Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?

Author(s): Jürgen Habermas and William Rehg

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6 (Dec., 2001), pp. 766-781
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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DEMOCRACY,LAW,FOUNDING

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
A ParadoxicalUnionofContradictory
Principles?

JURGENHABERMAS
University
ofFrankfurt

1.

The modemconception ofdemocracy differs

fromtheclassicalconcep-
tioninvirtueofitsrelation toa typeoflawthatdisplaysthreecharacteristics:
modemlawispositive, compulsory, andindividualistic.
Suchlawconsistsof
normsthatareproducedbya lawgiver, aresanctioned bythestate,andare
meantto guaranteeindividualliberties. Accordingto theliberalview,the
democratic self-determination of citizenscan be realizedonlythrough the
mediumofsucha law,thestructural propertiesofwhichensureliberty. Con-
sequently,theidea ofa "ruleoflaw,"whichinthepastwas expressedinthe
idea of humanrights,comes on the scene alongside-and together
with-thatofpopularsovereignty as a secondsourceof legitimation. This
duality raises the question of how the democratic principle and
constitutionalism arerelated.'
According to theclassicalconception, thelawsofa republicexpressthe
unrestrictedwilloftheunitedcitizens.Regardless ofhowthelawsreflect the
existingethosof thesharedpoliticallife,thisethospresents no limitation
insofaras itachievesitsvalidityonlythrough thecitizens'ownprocessof
will-formation.Theprinciple oftheconstitutional exerciseofpower,on the
otherhand,appearstosetlimitsonthepeople'ssovereign self-determination.
The ruleof law requiresthatdemocratic will-formationnotviolatehuman
rightsthathavebeenpositively enactedas basicrights. The twosourcesof
legitimationalso competewitheachotherinthehistory ofpoliticalphiloso-
phy.Liberalism andcivicrepublicanism disagreeon whether the"libertyof
themodems"orthe"liberty oftheancients" shouldenjoypriorityintheorder

POLITICAL THEORY,Vol.29 No. 6, December2001 766-781

c 2001 Sage Publications
766

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 767

ofjustification.Whichcomesfirst: theindividual libertiesofthemembers of

themodemmarketsocietyor therightsof democratic citizensto political
participation?
The one sideinsiststhatinbasicrights, theprivateautonomy ofcitizens
assumesa formthat-"'unchangeable" in itsessentialcontent-guarantees
theanonymous ruleoflaw.According to theotherside,thepoliticalauton-
omyof citizensis embodiedin theself-organization of a community that
freelymakesits own laws. If thenormative justificationof constitutional
democracy is tobe consistent,thenitseemsonemustrankthetwoprinciples,
humanrights andpopularsovereignty. Tobe legitimate, laws,including basic
rights,musteitheragreewithhumanrights (howevertheseinturnarelegiti-
mated)orissuefromdemocratic will-formation. On thefirst alternative, the
democraticlawgivermay decide in a sovereignmanneronlywithinthe
boundaries ofhumanrights;on thesecondalternative, thedemocratic law-
givercan setup anyconstitution itwantsand,as thecase maybe,violateits
ownbasic law,thusimpairing theidea oftheconstitutional state.
However,thesealternatives contradict a strongintuition.2 The idea of
humanrights thatis spelledoutinbasicrights mayneither be imposedonthe
sovereign lawgiveras a limitation norbe merelyinstrmentalized as a fimc-
tionalrequisiteforlegislative purposes.In a certainway,we considerboth
principlesas equallyoriginal.One is notpossiblewithout theother, butnei-
thersetslimitson theother.The intuition of "co-originality" can also be
expressed thus:private andpublicautonomy requireeachother. Thetwocon-
ceptsareinterdependent; theyarerelatedto eachotherbymaterialimplica-
tion.Citizenscanmakeanappropriate useoftheirpublicautonomy, as guar-
anteedbypoliticalrights, onlyiftheyaresufficiently independent invirtue of
an equallyprotected privateautonomy intheirlifeconduct.Butmembers of
societyactuallyenjoytheirequalprivateautonomy toan equal extent-that
is,equallydistributed individual
libertieshave"equalvalue"forthem-only
ifas citizenstheymakean appropriate use oftheirpoliticalautonomy.
RousseauandKantbothformulated thisintuition intheconceptofauton-
omy.3 Theideathattheaddresseesofthelawmustalso be abletounderstand
themselves as itsauthorsdoesnotgivetheunitedcitizensofa democratic pol-
itya voluntaristic,carteblanchepermission tomakewhatever decisionsthey
like.The legalguarantee to behaveas onepleaseswithintheboundsofthe
law is thecoreofprivate, notpublic,autonomy. Rather, on thebasisofthis
freedom ofchoice,citizensareaccordedautonomy inthesenseofa reason-
able will-formation,even if this autonomycan only be enjoined
[angesonnen]andnotlegallyrequiredofthem.Theyshouldbindtheirwills
to just those laws theygive themselvesafterachievinga commonwill
through discourse.Correctly understood, theidea ofself-legislation engen-

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768 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

dersan internal relationbetweenwillandreasoninsucha waythatthefree-

domofeveryone-that is,self-legislation-dependson theequal consider-
ation of the individualfreedomof each individualto take a yes/no
position-thatis, self-legislation. Undertheseconditions, onlythoselaws
thatlieintheequalinterest ofeachcanmeetwiththereasonableagreement of
all.
However, RousseaunorKantcouldfindan unambiguous
neither wayof
usingtheconceptofautonomy ofconstitutional
forthejustification democ-
racy.Rousseauinscribed thewill ofthepeoplewithreasonby bindingthe
democratic processtotheabstract anduniversalformoflaws,whereasKant
triedto accomplishthisrelation toreasonbysubordinating lawtomorality.
As I willshow,however, thisinternalconnectionbetweenwillandreasoncan
developonly in the dimensionof time-as a self-correcting historical
process.
Itis true,ofcourse,thatintheConflict oftheFaculties,Kantwentbeyond
thesystematic boundaries ofthisphilosophy andraisedtheFrenchRevolu-
tiontothelevelofa "historical ofa moralprogress
sign"forthepossibility of
humanity.4 But in thetheoryitselfwe findno traceof theconstitutional
assembliesofPhiladelphia andParis-at leastnotthereasonabletraceofa
great,dualhistorical eventthatwe can nowsee in retrospect as an entirely
newbeginning. Withthiseventbegana projectthatholdstogether a rational
constitutional discourseacrossthecenturies. In whatfollows,I takea recent
studybyFrankMichelmans as theoccasionto arguethattheallegedlypara-
doxicalrelation betweendemocracy andtheruleoflawresolvesitselfinthe
dimensionof historical time,providedone conceivestheconstitution as a
projectthatmakesthefounding actintoan ongoingprocessofconstitution-
makingthatcontinues acrossgenerations.

2.
Politicalsystemssuch as the UnitedStatesand the GermanFederal
Republichavesetupanindependent institution
charged the
withscrutinizing
ofparliamentary
constitutionality In
legislation. thesesettings,thefunction
andstatusofthispolitically branch-theConstitutional
influential Courtor
SupremeCourt-sparkdebates over therelationbetween democracy andthe
ruleof law.In theUnited a
States, debate has been goingon forsome time
overthe legitimacy of thehighest-leveljudicial reviewexercisedby the
SupremeCourt.Againandagain,civicrepublicans whoareconvincedthat
"all governmentis bythepeople"bristleattheelitepoweroflegalexperts to
void thedecisionsof a democratically electedlegislature,althoughthese

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 769

expertsthemselves arenotlegitimated bya democratic majority butcanonly

call on theirtechnicalcompetencein constitutional interpretation. Frank
Michelmansees thisproblematic personifiedinWilliamJ.Brennan, a com-
mandingfigurein recentAmericanconstitutional jurisprudence.As
Michelman describeshim,Brennanis a liberalwhodefendsindividual liber-
tiesinstrongly terms;a democrat
moralistic whoradicalizesrights ofpoliti-
calparticipationandwantstogivea hearing tothevoicelessandmarginalized
as well as to thedeviantand oppositional voices;a socialdemocrat whois
highlysensitiveto questionsof socialjustice;and,finally, a pluralist who,
goingbeyondtheliberalunderstanding of tolerance, pleads fora politics
open to difference and to therecognition of cultural,racial,and religious
minorities. In short,by employing thepaletteof Americanpragmatism to
depictBrennanas a model of contemporary republicanism, Michelman
wantsto sharpenthequestionthatinterests us here:whena convinced
democrat withthismentality, in theroleofa highlyactivistSupremeCourt
judge,has no qualmsin makingextensive use ofthedubiousinstrument of
judicialoversight,thenperhapsthejurisprudence hehas shapedexposesthe
secretof how one can combinetheprincipleof popularsovereignty with
constitutionalism.
Michelmanuses Brennanto exemplify theroleof a "responsive judge"
whoqualifiesas democratically abovesuspicionwhenitcomestointerpret-
ingtheConstitution. Brennanqualifiesforthistrustbecausehe renders his
decisionsas besthe knowshowand accordingto his conscienceand only
afterhe has listenedas patiently
as possible-withan inquisitive hermeneu-
ticsensitivityanda desiretolearn-tothetangleofviewsintherelevant dis-
coursesconducted incivilsocietyandthepoliticalpublicsphere.Interaction
withthelarger public,beforewhichlegalexperts areheldresponsible, is sup-
posedtocontribute tothedemocratic legitimation ofthedecisionsofa consti-
tutionaljudgewhohasnotbeendemocratically legitimatedoratleastnotsuf-
ficiently
legitimated

Itis a condition
oftheinterpreter's
greaterorlesserreliability
and ofwhatwecan do to
bolsterit.Andonecondition thatyouthinkcontributes greatly is thecon-
toreliability
stantexposureoftheinterpreter-themoralreader-tothefullblastofthesundry opin-
ionson thequestionsofrightnessofoneoranother interpretation, anduninhibit-
freely
edlyproduced byassorted
members ofsocietylisteningtowhattheothers havetosayout
oftheirdiverselifehistories,
current andperceptions
situations, ofinterestandneed.6

Michelmanis apparently guidedby the intuition thatthe discursive

besiegementoftheCourtbya mobilizedsocietygivesriseto an interaction
thathas favorableconsequencesforbothsides. For theCourt,whichas
alwaysdecidesindependently,
theperspectiveof theexpertsis broadened

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770 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

alongwiththebase ofjustifications foritsdecision.Forcitizens, whosepro-

vocativepublicopinionsexertaninfluence ontheCourt,thelegitimacy ofthe
decisionprocedure is at leastincreased.To judge howthismodelcan help
resolvetheallegedparadox,onewouldhavetoanalyzeindetail,ononehand,
thecognitive roleplayedbythediscursive offensive as a meansofbroadening
thelegalpublicsphereforthepracticeoftheCourtand,ontheother, thefimc-
tionalcontribution suchdiscourseis supposedto haveforthesocialaccep-
tanceofthedecision.However,I suspectthatpragmatic reasonsandhistori-
cal circumstances aremoredecisivefordetermining howthetaskofjudicial
oversight is bestestablished ina givencontext. Theseinstitutional possibili-
tiesshouldcertainly be assessedinthelightoftheprinciples ofpopularsov-
ereignty and constitutionalism, buttheconstellation and interplay of these
principles do notyieldpatanswers.
Forourmainissue,I findthewayMichelmanarrivesathismodelofthe
"responsive" judgemoreinteresting thantheproposalitself.Forsometime
now,Michelmanhas debatedagainstessentially threepositions(whichhe
seesrepresented byRonaldDworkin, RobertPost,andmyself).7 Inwhatfol-
lows,I stylizethearguments andcounterarguments insucha waythatthese
threepositions"emergefromone another" in gooddialecticalfashion.
According totheliberalview,thedemocratic legislativeprocessrequires a
specificformoflegalinstitutionalization ifitis tolead to legitimate regula-
tions.A "basiclaw" is introduced as thenecessaryandsufficient condition
forthedemocratic processitself, notforitsresults:democracy cannotdefine
democracy. The relationship betweendemocracy as thesourceof legitima-
tionanda constitutionalism thatdoesnotneeddemocratic legitimation poses
noparadox,however. Forconstitutive rulesthatfirst makea democracy pos-
sible cannotconstraindemocraticpracticein the mannerof extemally
imposednorms.By simplyclarifying theconcepts, theallegedparadoxdis-
appears:enablingconditionsshouldnot be confusedwithconstraining
conditions.
Theconclusionthattheconstitution is in somesenseinherent indemoc-
racyis certainly plausible.Buttheargument putforth asjustificationis inade-
quatebecauseitrefers onlytopartofthebasiclaw,thepartimmediately con-
stitutive
forinstitutions ofopinion- andwill-formation-that is,itrefers only
to rightsof politicalparticipation and communication. But libertyrights
makeup thecoreofbasicrights-habeascorpus,freedom ofreligion, prop-
ertyrights-inshort,all thoselibertiesthatguarantee an autonomouslife
conductandthepursuit ofhappiness. Theseliberalbasicrights evidently pro-
tectgoodsthatalso havean intrinsic value.Theycannotbe reducedto the
instrumental function theycanhavefortheexerciseofthepoliticalrights of

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 771

citizens.Because theclassicallibertiesarenotprimarily intendedto foster

the qualificationforpoliticalcitizenship,liberalrights,unlikepolitical
rights,cannotbe justifiedby the argument thattheymake democracy
possible.
Accordingto therepublican view,thesubstanceoftheconstitution will
notcompetewiththesovereignty ofthepeopleonlyiftheconstitution itself
emergesfromaninclusive processofopinion-andwill-formation onthepart
ofcitizens.To be sure,we mustthenconceivedemocratic self-determination
as an uncoercedprocessof ethical-politicalself-understandingundertaken
bya populaceaccustomed tofreedom. Undertheseconditions,theruleoflaw
remains unharmed becauseitgainsrecognition as anintegral
component ofa
democraticethos.Rootedin themotivations and attitudesof thecitizens,
constitutionalprinciples
areless coerciveandmorepermanent thanformal
juridicalmechanismsthatimmunizetheconstitution againstchangesby
tyrannicalmajorities.However,thisreflectionis guiltyofbeggingtheques-
tion;namely,itbuildsintothehistory ofideasandpoliticalcultureofthepol-
itypreciselythoseliberalvalueorientationsthatmakelegalcoercionsuper-
fluousbyreplacingitwithcustomandmoralself-control.

3.
The republicanconceptionacquiresa different, namelya proceduralist
sensewhentheexpectation ofreasonconnectedwitha self-limiting demo-
craticopinion-andwill-formation shiftsfroma basisintheresourcesofan
existing valueconsensustotheformal propertiesofthedemocratic process.
Neo-Aristotelians mustbankon theliberalqualityand tradition-building
forceofa democratic formoflife;neo-Kantians, bycontrast, radicalizethe
viewthattheideaofhumanrights intheveryprocessofa reason-
is inherent
able will-formation: basic rightsare answersthatmeetthedemandsof a
politicalcommunication amongstrangers andgroundthepresumption that
outcomesare rationally acceptable.The constitutionthereby acquiresthe
procedural senseofestablishingforms ofcommunication thatprovideforthe
publicuseofreasonanda fairbalanceofinterests ina manner consonant with
theregulatory need and context-specific issue. Because thisensembleof
enablingconditionsmustbe realizedin themediumof law,theserights
encompassbothliberalfreedoms andrights ofpoliticalparticipation,
as we
shallsee.
It is notwithoutsympathy thatMichelmandescribesthebasic assump-
tionsofthisconception ofdeliberative democracy:

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772 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

a beliefthatonlyinthewakeofdemocratic
first, debatecan anyonehopeto arriveat a
reliableapproximation totrueanswerstoquestionsofjusticeofproposedconstitutional
norms, understood ofeveryone's
intheiruniversalizability
as consisting ortheir
interests
hypothetical unanimous ina democratic
acceptability discourse;and,second,thatonly
inthatwaycananyonehopetogaina sufficient conditions
historical
graspofrelevant to
produceforthecountry inquestion,ina legallyworkableform, of
an aptinterpretation
whatever abstractpractical anddem-
normscanpassthejusticetestsofuniversalizability
ocratic-discursiveacceptability.8

However,Michelmandoes not regardthisconceptionof deliberative

democracyas a solutionto the supposedlyparadoxicalrelationbetween
democracy andtheruleoflaw.Theparadoxseemstoreturn whenwe trace
matters backtotheactofconstitutionmakingandaskwhether discoursethe-
oryallowsus to conceivetheopinion-and will-formation of theconstitu-
tionalconventionas anunconstrained democraticprocess.Elsewhere,I have
proposedthatwe understand thenormativebases of constitutional
democ-
ofa deliberative
racyas theresult processthatthefounders-
decision-making
motivated bywhatever contingencies-undertook
historical withtheinten-
tionof creatinga voluntary, associationof freeand equal
self-determining
citizens.9The founders soughta reasonableanswerto thisquestion:what
rightsmustwe mutually accordoneanother ifwe wanttolegitimately regu-
lateourcommonlifebymeansofpositivelaw?
Giventhiswayofframing theissueandgivena discursive modeofdelib-
eration,twothingsfollow:

* First,onlythoseoutcomescancountas legitimate uponwhichequallyentitledparticipants

inthedeliberation agree-thatis,outcomesthatmeetwiththejustified
can freely consent
ofall underconditions ofrationaldiscourse.
* Second,giventhespecificway of framing committhem-
thequestion,theparticipants
selvestomodemlaw as themediumforregulating theircommonlife.Themodeoflegiti-
mationthrough a generalconsentunderdiscursive realizestheKantianconcept
conditions
ofpoliticalautonomy onlyin connectionwiththeidea ofcoercivelawsthatgrantequal
individual Foraccording
liberties. totheKantianconceptofautonomy, nooneis truly
free
underlawsthattheyhavegiventhemselves
untilall citizensenjoyequal liberties aftera
reasonabledeliberation.

BeforeI recallthesystemofrightsthatemergesfrom thisdiscourse-theo-

reticapproach,I mustdeal withtheobjectionMichelmanraisesagainstthis
third,proceduralist atreconciling
attempt theidea ofhumanrights withthe
principleof popularsovereignty.To perceivetheforceof thisinteresting
objection,onemustbe clearabouttheconsequences ofattemptingtoexplain
theformofconstitutionaldemocracy intermsofthelegalinstitutionalization
of a far-reachingnetworkof discourses.Publicdiscoursesmustbe tempo-

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 773

rally,socially,andmaterially specifiedin relationto politicalopinion-and

will-formation in arenasofthepublicsphereorin legislative bodiesand in
relationtolegallycorrectandmaterially informed decision-making practices
incourtsoradministrations. Michelmanhas inviewthisdimension oflegal
regulations,beginning withbasicrights andvotingrights, extending further
tothespecifications oftheorganizational partoftheconstitution, andfinally
movingtotheprocedural rightsandrulesoforderofindividual governmental
bodies.
Dependingonthematter inneedofregulation andtheneedfora decision,
sometimes themoralandlegalaspectsofan issuestandintheforeground; at
othertimestheethicalaspectsstandout.Sometimes empirical questionsare
involvedthatcall forexpertknowledge; at othertimesitis a matterofprag-
maticquestionsthatrequirea balancingof interests and,thus,fairnegotia-
tions.Thelegitimation processesthemselves movethrough variouslevelsof
communication. Standingincontrasttothe"wild"circlesofcommunication
intheunorganized publicspherearetheformally regulated deliberative
and
decision-making processesof courts,parliaments, bureaucracies, and the
like.Thelegalprocedures andnonnsthatgoverninstitutionalized discourses
shouldnotbe confusedwiththecognitive procedures andpatterns ofargu-
mentation thatguidetheintrinsic courseofdiscourseitself.

4.
Itis thislegaldimension
oftheprocessofestablishing
formsofcommuni-
cationthatMichelmanrefers towhenhe arguesthattheconstitution-making
practicecannotbe reconstructed onthebasisofdiscoursetheory.
Thereason
is thatthisapproachcannotavoidthecircularity
oflegalself-constitution
and
thusgetstrappedin an infinite regress:

A trulydemocratic processis itselfinescapablya legallyconditionedand constituted

process.It is constituted,
forexample,by laws regarding politicalrepresentation
and
civilassociations,
elections, families, freedom ofspeech,property,accesstomedia,and
so on.Thus,inordertoconfer legitimacyona setoflawsissuingfromanactualsetofdis-
cursiveinstitutionsand practicesin a country,thoseinstitutionsand practiceswould
themselves havetobe legallyconstituted intherightway.Thelawsregarding elections,
representation,associations,
families,speech,property,andso on,wouldhavetobe such
as to constitutea processof moreor less "fair"or "undistorted"democratic political
communication, notonlyintheformal arenasoflegislation
andadjudication butincivil
societyatlarge.Theproblemis thatwhether theydo ornotmayitselfatanytimebecome
a matterofcontentious butreasonabledisagreement, accordingtotheliberalpremiseof
reasonableinterpretativepluralism.'0

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774 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

Theprocedural legitimacy oftheoutcomeofanygivendiscoursedepends

on thelegitimacy oftherulesaccordingto whichthattypeofdiscoursehas
beenspecifiedandestablished fromtemporal, social,andmaterial pointsof
view.Ifprocedural legitimacy is thestandard,thentheoutcomeofpolitical
elections, thedecisionofparliaments, orthecontent ofcourtdecisionsis in
principle subjecttothesuspicionthatitcameaboutinthewrongway,accord-
ingtodeficient rules,andina deficient institutional
fiamework. Thischainof
presuppositions of legitimation reachesbackevenbeyondtheconstitution-
makingpractice.For example,the constitutional assemblycannotitself
vouchforthelegitimacy oftherulesaccordingto whichitwas constituted.
Thechainneverterminates, andthedemocratic processis caughtina circular
self-constitution thatleadsto an infinite regress.
I prefer nottomeetthisobjection byrecourse tothetransparent objectivity
of ultimatemoralinsights thatare supposedto bringtheregressto a halt.
Ratherthanappealtoa moralrealismthatwouldbe hardtodefend, I propose
thatwe understand theregressitselfas theunderstandable expression ofthe
future-oriented character, oropenness,ofthedemocratic constitution: inmy
view,a constitution thatis democratic-notjust initscontent butalsoaccord-
ingtoitssourceoflegitimation-is a tradition-
building projectwitha clearly
marked beginning intime.All thelatergenerations havethetaskofactualiz-
ingthestill-untapped normative substanceofthesystemofrights laiddown
in theoriginaldocumentof theconstitution. Accordingto thisdynamic
understanding oftheconstitution, ongoinglegislation carrieson thesystem
ofrights byinterpreting andadaptingrights forcurrent circumstances (and,
tothisextent, levelsoffthe threshold betweenconstitutional normsandordi-
narylaw). To be sure,thisfalliblecontinuation of thefounding eventcan
breakoutof thecircleof a polity'sgroundless discursiveself-constitution
onlyifthisprocess-whichis notimmuneto contingent interruptions and
historical regressions-canbe understood inthelongrunas a self-correcting
learning process.
In a countxy suchas theUnitedStates,whichcanlookbackonmorethan
twohundred yearsofcontinuous history,
constitutional we findevidencethat
supports thisdynamicinterpretation. BruceAckerman refersto "hot"peri-
ods,suchas theNew Deal underRoosevelt,thatwerecharacterized bythe
innovative spiritof successfulreforms. Such timesof productive radical
changemakepossibletherareexperience ofemancipation andleavebehind
thememory ofaninstructive historicalexample.Contemporaries canseethat
groupshitherto discriminated againstgaintheirownvoiceandthathitherto
underprivileged classesareputintoa positiontotaketheirfateintotheirown
hands.Oncetheinterpretive battleshavesubsided,all partiesrecognizethat
thereforms areachievements, although theywereat first sharply contested.

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 775

theyagreethatwiththeinclusionofmarginalized
In retrospect groupsand
withtheempowerment ofdeprived classes,thehithertopoorlysatisfiedpre-
suppositionsforthelegitimacy ofexisting democraticprocedures arebetter
realized.
Ofcourse,theinterpretationofconstitutional
historyas a leaningprocess
is predicatedon thenontrivialassumption thatlatergenerations will start
withthesamestandards as did thefounders. Whoeverbases herjudgment
todayonthenormative expectation ofcompleteinclusionandmutualrecog-
as wellas ontheexpectation
nition, ofequalopportunities forutilizing
equal
mustassumethatshecanfindthesestandards
rights, byreasonably appropri-
atingtheconstitutionanditshistory ofinterpretation.
The descendents can
leamfrom pastmistakesonlyiftheyare"inthesameboat"as theirforebears.
Theymustimputetoall thepreviousgenerations thesameintention ofcreat-
ingandexpanding thebasesfora voluntary associationofcitizenswhomake
theirownlaws.All participants mustbe able torecognizetheprojectas the
samethroughout historyandtojudgeitfromthesameperspective.
Michelmanseemsto agree:

Constitutional
framerscan be ourframers-their historycan be ourhistory,
theirword
can commandobservance fromus nowon popularsovereignty grounds-onlybecause
andinsofar
as they,
inoureyesnow,wereahready onwhatwejudgetobe thetrackoftrue
reason.... In theproduction
constitutional ofpresent-daylegalauthority,
constitutional
framershavetobe figures ofrightnessforus beforetheycan be figures I
ofhistory."

The unifying bondthusconsistsof thesharedpracticeto whichwe have

recoursewhenwe endeavortoarriveata rational understanding ofthetextof
theconstitution.
Itis no accidentthatthefounding constitutionalactis expe-
riencedas a decisivepointin thenation'shistory, becausewiththisactthe
groundsfora world-historically newkindofpracticehavebeenestablished.
Theperformative meaningofthispractice-a practicemeanttobringforth a
self-determiningcommunity of freeand equal citizens-is simplyspelled
outinthewordsoftheconstitution. Thismeaningremainsdependent on an
ongoingexplication thatis carriedoutinthecourseofapplying, interpreting,
andsupplementing constitutional norms.
Thankstothisintuitively availableperformative meaning, eachcitizenof
a democratic politycan at anytimereferto thetextsand decisionsof the
foundersand theirdescendents in a criticalfashion,just as one can,con-
adopttheperspective
versely, ofthefounders andtakea criticalviewofthe
presenttotestwhether theexisting institutions, andprocedures
practices, of
democratic opinion-andwill-formation satisfythenecessary conditions fora
processthatengenders legitimacy. Philosophers andotherexperts canintheir

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776 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

ownwaycontribute ofwhatitmeansto pursuetheprojectof

explanations
associationoffreeandequal consociatesunder
realizinga self-determining
law.On thispremise, eachfounding ofa pro-
actalso createsthepossibility
cess ofself-correcting to tapthesystemofrights
attempts evermorefully.

5.

Reflection onthehistorical dimension ofrealizingtheconstitutional pro-

jectcan,perhaps, defangtheprimafacieplausibleobjectiontothediscourse-
theoretic interpretation of thedemocratic self-constitutionof theconstitu-
tionalstate[Verfassungsstaat]. Butonehasnotthereby shownhowtheprin-
ciplesoftheruleoflaw foundintheconstitution areinherent indemocracy
itself.To demonstrate thatdemocracy andconstitutionalism arenotparadox-
icallyrelated, we mustexplainthesenseinwhichbasicrights as a whole,and
notmerely politicalrights,areconstitutivefortheprocessofself-legislation.
Similarto its social-contract predecessors, discoursetheorysimulates
an originalcondition:an arbitrary numberof personsfreelyenterintoa
constitution-making practice.The fiction offreedom theimportant
satisfies
condition ofanoriginalequalityoftheparticipating whose"yes"and
parties,
"no" countequally.The participants mustsatisfythreefurther conditions.
First,theyareunitedbya commonresolution to legitimatelyregulatetheir
future lifetogether bymeansofpositivelaw.Second,theyarereadyandable
to takepartin rationaldiscoursesandthusto satisfythedemanding, prag-
maticpresuppositions ofa practiceofargumentation. Unlikethetradition of
modemnatural law,thissupposition ofrationalityis notlimited topurposive
rationality; moreover, in contrastto Rousseauand Kant,it does notjust
extendto morality butmakescommunicative reasona condition.'2 Finally,
entrance intothepracticeofconstitution makingis boundup withthereadi-
nessto makethemeaningofthispracticean explicittopic(i.e.,tomakethe
resources oftheperformance a topicofdiscussion).Thatis,tobeginwiththe
practiceamounts tonothing morethanreflecting on andconceptually expli-
catingthespecificmeaningoftheintended enterprisetheparticipants have
gottenthemselves intowiththeirverypracticeofconstitution making.This
reflection attendsto a seriesof constructive tasksthatmustbe completed
beforetheworkofconstitution makingcan actuallybegin-thenextstage.
Thefirst thingtheparticipants realizeis thatbecausetheywanttorealize
theirintention through the medium oflaw,theymustcreatea systemofsta-
tuses to ensure that every future member oftheassociationcountsas a bearer
ofindividual rights. A systemofpositiveandcompulsory law withsuchan
individualistic qualitycan comeaboutonlyifthreecategoriesofrightsare

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 777

concomitantly Ifwe considerthatthecapacityforgeneralcon-

introduced.
oflegitimacy,
sentis a requirement thesecategoriesareas follows:

i. basicrights
(whatevertheirconcrete thatresultfromtheautonomous
content) elabora-
tionoftherighttothegreatestpossiblemeasureofequal individual
freedom ofaction
foreachperson;
ii. basicrights(whatevertheirconcrete thatresultfromtheautonomous
content) elabora-
tionofthestatusofa memberin a voluntaryassociationoflegalconsociates;
iii. basicrights
(whatevertheirconcrete thatresultfromtheautonomous
content) elabora-
tionofeachindividual's underlaw,thatis,thatresultfromthe
righttoequalprotection
actionability
ofindividual
rights.

Thesethreecategories ofrightsarethenecessary basisforan associationof

citizensthathasdefinitesocialboundaries andwhosemembers mutually rec-
ognizeone another as bearersofactionableindividual rights.
In respectto thethreeabovecategories, however, participants
anticipate
onlythattheywillbe future usersandaddresseesofthelaw.Because they
wantto groundan associationofcitizenswhomaketheirownlaws,itnext
occursto themthattheyneed a fourth categoryof rightsso thattheycan
mutually recognizeoneanother also as theauthorsoftheserights as wellas
ofthelawingeneral.Iftheywanttoholdfasttothemostimportant aspectof
theirpractice,its self-determiningcharacter, notonlynow butalso in the
future,thentheymustempowerthemselves as politicallawgiversby intro-
ducingbasicpoliticalrights. Without thefirstthreecategoriesofbasicrights,
something likelaw cannotexist;butwithout a politicalelaborationofthese
categories,thelawcouldnotacquireanyconcrete contents.Forthelatter,an
additional(and also initially
empty)category ofrightsis necessary:

iv. basicrights
(whatever theirconcrete thatemergefromtheautonomous
content) elabo-
rationoftherightto an equal opportunity inpoliticallaw-giving.
toparticipate

It is important to keep in mindthatthisscenariohas recapitulated a

thought processcarriedoutinmente,so tospeak-even iftheprocessis sup-
posedto havetakenshapeinthecourseofa deliberative practice.Thusfar,
nothinghas actuallyhappened.Nothingcouldhappen:beforethepartici-
pantsconcludetheirfirstactoflawmaking, theymustachieveclarity regard-
ingtheenterprisetheyhaveresolveduponwiththeirentrance intoa practice
ofconstitution
making.However, aftertheyhavemadeexplicittheirintuitive
knowledge oftheperformative meaning theyknowtheymust
ofthispractice,
createthefourabovecategories ofbasicrightsina singlestroke,
so tospeak.
Of course,theycannotproducebasicrightsin abstracto butonlyparticular
basicrightswitha concretecontent.
Forthisreason,theparticipantswhothus

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778 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

farwereengagedin inwardreflection, focusedon a kindof philosophical

clarification,
muststepoutfrombehindtheveilofempirical ignorance and
perceivewhatingeneralmustbe regulated underthegivenhistorical circum-
stancesandwhichrights arenecessary fordealingwiththesematters inneed
ofregulation.
Onlywhentheyareconfronted, we say,withtheintolerable consequences
oftheuse ofphysicalviolencedo theyrecognizethenecessity ofelementary
rightsto bodilyintegrity or to freedomof movement. The constitutional
assemblycanreachdecisionsonlywhenitsees therisksthatmakea specific
needforsecurity intoa matter itmustaddress.Onlytheintroduction ofnew
informationtechnologies leadstoproblems thatmakesomekindofdatapro-
tectionnecessary. Onlywhentherelevant features oftheenvironment shed
lightonourowninterests doesitbecomeclearthatweneedrights thatprotect
theconductof ourpersonaland politicallife-such familiar rightsas the
rightto concludecontracts and acquireproperty, to formassociationsand
publiclyexpressouropinions,tojoin andpracticea religion, andso on.
We must,therefore, carefullydistinguish two stages.The firststage
involvestheconceptualexplication of thelanguageof individualrightsin
whichthesharedpracticeofa self-determining associationoffreeandequal
citizenscanexpressitself-rights, thus,inwhichalonetheprinciple ofpopu-
larsovereignty canbe embodied.Thesecondstageinvolves therealizationof
thisprinciplethrough theexercise,theactualcarrying out,of thispractice.
Because thepracticeof civicself-determination is conceivedas a long-run
processofrealizingandprogressively elaboratingthesystem offundamental
rights,theprincipleofpopularsovereignty comesintoitsownas partandpar-
cel oftheidea ofgovernment bylaw.
Thistwo-stage scenariooftheconceptualgenesisofbasicrights clearly
showsthatthepreparatory conceptualstepsexplicatenecessaryrequire-
mentsfora legallyestablished democratic Theyexpressthis
self-legislation.
practiceitselfand are notconstraints to whichthepracticewouldbe sub-
jected.Onlytogether withtheideaofgovernment bylawcanthedemocratic
principlebe realized.Thetwoprinciples standina reciprocalrelationshipof
materialimplication.

6.
Because autonomymustnot be confusedwitharbitrary freedomof
choice,theruleof law neitherprecedesthewillofthesovereign norissues
fromthatwill.Rather,theruleoflawis inscribedinpoliticalself-legislation,
just as thecategoricalimperative-theidea thatonlyuniversalizablemax-

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 779

ims,maximscapableofuniversal consent,arelegitimate andreasonablein

thesenseof showingequal respectforeach person-is inscribedin moral
However,whereasthemorallyactingindividualbindsher
self-legislation.
willto theidea ofjustice,thereasonableself-binding ofthepoliticalsover-
eignmeansthatthelatterbindsitselfto legitimate law.Thepracticalreason
thatis articulated
intheruleoflawis-as legallyexercised rulership-bound
up withthe constitutive featuresof modemlaw. This explainswhythe
coimplication ofpopularsovereignty andconstitutionalism is reflectedinthe
relation betweentheautonomy ofthecitizenandtheautonomy oftheprivate
individual: one cannotbe realizedwithout theother.
Likemorality, so also legitimate lawprotects theequalautonomy ofeach
person:no individual is freeso longas all personsdo notenjoyan equalfree-
dom.Butthepositivity oflawnecessitates aninteresting splitinautonomy to
whichthereis nothing analogousinthemoralsphere.Thebindingcharacter
oflegalnormsstemsnotjustfrom theinsight intowhatis equallygoodforall
butfromthecollectively bindingdecisionsof authorities who makeand
applythelaw. This resultsin theconceptually necessarydivisionof roles
betweenauthorswhomakeandapplythelaw,on one hand,andaddressees
who are subjectto validlaw,on theother.The autonomy thatin themoral
spherespringsfroma singlesource,as itwere,appearsinthelegalspherein
thedualformofprivateandpublicautonomy.
Modemcompulsory lawcan demandonlythatitsaddresseesbehaveina
legalmanner: thatregardless ofone's motivation, onebehaveinconformity
withlaw.Becausethelawmaynotrequirelegalobedience"outofrespectfor
thelaw,"privateautonomy canbe guaranteed onlyintheformofindividual
libertiesthatentitleonetoan autonomous lifeconductandenablethemoral
consideration ofothersbutdo notobligateonetodo anything beyondwhatis
compatible withtheequal freedom ofeveryone else. Privateautonomy thus
takeson theformof a legallyguaranteed freedom of choice.At thesame
time,intheroleofpersons whoactmorally, legalpersonsmustalso beableto
followthelawoutofrespectforthelaw.Forthisreason,valid(inthesenseof
existing)law mustalso be legitimate. Andthelawcan satisfy thiscondition
onlyifithascomeaboutina legitimate way,namely, according totheproce-
duresofdemocratic opinion-andwill-formation thatjustify thepresumption
thatoutcomesarerationally acceptable.Theentitlement topoliticalpartici-
pationis boundup withtheexpectation ofa publicuse ofreason:as demo-
craticcolegislators,citizensmaynotignoretheinformal demand[Ansinnen]
to orientthemselves towardthecommongood.
The foregoing makesitappearas ifpracticalreasonhas itsplace onlyin
theexerciseof a politicalautonomythatallows theaddresseesof law to
understand themselves atthesametimeas itsauthors. Infact,practical reason

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780 POLITICAL THEORY /December2001

is realizedintheformofprivate autonomy nolessthanitis inthatofpolitical

autonomy. Thatis,bothareas muchmeansfortheotheras theyareendsin
themselves. Thedemandtoorient oneselftothecommongood,whichis con-
nectedwithpoliticalautonomy, is also a rational
expectationinsofar as only
thedemocratic processguarantees thatprivateindividuals will achievean
equal enjoyment of theirequal individualliberties.Conversely, onlywhen
theprivateautonomy of individualsis secureare citizensin a positionto
make correctuse of theirpoliticalautonomy.The interdependence of
constitutionalism anddemocracy comestolightinthiscomplementary rela-
tionship betweenprivate andcivicautonomy: eachsideis fedbyresources it
has fromtheother.

-TranslatedbyWilliam
Rehg

NOTES
1. [Habermasuses a numberof termsto expressthe idea of the rule of law or
constitutionalism (takenas equivalentforthe purposesof thisessay). The mostliteralis
Herrschaft derGesetze,whichI alwaystranslate as "ruleoflaw."Rechtsstaat,theliteralmean-
ingofwhichis "law state,"maybe rendered eitheras "constitutionalstate"or"ruleoflaw."To
distinguish Rechtsstaatlichkeit,I translate
it as "constitutionalism"or "government by law."
Note,bytheway,thattheGermanwordfor"constitution" is Verfassung.-Translator]
2. See Jurgen Habermas, "On theInternal RelationbetweentheRuleofLaw andDemoc-
racy,"InclusionoftheOther, ed. C. CroninandP.DeGreiff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1998),
chap.10.
3.1.Maus,ZurAujklarung derDemokratietheorie amMain,Germany,
(Frankfurt 1992).
4. ImmanuelKant,TheConflict oftheFaculties,trans.M. J.Gregor(New York:Abaris,
1979), 151 (Ak. ed. VII, 84).
5. FrankMichelman, BrennanandDemocracy(Princeton, NJ:Princeton UniversityPress,
1999).
6. Michelman, Brennanand Democracy, 59.
7. [See RonaldDworkin, Freedom'sLaw: TheMoralReadingoftheAmerican Constitution
(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1996); RobertPost, Constitutional Domains:
Democracy,Community, Management(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1995);
Jurgen Habermas'sviewsaremostfullyelaborated inhisBetweenFactsandNorms:Contribu-
tionstoaDiscourseTheory ofLawandDemocracy, trans.WilliamRehg(Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press,1996).-Translator]
8. FrankMichelman,"Constitutional Authorship," Constitutionalism:Philosophical
Foundations, ed. L. Alexander(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UniversityPress,1998),64-98at
90.
9. See Habermas,BetweenFactsand Norms.
10. Michelman,"Constitutional Authorship," 91; cf. FrankMichelman'sreviewof
Habermas,"BetweenFactsandNorms," JournalofPhilosophy 93 (1996): 307-15;also Jurgen
Habermas,"DemocracyandPositiveLiberty," BostonReview21 (1996): 3-8.

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 Habermas/CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 781

11. Michelnan,"Constitutional
Authorship,"
81.
12. Jurgen
Habermas,On thePragmaticsof Communication,
ed. M. Cooke (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press,1998),chap.7.

JurgenHabermasis a professor ofphilosophy,

emeritus,at theUniversity
ofFrankfurt
and a visitingprofessorofphilosophyat Northwestern Amonghis most
University.
recentbooksare The InclusionoftheOther(1998), The Liberating
Powerof Symbols
(2001), and The Postnational
Constellation
(2001).

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