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PRE-WEEK NOTES ON JUDICIAL ETHICS

Deputy Court Administrator Raul B. Villanueva
2018 Bar Exams

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

1. Who has administrative supervision over judges?

The Supreme Court (SC) has “administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.”
(Sec. 6, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). This empowers the Supreme Court to oversee, among others, the
judges’ “administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations, and to take administrative
actions against them if they violate these legal norms”. (OCA v. Judge Ruiz, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, 02
February 2016)

2. Who assists the Supreme Court in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision over
all courts?
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No.
828 dated 18 November 1975 to “assist the (SC) in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision over all courts.” In PD No. 828, the SC was given the authority to determine and define the
powers, functions and responsibilities of the Court Administrator and Deputy Court Administrators.
(Sec. 6, PD No. 828)

3. Does the Office of the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over administrative actions against
judges?
No. It is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers. (Judge Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993; Judge Caoibes,
Jr. v. The Honorable Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 132177, 19 July 2001)

4. Can judges be preventively suspended?

Yes. The SC possesses the power to preventively suspend an administratively charged judge until a
final decision is reached particularly when a serious charge is involved and a strong likelihood of guilt
exists. (OCA v. Judge Ruiz, supra.)

5. What is the nature of the preventive suspension that may be imposed on judges?
The power to preventively suspend judges is inherent in the SC’s power of administrative supervision
over all courts and their personnel as a measure to allow unhampered formal investigation. It is
likewise a preventive measure to shield the public from any further damage that the continued exercise
by the judge of the functions of his office may cause. (OCA v. Judge Ruiz, ibid.) Thus, the preventive
suspension is not considered a penalty but a preventive measure.

6. Is the SC deprived of the authority to rule on complaints against judges who retired or has
been separated from the service?
That a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest
the SC of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the service. (OCA v. Judge
Ruiz, ibid.)

7. Why does the SC still retains its jurisdiction over erring judges who committed infractions
while in the service?
The SC retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. (Gallo v.
Judge Cordero, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1035, 21 June 1995)

8. Is the act committed prior to the appointment of a judge to the judiciary under the jurisdiction
of the SC?
Yes. It is immaterial that the respondent was not yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly
committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. The rules of the SC itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for the
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immediate forwarding to the SC for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. (OCA v. Judge Ruiz,
supra.)

9. Can an administrative charge against a judge be considered as a disciplinary action against

him as a member of the Bar?
Yes. In Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-9-02-SC (dated 17 September 2002), it is provided
that an administrative charge against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also
grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar (like violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility), shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such
judge as a member of the Bar. The said administrative matter also states that judgment in both respects
(or cases) may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (OCA v. Judge Ruiz, ibid.)

10. Can an erring judge be disbarred in the same administrative case filed against him without
affording him his right to due process?
No. A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC requires that the respondent judge must comment on the complaint and show
cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a
member of the Bar. (OCA v. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813/A.M. No. 12-1-09-MeTC/A.M. No.
MTJ-13-1836/A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815; OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ/OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ/OCA
IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ/OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ/A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821, 22 November 2016)

11. What is the quantum of evidence required in cases involving judicial officers?
Only substantial evidence is required to support the SC’s conclusions in administrative proceedings.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even
if such might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. (OCA v. Judge Ruiz, supra.)

12. Are notice and hearing indispensable in administrative proceedings against judges?
No. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Serve, which govern the conduct of
disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical
rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. (OCA v. Judge
Ruiz, ibid.)

PROCEEDINGS FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES

(OR APPELLATE COURT JUSTICES)

13. How are complaints against judges (or justices) initiated?

Complaints against judges/justices can be instituted in 3 ways: (1) motu proprio by the SC; or (2) upon
a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. (Sec. 1, Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC effective 01 October
2001)

14. What action can be taken on the complaint if it is sufficient in form and substance?
If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon the
respondent and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of service. (Sec. 2,
Rule 140)

15. Who will be assigned to conduct an investigation of the respondent if the SC requires this?
Under Sec. 3, Rule 140, the following are assigned to conduct the investigation of a respondent judge
(or justice):
RESPONDENT DESIGNATED TO INVESTIGATE
 Justice of the CA, CTA or SB  Retired SC Justice
NOTE: Usually designated by the SC en banc
 Judge of a RTC or a special court of  CA Justice
equivalent rank (Shari’ah District Court) NOTE: The CA has stations in Manila, Cebu
and Cagayan de Oro. The investigating justice
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will come from the station who has jurisdiction

over the respondent’s case
 Judge of an inferior court (Municipal Trial  Judge of the RTC
Courts/Shari’ah Circuit Court) NOTE: Usually designated is the RTC
Executive Judge who has jurisdiction over the
respondent

16. How long should the investigation last? When is the report of the investigation to be
submitted?
The investigation, which involves the presentation of oral and documentary evidence by the parties
before the investigating justice/judge, shall be terminated within 90 days (unless extended by the SC).
Thereafter, the investigation report should be submitted within 30 days, containing the findings of
fact and recommendation, accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the pleadings filed
by the parties. (Secs. 4 & 5, Rule 140)

17. What is the classification of charges that judges (or justices) can be liable for? Name some of
them.
Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious and light. Serious charges are those,
among others, involving bribery, dishonesty and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law,
gross misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, immorality, and gross ignorance of the
law. (Sec. 8, Rule 140) Less serious charges are those for undue delay in rendering a decision or order,
unauthorized practice of law, violation of SC rules, directives or orders, double compensation and
simple misconduct. (Sec. 9, Rule 140) Light charges pertain to vulgar and unbecoming conduct,
gambling in public, fraternizing with lawyers, and undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
(Sec. 10, Rule 140)

18. What are the sanctions that may be imposed for those guilty of a serious charge, a less serious
charge or a light charge?
Under Sec. 11, Rule 140, the following are the sanctions for those found guilty of the charges filed
against them:

KIND OF CHARGE SANCTION/PENALTY

Serious charge  Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits (except earned leaved credits), and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs); or
 Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months; or
 Fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000
Less serious charge  Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than 1 nor more than 3 months; or
 Fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000
Light charge  Fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000;
and, or
 Censure, reprimand or admonition with warning
19. What is the nature of the proceedings against judges (or justices)?
The proceedings shall be private and confidential. Likewise, a copy of the decision or resolution shall
be attached to the record of the case. (Sec. 12, Rule 140)

20. Can the SC impose a fine in an amount exceeding P40,000?

Yes. This depends on the situation. A judge who is already retired from the service at the time the Court
promulgated its decision was fined P100,000, taking into account the several cases and motions he had
failed to dispose of, the unreasonable delay the omission caused to the parties, and the judge’s previous
administrative charge for the same offense. (OCA v. Retired Judge Tandinco, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1760,
16 November 2015)
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21. Is a judge who interferes with a case, offers bribes to some witnesses not to testify therein and
have the records sent to his sala or court without raffle, as well as for committing acts of
immorality, liable for serious charges?
Yes. The interference of a judge in a case and having the records thereof directly sent to his sala
without raffle are not only gross misconduct on the part of the judge, but also, constitutes a violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, especially when bribes were offered for some witnesses not to
testify in the subject case. Further, failure to offer any evidence, except general denials to disprove his
moral indiscretion, which appeared to be widely known in the community, and simply dismissing the
same as a mere fabrication, renders respondent judge liable for immorality. Indeed, gross misconduct,
bribery, violation of RA No. 3019 and immorality, all of them constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, are SERIOUS CHARGES under Sec. 8, Rule 140, that merit the penalty of
dismissal from the service. (Rivera v. Judge Blancaflor, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290, 18 November 2014)

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

22. How many canons does the New Code of Judicial Conduct have? Describe each briefly.
The NCJC has 6 canons (Triple I-PEC). These canons are the following:
1. Independence (Canon 1) – this is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of
fair play. It requires judges to uphold and exemplify JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE in the exercise of
their judicial functions, free of any extraneous or outside influence from any quarter, including those
from the Executive and Legislative branches of government, as well as be independent from their
judicial colleagues, refrain from influencing the outcome of litigation before another court or
administrative agency, and not allow their family, social or other relationships to influence their judicial
conduct or judgment.

2. Integrity (Canon 2) – this is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges. This requires judges to conduct themselves above reproach, their
behavior must reaffirm the people’s faith in the INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIARY, and see to it that
justice is done and is seen to be done.

3. Impartiality (Canon 3) – this is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It requires
judges to perform their duties without favor, bias or prejudice, ensure that their conduct, in or out of the
court, maintains and enhances the confidence in the IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDGE AND THE
JUDICIARY, minimize occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from
hearing or deciding cases, disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they
are unable to decide the matter impartially, and not make any comment that might affect the outcome of
any case, proceeding or pending litigation.

4. Propriety (Canon 4) – this is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. It requires a
judge to AVOID IMPROPRIETY or the appearance thereof in all his activities, accept personal
restrictions, not give rise or reason to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality involving
members of the legal profession, exercise his rights or freedoms (like freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly) in a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office, not allow the
prestige of his judicial office to advance private interests, limit activities (like writing, giving lectures
or teaching) on matters concerning the law, the legal system and the administration of justice, not
practice law and not ask or accept any gift, bequest, loan or favor that might affect the performance of
judicial duties.

5. Equality (Canon 5) – this requires treating equally all those coming to the courts. This requires
judges to be aware of the diversity in society and differences arising from various sources (such as race,
color, sex, religion, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status), NOT TO
MANIFEST BIAS OR PREJUDICE, by words or deeds, towards any person or group on irrelevant or
baseless grounds, carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, and require
lawyers to refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice towards anyone.

6. Competence and Diligence – these are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. It
requires judges to give priority and DEVOTE THEIR PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY TO THEIR
JUDICIAL DUTIES, take steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities
necessary for the proper performance of their judicial functions efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
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promptness, and maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before them, as well as be patient,
dignified and courteous with those he deals with in an official capacity.

23. Are Justices of the appellate courts or third level courts (Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan or
Court of Tax Appeals) covered by the NCJC?
Yes. When the NCJC refers to a “judge” this actually means any person exercising judicial power
however designated the said “judge” may be. Thus, the NCJC covers Justices of the appellate or third
level courts as they are under the administrative supervision of the SC.

24. Are Justices of the SC covered by the NCJC?

No. The procedure to discipline Justices of the SC is covered by the appropriate provisions of the
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. XI – on removal of SC members through impeachment), the SC Internal
Rules (Sec. 13, Rule 2 – on the creation of the Ethics Committee that investigates all complaints
involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards, including anonymous complaints,
filed against members of the SC) and recent jurisprudence (on quo warranto).

25. Can a judge who, upon the conduct of a judicial audit, was found to have cases for decision
that remained undecided beyond the reglementary period and cases with pending incidents also
unresolved beyond the reglementary period, be absolved of any liability on the ground that such
failure was due to “human frailties”?
No. A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an
extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits an administrative sanction. Judges must closely adhere to the
Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence and independence of the
judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient. (OCA v. Judge Bustamante, A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1806, 07 April 2014)

26. What is the remedy of a judge who might not be able to decide cases within the reglementary
period?
While the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are regarded as mandatory
(like the 90-day period to decide regular cases or the 15-day period to decide drugs cases), the Court
has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of our judges and has been understanding of the
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing their businesses. The Court, in several
instances, has allowed extensions of time to decide cases
beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request from the Court an extension of
time to decide the cases (prior to the lapse of the reglementary period), and to justify any request
for additional time. (OCA v. Retired Judge Tandinco, supra.)

27. Can a judge notarize affidavits of cohabitation for contracting parties whose marriages he
likewise solemnized?
No. This is in violation of Circular No. 1-90 dated 26 February 1999 which allows municipal trial court
judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official
functions and duties. Municipal trial court judges may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake
the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of
conveyances that bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions judges. Under the
NCJC on Integrity, judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. If the law involved is basic, ignorance
constitutes “lack of integrity”. (Tupal v. Judge Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, 24 February 2014)

28. What are the 2 kinds of inhibition?

Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court contemplates 2 kinds of inhibition, COMPULSORY
DISQUALIFICATION and VOLUNTARY INHIBITION. Compulsory disqualification assumes
that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for reasons stated in the 1 st paragraph of Sec. 1,
Rule 137. On the other hand, voluntary inhibition under the 2 nd paragraph of the said section leaves to
the judge’s discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons
with only his conscience to guide him. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. (Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, etc., IPI
No. 12-203-CA-J, 10 December 2013)
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29. Can a judge who handles a criminal case involving a sibling and issuing a warrant for her
arrest administratively liable?
Yes. The Court has been clear about the compulsory disqualification of judges related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party being a duty designed to free the adjudication of cases from
suspicion as to its fairness and integrity. As such, the issuance of a judge of the warrant of arrest
against his own sister was an outright violation of the stringent rules on compulsory disqualification.
For said judge, self-disqualification was absolute and should have been immediate. This is basic as a
rule of thumb for which an erring judge may be held accountable for gross ignorance of the law or rule.
(Dr. Paderanga, et al. v. Judge Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, 17 August 2015)

30. Are allegations of bias, negligence or improper motives against a judge sufficient for him to
inhibit?
No. The mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his
noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. (Re:
Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, etc., supra.; Ascaño, et al. v. Judge Jacinto, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, 12
January 2015)

31. Can a judge be penalized for raising his voice and uttering abrasive and unnecessary remarks
to a litigant’s witness?
Yes. A judge who raises his voice and utters abrasive and unnecessary remarks to a party’s
witness fails to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Sec. 6, Canon 6, NCJC.
Instead, a judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court.
(Ascaño v. Judge Jacinto, ibid.)

32. Compare the grounds for disqualification or inhibition of a judge in handling a case under
Sec. 5, Canon 3, NCJC, and the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers under Sec. 1,
Rule 137, Rules of Court.
Sec. 5, Canon 3, NCJC and Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, have almost similar grounds for
compulsory disqualification and different, to a large extent, on grounds for voluntary inhibition, to wit:

NATURE OF SEC. 5, CANON 3 SEC. 1, RULE 137

DISQUALIFICATIO NCJC RULES OF COURT
N/
INHIBITION
COMPULSORY  Judge knows that his or her  Judge or his wife or child,
DISQUALIFICATION spouse or child has a financial is pecuniarily interested
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, as heir, legatee, creditor or
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the otherwise, in any case
subject matter in controversy or
in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceedings  Judge is related to either
 Judge is related by party within the 6th
consanguinity or affinity to a degree of consanguinity
party litigant within the 6th civil or affinity, or to counsel
degree or to counsel within the within the 4th degree
4th civil degree  Judge has been executor,
 Judge served as executor, administrator, trustee or
administrator, guardian, counsel in any case
trustee, or lawyer in a case or
matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge
served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or
lawyer was a material witness
therein  Judge has presided in any
 Judge’s ruling in a lower court inferior court when his
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is the subject of review ruling or decision is the

subject of review

 Judge previously served as a

lawyer or was a material
witness in the matter in
controversy
 Judge, or a member of his or her
family, has an economic interest
in the outcome of the matter in
controversy
 Judge has actual bias or
prejudice concerning a party or
personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings
VOLUNTARY  Judge may, in the
INHIBITION EXERCISE of his
SOUND DISCRETION,
disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for JUST
or VALID REASONS

33. May a compulsorily disqualified judge still be allowed to participate in the proceeding?
Yes. A compulsorily disqualified judge may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on
the records the basis of his disqualification. If based on such disclosure the parties and lawyers,
independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing (which must be incorporated in the
records of the proceedings) that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the
judge may then participate in the proceeding. (Sec. 6, Canon 3, NCJC) This is likewise allowed
under Sec. 1, Rule 137.

34. Can a judge be dismissed from the service for a “chance meeting” with a complainant who
has pending cases before him in the absence of counsel?
Yes. By meeting privately with complainant, in the absence of the latter’s counsel,

respondent judge violated, among others, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the NCJC. A judge is the visible
representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. His actions are suspect
when, after the said meeting, the complainant suffered reversals in her cases before the respondent
judge, indicating his lack of impartiality (Canon 2). The insistence of respondent that what he had
with complainant was a “chance meeting” belittled the integrity required of judges in all their
dealings inside and outside the courts (Canon 3). For these actions, respondent judge lost the
requisite integrity, impartiality and propriety fundamental to his office. Further, for violating Canons 2,
3 and 4 of the NCJC, respondent judge is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. (Sison-Barias
v. Judge Rubia, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, 10 June 2014)

35. May a judge be allowed to appear as a “counsel of the respondent’s counsel”?

No. The actuations of respondent judge, providing assistance to her daughter who recently passed the
bar examinations in representation of his wife, and then declaring upon being questioned about his
presence in an administrative proceeding that he is serving as the “counsel of the respondent’s
counsel”, renders him administratively liable. Canon 4, among others, reiterate the prohibition from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. It ensures as well
that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors
to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their
functions. (Sps. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217, 08 April 2013)

36. Is a respondent judge, after filing his comment to the charges against him, deprived of his
right to due process for not being able to participate further in the administrative proceedings?
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No. Respondent’s right to due process is not violated by the resolution of the case since he already
submitted his comment containing his explanations and refutations of the charge against him. In
administrative cases, the requirement of due process is satisfied whenever the parties are
afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy, either
through oral arguments or through pleadings. (Sps. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon, ibid.)

37. Is it proper for a judge to get the collections of his courts and borrow the same?
No. The act of misappropriating court funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct. Court
funds should not be used outside of official business. This is contrary to Canon 5 which enjoins
judges from accepting a “loan” from anyone except as may be authorized by law. (OCA v. Judge Balut,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-15-2426, 16 June 2015)

38. Can a judge who was earlier fined for his undecided cases and unresolved pending incidents
discovered during a judicial audit still be held liable and dismissed from the service for collection
shortages of court fees that was detected during a financial audit?
Yes. The fine earlier imposed on respondent judge was in connection with the judicial audit
conducted with respect to his court cases, not about court funds, hence, he can still be penalized
separately for the same. A review of the records shows that respondent judge actually messed with the
court collections. (OCA v. Judge Balut, ibid.)

39. Are judges absolutely free to participate in social networking (or social media) activities?
No. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social
networking activities (like Friendster as in the instant case), they have to be reminded that they do not
thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is
in this light that the Court finds the respondent guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures
(described as “vulgar” or “lewd”) in a manner viewable by the public. When respondent made the
pictures available for public

consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may
be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. (Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2200, 02 April 2014)

NOTE: OCA CIRCULAR NO. 173-2017 dated 17 August 2017 (Proper Use of Social Media) enjoined
Judges and court personnel who participate in social media TO BE CAUTIOUS AND CIRCUMSPECT
in POSTING PHOTOGRAPHS, LIKING POSTS AND MAKING COMMENTS IN PUBLIC ON
SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKING SITES, for public confidence in the judiciary (may be) eroded by
their irresponsible or improper conduct.

40. Can a judge who was investigating or who investigated an administrative complaint against
another judge be allowed to discuss or comment thereon in his law class or among his students
while it is still pending resolution or final action by the SC?
No. While the judge cannot be charged with misconduct since the remarks against the judge
being investigated was made in his class discussions and not related to the discharge of his official
functions as a judge, he is still liable for violating the sub judice rule as proscribed in Sec. 4,
Canon 3 (Impartiality) which states that judges shall not “make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.” As such, he cannot make
comments thereon to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. No matter how noble his objective
may be, and even if he is invoking his constitutional right to free speech, in discussing a pending case
he carried out the same with insensitivity and in bad taste. To the Court, a judge should always
conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself, the Court and the judiciary as a whole, pursuant to Secs. 1 and 2, Canon 4 (Propriety).
When respondent judge failed to restrain himself in discussing the case of the judge under
investigation, this strongly indicated his intention to taint said judge’s reputation. As a judge,
respondent is expected to uphold and comply with the ethical conduct expected of him not only in the
performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as well, in accordance
with Secs. 1 and 2, Canon 2 (Integrity). However, the instant charge being his first offense, the
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appropriate penalty under the circumstances is admonition. (Tormis v. Judge Paredes, A.M. No.
RTJ013-2366, 04 February 2015)

41. Can a judge be penalized for making an untruthful statement in his Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) that he prepared and/or submitted before being appointed to the Judiciary?
Yes. While being a provincial prosecutor, respondent judge as admonished for simple misconduct in an
Ombudsman case. This is considered an administrative offense, which the said judge should have
declared in his Personal Data Sheet when he was asked therein: “Have you ever been convicted of any
administrative offense?” As visible representation of the law, respondent judge should have
conducted himself in a manner which would merit the respect of the people in him in particular
and to the Judiciary in general. Dishonesty is considered a grave offense. (In re: Anonymous
Complaint against Judge Contreras, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2452, 9 March 2016)

42. May a judge who fails to pay his debts be held administratively liable?
Yes. Propriety and appearance of impropriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge. Thus, judges are enjoined to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities. The Court held that the mere inability of a judge to pay a loan constitutes impropriety,
moreso when there is no intentional act for such failure on his part. (Ongcuangco Trading Corp. v.
Judge Pinlac, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2402, 15 April 2015)

43. Is it correct for a judge to claim that her first marriage was invalid due to the solemnizing
officer’s lack of authority to justify her contracting a second marriage?
No. While the second marriage of respondent judge may not be considered as bigamous since the first
marriage is invalid due to the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority, she may have disobeyed the law
by knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws

(Art. 350, Revised Penal Code). Her marriage may be ceremonial based on a religious ritual being
followed or observed by her and her first husband under the benevolent neutrality doctrine and
claims of religious freedom, this cannot shield the respondent judge from liability for misconduct
under our laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first husband. She
knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with her second husband while her first
marriage was subsisting. (Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, 22 July 2015)

44. Can a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law be dismissed from the service?
Yes. A judge manifests serious lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic legal principles on
prejudicial question and on jurisdiction in petitions for suspension of criminal action based on
prejudicial question, as prescribed by Secs. 6 and 7, Rule 111. The rule is clear that in filing a
petition for suspension of criminal action based upon a pendency of a prejudicial action in a civil
action, the same should be made before the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. If an information had already been filed before the court for trial, the
petition to suspend should be filed before the court where the information was filed. In the instant case,
the civil case was filed only after criminal proceedings have already been conducted by the prosecution
service. Hence, such civil case cannot serve as a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the
proceedings in the first criminal case. The respondent’s actions did not only affect the image of the
judiciary, it also put his competency and even his moral character in serious doubt. In order to
have a successful implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit
members, officials and personnel, a rigid set of rules of conduct must necessarily be imposed on
judges. After all, the standard of integrity applied to them (judges) is – and should be – higher
than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the privilege and the right
to judge. (DOJ v. Judge Mislang/Home Development Mutual Fund v. Judge Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-
14-2369/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372, 26 July 2016)

45. Can the SC consolidate all the administrative cases against an erring judge and decide the
same in one resolution?
Yes. The SC can consolidate cases of judges involving several charges for gross misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression and conduct unbecoming of a judge, as
well as other closely-related administrative complaints involving the same respondent. (OCA v.
Judge Yu, etc., supra.)
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46. Is non-compliance with a directive of the SC for the establishment of night courts in some
stations justified simply because the judge is still protesting the same and her protest has not yet
been acted upon?
No. To say that the protest should be resolved first so as not to render it moot before complying
with the valid issuance or directive of the court is sheer arrogance. Any issuance or directive from
the Court (or even the Office of the Court Administrator) is not a mere request, but should be
complied with. With respect to such issuances or directives, judges are considered as not enjoying
the privilege to dissent. As such, the unexpected resistance to implement a valid SC order constituted
gross insubordination. She also committed gross misconduct for betraying her sworn duty to maintain
fealty to the law and brought dishonor to the Judiciary. (OCA v. Judge Yu, etc., ibid.; In re: Evaluation
of Administrative Liability of Judge Lubao, etc., A.M. No. 15-09-314-RTC, 19 April 2016)

47. Do judges have unrestricted freedoms of speech and expression?

No. Judges and other judicial officers of the land may enjoy the freedoms of speech and expression as
citizens of the Republic, they should always conduct themselves, while expressing such freedoms,
in a manner that should preserve the dignity of their judicial offices and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. (OCA v. Judge Yu, etc., supra.; Sec. 6, Canon 4, NCJC)

48. Can a judge refuse to honor the appointments of court personnel duly processed by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA)?
No. A judge cannot impose her recommendee on the OCA’s Selection and Promotion Board
which was legally mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its assessment of applicants
based on performance, eligibility, education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments,
psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and potentials. More importantly, characterizing the
appointment of a court personnel as “void ab initio” or “a big joke” is showing disrespect, which
renders the respondent judge guilty of another serious misconduct. (OCA v. Judge Yu, etc., ibid)

49. Can a judge issue a show-cause order against his/her fellow judges?
No. The issuance of a show-cause order by a judge against his/her fellow judges represented clear
abuse of court processes, and revealed his/her arrogance in the exercise of his/her authority as a
judicial officer. Such judge thereby knowingly assumed the role of a tyrant wielding power with
unbridled breadth. Moreso, if such issuance emanated from a desire to retaliate against fellow judges
and the concerned court employees considering that the allegedly contumacious conduct was the
copying of court records to be used as evidence in the administrative complaint against the judge. The
judge also thereby breached her duty to disqualify himself/herself from acting at all on the
matter. (OCA v. Judge Yu, etc., ibid)

50. Is it proper for a judge to send inappropriate messages to a fellow judge? Can these messages
be considered as confidential and inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule?
No. Sending messages that contain sexual insinuations is ostensibly improper for a judge. Such
showed deep-seated proclivities reflective of conduct unbecoming of a member of the Judiciary.
Also, the exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, presupposes a violation of
law on the part of the agents of the Government, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined under the
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. III). Since the subject of the inquiry was the messages sent to a fellow judge,
the ownership of the messages pertained to the latter as the recipient. As such, the receiving judge
who grants access thereto does not violate the erring judge’s right to privacy. (OCA v. Judge Yu,
etc., ibid)

51. May a judge archive a case after issuing a warrant of arrest?

No. The respondent judge violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated 21 June 1993
(Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases) when she issued an order directing the immediate
archiving of the subject criminal cases, after ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the accused in the same order. The archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure
designed to shelve cases but is done only where no immediate action is expected. Respondent did
not cite any ground for the suspension of the proceedings. What she did was unprecedented. She did
not even bother to wait for the return of the warrants or wait for the six-month period before archiving
the case. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if not incompetence and ignorance of the law and
 11

jurisprudence. It was a case of grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not in accord with law
or justice. (Judge Marcos [Ret.] v. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, 24 January 2017)

52. Is it correct for a judge to recall the warrants of arrest on the claim that these were issued
inadvertently?
No. Such actuation shows manifest bias and partiality, if not gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote
that the warrants of arrest were “inadvertently issued” without any explanation why there was
such inadvertence in the issuance. The Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of
the judicial function. It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to
personally determine the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants of
arrest. (Judge Marcos [Ret.] v. Judge Cabrera-Faller, ibid.)

53. Will the hasty dismissal of a criminal case result in administrative liability on the part of the
judge?
Yes. The well-settled rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused,
rests on the sound discretion of the said court is not absolute. Dismissing the case on the ground
that there was “no probable cause” was strained and taxed one’s credulity. Respondent judge should
know that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. A hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is strong
or weak. A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of
the crime charged. This is not so obtaining in the instant hazing case. (Judge Marcos [Ret.] v. Judge
Cabrera-Faller, ibid)

54. Can a judge who is considered resigned from judicial office still be penalized?
Yes. A judge who filed her certificate of candidacy to run for public office is deemed resigned from
judicial office. Nevertheless, cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is
not a ground to dismiss the case filed against said judge at the time that she was still in the public
service. Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal for said judge’s unethical conduct and gross
inefficiency in performing her duties as a member of the bench, the Court imposed instead the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of all said judge’s retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits. Furthermore, she is barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. (OCA v. Judge Demot-
Mariñas, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446/A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, 7 March 2017)

55. Is it mandatory that an anonymous complaint be supported by affidavits, documents or

public records which may substantiate the allegations therein?
No. The Court can initiate proceedings for the discipline of judges motu proprio pursuant to Sec.
1, Rule 140. Thus, the Court has acted upon anonymous complaints on its own initiative “needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant” and the Court, to determine the veracity
of the allegations made therein, usually directs the conduct of discreet investigations. (Anonymous
complaint against Judge Duremdes, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2493, 17 April 2017)

56. May a judge who drinks every night at public places administratively liable?
Yes. This behavior negatively impacts on the reputation of respondent being a judge and of the
judiciary as well. A judge’s personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but
also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible
personification of law and justice. (Anonymous complaint against Judge Duremdes, ibid)

57. Can a judge who opted to optionally retire be held liable for continuing to function as a judge
beyond the stated effectivity period of his optional retirement?
Yes. Administrative Circular No. 43-2004 (Adopting New Guidelines on the Filing of Applications
for Optional Retirement) required, among others, that the judge applying for optional retirement
should already cease working and discharging his functions as judge even “(i)f on the date
specified in the application as the date of the effectivity of the (optional) retirement, (he) has not
yet received any notice of approval or denial of his application.” The OCA found and reported that
 12

in the period in question respondent judge decided 10 civil cases and 4 criminal cases assigned to his
branch, as well as dismissing 10 criminal cases and acquitting an accused in a criminal case in another
branch where he was assigned. (OCA v. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, 18 April 2017)

58. Can a judge conduct his trial without wearing a judicial robe?
No. The claim of respondent judge that he was not wearing the judicial robe due to extreme,
non-functioning air-conditioning units and regular brownouts, is unacceptable. The wearing of robes
by judges during official proceedings, which harks back to the 14 th century, is not an idle
ceremony. Such practice serves the dual purpose of “heighten(ing) public consciousness on the
solemnity of judicial proceedings” and of impressing upon the judge, the exacting obligations of
his office. Also, respondent’s act of not wearing the judicial robe during court sessions is violative of
Administrative Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989. (Mclaren, et al. v. Judge Gonzales, A.M. No. MTJ-
16-1876, 26 April 2017)

59. May a judge be held liable for recommending for employment a convicted felon who has not
yet been discharged from probation?
Yes. A judge should be circumspect and wait for the final discharge of her recommendee for utility
worker before entertaining his application and giving him his favorable recommendation, as it is only
upon the final discharge of said applicant from probation that his case is deemed terminated and
all his civil rights lost or suspended are restored. Such act on the part of the judge is violative of
the canon on propriety. (Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint, Judge Samson, et al., A.M. No MTJ-16-
1870, 6 June 2017)

60. Can a judge be penalized for harassing and humiliating a police officer assigned at the hall of
justice?
Yes. The dissatisfaction of a judge with the decision to post police officers in the hall of justice does not
justify acts of accosting the complainant police officer. While respondent judge may be security
conscious, checking the booking of firearms is not part of his job. Further, his act of demanding for the
police officer’s firearms and Acknowledgment Receipt of Equipment in an aggressive manner
effectively harassed the already nervous police officer. Being a magistrate, respondent judge should
have observed judicial temperament which requires him to be always temperate, patient, and
courteous, both in conduct and in language. (PO1 Marcelo v. Judge Barcillano, A.M. No. RTJ-16-
2450, 7 June 2017)

EXECUTION OF PENALTIES AND CLEMENCY

61. What is the nature of decisions in administrative cases involving judicial officers?
Decisions in administrative cases are immediately executor; therefore judges dismissed from the
service can no longer discharge judicial functions and receive salaries and allowances. In fact,
even if the Court resolution is subject to a motion for reconsideration, the decision is immediately
executory. (DOJ v. Judge Mislang/Home Development Mutual Fund v. Judge Mislang, supra)

62. When are fines imposed on erring judges supposed to be paid?

Fines imposed against judges and lower court personnel must be paid within 30 days from receipt of
the decision, unless a different period has been prescribed by the Court. If a fine remains unpaid
beyond 30 days or not time-bound but remains unpaid for 30 days, the same shall be reported to the
OCA who will require the concerned judge or personnel to explain the failure to pay the fine and to pay
it within 10 days. If there is a failure to comply therewith, the appropriate recommendation will be
made to the Court for appropriate action. (OCA Circular No. 63-2012, 10 July 2012)

63. What is the nature of judicial clemency?

Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge. It can
be granted only if there is a showing that it is merited; thus, proof of reformation and a showing of
potential and promise are indispensable. (Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge
Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183 [Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of then Judge Villalon-
Pornillos], 14 February 2017)

64. What are the requirements in order to be entitled to judicial clemency?

The requirements for the grant of judicial clemency involve the following:
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REQUIREMENTS DESCRIPTION/RATIONALE
Proof of remorse and Includes but should not be limited to certifications or
reformation testimonies of the officer(s) and chapter(s) of the IBP, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity
NOTE: A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation
Sufficient time must have This is to insure a period of reformation
lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty
The age of the person asking This is to show that petitioner still has productive years ahead
for clemency of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself
There must be a showing of Includes intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
promise and potential for contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the
public service legal system or administrative and other relevant skills

There must be other relevant Includes providing community service socio-civic work,
factors and circumstances that religious involvement, or assistance to
may justify clemency indigents/paupers/poor or down-trodden
(Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Villalon-Pornillos, ibid)