RICARZE v CA
account using Gutierrez’s name.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze, a collector-messenger by City
Service Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in
messengerial services, was assigned to the main office of
Caltex in Makati. His primary task was to collect checks
payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier, and also to
deliver invoices to Caltex’s customers.
Caltex, through their Banking and Insurance Department
Manager Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the OCP of Makati for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. They alleged that while
his department was conducting a daily electronic report from
Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB), it was
discovered, that unknown to the department, a company check
of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Guiterrez had been
cleared through PCIB. An investigation revealed that two other
checks were also missing and that in the first check, Romano’s
signature and one Victor Goquinco’s signature were forgeries.
Another check (P1,790,757.25) was likewise payable to Dante
R. Gutierrez, was also cleared, was also not issued by Clatex,
and the signatures were forged. These two checks were
deposited at BDO SM Makati in the name of a regular
customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
However, Gutierrez disowned the savings account and the
signatures. He denied having withdrawn any amount from said
savings account. Further investigation showed that the savings
account had actually been opened by petitioner. The forged
checks were deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrez’s
name. A bank teller from BDO (Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz)
identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings
The PCIB credited P581,229 to Caltex. However, the CP of
Makati was not informed of this. After preliminary
investigation filed two Informations for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents against the petitioner
before the RTC of Makati.
Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the SRMO
Law Office, as private prosecutor, filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence.
The petitioner opposed the pleading and argued the private
complainant was represented by ACCRA Law and the Balgos
and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the
prosecution had rested its case that the SRMO entered its
appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB.
Additionally, they argued that since ACCRA and Balgos and
Perez have not withdrawn, SRMO had no personality to appear
as private prosecutor. According to the Informations, the
private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB, thus the Formal
Offer of Evidence by SRMO should be stricken from the
records.
Petitioner added that unless the Informations were amended to
change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused
would be prejudiced. Although, he noted that the Informations
can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned. He still insisted that the amendments of the
Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended for Caltex
would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIB countered and argued that the PCIB had re-credited the
amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity, thus, the PCIB
had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant and is entitled to receive any civil
indemnity which the trial court would adjudge. It pointed out
that petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of ACCRA to
PCIB and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex.
Petitioner rebutted by stating that the substitution of PCIB as
private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion and
that the Information must be amended to allege that the private
complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary
investigation.
The PCIB, through SRMO, argued that as Section 2, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, the
erroneous designation of the name of the offended is a mere
formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the
offended in the Information.
The RTC granted the motion of the private prosecutor for the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex.
However, it denied petitioner’s motion to have the formal offer
of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA praying to
annul the RTC’s orders, arguing that damage or injury to the
offended is an essential element of estafa. The amendment of
the Informations substituting the PCIB for Caltex as offended
would prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense
available before the amendment, which would be unavailable if
the Informations are amended.
The CA dismissed the petition and held that when PCIB
restored the checks to Caltex, it was subrogated to the latter’s
right against petitioner. That in offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended is not absolutely
indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can properly be identified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substitution of PCIB will substantially
prejudice the rights of the petitioner, thus prohibited by Section
14 of Rule 110?
RULING:
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment may be made without leave of court. After entry of
plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave
of court and if it does not prejudice the accused’s rights. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except
if beneficial to the accused.
A substantial amendment is the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court.
Formal amendments are all other matters, which may be new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty, an
amendment which does not charge another offense different
from the one in the original one, additional allegations which
don’t alter the prosecution’s theory in that it might cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form’ of defense, an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial
right, and merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in
the information and not to introduce new and material facts and
merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
to see if a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be available after the amendment is made and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment which does not change the charged crime’s nature
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment.
Petitioner argues that the charges against him should be
dismissed because the allegations in both Informations failed to
name PCIB as the true offended party. This does not hold
water. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that a complaint or information is sufficient if
it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense
by the statue, the acts of omissions constituting the offense, the
name of the offended, the approximate time of the crime, and
the place where it happened.
1302 of the Civil Code. The latter is that which takes place by
the parties’ agreement. Thus, petitioner’s acquiescence is not
needed for subrogation to happen because the instant case is
one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law and
without need of the debtor’s knowledge.
The substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant is
not a substantial amendment because it did not alter the basis of
the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any
prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence of the forged
checks remained the same and was available to petitioner
before the trial. He cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.
Petitioner did not timely object to the appearance of SRMO as
private prosecutor for PCIB because he did not question the
said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the
same, thus he can’t feign ignorance or surprise of the incident.

Petitioner’s argument, that in no way PCIB subrogated to the

rights of Caltex because he has no knowledge of it and never
consented to it, is misplaced. Subrogation is the transfer of all
the rights of the creditor to a third person who substitutes him
in all his rights. The Court agrees that petitioner failed to make
a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation. The
former is that which takes place without agreement but by
operation of law because of certain acts (provided in Article