MUSTANG LUMBER v.

CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.. Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court
held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to
seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended.
Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done
lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of
the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore,
such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit
to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the
area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said
purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,
one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion
received, petitioner appealed the order.then TO petition to certiorari to CFI negros occidental ,
petitioner asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the
order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition, no capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts
in a special civil action.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.

Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the
President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:

(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.
 MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.. Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court
held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to
seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended.
Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.
The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done
lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of
the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore,
such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit
to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the
area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said
purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,
one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion
received, petitioner appealed the order.then TO petition to certiorari to CFI negros occidental ,
petitioner asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the
order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition, no capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts
in a special civil action.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.

Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the
President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:

(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.. Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court
held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to
seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended.
Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done
lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of
the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore,
such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit
to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the
area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said
purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,
one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion
received, petitioner appealed the order.then TO petition to certiorari to CFI negros occidental ,
petitioner asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the
order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition, no capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts
in a special civil action.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.

Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the
President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:

(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such
was to expire on 25 September 1990.. Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court
held that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to
seize the Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended.
Thus, petitioner was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done
lawfully as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of
the exceptions to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore,
such search and seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or
employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE
GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit
to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the
area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was released for said
purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the
Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the area into three portions,
one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion
received, petitioner appealed the order.then TO petition to certiorari to CFI negros occidental ,
petitioner asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the
order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition, no capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts
in a special civil action.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.

Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of
Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants
can claim to have a preferential right over another. The interpretation by the Office of the
President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.

The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:

SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right
to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:

(a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied
and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto.

The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates:

1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.

2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947

3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952

4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953

5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January
14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land
available for lease permits and c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
applications.