter, required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda.43
The Court’s Ruling
Procedural Issues
Respondents claim that Mike Arroyo’s petition is moot and
that of GMA is moot and academic. They explain that the Mike
Arroyo petition presents no actual controversy that
necessitates the exercise by the Court of its power of judicial
review, considering that he was not among those indicted for
electoral sabotage in the 2007 national elections as the
Comelec dismissed the case against him for insufficiency of
evidence.44 Anent the 2004 national elections, the Fact-Finding
Team is yet to complete its investigation so Mike Arroyo’s
apprehensions are merely speculative and anticipatory.45 As to
the GMA petition, respondents aver that any judgment of the
Court will have no practical legal effect because an Information
has already been filed against her in Branch 112, RTC of Pasay
City.46 With the filing of the Information, the RTC has already
acquired jurisdiction over the case, including all issues relating
to the constitutionality or legality of her preliminary
investigation.47 Respondents also claim that the issues relating
to the constitutionality and validity of the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of GMA are best left to the trial court,
considering that it involves questions of fact.48 Respondents
add that considering that the RTC has concurrent jurisdiction
to determine a constitutional issue, it will be practical for the
Court to allow the RTC to determine the constitutional issues
in this case.49
We do not agree.
Mootness
It cannot be gainsaid that for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy, that
is, one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.50 The
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice.51
A case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical use or value.52 However, a case should
not be dismissed simply because one of the issues raised
therein had become moot and academic by the onset of a
supervening event, whether intended or incidental, if there are
other causes which need to be resolved after trial. 53
Here, the consolidated cases are not rendered moot and
academic by the promulgation of the Joint Resolution by the
Joint Committee and the approval thereof by the Comelec. It
must be recalled that the main issues in the three petitions
before us are the constitutionality and legality of the creation
of the Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team as well as
the proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto. The assailed
Joint Order specifically provides that the Joint Committee was
created for purposes of investigating the alleged massive
electoral fraud during the 2004 and 2007 national elections.
However, in the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial Report, the team
specifically agreed that the report would focus on the
irregularities during the 2007 elections. Also, in its November
18, 2011 Resolution, the Comelec, while directing the filing of
information against petitioners Abalos and GMA, ordered that
further investigations be conducted against the other
respondents therein. Apparently, the Fact-Finding Team’s and
Joint
Committee’s respective mandates have not been fulfilled and
they are, therefore, bound to continue discharging their duties
set forth in the assailed Joint Order. Moreover, petitioners
question the validity of the proceedings undertaken by the
Fact-Finding Team and the Joint Committee leading to the
filing of information, on constitutional grounds. We are not,
therefore, barred from deciding on the petitions simply by the
occurrence of the supervening events of filing an information
and dismissal of the charges.
Jurisdiction over the validity of the
conduct of the preliminary investigation
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the
issue of jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and
at the same time with the propriety of the conduct of
preliminary investigation. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG),54 the Court
resolved two issues, namely: (1) whether or not the PCGG has
the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-
graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against
Eduardo Conjuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged
misuse of coconut levy funds; and (2) on the assumption that
it has jurisdiction to conduct such a preliminary investigation,
whether or not its conduct constitutes a violation of
petitioner’s right to due process and equal protection of the
law.55 The Court decided these issues notwithstanding the fact
that Informations had already been filed with the trial court.
In Allado v. Diokno,56 in a petition for certiorari assailing the
propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the Court could
not ignore the undue haste in the filing of the information and
the inordinate interest of the government in filing the same.
Thus, this Court took time to determine whether or not there
was, indeed, probable cause to warrant the filing of
information. This, notwithstanding the fact that information
had been filed and a warrant of arrest had been issued.
Petitioners therein came directly to this Court and sought relief
to rectify the injustice that they suffered.
Hierarchy of courts
Neither can the petitions be dismissed solely because of
violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This principle
requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked
court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher
court.57 The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the
Court of Appeals and the RTC, a direct invocation of this
Court’s jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in
the petition, as in the present case.58 In the consolidated
petitions, petitioners invoke exemption from the observance
of the rule on hierarchy of courts in keeping with the Court’s
duty to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.59
It is noteworthy that the consolidated petitions assail the
constitutionality of issuances and resolutions of the DOJ and
the Comelec. The general rule is that this Court shall exercise
only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation.
However, such rule is subject to exception, that is, in
circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the
issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first
instance is of paramount importance and immediately affects
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people.60
This case falls within the exception. An expeditious resolution
of the issues raised in the petitions is necessary. Besides, the
Court has entertained a direct resort to the Court without the
requisite motion for reconsideration filed below or without
exhaustion of administrative remedies where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the government
or of the petitioners and when there is an alleged violation of
due process, as in the present case.61 We apply the same
relaxation of the Rules in the present case and, thus, entertain
direct resort to this Court.
Substantive Issues
Bases for the Creation of the
Fact-Finding Team and Joint Committee
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
powers and functions of the Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof
vests in the Comelec the power to:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This was an important innovation introduced by the 1987
Constitution, because the above-quoted provision was not in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.62
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement
and administration of all election laws is intended to enable
the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free,
orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The failure of the
Comelec to exercise this power could result in the frustration
of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony
of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.63
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec
was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its
duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four
months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint
with the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with the
Ministry Department of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the
Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision
of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government. 64 Thus, under Section
2,65 Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants are given continuing
authority as deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under election laws and
to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly
with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner or its
duly authorized representatives.66
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been
lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been
conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the
continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec. The
reason for this delegation of authority has been explained in
Commission on Elections v. Español:67
The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is
necessitated by the need for prompt investigation and
dispensation of election cases as an indispensable part of the
task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its
workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient number of
legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute
such cases.68
Moreover, as we acknowledged in People v. Basilla,69 the
prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election
offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide
elections would simply not be possible without the assistance
of provincial and city fiscals prosecutors and their assistants
and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the DOJ.70
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was amended by
Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369,71 which reads:
Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the
other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same.72
As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated
authority, the other prosecuting arms of the government, such
as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses and to prosecute the same.
It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the
Comelec and the DOJ to perform any act necessary to ensure
the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election
offenses. Pursuant to the above constitutional and statutory
provisions, and as will be explained further below, we find no
impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to create the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team for the purpose of
conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive
electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the
2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the
presidential and senatorial elections. 73
Constitutionality of Joint-Order No. 001-2011
A. Equal Protection Clause
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the
investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents.
They argue that there is no substantial distinction between the
allegations of massive electoral fraud in 2004 and 2007, on the
one hand, and previous and subsequent national elections, on
the other hand; and no substantial distinction between
petitioners and the other persons or public officials who might
have been involved in previous election offenses. They insist
that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo
Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration. To bolster their claim, petitioners explain that
Joint Order No. 001-2011 is similar to Executive Order No. 1
(creating the Philippine Truth Commission) which this Court
had already nullified for being
violative of the equal protection clause.
Respondents, however, refute the above contentions and
argue that the wide array of the possible election offenses and
broad spectrum of individuals who may have committed them,
if any, immediately negate the assertion that the assailed
orders are aimed only at the officials of the Arroyo
Administration.
We agree with the respondents.
The equal protection clause is enshrined in Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.74
The concept of equal protection has been laid down in Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010:75
One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in
a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat
similarly-situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly-
constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.76
Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint Order No. 001-
2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the
officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it
infringes the equal protection clause. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of
investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo
Administration since Executive Order No. 177 specifically
referred to the "previous administration"; while the Joint
Committee was created for the purpose of conducting
preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004
and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among
those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their
acts in the performance of their official duties. Private
individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the
Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor
or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, it does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 78
We once held that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted
virtually plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and
by law and thus may, for every particular investigation,
whether commenced by complaint or on its own initiative,
decide how best to pursue each investigation. Since the Office
of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying
treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself
be considered a violation of any of the parties’ rights to the
equal protection of the laws.79 This same doctrine should
likewise apply in the present case.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the broad power
of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall,80 and tasked to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections,81 the Comelec has the
authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the
Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or
national elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed
in the conduct of the elections. This shows that every election
is distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure
that the rules are updated to respond to existing
circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for
violations of election laws may be filed either with the Comelec
or with the DOJ. The Comelec may even initiate, motu proprio,
complaints for election offenses.82
Pursuant to law and the Comelec’s own Rules, investigations
may be conducted either by the Comelec itself through its law
department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These
varying procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that
respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners’ insistence
of infringement of their constitutional right to equal protection
of the law is misplaced.
B. Due Process
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel does not possess the
required cold neutrality of an impartial judge because it is all
at once the evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge. They
explain that since the Fact-Finding Team has found probable
cause to subject them to preliminary investigation, it is
impossible for the Joint Committee to arrive at an opposite
conclusion. Petitioners likewise express doubts of any
possibility that the Joint Committee will be fair and impartial
to them as Secretary De Lima and Chairman Brillantes had
repeatedly expressed prejudgment against petitioners
through their statements captured by the media.
For their part, respondents contend that petitioners failed to
present proof that the President of the Philippines, Secretary
of Justice, and Chairman of the Comelec actually made the
statements allegedly prejudging their case and in the context
in which they interpreted them. They likewise contend that
assuming that said statements were made, there was no
showing that Secretary De Lima had tried to intervene in the
investigation to influence its outcome nor was it proven that
the Joint Committee itself had prejudged the case. Lastly, they
point out that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies,
the Fact-Finding Team and the Joint Committee, with their
respective mandates. Hence, they cannot be considered as
one.
We find for respondents.
It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like
court proceedings, subject to the requirements of both
substantive and procedural due process. 83 Preliminary
investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the
prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his
functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer.84 The authority of a
prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside
over or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than
that of a municipal judge or even an RTC Judge.85 Thus, as
emphasized by the Court in Ladlad v. Velasco:86
x x x We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that
their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or
unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving
the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to
any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may public's perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.87
In this case, as correctly pointed out by respondents, there was
no showing that the statements claimed to have prejudged the
case against petitioners were made by Secretary De Lima and
Chairman Brillantes or were in the prejudicial context in which
petitioners claimed the statements were made. A reading of
the statements allegedly made by them reveals that they were
just responding to hypothetical questions in the event that
probable cause would eventually be found by the Joint
Committee.
More importantly, there was no proof or even an allegation
that the Joint Committee itself, tasked to conduct the requisite
preliminary investigation against petitioners, made biased
statements that would convey to the public that the members
were favoring a particular party. Neither did the petitioners
show that the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of
Justice or the Chairman of the Comelec intervened in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation or exerted undue
pressure on their subordinates to tailor their decision with
their public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined
result.88 Moreover, insofar as the Comelec is concerned, it
must be emphasized that the constitutional body is collegial.
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as
that of the entire body itself.89 In equating the alleged bias of
the above-named officials with that of the Joint Committee,
there would be no arm of the government credible enough to
conduct a preliminary investigation.90
It must also be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011
created two bodies, namely: (1) the Fact-Finding Team tasked
to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence which
can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted
by the Joint Committee; and (2) the Joint Committee
mandated to conduct preliminary investigation. It is,
therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which
acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge.
C. Separation of powers
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel is a new public office as
shown by its composition, the creation of its own Rules of
Procedure, and the source of funding for its operation. It is
their position that the power of the DOJ to investigate the
commission of crimes and the Comelec’s constitutional
mandate to investigate and prosecute violations of election
laws do not include the power to create a new public office in
the guise of a joint committee. Thus, in creating the Joint
Panel, the DOJ and the Comelec encroached upon the power
of the Legislature to create public office.
Respondents dispute this and contend that the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team are not new public offices,
but merely collaborations between two existing government
agencies sharing concurrent jurisdiction. This is shown by the
fact that the members of the Joint Panel are existing officers
of the DOJ and the Comelec who exercise duties and functions
that are already vested in them.
Again, we agree with respondents.
As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power
to investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute cases of
election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. On the other hand,
the DOJ is mandated to administer the criminal justice system
in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting
in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system.91 It is specifically
empowered to "investigate the commission of crimes,
prosecute offenders and administer the probation and
correction system."92 Also, the provincial or city prosecutors
and their assistants, as well as the national and regional state
prosecutors, are specifically named as the officers authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation.93 Recently, the Comelec,
through its duly authorized legal offices, is given the power,
concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the
government such as the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses.94
Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of
Court and not the assailed Joint Order which give the DOJ and
the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary investigation.
No new power is given to them by virtue of the assailed order.
As to the members of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team, they perform such functions that they already perform
by virtue of their current positions as prosecutors of the DOJ
and legal officers of the Comelec. Thus, in no way can we
consider the Joint Committee as a new public office.
D. Independence of the Comelec
Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec
has effectively abdicated its constitutional mandate to
investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of
violation of election laws including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices in
favor of the Executive Department acting through the DOJ
Secretary. Under the set- up, the Comelec personnel is placed
under the supervision and control of the DOJ. The chairperson
is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly surrendered
its independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share its
exercise of judgment and discretion with the Executive Branch.
We do not agree.
Section 1,95 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent.
Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under
the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge
of their respective functions.96 The Constitution envisions a
truly independent Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as the
guardian of the people’s sacred right of suffrage – the
citizenry’s vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political
stability.97
Prior to the amendment of Section 265 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the Comelec had the exclusive authority to
investigate and prosecute election offenses. In the discharge
of this exclusive power, the Comelec was given the right to
avail and, in fact, availed of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government such as the prosecutors of the DOJ.
By virtue of this continuing authority, the state prosecutors
and the provincial or city prosecutors were authorized to
receive the complaint for election offense and delegate the
conduct of investigation to any of their assistants. The
investigating prosecutor, in turn, would make a
recommendation either to dismiss the complaint or to file the
information. This recommendation is subject to the approval
of the state, provincial or city prosecutor, who himself may file
the information with the proper court if he finds sufficient
cause to do so, subject, however, to the accused’s right to
appeal to the Comelec.98
Moreover, during the past national and local elections, the
Comelec issued Resolutions99 requesting the Secretary of
Justice to assign prosecutors as members of Special Task
Forces to assist the Comelec in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses. These Special Task Forces
were created because of the need for additional lawyers to
handle the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the
prosecutors the power to conduct preliminary investigation.
Otherwise, the prompt resolution of alleged election offenses
will not be attained. This delegation of power, otherwise
known as deputation, has long been recognized and, in fact,
been utilized as an effective means of disposing of various
election offense cases. Apparently, as mere deputies, the
prosecutors played a vital role in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, in the resolution of complaints filed before
them, and in the filing of the informations with the proper
court.
As pointed out by the Court in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v.
Commission on Elections,100 the grant of exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the
Comelec was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the
Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts
preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently
with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. If the
prosecutors had been allowed to conduct preliminary
investigation and file the necessary information by virtue only
of a delegated authority, they now have better grounds to
perform such function by virtue of the statutory grant of
authority. If deputation was justified because of lack of funds
and legal officers to ensure prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses, the same justification should
be cited to justify the grant to the other prosecuting arms of
the government of such concurrent jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment
for the creation of a Joint Committee. While the composition
of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is dominated by
DOJ officials, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is
inferior. Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint
Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall
still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec,
though it acts jointly with the DOJ, remains in control of the
proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec has
thereby abdicated its independence to the executive
department.
The text and intent of the constitutional provision granting the
Comelec the authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is to give the Comelec all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 101 The Comelec
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created.102 We may not agree fully
with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this Court should not
interfere.103 Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should
be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as
an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
Although it belongs to the executive department, as the
agency tasked to investigate crimes, prosecute offenders, and
administer the correctional system, the DOJ is likewise not
barred from acting jointly with the Comelec. It must be
emphasized that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in conducting preliminary investigation of election
offenses. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. 104 Contrary
to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate
bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such
as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of
substantially the same complaint with another office (such as
the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the
second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed,
it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.105 As cogently held by the Court in
Department of Justice v. Hon. Liwag:106
To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before
two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity
of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the
respondent who would have to appear and defend his position
before every agency or body where the same complaint was
filed. This would lead hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the
distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at
the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions
regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary
expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and
limited resources of Government, in a duplication of
proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.107
None of these problems would likely arise in the present case.
The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would
exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the
preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two
complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the
complaint of Senator Pimentel – both complaints were filed
with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were
filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by
only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to
disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those
given such authority. This is especially true in this case given
the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by
petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to
maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec
and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.
Citing the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, petitioners insist
that the investigation conducted by the Comelec involving
Radam and Martirizar bars the creation of the Joint Committee
for purposes of conducting another preliminary investigation.
In short, they claim that the exercise by the Comelec of its
jurisdiction to investigate excludes other bodies such as the
DOJ and the Joint Committee from taking cognizance of the
case. Petitioners add that the investigation should have been
conducted also by the Comelec as the 2007 cases of Radam
and Martirizar include several John Does and Jane Does.
We do not agree.
While the Comelec conducted the preliminary investigation
against Radam, Martirizar and other unidentified persons, it
only pertains to election offenses allegedly committed in
North and South Cotabato. On the other hand, the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Joint Committee (involving
GMA) pertains to election offenses supposedly committed in
Maguindanao. More importantly, considering the broad
power of the Comelec to choose the means of fulfilling its duty
of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of
election offenses as discussed earlier, there is nothing wrong if
the Comelec chooses to work jointly with the DOJ in the
conduct of said investigation. To reiterate, in no way can we
consider this as an act abdicating the independence of the
Comelec.
Publication Requirement
In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the DOJ is
governed by the Rules of Court, while the Comelec is governed
by the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure. There is, therefore,
no need to promulgate new Rules as may be complementary
to the DOJ and Comelec Rules.
As earlier discussed, considering that Joint Order No. 001-2011
only enables the Comelec and the DOJ to exercise powers
which are already vested in them by the Constitution and other
existing laws, it need not be published for it to be valid and
effective. A close examination of the Joint Committee’s Rules
of Procedure, however, would show that its provisions affect
the public. Specifically, the following provisions of the Rules
either restrict the rights of or provide remedies to the affected
parties, to wit: (1) Section 1 provides that "the Joint Committee
will no longer entertain complaints from the public as soon as
the Fact-Finding Team submits its final report, except for such
complaints involving offenses mentioned in the Fact-Finding
Team’s Final Report"; (2) Section 2 states that "the Joint
Committee shall not entertain a Motion to Dismiss"; and (3)
Section 5 provides that a Motion for Reconsideration may be
availed of by the aggrieved parties against the Joint
Committee’s Resolution. Consequently, publication of the
Rules is necessary.
The publication requirement covers not only statutes but
administrative regulations and issuances, as clearly outlined in
Tañada v. Tuvera:108 effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.109
As opposed to Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice,110 where the Court
held that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is only an internal
arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the
Ombudsman outlining the authority and responsibilities
among prosecutors of both offices in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, the assailed Joint Committee’s Rules
of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors of the DOJ and
the Comelec but also the conduct and rights of persons, or the
public in general. The publication requirement should,
therefore, not be ignored.
Publication is a necessary component of procedural due
process to give as wide publicity as possible so that all persons
having an interest in the proceedings may be notified
thereof.111 The requirement of publication is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process. It is imperative
for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgressions of a law or rule of which
he had no notice whatsoever.112
Nevertheless, even if the Joint Committee’s Rules of Procedure
is ineffective for lack of publication, the proceedings
undertaken by the Joint Committee are not rendered null and
void for that reason, because the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Joint Committee pursuant to the procedures
laid down in Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Validity of the Conduct of
Preliminary Investigation
In her Supplemental Petition,113 GMA outlines the incidents
that took place after the filing of the instant petition,
specifically the issuance by the Joint Committee of the Joint
Resolution, the approval with modification of such resolution
by the Comelec and the filing of information and the issuance
of a warrant of arrest by the RTC. With these supervening
events, GMA further assails the validity of the proceedings that
took place based on the following additional grounds: (1) the
undue and unbelievable haste attending the Joint Committee’s
conduct of the preliminary investigation, its resolution of the
case, and its referral to and approval by the Comelec, taken in
conjunction with the statements from the Office of the
President, demonstrate a deliberate and reprehensible
pattern of abuse of inalienable rights and a blatant disregard
of the envisioned integrity and independence of the Comelec;
(2) as it stands, the creation of the Joint Committee was for the
singular purpose of railroading the proceedings in the
prosecution of the petitioner and in flagrant violation of her
right to due process and equal protection of the laws; (3) the
proceedings of the Joint Committee cannot be considered
impartial and fair, considering that respondents have acted as
law enforcers, who conducted the criminal investigation,
gathered evidence and thereafter ordered the filing of
complaints, and at the same time authorized preliminary
investigation based on the complaints they caused to be filed;
(4) the Comelec became an instrument of oppression when it
hastily approved the resolution of the Joint Committee even if
two of its members were in no position to cast their votes as
they admitted to not having yet read the voluminous records
of the cases; and (5) flagrant and repeated violations of her
right to due process at every stage of the proceedings
demonstrate a deliberate attempt to single out petitioner
through the creation of the Joint Committee.114
In their Supplement to the Consolidated
Comment,115 respondents accuse petitioners of violating the
rule against forum shopping. They contend that in filing the
Supplemental Petition before the Court, the Urgent Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam with the RTC, and the Motion to Vacate
Ad Cautelam with the Comelec, GMA raises the common issue
of whether or not the proceedings before the Joint Committee
and the Comelec are null and void for violating the
Constitution. Respondents likewise claim that the issues raised
in the supplemental petition are factual which is beyond the
power of this Court to decide.
We cannot dismiss the cases before us on the ground of forum
shopping.
Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another
and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari.116There can also
be forum shopping when a party institutes two or more suits
in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in
order to ask the courts to rule on the same and related causes
and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a party’s chances of obtaining
a favorable decision or action.117
Indeed, petitioner GMA filed a Supplemental Petition before
the Court, an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam before the
RTC, and a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam before the Comelec,
emphasizing the unbelievable haste committed by the Joint
Committee and the Comelec in disposing of the cases before
them. However, a plain reading of the allegations in GMA’s
motion before the RTC would show that GMA raised the issue
of undue haste in issuing the Joint Resolution only in support
of her prayer for the trial court to hold in abeyance the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, considering that her motion
for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to be furnished
copies of documents was not yet acted upon by the Joint
Committee. If at all the constitutional issue of violation of due
process was raised, it was merely incidental. More
importantly, GMA raised in her motion with the RTC the
finding of probable cause as she sought the judicial
determination of probable cause which is not an issue in the
petitions before us. GMA’s ultimate prayer is actually for the
court to defer the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Clearly,
the reliefs sought in the RTC are different from the reliefs
sought in this case. Thus, there is no forum shopping.
With respect to the Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam filed with
the Comelec, while the issues raised therein are substantially
similar to the issues in the supplemental petition which,
therefore, strictly speaking, warrants outright dismissal on the
ground of forum shopping, we cannot do so in this case in light
of the due process issues raised by GMA.118 It is worthy to note
that the main issues in the present petitions are the
constitutionality of the creation of the Joint Panel and the
validity of the proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto for
alleged violation of the constitutional right to due process. In
questioning the propriety of the conduct of the preliminary
investigation in her Supplemental Petition, GMA only raises
her continuing objection to the exercise of jurisdiction of the
Joint Committee and the Comelec. There is, therefore, no
impediment for the Court to rule on the validity of the conduct
of preliminary investigation.
In Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman,119 the Court explained the
nature of preliminary investigation, to wit:
A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed
on trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble,
expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the state from having to conduct useless and
expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a component of due process in
administering criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound for trial and
before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty
is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to
deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. 120
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal
justice system which spells for an individual the difference
between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail
term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the
other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a
preliminary investigation as not a mere formal or technical
right but a substantive one, forming part of due process in
criminal justice.121
In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the
petitioners basic due process rights such as the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-
affidavits, and other supporting documents in her
defense.122 Admittedly, GMA received the notice requiring her
to submit her counter-affidavit. Yet, she did not comply,
allegedly because she could not prepare her counter-affidavit.
She claimed that she was not furnished by Senator Pimentel
pertinent documents that she needed to adequately prepare
her counter-affidavit.
In her Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam123 to require Senator
Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his
complaint-affidavit and for production of election documents
as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage, GMA prayed that
the Joint Committee issue an Order directing the Fact-Finding
Team and Senator Pimentel to furnish her with copies of the
following documents:
 a. Complaint-affidavit and other relevant documents
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel III filed before the
Commission on Elections against Attys. Lilia Suan-
Radam and Yogie Martirizar, as well as the
Informations filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 114 in Criminal Case Nos. R-PSU-11-
03190-CR to R-PSU-11-03200-CR.
b. Records in the petitions filed by complainant
Pimentel before the National Board of Canvassers,
specifically in NBC Case Nos. 07-162, 07-168, 07-157,
07-159, 07-161 and 07-163.
c. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Maguindanao."
d. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Norte."
e. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan."
f. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur."
g. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Sulu."
h. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Basilan."
i. Documents which served as basis in the allegations
of "Significant findings specific to the protested
municipalities in the Province of Sultan Kudarat."124
GMA likewise requested the production of election documents
used in the Provinces of South and North Cotabato and
Maguindanao.125
The Joint Committee, however, denied GMA’s motion which
carried with it the denial to extend the filing of her counter-
affidavit. Consequently, the cases were submitted for
resolution sans GMA’s and the other petitioners’ counter-
affidavits. This, according to GMA, violates her right to due
process of law.
We do not agree.
GMA’s insistence of her right to be furnished the above-
enumerated documents is based on Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
(b) x x x
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those
which he intends to present against the respondent, and these
shall be made available for examination or copying by the
respondent at his expense,
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be
made available for examination, copying or photographing at
the expense of the requesting party.126
Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure also
grants the respondent such right of examination, to wit:
Sec. 6. Conduct of preliminary investigation. – (a) If on the basis
of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting evidence, the
investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the
inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint
and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Sec. 8 (c) of this
Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent,
attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other
supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days
from receipt within which to submit counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the
right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.127
Clearly from the above-quoted provisions, the subpoena
issued against respondent therein should be accompanied by
a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and
documents. GMA also has the right to examine documents but
such right of examination is limited only to the documents or
evidence submitted by the complainants (Senator Pimentel
and the Fact-Finding Team) which she may not have been
furnished and to copy them at her expense.
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain
election documents which served as bases in the allegations of
significant findings specific to the protested municipalities
involved, there were no annexes or attachments to the
complaint filed.128 As stated in the Joint Committee’s Order
dated November 15, 2011 denying GMA’s Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners
with all the supporting evidence129 However, Senator Pimentel
manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to
the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial Report.130Therefore, when GMA
was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial
Report, she was already granted the right to examine as
guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Those were the only documents
submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If there are
other documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentel’s
complaint but were not submitted to the Joint Committee, the
latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point
(without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may
later be presented during the trial)131 as the evidence
submitted before it were considered adequate to find
probable cause against her.132 Anyway, the failure of the
complainant to submit documents supporting his allegations
in the complaint may only weaken his claims and eventually
works for the benefit of the respondent as these merely are
allegations unsupported by independent evidence.
We must, however, emphasize at this point that during the
preliminary investigation, the complainants are not obliged to
prove their cause beyond reasonable doubt. It would be unfair
to expect them to present the entire evidence needed to
secure the conviction of the accused prior to the filing of
information.133 A preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ respective
evidence but the presentation only of such evidence as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.134 Precisely there is a trial to allow the
reception of evidence for the prosecution in support of the
charge.135
With the denial of GMA’s motion to be furnished with and
examine the documents referred to in Senator Pimentel’s
complaint, GMA’s motion to extend the filing of her counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence was consequently
denied. Indeed, considering the nature of the crime for which
GMA was subjected to preliminary investigation and the
documents attached to the complaint, it is incumbent upon
the Joint Committee to afford her ample time to examine the
documents submitted to the Joint Committee in order that she
would be able to prepare her counter-affidavit. She cannot,
however, insist to examine documents not in the possession
and custody of the Joint Committee nor submitted by the
complainants. Otherwise, it might cause undue and
unnecessary delay in the disposition of the cases. This undue
delay might result in the violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of cases as enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "all persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies." The constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.136 Any party to a
case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the
administration of justice to expedite its disposition. 137 Society
has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the
society’s representatives are the ones who should protect that
interest.138
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the denial of
GMA’s motion to be furnished with and examine the
documents referred to in Senator Pimentel’s complaint carried
with it the denial to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit
and other countervailing evidence rendering the preliminary
investigation irregular, such irregularity would not divest the
RTC of jurisdiction over the case and would not nullify the
warrant of arrest issued in connection therewith, considering
that Informations had already been filed against petitioners,
except Mike Arroyo. This would only compel us to suspend the
proceedings in the RTC and remand the case to the Joint
Committee so that GMA could submit her counter-affidavit
and other countervailing evidence if she still opts to. However,
to do so would hold back the progress of the case which is
anathema to the accused’s right to speedy disposition of cases.
It is well settled that the absence or irregularity of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the
case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information
or render it defective. Dismissal is not the remedy.139Neither is
it a ground to quash the information or nullify the order of
arrest issued against the accused or justify the release of the
accused from detention.140 The proper course of action that
should be taken is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon
such information and to remand the case for the conduct of
preliminary investigation.141
In the landmark cases of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) 142 and Allado v.
Diokno,143 we dismissed the criminal cases and set aside the
informations and warrants of arrest. In Cojuangco, we
dismissed the criminal case because the information was filed
by the PCGG which we declared to be unauthorized to conduct
the preliminary investigation and, consequently, file the
information as it did not possess the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. In Allado, we set aside the warrant of arrest
issued against petitioners therein and enjoined the trial court
from proceeding further for lack of probable cause. For one,
there was serious doubt on the reported death of the victim in
that case since the corpus delicti had not been established nor
had his remains been recovered;and based on the evidence
submitted, there was nothing to incriminate petitioners
therein. In this case, we cannot reach the same conclusion
because the Information filed before the RTC of Pasay City was
filed by the Comelec en banc which had the authority to file
the information for electoral sabotage and because the
presence or absence of probable cause is not an issue herein.
As can be gleaned from their assignment of errors/issues,
petitioners did not question the finding of probable cause in
any of their supplemental petitions. It was only in GMA’s
memorandum where she belatedly included a discussion on
the "insufficiency" of the evidence supporting the finding of
probable cause for the filing of the Information for electoral
sabotage against her.144 A closer look at her arguments,
however, would show that they were included only to highlight
the necessity of examining the election documents GMA
requested to see before she could file her counter-affidavit. At
any rate, since GMA failed to submit her counter-affidavit and
other countervailing evidence within the period required by
the Joint Committee, we cannot excuse her from non-
compliance.
There might have been overzealousness on the part of the
Joint Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing
the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing
the information in court. However, speed in the conduct of
proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se
be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions.145 The orderly administration of justice remains the
paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar
circumstances of each case.146 To be sure, petitioners were
given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence.
Instead of complying with the Joint Committee’s directive,
several motions were filed but were denied by the Joint
Committee. Consequently, petitioners’ right to submit
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was forfeited.
Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases and following the procedures set forth in
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion
and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn,
performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed,
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They even
actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several
motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the
constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases,
unnecessary delays should be avoided.
Finally, we take judicial notice that on February 23, 2012, GMA
was already arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the
charge against her and thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which
has been granted. Considering that the constitutionality of the
creation of the Joint Panel is sustained, the actions of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team are valid and effective. As
the information was filed by the Commission authorized to do
so, its validity is sustained. Thus, we consider said entry of plea
and the Petition for Bail waiver on the part of GMA of her right
to submit counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence before
the Joint Committee, and recognition of the validity of the
information against her. Her act indicates that she opts to avail
of judicial remedies instead of the executive remedy of going
back to the Joint Committee for the submission of the counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as discussed
earlier, the absence or irregularity of preliminary investigation
does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case nor does
it impair the validity of the criminal information or render it
defective.
It must be stressed, however, that this supervening event does
not render the cases before the Court moot and academic as
the main issues raised by petitioners are the constitutionality
of the creation of the Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding
Team and the validity of the proceedings undertaken pursuant
to their respective mandates.
The Court notes that the Joint Committee and the Comelec
have not disposed of the cases of the other respondents
subjects of the preliminary investigation as some of them were
subjected to further investigation. In order to remove the
cloud of doubt that pervades that petitioners are being singled
out, it is to the best interest of all the parties concerned that
the Joint Committee and the Comelec terminate the
proceedings as to the other respondents therein and not make
a piecemeal disposition of the cases.
A peripheral issue which nonetheless deserves our attention is
the question about the credibility of the Comelec brought
about by the alleged professional relationship between
Comelec Chairman Brillantes on one hand and the
complainant Senator Pimentel and Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ),
GMA’s rival in the 2004 elections, on the other hand; and by
the other Commissioners’147 reasons for their partial
inhibition. To be sure, Chairman Brillantes’ relationship with
FPJ and Senator Pimentel is not one of the grounds for the
mandatory disqualification of a Commissioner. At its most
expansive, it may be considered a ground for voluntary
inhibition which is indeed discretionary as the same was
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the Commissioner judge based on his or her rational
and logical assessment of the case. 148 Bare allegations of bias
and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a
judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence without fear or favor.149 It being
discretionary and since Commissioner Brillantes was in the
best position to determine whether or not there was a need to
inhibit from the case, his decision to participate in the
proceedings, in view of higher interest of justice, equity and
public interest, should be respected. While a party has the
right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge (or
prosecutor or Commissioner) who does not appear to be
wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in
handling the case, this right must be weighed with his duty to
decide cases without fear of repression.150
Indeed, in Javier v. Comelec,151 the Court set aside the
Comelec’s decision against Javier when it was disclosed that
one of the Commissioners who had decided the case was a law
partner of Javier’s opponent and who had refused to excuse
himself from hearing the case. Javier, however, is not
applicable in this case. First, the cited case involves the
Comelec’s exercise of its adjudicatory function as it was called
upon to resolve the propriety of the proclamation of the
winner in the May 1984 elections for Batasang Pambansa of
Antique. Clearly, the grounds for inhibition/disqualification
were applicable. Second, the case arose at the time where the
purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will
scorned through the confabulation of those in authority. 152 In
other words, the controversy arose at the time when the
public confidence in the Comelec was practically nil because of
its transparent bias in favor of the administration.153Lastly, in
determining the propriety of the decision rendered by the
Comelec, the Court took into consideration not only the
relationship (being former partners in the law firm) between
private respondents therein, Arturo F. Pacificador, and then
Comelec Commissioner Jaime Opinion (Commissioner
Opinion) but also the general attitude of the Comelec toward
the party in power at that time. Moreover, the questioned
Comelec decision was rendered only by a division of the
Comelec. The Court thus concluded in Javier that
Commissioner Opinion’s refusal to inhibit himself divested the
Comelec’s Second Division of the necessary vote for the
questioned decision and rendered the proceedings null and
void.154
On the contrary, the present case involves only the conduct of
preliminary investigation and the questioned resolution is an
act of the Comelec En Banc where all the Commissioners
participated and more than a majority (even if Chairman
Brillantes is excluded) voted in favor of the assailed Comelec
resolution. Unlike in 1986, public confidence in the Comelec
remains. The Commissioners have already taken their
positions in light of the claim of "bias and partiality" and the
causes of their partial inhibition. Their positions should be
respected confident that in doing so, they had the end in view
of ensuring that the credibility of the Commission is not
seriously affected.
To recapitulate, we find and so hold that petitioners failed to
establish any constitutional or legal impediment to the
creation of the Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation
Committee and Fact-Finding Team.
First, while GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those
subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents
therein were linked to GMA; thus, Joint Order No. 001-2011
does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Second, the due process clause is likewise not infringed upon
by the alleged prejudgment of the case as petitioners failed to
prove that the Joint Panel itself showed such bias and partiality
against them. Neither was it shown that the Justice Secretary
herself actually intervened in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. More importantly, considering that the Comelec
is a collegial body, the perceived prejudgment of Chairman
Brillantes as head of the Comelec cannot be considered an act
of the body itself.
Third, the assailed Joint Order did not create new offices
because the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team perform
functions that they already perform by virtue of the
Constitution, the statutes, and the Rules of Court.1âwphi1
Fourth, in acting jointly with the DOJ, the Comelec cannot be
considered to have abdicated its independence in favor of the
executive branch of government. Resolution No. 9266 was
validly issued by the Comelec as a means to fulfill its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election
offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The role of
the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation of election
offenses has long been recognized by the Comelec because of
its lack of funds and legal officers to conduct investigations and
to prosecute such cases on its own. This is especially true after
R.A. No. 9369 vested in the Comelec and the DOJ the
concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses. While we uphold the validity of Comelec
Resolution No. 9266 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, we declare
the Joint Committee’s Rules of Procedure infirm for failure to
comply with the publication requirement. Consequently, Rule
112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the 1993 Comelec
Rules of Procedure govern.
Fifth, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They
were furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and
other supporting documents submitted to the Joint
Committee and they were required to submit their counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence. As to petitioners Mike
Arroyo and Abalos, the pendency of the cases before the Court
does not automatically suspend the proceedings before the
Joint Committee nor excuse them from their failure to file the
required counter-affidavits. With the foregoing disquisitions,
we find no reason to nullify the proceedings undertaken by the
Joint Committee and the Comelec in the electoral sabotage
cases against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and
supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution
No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011
dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial
Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However,
the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and
2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of
publication.
In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the
proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule
112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary
investigation is hereby declared VALID.
Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 112, where the criminal cases for electoral sabotage
against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.