@ The Metaphilosophy Foundation and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995.

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MET APHILOSOPHY
Vol. 26, No. 1&2, January/April 1995
0026-1068

A DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON

QUENTIN SMITH

I
The Principle of Sufficient Reason has very few contemporary defenders
of any of its versions. (For a recent critique of this principle, see [Post
1991, 1987; Smith and Craig 1993, pp. 178-1911). This is particularly
true of some of its stronger versions, such as the principle that there is a
sufficient reason why there are true propositions that entail that some
contingent concrete objects exist. Most if not all contemporary
philosophers believe this strong version of the principle is necessarily
false, and some have presented an argument that it is necessarily false
(e.g., [Rowe 19751). The aim of this paper is to show that this principle
is possibly true and is necessarily true if either (a) God necessarily exists
or (b) space-time necessarily exists and contingently possesses a
quantum mechanical vacuum. I will also distinguish this version of the
principle from some other strong versions of PSR (principle of sufficient
reason), all of which can be false consistently with the necessary truth of
our version of the principle.

I1
I begin by distinguishing several versions of PSR and defining my key
terms. Four versions of PSR are:

PSRl : Each true proposition that entails that some contingent concrete
object (body or mind) begins to exist has a sufficient reason why it is
true.
PSR,: Each true proposition that entails that some concrete object
exists has a sufficient reason why it is true.
PSR3: Each true proposition has a sufficient reason why it is true.
PSR,: There is a sufficient reason why there are true propositions that
entail that some contingent concrete object exists.

I shall show that PSR, can be true and, moreover, can be true
consistently with the falsity of PSR1, PSRz and PSR3. This requires
some key terms to be defined.
Some propositions are contingently the semantic content of sentence-
tokens and all propositions are necessarily bearers of truth values

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98 QUENTIN SMITH

(assuming there are no true value gaps). I adopt a realist theory of

propositions that implies propositions are abstract objects that have a
sentence-like structure (but are not themselves sentences), and that
propositions are neither reducible to nor dependent upon human mental
phenomena (see [Smith 1993, pp. 133-2241). A contingent and positive
truth is a proposition that entails some contingent concrete object exists.
An object is contingent if and only if it exists in some but not all possible
worlds. Whatever is a concrete object is a body (electron, star, etc.) or
mind (e.g., a human mind).
A sufficient reason for the truth of a contingent and positive
proposition p is another proposition q that meets two conditions: (i) q
explains why p is true, (ii) q entails p, in the sense of relevance logic.
Note that (ii) is a stronger condition than the condition that “q strictly
implies p”, since the proposition that Alice is awake on November 4,
1994 strictly implies that triangles have three sides, but there is no
relation of relevant entailment. (Each necessary truth is strictly implied
by each contingent truth, but it is not the case that each necessary truth
is relevantly entailed by each contingent truth.) Furthermore, condition
(ii) about relevant entailment is not enough by itself to give a
metaphysically interesting definition of sufficient reason , since condition
(ii) by itself gives us many trivial cases of sufficient reasons. For
example, the proposition that Alice is attentive most of the day on
November 4, I994 relevantly entails that Alice is awake o n November 4,
2994, but the first proposition is a sufficient reason for the second only
in a trivial and uninteresting sense. Condition (i) about explanation is
not met by this pair of propositions, since Alice’s attentiveness does not
explain why she is awake but is merely the mode in which she is awake.
An example where conditions (i) and (ii) are both met is that the
proposition, all bodies in the solar system at a distance f r o m the sun are
gravitationally attracted to the sun, and the earth is in the solar system,
entails the earth is gravitationully attracted to the sun. The first
proposition explains and relevantly entails the second proposition and
thus is a “sufficient reason” for it in a metaphysically interesting sense.
Given condition (i) about explanation, condition (ii) about relevant
entailment is not redundant; explanation does not require entailment,
let alone relevant entailment, since some explanations are probabilistic.
The sufficient reason for the truth of any metaphysically necessary
proposition p is p itself. In the case of any necessarily true proposition p,
conditions (i) and (ii) are both met by the proposition p itself: the
explanation for the truth of p lies in the nature of p itself (and not in
some different proposition q that makes p true) and p relevantly entails
p (each proposition relevantly entails itself).
The above remarks suffice to define my key terms. I shall now argue
that PSR3 is necessarily false, and PSR, and PSRz contingently false,
consistently with the necessary truth of PSR4. This involves examining

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 A DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON 99

the three false principles of sufficient reason and arguing that the fourth
principle, PSR4, is possibly true and may reasonably be held to be
necessarily true.

111
The third principle of sufficient reason I listed is:

PSR3: Every true proposition has a sufficient reason why it is true.

There is a demonstration that PSR3 is necessarily false. Consider the

actual world W. The actual world is the maximal proposition W, such
that W (a) entails each proposition p o r its negation and W (b) possesses
only true conjuncts. Any merely possible world W* is a maximal
proposition that meets condition (a) but not (b); at least one of W*s
conjuncts is false. Thus, a world is a maximal proposition and the
actuality of the world W is the being true of that proposition. (Note that
the universe is not the actual world; the universe is the aggregate of all
bodies and embodied minds.) Is it logically possible that there is a
sufficient reason why the actual world W is actual? Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that God actually exists and creates the universe.
Thus, the proposition, God creates the universe, is one of the true
conjuncts of the actual world W. This proposition about God is a
sufficient reason for the truth of the universe exists, but it is not a
sufficient reason for the truth of the proposition world W is actual.
Assuming the classical definition of God as free in the libertarian sense,
there is no sufficient reason for the truth of the proposition God creates
the universe. God is not psychologically or logically determined to create
a universe, let alone this universe, and thus there is no sufficient reason
for the truth of the proposition God creates the universe. Given this,
there is no sufficient reason for the truth of the proposition that world W
is actual. If there is one conjunct (of the maximal proposition) whose
truth has no sufficient reason, then the truth of the maximal proposition
has no sufficient reason. The truth of a conjunction has a sufficient
reason if and only if there is a sufficient reason for the truth of each of
the conjuncts. If the building collupsed and Alice freely decided to write a
book has a sufficient reason, then both of its conjuncts have a sufficient
reason. If the conjunct about Alice’s free decision has no sufficient
reason (because of libertarian free will), then the conjunction has no
sufficient reason.
There is a more general proof that there can be no sufficient reason
for the actuality of the actual world. For any conjunctive proposition p
and for any proposition q that is a sufficient reason for p, q is a sufficient
reason for p if and only if q is a sufficient reason for each conjunct of p.
Thus, if the actual world W has a sufficient reason, this reason is a

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100 QUENTIN SMITH

proposition q that relevantly entails and explains each conjunct of W.

But if q is a contingently true proposition, q is a conjunct of W and does
not explain itself, since only necessarily true propositions explain
themselves. In this case, q cannot explain W, since there would be at
least one conjunct of W, namely q, that q does not explain. On the other
hand, if q is its own sufficient reason, q is necessarily true; but if q is
necessarily true, it cannot be a sufficient reason for W, since if q were a
sufficient reason for W it would entail W and an entailment of a
necessary truth is itself a necessary truth, contradicting the fact that W is
true contingently.

IV
We have seen that PSR3 is necessarily false. We may reasonably regard
PSRl as contingently false; PSR,, we recall, is:

PSRl: Every true proposition stating that some concrete object (body
or mind) begins to exist has a sufficient reason why it is true.

This is reasonably regarded as false since some things, such as virtual

particles that begin to exist in a quantum mechanical vacuum, begin to
exist without a sufficient reason. (They have a probabilistic cause, but
not a determining cause.) PSRl may be regarded as false contingently,
since there is some merely possible world in which every concrete object
that begins to exist has a determining cause.
We may also plausibly suppose that PSR2 is contingently false:

PSR2: Every true proposition stating that some concrete object exists
has a sufficient reason why it is true.

PSRz is false if PSR, is false; if there is no sufficient reason why a

given virtual particle x begins to exist, there is no sufficient reason why x
exists. PSR2 is false contingently, since there is some possible world in
which every contingent concrete object that exists, both begins to exist
and has a determining cause in some earlier contingent concrete object.
In this world, PSR, and PSR2 are both true.

V
Given that we have now explained why PSR,, PSR2 and PSRJ are false,
we may present the main argument of this paper, that PSR4 can be true
even if the aforementioned three versions of PSR are false. I shall argue
that, contrary to received opinion, PSR4 is possibly true, even if PSR, ,
PSR2 and PSR3 are false, and that PSR4 is necessarily true if God

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 A DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON 101

necessarily exists or a space-time necessarily exists and is contingently

endowed with a quantum mechanical vacuum. PSR4 is:

PSR4: There is a sufficient reason why there are true propositions that
entail that some contingent concrete object exists.

Our first observation about PSR4 is that the sufficient reason

mentioned in PSR4 cannot be a necessary truth. The reason for this is
not that a necessary truth cannot be a sufficient reason for there being
contingent truths. There is a necessary truth that is a sufficient reason
for the truth of the proposition there are contingent truths. The latter
proposition, although about contingent truths, is itself a necessary truth
and thus is a sufficient reason for its own truth. The fact that there are
contingent truths is a necessary truth follows from the fact that there are
at least two possible worlds. If there are at least two possible worlds W
and W*, it follows that there is at least one proposition p that is true in
W but not in W*. If W and W* contained all and only the same truths,
then W is identical with W*. If the proposition p is true in W but not in
W*, then p possesses its truth value contingently. If W is actual, then p
is contingently true and if W* is actual, then the negation of p is
contingently true. Therefore, there are contingent truths is true in each
possible world, i.e., it is a necessary truth.
The reason that the sufficient reason mentioned in PSR4 cannot be a
necessary truth is that PSR, is not about all contingent truths, but only
about all contingent positive truths. As we said, a contingent positive
truth is a true proposition that entails that some contingent concrete
object exists. The proposition that there are contingent positive truths is
contingently true, since there is some possible world in which there exist
no contingent concrete objects; in this world there exist only abstract
objects (and perhaps God, if God is a necessarily existent concrete
object). Thus, there are contingent positive truths is itself a contingent
positive truth. Since it is not a necessary truth, it cannot have a
necessary truth for its sufficient reason (if it has a sufficient reason at
all). If there are contingent positive truths has a sufficient reason, this
sufficient reason must itself be a contingent positive truth. Could there
be such a sufficient reason? Most philosophers, following William
Rowe, hold there could be no such sufficient reason. It seems to me,
however, that Rowe’s argument is unsound and that there can be such a
sufficient reason, as I shall argue in what follows.

VI
Rowe has mounted a prima facie plausible argument that it is logically
impossible for there to be a sufficient reason why there are positive and
contingent truths. Rowe uses the terminology of “states of affairs”

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102 QUENTIN SMITH

rather than “propositions” and focuses his discussion on the state of

affairs t:
(t) there obtain positive, contingent states of affairs.
Rowe holds that a state of affairs is positive and contingent if and only if
it entails that at least one contingent concrete object exists. According
to Rowe, states of affairs are abstract objects that exist even if they do
not obtain. They are isomorphic to propositions, which exist even if they
are false. “Propositions either are true or false and exist even if they are
false” is logically equivalent to “states of affairs either obtain or do not
obtain and exist even if they do not obtain.” It is arguable that states of
affairs as Rowe defines them are in fact identical with propositions (see
[Smith 1993, pp. 156-1581), but even if they are only isomorphic, there
is a sufficient similarity for an argument about propositions to be
logically equivalent to a corresponding argument about states of affairs.
Rowe adopts the assumptions that t is contingent, which is arguably a
true assumption, given our foregoing consideration that there is some
possible world in which there exist abstract objects but no contingent
concrete objects. Rowe argues that if t is positive and contingent, then
no state of affairs can be a sufficient reason for the obtaining of t and
thus that it is impossible for there to be a sufficient reason why there
obtain positive and contingent states of affairs. If q is a state of affairs
that supposedly explains t and if “actual state of affairs” means
“obtaining state of affairs”, then we have the requisite terminology to
understand Rowe’s argument. Rowe writes:

Suppose that q is the statc of affairs that explains t and that ‘q explains t’ is
made true by the fact that the actual statc of affairs q stands in a certain
relation R to t. The actual state of affairs qRt must entail the state of affairs t,
otherwise the fact that qRt would not make it true that q explains t. . . . Now
the actual state of affairs qRt is either necessary or contingent. It cannot be
necessary, fort would then be necessary , . . This means that the actual state
of affairs qRt is u positive, contingent stute ofuffairs. This being so, it is clear
that qRt cannot make it true that q explains t. For to explain t, q must explain
why there arc positive, contingent states of affairs - and clearly q cannot
serve this explanatory role by virtue of standing in relation R to t , if the fact
that q stands in relation R to t is itself a positive contingent, state of affairs.
(Rowe 1975, p. 10s.)
I do not agree that it is “clear” that q cannot explain t if qRt is
contingent. Rowe offers no further argument but offers a theistic
example. He asks us to suppose that “God willed that positive
contingent states of affairs be actual” (Rowe 1975, p. 106). Thus, God
wills that positive contingent states of affairs be actual is a positive,
contingent state of affairs: it obtains contingently and entails that some
contingent concrete object exist. Rowe reasons that this prevents this

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 A DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON 103

state of affairs from explaining why t is actual. “Clearly, the fact that
accounts for why there are positive contingent state of affairs cannot
itself be a positive, contingent state of affairs“ (Rowe 1975, p. 106).
However, Rowe’s statement may be doubted. Rowe is willing to
countenance that God necessarily exists and thus that God exists is a
necessarily obtaining state of affairs; accordingly, God exists is not one
of these state of affairs needing to be explained by the fact of God’s
willing that positive, contingent states of affairs obtain. What needs to
be explained is merely that there obtain positive contingent states of
affairs, which is logically equivalent to explaining there are contingent
concrete objects. However, this state of affairs does have an explanation;
it is explained by:

(1) God wills that there be contingent concrete objects.

(1) is a sufficient reason for t, since ( 1 ) meets the two conditions for
being a sufficient reason: The state of affairs (1) relevantly entails t and
explains t. Consequently, Rowe does not appear to be correct in holding
that there can be no sufficient reason or explanation for t.
To explore this matter further, note that (1) is itself a positive,
contingent state of affairs. If the libertarian theory of free will applies to
God, as it is normally thought to, then there is no sufficient reason why
(1) obtains. Consequently, there is at least one positive contingent state
of affairs that obtains for no sufficient reason. Does this imply that t
obtains for n o sufficient reason? If so, (1) cannot be the sufficient reason
for t.
However, this implication does not hold, even though it may appear
to hold at first glance. The appearance that (1) cannot be a sufficient
reason for t is due to a failure to appreciate that the following two states
of affairs are mutually consistent:

(2) There are some positive, contingent states of affairs that obtain
for no sufficient reason.
(3) There is a sufficient reason why there are positive, contingent
states of affairs that obtain.

These two states of affairs are consistent since (3) does not entail that
each obtaining positive, contingent state of affairs has a sufficient reason
why it obtains. If (3) obtains, then there is at least one positive,
contingent state of affairs that has a sufficient reason for obtaining; at
least the state of affairs t obtains for the sufficient reason mentioned in
(3). However, if (3) obtains, it need not be the case that every obtaining
positive, contingent state of affairs obtains for a sufficient reason, be it
the reason mentioned in (3) or some other reason. This is because a
proposition of the form:

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104 QUENTIN SMITH

(4) There is a sufficient reason why there are Fs

does not entail a proposition of the form
(5) For each x that is F , there is a sufficient reason why it exists.

For example, there may be a sufficient reason why there are particles
rather than no particles at all. But that does not imply there is a
sufficient reason for the existence of each particle. It may be that there
is a sufficient reason for the existence of some particles, the so-called
“real particles” (the long lasting electrons, protons, etc.), which entails
there is a sufficient reason for there existing some particles rather than
no particles at all, and yet that there is no sufficient reason for the
existence of other particles, virtual particles (the short lasting electrons
and protons, etc., that probabilistically begin to exist in a quantum
mechanical vacuum). Consequently, God’s willing that there obtain
positive contingent states of affairs is a sufficient reason for there
obtaining positive contingent states of affairs, even though there is at
least one positive contingent state of affairs, namely, the mentioned
state of affairs about God’s willing, that obtains for no sufficient reason.
These considerations are consistent with the fact that it is logically
impossible for there to be a sufficient reason for the conjunction of all
obtaining positive, contingent states of affairs. There is a sufficient
reason for the conjunction of all obtaining positive, contingent states of
affairs if and only if each positive, contingent state of affairs that
obtains, obtains for a sufficient reason. But it is logically impossible for
each obtaining positive, contingent state of affairs to have a sufficient
reason. The conjunction of all obtaining positive, contingent states of
affairs is itself a positive, contingent state of affairs and it obtains for no
sufficient reason. If it obtained for a sufficient reason SR, then SR is
either a positive contingent state of affairs or is not. If SR is a positive
contingent state of affairs, then SR is one of the conjuncts of the
conjunction of all obtaining positive contingent states of affairs. In this
case, SR can at best be a sufficient reason for the obtaining of every
other conjunct; it cannot be a sufficient reason for its own obtaining, for
then it would be a necessary state of affairs. But if it cannot be a
sufficient reason for its own obtaining, then it cannot be a sufficient
reason for the obtaining of the conjunction of all obtaining positive,
contingent states of affairs. On the other hand, if SR is not itself a
positive, contingent state of affairs, it is either a necessary state of
affairs or a negative contingent state of affairs. If SR is a necessary
state of affairs, it cannot be a sufficient reason for the conjunction of all
positive, contingent states of affairs; if it were such a reason, SR’s
necessity would be inherited by this conjunction, contradicting the fact
that the conjunction is contingent. If SR is a negative, contingent state
of affairs, it cannot explain the conjunction of all obtaining positive,

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 A DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON 105

contingent states of affairs, since no state of affairs of the form Zt is not

the case that Fs exist can be a suitable explanatory state of affairs.

VII
The fact that there can be a sufficient reason for the truth (obtaining) of
positive, contingent propositions (states of affairs) does not hinge upon
the possibility of theism being true. Suppose that Richard Gale (1976) is
correct that space-time necessarily exists, and suppose that God does
not exist. Suppose further than a quantum cosmology of the sort
envisaged by Tryon, Gott, Pagels, Brout, and others is true, at least in
broad outline (see Smith, 1986). According to these cosmologies, there
exists an empty background space-time that contains a quantum
mechanical vacuum. This vacuum is regularly emitting virtual particles,
and in some cases the emitted virtual particles produce a distortion of
the background space-time that leads to the production of real particles
and a “big bang” that ensues in an expanding universe, such as our own.
Suppose in some possible worlds the background space-time contains a
quantum mechanical vacuum and in others it does not. In the worlds
where there is no quantum mechanical vacuum, no virtual or real
particles are emitted and there are no positive contingent truths.
However, in the worlds where the background space-time contains a
quantum mechanical vacuum, there are virtual and real particles
emitted from the vacuum and it is the case that in these worlds some
positive contingent propositions are true, namely, the propositions
asserting that the relevant particles exist. Suppose the actual world is
one of the worlds in which the background space-time contains a
quantum mechanical vacuum. Given this, there actually is a sufficient
reason why there are positive and contingent truths. The sufficient
reason is that there exists a space-time that contains a quantum
mechanical vacuum. This is a contingent positive truth. There exists a
space-time is the naturalistic analog to the theistic proposition God
exists (both are considered to have the modal status of necessary truths)
and there exists a space-time that contains a quantum mechanical vacuum
is analogous to God wills that there be contingent concrete objects (both
are positive contingent truths that have no sufficient reason, and yet are
the sufficient reason why there are positive contingent truths at all). The
proposition there exists a space-time that contains a quantum mechanical
vacuum meets the two conditions for being a sufficient reason for there
are contingent concrete objects (which, we recall, is logically equivalent
to there are positive contingent truths). Since the concept of a quantum
mechanical vacuum analytically entails that it is a source of virtual
particles, which are a species of contingent concrete objects, the
sufficient reason mentioned relevantly entails there are contingent
concrete objects. Further, the sufficient reason explains why there are

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106 QUENTIN SMITH

contingent concrete objects (the explanation of virtual particles in terms

of the presence of a quantum mechanical vacuum is standard in
quantum mechanics). Observe that there exists a space-time that contains
a quantum mechanical vacuum does not give a sufficient reason for the
existence of any given virtual particle; for any given virtual particle x, x
has a merely probabilistic reason for existing. However, if there is a
quantum mechanical vacuum, there is a sufficient condition of there
being some virtual particles. “Each F that exists has a probability of less
than one of existing” is consistent with “There is a probability of one
that some Fs exist”.
In conclusion, I have argued that one version of the principle of
sufficient reason, PSR4 is possibly true and may be true even if PSR,,
PSR, and PSR3 are false. Indeed, PSR4 is necessarily true if God
necessarily exists or if space-time necessarily exists and contingently
contains a quantum mechanical vacuum. If PSR4 is necessarily true, part
of the “mystery of being” is unveiled, namely, the mystery of why there
are any positive, contingent truths at all, rather than no positive,
contingent truths.

College of Arts and Sciences

Department of Philosophy
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, M I 49008-5022
USA

References
Gale, Richard. (1976). Negation and Non-Being. American Philo-
sophical Quarterly, monograph no. 10.
Post, John. (1991). Metaphysics. New York: Paragon House.
Post, John. (1987). The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive
Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rowe, William. (1975). The Cosmological Argument. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Smith, Quentin. (1993). Language and Time. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Smith, Quentin (1986). “World Ensemble Explanations”, Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 67: 73-86.
Smith, Quentin and Craig, William Lane. (1993). Theism, Atheism and
Big Bang Cosmology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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