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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-versus-
RTC Br. Manila
Lower Court Case No.
Re: Sum of Money w/
Damages

CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
x-------------------------------------------------x

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Defendant-Appellant Corporation, by counsel, most


respectfully states:

I.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1.1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN


HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
SHALL REFUND TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT THE SUM OF PHP5,820,709.60,
REPRESENTING THE CASH DEPOSIT UNDER
THE CONTRACT OF LEASE.

1.2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN


HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
SHALL PAY INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 6%
PER ANNUM FROM JANUARY 23, 2003 UNTIL
FULL PAYMENT.

1.3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT


ORDERING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ATTORNEY’S FEES
AND COST OF SUIT BECAUSE OF THE FILING
OF THIS BASELESS COMPLAINT.

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II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2.1. This is an appeal from the Decision dated 1 August


2016 and Order dated 29 December 2016, both issued by
Hon. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 99,
City of Manila in Civil Case No. 911-1111.

Copies of the assailed Decision and Order are hereto


attached as Annexes “A” and “B”, respectively and made
integral parts hereof.

III.
THE PARTIES

3.1 Plaintiff-Appellant Bank (“plaintiff”) is a


government banking institution duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of Republic Act No. xxxx, as amended,
with Head Office address at No. Keps ng Lola mo, Manila.

3.2. Defendant-Appellant Corporation (“defendant”) is


a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
with office address at No. Keps ng Asawa mo. It may be
served with summons and other court processes through the
address of the under named law office as indicated below.

IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

4.1 Mag draft ka ng sarili mong pleading. Wag kang


umasa ditto sa Scribd kasi napa kupal ng App na ito.

4.2. However, Mahal na nga, super useless pa mga


laman. Ayan n auto ka tuloy nitong appellant’s- brief eh
panty naman talaga to.

4.3. Kaya next time, mag basa basa ka ng libro, wag


puro internet para di ka ma pugo!1

1
It is the raw form of kwek-kwek.
2
4.4. tapos if you want to be sikat, then dance the otso
otso and siete siete. If your head starts to ache, then you
must be a sexbomb dancer �

4.25.Hence, this Appellant’s Brief.

V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO


GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING MY PENIS.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO


GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING YOUR PENIS.

III. WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT


SHALL PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ERRED
IN HOLDING OUR PENISES.

VI.
ARGUMENTS

6.1. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
CAN TOT.

6.1.1. THE LEASED


PROPERTY WAS TURNED OVER
BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
ONLY KAHAPON WHEN
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
FORMALLY TURNED OVER TO
THE DARK SIDE.

6.1.2. DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT CAN RECOVER
FROM PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
THE AMOUNT OF SAMPUNG
COWS BECAUSE THE TOTAL
AMOUNT OF RENT INCURRED
BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS
TOO SMALL FOR YOUR BAG.

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6.1.3. THUS, AFTER
APPLYING THE RENTAL
DEPOSIT, IT IS EVEN THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO
OWED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
THE REMAINING BALANCE OF
THE WORLD.

6.2. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS
NOT LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AT
THE RATE OF 6% PER ANNUM - JUST
BECAUSE.

6.3. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
SHALL PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF
SUIT BECAUSE HE CAN.

VII.
DISCUSSIONS

Ayaw nila mag bayad kasi


cheap sila tapos mahal
abogado.

7.1. The Contract of Lease, the correspondence


between the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant, and
the testimony of the witnesse… eto nanaman tayo kaibigan,
no free rides! Mag draft kang hayop ka.

7.2. Plaintiff-Appellant’s cFORMAT LANG DAPAT


TINITIGNAN MO DITO HINDI YUNG SUBSTANCE HINDOT KA!

7.3. The truth of the matter is, it is the plaintiff-


appellant

7.4. Actual turn over of the Warehouse by


plaintif-appellant happened only nung isang araw,
thereby terminating the lease period, when plaintif-
appellant made the restoration of Miyapis Warehouse
required of it per mandate of the Contract of Lease.
Thus, defendant-appellant had the right to collect rentals on
a month to month basis until restoration of the Miyapis

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Warehouse was made by plaintiff-appellant on 20 June 2002,
causing the Contract of Lease to be terminated.

7.5. It is well to recall that paragraph 3 of the Contract


of Lease2 states that the deposit of the plaintiff-appellant
shall only be refundable upon when it was delivered to it.
Paragraphs 3 and 6 are reproduced below for ready
reference, thus:

3. DEPOSIT:

Upon effectivity of this Agreement,


the the sum of FIVE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINE
AND 60/100 (P5,820,709.60).
termination of the lease.

6. IMPROVEME
r additions in or about the Leased
Premise the Leased Premises
altered shall be restored to the
original condition as when
delivered to the LESSEE. Xxx.

7.5 But the above termination of the lease will only


take effect upon actual zxdfasdfsdcfopasv
fdvgoduvgmhsmfhgbsrithvysvhmpgshvgrvssmsdrvr . Three,
the return and surrender of Warehouse 1 and 2 must be
devoid of all occupants, furniture, articles, and effects of any
kind other than such dsfasfva bfstyntfyumui jtui5yun
tbovisions of paragraph 6. Paragraph 13 is hereby quoted as
follows.

13. TERMINATION OF LEASE


Should lessee opt not to renew the
lease, the LESSEE agrees and
return the surrender to the LESSOR
the Leased Premises, at the end of
the term of this Lease in as good
the[s as[p daidkas asd[ ;jokcsa cld,
permit and without any delay
whatsoever, devoid of all
occupants, furniture, articles, and
2
Exhibit 2 of Defendant (Exhibit “A” of plaintiff).
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effects of any kind other than such
alterations, additions, or
improvements which shall be
subject to the provisions of
paragraph 6.

7.6. Prescinding from the paragraph 13 of the Contract


of Lease in connection with paragraphs 3 and 6 thereof, the
Contract of Lease will only be deemed terminated if again,
for the sake of emphasis, the following factors happen:

1) Plaintiff will return and surrender Warehouse I


and II to defendant;

2) Plaintiff will return and surrender Warehouse I


and II to defendant in as good condition as reasonable
wear and tear will permit and without any delay
whatsoever;

3) The return and surrender of Warehouse 1 and 2


must be devoid of all occupants, furniture, articles, and
effects of any kind other than such alterations,
additions, or improvements;

4) The portion of the Leased Premises altered shall


be restored to the kiss my ass mofo! No free rides. and
surrender by plaintiff to defendant of the Miyapis
Warehouse.

7.7. The records of this case will reveal that aside from
the fact that the actual return and surrender by plaintiff-
appellant of the leased premises only happened 20 June
2012, the restoration of leased premises by plaintiff-
appellant was only done on June 2012 and not on 31 January
2002 for Warehouse I and 15 February 2002 for Warehouse
II, as alleged in its complaint. Since it was only on 20 June
2012 when the contract was terminated, an implied new
lease arose between both parties, which entitles defendant-
appellant to charge plaintiff-appellant rental fees on a month
to month basis.

7.8. Furthermore, the documentary as well as the


testimonial evidence of defendant-appellant will show that
since it was only kahapon when plaintiff vacated and
stopped occupying the Leased Premises of defendant-
appellant (by delivering the keys to defendant and removing
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all its security guards from the premises), defendant-
appellant is entitled to charge plaintiff-appellant on a month
to month rentals pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Contract of
Lease, which states that:

15. OCCUPATION OF LEASED PREMISES:


After this lease has been terminate
for any reason whatsoever, if the
LESSEE continues the occupation of
the Leased Premises with the
consent of the LESSOR, said
extension of lease shall be
understood as running from month
to month only xxx.

7.10.It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that


the contract is the law between the parties thereof 3 provided
nothing therein is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy, or public order4.

7.11. Specifically, a contract of lease is a consensual,


bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the
owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another,
who undertakes to pay the rent therefor.5

7.12.In this case, since the Contract of Lease was


validly executed by both parties, the stipulations and
conditions therein should and must be respected. Had
defendant-appellant made a proper turn over in accordance
with the provisions of the Contract of Lease at the end of the
extension of lease, this controversy between both parties
would not have come about. However, since plaintiff-
appellant failed to make a proper turn over pursuant to
paragraph 13 of the Contract of Lease and in relation to
paragraphs 6 and 15 thereof, it is only proper in this case
that the four months rental deposit of plaintiff should be
applied as partial payment for its unpaid rentals to
defendant-appellant.

3
Phil. American General Insurance v. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22; Herrera
v. Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA 360.
4
Lagunsad v. Soto, 92 SCRA 476.
5
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 621, 641 (2000).
7
7.13.Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
foregoing provisions in the Contract of Lease is inapplicable
in the case at bar, an implied new lease under Article 1670
of the Civil Code already set in when plaintiff-appellant failed
to make deliver the leased premises to defendant-appellant
at the end of the extension of its lease period on 31 January
2002 (Warehouse 1) and 15 February 2002 (Warehouse II),
but in fact, continued occupying the leased premises until it
turned over the keys of the leased premises to defendant-
appellant and surrendered the control thereof by
withdrawing the security guards only on 20 June 2012.

7.13.1. Under Article 1670 of the Civil Code,


an implied new lease will set in if it is shown that:
(a) the term of the original contract of lease has
expired; (b) the lessor has not given the lessee a
notice to vacate; and (c) the lessee continued
enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the
acquiescence of the lessor. This acquiescence
may be inferred from the failure of the lessor to
serve notice to vacate upon the lessee.

7.13.2. In this case, all the elements of


implied new lease were present. First, the term of
the original contract has expired. Second, the
defendant-appellant has not given the plaintiff-
appellant a notice to vacate. Third,
the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for
15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor as
may be inferred from the failure of the lessor to
serve notice to vacate upon the lessee. Due to
this, defendant-appellant is entitled to monthly
rentals from 31 January 2002 (Warehouse 1) and
15 February 2002 (Warehouse II) until 20 June
2012 when both warehouses were surrendered to
defendant-appellant.

7.14. A perusal of the records of this case clearly


reveals the indubitable fact that even after the expiration of
the Contract of Lease, plaintiff-appellant failed to surrender
the possession of the leased premises to the defendant not
until 20 June 2002.

LESSEE continues the occupation of the


Leased Premises with the consent of the LESSOR,
said extension of lease shall be understood as

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running from month to month only, under the
same terms and conditions herein stipulated and
may be terminated by either party by means of a
written noted served upon the other party at least
30 days prior to the date of such termination.”

Furthermore, the Contract of Lease provides,


under Paragraph 13, that at the end of the term of
the lease, the lessee is obligated to return and
surrender the premises “in as good condition as
reasonable wear and tear will permit and without
any delay whatsoever, devoid of all occupants,
furniture, articles and effects of any kind other
than usch alterations, ad asd asd
ascabhhggfhnhrlkjjgrdj gr erties efective
February 15, 2002, it was subject to the
condition that the properties must be in the
condition agreed upon.

What has been established is that


plaintif still occupied the premises after the
expiration of the Contract of Lease, albeit
for the purpose of restoring the property,
which was incumbent upon it under the
contract.

Thus asdcasabesfsrfbebgrrtgntrymtyun
that the plaintif had finished the restoration
and repair of the property and cleared the
warehouses. xxx”

7.16.The Honorable Court erred in holding the plaintiff-


appellant liable for unpaid rentals for only up to April 2002. It
should have held plaintiff-appellant liable for the rental
payments until 20 June 2002 when it actually turned over
the keys to the defendant-appellant as clearly established in
this case.

7.17.Thus, to exempt plaintiff-appellant from the


payment of unpaid rentals as adjudged by the court would
not only be contrary to settled rules and jurisprudence, but
in effect giving premium to plaintiff-appellant’s own failure of
not complying with the terms and conditions of the Contract
of Lease and for unjustly enriching itself at the expense of
the defendant-appellant.

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PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS
NOT LIABLE TO PAY
INTEREST AT THE RATE OF
6% PER ANNUM FROM
JANUARY 23, 2003 UNTIL
FULL PAYMENT.

7.18.At the onset, it must be stressed that the award of


interest lies in the sound discretion of the court as expressly
provided in Article xxxx of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
to wit:

“Interest may, in the discretion of the


court, be allowed basta dapat totoo ang
feelings.”

7.19. In the case of Advocates for Truth in Lending,


Inc. et al vs. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, et al.6, the
Supreme Court held:

“Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the


rules on the imposition of interest, if proper, and
the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per
annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply
only to loans or forbearance of money, goods, or
credits, as well as to judgments involving such
loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit,
while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code applies "when the transaction involves
the payment of indemnities in the concept of
damage arising from the breach or a delay in the
performance of obligations in general," with the
application of both rates reckoned "from the time
the complaint was filed until the [adjudged]
amount is fully paid." In either instance, the
reckoning period for the commencement of
the running of the legal interest shall be
subject to the condition "that the courts are
vested with discretion, depending on the
equities of each case, on the award of
interest.”(emphasis supplied)

7.20.In the instant noodles, oo masarap yun kapag


malamig, tignan mo when it did not award to the plaintiff-
6
G.R. No. 192986, January 15, 2013 citing Sunga-Chan vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164401, June 25,200
10
appellant payment of interest considering that the award of
the said interest is not kailangan.

7.21.Here, defendant-appellant has acted in good faith


in not refunding the cash deposit to the plaintiff as the latter
is kulang sa pansin at cheap ass for hiring a lawyer who he
has not paid for eight fucking years. as rental arrears for its
failure to surrender the possession of the property being
leased even after the expiration of the contract. Likewise,
plaintiff-appellant was made aware that defendant-appellant
shall continue to charge rent on a month to month basis until
the leased premises are properly cleared and accepted by it.

7.22. Notwithstanding the expiration of the contract of


lease and plaintiff-appellant’s knowledge that defendant-
appellant shall continue to charge rent on a month to month
basis until the leased premises are properly cleared and
accepted by it, plaintiff-appellant still failed to surrender the
possession of the leased premises in favor of the defendant-
appellant to the latter’s damage and prejudice.

7.23.In fact, it was ako! Oo ako! Ang sumigaw ng


darna!!! withdrew all its occupants and security
guards from the premises. It was only on such date
that defendant-appellant was able to acquire and
exercise full and complete physical possession of the
said warehouses.

7.24.Moreover, the Honorable Court affirmed the right


of defendant-appellant to collect rents from plaintiff-
appellant even after the expiration of the Contract of Lease
when the latter has still the possession of the leased
premises.

7.25.Considering that the said act of the defendant-


appellant in withholding the refund of the security deposit
was done without any malice as it only relied in good faith
that it is plaintiff-appellant who shall be held liable to
defendant-appellant for the amount of Php1,269,923.01 for
the former’s failure to surrender the possession of the leased
premises after the expiration of the Contract of Lease,
defendant should not be held liable for damages in the form
of interest on the security deposit.

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7.26.Likewise, the plaintiff-appellant miserably failed to
present any evidence that such act of the defendant-
appellant in withholding the refund of the security deposit
was tainted with malice and/or bad faith.

7.27.In the case of Mata, et al. vs. Agravante7, the


Supreme Court held:

“we reiterate the basic postulate that in the


absence of proof that there was malice or bad
faith on the part of the respondents, no damages
can be awarded.”

PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY


DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S
FEES AND COST OF SUIT
BECAUSE OF THE FILING
OF THIS BASELESS
COMPLAINT.

7.28.As can be gleaned from the foregoing, plaintiff-


appellant shall pay defendant-appellant attorney’s fees and
cost of suit because of the filing of this baseless complaint.
Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
when plaintiff-appellant's act or omission has compelled the
defendant-appellant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect its interest, as in this case when
defendant was compelled to incur expenses of attorney’s
fees8 and litigation to protect its interest.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the


Decision dated kelan kasi? and the Order Kahapon be SET
ASIDE and a new judgment be rendered against plaintiff-
appellant as follows:

1. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay defendant-


appellant the amount of isang singkong duling
7
G.R. No. 147597, August 6, 2008.

8
Annex “9” of defendant.
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with legal interest from the time of demand on 10
January 2000 up to the time the said amount is
fully paid.

2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay defendant-


appellant for attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation in the amount of not less than
Phpdalawang Singkong duling, because I can!

Other measures of relief, just and equitable under the


premises, are likewise prayed for.

Keps ng nanay mo, 4 September 2099.

By:

LAWYER DETAILS
Wag po kuripot/mag hire ka ng abogado
Para di ka po makulong/ oo di po kami cheap.

Copy Furnished:

ATTY. MOMOLAND
LEGAL SERVICES GROUP
Litigation Department
Bank
Keps ng Asawa mo

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT


MANILA
BRANCH 25

EXPLANATION

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Copies of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief were served to
the above-named parties by registered mail due to distance,
and time and man power constraints.

Pat

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