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21st December 2013 Tañada vs. Tuvera

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized
in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491,
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279,
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628,
1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787,
1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816,
1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844,
1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471,
474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544,
549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51,
59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call
a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports
the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of
this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping
in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is
not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent
the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2
of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication
of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon
the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are
kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication,
the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only
to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8
to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right
of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said
law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication
in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may
be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise
a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published
in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing
paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This
is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be
that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the
Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive
act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far.
It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur
in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity
to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the
corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions
of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is
that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is
provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this
is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only]
one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in
the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier
effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication
which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in
the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already
provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided "
Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a
built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law
may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same
footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision
of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise
a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published
in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so
aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing
paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This
is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be
that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the
Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive
act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far.
It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur
in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity
to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the
corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions
of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only
laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is
that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is
provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this
is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only]
one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in
the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier
effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication
which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will
not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in
the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already
provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided "
Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a
built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law
may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different
mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same
footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision
of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese,
45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San
Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs.
Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87
Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System,
17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of
Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director
Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to
respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed
therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the
publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in
tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and
State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30,
1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968,
24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief
Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication
of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex
rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

Posted 21st December 2013 by Dennis Gonzales

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21st December 2013 Co Kim Chan vs.

Tan Keh
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-51            November 16, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
Revilla and Palma for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
Vicente Hilado and J. A. Wolfson as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision rendered in
this case filed by the respondent. Two attorneys at law, who were
allowed to appear as amici curiae, have also presented
memoranda to discuss certain points on which the dissenting
opinions rely.
(1) It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine
Islands by the Japanese was not actual and effective because of
the existence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains and
even towns and villages; and consequently, no government de
facto could have been validly established by the Japanese
military forces in the Philippines under the precepts of the Hague
Conventions and the law of nations.
The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and
eren in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left
by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of trOops sent on
patrol to these places, was not s5fficient to make tha military
occupation ineffective, nor did it cause that occupation to cease,
or prevent the constitution or establichment of a de facto
govarnment in the Islands. The belligerent occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese invaders became an accomplished
fact from the time General Wainwright, Commander of the
American and Filipino forces in Luzon, and General Sharp,
Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao, surrendered
and ordered the surrender of their forces to the Japanese
invaders, and the Commonwealth Government had become
incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and the invader had
substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate
government in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
"According to the rules of Land Warfare of the United States
Army, belligerent or so-called military occupation is a question of
fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the
invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of
publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader is in position
to substitute and has substituted his own authority for that of the
legitimate government of the territory invaded." (International
Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, by
Hyde Vol. II, pp. 361, 362.) " Belligerent occupation must be both
actual and effective. Organized resistance must be overcome
and the forces in possession must have taken measures to
establish law and order. It doubtless suffices if the occupying
army can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops
to make its authority felt within the occupied district." (Id., p.
364.) "Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . . . It
does not cease, however, . . . Nor does the existence of a
rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease,
unless the legitimate government is re-established and the
occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or guerrilla
operations." (Id., p. 365.)
But supposing arguendo that there were provinces or districts in
these Islands not actually and effectively occupied by the
invader, or in which the latter, consequently, had not substituted
his own authority for that of the invaded government, and the
Commonwealth Government had continued publicly exercising
its authority, there is no question as to the validity of the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts functioning in said territory,
under the municipal law, just as there can be no question as to
the validity of the judgments and proceedings of the courts
continued in the territory occupied by the belligerent occupant,
under the law of nations.
(2) It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in
the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an instrument of national policy,
rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing
the belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a
provisional or de facto government in the Philippines, because
Japan started war treacherously and emphasized was as an
instrument of national policy; and that to give validity to the
judicial acts of courts sponsored by the Japanese would be
tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and
would be nothing short of legalizing the Japanese invasion of the
Philippines.
In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the provisions of
the Hague Conventions which impose upon a belligerent
occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal
laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order
to reestablish and insure "I" ordre et al vie publice," that is, the
public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life
of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader,
but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of
the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in
order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not
be unnecessarily deranged.
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date,
among then Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p.
338) in their recently revised Treatises on International Law,
edited in the year 1944, and the Interpretation of the Supreme
Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of
Dow vs. Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a
necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the
political relations of its people to their former government are, for
the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and
the protection and benefit of others not in the military service, or,
in other words, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws,
that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property and
provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to
continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They
are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded
by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158;
25 U. S. [Law, ed.], 632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor,
as Japan was, does not, therefore, exempt him from complying
with the said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it
make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by
the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such
judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is
presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible
to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and
prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the
conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his
nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the
nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or
occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.
(3) We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in
the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23,
1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and
because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not deem
it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation
should be construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the
minds of persons interested is sustaining a contrary
interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say that
term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean
legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim
"noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a particular
word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its meaning may be made clear and specific
by considering the company in which it is found. (Black on
Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the
proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes
of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be
interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Orders of the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, Ordinances
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and
others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations
with which the word "processes" is associated.
To illustrate, "an English act required licenses for "houses, rooms,
shops, or buildings, kept open for public refreshment, resort, and
entertainment." It was adjudged that the word "entertainment," in
this connection, did not necessarily mean a concert, dramatic
performance, or other divertissement, nor did it necessarily imply
the furnishing of food or drink, but that, judged from its
associations, it meant the reception and accommodation of the
public. So where a policy of marine insurance is specified to
protect the assured against "arrests, restraints, and detainments
of all kings, princes, and people," the word "people" means the
ruling or governing power of the country, this signification being
impressed upon it by its association with the words "kings" and
"princes." Again, in a statute relating to imprisonment for debt,
which speaks of debtors who shall be charged with "fraud" or
undue preference to one creditor to the prejudice of another, the
word "undue" means fraudulent. A statute of bankruptcy,
declaring that any fraudulent "gift, transfer or delivery" of
property shall constitute an act of bankruptcy, applies only to
such deliveries as are in the nature of a gift — such as change
the ownership of the property, to the prejudice of creditors; it
does not include a delivery to a bailee for safekeeping." (Black on
Interpretation of Laws, supra.)
(4) The state of Wheaton (International Law), 7th ed., p. 245) that
"when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid, it must be
remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his
acts should all be reversed (by the restored government or its
representatives) no international wrong would be committed,"
evidently does not mean that the restored government or its
representatives may reverse the judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts during the belligerent occupation without violating the
law of nations and doing any wrong at all. A violation of the law
of nations does not always and necessarily cause an
international wrong. As the said judicial acts which apply the
municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons
and property, and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good
and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true
that no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed
or invalidated by the restored or legitimate government,
international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless true
and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be
caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate
government. According to the law of nations and Wheaton
himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the
occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been
restored. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by
he parties by virtue of such judgments, the restored government
or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without
causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such
reversal would deprive them of their properties without due
process of law.
In this connection, it may not be amiss to refer to the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Raymond
vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), quoted in our decision as applicable
by analogy. In said case, the Commander in Chief of the United
States forces in South Carolina, after the end of the Civil War and
while the territory was still under Military Government, issued a
special order annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery
in a case within its jurisdiction, on the wrong assumption that he
had authority to do so under the acts of Congress approved
March 2, and July 19, 1867, which defined his powers and duties.
That Supreme Court declared void the said special order on the
ground "that it was an arbitrary stretch of authority needful to no
good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have
conferred power to do such an act is a question we are not called
upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise
of military power where the rights of the citizen are concerned,
shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires."
(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the
Commonwealth continued in the Philippines by the belligerent
occupant became also courts of Japan, and their judgments and
proceedings being acts of foreign courts cannot now be
considered valid and continued by the courts of the
Commonwealth Government after the restoration of the latter. As
we have already stated in our decision the fundamental reasons
why said courts, while functioning during the Japanese regime,
could not be considered as courts of Japan, it is sufficient now
to invite attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of The Admittance, Jecker vs.
Montgomery (13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240), which we did not
deem necessary to quote in our decision, in which it was held
that "the courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the
war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing
more than the agents of the military power, to assist it in
preserving order in the conquered territory, and to protect the
inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied
by the American arms. They were subject to the military power,
and their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding
officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the
United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of
prize or no prize." (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13
How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240.).
(6) The petition for mandamus in the present case is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. The mandamus applied for is not
to compel the respondent judge to order the reconstitution of the
record of the case, because the record had already been
reconstituted by order of the court. It is sought to compel the
respondent judge to continue the proceedings in said case. As
the judge refused to act on the ground that he had no power or
jurisdiction to continue taking cognizance of the case,
mandamus and not appeal is the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. For it is a well established rule that "if a a court has
erroneously decided some question of law or of practice,
presented as a preliminary objection, and upon such erroneous
construction has refused to go into the merits of the case,
mandamus will lie to compel it to proceed." (High on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, section 151; Castro Revilla vs.
Garduño, 53 Phil., 934.)
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by
the respondents is denied. The petition for oral argument on said
motion for reconsideration, based on the resolution of division of
this Court dated July 3, 1945, amendatory of section 2, Rule 54,
of the Rules of Court, is also denied, since said resolution has not
yet been adopted by this Court in banc, and the respondents and
amici curiae were allowed to file, and they filed, their arguments
in writing.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, De Joya, and Pablo, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J., concurring:
I subscribe to the majority view, because it follows the trend of
American juridical thought on the legal consequences of
liberation from enemy conquest; and because General
MacArthur's proclamation annulling all laws, regulations and "
processes" other than those of the Commonwealth did not
include judicial proceedings.
In ordinary parlance, process means, "Act of proceeding;
procedure; progress"; "something that occurs in a series of
actions or events"; "any phenomenon which shows a continuous
change in time."1
In court language, process, of course, refers to the means
whereby a court compels the appearance of a defendant before
it or a compliance with its demands, and may include in its
largest sense, all proceedings of the court, from the beginning to
the end of a suit.2
Here we have, not a judicial statement, but a military
proclamation of the great American liberator whose intent may
be gleaned from his utterances and writings. Speaking at the
inauguration of President Quezon, December 31, 1941, he called
the occasion "symbolical of democratic processes."3 Announcing
the discontinuance of United States Army's participation in
Philippine affairs, he referred to "Government by constitutional
process" and "Government under constitutional process." In the
very proclamation of October 23, 1944, he promised to restore to
the people "the sacred right of Government by constitutional
process." Therefore, the word "processes" in that proclamation
referred to orders or instructions, establishing governmental
changes or practices — directives that may not fall strictly within
the category of laws or regulations. I am fortified in this
conclusion by the auxiliary rules of interpretation, noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis.
Furthermore, General MacArthur could not have forgotten the
classic Army tradition that, upon military occupation, usually the
"legislative, executive or administrative" functions of the enemy
Government are affected — not the judicial.4
Unconvincing is the argument that no judicial act is touched by
Judge Dizon's order. The summons requiring the defendant to
answer was a positive court action or proceeding.
Untenable is the position that petitioner should be restrictly to his
remedy by appeal. Considering the numerous persons and cases
affected, and the pressing importance of the issue, the Court
may rightly entertain a petition for extraordinary legal remedy 5.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

We are of opinion that the motion for reconsideration should be
granted, and the petition denied.
We believe that the majority opinion in this case should be
revoked and not be given effect:
1. Because it ignores one of the specific provisions of the
October Proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur;
2. Because it sets aside completely the true meaning and
significance of the words "all processes," as nullified in said
proclamation;
3. Because it attributes to General MacArthur an intention which
is precisely the opposite of the one expressly manifested in the
proclamation;
4. Because it wrongly surmises what General MacArthur could
not have intended, on the false assumption that judicial
processes during the Japanese regime are valid in accordance
with international law;
5. Because it gives judicial processes under the Japanese regime
such character of sacredness and untouchability that they
cannot be nullified by the legitimate government;
6. Because it gives the judicial processes under the Japanese
regime, although taken under the authority of an enemy, greater
sanctity than those of a legitimate occupant or of a government
de jure, which are always subject to nullification, in the discretion
of the legitimate government;
7. Because it gives judicial processes under the Japanese regime
greater force and validity than final decisions rendered by courts
of the individual states of the United States of American, which
cannot be enforced in our country without the institution of an
action before our tribunals;
8. Because it exempts the parties in the judicial processes, under
the Japanese regime, for the obligation of paying the necessary
judicial fees to the Government of the Commonwealth, granting
them a discriminatory privilege in violation of the "equal
protection of the laws" clause of the Philippine Constitution;
9. Because it flagrantly violates the policy specifically delineated
in the declaration of President Roosevelt regarding the Vargas
"Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine Republic;"
10. Because it validates foreign judicial processes taken when
the Commonwealth Government was already reestablished in
Philippine territory;
11. Because it ignores the fact that the judicial processes in
question were taken under a foreign authority with an ideology
which is the opposite of that underlying the Philippine legal and
constitutional systems and repugnant to the judicial sense of our
people;
12. Because it encourages, in some way, the defiant attitude
adopted by plaintiff Co Kim Cham against the Commonwealth
Government which has been reestablished in Philippine territory
by filing the complaint before a court, under the Japanese
regime, almost one month after the Commonwealth Government
began functioning in Leyte with the absolute certainty that its
authority will soon be extended throughout the Philippines;
13. Because it creates problems that might lead to either
injustice or inconsistency on the part of this Court, such as the
deposit of P12,500 made by plaintiff Co Kim Cham in "micky
mouse" money, which is one of the processes validated in the
majority opinion;
14. Because it subjects the legitimate government to greater
restrictions than those imposed by international law upon a
belligerent invader, notwithstanding the fact that The Hague
Convention restrictions are only applied to the invader, and not to
the restored legitimate government, there being absolutely no
reason why international law should meddle with the domestic
affairs of a legitimate government restored in her own territory;
15. Because there is absolutely no reason why an invader may
revoke the officials acts of the ousted legitimate government, a
right specifically recognized in the majority opinion, but the
legitimate government, once restored, is bound to respect such
official acts of the defeated invader, as judicial processes, which
is the same as granting outlaws greater privileges than those
granted to law-abiding citizens.
On October 20, 1944, with the landing in Leyte of the armed
forces of liberation, the Commonwealth Government under
President Sergio Osmeña was reestablished in Philippine
territory.
On October 23, 1944, General Douglas MacArthur issued his
October Proclamation, nullifying all processes of any government
other than the Commonwealth Government. Said proclamation
was issued in keeping with the spirit and purposes of the
following declaration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt:
On the fourteenth of this month, a puppet government
was set up in the Philippine Islands with Jose P. Laurel,
formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as
"president." Jorge Vargas formerly a member of the
Philippine Commonwealth Cabinet and Benigno Aquino,
also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely
associated with Laurel in this movement. The first act of
the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance
with Japan. The second act was a hypocritical appeal for
American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit,
and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino
people.
I wish to made it clear that neither the former
collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor
the present "Philippine Republic" has the recognition or
sympathy of the Government of the United States . . . .
Our sympathy goes not to those who remain loyal to the
United States and the Commonwealth — the great
majority of the Filipino people who have not been
deceived by the promises of the enemy . . .
October 23, 1943
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
President of the United States
(From U. S. Naval War College, International Law
Documents. 1943, pp. 93-94.)
Plaintiff Co and her attorneys must have been fully aware of the
above-mentioned facts when on November 18, 1944, she filed
the complaint in this case, and deposited in court the amount of
P12,500.
The fact of the landing in Leyte was officially announced by the
Japanese radio, by the papers published in Manila, all Japanese
controlled, and by all agencies of Japanese propaganda,
although with a few days' delay and with the usual distortion of
real facts.
As to the real facts, it must be presumed that plaintiff and her
attorneys obtained the same information generally circulated
from underground sources — Filipino, Chinese, Spanish, Swedish,
Swiss, Czechs, etc. — who were keeping short wave radio sets,
and were circulating surreptitious sheets containing the latest
war news, including developments in Leyte.
Although the Japanese kempei were becoming harsher, it is also
a fact that in the second half of November, 1944, the Japanese
forces in Manila were considerably weakened and reduced, being
deployed in great number in two opposite directions, north and
south, and people were bolder in obtaining and propagating the
real war news.
Among these were the victorious occupation of Leyte and Samar
in October, 1944, and the crushing defeat suffered in said month
by the bulk of the Japanese Navy in two greatest naval battles
recorded in history, and the reestablishment of the
Commonwealth Government including several measures
adopted by the same.
Among the underground means of propaganda was the
circulation of the mimeographed paper The Liberator, containing
almost full accounts of political and war developments in Europe
and in the Pacific.
When plaintiff filed her complaint in this case, she was fully
aware that she was running the risk that her action and efforts in
court might become useless or futile, besides the imminent
reestablishment of the Commonwealth authority in Manila.
We may add that plaintiff, in fact, defied the authority of the
Commonwealth Government reestablished in Philippine territory,
when she filed said complaint about one month after said
government was reestablished.
It is true that the Japanese were still controlling Manila then. But
it is not less true that their control was precarious and everybody,
including the Japanese themselves, was awaiting the arrival at
any time of the American forces of Manila. The Japanese had
already dug trenches in many places in Manila, built gun
emplacements, and constructed, specially in the south side of
the Pasig River, very visible military installations and other
preparations to give battle within the City streets against the Fil-
American forces. Everybody saw how the Japanese airplanes
were reduced to a negligible minimum and how the American
bombers, encountering no opposition, except from anti-aircrafts,
ranged at will over all Japanese military installations in and
around Manila and in the waterfronts of the City. In Manila, no
aerial dogfights were seen after the first two days of bombing on
September 21 and 22, 1944. After then, the Japanese fliers
chose, as a wiser policy, to disappear completely from the Manila
sky whenever American planes began to show up, to return one
or two hours after the American planes had ended their mission.
Under these circumstances the position of plaintiff seems to
become precarious and indefensible by her attitude of defiance
to the Commonwealth Government, which was certain to be
reestablished also in Manila, with the same sureness that a
falling stone will follow the universal law of gravitation as stated
by Isaac Newton.
In the present case plaintiff Co seeks to recover from defendant
Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh the undivided half of a property located
in Manila described in Torrens title under Transfer Certificate No.
64610 of the Register of Deeds of the City.
From the facts alleged in the complaint, as a condition precedent
to the recovery of said undivided half, plaintiff had to return to
defendant the amount of P12,500. As defendant refused to
accept said amount, upon filing the complaint, plaintiff deposited
in court said amount. It does not appear clearly what money was
deposited. No doubt it must be of the kind commonly known as
"mickey mouse" money, as the complaint was filed in the latter
part of November, 1944. (President Osmeña and General
MacArthur were already in Philippine territory with the Armed
Forces of Liberation.).
If the proceedings had in the case until the record of the same
was burned are to be validated, it is evident that plaintiff must be
credited with having made a valid deposit in court in the amount
of P12,500.
In case decision is rendered as prayed for in the complaint, and
the undivided half of the property in question is adjudicated to
the plaintiff, no one shall deny, as a matter of elemental justice,
that defendant is entitled to receive the full amount of P12,500,
which must be returned to him as a condition in order that he
may relinquish his title to the property in favor of the plaintiff.
Now the problem facing us is how to determine the way in which
defendant will recover the amount of P12,500. The amount was
deposited in the court of that brazen political fraud inflicted upon
our people, the Laurel Philippine Republic. But where is that court
today? If the money could be located and disposed of, is it not
absolutely worthless?
The decision will be rendered by the courts of the
Commonwealth Government, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in the first place, and, in case of appeal, this Supreme
Court, as a tribunal of last resort.
The decision necessarily will include a pronouncement as to how
defendant will get the money. To make that pronouncement the
Court of First Instance of Manila and this Supreme Court,
undoubtedly, will be placed in a quandary.
Indeed we do not see how the money deposited in the court
under the Japanese regime can be turned over to defendant.
The validation of the proceedings in question starts from the
fiction that Commonwealth courts are continuations of the
courts which functioned under enemy occupation and authority,
including the Court of First Instance which functioned under the
Vargas Philippine Executive Commission, and, later, the Laurel
Philippine Republic, in which the complaint of this case has been
filed. To follow this fiction to its natural consequences, the
present Court of First Instance of Manila must be the one who
ought to turn over the money to the defendant. Can it do it? Can it
give a money which is not in its possession but in the possession
of the defunct Court of First Instance under the Japanese
regime?
As the Commonwealth courts have no money to turn over to the
defendant, from whom and from where shall it get the money?
This is a question that has never been answered, and we are
afraid that it cannot be given any satisfactory answer.
As the defendant is entitled to his money, and the money must
be paid by the plaintiff, it seems that plaintiff is the one who
must find a way to give the money to defendant. But plaintiff may
justly claim that she had done what was legally expected from
her when, after offering the amount to defendant and the same
refused to accept the money, she deposited it in court.
She cannot be compelled to disburse another P12,500 to be
given to the defendant. If the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
the decision it may render, should order her to pay P12,500 to the
defendant, without taking into consideration what she has
deposited in court in November, 1944, she may invoke the
decision of this Supreme Court validating the proceedings,
including therein the deposit of P12,500. If the deposit is valid,
plaintiff is relieved from further obligations and in such case,
how shall justice be rendered to defendant?
Our courts must not fall in the inconsistency of validating all the
proceedings taken until the record of the case has been
destroyed, and to except from said validation the deposit made
by the plaintiff. If the deposit is valid, the courts must not allow
such validation to be a simple mockery, and offensive farce
without any other meaning than to make the administration of
justice an object of laughter.
It is evident from the foregoing that the validation of the
proceedings in question, in utter disregard of the October
Proclamation issued by General MacArthur and of the
Declaration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, leads to an absurd
situation from which our courts cannot escape and which will
entangle them in a maze of problems incompatible with the
administration of justice.
The validation of the processes in the case in question, including
the deposit of P12,500, will place our courts of justice in the
same predicament as the judge in the "Merchant of Venice," the
Shakespearean masterpiece. The validity of the deposit made by
plaintiff Co Kim Cham once recognized, she is entitled, like
Shylock, to her pound of flesh, which can be denied her only
through a judicial trick, the only way open to apparently avoid
inconsistency.
In the preface to his work entitled "The Struggle for Law," the
great jurist Jhering, expressed the following opinion as to the
legal issue presented by the English dramatic genius:
One word more, on a point which has been contested
even by those with whom I otherwise agree. I refer to my
claim that injustice was done to Shylock.
I have not contended that the judge should have
recognized Shylock bond to be valid; but that, once he
had recognized its validity he should not, subsequently,
have invalidated it by base cunning. The judge had the
choice of deciding the bond valid or invalid. He should
have declared it to be the latter, but he declared it to be
the former. Shakespeare represents the matter as if this
decision was the only possible one; no one in Venice
doubted the validity of the bond; Antonio's friends,
Antonio himself, the court, all were agreed that the bond
gave the Jew a legal right. And confiding in his right thus
universally acknowledged, Shylock calls for the aid of the
court, and the "wise Daniel," after he had vainly
endeavored to induce the revenge-thirsty creditor to
surrender his right, recognized it. And now, after the
judge's decision has been given after all doubt as to the
legal right of the Jew has been removed by the judge
himself, and not a word can be against it; after the whole
assembly, the doge included, have accommodated
themselves to the inevitable decree of the law — now that
the victor, entirely sure of his case, intends to do what the
judgment of the court authorized him to do, the same
judge who had solemnly recognized his rights, renders
those rights nugatory by an objection, a stratagem so
contemptible that it is worthy of no serious attention. Is
there any flesh without blood? The judge who accorded
Shylock the right to cut a pound of flesh out of Antonio's
body accorded him, at the same time, the right to
Antonio's blood, without which flesh cannot be. Both
refused to the Jew. He must take the flesh without the
blood, and cut out only an exact pound of flesh, no more
and no less. Do I say too much when I assert that here
the Jew is cheated out of his legal right? True, it is done
in the interest of humanity, but does chicanery cease to
be chicanery because practiced in the name of
humanity?
We vote for granting the motion for reconsideration to avoid
placing our courts of justice in the predicament depicted in the
Shylock case.
The next question we are about to discuss, concerning a
procedural incident in this case, is most unusual. So far, we were
concerned only with questions of right of parties coming to us
for redress, and we have striven to champion the cause of those
parties who, we believe, are deprived of their rights, victims of
oppression, or denied justice. The problem confronting us now is
essentially of internal character. Although it also affects the
litigants in this case, it also transcends into the very official
functions of this very Court.
What really is under test is the ability or capacity of this Court to
administer justice. The question affects the rights and
constitutional prerogatives of the individual members of the
Tribunal in relation to the performance of their official duties.
Is a member of this Court entitled to hear the parties and their
attorneys on a question pending before us before exercising his
constitutional duty to vote on said question? May a majority
deprive any member of the opportunity of being apprised of all
the facts and all the arguments, written or oral, that the parties
and their attorney may present in a case submitted to our
consideration?
In the present case, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent, in which it is prayed that said motion for
reconsideration be set for hearing, invoking the resolution
adopted by this Court on July 3, 1945, and in view of the special
fact that there are two new members of this Court who did not
have the opportunity of hearing the parties when this case was
originally argued, or of participating when it was decided.
One of the new members proposed, seconded by two other
members, that said hearing on the motion for reconsideration be
set, alleging that he wants to have an opportunity of hearing the
parties or their attorneys before voting on said motion.
A majority resolved to deny the motion. We dissented from such
action, and this opinion explains why we had to dissent.
The motion was made by one of the member of this Court,
prompted not only by the desire to give the respondent ample
opportunity to argue upon his motion for reconsideration and to
give the movant a change of hearing oral arguments upon the
vital questions raised in this case, but by the idea of granting the
petition of the respondent in accordance with the resolution
unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court on July 3, 1945,
which reads as follows:
The Supreme Court, upon motion of Justice Perfecto,
unanimously resolved to adopt the policy of granting
litigants or their attorneys the most ample and fullest
opportunity of presenting and arguing their cases, by
permitting them to present, after oral arguments,
memoranda within reasonable time, to argue in open
court motions of reconsideration, and, in general, by
liberalizing in the discretion of the Court the application
of the rules, to insure, in the interest of justice, the most
 complete and free discussion of every question properly
submitted. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 4, p. 284.)
It must be remembered that this resolution was adopted
simultaneously with another proposed by Mr. Justice De Joya for
the purpose of definitely stopping a practice which was not in
keeping with the highest ethical standards of the law profession,
or with the dignity of the Supreme Court. Said resolution reads as
follows:
The Supreme Court, upon motion of Justice De Joya,
unanimously resolved, as one of the means of
maintaining the highest ethical standard of the legal
profession, not to permit private discussion by lawyers of
their cases with individual Justices. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 4,
p. 284.)
We were fully aware that the real cause of the practice sought to
be stopped by the De Joya Resolution was the desire of litigants
and their attorneys to have important motions, such as motions
for reconsideration, properly considered before they are acted
upon.
In all courts other than the Supreme Court, the parties and their
attorneys are always given the opportunity of arguing before the
tribunals, or the corresponding judges, all their motions and their
petitions, without distinction as to their importance or lack of
importance.
But in the Supreme Court no such opportunity was granted in the
past. All motions were acted upon without hearing and without
granting the litigants or their attorneys the opportunity of
properly discussing by oral argument the questions raised in said
motions, although said questions are of great importance and of
decisive nature, such as motions for new trial, rehearing, or
reconsideration.
The fact that the resolutions upon said motions usually are not
accompanied by any reason to support the action taken,
although in many instances the motions raised important
questions and in their preparation the lawyers employed weeks
or months of painstaking research, study, thinking, and many
sleepless nights, in order to present, in the best possible manner,
the questions raised, gave rise to the suspicion, founded or
unfounded, generally entertained by the members of the bar, that
the members of the Supreme Court did not care to read even
said motions. The suspicion was even stronger with respect to
the almost invariable denial, expressed in one or two words, of
motions for reconsiderations. From mere suspicion to a strong
belief only one step is lacking.
To meet this unsatisfactory situation, resourceful litigants and
attorneys decided to have private conversations with individual
members of the Court to argue their motions without, naturally,
giving the opposing parties the necessary opportunity to be
heard therein.
The fact that some motions for reconsideration, although very
few, were granted in cases where said private conversations took
place, could not dispel the suspicion.
Years ago, we came to the conclusion that the only way of
stopping the practice is to eliminate the causes, that is, to
eliminate the unjustifiable restrictions which deprived parties and
attorneys of all the opportunities to fully present the cases and
argue their motions.
The practice of not allowing an attorney to argue orally and to
submit, at the same time, a written memorandum was a cause of
much dissatisfaction among the members of the bar; and it was
also one of the causes which induced some of them to seek
private conversations with members of the Supreme Court.
Convinced that these procedural restrictions are unreasonable as
they serve only to restrict the opportunities by which this Court
may be completely apprised of the questions of fact and of law
submitted to their decision, we were of opinion that it is high
time for the Supreme Court to do away with them.
That is the reason why we proposed the resolution which was
unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court, incorporating
amendments proposed by Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice De
Joya, and which we very willingly accepted.
This is the first time when a party in a litigation is seeking the
opportunity to argue orally upon his motion for reconsideration
according to the terms of the resolution.
We do not see any reason why the Supreme Court shall betray
the faith of that party by ignoring a resolution unanimously
adopted by the same Court.
One of the members thereof, invoking his official privilege, in the
performance of his constitutional duties to be duly apprised of
the questions raised in the motion for reconsideration, proposed
that he be given an opportunity to hear the parties in an oral
argument. We do not understand why his proposition should be
turned down, as it was, and why he should be denied the
opportunity he needs for the proper performance of his
constitutional duties.
In a legislative chamber composed of members belonging to
opposing political parties, in the heated debates to vie for
popular favor, the majority party have sometimes denied
improperly some prerogatives to members of the minority party,
but it is unheard of that a majority party ever denied any minority
member a right essential to the proper performance of his
official functions, such as the right to have proper information
upon any question to be voted upon, the right to hear witness
and arguments, the right to read memoranda, the right to ask
questions to any other member of the chamber and to the chair,
and to interrogate any person who might enlighten him as to
matters under consideration of the chamber.
The Supreme Court is not a political body composed of members
divided for partisan considerations. No one here is personally,
politically, or economically interested in the result of any case. It
is really inconceivable how a majority in this Court could trample
upon the rights and privileges of a fellow member. It is more
inconceivable if we take into account the fact that we consider
ourselves as brethren, and by tradition we are calling ourselves
as such.
We can understand that amour propre may induce judges not to
entertain with sympathy motions for reconsideration, as one of
the natural weaknesses of humankind is to resent that others
should point out one's real or fancied mistakes. But when we
assumed our position in the highest tribunal of the land, the only
governmental institution on which our fundamental code
bestowed the appellative "supreme," where we attained the
uppermost position of honor to which a lawyer can aspire, we are
supposed to have left that weakness behind, and all questions on
matters which are official in nature submitted to us shall be
viewed with absolute personal detachment, with the only aim of
doing justice to all and anyone of the eighteen million inhabitants
of this country that might come to us, without asking anything
for ourselves, but giving all of ourselves to help our people attain
their mission in the centuries and millennia to come.
We know that the publication of the resolution in question was
received by members of the bar with a sigh of relief. They could
not fail to welcome a procedural innovation which will to away
with one of the headaches in the practice of the profession of
law; how to argue in person a motion for reconsideration, and
such other motions of decisive importance in the cases they are
handling. We who had endured the same headaches sympathize
with and share the disappointment that the action of the majority
will inflict upon law practitioners. Such unhappiness cannot
allow us to be happy. Happiness, to be true, must be shared with
others. Unshared happiness is deceitful tinsel.
When the resolution was adopted by unanimous vote, we felt
elated by the though that the cause of the administration of
justice had advanced another step in the thorny way of
procedural progress. We believed that the liberal spirit embodied
in the resolution accomplished another triumph against outworn
practices, without better claim for survival than the fact that they
are mouldy appendices of an old routine, which is a strong
appeal to those who would not lift a finger to find out if there are
better things than those of which we are used to, to look in the
realms of law and ideas for happier worlds to discover and
conquer, to see if new pages of the book of science will offer
hitherto unknown marvels for an improved service to human
necessities, because they do not happen to feel the natural urge
towards perfection, which is a permanent force in mankind.
Our satisfaction did not last long. The resolution lived a paper life
in the minutes of the Supreme Court and in the pages of the
Official Gazette, giving for almost four months new hopes to the
members of the bar, hopes which !alas!, did not come true. The
liberal spirit which we felt triumphant, suffered a crushing defeat,
overwhelmed by the forces of reaction, bent on clinging to the
mistakes of the past. The liberal innovation was decreed
decapitated, to give way to the revival of an absurd judicial
practice, wholly unreasonable and unsatisfactory, and not the
best suited for a more effective administration of justice by the
highest tribunal of our country.
In this hour of sorrow at the running back of the clock of judicial
progress, it is our hope that the last setback is not definite for all
time. Someday the forces of progress will rally and again march
forward, singing the blissful hymn of a new dawn. Setbacks are
frequent in the trials and errors of democracy. But in the long run,
reason will reign supreme. The slippery earthen feet of the idols
of error shall be exposed and will cause them to crumble into a
crash from which there is no possible redemption. What is good,
is good; what is bad, is bad. We firmly believe that, for the proper
performance of its official functions, for the most efficient
fulfillment of its judicial duties, the Supreme Court should never
curtail the opportunity of the parties and their lawyers to present
and argue fully, in writing and by oral argument, all questions
properly submitted to our consideration. It is the only way of
reducing to the possible minimum our chances of rendering
erroneous decisions. If we are not fully apprised of all
information, evidence, and arguments that litigants and their
attorneys might present and offer to present within the proper
time, we are likely to overlook facts and ideas that might give the
necessary clue to the correct solution of the factual or legal
problems raised in the cases and which will determine whether
we are doing justice or injustice.
Painstakingly searching and inquisitive in fact-finding,
benedictine patience in trying to understand the respective
positions of contending parties, and thoroughness in judicial
investigation and in proving and testing legal propositions and
theories in the medical laboratory of analysis and inquiry, are the
prices of real and substantial justice. The prices are high, but
justice is a treasure worth paying all the prices men can offer.
Her value is so high that no price is enough to insure its
attainment. It even merits, not only the best prices, but the
noblest sacrifices. It is after all, one of the fundamental purposes
of society. It is one of the dazzling gems with which human
character is studied. No efforts must be spared to reach the goal
where the golden wreaths and jewelled garlands of human
aspirations lay.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the resolution of the majority
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents
in this case. There will be no need of restating here all the
arguments set forth in my dissent against the original majority
opinion herein, as well as those which have been expressed in
my concurring opinion in G.R. No. L-49, Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, p. 355, ante. However, in reiterating these arguments, by
reference, in support of the present dissent, I feel in duty bound
to reinforce them by some additional considerations in view of
the resolution of the majority.
In the first place, the resolution of the majority says:
We held in our decision that the word "processes," as
used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur
of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean
judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons
therein set forth, we did not deem it necessary to specify
the processes to which said proclamation should be
construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the
minds of persons interested in sustaining a contrary
interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to
say that term as used in the proclamation should be
construed to mean legislative and constitutional
processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis."
According to this maxim, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found.
(Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.)
Since the proclamation provides that "all laws"
regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void, the word "processes" must be interpreted
or construed to refer to the Executive Orders of the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission,
Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of
said Republic, and other that are of the same class as the
laws and regulations with which the word "processes" is
associated, (Pp. 5, 6.)
Here we have a frank admission that "the Constitution itself of
said Republic" is among the "processes" declared null and void
by the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur. Now, the courts of that "Republic"
were organized and functioned under and by virtue of said
Constitution, particularly under Article IV thereof. Section 4 of
said Article provides that the members of the Supreme Court
shall be appointed by the President with the advice of the
Cabinet, and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by
the President with the advice of the Supreme Court.
Consequently, those courts, commencing with the Supreme
Court down to the lowest justice of the peace or municipal court,
had to be organized anew, for their constitution under said Article
IV was to be different from that of the Commonwealth courts
under Article VIII of the Commonwealth Constitution. And, of
course, the courts, which has thus been created under the
Constitution of the "Republic," could not derive their powers,
authority or jurisdiction, if any, except from the same
Constitution, and any pertinent legislation enacted pursuant
thereto. But if, as admitted by the majority, that Constitution was
null and void under General of the Army MacArthurs' aforesaid
proclamation, no legal power, authority or jurisdiction could have
been conferred by virtue thereof upon the said courts and, as a
consequence, the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila
wherein the proceedings in question were had could not validly
exercise such power, authority or jurisdiction. As a corollary, all of
said proceedings must of necessity be null and void.
When the record of the case was burned during the battle for the
liberation of Manila, the only proceedings which had been had in
civil case No. 3012 of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First
Instance of Manila were: (1) the complaint Annex X of the
petition for mandamus, dated November 17, 1944; (2) the
notification Annex X-1 dated November 20, 1944; (3) the motion
to dismiss Annex X-2, dated November 28, 1944; (4) the urgent
motion for time to file opposition Annex X-3, dated December 14,
1944; and (5) the opposition to motion to dismiss Annex X-4,
dated December 21, 1944. The case had not been heard yet;
consequently, there had been no decision disposing thereof.
At that stage of the proceedings, the record was destroyed, and
shortly thereafter, upon the liberation of the city, it became legally
and physically impossible for that Japanese-sponsored court to
continue functioning. The very Constitution under which it had
been organized was admittedly declared null and void by the
Commander in Chief of the liberation army in his aforesaid
proclamation. As we believe having demonstrated in our
dissenting opinion when this case was decided, that declaration
of nullity was retroactive to the very inception of the laws,
regulations and processes condemned thereby — that these
were null and void ab initio. But, making another concession to
the contrary view, let us suppose that under the aforesaid
proclamation the Constitution of the "Republic" became null and
void only upon the liberation of Manila is so far as this area was
concerned. Under the same hypothesis, the Japanese-sponsored
Court of First Instance of Manila created by authority of that
instrument, and all its pending unfinished proceedings also
became null and void upon the date of that liberation. When the
Court of First Instance of Manila was reestablished under the
Commonwealth Constitution and laws, it had absolutely nothing
to do with either the defunct and so-called Court of First Instance
of Manila under the "Republic" nor its "proceedings" which were,
besides, nothing but a name without substance in the eyes of the
law. And yet the majority would by mandamus compel the
reestablished the Court of First Instance of Manila to continue
said legally non-existent proceedings to final judgment. This
could not be done without considering those proceedings valid
despite the nullity of the court in which they were had due to the
admitted nullity of the Constitution of the "Republic of the
Philippines" under which said court was created, and without
making the Commonwealth of the Philippines respect pro tanto
the said "Republic," which was the creature of the very
representatives of the Japanese Empire who are currently being
tried as War Criminals.
In the second place, the said resolution contains the following
paragraphs:
It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution
and in the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an instrument of
national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of
international law authorizing the belligerent Japanese
army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto
government in the Philippines, because Japan started
war treacherously and emphasized was as an instrument
of national policy; and that to give validity to the judicial
acts of courts sponsored by the Japanese would be
tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these
invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the
Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the
provisions of the Hague Conventions which impose upon
a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as
well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless
absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I"
ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and safety,
and the entire social and commercial life of the country,
were inserted, not for the benefit of the invaders, but for
the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of
the occupied territory and of those not in the military
service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
society may not be unnecessarily deranged. (Pp. 3, 4.)
The trouble with the case of Japan in the Philippines is that, in
establishing here the puppet regimes of the Philippine Executive
Commission and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, she
did not undertake to fulfill any duty as provided by the Hague
Conventions in order to reestablish and insure public order and
safety, etc. "for the protection and benefit of the people or
inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the
military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business
of society may not be unnecessarily deranged." Her sole purpose,
as conclusively shown by her previous, contemporaneous, and
subsequent acts in the Philippines, was to make of those puppet
organization mere instrumentalities for the further prosecution of
her war aims. The strict control and supervision which were
constantly retained and exercised by the Japanese Army over,
first the Philippine Executive Commission and, later, the so-called
Republic, under the circumstances prevailing during the entire
period of their existence, show to my mind that they were created
merely to serve as such instrumentalities. A strong corroboration
of this conclusion is found in the declaration of Mr. Jose P.
Laurel, President of that "Republic," when Japan surrendered, that
by the acceptance by Japan of the terms of the Potsdam
Declaration the said "Republic" ceased to exist: this could only
mean that said "Republic" was inseparably linked with Japan's
war effort — if it had been intended only as a provisional
government set up by the occupation army, it would have been
considered by Mr. Laurel as terminated upon the liberation of the
Philippines which happened before Japan's surrender. Any
semblance of incidental benefit which to some eyes might have
appeared to accrue therefrom to a more or less insignificant
portion of our population, was not more than incidental or
nominal. It should not be allowed to blindfold our eyes to the real
and deceitful aim of the enemy. This is the same deceit to which
President Roosevelt referred in his message dated October 23,
1943, cited in my main dissenting opinion.
If, fundamentally, the Japanese-sponsored Court of First
Instance of Manila lacked all power and jurisdiction over the said
civil case No. 3012, no amount of benefit to any particular
litigants who might have resorted to it, which may be said to
arise from the proceedings of that court, could confer upon it
such power and jurisdiction. This is so self-evident as to render
demonstration unnecessary.
I, therefore, vote for the granting of the motion for
reconsideration.

BRIONES, M., disidente:

Siento tener que disentir de la resolucion de la mayoria. Opino
que el pedimento de reconsideration debe concederse y en
consecuencia denegarse el mandamus solicitado por el
recurrente.
Al interpretar la proclama del General MacArthur de 23 de
Octubre de 1944 que anula todas las actuaciones del gobierno
establecido en estas islas bajo la ocupacion militar japonesa,
creo ue la inteleccion mas apropiada es que, como regla general,
esa proclama anula todo, incluso las actuaciones judiciales
(judicial processes), sobre todo aquellas cuya entidad y cuyos
efectos rebasan el periodo de la esclavitud forzosa y
transcienden y repercuten en la postliberacion. En otras palabras,
la nulidad, la ineficacia debe ser la regla general; y validez, la
eficacia la excepcion, la salvedad.
La razon de esto es sencilla. El gobierno de ocupacion
representaba en nuestra vida un parentesis anomalo, de obligada
ilegitimidad, y es nada mas que natural que el gobierno legitimo,
de jure, al restaurarse, no transigiese con los actos y procesos de
aquel gobierno, excepto en lo que fuera absolutamente
necesario e irremediable. Caerian, por ejemplo, bajo esta
excepcion solamente aquellos actos y procesos resultantes del
hecho de que formabamos una comunidad civilizada con
necesidades e intereses individuales y sociales complejos; y de
que por instinto de conservacion y para vivir con cierto orden y
relativa tranquilidad y no precipitarnos en la anarquia y en el
caos habiamos menester la egida de un gobierno, sin importar
que este no fuese hechura de nuestra voluntad y que inclusive no
fuera repulsivo. Mas alla del minimum de esta forzosidad, no
puede haber transaccion con los actos y procesos de aquel
regimen.
Como corolario de esta inteleccion es obvio que por mucho que
nos tienten y atraigen ciertas doctrinas y principios conocidos de
derecho international sobre gobiernos de facto, no es
conveniente y es hasta peligroso sentar reglas absolutas que a
lo mejor no cuadran con las circunstancias peculiares de cada
caso. Lo mas seguro es enjuiciar por sus propios meritos cada
acto o proceso que se plantee.
En la determinacion judicial de esta clase de asuntos nunca se
deben perder de vista, entre otras, las siguientes circunstancias:
(1) que la invasion japonesa, aun en el apogeo de su fuerza,
jamas pudo quebrantar le lealtad fundamental del pueblo filipino
a su gobierno y al gobierno de los Estados Unidos de America;
(2) que en casi todas partes de Filipinas esta lealtad hizo posible
la articulacion y organization soterranea de fuerzas de
resistencia contra el enemigo; (3) que si bien el control japones
era por lo general efectivo en las ciudades y grandes
poblaciones, era, sin embargo, precario en muchos pueblos y
barrios, sobre todo en aquellos que no tenian valor estrategico o
eran poco propicios a la confiscacion y rapiña, dominando
practicamente en dichos sitios las guerrillas; (4) que en algunas
regiones el gobierno del Commonwealth seguia funcionando,
trasladandose de un sitio a otro para burlar la persecucion del
enemigo a acuartelandose en zonas a donde no alcanzaba la
accion de las guarniciones japonesas; (5) que muchos
habitantes de los llanos y poblados se sustrajeron a la
jurisdiccion del gobierno de fuerza predominante ( paramount
force), refugiandose en las montañas y lugares dominados por
las guerrillas y colocandose bajo la proteccion y salvaguardia de
estas, o bien en sitios donde no habia ni japoneses ni guerrillas,
(6) y por ultimo, que despues del desembarco del General
MacArthur y de sus fuerzas libertadoras en Leyte el 20 de
Octubre de 1944, la lealtad filipina y el espiritu de resistencia
llegaron a su maxima tension y la ocupacion japonesa se fue
desmoronando rapidamente a pedazos hasta sufrir finalmente
un colapso total.
Examinemos ahora el caso que nos ocupa. ¿Hay razones para
catalogarlo excepcionalmente en la categoria de aquellos actos
o procesos judiciales que, bajo la inteleccion ya antedicha,
merecen que se les de vida y efectividad aun despues de
fenecido el rigimen de ilegitimidad bajo el cual se iniciaron y
tramitaron? Creo que no. Veanos por que.
De autos resulta que el expediente cuya reconstitucion se pide
formose mediante demanda incoada ante el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Manila el 17 de Noviembre de 1944, es decir,
cuando ya las fuerzas libertadoras del General MacArthus
estaban fuertemente asentadas en Leyte y el Gobierno del
Commonwealth firmemente restablecido en suelo filipino. El
asunto versaba sobre derechos relacionados con propiedad
inmueble y el estado de su tramitacion no paso de la etapa de
las alegaciones hasta que ocurrio el devastador incendio de
Manila causado por los japoneses despues de la entrada de los
Americanos en esta ciudad el 3 de Febrero de este ano, 1945.
Los records del Juzgado se quemaron con motivo de dicho
incendio, entre ellos el expediente de autos. Despues de la
restauracion de los tribunales, la parte demandante pidio la
reconstitucion del expediente por medio de copias de los
escritos presentados. La parte demandada se opuso: primero,
porque se trataba de un asunto incoado bajo la ocupacion
japonesa y, por tanto, quedaba automaticamente anulado,
despues de la liberacion de Manila, bajo los terminos de la
proclama del General MacArthur de que se ha hecho mencion;
segundo, porque no se podia confiar en la autenticidad de las
copias proporcionadas por la parte demandante. El Juzgado
estimo la opisicion por el fundamento de la invalidez y porque, a
falta de una ley expresa del Commonwealth al efecto, no se
consideraba autorizado para ordenar la reconstitucion del
expediente y asumir jurisdiccion sobre el mismo. De ahi la
interposicion del presente recurso de mandamus para compeler
al Juzgado a ordenar la reconstitucion del expediente y a seguir
conociendo del mismo.
Aunque es verdad que la Ciudad de Manila no estaba aun
liberada cuando se presento la demanda de autos, con todo
opino que el Juzgado no erro ni abuso de su discrecion al
negarse a dar validez a lo tramitado bajo la ocupacion japonesa
con motivo de dicha demanda y a reconstituir el expediente, a
tenor de lo dispuesto en la proclama del General MacArthur
tantas veces mencionada. Es evidente que no se trata aqui de un
proceso judicial comprendido dentro del minimum de forzosidad
de que hablo mas arriba y cuya validez y eficacia el gobierno
legitimo no tendria mas remedio que reconocer so pena de
causar un dano irreparable a las partes. No habia llegado a
cristalizar ningun estado juridico definitivo en el asunto, no se
habia dictado ninguna sentencia, ni siquiera habia comenzado a
verse. No se pretende que las partes perderian algun derecho
vital y sustantivo si no se reconstituyera el expediente quemado,
o que no podria reproducirse el litigio ahora ante los tribunales
del Commonwealth, en un pleito completamente nuevo y
original.
Si esto es asi ¿por que, pues, se ha de compeler al gobierno
legitimo, al tribunal de jure, a aceptar como validas y, por
añadidura, a heredarlas y reconstituirlas, unas actuaciones
tramitadas a ultima hora, de prisa y corriendo, cuando los
japoneses ya estaban de retirada y las fuerzas libertadoras del
General MacArthur estaban en visperas de una victoria
aplastante y decisiva, maxime porque esas actuaciones no
envolvian nada vital ni apremiante en el sentido de que su
incoacion no pudiera haberse pospuesto para despues de la
liberacion?
¿Por que no se ha de dar al gobierno legitimo, al tribunal de jure,
cierta latitud en el ejercicio de su discrecion al determinar cual
debe ser aceptado como valido en los autos y procesos de aquel
regimen de fuerza predominante ( paramount force) y cual debe
ser considerado como nulo e ineficaz? ¿Es acaso que el
gobierno legitimo ha de sentirse como paralizado y cohibido al
enjuiciar los actos y procesos del gobierno establecido por el
invasor?.
Y, sobre todo ¿por que al interpretar la proclama del General
MacArthur hemos de restringirla demasiado en ves de darle la
mayor latitud posible, limitada tan solo por aquel minimum de
forzosidad de que he hablado antes? ¿No es acaso un principio
bien establecido de derecho internacional que si el gobierno
legitimo, al restaurarse, puede convalidar ciertos actos o
procesos del gobierno de ocupacion, tambien puede optar por lo
contrario y que no hay nada que en buena ley le impida hacerlo
en gracia a la majestad de la soberania legitima? (Wheaton's
International Law, pp. 244-245.)
Existen, ademas, otras consideraciones fuera de las indicadas. El
17 de Noviembre de 1944 en que se presento la demanda de
autos la situacion en Manila ya era muy critica y alarmante. Los
aviones aliados dominaban el aire. Los Japoneses estaban
tratando desesperadamente de fortificar la ciudad. Parecia que
iban a defenderse aqui hasta el ultimo cartucho. Las autoridades
locales conminaban a la poblacion a que evacuara la ciudad en
prevencion de batallas en las calles y de casa en casa. Bajo tales
circunstancias es harto dudoso ques los tribunales estuvieran
funcionando todavia normalmente entonces y que los procesos
judiciales fueran tales como debian ser en una situacion
ordenada y normal. Es evidente que tales procesos, tramitados
en condiciones tan anomalas y precarias, no merecen que se les
de validez reconstituyendolos, tanto mas cuanto que las partes
nada pierden con su invalidacion, pudiendo, como pueden,
someter sus contenciones a los tribunales restablecidos del
Commonwealth mediante la incoacion de nuevos pleitos. Lo
mas que tendrian que hacer seria pagar nuevos derechos de
escribania y de sherifato, pero si protestasen por este nuevo
pago, diria entonces que ello seria un buen argumento en contra
de la reconstitucion.
En vista de todas las circunstancias, se puede afirmar con buen
fundamento que la parte demandante, cuando presento su
demanda en Noviembre de 1944, sabia o debia saber que el
gobierno del Commonwealth — el de jure — ya estaba
firmemente restablecido en suelo filipino, y que el tremendo
exito de unas operaciones militares victoriosas estaba
posibilitando rapidamente su pronta restauracion en plena
capital del archipielago. Asi que por anologia se puede aplicar a
este caso lo que en el asunto de State vs. Carroll (28 Conn., 449)
se declaro, a saber:
When, therefore, in civil cases, the public or third persons
had knowledge that the officer was not an officer de jure,
the reason for validating the acts to which they
submitted, or which they invoked, failed, and the law no
longer protected them. (Cases on Amer. Admin. Law,
146.)
Es igualmente aplicable por anologia esto que se dijo en el
asunto de State vs. Taylor (108 N. C., 196):
The citizen is justly chargeable with laches, does that
which is his own wrong and wrong to the public, when he
recognizes, tolerates, encourage and sustains a mere
usurper, one whom he knows, or ought, under the
circumstances, to know to be such. In such cases,
neither justice, necessity nor public policy requires that
the acts of the usurper shall be upheld as valid for any
purpose. Indeed, these things, the spirit and purpose of
government strongly suggest the contrary. (Cases on
Amer. Admin. Law, 143.)
Ahora pasare a tratar de un punto procesal. El mandamus
procede cuando hay de por medio un deber ministerial que
cumplir y a la parte agraviada no le queda otro remedio expedito
y adecuado. ¿Es este el caso que tenemos ante nosotros? Creo
que no. El Juzgado tenia perfecta discrecion para reconstituir o
no el expediente en cuestion porque mientras, por un lado, no se
creia autorizado para asumir jurisdiccion sobre un asunto
heredado de la ocupacion japonesa a falta de una ley expresa del
Commonwealth que le autorizase para ello, por otro lado con su
proceder no privada a las partes del derecho de plantear sus
desavenencias ante los tribunales del gobierno legitimo
restablecido, en medio de la presente atmosfera de plena
libertad y plena justicia. Pero de todas maneras, aun suponiendo
que el Juzgado haya incurrido en error al ejercer su discrecion de
la manera que ejercio, a la parte agraviada le quedaba un
remedio expedito y adecuado: la apelacion.
En resumen, mi inteleccion del asunto que nos ocupa es la
siguiente:
(a) Que la proclama del General MacArthur anula, como regla
general, todos los actos y procesos legislativos, administrativos
y aun judiciales del gobierno de superior fuerza establecido por
los japoneses durante la guerra.
(b) Que esa proclama, sin embargo, deja excepcionalmente un
margen para cierto minimum de validez forzosa, minimum
impuesto por las exigencias del instinto de conservacion, del
orden y de la vida civilizada que teniamos que vivir y conllevar en
medio de los riesgos, tribulaciones y horrores bajo la ocupacion
militar.
(c) Que el caso que tenemos ante nosotros no cae dentro del
radio de ese minimum no solo porque no envolvia para las partes
nada urgente ni vitalmente forzoso que hiciese inaplazable su
planteamiento ante los tribunales del regimen de ocupacion en
visperas de la victoria devisiva de las fuerzas libertadoras y
cuando el gobierno de Commonwealth ya estaba firmemente
restablecido en suelo filipino y la situacion en Manile era a todas
luces anormal, sino porque nada hay que prive a las partes de su
derecho de promover el mismo litigo ante los tribunales del
Commonwealth mediante la incoacion de un expediente nuevo y
original.
(d) Y, finalmente, que aun suponiendo que el Juzgado haya
incurrido en error, el recurso procedente no es el de mandamus
sino la apelacion.

Posted 21st December 2013 by Dennis Gonzales

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21st December 2013 Arcega vs. Court of

Appeals
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 122206 July 7, 1997

SPOUSES RAFAEL Y. ARCEGA and TERESITA F. ARCEGA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (17th Division), and RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In June 1988, petitioners herein, the spouses Rafael and Teresita
Arcega, obtained two loans amounting to P900,000.00 from
respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). Said
loan was secured by a real estate mortgage executed by the
parties on April 10, 1989 on a 561-square-meter property with
improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
377692. 1 Petitioners paid a total of about P300,000.00 but later
defaulted on their loan obligations.
The bank foreclosed the mortgage on petitioners' property and
acquired the property at the public auction held on May 21, 1990
with the highest bid of P984,361.08. The Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale issued on the same day was duly registered with the
Quezon City Register of Deeds on May 25, 1990.
The spouses Arcega repeatedly communicated with respondent
bank's Assistant Vice-President Emily Sibulo Hayudini in
connection with the status of the foreclosed property. 2 On May
23, 1991, two days before the expiration of the redemption
period, Rafael Arcega wrote the bank for an extension of three
weeks and informing it that he has applied for a housing loan 3 to
refinance his loan account with RCBC. On May 25, 1991,
petitioners' counsel wrote respondent bank for a four-week
extension within which to redeem the property. Four days later,
respondent bank informed petitioners that their request for a
three-week extension, until June 14, 1991, was granted. During all
this time, petitioners raised no question regarding the regularity
of the foreclosure sale and proceedings.
On June 14, 1991, Assistant Vice-President Hayudini inquired
through the telephone from Mr. Ching Hoe, Benefits Specialist of
the Asian Development Bank about the status of Rafael Arcega's
loan. Mr. Hoe informed her that said loan application was
canceled because Arcega was going to file a court case.
Surprised at this development, after the expiration of the
extended redemption period, respondent bank's officers
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation on June 17, 1991 to
secure a new title in the name of Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation. T.C.T. No. 40782 was later issued in the bank's
name.
It appears that on June 11, 1991, petitioners filed Civil Case No.
91-9055 against respondent bank for annulment of foreclosure
and/or auction sale with restraining order/preliminary
injunction/damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104. In said complaint, petitioner averred that they
were not aware of the auction sale, that there was no notice of
posting or prior publication thereof in a newspaper of general
circulation as required by law and that they registered the bank's
action pertinent to the foreclosure to no avail. The Notice of Lis
Pendens was annotated on the title of the subject property on
July 16, 1991.
On November 23, 1993, the bank filed "In re: Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Possession" (LRC No. Q-6483(93)) with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
On February 3, 1994, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to prevent
respondent bank and Sheriff from transferring the subject
property to third persons in the case at bar. After hearing and due
consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties, on June
21, 1994, the Regional Trial Court issued its questioned Order
granting the writ of a preliminary injunction. Respondent bank's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
August 1, 1994.
On August 24, 1994, RCBC sought relief in the Court of Appeals
by way of a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the
trial court's Orders dated June 21, 1994 and August 1, 1994.
Respondent appellate court granted the petition on August 17,
1995 in a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED by this Court. The questioned Orders
dated June 21, 1994 and August 1, 1994 of the
respondent court, granting the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction, and denying its
reconsideration in Civil Case No. Q-91-9055 are
declared null and void.
On October 12, 1995, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Arcegas was denied by respondent court.
Hence, the instant petition for review was filed seeking the
annulment of the Court of Appeals' decision for lack of legal
basis and for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On the sole question of whether or not the writ of preliminary
injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion, we affirm
respondent court's decision and deny the instant petition.
The issuance of the writ was unjustified, the spouses Arcega not
having any legal right the merits protection by the court.
For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper,
it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. 4
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 5 Injunction
is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the
complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is
not proper. 6 The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of actual existing right is no ground for an injunction. 7
The circumstances in the case at bar show that the Arcegas did
not possess a clear legal right sought to be protected by said
writ. Petitioners defaulted on their loan and failed to redeem the
subject property during the extended period granted by the bank.
It was only three days prior to the redemption period that
petitioners added to question the foreclosure proceedings, giving
the impression that the case at bar is an afterthought or a last-
ditch effort to save their property. Title to the property had
already been transferred to the bank which now possesses a
certificate of title in its name.
Respondent bank's right to possess the property is clear and is
based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties
in the foreclosure sale to whom title has been conveyed. 8 Under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 and Section 35 of Rule 39, the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the
property. 9 The bank in this case has a better right to possess the
subject property because of its title over the same. 10
Respondent appellate court added:
. . . (I)t was highly irregular for the respondent
court to issue the questioned writ based merely
on the document of sheriff's certificate of
posting. No other evidence, oral or documentary,
was ever presented by the private respondents to
fully substantiate their prayer for the injunctive
relief. It is well-settled that a foreclosure
proceeding enjoys the presumption of regularity
in its conduct being an official business, and it is
the defendants, herein private respondents, who
have the burden of showing by convincing proof
that the foreclosure proceeding is tainted with
irregularity for them to be entitled to the writ
prayed for. 11
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, where Civil Case No.
91-9055 is pending is directed to continue with the proceedings
of said case and resolve the same with dispatch. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 The bank charged 19.5% per annum as interest
rate on the loans which were payable in ten years.
2 As of October 15, 1990, the Statement of
Account amounted to P1,232,479.94, which
amount included 33% interest for 143 days,
attorney's fees, sheriff's fee, documentary
stamps, etc.
3 With the Asian Development Bank, where
petitioner Rafael Arcega was employed.
 4 Syndicated Media Access Corporation v. CA,
219 SCRA 797 (March 11, 1993).
5 Vinzons-Chato v. Natividad, 244 SCRA 787
(June 2, 1995).
6 China Banking Corporation et. al. v. CA, G.R. No.
121158, December 5, 1996.
7 Ulang v. CA, 225 SCRA 642 (August 29, 1993)
citing Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. CFI Negros
Occidental, 42 SCRA 577); Prado v. Veridiano II,
204 SCRA 654 (December 6, 1991).
8 Philippine National Bank v. CA, 118 SCRA 110
(November 2, 1982).
9 Javelosa v. CA, G.R. No. 124292, December 10,
1996.
10 Persons with Torrens title over land are
entitled to possession thereof. Pangilinan v.
Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136 (1972).
11 Rollo, p. 38.

Posted 21st December 2013 by Dennis Gonzales

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Alcantara vs.
21st December 2013
Director of Prisons
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
 Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6            November 29, 1945

ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Buenaventura B. Martinez for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the
petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty
by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of
the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No.
790)and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four
months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days
of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944, and
June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.
Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern
Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of
Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and
that only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in
question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of
the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to our
decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113,
ante), does not refer to judicial processes.
In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-
called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in
the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the
belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good
and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a political
complexion. In that the same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals which was
continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed
prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The
division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of
the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic
effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by
the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of
such court, like those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation,
were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the
liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a
political complexion, as this court held in its decision in the abovementioned case of Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein
cited.
Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He
was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the
Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and
enforceable.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a
new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime
against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a
new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and
necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend,
directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety
and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security ,
such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc.,
were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised
Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
DE JOYA, J., concurring:
The principal question involved in this habeas corpus case is the validity of the judicial
proceedings held, during the Japanese occupation, in the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
in which herein petitioner was accused of frustrated murder, and in the Court of Appeals of
Northern Luzon, in which, on appeal, said petitioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment
ranging from four moths and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, and nine
months and three days of prison correccional; and the effect on said proceedings of the
proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, dated October 24 1944. The decision of this
questions requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection with the
municipal law of this country.
Under the Constitution Commonwealth of the Philippines, International Law is part of the
Fundamental law of the land (Article II, sec. 3). As International Law is an integral part of
our law, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever question of right
depending upon it are presented for our determination (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S. 146;
22 Sup. Ct., 552; 46 Law. ed., 838).
Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating their mutual
relations, the proof of their existence is to be found in the consent of the nations to abide
by them; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nation, as
found in the writings of publicist and in the decisions of the highest courts of the different
countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U. S., 677; 20 Sup. Ct., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320.).
But while usages and customs are the older original source of International Law, great
international treaties are a latter source of increasing importance, such as The Hogue
Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly
declare that:
ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under
the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established,
and in a position to assert itself.
 ART. XLII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish
and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32 Stat., II, 1821.).
The above provisions of the Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations giving
adherence to them, among which is the United States of America (32 Stat., II, 1821).
The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise
governmental authority, but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and
this authority will be exercised upon principles of International Law (New Orleans vs.
Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs.
United States 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; II Oppenheim on
International Law, sec. 167).
It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue in force, in so far
as they do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial tribunals of the
occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation, and is not
usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, because it is
easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and also because the
latter are more competent to administer the laws of the territory; and the military occupant
generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing
to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by
superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. United States, 97 U.S. 39; 24 Law. ed
992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. United States,
229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260 Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578;
Wilson, International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. [1909], pp. 464, 465,
475, 476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International
Law, 3d ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake,
International Law, Part II, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).
In 1811, during the occupation of Catalonia, Spain, by the French army, a Frenchman,
accused of the murder of a Catalan in that province, was tried and convicted by the assize
Court of the Department of the Pyrenees Orientales, France. Upon appeal to the French
Court of Cassation, the conviction was quashed, on the ground that the courts of the
territory within which the crime had been committed had exclusive jurisdiction to try the
case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by French troops and its government by the
French authorities had not communicated to its inhabitants the character of French
citizens, nor to their territory the character of French territory, and that such character could
only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which had not been gone through." (Hall,
International Law, 6th ed., p. 461.)
It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the name of the
Philippine Executive Commission, or the so-called Philippine Republic, afterwards, during
Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting our courts
to function and administer said laws, as proclaim in the City of Manila, by the commander
in chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the
rules and principles of International Law.
If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory under military
occupation governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the
proper administration of justice, in accordance with the local laws, it must necessarily
follow that the judicial proceeding conducted before the courts established by the military
occupant must be considered legal and valid, even after said government established by
the military occupant had been displaced by the legitimate government of the territory.
Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War,
merely setting the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not only tending
to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed
in aid of the rebellion, had been declared valid and binding (Cook vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437;
Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509;24 Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs.
Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459;
Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment
of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for the purchase money slaves was held
valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871 (French vs. Tumllin, 10 Am. Law.
Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).
The judgments by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of the
America were considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the
American Civil War, because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto
government. The Confederate States were a de facto government, in the sense that its
citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil matters, and did not
become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such act of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8
Wall. [U.S.] 9; 19 Law ed., 361).
In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Supreme Court of
the United States held-- "It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil war the
same general law for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights,
which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and
afterwards. As far as the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy
of the national authority, or the just rights of the citizens, under the Constitution, they are in
general to be treated as valid and binding." (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs.
Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White 7 Wall., 700.)
The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem
to fall under the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of
the United States:
But there is another description of government de facto, called also by publicists
a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, he more aptly denominated a
government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics (1) that its
existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2)
that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts though not warranted by the
laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established
over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by
civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod vs.
United States [1913], 229 U.S., 416.)
The government established in the Philippines, under the Philippine Executive Commission
or under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and should,
therefor, be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings
conducted before the courts has been established in this country, during said Japanese
occupation, and are should be considered as legal and valid enforceable, even after the
liberation of this country by the American forces, as a long a said judicial proceedings had
been conducted, in accordance with the law of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the
prosecution of the petitioner in this case, for the crime of frustrated murder, which was
reduced to illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth
government, before and during Japanese occupation.
Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, and
that the accused should be immediately released from the custody, under the provisions of
the proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur dated October 23, 1944; as said
proclamation nullifies all the laws, regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
In other words petition demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by the
General Douglas McArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would
inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties. When an act is susceptible of two or
more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the Courts will
always adopt the former (United States vs. Coombs [1838]], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004;
Board of Supervisors of Grenada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5
Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924],
46 Phil., 22; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the
dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that
solution which will most effectively promote the public policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs.
Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction as not to
lead it injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exception to its language, which would avoid results
of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (United
States vs. Kirby, 7 Wall [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed, 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. United States,
143 U.S., 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U.S.,
39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of
the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to
adopt that which saves its constitutionality, includes the duty of a avoiding a construction
which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (United States
vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct. 527; 53 Law. ed., 836).
According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited
above, the judicial proceedings conducted before the court of the justice, established here
during Japanese military occupation, merely applying the provisions of the municipal law of
the territory, as the provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case which have no
political or military significance, are and should be considered legal, valid and binding. It is
to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur knows said rules and principles of
International Law, as International Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the
land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. And it is
also to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur has acted, in accordance with said
principles of International Law, which have been sanction by the Supreme Court of the
United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts,
during the Japanese occupation would be highly detrimental to public interests.
For the forgoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion, and the petition for habeas
corpus filed in this case should, therefore, be denied.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Following our opinions in this cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 153,
ante), and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 334, ante), G.R. No. L-5 and G.R. No. L-49
respectively, the proceedings attacked by petitioner belong to the judicial processes
declared null and void in the proclamation issued by General McArthur on October 23,
1944, and therefore, we vote the granting of the writ of habeas corpus prayed for.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

Upon the grounds stated my main dissenting opinion, in G.R. No. L-5 Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 199, ante), and in my concurring opinion in G.R. No. L-49,
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 355, ante), I dissent from the opinion of the majority
herein. The writ of habeas corpus sought by petitioner should be granted because the
nullity of the judgment and proceedings under which he has been imprisoned and
restrained of his liberty. As stated in the majority opinion, the sentence against him became
final on September 122, 1944, and had been pronounced by the Japanese-sponsored Court
of Appeals of Northern Luzon upon appeal from a judgment of conviction by the Japanese
sponsored Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.

Posted 21st December 2013 by Dennis Gonzales

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21st March 2013 2012 Bar Exam Result

Go to the Main Directory [http://law-landmark-cases.blogspot.com
/2012/12/main-directory.html]

Provided hereinbelow is the list of successful examinees of the

October 2012 Bar Examinations held at the University of Sto.
Tomas, released by the Supreme Court of the Philippines today,
March 20, 2013.

Congratulations!

Source: http://121.58.195.99/bar2012.html

1. A JOSE- AGUSTIN, Karren

2. ABASTILLAS, Lemuel
3. ABERIN, Ma. Christine
4. ABES, Royce Nieville
5. ABRENZOSA, Cleofe
6. ABUAN, Ruby Ryza
7. ACEDO, Kristian Josef
8. ACORDA, Jacqueline
9. ACOSTA, Lourdes Mae
10. ACOSTA, JR., Gil
11. ACUÑA, Jose Fidel
12. ADAN, Jan Mari
13. ADAP, Sanawia
14. AGANA, III, Carlos Ivan
15. AGATEP, Pia Augustha
16. AGBAY-ABILAR, Janice
17. AGBON, Ma. Cecelia Esperanza
18. AGOPITAC, Nestle
19. AGUAVIVA, Ava Marie
20. AJES-LAURENTE, Lilibeth
21. ALAMEDA, Abigail
22. ALAWI, JR., Saipal
23. ALBANO, Pia Ursula
24. ALBANO, Ranvylle
25. ALBAS, Dominique
26. ALBINA, Dionel
27. ALBOTRA, Tet Chea
28. ALCANTARA, Austin Claude
29. ALCANTARA, Rickmon Albert
30. ALCERA, II, Hermie
31. ALDOVINO, Marian Mae
32. ALEJANDRE, Pauline
33. ALFELOR, JR., Avelino
34. ALI, JR., Lanang
35. ALIM, Nicolito Jesus
36. ALIVIA, Mikhail Sherard
37. ALMARIO, Ann Therese
38. ALMENDRAL, Chrizellie
39. ALMIREZ, Hanna Maria Nica
40. ALOJADO, Carlo Enrico
41. ALVAREZ, Aila May
42. ALVAREZ, Maria Margarita
43. ALVERO, Marierose
44. AMADOR, Tina Andrea
45. AMAN, Takahiro Kenjie
46. AMARO, Ana Mae
47. AMBROCIO, Ma. Carmencita
48. AMSAN, Munib
49. ANDAWI, Melody
50. ANDRION, Jofre
51. ANG, Kathleen Mae
52. ANG, JR., Rodolfo
53. ANGELES, Raul
54. ANTIGUA, Perseus
55. ANTONIO, Rafael
56. APALISOK, JR., Simplicio
57. APARTE, Frances Margaret
58. APORTADERA, Mario Leonardo Emilio
59. AQUENDE, Joseph Angelo Wesley
60. ARANAS, Kim
61. ARCEO, Irene
62. ARCEO, Mariam
63. ARCEÑO, Jackielyn
64. ARDIENTE, Arnold
65. ARELLANO, May Kristine
66. ARIAS, Michelle
67. ARMENTA, Joshua
68. ARQUIZA, Arbee
69. ARQUIZA, Carlo
70. ARRIBA, Mona Liza
71. ARRIOLA, Roanne
72. ARTICONA, Mercedes
73. ARTICULO, Mark Anthony
74. ARTUGUE, Arianne
75. ARUGAY, Manuel Adrian
76. ASPIRAS, Janice
77. ASUNCION, Mark Anthony
78. ASUNTO, Daisy Ray
79. ATANACIO, John David
80. AUGUSTO, Davemark
81. AUSAN, Anniefair
82. AUSTRIA, Carlo
83. AUTENCIO, Anthony
84. AUZA, Jannycer
85. AVILA, Aldan
86. AVILA, Rachelle Faye
87. BABIERA, Jan Christian
88. BACOLOD, Julse
89. BAGAIPO, Cesar
90. BAGATSING, Lea Margarette
91. BAGUIO, Cindy
92. BAGULAYA, Jose Duke
93. BAILAN, Bai Sittie Saida
94. BAINTO, Neal Vincent
95. BAJAS, Joey
96. BAJETA, Jonathan
97. BAKILAN, Bernard
98. BALAGA, Jo Ann
99. BALANQUIT, Raoul Jann
100. BALAORO, Grace
101. BALBA, Zack Hansel
102. BALDOMERO, Ivan Jeffrey
103. BALDOVINO, Aldwin Kenneth
104. BALDOVINO, Alexander
105. BALDOVINO, Tanya Justine
106. BALILI, Neil Aaron
107. BALMES, Irene
108. BALORO, Joemyl
109. BALTAZAR, Ana Lyn
110. BANAYAT-NAS, Hermilia
111. BANDALAN, Jared Anthony
112. BANGHE, Hannah Jane
113. BANZON, Eva
114. BAPTISTA, Joe Allan
115. BARCELONA, Ralph Karlo
116. BARQUEZ, Ma. Elisa Jonalyn
117. BARRIOS, Angelo
118. BASCUGUIN, Maria Jocelyn
119. BASE, Amerissa
120. BASE, Maria Graciela
121. BAUTISTA, Judy-ann
122. BAUTISTA, Krystel Jehan
123. BAUTISTA, Maria Theresa
124. BAYONA, Phoebe Ann
125. BEBER, Dindo
126. BECHAYDA, JR., Jose
127. BEDURAL, Vladimir
128. BENIGIAN, II, Mardovic Dodge
129. BENITEZ, JR., Arcadio
130. BERAY-DE AUSEN, Penelope
131. BERNARDINO, Ramon Felipe
132. BERNARDO, Donna Ametyst
133. BERNARDO, Nicolo
134. BERNARDO, Pallo Mert
135. BIADO, Nazariel
136. BIDAD, Jonelyn
137. BILANGEL, Judy Ann
138. BILIRAN, Amabelle
139. BINARAO, Romael Meng
140. BIRONDO, Francis Ian
141. BLANCIA, Andrei Marion
142. BONDOC, Hector Jerome
143. BONGHANOY, Al
144. BONILLA, Diana Lutgarda
145. BORBON, Mariven
146. BORDON, Maria Janina Ann
147. BORJA, Ma. Arlene
148. BORROMEO, Gabriel Angelo
149. BOTABARA, Theresa
150. BRACERO, II, Wivino
151. BRAGAT, Junrie
152. BRILLANTES, Roselle Louie
153. BRION, Eden
154. BRIONES, Conrado
155. BRIONES, Gerald
156. BRONCE, Roentgen
157. BUAGÑIN, Venice
158. BUENAVENTURA, Ma. Clarissa Hearty
159. BUENAVENTURA, Roberto Martin
160. BULOTANO, Ronnie
161. BULSECO, Khristine Gail
162. BUSTOS, Adrian Francis
163. CABANTING, Gil Matthew
164. CABANTUD, Racel
165. CABATINGAN, Justine Mae
166. CABI, Romina Aina
167. CABIEDES, Rodrigo
168. CABRERA, Fernando Juan
169. CABRERA, John Patrick
170. CACHAPERO, JR., Oliver
171. CADABUNA, Marvin Jay
172. CADDAWAN-PANCHO, Julaida
173. CAHAYAG, Rommel
174. CAIBAN, Lee Ferdinand
175. CAJUCOM, Oscar Carlo
176. CALAG, Welan
177. CALALANG, Mary Bianca
178. CALAMAY, Cesar Norman
179. CALDERINI, Charmaine
180. CALDERON, Abegail Joan
181. CALINGASAN, Charlene Mae
182. CALMA-CHAN, Gabriela
183. CALUAG, Edmond
184. CALVAN, Myrtle
185. CAMACHO, Gianfrancis
186. CAMACHO, Paolo Francisco
187. CAMAGANACAN, Emelie
188. CAMISO, Aldous Benjamin
189. CAMUA, Mariacarla
190. CANDELARIA, Marissa
191. CANTILLAS, Irish Claire
192. CANTOS, Rj
193. CAPANAS, Jovalie Claire
194. CAPELLAN, Marina Victoria
195. CARANDANG, Ma. Buenafe
196. CARBONELL, Rhea Joy
197. CARDIÑO, Gian Carlo
198. CARDONA, Sarah Jeane
199. CARILLO, Marc Jay
200. CARINGAL-DE CASTRO, Maria Yvet
201. CARLOBOS, Princess Christine
202. CARPIO, Menachem
203. CARTAGENA, Philipp King
204. CASADOR, Angeli Ness
205. CASALS, Detchie
206. CASIBANG, JR., Ruben
207. CASIDSID-PORTENTO, Regina
208. CASIO, Jo Ann Marie
209. CASISON-DUNGCA, Maricel
210. CASTILLO, Beverly
211. CASTILLO, Dante
212. CASTILLO, Mark Erwin
213. CASTRO, Joanne Frances
214. CASTRODES, Kristine Joyce
215. CASUELA, Nathaniel Joseph
216. CATACUTAN, Richard
217. CATACUTAN, JR., Felicisimo
218. CATALAN, Jo-am
219. CATALUÑA-RENEGADO, Catherine
220. CATULONG, Zacharias
221. CAYABAN, Iva Freyritz Erica
222. CAYCO, Natasha
223. CAYCO, Victor Carlo Antonio
224. CAÑARES, Vhincent
225. CAÑETE, Stephen Roy
226. CEDEÑO, Jessa Mary Ann
227. CERIALES, Roni
228. CHAN, Christian
229. CHAN, Clifford
230. CHAN, Jereline
231. CHAVES, Carla Michelle
232. CHING, May Ann
233. CHINTE, Mary Eileen
234. CHU, Kristine Paula
235. CHUA, Sacel Anne
236. CINCO, Abegail Marie
237. CLAUDIO, Joanne Lucille Germaine
238. CLAUDIO, Kristoffer
239. CLAUDIO, Lesley Anne
240. CLEDERA, Kim Debra
241. COMA, Joanne Marie
242. CONCEPCION, Irene Charmaine
243. CONCEPCION, Robin Bryan
244. CONDE, Fiona
245. CONDE, Maricar
246. CONVOCAR, Daniel Luis
247. CORESIS, Ma. Katrina
248. CORPUZ, Danielle Sigfreid
249. CORPUZ, Grazielynne
250. CORRALES, Michael John
251. CORSAME-FUENTES, Gazzelenne
252. COVARRUBIAS, Jose Janello
253. CRISOSTOMO, Jaim Mari
254. CRUZ, Emmanuel Rey
255. CRUZ, Gino Carlo
256. CRUZ, Jennifer Anne Marie
257. CRUZ, Keneth Joyce
258. CRUZ, Niño Martin
259. CRUZ, Roxanne Joan
260. CUARTERO, Dave
261. CUBA, Margareth Kristel
262. CUBERO, Ronald
263. CUBILLAN, Asis
264. CUCHAPIN, Mykedox Knoel
265. CUEVAS, Dyan Marie
266. CUI, Rosabel
267. CURADA, Yul Bernie
268. CURAMMENG, Jessieh Rey
269. CUSTODIO, Daniel Ben
270. DANCE, Kristoffer Lee
271. DAPITON, Roel
272. DAQUIOAG, Florence
273. DE ANDRES, JR., Gabriel
274. DE CHAVEZ, Marc Roby
275. DE CHAVEZ-ALEDO, Sharon
276. DE DUMO, Jilliane Joyce
277. DE GUZMAN, Arjel
278. DE GUZMAN, Michael
279. DE GUZMAN, Robert Josef
280. DE GUZMAN, Steven Michael
281. DE LA CRUZ, Christian
282. DE LEON, Jose
283. DE LOS REYES, Dianne Margarette
284. DE LOS SANTOS, Christian Loren
285. DE MESA, Beverly Elvy
286. DE VERA, Ma. Christine Fel
287. DE VERA, II, Rustico
288. DE VILLA, Rhodora
289. DEJARME, Doreen
290. DEL ROSARIO, Joseph Carl
291. DELA CALZADA, Renato
292. DELA CRUZ, Gerald
293. DELA CRUZ, Glenna Mari
294. DELA CRUZ, Vann Allen
295. DELA CUESTA, Rogie
296. DELA PEÑA, Toni Carla
297. DELOS SANTOS, Lilian
298. DEOMPOC, Mary Khristel
299. DEVERATURDA, Joan Paula
300. DIALINO, Karen
301. DIAZ, Mario Vincent
302. DIESMOS, Angelo Ted
303. DIESTO, Jovian
304. DIGO, Jerry
305. DIMACULANGAN, Roberto Miguel
306. DIMAFELIX, II, Alfredo
307. DIMATATAC, Edwin
308. DIMSON, Caira Joyce
309. DIOKNO, Angelo
310. DISPO, D'lorenz Miro
311. DIZON, Justinne
312. DOCENA, Hans Christian
313. DOGWE-RAMIREZ, Marifi
314. DOMINGO, Frances Yani
315. DOMINGUEZ, Ilyn
316. DONATO, Carol
317. DORIA, Dianne
318. DU, Minister Moises
319. DUAZO, Rose Shayne
320. DUCUSIN, Alejandro
321. DULAY-MARCOS, Vicky Runa
322. DUMAGAT, Maricon
323. DUMALAY, Marichriz
324. DUNUAN, Brionelle La Realesa
325. DY, Frederick
326. ELEAZAR, Armand Dietrich
327. ELGO, Phil Ephraim
328. ELTANAL, Felwin Rau
329. ENAD, Rajiv
330. ENCABO, III, Melchisedech
331. ENCARNACION, Ian
332. ENCARNACION, Mark Francis
333. EPE, Evan
334. ERMINO, Augusto Ceasar
335. ESCALONA, Leo Miguel
336. ESCATRON, Karie
337. ESCOBER, Carlo
338. ESCUETA, Leonard
339. ESMENDA, Alvin
340. ESMERALDA, Patrick
341. ESPARCIA, Janis Louis
342. ESPARRAGO, Sheldon
343. ESPINA, Corin Celeste
344. ESPINOSA, Ron Ely
345. ESPIRITU, Harvey Rhey
346. ESPIRITU, Leah Eloisa
347. ESPIRITU, Paula
348. ESQUIVIAS, Joaquin Pablo
349. ESTIGOY, Karene Maneka
350. ESTRADA-ALCANTARA, Maria Socorro
351. ESTRELLA, Eric
352. EVAN, Noel
353. EVANGELISTA, Carlo Eduardo
354. EX, Doyle
355. EÑANO, Carissa Ann
356. FABUL, Joseph Vincent
357. FAJARDO, Celerina Rose
358. FAJARDO, Idamae
359. FAJARDO, Jan Ale
360. FATALLA, Dave Florenz
361. FEDERIO, Maria Desiree
362. FELICES, Rachel Marie
363. FELICIA, Luz Angela
364. FELIPE, Eduardo
365. FELIX, Peter Anthony Joseph
366. FERIA, Jerome Christopher
367. FERNANDO, Angelo
368. FERRAREN, Ryan
369. FERRER, Rosette
370. FLORES, Raymund Jonas
371. FLORES, Soleil
372. FLORES, II, Lester Jay Alan
373. FOLLO, Dennis
374. FONTANILLA, Viktor Samuel
375. FRAGANTE, Francis
376. FRANCISCO, Jeremiah
377. FRANCISCO, Jose Ma. Jason
378. FULGENCIO, Genesis
379. GABITO, Garry
380. GABOR-TOLENTINO, Joy Marie
381. GADIT, Earl
382. GALANG, John Paul
383. GALICIA, Gene Franco
384. GALLEVO-BAMBO, Majella Theresa
385. GALMAN, Franklin Gerard
386. GALVEZ, Edmund Cyril
387. GALVEZ, Jerico Angelo
388. GAMO, Ciselie Marie
389. GANASI, Dante
390. GANDO, Jovi Louie
391. GARCIA, Jan David
392. GARCIA, Junnar
393. GARCIA, Ron Michael
394. GARCINEZ, Paolo Gonzalo
395. GARRIDO, Kinni Albert
396. GATCHALIAN, Kate Carra
397. GATDULA, Genesis
398. GAYANILO, Brian
399. GENON, Aero Jel
400. GEOCANIGA, Gene Pedmon
401. GERNALE, Jay
402. GERVACIO, Diana
403. GIGANTONE, Maria Riza Lea
404. GILBUENA, Francis Conrad
405. GINGOYON, Laiza Kristel
406. GO, David Michael
407. GO, Marie Michelle
408. GO, Paolo Angelo
409. GOC-ONG, Lara May
410. GODINEZ, Jose Mari
411. GOMEZ, Ace
412. GOMEZ, Joni
413. GOMEZ, Mikhail Josef
414. GONZAGA, Odessa Grace
415. GONZALES, Christian
416. GONZALES, Jenny
417. GONZALES, Kristine Carmela
418. GONZALES, Nil Ryan
419. GORDULA, Xavier Elbert
420. GOYENA, Ma. Flor De Lis
421. GRANADO, Glenbelle
422. GUANGCO, Ma. Veronica
423. GUERRA, Blesscille
424. GUERRERO, Alan Martin
425. GUERRERO, Katrina Elena
426. GUEVARA, Kristine Bernadette
427. GUILLERMO, Maica
428. GUINOMLA, Mohammad Jamaludin
429. GUINTO, Celeni Kristine
430. GUMBAN, Margaret Rose
431. GUMBAN, Vanessa
432. GURREA, Fay Irene
433. GUTIERREZ, Eva Marie
434. GUZMAN, Jeffvince
435. HADLOCON, Fatima Faye
436. HASSANI, Mary Sayeh
437. HEREDIA, Criselda
438. HERMOSURA, Chasmeneth
439. HERNANDEZ, Maria Concepcion
440. HERNANDEZ, Patricia Andrea
441. HILARIO, Dan Raphael
442. HILARIO, Kyndell
443. HINLO, Marco
444. HIPOLITO, Maria Monica
445. HULIGANGA, Lovella May
446. HUMARANG, Jayson
447. HUMILDE, Noemi
448. IBAÑEZ, Jonathan
449. IGNACIO, Christopher John Marcelino
450. ILANO, Jose Angelito
451. IMPERIAL, Ramil
452. IMRAN, Adzlan
453. INCIONG, Jhoan Andrei
454. INDIOLA, Rio Aiko
455. INFANTE, Colleen
456. INGLES, Ignatius Michael
457. INLAO, Charle Magne
458. IRANZO, Kristoffer Edward
459. ISIDRO, Laida May
460. JAAFAR, Faigdar
461. JACOBA, Maria Laviña Rae
462. JARANILLA, David
463. JAVIER, April Rose
464. JAVIER, Carlo Michael
465. JAYME, Joel
466. JOAQUINO, JR., Joseph James
467. JUAN, Vincent
468. JUATCO, Francis
469. JULARBAL, Starr
470. JUSI, Genevieve
471. KALAW, Jenny Kay
472. KATIPUNAN, Andrea
473. KIAMZON, Joyful Josette
474. KING KAY, Catherine Beatrice
475. KO, Patricia
476. KUSAIN-KANSI, Adjuria
477. LA ROSA-MILLARES, Katherine Joy
478. LABADOR, Jed
479. LABIANO, Lester
480. LACAP, Karen Kristi
481. LACEDA, Jovert
482. LACHICA, Lemuel
483. LACNO, Sarah Vanessa
484. LACSON, April Carmela
485. LAGGUI, Marie Hyacinth
486. LAMBINO, Mary Rhauline
487. LAMSEN, Jaenicen
488. LANGIT, Earla Kahlila Mikhaila
489. LANTION, Mell Christopher
490. LANUZO, Ma. Czarina
491. LAO, Michael Stephen
492. LAOHOO, Joyce Elaine
493. LAUROS, Jus
494. LAXAMANA, Aufelene Anne
495. LAYAAN, Geraldine
496. LAZARO, Grace Ann
497. LAZARO, Nicholai Noel
498. LEAL, Lemuel
499. LEDESMA, Leofred Ian
500. LEGASPI, Erwin
501. LEI, John Christopherson
502. LEIDO, Juan Paolo Miguel
503. LELIS, Alexa Marie
504. LENA, Andrew John
505. LEONG-ANUDIN, Leslie Ann
506. LERONA, Lawuel
507. LI, Carlo Martin
508. LIGGAYU, Minehaha
509. LIM, Jhella
510. LIM, Rachelle
511. LIM, Timothy Dalton
512. LIM-MAGTANGGOL, Rachelle
513. LISTONES, Paul
514. LIWAG, Jobelle Joyce
515. LLAMAS, Marvyn
516. LOGROÑO, Princess Jazmine
517. LONDRES, Louie Marie
518. LOPEZ-BALUYUT, Philjoy
519. LORA, Lizette Lou
520. LOTOC, Jeremy
521. LOZADA, Maria Kristile
522. LOZANO, Daphne
523. LU, Antonio Miguel
524. LUCAS, Danjun
525. LUCIANO, Mark Christian
526. LUIB, JR., Ronald
527. LUNA, Myla
528. LUNASCO, Emil
529. MABANTA, Marco Jose Maria
530. MABAZZA, Paolo
531. MACABODBOD, Lou Bryan
532. MACARAEG, Marck Joseph
533. MACARANDANG, Deen Asliah
534. MACARAYAN, Maichel Rick
535. MACHUCA, Jose Maria Angel
536. MADRIDIJO, Marlon
537. MAGCALAS, Felman Gem
538. MAGLINAO, Patrick
539. MALABUYOC, Ichelle
540. MALAGA, Vic Randolf
541. MALALAD, Warren Wesley
542. MALASA, Michelene
543. MALAWANI, Hanaphi
544. MALLANAO, Paul
545. MAMAILAO, Athiena
546. MAMAILAO, Paiza
547. MAMUKID, Michael
548. MANALO, May
549. MANALO, Melchor
550. MANANDEG, Gertrude Gay
551. MANAUIS, JR., Conrado
552. MANCAO, Katrina Michelle
553. MANGSI, Sanchez
554. MANGUBAT, Rex
555. MANIEGO, Catriona Rhiannon
556. MANRIQUE, Bernard
557. MANUEL, Sheila Gene
558. MAQUILAN, Jonathan
559. MARANAN, Maria Carmela
560. MARASIGAN, Nathan
561. MARAÑA, Jonalyn
562. MARCELO, Monica Joy
563. MARCELO, Ronel
564. MARIÑAS, Maria Rosario
565. MARON-MARTIN, Vobbye Jean
566. MAROTO, Ma. Alexandria Ixara
567. MARQUESES, Dan Michael
568. MARQUEZ, JR., Reynaldo
569. MARTIN, Mary Marjorie
570. MARTINEZ, IV, Lorenzo
571. MARTIREZ, Ike
572. MARTY, Frank Edward
573. MASLOG, Ma. Sheryl
574. MATALAM, Jamil Adrian Khalil
575. MATIAS, Serwin
576. MATILDO, JR, Lerdo
577. MAURERA, Katherine
578. MAYUGA, Adrian
579. MAÑEBO, Ferdinand
580. MEDINA, Maria Ana Karina
581. MEJIA, Nina Remedios
582. MEJIA, Venus Amelie
583. MELGAR, III, Josefino
584. MENDOZA, Daniel Angelo
585. MENDOZA, Emaculada Concepcion
586. MENDOZA, Gerardo
587. MENDOZA, Jason
588. MENDOZA, Marychelle
589. MENZON, Anthony
590. MERCADER, Ryan
591. MERIDA, JR., Manuel
592. MILLEZA, Carmel Rosame
593. MILLORA, II, Efren Joe
594. MINA, Iellen Therese
595. MIRANDA-RIMONTE, Ana
596. MIRAVALLES, Samantha
597. MITCHOR, April
598. MONTANO, IV, Julian
599. MONTEMAYOR, Meriam
600. MONTENEGRO, Kutz Melvin
601. MORA, Crisanto
602. MORALES, Armand
603. MORALES, Generick Humprey
604. MORGA, Ryan Calvin
605. MORILLO, Leo Adrian
606. MOTOOMULL-IDULSA, Marian Kanna
607. MUCOY-GRANADOS, Meralie
608. MULI, Katrina
609. MUPAS, Remedios
610. MUTIA, Mohammad Nabil
611. MUÑIZ, Angelo
612. MUÑOZ, Giselle Angelica
613. NAGAÑO, Lord Jayson
614. NAVARRA, Cherrylyn
615. NEJUDNE, Paul
616. NICOLAS, Jerwin
617. NIEMES, Vanessa
618. NIEVES, Jonas
619. NIFRAS, Francis Ariel
620. NOEL, Laura Katrina
621. NOGRALES, Juan Fidel Felipe
622. NONATO, Roselle Jean
623. NOVERAS, Chrsitian
624. NUCUP, Neil
625. NUEVO, Genie Celini
626. NUÑEZ, Jeremie
627. OBIAS, John Dominic
628. OCADO, Allian
629. OCAMPO, Christopher Louie
630. OCAMPO, Gilbert Paolo
631. OCAMPO, Riza Lyn
632. OFANDA, Adonis
633. OLAVERE, Albert
634. OLYMPIA, Abrame-lionel Gamaliel
635. OMOLON, Maila Giselle
636. ONA, Kristel Concepcion
637. ONG, Tracy Anne
638. OPINION, Richard
639. OPOSA, Juan Antonio
640. OPSIMA, Gayle
641. ORAL, Daniel Martin
642. ORATE, Danessa Fayne
643. ORBETA, Frances Grace Allyana
644. ORBITA, Chona
645. ORDOÑEZ, Jaclyn Anne
646. ORTIZ, Edison
647. OSORIO, Rolant Andrie
648. PABLICO, Maria Asuncion
649. PABLICO, My Kristia
650. PACASEM, Ubaida
651. PADER-VILLANUEVA, Carmina Agnes
652. PADILLA, Albert
653. PADILLA JR., Victor
654. PADOGA, Dean Martin
655. PAGADOR, Winston
656. PAGALILAUAN, Edison James
657. PAGLICAWAN, Maria Angelica
658. PALENCIA-UYTENGSU, Maida Joy
659. PALLA, Bartolome
660. PALOMAR, Sunshine
661. PALU-AY, Matias Monico
662. PANA, Melbourne Ziro
663. PANGANIBAN, Victoria
664. PANTIG, Hazel
665. PARADO, Lovely Myrrh
666. PAREJA, Judiel
667. PARUBRUB, Christina
668. PARUNGAO, Ronald
669. PASION, Roseann Claudine
670. PATAUEG, JR., Nicolas
671. PATIÑO, Erica Christel
672. PAVON, Teddy Edmund
673. PAYUMO, Margielyn
674. PAZZIUAGAN, Cheska Ann
675. PEDROSA, JR., Jose Aaron
676. PEGALAN, Ricky Heart
677. PELAEZ, Lawrence Leo
678. PELANDAS, Bryan
679. PELINIO, Norman
680. PELOBELLO, JR., Herminio
681. PERALTA, Romark
682. PERANDOS, Katty Jean Lourdes
683. PERAS, Phoebeth
684. PERDITO, Kristine Jane
685. PEREDO-MILLAN, Cynthia Lyn
686. PEREGRINO-CO, Jaydee
687. PEREZ, Alexander Brian
688. PEREZ, Lilibeth
689. PERNITES, Russel
690. PEÑADA, Joanna May
691. PICZON, Edson
692. PILAR, Sir Achilles
693. PIMENTEL, Joanna Pauline
694. PINILI, Richard
695. PIÑON, Joseph Carlo
696. PLAZA, Leslie Mae
697. PLAZO, Joseph
698. PRADO, Carlos Manuel
699. PRINCIPIO, Pearl Lizza
700. PROCHINA, Mary Avon
701. PUA, Alvin Greg
702. PUA, Moses Eleazar
703. PUERTO, Basil
704. PUGUON, Jener
705. QUESADA, Michael
706. QUEZADA, Peter Paul
707. QUIACHON, Nea Cecille
708. QUIAMBAO, Reinier
709. QUIBO, Grace May
710. QUIBRANZA, Lorraine Anne
711. QUILATES, Donelle Jay
712. QUIMPO, Andro Julio
713. QUINAGORAN, Fidelis Victorino
714. QUINTOS, Beverly Anne
715. QUISUMBING, Julia Francesca
716. RADAZA, Eirah
717. RAFAEL, Marq Azeus
718. RAMEL, Christopher
719. RAMOS, Agatha Kristy
720. RAMOS, Billy James
721. RAMOS, Dave
722. RAMOS, Maridelle
723. RAMOS, Raymond
724. RASO, Karl Vincent
725. RAVELO, Zaide
726. RAYMUNDO, Vir Celito
727. RECIERDO, Mark Francis
728. RECIO, Albee Alliana
729. RECTO, Mark Alvin
730. REMOLACIO, Emmanuel
731. REPOLLO-UY, Alnessa Thea
732. REVALDE, Jeser
733. REVILLA, JR., Rodrigo
734. REYES, Clarisse
735. REYES, Jaymie Ann
736. REYES, Jose Antonio
737. REYES, Maryann Agnes Jertez
738. REYES, Misheil
739. RICAFLANCA, Leizl
740. RICAZA, Michelle Marie
741. RIGODON, Lou Diane
742. RILLERA, Jobert
743. RIVERA, Joonee Randyl
744. ROA-OARDE, Dianne Marie
745. ROBLES, Edgar Michael
746. ROBLES, Sunshine
747. ROCHA, Robert Angelo
748. RODRIGUEZ, Miracle Anne
749. ROJO, Jane Catherine
750. ROLEDA, Danell Lenard
751. ROMEA, George Michael
752. ROMERO, Allan
753. ROMUALDO, Xavier Jesus
754. RONDAL, Jaye Loren
755. ROSALES, Vicente Rafael
756. ROXAS, Juan Paolo
757. RUBINO, Junald
758. RUDAS, Vincent
759. SABADO, Joseph Mario
760. SABAS, Lloyd Francis
761. SABAUPAN, Flor Angela
762. SABORNAY, Ricky
763. SABORNIDO, Noemi
764. SAGARIO, Leo Angelo
765. SAJONIA, Louie
766. SALARZON, Henry Claude Roy
767. SALAZAR, Jerome
768. SALAZAR, Patrick Henry
769. SALCEDO, Anna
770. SALCEDO-PUDPUD, Debbie Love
771. SALEM-INES, Chermibelle
772. SALENDAB, Ayla Herazade
773. SALLIDAO, Eric
774. SALVA, Carlo Emmanuel
775. SALVANI, A.d. Vincent Iv
776. SAMACO, Leo Bernard
777. SAMSON, Martin Luigi
778. SAN DIEGO, JR., Virgilio
779. SAN PEDRO, Leila Grace
780. SANCHEZ, Janer
781. SANCHEZ, Marie Yasmin
782. SANDOVAL, Camhella
783. SANDOVAL, Josephine Grace
784. SANDRINO, Maureen Grace
785. SANGGACALA, Naima
786. SANTAMARIA, Dindo
787. SANTIAGO, Dulce Corazon
788. SANTIAGO, Jefferson
789. SANTIAGO, Philippe Emile
790. SANTOS, Alexander
791. SANTOS, Ana Lorraine
792. SANTOS, Aurelia Beatrice
793. SANTOS, Hanzel
794. SANTOS, Joel
795. SANTOS, Joel
796. SANTOS, Joel Enrico
797. SANTOS, Juan Paolo
798. SANTOS, Karichi
799. SANTOS, Kathleen Mae
800. SANTOS, Melissa Christina
801. SARABOSQUEZ, Justine Keith
802. SARANGAYA, JR., Ismael
803. SARI, Jayson
804. SARONA, JR., Isidro
805. SAYSON, Charlotte Lyza
806. SAZON, Ser Christian
807. SEE, Candice Faye
808. SELLEZA, Suzy Claire
809. SERCADO, Marie Arcie Anne
810. SERENIO, Darlon
811. SERENO, Jose Lorenzo
812. SIA, Emmanuel
813. SIADEN, Nathaniel
814. SIASON-VILLA, Belinda
815. SINGCO, Jamee
816. SINGZON, Maria Eloisa Imelda
817. SIRON, Monica Leonila
818. SISON, Juvin
819. SO, Jelani Carlo
820. SO, Kristina Carmela
821. SOBREPEÑA, Deborah Miriam
822. SOCO, Patrina
823. SOCRATES, Louie
824. SOLEJON, Franie
825. SOLIDON, Ed Rowland
826. SOLIVEN, Jan Vincent
827. SOMOROSTRO, Genaro
828. SORIANO, Raymond Adrian
829. SORIANO, Sarah
830. SORIASO, Louresse Patricia Jane
831. SPALDING, Donn Robert
832. STA. BARBARA, Jesus Erick
833. SUAREZ, Roberto Paolo
834. SUAREZ, Shiela May
835. SULIT, Dioxenos
836. SUMAGAYSAY, Laser Blitz
837. SUMAOY, Dexter Rey
838. SUMIBCAY, Dexter Caesar
839. SUROPIA, Fehma
840. SY, Clarence
841. TABALON, Leonard Lyle
842. TABLADILLO, Stephanie
843. TADIQUE, Roxanne
844. TAGANAS, Olivia
845. TAGUBA, Jezreel Caridad
846. TAGUIAM, Christa Maria
847. TAIB, Najeeb
848. TALLEDO, Harold Christian
849. TAMAYO, Maribel
850. TAMONDONG, Mark Lester
851. TAMONDONG, JR., Eddie
852. TAN, Cheryl Bevin
853. TAN, Maria Theresa
854. TAN, Talitha Renee
855. TANCINCO, Rafael Lorenzo
856. TANCINCO, Roy Shaun
857. TANGCO, Karen Kreez
858. TANSINGCO, Samira Nimfa
859. TANUNTANUM, Erik
860. TAPIA, Mayette
861. TATLONGHARI, Renel
862. TAYHOPON, Kristoffer Ryan
863. TE, Justine
864. TECSON, Janna Mae
865. TEEHANKEE, Ryan Christopher
866. TELAN, John Benedict
867. TINAGAN, James Michael Vincent
868. TING, Camille Sue Mae
869. TIOPIANCO, Francis Paolo
870. TOBIAS, Ana Patricia
871. TOLENTINO, Arc Aldrin
872. TORREFLORES-ALIAN, Connie
873. TORRENTIRA, Rosalio
874. TORRES, Phillip
875. TORRES, Reyjie
876. TRASPORTO, Jose Donel
877. TUGADI, Marifem
878. TUMANDA, Jansyl Lovan
879. TUPAZ, Kristine
880. TUTAAN, Tyrone
881. TY, Evita Grace
882. UBERITA, Joan
883. UDDIN, Zalman
884. URSUA, Melissa Asuncion
885. USON, Adriana Alexis
886. UY, Johan Christian
887. UY, Kim Raisa
888. UY, Rhea
889. VALAQUIO, Ma. Ailyne
890. VALDEZ, Cristina
891. VALDEZ, Maia Chiara Halmen Reina
892. VALDEZ, JR., Edgar
893. VALENCIA, David Evelio
894. VALENTIN, Charmaine
895. VALENTON, Johvie
896. VALERA, Stephen Russel Keith
897. VARGAS, Jacqueline
898. VARGAS, Mona Angela
899. VARON, Iniego Carl
900. VELASCO, Ethelene
901. VELASCO, Lady Ivy Vanity
902. VELOSO, III, Marcelino
903. VENTURA, Mary Grace
904. VENTURA, Ruby Ann
905. VENZUELA, Kristine Ann
906. VERCIDE-LUNA, Jocelyn
907. VERTULFO-ARBOLE, Jovilly Donna
908. VESTIL, Rosalita
909. VICENTE, Nilda
910. VIERNES, JR., Celestino
911. VILLACORTE, Audrey Eunize
912. VILLALOBOS, Melchor
913. VILLALON, Albert Angelo
914. VILLANO, Sheela
915. VILLANUEVA, Carlos Joseph
916. VILLANUEVA, Norliza
917. VILLANUEVA, Ralph Christian
918. VILLANUEVA, Roberto
919. VILLANUEVA, Ronn Michael
920. VILLANUEVA, Tiofilo
921. VILLAR, Viferlyn
922. VIRAY, Joshua
923. VIRTUDAZO, Rilven Christian
924. VIÑAS, Sheiryl
925. WACQUISAN, Ma. Tilde Titina
926. WHITE, Charles Jensen
927. WIEDMER, Patrick Heinz
928. WONG, Joyce Anne
929. YAM, Mark Benjamin
930. YANG, Alarice
931. YANKEE, Jimson
932. YAO, Jacqueline Anne
933. YAP, Cherrylin
934. YAP, Shan Yran
935. YAU, Weny
936. YLADE, Donna Frances
937. YMAS, Priscilla Mae
938. YODICO, II, Rodolfo
939. YOUNG, Michael Wilson
940. YU, Diane Cecilia
941. YU, Stephen
942. ZABALA, Mark Louie
943. ZAFRA, Yolanda
944. ZAMBRANO, Gino Antonio
945. ZAMORAS-VIRTUDAZO, Luz
946. ZAPANTA, Arthur Imanuel
947. ZARAGOZA, Anicka Nicoli
948. ZARENO, Jewelynn Gay
949. ZERNA, Adelaine Faith

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals [http://www.law-students-
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Labels: 2012 Bar Examination Result, Bar Matters, Directory of

Digested Cases, Directory of Legal Concepts, Opinions and
Updates

0 Add a comment
 Lacoste vs.
11th December 2012
Fernandez

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/2012/12/main-directory.html]

La Chemise Lacoste vs. Fernandez

GR 63796-97, 21 May 1984; First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J)

Facts: 

La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual

owner of the trademarks “Lacoste,” “Chemise Lacoste,”
“Crocodile Device” and a composite mark consisting of the word
“Lacoste” and a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on
clothings  and other goods sold in many parts of the world and
which has been marketed in the Philippines (notably by Rustans)
since 1964.  In 1975 and 1977, Hemandas Q. Co. was issued
certificate of registration for the trademark “Chemise Lacoste
and Q Crocodile Device” both in the supplemental and Principal
Registry.   In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed for the
registration of the “Crocodile device” and “Lacoste”.   Games and
Garments (Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas Q.Co.)
opposed the registration of “Lacoste.”

In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint

alleging acts of unfair competition committed by Hemandas and
requesting the agency’s assistance.   A search warrant was
issued by the trial court.  Various goods and articles were seized
upon the execution of the warrants.  Hemandas filed motion to
quash the warrants, which the court granted.   The search
warrants were recalled, and the goods ordered to be returned.  La
Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:  

Whether the proceedings before the patent office is a prejudicial

question that need to be resolved before the criminal action for
unfair competition may be pursued.

Held:

No.  The proceedings pending before the Patent Office do not

partake of the nature of a prejudicial question  which must first
be definitely resolved.   The case which suspends the criminal
action must be a civil case, not a mere administrative case,
which is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.  
The issue whether a trademark used is different from another’s
trademark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in
the criminal proceedings before a court of justice instead of
raising it as a preliminary matter in an administrative proceeding.

Inasmuch as the goodwill and reputation of La Chemise Lacoste

products date back even before 1964, Hemandas cannot be
allowed to continue the trademark “Lacoste” for the reason that
he was the first registrant in the Supplemental Register of a
trademark used in international commerce.  Registration in the
Supplemental Register cannot be given a posture as if the
registration is in the Principal Register.  It must be noted that one
may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing
trademark is registered.  La Chemise Lacoste is world renowned
mark, and by virtue of the 20 November 1980 Memorandum of
the Minister of Trade to the director of patents in compliance
with the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial
property, effectively cancels the registration of contrary
claimants to the enumerated marks, which include “Lacoste"

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Posted 11th December 2012 by Dennis Gonzales

Labels: Intellectual Property Rights, La Chemise Lacoste vs.

Fernandez, Lacoste

0 Add a comment
11th December 2012 Seagull Maritime
Corporation vs.
Balatongan

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/2012/12/main-directory.html]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989

SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING &
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, petitioners

vs.

NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & San Vicente for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Benjamin B. Vergara for private respondent

GANCAYCO, J.:

On November 2, 1982, a "crew Agreement" was entered into by

private respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and Philimare Shipping
and Equipment Supply (hereinafter called Philimare) whereby the
latter employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel
"Santa Cruz" (renamed "Turtle Bay") with a monthly salary of US $
300.00. Said agreement was processed and approved by the
National Seaman's Board (NSB) on November 3, 1982. 1

While on board said vessel the said parties entered into a

supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982 2

which provides among others:

1. The employer shall be obliged to insure the

employee during his engagement against death
or permanent invalidity caused by accident on
board up to:
US $ 40,000 - for death caused by
accident
 US $ 50,000 - for permanent total
disability caused by accident. 3

On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez

Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez
Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the
Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center
from October 23, 1983 to March 27, 1984. On August 19, 1985
the medical certificate was issued describing his disability as
"permanent in nature."

Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability

insurance in the amount of US $ 50,000.00 as provided for in the
contract of employment but his claim was denied for having
been submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for
doing so.

Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a complaint against

Philimare and Seagull Maritime Corporation (hereinafter called
Seagull) in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for non-payment of his claim for permanent total
disability with damages and attorney's fees.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers with
the corresponding documentary evidence, the officer-in-charge
of the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA
rendered a decision on May 2, 1986, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents

are hereby ordered to pay complainant the
amount of US $ 50,000.00 representing
permanent total disability insurance and
attorney's fees at 10% of the award. Payment
should be made in this Office within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof at the prevailing rate of
exchange. This Office cannot however rule on
damages, having no jurisdiction on the matter.

SO ORDERED. 4

Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National

Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Pending
resolution of their appeal because of the alleged transfer of the
agency of Seagull to Southeast Asia Shipping Corporation,
Seagull filed on April 28, 1987 a Motion For
Substitution/Inclusion of Party Respondent which was opposed
by Balatongan. 5 This was followed by an ex-parte motion for
leave to file third party complaint on June 4, 1987 by Seagull. A
decision was promulgated on December 7, 1987 denying both
motions and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. 6 A motion
for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit
in a resolution dated February 26, 1988. 7
Hence, Seagull and Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order based
on the following grounds:

1. Respondent POEA erred in applying the

Supplemental Contract;
2. Respondents POEA and NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the
Supplemental Contract was signed on board MV
Santa Cruz by and between private respondent
and your petitioner; and
3. Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not giving due course to your
petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Third Party
Complaint as well as their Motion for
Inclusion/Substitution of respondents. 8

On March 21, 1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining

order enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned
decision and resolution of public respondents.

Petitioners argue that prior to private respondent's departure he

executed a crew agreement on November 2, 1982 which was
duly approved by the POEA; that the supplementary contract of
employment that was entered into on board the vessel "Turtle
Bay" which provides for a US $ 50,000.00 insurance benefit in
case of permanent disability was neither approved nor verified by
respondent POEA; and that the same violates Article 34(i) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides as follows:

Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. - It shall be unlawful

for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of
authority:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(i) to substitute or alter employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor
from the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the approval of
the Department of Labor.

Petitioners also call attention to Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the

Supplementary Contract which provides as follows:
2. Notwithstanding his claim against the insurers
the employee hereby expressly waives all claims
 of his own or his heirs for compensation of
damages due to death or permanent invalidity
which he suffered during his engagement against
the employers ... unless his death or permanent
invalidity has been caused by willful act of any of
the above-named persons. 9

Petitioners stress that while public respondents upheld the

applicability of said supplementary contract insofar as it
increased the benefits to private respondent, public respondents
considered the provision on the waiver against all claims by
private respondent to be contrary to public policy.
In its questioned decision dated December 7, 1987, the
respondent NLRC made the following disquisition:

The focal issue for determination is the validity

and enforceability of the second contract of
employment entered into by and between
complainant and respondents on board the
vessel where the former had served as a member
of its complement despite the absence of NSB
verification or approval. With respect to the
findings of facts in the appealed decision, We
consider the same as duly supported by
substantial evidence and the admissions of the
parties in their pleadings.

Much stress and emphasis are made by the

respondents in their appeal that this claim has no
legal basis or footing inasmuch as the second
contract of employment containing a total
disability insurance benefit of US $ 50,000.00,
much more than that embodied in the first
contract of employment which was approved by
the defunct NSB, was not verified or approved by
the latter. Accordingly, the respondents posit the
argument that subject claim may not prosper
pursuant to the provisions of Art. 34(i) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides that it
shall be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority '(T)o substitute or
alter employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor from the time
of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the period of expiration of the same
without the approval of the Department of Labor.

Did the POEA commit a reversible error when it

considered the second contract of employment
 as valid sans any verification or approval thereof
by the NSB? Our answer to this query is in the
negative. Apparently, the intention of the law
when Art. 34 of the Labor Code was enacted is to
provide for the prohibited and unlawful practices
relative to recruitment and placement. As shown
in the 'Explanatory Note' of Parliamentary Bill No.
4531, pertaining to Art. 34 (supra), thus:

Many of the provisions are already existing and

were simply restated. Some however were
restated with modifications and new ones were
introduced to reflect what in the past have been
noted to be pernicious practices which tend to
place workers at a disadvantage.'
it is indubitably clear that the purpose of having
overseas contracts of employment approved by
the NSB(POEA) is whether or not such contracts
conform to the minimum terms and conditions
prescribed by the NSB (POEA). In other words,
the law did not at all prohibit any alteration which
provided for increases in wages or other benefits
voluntarily granted by the employer. Precisely,
under Section 2, Rule 1, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA, '(t)he standard format
of employment contracts shall set the minimum
standards of the terms and conditions of
employment. All employers and principals shall
adopt the model contract in connection with the
hiring of workers without prejudice to their
adopting other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum
standards of the Administration.' Where, as here, it
is admitted that the second contract although not
verified or approved by the NSB (POEA) granted
more benefits by way of total disability insurance
to the complainant, the respondents may not be
allowed to disvow their own voluntary acts by
insisting that such beneficial contract in favor of
the seaman is null and void. (Emphasis supplied.)
10

We agree.

The supplementary contract of employment was entered into

between petitioner and private respondent to modify the original
contract of employment The reason why the law requires that the
POEA should approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of
the Labor Code is to insure that the employee shall not thereby
be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are
within the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of
such employment contract set by the POEA. This is why a
standard format for employment contracts has been adopted by
the Department of Labor. However, there is no prohibition against
stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee than
those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a
"supplementary contract" was entered into affording greater
benefits to the employee than the previous one, and although the
same was not submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public
respondents properly considered said contract to be valid and
enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncements of public respondents
have the effect of an approval of said contract. Moreover, as said
contract was voluntarily entered into by the parties the same is
binding between them. 11 Not being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order, its validity must be
sustained. 12 By the same token, the court sustains the ruling of
public respondents that the provision in the supplementary
contract whereby private respondent waives any claim against
petitioners for damages arising from death or permanent
disability is against public policy, oppressive and inimical to the
rights of private respondent. The said provision defeats and is
inconsistent with the duty of petitioners to insure private
respondent against said contingencies as clearly stipulated in
the said contract.

Petitioners however argue that they could not have entered into
said supplementary contract of employment as Philimare was a
mere manning agent in the Philippines of the shipping company
managed by Navales Shipping Management and Marine
Consultant (Pte) Ltd., its principal. Petitioners assert that the
said supplementary contract was entered into by private
respondent with their principal, Navales Shipping Management
and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd. on board the vessel Turtle Bay
so petitioners cannot be held responsible thereunder.

This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public
respondents are conclusive in this proceeding. Public
respondents found that petitioner Philimare and private
respondent entered into said supplementary contract of
employment on December 6, 1982. Assuming for the sake of
argument that it was petitioners' principal which entered into
said contract with private respondent, nevertheless petitioner, as
its manning agent in the Philippines, is jointly responsible with its
principal thereunder. 13

There is no question that under the said supplementary contract

of employment, it is the duty of the employer, petitioners herein,
to insure the employee, during his engagement, against death
and permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to $
50,000.00. Consequently, it is also its concomitant obligation to
see to it that the claim against the insurance company is duly
filed by private respondent or in his behalf, and within the time
provided for by the terms of the insurance contract.

In this case, the private respondent met the accident on October

6, 1983. Since then, he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal
Authority Hospital and thereafter be was repatriated to the
Philippines wherein he was also hospitalized from October 22,
1983 to March 27, 1984. It was only on August 19, 1985 that he
was issued a medical certificate describing his disability to be
permanent in nature. It was not possible for private respondent
to file a claim for permanent disability with the insurance
company within the one-year period from the time of the injury,
as his disability was ascertained to be permanent only thereafter.
Petitioners did not exert any effort to assist private respondent
to recover payment of his claim from the insurance company.
They did not even care to dispute the finding of the insurer that
the claim was not flied on time. 14 Petitioners must, therefore, be
held responsible for its omission, if not negligence, by requiring
them to pay the claim of private respondent.

The Court finds that the respondent NLRC did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners, motion for leave
to file third-party complaint and substitution inclusion of party
respondent. Such motion is largely addressed to the discretion of
the said Commission. Inasmuch as the alleged transfer of
interest took place only after the POEA had rendered its decision,
the denial of the motion so as to avoid further delay in the
settlement of the claim of private respondent was well-taken. At
any rate, petitioners may pursue their claim against their alleged
successor-in-interest in a separate suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
March 21, 1988 is hereby LIFTED. No costs. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Annex 1 to Annex D of the Petition, Page 31,
Rollo.
2 Annex R of the Petition, Page 105 Rollo.
3 Page 163, Rollo.
4 Annex G to the Petition, pages 48 to 49, Rollo.
 5 Annexes K to L to the Petition, pages 58 to 68,
Rollo.
6 Annex O to the Petition, pages 82 to 96, Rollo.
7 Annex T to the Petition, page 120, Rollo.
8 Page 9, Rollo.
9 Page 12, Rollo. +
10 Pages 87 to 89, Rollo.
11 Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41
SCRA 565 (1971).
12 Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722
(1980); Philippine American General Insurance
Company, Inc. vs. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22 (1974);
Article 1306 and 1356, Civil Code.
13 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs.
NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 80143-44, December 8,
1988.
14 Annexes 2 and 1-A to Annex D the Petition,
pages 33 to 35, Rollo.

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Posted 11th December 2012 by Dennis Gonzales

Labels: GR 82252, Labor Relations, Seagull Maritime Corporation

v. Balatongan

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11th December 2012 Leonardo vs. Court

of Appeals

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 152459

FACTS
 The Case

          Before the Court is a petition for review

assailing the 29 June 2001 Decision[1]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn1] and
20 February 2002 Resolution[2]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51160.
The Court of Appeals set aside the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision holding Digital Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (DIGITEL) jointly and severally
liable with Balagtas Telephone Company
(BALTEL) and its proprietor Domingo de Asis.[3]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn3]

The Antecedent Facts

                  BALTEL holds the franchise from the

Municipality of Balagtas, Bulacan to operate a
telephone service in the municipality.   BALTEL
also has authority from the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to
operate in the municipality.

          BALTEL hired Emelita Leonardo, Conrado

Bargamento, Emelita Nuñez, Rodolfo Graban,
and Roberto Graban (“petitioners”) for various
positions[4] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn4] in
the company.   On 22 April 1991,[5]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn5]
BALTEL[6] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn6] and
DIGITEL entered into a management contract.[7]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn7]
Under the terms of the contract, DIGITEL was to
provide personnel, consultancy and technical
expertise in the management, administration,
and operation of BALTEL’s telephone service in
Balagtas, Bulacan.   DIGITEL also undertook to
improve the internal and external plants of
BALTEL’s telephone system and to handle
customer relations and such other matters
necessary for the efficient management and
operation of the telephone system.

                  In a letter[8] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn8]
dated 27 January 1994, BALTEL informed the
NTC that it would cease to operate effective 28
February 1994 because it was no longer in a
financial position to continue its operations.  On
17 February 1994, BALTEL assigned to DIGITEL
its buildings and other improvements on a parcel
of land in Balagtas, Bulacan covered by OCT No.
O-7280 where BALTEL conducted its business
operations.   The assignment was in partial
payment of BALTEL’s obligation to DIGITEL which
as of 31 December 1993 amounted to
P712,471.74.
 On 28 February 1994, petitioners’
employment ceased. They executed separate,
undated and similarly worded quitclaims
acknowledging receipt of various amounts
representing their claims from BALTEL. In their
quitclaims, petitioners absolved and released
BALTEL from all monetary claims that arose out
of their employer-employee relationship with the
company. Petitioners also acknowledged that
BALTEL closed its operations due to serious
business losses.

                  On 1 March 1994, petitioners filed a

complaint against BALTEL and Domingo De Asis
for recovery of salary differential and attorney’s
fees.   Petitioners later filed a supplemental
complaint to include illegal dismissal as
additional cause of action and to implead
DIGITEL as additional respondent.   DIGITEL
denied having any liability on the ground that it
was not petitioners’ employer.   In its 29 May
1995 Decision,[9] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn9]
Labor Arbiter  Dominador B. Saludares ruled as
follows:

         WHEREFORE, premises considered,

judgment is hereby entered in favor of the
complainants and against respondents Balagtas
Telephone System and/or Domingo de Asis and
Digital Telecommunications Phils., Inc. ordering
the latter, jointly and severally as follows:

1.           To pay the sum of P14,950.00

representing the unpaid salaries
of all the five (5) complainants for
the month of February 1994;
 2.      To pay another sum of P4,486.44
representing the unpaid overtime
pay of complainants Emelita
Leonardo, Conrado Bargamento
and Emelita Nuñez for February
1994;

3.      To pay the sum of P71,400.00 as

salary differential of the
complainants;

4.           To pay the backwages of all

complainants from the date they
were dismissed on February 28,
1994 up to this writing computed
in the sum total of P224,250.00,
less their separation pay which
they have received;

5.      To pay the sum of P31,508.64 as

attorney’s fees which is
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of
the amount of the award; and

6.          To immediately reinstate all the

complainants to their former or
equivalent positions under the
same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to their dismissal
or separation including payment
of their prevailing basic salaries
and all other benefits or at the
option of the employer merely
reinstate in the payroll also with
the payment of their salaries and
all other benefits in accordance
with Article 223 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6715. Respondents are further
ordered to submit upon receipt
hereof their compliance with the
reinstatement aspect.
           
SO DECIDED.[10] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn10]

                  DIGITEL appealed the Labor Arbiter’s

Decision before the NLRC. In its 29 December
1997 Decision,[11] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn11] the
NLRC dismissed the appeal. DIGITEL moved for
the reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. In
its 29 July 1998 Decision,[12]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn12] the
NLRC denied DIGITEL’s motion for
reconsideration.

          DIGITEL filed a petition for review before

this Court.   In its                             2 December 1998
Resolution, this Court referred the case to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC.[13] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn13]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

          In its 29 June 2001 Decision, the Court of

Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC
Decision insofar as it held DIGITEL severally
liable with BALTEL and Domingo de Asis.   The
Court of Appeals ruled that DIGITEL is not the
successor-in-interest of BALTEL.   The Court of
Appeals held that the records do not show that
DIGITEL became the absolute owner of BALTEL,
or that DIGITEL absorbed BALTEL’s employees.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that there
was no showing that DIGITEL acquired BALTEL’s
franchise.  The Court of Appeals ruled:
           WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE insofar as it held petitioner jointly and
severally liable with Balagtas Telephone
Company and Domingo de Asis for the
obligations of the two to private respondents,
with the result that private respondents’
complaint against petitioner before the labor
arbiter is DISMISSED.

                      SO ORDERED.[14]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=66240790047031126
6#_ftn14]

          Petitioners moved for the reconsideration

of the Court of Appeals’ Decision.   In its 20
February 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.

          Hence, the petition before this Court.

          Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals

erred in disregarding the factual findings of both
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which should
have been given more weight by appellate
tribunals.  

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1.    Whether DIGITEL is the successor-in-

interest of BALTEL; and

                  2. Whether an employer-employee
relationship exists between petitioners and
DIGITEL.

The Ruling of This Court

          The petition has no merit.

          The Court of Appeals has the power to

review the decisions of the NLRC and to pass
upon factual issues raised by the parties.  In R &
E Transport, Inc. v. Latag,[15]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn15]
this Court held:

                   The power of the CA to review

NLRC decisions via a Rule 65 petition is now a
settled issue. As early as St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC, we have definitively ruled that the
proper remedy to ask for the review of a decision
of the NLRC is a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that such
petition should be filed with the CA in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts. Moreover, it has already been explained
that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa (BP)
129, as amended by Republic Act 7902, the CA –
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari – was specifically
given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and
when necessary, to resolve factual issues.

                  We agree with petitioners that factual

findings of quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies are accorded great respect and even
finality by the courts.  However, this rule is not
absolute.   When there is a showing that the
factual findings of administrative bodies were
arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record, they may be examined by
the courts.[16] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn16]   In
this case, the Court of Appeals found “nothing in
the records [to support] the conclusion that
DIGITEL became the ‘absolute owner’ of BALTEL
or that the former ‘absorbed’ the latter’s
employees.” Hence, the Court of Appeals is
justified in reviewing the factual findings of both
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

There is No Employer-Employee Relationship

Between DIGITEL and Petitioners

          To determine the existence of an employer-

employee relationship, the Court has to resolve
who has the power to select the employees, who
pays for their wages, who has the power to
dismiss them, and who exercises control in the
methods and the results by which the work is
accomplished.[17] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn17]
The most important element of an employer-
employee relationship is the control test.  Under
the control test, there is an employer-employee
relationship when the person for whom the
services are performed reserves the right to
control not only the end achieved but also the
manner and means used to achieve that end.[18]
[http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftn18]

          In this case, DIGITEL undoubtedly has the

power of control.  However, DIGITEL’s exercise of
the power of control necessarily flows from the
exercise of its responsibilities under the
management contract which includes providing
for personnel, consultancy and technical
expertise in the management, administration,
and operation of the telephone system. Thus,
the control test has no application in this case.

          The Court notes that DIGITEL did not hire

petitioners.   BALTEL had already employed
petitioners when BALTEL entered into the
management contract with DIGITEL.   We also
agree with the Court of Appeals that the fact that
DIGITEL uses its payslips does not necessarily
imply that DIGITEL pays petitioners’ salaries.  As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, DIGITEL
introduced its own financial and accounting
systems to BALTEL and it included the use of
DIGITEL’s payslips for accounting purposes.  The
management contract provides that BALTEL
shall reimburse DIGITEL for all expenses
incurred in the performance of its services and
this includes reimbursement of whatever
amount DIGITEL paid or advanced to BALTEL’s
employees.

          Finally, DIGITEL has no power to dismiss

BALTEL’s employees.  When DIGITEL wanted to
dismiss Roberto Graban for habitual tardiness,
BALTEL did not approve DIGITEL’s
recommendation.   In the end, Roberto Graban
was just suspended from work.

          In sum, no employer-employee relationship

exists between petitioners and DIGITEL.  Hence,
DIGITEL is not solidarily liable with BALTEL and
Domingo de Asis to petitioners.

          WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We

AFFIRM the 29 June 2001 Decision and 20
February 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51160.    

[1] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref1]                          
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with
Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Roberto A.
Barrios, concurring.  Rollo, pp. 315-324.
[2] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref2]                          
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with
Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon Magtolis and Roberto
A. Barrios, concurring.  Id. at 34.
[3] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref3]                           Also
referred to as Domingo Asis.
[4] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref4]                          
Emelita Leonardo was hired in 1988 as telephone
operator; Conrado Bargamento was hired in 1977 as
collector; Emelita Nuñez was hired in 1984 as telephone
operator; Rodolfo Graban was hired in 1971 as telephone
lineman and Roberto Graban was hired in 1990 as
telephone lineman.  Rollo, pp. 315-316.
[5] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref5]               21 April
1991 in the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
[6] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref6]
The agreement was signed by Estela L. de Asis, attorney-
in-fact of Domingo de Asis who owns the franchise to
operate the telephone system.
[7] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref7]              
Denominated as “Appointment and Agreement.”
[8] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref8]               Signed by
Estela de Asis.  Rollo, p. 107.
[9] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref9]               Id.
at 69-81.
[10] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref10]                       Id. at
79-81.
[11] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref11]                      
Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso with
Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo, concurring.  CA rollo,
pp. 16-22.
[12] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref12]                      
Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso with
Commissioners Rogelio L. Rayala and Alberto R. Quimpo,
concurring. Id. at  24-26.
[13] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref13]             356 Phil.
811 (1998).
[14] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref14]             Rollo, pp.
323-324.
[15] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref15]             G.R. No.
155214, 13 February 2004, 422 SCRA 698, at 703-704.
[16] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref16]             Id.
[17] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref17]                      
Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., G.R. No. 157752, 16 March
2005, 453 SCRA 529.
[18] [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266#_ftnref18]                      
Abante, Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing & Parts Corporation, G.R.
No. 159890, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 368.

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Posted 11th December 2012 by Dennis Gonzales

Labels: employer-employee relationship, GR 152459, Labor

Standards, Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

0 Add a comment
11th December 2012 Who is to blame
when a marriage
fails?
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cases.blogspot.com/2012/12/main-directory.html]

SECOND DIVISION

[ [http://www.blogger.com
/blogger.g?blogID=662407900470311266] G.R. No.
119190.  January 16, 1997]

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to

steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate.   Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught
wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.   Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's
decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly
denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by
the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals[1]
[http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_edn1] in its decision are as follows:

"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were

preponderantly established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the
defendant at the Manila Cathedral, xxx Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh.
"A")
"After the celebration of their marriage and wedding
reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same
room for the first night of their married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to
enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with
each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep.
There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place
where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did
so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his
nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking
a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since
May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see
her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
“The results of their physical examinations were that she
is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband’s examination was kept confidential up to this
time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to
her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to
return but he never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if
their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his
wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and
he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is
any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is
any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science K

"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on

May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for  this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex
with him only once but he did not continue because she
was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant,
why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return
the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain
valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that
there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to
masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman.
"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there
is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence
is not fabricated.”[2] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph
/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997/119190.htm#_edn2]

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the

dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.  Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
"SO ORDERED. "
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred:
I

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there

was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have

sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner

and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the

parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden
of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since
there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no
other basis for the court's conclusion except the
admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid
acts intended to validate marriage and should retard
acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion
drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been
a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment
of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.[3] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph
/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997/119190.htm#_edn3]

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings.  - Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on
the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by
the  adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the
form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented,
it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side.
He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the
reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner
does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only
shows that there is no collusion between the parties.
When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are
reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged
resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by
this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The
issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court
clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)."[4]
[http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_edn4]

Petitioner further contends that respondent court

erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with
each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
He points out as error the failure of the trial court to
make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the
reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily
due to psychological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, - i.e., physical disorders, such
as aches, pains or other discomforts, - why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse
from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of
10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor
the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate,
since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent
evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder
as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner
could have discussed with private respondent or asked
her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him
everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to
show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.[5] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence
/1997/jan1997/119190.htm#_edn5] Since it is petitioner's
claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps
physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of
a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity."[6] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence
/1997/jan1997/119190.htm#_edn6]

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations

under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.  In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the
husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed
with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his
rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins,
111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not
go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that
she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and
fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what
the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not psychological  incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of
cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant
or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of
a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code.”[7] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence
/1997/jan1997/119190.htm#_edn7]

While the law provides that the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another.  Indeed, no man
is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to
say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing
but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That is - a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by
the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects
and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

[1] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_ednref1] Thirteenth Division: Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo Montenegro and
Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.

[2] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_ednref2] Rollo, pp. 20-24.

[3] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_ednref3] Ibid.

[4] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
 /119190.htm#_ednref4] Rollo, p. 34.

[5] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_ednref5] Exhs.  "2",  "2-B" and "2-C”.

[6] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_ednref6] Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso,
p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.

[7] [http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997
/119190.htm#_ednref7] Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

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Posted 11th December 2012 by Dennis Gonzales

Labels: Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, GR 119190, Who is to

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