RAYA, CHARLES ROGER M.

LLB 5-B

TAÑADA vs. ANGARA

[272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997]

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of

the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for
brevity). By signing the Final Act, Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, agreed: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
To that effect, the President ratified and submitted the same to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section21, Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by
the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further,
they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement
“place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Art. II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, all of
the 1987 Philippines Constitution.

Ruling of the Court:

The court ruled the petition in favor of the respondents.

Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These principles
in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

The provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general principles relating to
the national economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regard to “the grants or rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of
trade and commerce. While the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest
of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

On the other hand, there is no basis on the contention that under WTO, local industries will all be
wiped out and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy, in fact, WTO recognizes
need to protect weak economies like the Philippines.

PEOPLE vs. VERA

G.R. No. L-45685

Facts:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime
he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has
no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable
to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And
even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in
effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws.

Ruling of the Court:

An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schechter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.