Kant's Interpretation of Hume's Problem*

ADOLF REINACH

At what moment Hume exercised a decisive influence on Kant, which

direction this influence took, how highly this influence should be esti-
mated, how to understand Kant's reply to Hume's problem, and
whether one needs to look upon this answer as a finally decisive resolu-
tion of the problem-these are questions which have been much dis-
cussed. These questions will not be discussed here. I want to begin at a
point which, in a certain sense, is prior to all these problems. I want to
ask whether the total picture which Kant, during the critical period,
gives of the Humean problem should be taken as entirely correct. Kant
does not give merely a simple statement of the Humean problem; he
also speaks of the motives which lead to it, of the extension which, for
the sake of consistency, it should have been subjected to, and of the
unwelcome consequences which a corresponding generalization of
Hume's answer would have occasioned for science and reason. We are
told that the moving forces of Humean inquiry remain alive in Kant,
that he permits them the full scope which they, by their very nature,
demanded; that he nevertheless gave them a direction quite different
from Hurne's and thereby protected human reason from those dangers.
One critic has, on specific points, raised objections against Kant's
expositions; he has rightly noticed that they are not quite consistent

* "Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems" first appeared in Zeitschrift fiir

Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Band 141 ( 1908), pp. 176-209. Translated
by permission of Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tiibingen).
Adolf Rcinach (1883-1917) was, next to Edmund Husserl, the most important
member of the Gottingen phenomenological circle. He was killed during \V orld
\Var I, at the age of thirty-four. Of this essay on Hume and Kant, Husserl remarks,
in his obituary notice for Rcinach in Kant-Studien ( 1918-19), that it deepened
his understanding of Humean "relations of ideas" and exercised a definitive influence
on his own progress toward pure phenomenology. Reinach's other works include
the following: "Zur Theorie des N egativen Urteils" ( 1911), "Die Dberlegnng:
ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung" ( 1912), and "Die apriorischen Grundlagen
des biirgerlichen Rechts" (1913).
\Vith the exception of a few inconsequential changes and additions, the follow-
ing notes are Reinach's.
with each other!; the total picture, however, which Kant gives us has
not been, as far as I see, challenged in its essential features. And yet it
appears to me that precisely these essential features are not correct.
According to Kant's presentation, 2 and the historians who follow
Kant, Hume is concerned with the problematic character of the uni-
versal law of causality and specific material causal judgments. 3 He saw
that these make claim to necessity and therefore to apriority, and that
further they were undoubtedly synthetic in character. The question
therefore arose, with what justification can I go beyond a given concept
and "connect with it another which is not at all contained in it, and
that in a manner as if it necessarily belongs to the former?" 4 This means
that Hume has already raised the problem of synthetic a priori judg-
ments-to be sure, not the general problem of the possibility of such
judgments, but the special problem about the possibility of causal
judgments. He remained confined to this special problem. Naturally his
problematic ought to have been extended; besides the concept of
causality other metaphysical concepts ought to have been considered;
specifically, mathematical propositions should have been subjected to
the same sort of inquiry. Hume failed to undertake such an investiga-
tion, for he regarded mathematical propositions as analytic. 5 Only in
the case of causal judgments, he showed that they cannot be validated
by reason alone, that one has therefore to look for their origin in exper-
ience, whereby the claim to necessity with which these judgments ap-
pear is rejected. It is regrettable that Hume misunderstood the
synthetic nature of mathematical judgments. If he had raised the same
question here, as with causal judgments, he would have then hesitated
to give the same answer. He would then have looked for the origin of
mathematical judgments as well in experience, "which he was insight-
ful enough to do." Hume is a skeptic only with regard to a definitely
circumscribed field of knowledge. The material consequence of his in-
vestigations, however, was a more general skepticism in every scientific
use of reason in general. His isolated question therefore acquired a
general significance, which Kant is the first to apprehend. Kant had no
illusions about the synthetic nature of mathematical judgments. But
more than that, he saw that the question about the possibility of syn-

1. Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft I, pp. 345ff.

Also compare Reininger, Kant-Studien, Vol. 6.
z. Vaihinger gives the most important texts. See lac. cit., pp. 304ff.
3· Vaihinger has emphasized that the two questions are not kept separate in
Kant's statements.
4· Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,§ 5·
5· Compare Critique of Practical Reason, Preface; Prolegomena §4-
 thetic a priori judgments, which Hume had raised only with regard to
causal propositions, signified nothing less than the question about the
possibility of science in general. Of course, he was very far removed
from the answer which Hume gave to this question. He found a way to
"ground" the validity of synthetic a priori judgments, whereby he over-
came the general skepticism implied by Humean thought and created
at the same time an unshakable foundation for all sciences. Hume's
problem was thus the stimulating starting point for Kant. The great
step that he took beyond Hume was to generalize the Humean problem
and to give his new answer for this problem.
Two propositions appear to me to be most important in this formula-
tion. With his criticism of causal propositions, Hume had questioned
the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in one special case. And
Hume had taken mathematical propositions to be analytic. The first
proposition is naturally the more important; the second, however, pre-
sents itself as a necessary supplement to it. Only on its supposition does
it become intelligible why Hume had failed to extend the scope of his
question. The picture that Kant gives us of Hume is built upon these
two propositions. Before we do anything else, we must subject these
two to an examination. To begin with the second proposition: did
Hume in fact regard mathematical propositions as a priori and indeed
as analytic-a priori? One may first of all raise an objection against talking
about the 'a priori' in the case of Hume. The catchword "empiricism"
appears to contradict the very admission of a priori propositions at all.
We are here concerned, however, not with names but with the thing,
and about this thing itself a few brief remarks may be permitted. Hume
should have recognized a priori knowledge in Kant's sense; and a priori
knowledge, according to the plain statements of the Introduction to the
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is independent of ex-
perience and also such that we have two sufficient and necessary criteria
for it: universality and necessity. The concept of necessity plays a special
role in discussions of the Humean standpoint. We want therefore to go
into it somewhat closely. We may take it, from Kant's discussions, that
necessity in his sense has nothing to do with subjective compulsion, i.e.,
with an experience of constraint to think thus and not otherwise, but
that he is concerned with an objective necessity, with what must be so
constituted and "cannot be otherwise." This objective necessity is open
to further examination and indeed also needs it. In this connection, a
few hints must suffice. To begin with, it is striking that the necessity of
an instance of knowledge does not find expression in its direct formula-
tion. One who is convinced of the necessity of the judgment "3 is
greater than z" would not normally express this judgment in any man-

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

ner other than the one here given. Only under definite presuppositions
would one say "3 is necessarily greater than 2," or "3 must be greater
than 2." There must correspondingly be certain presuppositions if one
wishes to bring this necessity to clear and adequate givenness. In the
simple making of this judgment, the necessity is certainly not given to
me in this manner. Only when I try to think of 3 as equal to 2 or even
as smaller than 2, do I recognize that that is impossible, and with that I
simultaneously recognize that 3 is necessarily greater than 2. It is quite
generally the case that I can bring objective necessity to adequate given-
ness only on the basis of a futile effort to represent to myself a contrary
state of affairs. In this connection, one thing needs to be noticed and
strongly emphasized: The fact that a clear apprehension of necessity is
possible under definite subjective conditions does not at all imply that it
is only a "subjective" necessity. That 3 is greater than 2-this fact is nec-
essary, irrespective of whether I apprehend its necessity or not. If I am to
apprehend the necessity, then of course the definite attitude of mine
that has just been prescribed is to be presupposed: I must try to think for
myself that 3 is smaller than 2. If I do that, I clearly recognize that 3 is
necessarily greater than 2. I apprehend this necessity as an aspect im-
manent to the state of affairs, and the evidence with which it presents
itself to me cannot be undermined by any subsequent reflection. We do
not find such a necessity in the case of all states of affairs. An object lies
near another-in this case I can very well imagine that the two objects
are far away from each other, without finding this new state of affairs
impossible and the first necessary. There is here no "cannot be other-
wise." The state of affairs is contingent. One may, on this point, go a
little further and ask: Wherein lies the basis of this fundamental dif-
ference amongst states of affairs? Specifically, how is one to understand
that the being-beside-each-other of two objects is something contingent
while it is on the other hand necessary that 3 is greater than 2? This
question leads to far-reaching problems. Meanwhile a provisional an-
swer which will suffice for our present purpose is not difficult to give:
It is grounded in the nature of the numbers 3 and 2 that the former is
greater than the latter; but there are no objects whose nature it is to lie
beside each other. With exactly identical properties, things may be
either near each other or far removed from each other. In the one case,
therefore, the predicate is grounded in the essence of the subjects; in
the other case, not so. And we can generally say that states of affairs of
which the first holds good, which we may also regard as essential inter-
connections, are always necessary. States of affairs that are not essential
interconnections are contingent. Essential interconnection, then, is
that on which necessity depends; likewise, universality also derives from
it. For if a predicate is grounded in the essence of one or more objects,
what is thereby said is that it holds good not only of particular objects,
but holds good plainly and unconditionally of all those objects which
possess the same essence. We thus see that universality and necessity
can both be traced back one step further: In every case they are to be
found if and only if the predicate is grounded in the essence of the
subject. Kant himself does not speak of this essential connection. He
limits himself to specifying universality and necessity as criteria of the
a priori. He certainly emphasizes that in this context one is speaking of
"strict"-and not comparative-universality and of an objective neces-
sity-and not a subjective constraint. But he does not ask where these
[i.e., necessity and universality] are located-in the knowing itself or in
the known state of affairs or somewhere else. Just as little does he ask
whether they can be further traced back. The concept of essential con-
nection is personally foreign to him, but in fact it indicates precisely
what he has in mind in the introductory discussions of the Critique
about the a priori. One may indeed characterize this a priori from very
different sides, and one may see only one side and neglect the others.
Kant has emphasized universality and necessity, but neglected the as-
pect of essential-belonging-together. Conversely, it is easily imaginable
that one see only the latter and either not attend to or even deny the
aspect of objective necessity. 6
Hume does not determine the concept of a priori in the same manner
asKant. But he did have-and we can sav• this on the basis of these dis-
cussions-precisely the same thing in mind as Kant. According to
Hurne, there are propositions which are "discoverable by the mere
operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent
in the universe." 7 The contrary of such a proposition is impossible; it
contains within itself a contradiction. Such propositions concern rela-
tions of ideas, as contrasted with those which concern matters of fact.
6. I can in the present context only indicate the theoretical beliefs which under-
lie these discussions. Neither objects-as is basically obvious-nor judgments nor
instances of knowledge-as one believed-are a priori. Those things which deserve
the name a priori in the primary and authentic sense are rather determinate states
of affairs, in other words those peculiar entities which we should sharply distinguish
from all objectivities which constitute them as elements, and from all judgments
and knowing which intentionally relate to them. The inquiry into the concept of
state of affairs has recently been opened up, especially by Husserl and Meinong. Its
fundamental significance for the most important philosophical problems will, I
believe, be clearer in increasing measure. I must here limit myself to pointing to the
inquiries that I hope soon to be able to publish on the problem of judgment and
the problem of the a priori.
7· An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (La Salle: Open Court Pub-
lishing Company, 1963), p. 24.
Relations of ideas, however, are those which "depend entirely on the
ideas, which we compare together. ... 'Tis from the idea of a triangle,
that we discover the relation of equality, which its three angles bear to
two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea remains
the same." 8 We single out only those amongst the determinations given
by Hume which are for our purpose the most important: He knows
relations of ideas, i.e., structures wherein a predicate is "conditioned"
by, or is grounded in, the nature of the terms that are placed in relation
to one another. In our vocabulary, this means that he knows essential
structures. He thereby knows what we found to be the basis of the
a priori. Several further dcterminations coincide with those of Kant.
Propositions about relations of ideas are to be discovered by the mere
operation of thought; their contraries are impossible. The other charac-
terizations given by Hume, such as independence from all existence,
are foreign to Kant. Instead, Hume misunderstands or does not men-
tion the characterizations which Kant has put forward as criteria of the
a priori: namely, necessity and universality. However, the different
characterization does not change the fact that Hume had in mind pre-
cisely the same subject matter as Kant. Moreover, the Kantian criteria
of the a priori are certainly implied by the Humean determinations.
From the fact that the relations are grounded in the "nature" of the
terms compared, what Kant has designated as strict universality does
follow, as we have already seen. And if, further, the contrary of relations
of ideas is impossible, the relations of ideas themselves must be
necessary.
Relations of ideas comprehend, as Hume tells us, "the sciences of
geometry, algebra and arithmetic." Insofar as this is the case according
to Hume, we could also say: Mathematics contains, for him, a priori
propositions. 9 To be sure, Kant maintains even more: According to
Kant, Hume took mathematical propositions to be analytic. With this,
we come to the more important part of our problem.
Hume "thought that their propositions-namely, those of mathe-
8. A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by Green and Grose, I, p. 372.
9· We shall not enter into a dispute over the words used. The most important
thing is that Hume and Kant, in spite of their different determinations, have a
common fact in mind. The determinations which Kant subsequently gives to the
concept of a priori are not constitutive of this concept. As little essential is it for
the concept of the a priori, whether one assumes that a priori states of affairs can be
known with greater certainty than empirical states of affairs, whether there is an
ultimate unshakable certainty for them, etc. These questions, which Hume, as is
well known, did not answer in the same manner for all relations of ideas, evidently
presuppose the concept of a priori. The objections which one feels compelled to
raise against the assumption of an a priori in Hume may be disposed of from this
point of view.
 matics-were all analytic, i.e., that they proceed from one determina-
tion to another only through identity, consequently in accordance with
the principle of contradiction." This remark by Kant is somewhat sur-
prising. He elsewhere emphasizes, rather expressly, that he is the first
person to have brought this classical distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments to clear consciousness. Locke alone, according to
him, had given some hint of this division. And precisely at the place
where he says this, Kant makes it specially clear that Locke's discussions
on this point were so little definitive that they did not lead Hume even
once to a closer consideration of the matter. Hume could not therefore
have expressly and consciously held this view. Kant also expressly em-
phasizes that Hume did not make the distinction "so formally and
universally, or with the [same] nomenclature," as Kant himself had
done; but Kant continues, it "was as if Hume had said: pure mathe-
matics contains only analytic propositions; metaphysics, however, con-
tains synthetic a priori propositions."
In fact, we find nowhere in Hume a direct indication of the view that
Kant ascribes to him. He does indeed speak of "relations of ideas"; and
one may at first be reminded by this term of propositions which "are
grounded in concepts." But that can happen only at first glance. For
neither does "idea" in Hume's sense have anything to do with "con-
cept" in Kant's sense, nor should the determination of predicates by the
constitution of ideas-in Hume's thought-be confused with the being-
contained of predicates in subject-concepts, in Kant's thought. If this
be so, then we should ask: How does Kant arrive at his belief that Hume
regarded mathematical propositions as analytic, and on what grounds
do the numerous investigators who have since then repeated this state-
ment base their belief?
It would be good, to begin with, to understand this question quite in
abstraction from the historical interpretation and solely with reference
to the facts at issue. That mathematical propositions are analytic may
be false; in the sense in which Kant understands the concept of analy-
ticity it is certainly false. But it is nevertheless a defensible standpoint.
I want to recall the discussions in Moses Mendelssohn's prize-winning
essay "On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences," on the analytical nature
of geometrical judgments. 10 There he writes:
Since geometry presupposes nothing other than the separated con-
cept of extension, and deduces from this one source all its conse-
quences, and indeed so deduces them that one clearly knows that all
10. Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by B. G. Mendelssohn,
Vol. II, pp. 7£.

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

 that is thereby asserted is necessarily connected with the original
concept of extension through the principle of contradiction, there is
no doubt that all geometrical truths are to be found wrapped up
within the concept of extension, which then geometry teaches us how
to develop. For what else could the most profound of the proofs do
other than dissect a concept and make clear what was unclear?
The point of view defended here may be false, but certainly can be
discussed. Seen from this perspective, the reproach that Hume held
mathematical judgments to be analytic is not all that bad. But one
need not leave out of consideration the fact that Hume does not pattern
his concept of relation of ideas only after mathematics. In the Enquiry,
to be sure, he enumerates only geometry, algebra, and arithmetic. This
is because in the Enquiry he is concerned with only the most important
objects of investigation. The Treatise, on the other hand, is more de-
tailed: A number of other relations of ideas are mentioned there. We
want to discuss here only the relation of resemblance. In the proposition
"Red and Orange are similar," a relation of ideas is asserted, according
to Hume. That is also quite correct. The similarity is grounded-as con-
trasted with, let us say, being-far-from-in the nature of Red and Yellow;
the contrary of this relation is impossible; knowledge of it is possible,
quite independently of experience, through the mere representation of
the two colors. The proposition is accordingly a priori in the sense of
Kant's fundamental determinations. Both the criteria of the a priori,
each of which taken by itself should be adequate, are satisfied in this
case. If I try to think of Red and Orange as being dissimilar, I then
recognize the impossibility of this and the necessity of the original state
of affairs. And further, resemblance obtains not merely between this or
that red and orange, but in strictest universality between "Red and
Orange in general." That Kant did not consider this and similar a priori
propositions may be explained by reasons whose consideration would
lead us far afield and besides is not relevant for our purpose. Hume
ascribes precisely the same basic determinations to the relation of re-
semblance and the other remaining relations of ideas as he does to the
mathematical relations of ideas. If he did think that propositions about
the latter were analytic, he should have held the same view also with
regard to the former. But what is a plausible thesis with regard to
mathematical propositions is, with regard to the other relations of ideas,
a plain absurdity. What would it mean to say that the proposition
"Red and Orange are similar" is analytic in Kant's sense? Analytic
judgments are those in which "the predicate B is covertly contained in
the concept A," those in which a mere explication of the subject is

168
 undertaken. Is resemblance actually "contained" in the concepts Red
and Orange? Does it "explicate" for us what is already thought in the
concepts, even if in an unclear manner? That would be obviously non-
sensical. The thought of Red and Orange does not contain in any sense
a thought of resemblance. Certainly Kant's concept of analytic judg-
ment is not univocal. But in whatever sense one may want to take it,
the judgment "Red and Orange are similar" is almost a paradigmatic
example of a synthetic judgment.U To ascribe to Hume the opposite
view is to ascribe to him an absurdity. But one does that implicitly if
one asserts that Hume regarded mathematical propositions as analytic;
for what holds good of mathematical relations of ideas also holds good,
according to him, of the rest. Perhaps Kant would not have made this
assertion if he had not taken into consideration only the introduction
of mathematical relations of ideas in the Enquiry. In any case it is in the
highest degree improbable that a thinker who had such close feeling
for the facts as Hume had, should arrive at such a nonsensical construc-
tion as the Kantian interpretation ascribes to him.
We thus see: Hume never directly characterized mathematical
propositions as analytic; such a view would, in the context of his total
thought, lead to the greatest absurdities. We must therefore, with equal
emphasis, ask the question: Where precisely did Hume give Kant the
occasion for this interpretation? Even though it may now seem quite
improbable that such an interpretation could be correct, still it was
certainly not plucked out of the air.
In the case of analytic judgments in Kant's sense, the predicate must
be contained in the subject-concept and should correspondingly follow
from it in accordance with the principle of contradiction. One may
maintain that these two determinations are also to be found in the
case of Hume's relations of ideas. Let us consider, to begin with, the
first. Hume asks whether in the case of the causal relation we are
11. A pertinent remark may be made here. In the context of the question
whether "7 + 5 = 12" is an analytic or a synthetic judgment, Kant says that 1:! is
not thought in the concept of the sum of 7 and 5· That may be so. But it seems to
me that that is not what concerns us here. In the analytic judgment the predicate
should be contained in the concept of the subject. The predicate in that proposition
is either the equality (in which case 7 + 5 and 12 are the subject) or the equality
with 12 (in which case 7 + 5 is the subject). In no case could 12 itself be the
predicate, nor could it be taken as such. Kant should have asked whether the
equality is already thought in the concepts of 7 + 5 and 12, or whether equality
with 12 is in the concept of 7 + 5-both must naturally be denied. The misunder-
standing of Kant, and of all who discuss the question on the same basis, is to be
understood only by the fact that we read the sign "=" as "is," whereby it can
erroneously appear as the copula, and 12, correspondingly, as the predicate of the
proposition.

16<)
concerned with a relation of ideas. The question is, whether through the
mere representation of a case we can know with what other case it is
causally connected. Hume denies this, and it is important for our pur-
pose to follow the reasons for his denial. He writes:
The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by
the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally
different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered
in it. Motion in the second billiard ball is a quite distinct event from
motion in the first: nor is there anything in the one to suggest the
smallest hint of the other.12
If the causal relation were a relation of ideas, then according to Hume,
it should be possible to "discover" the effect in the cause; this again can
be the case only if the one is somehow contained in the other. It ap-
pears, therefore, that the condition for a relation to be a relation of ideas
is precisely that which Kant regards as the condition of analyticity: the
being-contained of the predicate in the subject-concept. However, such
an inference would be quite hasty. Even here we can understand
Hume's statements only if we take them in their context. We should
bear in mind that the relation between cause and effect, even if we need
to consider it as a relation of ideas, can only be a relation of ideas of a
particular sort, that it would be of a different kind from all the other
relations of ideas which Hume mentions. In that case, not all that
Hume expects from it, should it be accepted as a relation of ideas, can
be taken to be true of all relations of ideas. One may particularly ask
whether those statements of Hume which one attempts, at first sight,
to appeal to for the analyticity of propositions about relations of ideas
in general, do not find their proper explanation in the unique nature of
the causal relation. In the case of the usual relations of ideas, as we
have already seen, the predicate ( r) is completely determined by the
ideas compared ( a,b). Through the mere representation of the ideas, we
recognize the relation which obtains between them. In the case of the
relation between cause and effect, we make still greater claims. An
object is given to us, let us say, in perception, and we immediately con-
clude from it another object with which it should be causally connected.
From smoke that we perceive, we infer fire as its cause; from the per-
ceived movement of a ba11, we infer as its effect the movement of an-
other ball which the former strikes. That is the usual causal inference
whose validity Hume wants to examine. It appears to presuppose a
relation such that in one of its members (a) a causal connection with
another (b) is grounded. If in fact there is such a relation, then the
12. Enquiry, p. 29.

1]0
 causal relation would be immediately justified; this question was also
raised by Hume at the very beginning. What we are concerned with is
obviously this: Should we regard the causal relation as a relation of
ideas, indeed-and this is the crux of the matter-as a relation of ideas
of a quite special, as it were a higher, kind? Unlike other relations of
ideas, in which r is given on the basis of the representation of a and b,
in the case of the causal relation it should be possible to have rb on the
basis of the perception of a. Or, seen from the objective side: Here rb
should be grounded in a-not, as elsewhere, r in a and b. Only now are
we in a position to evaluate the sentences quoted above from Hume. If
the causal relation were a relation of ideas of this kind, then that would
mean that the "mind can find the effect in the supposed cause." This,
however, Hume says, is never the case. I may consider an object (a) as
much as I want, I cannot discover in it anything about its causal rela-
tion with another object ( rb). One realizes how superfluous and un-
justified it would be to extend this consideration to all relations of ideas;
to suppose, that is to say, that in every case the second term can be
"discovered" in the first. The very meaninglessness of such a view
should convince us that Hume could not have held it, that he could not
have held that in the case of the resemblance of Red and Orange,
Orange or even the resemblance to Orange is "contained" in Red. One
needs only to look more closely in order to find that here one is dealing
with a quite special peculiarity to which causal inference, and accord-
ingly causal relation, seems to make claim. It can be shown from the
Enquiry how precisely Hume himself distinguished between the con-
cept of that qualified relation of ideas and the usual relations of ideas.
In the fourth section Hume first shows what we have stated here: that
the causal relation with the effect cannot be discovered in the cause and
that therefore the causal inference, as it now concerns us, cannot be
immediately justified. Then, however, he modifies his example:
When I see, for instance, a billiard ball moving in a straight line
towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by
accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse;
may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well
follow from that cause? .... And even after it is suggested, the con-
junction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary .... 13
Hume shows here also that if the cause and the effect were known to
me, I could not from their nature discover any causal connection be-
tween them, while from the very nature of Red and Orange the re-

13. Enquiry, pp. 29-30.

semblance that is grounded in these two colors becomes evident. It has
been said before that the causal relation cannot be a qualified relation
of ideas. We see now that one also should not regard it as an ordinary
relation of ideas. Only in the first case can the question arise whether
the effect is "contained" in the cause, or better, whether the effect can
somehow be discovered in the cause. In the second case, the question
can only be whether in the case of the causal relation-as with all usual
relations of ideas-the relational predicate is grounded in the two terms.
Hume never held mathematical relations of ideas to be qualified; it is
therefore also not permissible to apply to them those propositions which
in themselves may remind one of the Kantian definition of analytical
judgments, but which undoubtedly can be applied only and exclusively
in the case of causal relations.
So far, it is the causal inference which seemed to point to a peculiar
nature of the causal relation; there is also a peculiarity which lies im-
mediately in the relation itself. Hume does single this out as well, and
also there is the danger here of generalizing his remarks as being true of
all relations of ideas. Causality signifies a necessary connection in the
successive existence of two objects. It is not therefore totally inde-
pendent of existence, as relations of ideas, in accordance with Hume's
determinations, are wont to be. A causal connection between A and B
means that the existence of B is connected in a definite manner with
that of A. Neither the existence of A nor that of B is thereby directly
posited. But the existence of B is conditionally connected with that of
A. In this relation existence always plays the specified role, while in the
case of what Hume calls ideas it is altogether excluded. The resemblance
between Red and Orange contains nothing of existence, conditional or
unconditional. Owing to its conditional positing of existence, a propo-
sition is valid of the causal relation that Hume, in his main work, calls
"an established maxim in metaphysics":
That whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea of pos-
sible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is abso-
lutely impossible. We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and
from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. \:Ve
can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore
regard it as impossible.14
Its application to the case of the causal relation is easy. If we can con-
ceive an A, without at the same time conceiving a B that is causally
connected with it, then this A can in fact exist without B's necessarily

14- Treatise, I, p. 339·

 following upon it, i.e., it is not necessary that there be a causal relation
between A and B. Or, seen from the other side: If the causal relation
were in fact what it at first claims to be, i.e., a necessary connection
between the existence of two objects, then the representation of one
would also be necessarily connected with the representation of the
other. An illustration, which is about another frequently treated rela-
tion of necessary existential connection between two "objectivities,"
may clarify Hume's thesis on this point; we leave it open whether Hume
himself considered it to be a case of relations of ideas or not. Colors
can be found in the real world only as related, in a specific manner, with
extension; this is a proposition which connects the necessarily simul-
taneous existence of extension with the existence of calor. If this propo-
sition is valid, then according to Hume's fundamental principle of
metaphysics, no calor can be represented without a simultaneous repre-
sentation of extension. In fact one should agree that it is impossible to
represent clearly a calor that is not extended. In the case of causal rela-
tion, we are concerned with a necessary connection of succession. That
cannot, however, in principle alter the situation for Hume: Here also,
if it is to be a case of necessary relation, representation of the cause must
be necessarily followed by representation of the effect; the representa-
tion of the cause cannot at all be separated from that of the effect.
Hume shows that this is not so, and therewith also that the causal rela-
tion cannot be a relation of ideas. 15 One may again attempt to use
Hume's discussions for the purpose of showing the analytic nature of
propositions about relations of ideas: Hume in fact expressly requires
that if the causal relation is to be counted as a relation of ideas, then
the idea of a definite cause must "contain within itself" the idea of a
definite effect, that, in Kant's words, the predicate of a causal judgment
must be contained in the subject term. But we have now seen that this
requirement relates exclusively to the causal relation and finds its full
explication in the peculiar existence-dependence of the causal relation.
Only in its case does it make sense to require that the representation of
the cause should contain that of the effect in the same manner in which
the representation of calor includes that of extension. It does not, how-
ever, make any sense to require this in the case of those relations which
Hume recognizes as relations of ideas, to say, for example, that Red

15. \Vith reference to the formal causal principle that "it is impossible for some-
thing to begin to exist without a principle that brings it into being," the following
statements of Hume may be pertinent. "The separation, therefore, of the idea of a
cause from that of a beginning of existence is plainly possible for the imagination;
and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible . "
(Treatise, I, p. 381).

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

 contains within itself either Orange or resemblance to Orange. The
same holds good of mathematical relations of ideas. We thus find here
the same result as before, which we may summarize as follows: Those
places where Hume requires that, if the causal relation is to be recog-
nized as a relation of ideas, the effect must be "discovered" within the
cause or that representation of the cause should "contain within itself"
that of the effect-these relate exclusively to the causal relation as such;
they can be accounted for directly from the peculiar nature of the
causal inference and of the causal relation. It would be thoroughly in-
admissible to conclude from those places that Hume did regard as
analytic all relations of ideas and all those propositions which deal with
them, especially propositions about the mathematical relations of ideas.
Analytic judgments in Kant's sense have the peculiarity not only
that the predicate is somehow contained in the subject-concept, but
also-closely connected with that peculiarity-that they follow from
the principle of noncontradiction. It would be a contradiction to deny
through the predicate of a judgment that which is "thought, even if
confusedly, in the subject concept." The first determination, as we have
already seen, is only seemingly applicable to Hume's relations of ideas.
It appears to be far more justified to apply the second determination to
them. The causal law cannot, according to Hume, be regarded as a
relation of ideas, because "it implies no contradiction that the course of
nature may change, and that an object ... may be attended with dif-
ferent or contrary effects." 16 That is not a determination which, like the
one considered earlier, can be applied exclusively to the causal relation;
it is essential for relations of ideas in general. It is characteristic of
"matters of fact" in Hume's sense that their contrary "can never imply
a contradiction." 17 The contrary of relations of ideas, on the other hand,
contains within itself its own contradiction. Mathematical propositions,
according to Hume, are propositions about relations of ideas; conse-
quently, their contraries contain a contradiction within themselves.
Analytic propositions, according to Kant, are those "whose predicates
cannot be denied of their subjects without contradiction." From this
point of view, the conclusion appears unavoidable that mathematical
propositions must be regarded as analytic for Hume. Kant also came to
his interpretation of Hume in this way; for he regularly points out that
Hume thought the nature of pure mathematics "to rest entirely on the
principle of contradiction." However, we must beware here also of
hasty conclusions; it is first of all necessary to inquire what, precisely,

16. Enquiry, p. 36.

17. Enquiry, p. :z4.
 Hume understands by "contradiction" and what he can understand by
it in the context of his thought. We have seen earlier that for Hume the
contrary of a relation of ideas is "impossible"; we then stated that this
objective impossibility corresponds, in fact, to an objective necessity of
the relation of ideas itself-a necessity which Kant singles out as the
criterion of the a priori, but which Hume does not take into considera-
tion in his account of the concept of relations of ideas. The necessity
rests, as we have seen, on the fact that the predicate of the judgment
under consideration is "grounded" in the subject, that we are concerned
here with an essential structure. This basis of necessity is not mentioned
by Kant, while Hume-who on his part does not recognize objective
necessity-expressly states that in the case of relations of ideas the rela-
tion is determined through the nature of its relata. The situation which
we find in the case of relations of ideas exactly corresponds to that in the
case of their contraries. As in the case of the relation of ideas, the
equality of 4 and 2 +
2 is necessary; similarly the contrary state of af-
fairs, that 4 is greater than 2 +
2, is impossible. As in the case of that
necessity, so also with regard to this impossibility, one may ask, on what
is it really grounded? \Vith relations of ideas, the predicate arises out of
the structure of the subject terms; in the case of the contrary of relations
of ideas, the predicate "contradicts" their nature; it is "incompatible"
or "inconsistent" with them. It is this incompatibility which constitutes
the impossibility of the entire state of affairs.
These remarks accord perfectly with the import of Hume's thought.
He says of facts that their contrary always remains possible, because it
never contains a contradiction; we may add that the contrary of a rela-
tion of ideas is impossible, because it contains a contradiction. Here one
is speaking of "contradiction," but in a sense that is quite different from
Kant's. Kant thinks of what we may call logical contradiction, which is
seen most clearly when we compare two mutually contradictory pre-
dicative positings, "being-b of A" and "not being-b of A." In the case
of Kant's analytic judgments, this contradiction is to be found within a
single state of affairs; but also here it is two predicative positings-of
which one is concentrated in the subject place-which contradict each
other. The positing in the subject-place can be "clearly" performed-in
that case, the adequate expression for the judgment would be: "An
A which is b, is not b." It may, however, also be that the predicate is
thought only "confusedly" in the subject-concept and then can be
separated from it by analysis: But then we have what Kant understands
by analytic judgments. But in both cases-whether the predicate is
thought in the subject-place clearly or confusedly-the contrary of the
judgment would involve a logical contradiction. Now there is no doubt

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

 that such a logical contradiction is not there in the case of the contrary
of a relation of ideas. Such a logical contradiction presupposes two
mutually opposed predicative positings which found it. Hume, how-
ever, thinks of a contradiction between a relation and two simple ideas.
That Red and Yellow are dissimilar contains, according to Hume, a
contradiction, but it would be obviously absurd to say that what we
have in this case is a logical contradiction, as in the case of Kant's
analytic judgments. What is it in this case that contradicts? Certainly
not the dissimilarity, on the one hand, and the two colors, on the other!
They are mutually incompatible, but not logically contradictory. They
are not related to each other as "being-b" and "not being-b" asserted
of one and the same object. We are not at all justified in ascribing to
Hume such an absurd view. Hume certainly does speak of "contradic-
tion," but there is also a sense of "contradiction" that is different from
the logical. Hume could have meant here only what we have referred to
as the incompatibility between predicate and subject. That sort of
contradiction characterizes not only this case but the contraries of rela-
tions of ideas in general. We have already emphasized that one may
express it by saying that the predicate "contradicts" the subject and that
the contrary of relations of ideas, in this respect and in this quite novel
sense, contains in fact a contradiction. As before, we must again draw
attention to the fact that it is quite understandable how Kant, by re-
ferring exclusively to the Enquiry, could have come to his view. That
the contrary of mathematical relations of ideas, of which alone Hume
speaks here, contains a logical contradiction, is a view which, even if it
be false, one may come to hold, given certain assumptions. In the
Treatise, on the other hand, where the similarity of colors and other
examples of that sort are given as instances of relations of ideas, one
just cannot arrive at that interpretation. No point of view is conceivable
from which one could say that two colors and their dissimilarity con-
tradict each other in the logical sense. There is no doubt that Hume
did not understand by "contradiction" anything other than incom-
patibility. Should one need some other proof of this, one may find it in
his use of language. The expressions "contradict," i.e., full of contradic-
tion, and "incongruous," i.e., incompatible, are used by Hume as
synonyms.18

18. Compare the index in R. Richter's edition of the Enquiry, pp. 203ff. In the
translation that Sulzer edited and Kant used, there is talk of "\Viderspruch" and
"Widerspruchlosigkeit," where the original text does not at all contain the expres-
sion "contradiction." That could have given Kant the impression that Hume used
the concept of contradiction in a much narrower and stricter sense than it is in fact
the case. That can be shown by several texts, such as the following. Hume is
 We have now shown in detail something of which a look at Hume's
example of the similarity of colors should convince us immediately:
Hume never maintained, in the case of a relation of ideas, that the pre-
dicate is somehow contained in the subject-concept, or that its denial
involves a logical contradiction. His propositions about relations of
ideas are not analytic, nor is there the slightest justification for suppos-
ing that he regarded them as analytic. The propositions of mathematics
occupy, in this respect, no special position amongst the propositions
about relations of ideas. We should not, therefore, maintain that they
are, according to Hume, analytic in nature.
Kant's interpretation is quite universally shared.19 One critic, in fact,
has gone further and advanced the thesis that before Kant the syn-
thetic character of mathematics was universally misunderstood. 20 I
want to throw doubt on this thesis, especially insofar as Locke is con-
cerned. As is well known, the distinction between matters of fact and
relations of ideas was in no way introduced by Hume. Locke also had
recognized it and in quite the same way as Hume.21 According to Locke,
the relations of ideas are independent of the existence of real objects
corresponding to the ideas, and the relations are "grounded" in the
ideas themselves.22 In support of our position, it is quite remarkable and
certainly appropriate that Locke very clearly separates propositions
about relations of ideas from those which Kant called analytic and
which he regards as contentless.23 For Locke, all pure identity propo-
sitions (such as "what is a soul is a soul") are "trifling"; they are propo-
sitions that one immediately recognizes as giving no information. Such
propositions "only affirm the same term of themselves." By contrast,
all those propositions are "instructive" which "find out intermediate
ideas, and then lay them in such order one by another, that the under-
standing may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question."

speaking of the fact that one can, in the case of one and the same cause, think of
the most different effects. Hume writes, "All the suppositions are consistent and
conceivable." (Enquiry, p. 29) Sulzer's text runs thus: "All diese Vermutungen
sind begreiflich und si eh selbst nicht widersprechend." (p. 73) On another occasion
Hume speaks of the relation of the ideas of gold and mountain. He calls them "two
consistent ideas." (Enquiry, p. 17) Sulzer translates: "zwey einander nicht wider·
sprechende Begriffe." (p. 31)
19. Only isolated exceptions are known to me. Compare especially Compayre,
la philosophie de David Hume, p. 1 5o. Also Linke, D. Humes Lehre vom Wissen,
pp. 30ff.
2o. Riehl, Kritizismus. 2nd. ed.
21. Compare Riehl, Kritizismus, pp. 91 ff.
22. Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV, 2.
23. Ibid., IV, 8. (Reinach quotes from the German translation by Th. Schultze.)
This requirement is not satisfied by the second group of propositions,
which Locke regards as empty: propositions in which a part of a com-
plex idea is predicated of the whole, or where "one of the simple ideas
of a complex one is affirmed of the name of the whole complex idea."
This kind of proposition reminds us vividly of Kant's analytic judg-
ments. Examples on both sides show that the proposition "All gold is
malleable" is, according to Locke, an empty proposition if malleability
is already contained in the meaning of "gold." For Kant that would be
analytic under exactly the same conditions, just as would be the propo-
sition "All bodies are extended." The general characteristics of the
propositions are the same for Locke and Kant. Locke speaks, in the
domain of nonanalytic propositions, of "instructive" propositions in the
same sense in which Kant speaks of ampliative propositions. And the
term "explicative" is used in common by both for analytic propositions.
Certainly one does not find in Kant the contemptuous emphasis with
which Locke speaks of the "emptiness of mere verbal propositions."
The pedagogical gain which may lie in it, namely that what was at first
thought only obscurely in the total representation of the subject is then
developed in all clarity, is not considered by him. The explicative func-
tion of analytic judgments also relates, for Locke, only to the subject
word and not, as with Kant, to the subject-concept. Above all, analyti-
cal judgments do not perform, for Locke, that which is most important
for Kant: to emphasize sharply the concept and the fundamental prob-
lem of synthetic a priori judgments. This point of view is totally foreign
to Locke. Only from this consideration can one understand Kant's view
that before him no one had clearly grasped the distinction between
analytic and synthetic judgments. For if we abstract from the far-
reaching significance of the distinction within the Kantian problematic,
then we should recognize that Locke had thoroughly determined and
precisely formulated that distinction. 24
For our special purpose, we can learn the following from these dis-
cussions: Locke laid out the concept of relation of ideas in essentially

24. That Kant has not done justice to Locke on this point is also clear from the
texts from Locke's work on which Kant relies. Laas has already briefly pointed out
that the paragraphs 9 and 10 cited by Kant and the remarks preceding the third
chapter of the fourth Book contain much less about this matter than the eighth
chapter, on which we have relied here. It appears to me, however, that one must
go even further. The paragraphs cited by Kant have in fact nothing to do with the
division of judgments into analytic and synthetic. Those paragraphs are rather
concerned with quite another distinction within the sphere of non-empty, i.e., non-
analytic, knowledge, as our foregoing discussion has shown. Because Kant refers only
to these places, he has missed the very clear formulation Locke has given of the
concept of analytic judgment at other places.
 the same way as Hume. He expressly separated empty, i.e., analytic,
knowledge from relations of ideas, as also from all "informative"
knowledge. From this it follows that he did not consider propositions
about relations of ideas to be in general analytic. So far as mathematical
propositions are specifically concerned, Locke provides us here with an
unambiguous proof of our interpretation. He explicitly contrasts the
proposition "The external angle of a triangle is greater than each of the
two inner and opposite angles" with empty propositions. To be sure,
this mathematical proposition says something about a "complex idea,"
but not something which is "contained in it" but rather something
which is "a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea." 25 The
synthetic character of geometrical knowledge could not be emphasized
more clearly. The concept of relation of ideas is taken over by Hume
from Locke. The supposition that as opposed to Locke he regarded
them as analytic would be totally groundless. Hume does not say any-
thing at all about those empty propositions which Locke distinguished
from all other forms of knowledge, and in fact excluded them from the
domain of genuine knowledge-possibly because he also, like Locke,
regarded them as empty.
The interpretation of Hume's position with regard to mathematics
which we are here criticizing, is an essential component of that total
picture which Kant gives us of the Humean problematic. From the
simple supposition that Hume regarded the propositions of mathe-
matics as analytic, it becomes obvious for Kant that he did not question
their apriority and necessity in the same manner as he did in the case
of the necessity of causal judgments. Now that it has been shown that
Hume's attitude towards mathematics was quite different from what
Kant believed it to be, the second part of his interpretation is also put in
question. If Hume had actually questioned the synthetic-a priori char-
acter of causal judgment, then he would have also brought mathe-
matical judgments within the scope of his inquiry. We are thus led to
the second main question which we wanted to raise: Is it in fact the
possibility of a synthetic a priori judgment which Hume wanted to in-
vestigate in the case of causal judgments? That Hume regarded causal
propositions as synthetic cannot be doubted. We have also seen how
often and how definitively he emphasizes that nothing about the effect
or about a relation with the effect could be discovered in the idea of a
cause. That he also wanted to investigate the apriority of this synthetic
judgment, Kant deduces from the fact that Hume's inquiry is expressly
aimed at the "necessity" of the connection that is asserted in it. Neces-

25. Loc. cit., IV, 8, §8.

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

sity, however, is for Kant a sufficient criterion of the a priori: Our ques-
tion therefore reduces to the question, did Hume in fact want to in-
vestigate the "necessity" of the causal judgment precisely in the same
sense in which Kant understands this concept?
A few systematic remarks may be prefixed to what is really a historical
investigation. It is an obvious and often-raised demand that with the
generic concept of what one may in the widest sense call causal law, the
universal and formal causal law is to be distinguished from the general,
but materially determined causal laws. The first is formulated in the
Treatise thus: "Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of exist-
ence." Or also: "Every new existence or alteration of an existent must
have a cause." 26 An example of the latter, given by Hume, is: Fire
causes heat. From this universal "Law"27 we may distinguish the speci-
fic causal laws wherein one speaks not of fire in general but of specific
instances of fire. Thus we can say that this fire here and now causes
warmth. In all three cases, it is possible to speak of a "necessity." The
universal and formal causal law says not only that past experience shows
every new or otherwise existing object had a cause, but it also claims that
in all cases yet to come and in all future events the same must hold good.
According to it, it lies in the very essence of all generation and all change
that it must have a cause that precedes it. The state of affairs that is
thereby expressed is thus necessary. The same also holds good of de-
terminate causal law: Fire will, according to its essence, cause warmth;
it is necessary that as cause it have this effect. Finally, the same sort of
necessity is to be found also in the third case. That this fire here is
giving rise to warmth now is put forward as a necessary and not as a
contingent state of affairs. 28 In all three cases, we find the sort of neces-
sity about which we have spoken earlier, that objective necessity which
characterizes the total situation on the basis of an essential connection
between the subject and the predicate.29 In the formulation of the
judgments, this necessity remains, as we have seen, usually unexpressed.
It should be so, for the material content of the judgments does not
undergo any enrichment through it. In the proposition "All colors are
necessarily extended," the material contents, color and extension, be-

:z6. Loc. cit., I, pp. 380 f.

:z7. It hardly need be emphasized that "Law" here is not to be understood in
the sense of the exact sciences.
:z8. Here we shall not be concerned with the validity of these statements, but
only with their meaning.
:29. We need not deal, in the present context, with the question whether in
these three cases it is not possible to bring out certain differences in the nature of
this necessity. Compare Vaihinger, loc. cit., pp. 346ff.
 long to the realm of sensuous reality; the necessity, however, which is
expressed in this judgment has obviously nothing to do with this
sphere; it does not belong at all to its material contents. Without
prejudice to the completeness of the material contents of the judgment,
it can simply be removed from the formulation of the judgment. In
view of this simple fact, we shall in the future refer to it as "modal"
necessity. 30 We want thereby to give expression to the fact that there
is also a necessity in the material sense. We can also arrive at its con-
cept through a consideration of causal propositions. In the formal
causal law, there is talk of the cause as the presupposition of all coming
into being and alteration. In the ordinary manner of speaking, however,
one calls that event cause which not only precedes another in time, but,
as one represents it, is connected with it through a special tie; one event
"causes" the other; it "entails" it, or any other more or less metaphorical
expressions that one may use. The idea of a certain compulsion thereby
comes to expression, which moves from the first to the second event.
Conversely, the second event is "conditioned," "caused," "entailed,"
etc., by the first. This implies a necessity which also affects the first
event. All these are naturally very vague and indefinite concepts with
which we operate in day-to-day life. What concerns us here is not to
clarify it and to investigate its legitimate content, but to relate it to the
concept of necessity previously discussed. The ea use exercises a necessity
upon that which we call effect; the effect experiences a necessity from
the cause; if we keep this relation from both sides before the mind at
the same time, then we may say that between the two events there ob-
tains a causal or necessary connection. Also in this case we are speaking
of a necessity of connection; we maintain that this necessity must be
strictly distinguished from the modal necessity that we have spoken
about earlier. If we have first the judgment "A follows B" and then the
judgment "A is connected causally or necessarily with B," the second
judgment, as compared with the first, certainly enriches the material
content. In both cases, a relation between A and B is being asserted-in
the first case only a relation of temporal sequence, in the second case
one of necessary connection. The second relation, in a certain manner,
includes the first within itself, but it goes far beyond the first with re-
spect to its content. Therefore, whether I make the first or the second
judgment signifies a fundamental difference in material content. It is
quite otherwise in the case of what we have called "modal" necessity.
In the judgment "2 X 2 = 4" I assert a relation between 2 X 2 and 4;

30. That in logic one is accustomed to speaking of "modal"' in a quite different

sense, is an unavoidable but regrettable fact.

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

 but if I judge that 2 X 2 is necessarily 4, evidently I do not assert any
new relation between the arithmetical terms; it is the entire state of
affairs that is characterized in a specific manner. The material content
of the judgment, which here lies in the domain of numbers and their
relations, is not in any manner enriched. Precisely for that reason it is
possible here, unlike the other case, to let the necessity of the judgment
remain unformulated without prejudice to the completeness of its
content.
From another side, we can here go somewhat deeper into the matter.
Let us again consider the judgment "B follows A," which we may give
the form "B is successor of A" -in order to clearly distinguish between
the relation and the copula. If this is a case of causal relation, then we
would say: "B is the causal or necessary successor of A." The causal
necessity therefore supplements the predicate term, not the copula. To
be sure, there is also a necessity which determines the copula, and
through the copula determines the total state of affairs; that is precisely
the modal necessity. We then get the judgment: "B is necessarily suc-
cessor of A." Judgments of this form are possible, and it can be shown
that they, unlike the judgments of the first form, are not causal judg-
ments. It is a frequently expressed proposition that every stretch of time
qua temporal stretch, i.e., by its very essence, requires that another
stretch of time follow it (respectively precede it). We shall not con-
sider the question whether this proposition is true or not. We shall only
analyze its sense. It says that it is grounded in the essence of a stretch of
time as such that another stretch of time follows (respectively precede)
it, that every stretch of time B necessarily follows upon a stretch of time
A. Let us contrast this judgment to the one stated earlier. Earlier we
had: "Every event B is necessarily a successor of another event A." Both
judgments, irrespective of whether they are true or not, are meaningful.
Both refer, speaking quite generally, to a necessity of succession. But
this necessity of succession has in the two cases an evidently different
meaning. In the first case the necessity belongs to the material content
of the judgment and therefore gives a closer determination of the predi-
cate term; in this case we are concerned with a causal connection. In
the second case, there is no talk about causality-one is not saying that
one stretch of time is the cause of another. Here the necessity does not
at all belong to the material content of the judgment; it does not de-
termine the predicate; it rather determines the copula and thereby the
total state of affairs: It is a case of modal necessity. I think that there
cannot be any more doubt about the fundamental difference between
the two concepts of necessity.
Mathematical propositions obviously contain only modal necessity.
 Causal propositions on the other hand make claim to modal and causal
necessity. That the three kinds of causal propositions, which we have
distinguished earlier, claim modal necessity, has already been shown.
It is now easy to show the same about their claim to "material" neces-
sity. "Every new existent or alteration of an existent necessarily pre-
supposes a cause"-in this formulation the modal necessity has found
expression. A cause now is an event that is causally or "necessarily" con-
nected with another whose cause it is. If we substitute that in the
original proposition, then we get: "Every new existent or alteration of
an existent necessarily presupposes an event which is necessarily con-
nected with it." Both the concepts of necessity are to be found in this
proposition. The first occurrence is that of modal necessity, the second
is that of materia] necessity. Consider again: Fire necessarily produces
heat. It "produces" heat; that is, it is causally or necessarily connected
with heat. We then get the proposition: "Fire is necessarily in a neces-
sary connection with heat." Also specific material ( inhaltlich) causal
laws thus lay claim to both modal and material necessity. The same
holds good of singular causal propositions.
We thus find: If the necessity of causal propositions is to be ques-
tioned, then that may be formulated in two ways. The inquiry may be
directed towards modal necessity, or it may be directed towards material
necessity. According to Kant's interpretation, Hume inquired exclu-
sively into modal necessity, the necessity which causal propositions
have in common with mathematical propositions. As opposed to this
interpretation, we want to defend the view that Hume's attention was
mainly directed towards material necessity, i.e., towards the necessity
which does not at all belong to mathematical propositions. Naturally,
we do not thereby mean that Hume explicitly and consciously dis-
tinguished between the two concepts of necessity; they were, rather,
thoroughly confused by him. 111 But it can be shown that what in the
first place arrested his attention and towards which his investigation
\vas fundamentally directed was nothing other than material necessity.
The starting point of Hume's problematic in the Enquiry is that
positing of existence which rests neither upon the evidence of the
senses nor upon the guarantee of memory, but appeals to a causal in-
ference. I feel heat, and conclude that there must be fire. 32 On what is
this inference grounded? It obviously presupposes that between fire and

31. Compare e.g., Treatise, p. 379 on the one hand and p. 380 on the other.
Precisely here it becomes very clear that the starting point as well as the aim of the
investigation is material necessity.
32. As is well known, Hume did not discuss the general and formal law of
causality in the Enquiry.

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

 heat there is a necessary connection of such a sort that heat always re-
quires fire. At this point, it is still quite doubtful what sort of necessity
Hume had in his mind: Is it the modal necessity with which heat could
follow upon fire, or is it the material necessity which would characterize
this succession as a specifically causal one? Both would in fact justify
the causal inference. If the heat as the successor is grounded in the
essence of fire, exactly as the succession of a stretch of time is grounded
in the essence of another [stretch], and also if fire entails heat exactly as
collision causes the movement of a ball, in both cases the inference
from one to the other would equally well be justified. The manner in
which Hume conducts his investigation throws light upon what he had
chiefly in mind. He first shows that it is impossible to discover anything
of its cause or effect through representation of a thing and its properties.
But also when both cause and effect are known, it is still not possible
to recognize the connection between them "by pure reason." 33 What
Hume wants to inquire into is "necessary connection," and this is re-
garded by him as a relational predicate about which the question arises,
to begin with, whether it is determined by the nature of its terms exactly
as similarity is determined by the essence of two colors. Such a con-
sideration makes sense only in the case of what we have called material
necessity. Modal necessity is surely not a relational predicate of two
objects, but is a determination which holds good of the entire relational
state of affairs including its predicate. If we wanted to investigate the
modal necessity of the proposition "3 is necessarily greater than 2," the
question whether the necessity is grounded in the essence of 3 and 2
would have no sense. Exactly as little sense would have had the ques-
tion whether the necessity was grounded in the essence of fire and heat,
if Hume had wanted to examine the modal necessity of this specific
causal proposition. This question is meaningful only if it concerns the
material, connecting necessity, and if it is being asked whether this
necessity is conditioned by the ideas of fire and heat exactly as resem-
blance is determined by the ideas of yellow and orange. This interpre-
tation is fully confirmed by the fact that Hume equated the concept of
necessary connection with the concepts of "power, force and energy.'' 34
These concepts may have their place in the case of causal necessary con-
nection. They certainly do not have the least to do with modal neces-
sity. Mathematical propositions show that best: This necessity appears
in them purely and separately, it making no sense to speak, in their
case, of force or energy.
33· Regarding the ground of this peculiar and quite distinct mode of question·
ing, compare our earlier discussions.
34- Enquiry, p. 58.
 Hume expressly showed that the necessary connection does not have
its ground in the ideas, that it is not a case of relation of ideas. The
question now arises, with what justification we can assume a necessary
connection of events, what impression provides us the ground for apply-
ing such a far-reaching concept in our thought. The collision of a
billiard ball is followed by the movement of a second ball. We say that
the collision is the cause of the motion or that it is necessarily connected
with it. If, however, we examine the "impressions" we receive during
this entire episode, we find in them nothing that could support this way
of speaking. We perceive the motion of one ball, we also perceive the
ensuing movement of the second ball, but this is "all that appears to
the outer senses." 35 A causal connection between the two, a necessary
connection, is not here given to us, however closely we may look at the
situation. But also when we move a part of our body through an act of
will, the causal tie between the two is not directly given to us through
any impression. Contrary to what one may at first presume, "reflection
on one's own mental activities" cannot deliver to us the sought-for
impression. Neither from the outer senses nor from our own mental
activities can we get those immediate impressions from which our idea
of necessary connection could be derived.
We need not follow the further investigations of Hume regarding
the origin of that problematic idea. It is far from our intention to at-
tempt here an exposition of his theory of causality. What we have ex-
pounded should suffice for our purpose. It is also here confirmed that
Hume aimed at an inquiry into material necessity, not into modal
necessity. He inquires into the specific occurrence of causation in order
to find the impression for his idea. This makes sense only if he had in
view the causal tie of necessity; it cannot make any sense as long as one
thinks of the modal necessity of the state of affairs which, even if the
terms of the state of affairs belong to the world of outer or inner per-
ception, cannot itself ever belong to this world. Kant emphasizes again
and again, with full justification, that necessity can never be given
through experience. As contrasted with this, Hume tries to find it in
experience. The reason for this lies in the fact that one of them is
thinking of modal necessity, the other of material necessity.
For Kant's interpretation, it is understandable that Hume posed the
question whether the "synthetic proposition of the connection of an
effect to its cause" is "a priori possible." It must, however, be fully un~
intelligible, on this interpretation, that Hume attempted to ground this
connection through experience. It is therefore especially significant
that as a rule Kant passes over this effort of Hume silently in all his
35· Enquiry, pp. 33£.

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

expositions of the Humean problematic. The well-known statement of
the Prolegomena characterizes this situation excellently.
For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is
given me I can go beyond it and connect with it another which is not
contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged
to the former? Nothing but experience can furnish us with such con-
nections (thus he concluded from the difficulty which he took to be
impossibility), and all that vaunted necessity or, what is the same
thing, knowledge assumed to be a priori is nothing but a long habit of
accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective neces-
sity for objective.s6
According to Kant, Hume saw only two possibilities: either the founda-
tion of the causal judgment in pure reason, or the explanation of it from
experience, i.e., from the mechanism of association and the "subjective
necessity arising from it," which is falsely taken to be objective. That
for Hume there is a third possibility-the immediate grounding of
necessity through experience-is overlooked by Kant and, from Kant's
standpoint, must be overlooked. The founding of causal connection
through pure thought and through simple experience are, however, for
Hume, possibilities of equal worth. Only because he wants to deny both
is he [Hume] compelled to explain the belief in an objective necessity
by that psychological theory: As such he could have been satisfied with
a sensuous perception of causal connection.37
The problem formulated above is now solved immediately, the prob-
lem which Kant could solve only through the false assumption that
Hume took mathematical propositions to be analytic. Hume did not
extend the question which he raised in connection with causal judg-
ments to mathematical propositions, because such an extension is not
36. English translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), pp. 24-2. 5·
37· To be sure, perception could have provided him the causal connection only
in given particular cases. It could have shown only that a particular impact, under
definite circumstances, has the motion of a ball for its materially necessary conse-
quence. To infer from this, that under the same circumstances every impact what-
soever has a motion of the ball for its necessary consequence, presupposes the
principle that like causes have like effects. One may call this the general and
formal law of causality, but it is quite different from the latter as stated earlier. To
say that every coming-into-being and every alteration must have a cause, is not yet
to say that like causes have like effects. This latter proposition-though in a some-
what different formulation-was examined by Hume in the Enquiry. Thus it is not
quite correct to say that in the Enquiry Hume left completely unexamined the
general and formal principle of causality. There are in fact two such principles, one
of which is considered.
 possible. The necessity which was for him problematic in the case of
causal connection has nothing to do with the modal necessity of mathe-
matical states of affairs, and it is an evident equivocation when Kant in
both cases speaks of "necessary connection." 38 In still another point we
must depart from Kant's interpretation. According to him, Hume did
not recognize the necessity of causal propositions, as he did in the case
of mathematical propositions (because he thought them to be analytic).
We must dispute that also. Certainly one can speak of the apriority of
mathematical propositions according to Hume, insofar as they are con-
cerned with, as we have seen, relations of ideas; in such cases the predi-
cate is grounded in the nature of the relata. An essential mark of the
a priori is thereby satisfied. Objective necessity, on the contrary, which
Kant takes to be the criterion of the a priori, has not been cited as such
by Hume. We have seen above that it is possible to determine the
concept of the a priori from different aspects. It may be conceded that
Hume came close to recognizing necessity as the mark of relations of
ideas, since he expressly designates the impossibility of the contrary as a
property. However, he did not draw this consequence. This result, based
upon the Enquiry, is confirmed by a discussion of the Treatise. 39 In this
latter context, he speaks of the alleged necessity that 2 X 2 = 4 or that
the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and of this
necessity we are told that it "attaches only to the acts of our under-
standing by virtue of which we consider and compare these representa-
tions," exactly as "the necessity or the power which connects cause and
effect has its existence only in the compulsion of the human mind to
pass on from the one to the other." Hume recognizes as little an objec-
tive material necessity as an objective modal necessity. However, as we
have seen, no damage is thereby done to the apriority of mathematical
relations of ideas.
We have subjected the picture which Kant draws of the Humean
problematic to a modification from all sides. Hume never raised the
question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, either in
general or in a specific case. The necessity of causal propositions, which
was the subject matter of his investigations in the long run, was not
the same as the necessity of the Kantian a priori. He was rather con-
cerned with the determinate relation of causal connection which we
ascribe to events. Hume investigated this relation, as well as others, but
it has been shown to be neither a relation of ideas which can be appre-
hended by pure thought nor a fact given in sensuous perception. At this
38. Critique of Practical Reason [English Translation by T. K. Ab bott, London:
Longmans, 1963, pp. 99-100; 140-44.]
39· Lac. cit., p. 460.

• I,~ l"'l.r'l., r. n ,-... , 11 ,-. A 11 • I,

point, his skepticism regarding empirical science sets in. The danger
that this skepticism might extend to the other sciences was never
there-not because Hume held mathematical propositions to be
analytic, which in fact he never did, but because the connection of the
material necessity of causal propositions to which his doubt applied,
never obtained within the domain of mathematics. So far as mathe-
matical propositions are concerned, Hume did not, as Kant and others
following him believed, stop in the face of their necessity; rather, he also
disputed the objectivity of this modal necessity. But, to be sure, their
essential structure (Wesensgesetzlichkeit), i.e., their apriority in
Humc's sense, remains unaffected thereby.
One obviously need not assume that Hume's influence on Kant in
fact worked in the manner Kant described retrospectively. Kant's de-
scription implies that he was, already prior to that influence, in pos-
session of the critical point of view, which, however, if his own account
is correct, he first arrived at as a result of that influence. It must be more
or less clear by now that only on the basis of that critical point of view
could he arrive at the interpretation of Hume that we have criticized
above. How the influence of Hume on Kant historically took shape is a
question that requires more careful inquiry. We may, however, say
this much on the basis of the results of our discussion: The more
authentic the account of this influence on Kant, the more specifically
the interpretation of Hume which Kant gives in the critical writings
corresponds to the actual picture that he received at that time and that
influenced him, the higher shall we assess the autonomy of his thinking
and his independence from Hume.
Translated by J. N. Mohanty