Doctrine of liberality of technical procedures

In a special action for certiorari that I have filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection a criminal
case for estafa pending trial on the merits before the trial court, the main issue was the desire of the
accused for an order authorizing the conduct of a new and separate questioned document and
handwriting examination to be conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the same to
constitute as his own counter-expert evidence when he presents his defense evidence in due time.

In the said petition, I raised the following issues: doctrine of liberality of procedural rules in relation to
minor delays in meeting court deadlines, honest mistakes of a party, and non-finality of interlocutory
orders, excerpt as limited by Rule 65 on certiorari. (The original examination was conducted by the
Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The accused was not notified thereof and had no
participation therein, for reasons known only to the police examiners).

I wish to share the substance of my motion for reconsideration that I had filed with the Court of Appeals
in connection with the said pending case, for legal research purposes of the visitors of this blog. (I
deleted the references to the parties and the case caption).

X x x.

THE PETITIONER, by counsel, respectfully states:

1. Purpose and Material Dates. – This pleading seeks

the reconsideration of the Decision, dated ___, of
this Honorable Court, a copy of which was received
by the undersigned counsel for the petitioner on __.
The 15h day of the petitioner to file this motion
would end on ___.

2. Sole Ground. - With all due respect to the

Honorable Court, this motion is premised on the sole
ground that the Honorable Court has failed to
exercise its wise and fair discretion to apply the basic
remedial law doctrine of liberality in the appreciation
and application of technical and procedural rules to
promote and achieve the noble and equitable ends
of substantive justice.

3. Discussion. – By way of review, the petitioner

reiterates the ultimate facts of his petition.

3.1. On ___, the petitioner, thru counsel, filed a

MOTION FOR DOCUMENT AND HANDWRITING
EXAMINATION BY THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, dated ___ (Annex D, petition).
3.2. The prosecution opposed the same. The
petitioner filed a reply to the said opposition. On ___,
Branch __of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of ___ City
(JDR Judge) issued an order denying the aforecited
motion. (Annex A, petition).

3.3. The petitioner received by mail on ____ a copy

of the said Order, dated ___. His 15th day to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof would have
expired on ___, which fell on a Saturday. Thus, he
had up to the next Monday therefrom, i.e., ____, to
file his said motion for reconsideration.

3.4. The petitioner himself served copies (personal

service) of his motion for reconsideration, dated
____, on the public and private prosecutors on ____,
Monday (deadline). [Annex G, petition]. The
petitioner himself had offered to do the service and
filing of the said motion himself, instead of the
paralegal staff of the undersigned counsel, so that he
could save on the P1, 000.00/half day paralegal staff
fee being charged by the law office of his counsel
whenever his paralegal staff went out on legal field
work. Such a huge amount of P1, 000.00, for an
ordinary employee like the accused, meant a lot in
terms of financial value, because it was equivalent to
one-half sack of rice, which he might as well use to
feed his family.

3.5. By inadvertence, because the petitioner is not a

lawyer and was not adept with and trained in the
technical procedures of the Courts, despite the prior
briefing to him of his counsel, he inadvertently
thought that he had duly completed the “filing” of
the said motion for reconsideration by merely
“serving” copies thereof on the public and the
private prosecutors. Thus, he innocently missed the
“formal filing” of the “original copy” of the said
motion for reconsideration with the Trial Court (RTC
__ [JDR Court]) on ____ (deadline). He erroneously
thought (in good faith) that it was enough to serve
the motion on the two prosecutors.
3.6. When the petitioner made a status report on the
above matter to his counsel on ____ (two days after
the ___ deadline), the innocent mistake of the
petitioner was discovered by his undersigned
counsel. Thus, on that very same day, i.e., ____, his
undersigned counsel caused the “technical filing” of
the “original copy” of the said motion for
reconsideration with the RTC __ via REGISTERED
MAIL, per Registry Receipt No. ___issued on ____ by
the Post Office of ___ City. (See the upper right
portion of the motion for reconsideration, marked as
Annex G, Petition, showing the details of the said
Registry Receipt.

3.7. On ___, the undersigned counsel for the

petitioner reported the above matter (i.e., the fact of
filing of the original copy of the motion for
reconsideration) to the RTC ___ via a formal
VERIFIED EX PARTE MANIFESTATION, dated ____.
(See Annex H., Petition).
3.8. The prosecution opposed the abovementioned
pleadings of the petitioner. Meanwhile, the parties
agreed to terminate the JDR proceedings and moved
to transfer the criminal case to a Trial Judge. The case
was raffled for trial to RTC __ (public respondent),
which thereafter set the initial prosecution evidence
presentation on ___. On ___, the petitioner filed
with the public respondent RTC __ a motion to
resolve his pending motion for reconsideration. On
___, the undersigned counsel for the petitioner
received a copy of the 2nd questioned interlocutory
Order, dated ____ (see Annex B, Petition), denying
the motion for reconsideration because of “late
filing”.

4. The aforecited motion for reconsideration was

filed by registered mail on ___ (Annex G, supra). The
technical deadline was ___, a Saturday. The real
deadline was thus ___, the following Monday. If the
date ___, Monday, would be counted as the
reckoning date, the filing of the motion for
reconsideration was late by four (4) days. If the date
___, Monday, would be counted as the reckoning
date, the filing of the said motion was late by two (2)
days. The tardiness would range from two (2) to four
(4) days. The petitioner submits that the he should
be deemed as being late by two (2) days, and not
four (4) days, considering that his final and ultimate
deadline by operation of law was ___, the Monday
following ___, Saturday.

At any rate, as discussed hereinbelow, the

abovementioned “minor delay” should have been
seen with the eye of kind and compassionate
liberality by this Honorable Court as a dispenser of
equitable justice.

5. As discussed in the petition, Sec. 49, Rule 130 of

the Rules of Court provides that the opinion of an
expert witness, as in the instant case, requires
“special knowledge, skill, experience or training”.
The Courts should avail themselves of such expertise
where warranted in the interest of truth and justice.
In the case of SPOUSES SAMUEL ULEP, etc., et. al. vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G.R. No.
125254, October 11, 2005, it was held that “due to
the technicality of the procedure involved in the
examination of forged documents, the expertise of
questioned document examiners is usually helpful”
and, the accused believes, should, as a rule, be
encouraged by the Courts. In the case of PAN PACIFIC
INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND NICOLAS CAPISTRANO, G.R. No.
125283, February 10, 2006, the Supreme Court held
that bare denial cannot prevail over expert
testimonial evidence and that “he who disavows the
authenticity of his signature on a public document
bears the responsibility to present evidence to that
effect”, that “mere disclaimer is not sufficient”, that
“at the very least, he should present corroborating
witnesses to prove his assertion, and that “at best,
he should present an expert witness”.
6. As likewise discussed in the petition, in the case of
LILIA SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., EN
BANC, G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003, it was held,
among other things, that the Rules of Court should
be liberally construed in order to promote their
object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding; the rules
of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and
inexpensive determination of the cases before them;
liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice;
and litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on mere
technicalities.

7. In the case of LEY CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et. al. vs. UNION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 133801, June 27,
2000, it was held that “an interlocutory order is
always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds
shown at any time before final judgment”.

8. In the case of LEY CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et. al. vs. UNION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 133801, June 27,
2000, it was held that “an interlocutory order is
always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds
shown at any time before final judgment”. An
interlocutory order does not become final within 15
days.

Under Rule 65 (certiorari), the deadline to question

an interlocutory order via the special civil action of
certiorari is 60 days from date of receipt of the
resolution denying the petition or the motion for
reconsideration, if one was filed.
Under Rule 37, the 15-day period to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration refers to “a
judgment or a final order”. A “judgment”
presupposes the completion of trial on the merits. A
“final order” presupposes an order that ends a case
and leaves nothing else to be done therein, e.g., an
order granting a motion to dismiss. An interlocutory
order does not become final, in a sense.

With all due respect, to construe the 15-day “appeal

period” as strictly applicable to an interlocutory
order, as what had been done in this case by the trial
courts and this Honorable Court, contradicts the
foregoing jurisprudence and procedural rules.

9. To stress the abovementioned point, in the 1996

case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED, G.R. No. 123263,
December 16, 1996, the Supreme Court held that
“only final orders -- i.e., those that finally dispose of
a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the court respecting the merits of a case --
can become final and executory -- in the sense of
becoming unalterable through an appeal or review
proceeding.” The Court stressed that “interlocutory
orders, on the other hand -- i.e., those which resolve
incidental motions or collateral matters but do not
put an end to the case -- never become final in the
sense of becoming unchangeable and impervious to
impugnation after expiration of the period
prescribed for taking an appeal from a final
judgment.”

10. Just to emphasize a major point, mandatory

deadlines must be perceived and applied with
liberality where warranted by equitable
circumstances. There are many Supreme Court
decisions on “delay” which have been interpreted
with compassionate liberality by the highest tribunal
of the land.
11. An example is the 1988 analogous case PACIFIC
ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
TEODORO RANCES, G.R. No. 76595, May 6, 1988,
which held that “the brevity of the delay in filing an
appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient basis for
giving due course to the appeal. In the present case,
however, the factual circumstances combine with
the legal merits of the case urged by the petitioner
to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC
should have recognized and heeded the
requirements of orderly procedure and substantial
justice which are at stake in the present case by
allowing the appeal.”

The Supreme Court in the abovementioned case

stressed that the right to appeal should not be lightly
disregarded by a “stringent application of rules of
procedure especially where the appeal is on its face
meritorious and the interests of substantial justice
would be served by permitting the appeal.”

It ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our

judicial system. We have advised the courts to
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal (National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97
SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from
the constraints of technicalities (A. One Feeds, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590).

In the abovecited case, the Supreme Court further

stated, thus:

“The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a

very rigid and technical sense. The rules of procedure
are used only to help secure not override substantial
justice. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals [72 SCRA 1201).
Therefore, we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals
(83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the perfection
of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And
again in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 396, this Court
held that the delay in four (4) days in filing a notice
of appeal and a notion for extension of time to file a
record on appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity.

We should emphasize, however, that we have

allowed (delayed appeals) in some cases (to) x x x
serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity junction.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their

record on appeal should not be strictly construed as
to deprive them of the right to appeal especially
since on its face the appeal appears to be impressed
especially with merit.”
12. With all due respect, it is unfortunate that this
Honorable Court, in giving more importance to
“technical delay”, failed to appreciate the spirit and
wisdom of the foregoing liberal and equitable
jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, it is

respectfully prayed that judgment of this Honorable
Court, dated ___, be reconsidered; and that a new
judgment be promulgated (a) nullifying the two
questioned orders of the trial court; (b) allowing the
questioned document examination by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), subject to such
guidelines and conditions as this Honorable Court
may impose; and (c) suspending the presentation of
defense evidence by the petitioner before the trial
court until such time that the NBI questioned
document examination report shall have been
submitted to the trial court to form part of the
defense evidence of the petitioner upon proper
identification and authentication thereof.
Further, the petitioner respectfully prays for such
and other incidental reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises.
Las Pinas City, ____..

LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER

& ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES

Counsel for the Petitioner

Unit 15, Star Arcade, C. V. Starr Ave.

Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1743

Tel. No. 872-5443; Fax No. 874-2539

Email- lcmlaw@gmail.com

URL – http://lcmlaw.multiply.com

http://attylaserna.blogspot.com

MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR.

Roll No. 33640, 4/27/05

IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907

IBP PPLM Chapter

MCLE Compliance No. III-0002280

PTR No. 9802253, 1/5/09, Las Pinas

Posted by Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. at 4:06 PM