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G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983
DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA
MARAVILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Albay and JOSE A. RICO, respondents.
Jose P. Oira for petitioners.
Rodolfo A. Madrid for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
We are asked in this petition to review the amended
decision of the respondent court which declared as
absolutely null and void the sale of a residential lot in
Guinobatan, Albay to a Chinese national and ordered its
reconveyance to the vendors thirty years after the sale
inspite of the fact that the vendee had been a naturalized
Filipino citizen for fifteen years at the time.
We grant the petition. The questioned decision and the
order amending it are reversed and set aside.
The facts are not disputed.
On April 12, 1939, Maximino Rico, for and in his own
behalf and that of the minors Maria Rico, Filomeno Rico,
Prisco Rico, and Lourdes' Rico, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale (Annex 'A' to the complaint) over Lot 339
and a portion of Lot 327 in favor of the petitioner Donato
Reyes Yap who was then a Chinese national. Respondent
Jose A. Rico is the eldest son of Maximino Rico, one of
the vendors in Annex 'A'.
Subsequently, the petitioner as vendee caused the
registration of the instrument of sale and the
cancellation of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 29332
and 29410 and the consequent issuance in his favor of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2433 covering the two
lots subject matter of the Contract of Sale.
After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and after the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato Reyes Yap
was admitted as a Filipino citizen and allowed to take his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. He
was, thereafter, issued Certificate of Naturalization No.
7, File No. 19 of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major
portion of Lot No. 327 consisting of 1,078 square meters
which he acquired by purchase under the deed of sale in
favor of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a
Filipino citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his
mother and the naturalization of his father Donato Reyes
Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of
respondent Jose A. Rico. sold the remaining portion of
Lot 327 to the petitioner who had his rights thereon duly
registered under Act 496. Petitioner, Donato Reyes Yap,
has been in possession of the lots in question since
1939, openly, publicly, continuously, and adversely in
the concept of owner until the present time. The
petitioner has one surviving son by his first marriage to a
Filipino wife. He has five children by his second marriage
also to a Filipina and has a total of 23 grandchildren all
of whom are Filipino citizens.
The respondent court considered Section 5, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution that "no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines" to be an
absolute and unqualified prohibition and, therefore,
ruled that a conveyance contrary to it would not be
validated nor its void nature altered by the subsequent
naturalization of the vendee.
The dispositive portion of the amended decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the Contract of Sale
embodied in the 'Escritura de Compra
Venta' which is attached to the
Complaint as Annex 'A', is hereby
declared null and void ab initio and
without any legal force and effect.
The action to recover Lot 339 of the
Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan, Albay,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T2433. and Lot 327 covered by the
same Transfer Certificate of Title, is
hereby granted to plaintiff, upon
payment of the consideration price of
P150.00 and declaring plaintiff as the
lawful owner and entitled to the
possession thereof.
Defendant Donato Reyes Yap is hereby
ordered to produce his Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-2433 to the
Register of Deeds of Albay, so as to
enable said office to make the due and
proper annotations on said title as well
as in the original of the declaration of
nullity as herein adjudged. Let Transfer
Certificate of Title issued to plaintiff,
concerning said Lots 339 and 327 of
the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan,
Albay.
COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
The rulings in Vasquez v.Leng Seng Giap et al. (96 Phil.
447) and Sarosa Vda. de Bersabia v. Cuenco (113 SCRA
547) sustain the petitioner's contentions. We stated
in Sarosa Vda de Bersabia:
There should be no question that the
sale of the land in question in 1936 by
Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent
and void from the beginning (Art. 1409
[7], Civil Code) because it was a
contract executed against the
mandatory provision of the 1935
Constitution, which is an expression of
public policy to conserve lands for the
Filipinos. Said provision reads:
Save in cases of
hereditary succession,
no private agricultural
land shall be
transferred or
assigned except to in.
individuals,
corporations, or
associations, qualified
to acquire or hold
lands of the public
domain.
Had this been a suit between Epifania
and Ong King Po she could have been
declared entitled to the litigated land on
the basis, as claimed, of the ruling in
Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui
She, reading:
 Page 2 of 27

... For another thing, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

and this is not only
cogent but also The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land
important. Article sold by their father, now deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an
1416 of the Civil Code alien, on the ground that the sale was null and void ab
provides as an initio since it violates applicable provisions of the
exception to the rule Constitution and the Civil Code.
on pari delicto that
when the agreement is
not illegal per se but The order of the Court of First Instance of Sulu
is merely prohibited, dismissing the complaint was appealed to the Court of
and the prohibition by Appeals but the latter court certified the appeal to us
the law is designed for since only pure questions of law were raised by the
the protection of the appellants.
plaintiff, he may, if
public policy is The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of
thereby enhanced, Appeals as follows:
recover what he has
sold or delivered. ...
On September 30, 1966, the plaintiffs
filed a complaint in the Court of First
But the factual set-up has changed. Instance of Sulu alleging among others
The litigated property is now in the that they are the heirs of Jose Godinez
hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no who was married to Martina Alvarez
longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Godinez sometime in 1910; that during
Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, the marriage of their parents the said
was constitutionally qualified to own parents acquired a parcel of land lot
the subject property. There would be no No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of
more public policy to be served in 3,665 square meters as evidenced by
allowing petitioner Epifania to recover Original Certificate of Title No. 179 (D -
the land as it is already in the hands of 155) in the name of Jose Godinez; that
a qualified person. Applying by analogy their mother died sometime in 1938
the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. leaving the plaintiffs as their sole
Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons: surviving heirs; that on November 27,
1941, without the knowledge of the
... if the ban on aliens plaintiffs, the said Jose Godinez, for
from acquiring not valuable consideration, sold the
only agricultural but aforesaid parcel of land to the
also urban lands, as defendant Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese
construed by this citizen, which transaction is contrary to
Court in the Krivenko law and in violation of the Civil Code
case, is to preserve because the latter being an alien who is
the nation's lands for inhibited by law to purchase real
future generations of property; that Transfer Certificate Title
Filipinos, that aim or No. 884 was then issued by the
purpose would not be Register of Deeds to the said defendant,
thwarted but achieved which is null and void ab initio since
by making lawful the the transaction constituted a non-
acquisition of real existent contract; that on January 11,
estate by aliens who 1963, said defendant Fong Pak Luen
became Filipino executed a power of attorney in favor of
citizens by his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also
naturalization. an alien, who conveyed and sold the
above described parcel of land to co-
defendant Trinidad S. Navata, who is
Only recently, we had occasion to reiterate the above aware of and with full knowledge that
rulings in Vicente Godines v. Fong Pak Luen, et al. (G.R. Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as
No. L-36731, January 27, 1983). well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the
law are prohibited and disqualified to
WHEREFORE, the amended judgment of the respondent acquire real property in this
court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The jurisdiction; that defendant Fong Pak
complaint is DISMISSED. Luen has not acquired any title or
interest in said parcel of land as the
SO ORDERED. purported contract of sale executed by
Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law
and considered non- existent, so much
so that the alleged attorney-in-fact,
defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not
G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983 conveyed any title or interest over said
property and defendant Navata had not
acquired anything from said grantor
VICENTE GODINEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, and as a consequence Transfer
vs. Certificate of Title No. 1322, which was
FONG PAK LUEN ET AL., defendants, TRINIDAD S. issued by the Register of Deeds in favor
NAVATA, defendant-appellee. of the latter is null and void ab initio,-
that since one-half of the said property
Dominador Sobrevinas for plaintiffs-appellants. is conjugal property inherited by the
plaintiffs from their mother, Jose
Godinez could -not have legally
Muss S. Inquerto for defendant-appellee
conveyed the entire property; that
notwithstanding repeated demands on
said defendant to surrender to plaintiffs
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the said property she refused and still answer has been filed by said
refuses to do so to the great damage defendants.
and prejudice of the plaintiffs; and that
they were constrained to engage the On December 2, 196 7, the court
services of counsel in the sum of issued an order as follows:
P2,000.00.1äwphï1.ñët The plaintiffs
thus pray that they be adjudged as the
owners of the parcel of land in question Both parties having
and that Transfer Certificate of Title agreed to the
RT-90 (T-884) issued in the name of suggestion of the
defendant Fong Pak Luen be declared Court that they
null and void ab initio; and that the submit their
power of attorney issued in the name of supplemental
Kwan Pun Ming, as well as Transfer pleadings to support
Certificate of Title No. 'L322 issued in both motion and
the name of defendant Navata be opposition and after
likewise declared null and void, with submittal of the same
costs against defendants. the said motion to
dismiss which is an
affirmative defense
On August 18, 1966, the defendant alleged in the
Register of Deeds filed an answer complaint is deemed
claiming that he was not yet the submitted. Failure of
register of deeds then; that it was only both parties or either
the ministerial duty of his office to party to submit their
issue the title in favor of the defendant supplemental
Navata once he was determined the pleadings on or about
registerability of the documents December 9, the
presented to his office. Court will resolve the
case.
On October 20, 1966, the defendant
Navata filed her answer with the On November 29, 1968, the trial court
affirmative defenses and counterclaim issued an order missing the complaint
alleging among others that the without pronouncement as to costs.
complaint does not state a cause of (Record on Appeal, pp. 31- 37). A
action since it appears from the motion for reconsideration of this order
allegation that the property is was filed by the plaintiffs on December
registered in the name of Jose Godinez 12, 196F, which was denied by the trial
so that as his sole property he may court in an order of July 11, 1969,
dispose of the same; that the cause of (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 38, 43, 45, 47).
action has been barred by the statute of The plaintiffs now interpose this appeal
limitations as the alleged document of with the following assignments of
sale executed by Jose Godinez on errors:
November 27, 1941, conveyed the
property to defendant Fong Pak Luen
as a result of which a title was issued I. The trial court erred
to said defendant; that under Article in dismissing
1144 (1) of the Civil Code, an action plaintiffs-appellants'
based upon a written contract must be complaint on the
brought within 10 years from the time ground of prescription
the right of action accrues; that the of action, applying
right of action accrued on November Art. 1144 (1) New Civil
27, 1941 but the complaint was filed Code on the basis of
only on September 30, 1966, beyond defendant Trinidad S.
the 10 year period provided for by law; Navata's affirmative
that the torrens title in the name of defense of prescription
defendant Navata is indefeasible who in her answer treated
acquired the property from defendant as a motion to
Fong Pak Luen who had been in dismiss.
possession of the property since 1941
and thereafter defendant Navata had II. The trial court
possessed the same for the last 25 erred in denying
years including the possession of Fong plaintiffs-appellants'
Pak Luen; that the complaint is motion for
intended to harass the defendant as a reconsideration of the
civic leader and respectable member of order of dismissal.
the community as a result of which she
suffered moral damages of
P100,000.00, P2,500.00 for attorney's III. The trial court
fees and P500.00 expenses of litigation, erred in not ordering
hence, said defendant prays that the this case to be tried
complaint be dismissed and that her on the merits."
counterclaim be granted, with costs
against the plaintiffs. On November 24, The appellants contend that the lower court erred in
1967, the plaintiffs filed an answer to dismissing the complaint on the ground that their cause
the affirmative defenses and counter- of action has prescribed. While the issue raised appears
claim. As the defendants Fong Pak to be only the applicability of the law governing
Luen and Kwan Pun Ming are residing prescription, the real question before us is whether or
outside the Philippines, the trial court not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an
upon motion issued an order of April alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may
17, 1967, for the service of summons recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been
on said defendants by publication. No

conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and
possess it.
The question is not a novel one. Judicial precedents
indicate fairly clearly how the question should be
resolved.
There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose
Godinez of his residential lot acquired from the Bureau
of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a
Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which
provided:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land
will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
The meaning of the above provision was fully discussed
in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila (79 Phil. 461)
which also detailed the evolution of the provision in the
public land laws, Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act
No. 141. The Krivenko ruling that "under the
Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
agricultural lands, including residential lands" is a
declaration of an imperative constitutional policy.
Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to
defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However,
we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass
upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose
Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal
per se or merely pro-exhibited.** It is enough to
stress that insofar as the vendee is
concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can
the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on
imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now
in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the
constitutional prescription was never intended to apply.
The lower court erred in treating the case as one
involving simply the application of the statute of
limitations.
From the fact that prescription may not be used to
defend a contract which the Constitution prohibits, it
does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be
allowed to recover the property sold to an alien. As
earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien
vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S.
Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real
property.
In Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96
Phil. 447), where the alien vendee later sold the property
to a Filipino corporation, this Court, in affirming a
judgment dismissing the complaint to rescind the sale of
real property to the defendant Li Seng Giap on January
22, 1940, on the ground that the vendee was an alien
and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold
title to lands, held:
In Caoile vs. Yu Chiao 49 Qff Gaz.,
4321; Talento vs. Makiki 49 Off. Gaz.,
4331; Bautista vs. Uy 49 Off. Gaz.,
4336; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee 49 Off.
Gaz., 4345 and Mercado vs. Go Bio, 49
Off. Gaz., 5360, the majority of this
Court has ruled that in sales of real
estate to aliens incapable of holding
title thereto by virtue of the provisions
of the Constitution (Section 5, Article
XIII Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 44
Off. Gaz., 471) both the vendor and the
vendee are deemed to have committed
the constitutional violation and being
thus in pari delicto the courts will not
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afford protection to either party. (Article
1305, old Civil Code; Article 1411, new
Civil Code) From this ruling three
Justices dissented. (Mr. Justice Pablo,
Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes and the writer.
See Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Talento vs.
Makiki Bautista us. Uy, Rellosa vs.
Gaw Chee and Mercado vs. Go
Bio). supra.
The action is not of rescission because
it is not postulated upon any of the
grounds provided for in Article 1291 of
the old Civil Code and because the
action of rescission involves lesion or
damage and seeks to repair it. It is an
action for annulment under Chapter VI,
Title II, Book 11, on nullity of contracts,
based on a defect in the contract which
invalidates it independently of such
lesion or damages. (Manresa,
Commentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol
Vol. VIII, p. 698, 4th ed.) It is very likely
that the majority of this Court
proceeded upon that theory when it
applied the in pari delicto rule referred
to above.
In the United States the rule is that in
a sale of real estate to an alien
disqualified to hold title thereto the
vendor divests himself of the title to
such real estate and has no recourse
against the vendee despite the latter's
disability on account of alienage to hold
title to such real estate and the vendee
may hold it against the whole world
except as against the State. It is only
the State that is entitled by proceedings
in the nature of office found to have a
forfeiture or escheat declared against
the vendee who is incapable of holding
title to the real estate sold and
conveyed to him. Abrams vs. State, 88
Pac. 327; Craig vs. Leslie et al., 4 Law,
Ed. 460; 3 Wheat, 563, 589590; Cross
vs. Del Valle, 1 Wall, [U.S.] 513; 17
Law. Ed., 515; Governeur vs. Robertson,
11 Wheat, 332, 6 Law. Ed., 488.)
However, if the State does not
commence such proceedings and in the
meantime the alien becomes
naturalized citizen, the State is deemed
to have waived its right to escheat the
real property and the title of the alien
thereto becomes lawful and valid as of
the date of its conveyance or transfer to
him. (Osterman vs. Baldwin, 6 Wall,
116, 18 Law. ed. 730; Manuel vs. Wulff,
152 U.S. 505, 38 Law. ed. 532;
Pembroke vs. Houston, 79, SW 470;
Fioerella vs. Jones, 259 SW 782. The
rule in the United States that in a sale
of real estate to an alien disqualified to
hold title thereto, the vendor divests
himself of the title to such real estate
and is not permitted to sue for the
annulment Of his Contract, is also the
rule under the Civil Code. ... Article
1302 of the old Civil Code provides: ...
Persons sui juris cannot, however, avail
themselves of the incapacity of those
with whom they contracted; ...
xxx xxx xxx
. . . (I)f the ban on aliens from acquiring
not only agricultural but, also urban
lands, as construed by this Court in the

Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's land for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would
not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization. The title to
the parcel of land of the vendee, a
naturalized Filipino citizen, being valid
that of the domestic corporation to
which the parcel of land has been
transferred, must also be valid, 96.67
per cent of its capital stock being
owned by Filipinos.
Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan (SCRA 406) reiterated the above
ruling by declaring that where land is sold to a Chinese
citizen, who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the
latter cannot be impugned.
The appellants cannot find solace from Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Lui She (21 SCRA 52) which
relaxed the pari delicto doctrine to allow the heirs or
successors-in-interest, in appropriate cases, to recover
that which their predecessors sold to aliens.
Only recently, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v.
Cuenco (113 SCRA 547) we had occasion to pass upon a
factual situation substantially similar to the one in the
instant case. We ruled:
But the factual set-up has changed.
The litigated property is now in the
hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no
longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
Respondent, as a naturalized citizen,
was constitutionally qualified to own
the subject property. There would be no
more public policy to be served in
allowing petitioner Epifania to recover
the land as it is already in the hands of
a qualified person. Applying by analogy
the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs.
Giap & Sons: (.96 Phil. 447 [1955])
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring
not only agricultural but also urban
lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would
not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po,
private respondent's vendor, had no
rights of ownership to transmit, it is
likewise in escapable that petitioner
Epifania had slept on her rights for 26
years from 1936 to 1962. By her long
inaction or inexcusable neglect, she
should be held barred from asserting
her claim to the litigated property (Sotto
vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978])
Laches has been defined as the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or ommission to assert a
right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
(Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.,
No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA
Page 5 of 27
29, 35).' (Cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86
SCRA 154 [1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be
declared to be the rightful owner of the
property.
In the light of the above considerations, we find the
second and third assignments of errors without merit.
Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is
declared the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby denied. The
orders dismissing the complaint and denying the motion
for reconsideration are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B.
LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private
respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over
a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while
still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under
the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and
asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate
court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in
granting the application of respondent spouses for
registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347
and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area
of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one
Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application
for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch
XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship
through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the
parties have presented their respective evidence, the
court a quo rendered a decision confirming private
respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
this Court hereby approves the said
application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over
Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the
names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and
Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino
citizens by birth but now Canadian
citizens by naturalization and residing
at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City
and/or 201-1170-124 Street,
Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.

Once this Decision becomes final, let
the corresponding decree of registration
be issued. In the certificate of title to be
issued, there shall be annotated an
easement of .265 meters road right-of-
way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the
trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed
that both applicants were still Filipino
citizens when they bought the land in
controversy from its former owner. For
this reason, the prohibition against the
acquisition of private lands by aliens
could not apply. In justice and equity,
they are the rightful owners of the
subject realty considering also that
they had paid for it quite a large sum of
money. Their purpose in initiating the
instant action is merely to confirm their
title over the land, for, as has been
passed upon, they had been the owners
of the same since 1978. It ought to be
pointed out that registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. The
Torrens System was not established as
a means for the acquisition of title to
private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one
may already have (Municipality of
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-31189, March 31, 1987). With
particular reference to the main issue
at bar, the High Court has ruled that
title and ownership over lands within
the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates
back to the time of their purchase, not
later. The fact that the applicants-
appellees are not Filipino citizens now
cannot be taken against them for they
were not disqualified from acquiring the
land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng
Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11,
1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit
petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which
was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright
for having been filed out of time had it not been for the
constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private
respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over
the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even
privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be
public lands under the principle that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State under the Regalian
doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court
adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of
title would the land become privately owned land, for in
the same proceeding, the court may declare it public
land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented
established that applicants, by
Page 6 of 27
themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
the two adjacent parcels of land applied
for registration of title under a bona-
fide claim of ownership long before
June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it
is conclusively presumed that all the
conditions essential to the confirmation
of their title over the two adjacent
parcels of land are sought to be
registered have been complied with
thereby entitling them to the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title
pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration
Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation,
thus:
The land sought to be registered has
been declared to be within the alienable
and disposable zone established by the
Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit
"P"). The investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources
District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed
realty had been occupied by the
applicants "whose house of strong
materials stands thereon"; that it had
been declared for taxation purposes in
the name of applicants-spouses since
1979; that they acquired the same by
means of a public instrument entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly
executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo
Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I"
and "J"); and that applicants and their
predecessors in interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the
application for registration. But what is
of great significance in the instant case
is the circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino
citizens such that when they filed their
application for registration in 1987,
ownership over the land in dispute had
already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's
concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the
land was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of respondent spouses only
since 1979. However, tax declarations
or reality tax payments of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership.
(citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court
found that "applicants (respondents)
and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land for more
than 30 years prior to the filing of the
application for registration." This is not,
however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession
"since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073,
amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec.
also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is
a void in respondents' possession. They
fall short of the required possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.
And, even if they needed only to prove
 Page 7 of 27

thirty (30) years possession prior to the
filing of their application (on February
5, 1987), they would still be short of the
required possession if the starting point
is 1979 when, according to the Court of
Appeals, the land was declared for
taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo,
pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the
logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to
apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and
exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more.
This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land
Act (CA 141) reads:
the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this
except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were
in possession of the land sought to be registered only in
1978 and therefore short of the required length of time.
As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired
by private respondents through their predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest
and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as
an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v.
Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State.

Sec. 48. The following-described

citizens of the Philippines, occupying Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v.
lands of the public domain or claiming Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the
interest therein, but whose titles have 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
not been perfected or completed, may Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of
apply to the Court of First Instance Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where
(now Regional Trial Court) of the the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief
province where the land is located for Justice Narvasa, declared that:
confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor (The weight of authority is) that open,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit: exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period
xxx xxx xxx prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso
(b) Those who by themselves or through jure and without the need of judicial or
their predecessors-in-interest have been other sanction, ceases to be public land
in open, continuous, exclusive, and and becomes private property. . . .
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or Herico in particular, appears to be
ownership, for at least thirty squarely affirmative:
years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of . . . Secondly, under
title except when prevented by wars or the provisions of
force majeure. These shall be Republic Act
conclusively presumed to have No. 1942, which the
performed all the conditions essential to respondent Court held
a Government grant and shall be to be inapplicable to
entitled to a certificate of title under the the petitioner's case,
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis with the latter's
supplied) proven occupation
and cultivation for
As amended by PD 1073: more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself
and by his
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) predecessors-in-
and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the interest, title over the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in land has vested on
the sense that these provisions shall petitioner so as to
apply only to alienable and disposable segregate the land
lands of the public domain which have from the mass of
been in open, continuous, exclusive public land.
and notorious possession and Thereafter, it is no
occupation by the applicant himself or longer disposable
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under under the Public Land
a bona fide claim of acquisition or Act as by free patent .
ownership, since June 12, 1945. ..

It must be noted that with respect to possession and xxx xxx xxx
occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the law employs the terms "by
themselves", "the applicant himself or through his As interpreted in
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether several cases, when
the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the the conditions as
subject property for only a day so long as the period specified in the
and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has foregoing provision are
been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the complied with, the
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at possessor is deemed
bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in to have acquired, by
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of operation of law, a

right to a grant, a
government grant,
without the necessity
of a certificate of title
being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases
to be of the public
domain and beyond
the authority of the
Director of Lands to
dispose of. The
application for
confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of
which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be
evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon
the strength of said
patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate
the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of
the character and duration prescribed
by the statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself (Section 48
[b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title ..." No
proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession
claims is of the required character and
length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so
well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are
indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above
pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable
public land ipso jure converts the same to private
property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992];
Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on
such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218
SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA
78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied
with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued
Page 8 of 27
(National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the
land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established
as a means for the acquisition of title to private land
(Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As
could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private
respondents were able to establish the nature of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence
was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest
had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified
true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and
her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove
that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor
Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was
presented in evidence together with a letter from the
Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable
zone of the government and that no forestry interest was
affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents'
application for registration of title on the ground of
foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of
Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign
nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But
this is where the similarity ends. The applicants
in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the
alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
The land registration court decided in favor of the
applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on
appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before
us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice
Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence
adduced, the private respondents do
not rely on fee simple ownership based
on a Spanish grant or possessory
information title under Section 19 of
the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof
that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo
real" or royal grant (b) the "concession
especial" or especial grant; (c) the
"composicion con el estado" title or
adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
compra" or title by purchase; and (e)
the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which
could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The
primary basis of their claim is
possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their
predecessors have been in possession
since time immemorial, the rulings of
both courts could be upheld for, as this
 Page 9 of 27

Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of In the instant case, private respondents

Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]): offered no evidence at all to prove that
the property subject of the application
. . . All lands that were is an alienable and disposable land. On
not acquired from the the contrary, the entire property . . .
Government, either by was pasture land (and therefore
purchase or by grant, inalienable under the then 1973
belong to the public Constitution).
domain. An exception
to the rule would be . . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence
any land that should miserably failed to establish their
have been in the imperfect title to the property in
possession of an question. Their allegation of possession
occupant and of his since time immemorial, . . ., is patently
predecessors in baseless. . . . When referring to
interest since time possession, specifically "immemorial
immemorial, for such possession," it means possession of
possession would which no man living has seen the
justify the beginning, and the existence of which
presumption that the he has learned from his elders (Susi v.
land had never been Razon, supra). Such possession was
part of the public never present in the case of private
domain or that if had respondents. . . .
been a private
property even before . . ., there does not even exist a
the Spanish conquest reasonable basis for the finding that
(Cariño v. Insular the private respondents and their
Government, 41 Phil predecessors-in-interest possessed the
935 [1909]; 212 U.S. land for more than eighty (80) years, . .
449; 53 Law. Ed., .
594) The applicant
does not come under
the exception, for the xxx xxx xxx
earliest possession of
the lot by his first To this Court's mind, private
predecessor in respondents failed to prove that (their
interest began in predecessor-in-interest) had possessed
1880. the property allegedly covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15853 and made the
. . . alienable public subject of both his last will and
land held by a testament and the project of partition of
possessor, personally his estate among his heirs — in such
or through his manner as to remove the same from the
predecessors-in- public domain under the Cariño and
interest, openly, Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the
continuously and predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May
exclusively for the 1937, he transmitted no right
prescribed statutory whatsoever, with respect to the said
period (30 years under property, to his heirs. This being the
the Public Land Act, case, his possession cannot be tacked
as amended) is to that of the private respondents for
converted to private the latter's benefit pursuant to Section
property by the mere 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
lapse or completion of alternative ground relied upon in their
said period, ipso jure. application . . .
(Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate xxx xxx xxx
Court, supra)
Considering that the private
It is obvious from the foregoing rule respondents became American citizens
that the applicant must prove that (a) before such filing, it goes without
the land is alienable public land and (b) saying that they had acquired no vested
his possession, in the concept above right, consisting of an imperfect title,
stated, must be either since time over the property before they lost their
immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis
and Susi, or for the period prescribed supplied)
in the Public Land Act. As to the latter,
this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v.
Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration
adopted the rule enunciated by the of title not merely because they were American citizens
Court of Appeals, per then Associate at the time of their application therefor. Respondents
Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-
an applicant for registration under interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
Section 48 of the Public Land Act must manner that the property has been segregated from
secure a certification from the public domain; such that at the time of their application,
Government that the lands which he as American citizens, they have acquired no vested
claims to have possessed as owner for rights over the parcel of land.
more than thirty (30) years are
alienable and disposable. It is the In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly
burden of the applicant to prove its natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
positive averments. acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof,

acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the
prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-
interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private
respondents have constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by
respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this
case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in
their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions,
to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above
quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then
1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his citizenship may be a transferee
of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa
may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed
into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a
private land up to a maximum area of
one thousand square meters, in the
case of urban land, or one hectare in
the case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail
of the privilege herein granted;
Provided, That if both shall avail of the
same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns
urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be
a transferee of an additional urban or
rural lands for residential purposes
which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the
present, no other law has been passed by the legislature
on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition
of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP
185.
Page 10 of 27
Even if private respondents were already Canadian
citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed
above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof
by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains.
The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer
form part of the public domain. They are already private
in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural
land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of
a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer
Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered
the parcels of land in question. What is important is that
private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land,
they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
Considering that private respondents were able to prove
the requisite period and character of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the
requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by
private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6,
which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements
provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private
land shall be transferred under this
Act, unless the transferee shall submit
to the register of deeds of the province
or city where the property is located a
sworn statement showing the date and
place of his birth; the names and
addresses of his parents, of his spouse
and children, if any; the area, the
location and the mode of acquisition of
his landholdings in the Philippines, if
any; his intention to reside
permanently in the Philippines; the
date he lost his Philippine citizenship
and the country of which he is
presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under
Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6
of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said
requirements are primarily directed to the register of
deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much
less implied, that the requirements must likewise be
submitted before the land registration court prior to the
approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land
registration court should not be confused with the
issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It
is only when the judgment of the land registration court
approving the application for registration has become
final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is
the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
the register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is
submitted to the office of the register of deeds for
issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the

applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no participation in
the approval of the application for registration of title as
the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
93 Phil. 827
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals holding that the sale in question is valid and,
even if it were invalid, plaintiff cannot maintain the
action under the principle of pari delicto.
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee
Hun a parcel of land, together with the house erected
thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for
the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession
of the property under a contract of lease entered into on
the same date between the same parties. Alleging that
the sale was executed subject to the condition that the
vendee, being a Chinese citizen, would obtain the
approval of the Japanese Military Administration in
accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by
the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not
been obtained, and that, even if said requirement were
met, the sale would at all events be void under article
XIII, Section 5, of our Constitution, the vendor instituted
the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila seeking the annulment of the sale as well as the
lease covering the land and the house above mentioned,
and praying that, once the sale and the lease are
declared null and void, the vendee be ordered to return
to vendor the duplicate of the title covering the property,
and be restrained from in any way dispossessing the
latter of said property.
Defendant answered the complaint setting up as special
defense that the sale referred to in the complaint was
absolute and unconditional and was in every respect
valid and binding between the parties, it being not
contrary to law, morals and public order, and that
plaintiff is guilty of estoppel in that, by having executed a
deed of lease over the property, he thereby recognized
the title of defendant to that property.
Issues having been joined, and the requisite evidence
presented by both parties, the court declared both the
sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissed the
complaint. The court likewise ordered plaintiff to turn
over the property to defendant and to pay a rental of P50
a month from August 1, 1945 until the property has
been actually delivered. As this decision was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, plaintiff sued out the
present petition for review.
One of the issues raised by petitioner refers to the
validity of Seirei No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943 by the
Japanese authorities which prohibits an alien from
acquiring any private land not agricultural in nature
during the occupation unless the necessary approval is
obtained from the Director General of the Japanese
Military Administration. Petitioner contends that the sale
in question cannot have any validity under the above
military directive in view of the failure of respondent to
obtain the requisite approval and it was error for the
Court of Appeals to declare said directive without any
binding effect because the occupation government could
not have issued it under article 43 of the Hague
Regulations which command that laws that are
municipal in character of an occupied territory should be
respected and cannot be ignored unless prevented by
military necessity.
We do not believe it necessary to consider now the
question relative to the validity of Seirei No. 6 of the
Japanese Military Administration for the simple reason
Page 11 of 27
that in our opinion the law that should govern the
particular transaction is not the above directive but the
Constitution adopted by the then Republic of the
Philippines, on September 4, 1943, it appearing that the
aforesaid transaction was executed on February 2, 1944.
Said Constitution, in its article VIII, section 5, provides
that "no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines", which provisions are
similar to those contained in our present Constitution.
As to whether the phrase "private agricultural land"
employed in said Constitution includes residential lands,
as the one involved herein, there can be no doubt
because said phrase has already been interpreted in the
affirmative sense by this court in the recent case of
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil., 41, wherein this
court held that "under the Constitutionaliens may not
acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
residential lands." This ruling fully disposes of the
question touching on the validity of the sale of the
property herein involved.
The sale in question having been entered into in violation
of the. Constitution, the next question to be determined
is, can petitioner have the sale declared null and void
and recover the property considering the effect of the law
governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of
necessity be in the negative following the doctrine laid
down in the case of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et
al. vs. Uy Hoo, et al., 88 Phil., 103, wherein we made the
following pronouncement: "We can, therefore, say that
even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution, or
the doctrine in the Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale in
question, they are now prevented from doing so if their
purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily
parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that what
they were doing was in violation of the Constitution.
They cannot escape this conclusion because they are
presumed to know the law. As this court well said: 'A
party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.' The rule is
expressed in the maxims: 'Ex dolo malo non oritur
actio,' and 'In pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis.' (Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and
Hanopol, 40 Phil.210, 216.)"
The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In
Pari Delicto. This is well known not only in this
jurisdiction but also in the United States where common
law prevails. In the latter jurisdiction, the doctrine is
stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no
suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to
recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the
money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation.
The rule has sometime been laid down as though it were
equally universal, that where the parties are in pari
delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to
one against the other." (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,
Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 728.)
It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important
limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is considered
as advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief
against the transaction" (idem, p. 733). But not all
contracts which are illegal because opposed to public
policy come under this limitation. The cases in which
this limitation may apply only "include the class of
contracts which are intrinsicallycontrary to public policy,
contracts in which the illegality itself consists in their
opposition to public policy, and any other species of
illegal contracts in which, from their particular
circumstances, incidental and collateral motives of
public policy require relief." Examples of this class of
contracts are usurious contracts, marriage-brokerage
contracts and gambling contracts. (Idem. pp. 735-737.)
In our opinion, the contract in question does not come
under this exception because it is not intrinsically
contrary to public policy, nor one where the illegality

itself consists in its opposition to public policy. It is
illegal not because it is against public policy but because
it is against the Constitution. Nor may it be contended
that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be
tantamount to contravening the fundamental policy
embodied in the constitutional prohibition in that it
would allow an alien to remain in the illegal possession
of the land, because in this case the remedy is lodged
elsewhere. To adopt the contrary view would be merely to
benefit petitioner and not to enhance public interest.
The danger foreseen by counsel in the application of the
doctrine above adverted to is more apparent than real. If
we go deeper in the analysis of our situation we would
not fail to see that the best policy would be for Congress
to approve a law laying down the policy and the
procedure to be followed in connection with transactions
affected by our doctrine in the Krivenko case. We hope
that this should be done without much delay. And even
if this legislation be not forthcoming in the near future,
we do not believe that public interest would suffer
thereby if only our executive department would follow a
more militant policy in the conservation of our natural
resources as ordained by our Constitution. And we say
so because there are at present two ways by which this
situation may be remedied, to wit, (1) action for
reversion, and (2) escheat to the state. An action for
reversion is slightly different from escheat proceeding,
but in its effects they are the same. They only differ in
procedure. Escheat proceedings may be instituted as a
consequence of a violation of article XIII, section 5 of our
Constitution, which prohibits transfers of private
agricultural lands to aliens, whereas an action for
reversion is expressly authorized by the Public Land Act
(sections 122, 123 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No.
141).
In the United States, as almost everywhere else, the
doctrine which imputes to the sovereign or to the
government the ownership of all lands and makes such
sovereign or government the original source of private
titles, is well recognized (42 Am. Jur., 785). This
doctrine, which was expressly affirmed in Lawrence vs.
Garduño, G. R. No. 16542, and which underlies all titles
in the Philippines, (See Ventura, Land Registration and
Mortgages, 2nd ed., pp.2-3) has been enshrined in our
Constitution (article XIII). The doctrine regarding the
course of all titles being the same here as in the United
States, it would seem that if escheat lies against aliens
holding lands in those states of the Union where
common law prevails or where similar constitutional or
statutory prohibitions exist, no cogent reason is
perceived why similar proceedings may not be instituted
in this jurisdiction.
"Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty, and
rests on the principle of the ultimate ownership by the
state of all property within its jurisdiction." (30 C.J.S.,
1164)
"* * * In America escheats belong universally to the state
or some corporation thereof as the ultimate proprietor of
land within its Jurisdiction," (19 Am. Jur., 382.)
"An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of
property to the stae, which takes place when the title
fails." (Delany vs. State, 42 N. D., 630, 174 N. W., 290,
quoted in footnote 6, 19 Am. Jr., 381.)
"As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased
by an alien, it would more properly be termed a
'forfeiture' at common law." (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
"In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the estate
into the general property of the state because the tenant
is an alien or because he has died intestate without
lawful heirs to take his estate by succession, or because
of some other disability to take or hold property imposed
by law." (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
With regard to an action for reversion, the following
sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141 are pertinent:
Page 12 of 27
"SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to
corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
therefor by their charters."
"SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance,
royal decree, royal order, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the
public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies
organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition
shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition
by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged
and legalized by competent courts; Provide, further, That
in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally
capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of
this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations
shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements
to others so capacitated within the precise period of five
years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the
Government."
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation,
transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation
of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and
eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and
twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful
and null and void from its execution and shall produce the
effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent,
or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State."
Note that the last quoted provision declared any
prohibited conveyance not only unlawful but null and
void ab initio. More important yet, it expressly provides
that such conveyances will produce "the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or
permit, originally issued, recognized of confirmed,
actually or presumptively", and of causing "the reversion
of the property and its improvements to the State." The
reversion would seem to be but a consequence of the
annulment and cancellation of the original grant or title,
and this is so for in the event of such annulment or
cancellation no one else could legitimately claim the
property except its original owner or grantor the state.
We repeat. There are two ways now open to our
government whereby it could implement the doctrine of
this Court in the Krivenko case thereby putting in force
and carrying to its logical conclusion the mandate of our
Constitution. By following either of these remedies, or by
approving an implementary law as above suggested, we
can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution
regarding our natural resources without doing violence
to the principle of pari delicto. With these remedies open
to us, we see no justifiable reason for pursuing the
extreme unusual remedy now vehemently urged by
the amici curiae.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the sale in question
is null and void, but plaintiff is barred from taking the
present action under the principle of pari delicto.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed without
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 119682 January 21, 1999
FRANCISCO BAGUIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICARDO T.
MICHAEL, in his capacity as Heir-Successor of WILLIAM
MICHAEL, SR., and as President of MICHAEL
SLIPWAYS, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, of Mandaue City, nullifying Free
Patent No. 7757 and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-
15457 issued in the name of petitioner Francisco
Baguio.
The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land,
consisting of 5,870 sq. m., in Catarman, Liloan, Cebu.
Known as Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823, the land was
declared by the government public land in 1963.
The evidence shows that, on August 2, 1963, private
respondent Ricardo Michael's predecessor-in-interest,
William Michael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an
application for foreshore lease of the land. The
application was recommended for approval by the land
investigator who also recommended that the applicant be
granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one
year from October 4, 1963 to October 3, 1964.
On October 8, 1963, by virtue of a permit granted to him
by the Bureau of Lands, William Michael made some
reclamation on the land, built a fence around the
premises, and constructed a bridge over a portion which
was under water. Upon the expiration of the permit on
October 4, 1964, the Highways District Engineer
recommended to the Director of Lands that the land be
leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land
investigator recommended granting Michael the
authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the
completion of the reclamation made by him on the
premises. On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a
miscellaneous sales application covering the reclaimed
foreshore land.
On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the
Bureau of Lands for a free patent covering the same
land. In his application, petitioner stated that the land
was agricultural land and not claimed or occupied by
any other person and that he had been in actual and
continuous possession and cultivation of the same. On
the basis of these representations, a free patent was
issued to him and, on January 10, 1978. Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name
by the Register of Deeds of Cebu.
On April 6, 1978, petitioner demanded payment of
rentals from William Michael for the use of the land
occupied by Michael Slipways Inc.. On August 4, 1981,
petitioner filed an opposition to Michael's miscellaneous
sales application covering the land on the ground that he
was the registered owner thereof.
William Michael in turn protested the issuance by the
Bureau of Lands of a free patent to petitioner. He
claimed that he had been in actual possession of the
land since 1963 and that he had introduced substantial
improvements thereon.
On February 16, 1989, upon the recommendation of the
Land Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the government,
represented by the Director of Lands, filed a petition for
Page 13 of 27
cancellation of title and/or reversion of land against
petitioner Baguio and the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The
case case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City which granted private respondent Ricardo
Michael leave to intervene as heir and successor-in-
interest of William Michael and as president of Michael
Slipways, Inc.
On July 20, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision
canceling the free patent and the certificate of title of
petitioner Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land to
the public domain, and declaring private respondent
Michael the true and lawful occupant of the land. The
trial court ruled that the false statements made by
petitioner Baguio in his application for free patent had
the effect of ipso facto canceling the free patent and the
title of petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
February 28, 1995, affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that —.
1. The public respondent erred in not
declaring that respondent Republic of
the Philippines action was already
barred by prescription.
2. Granting arguendo that respondent's
action was not barred by prescription,
nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court,
erred in finding that petitioner "acted in
bad faith and procured the issuance of
the Free Patent (VII-I)-7757 and the
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457
through fraud and misrepresentation.
3. Granting arguendo that respondent
Republic's action should prosper,
nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court
erred in "(d)eclaring intervenor (private
respondent herein) as the true and
lawful possessor and occupant of the
land subject of the intervention.
4. The Regional Trial court erred in
finding that the land in question is a
foreshore land.
We find these contentions to be without merit.
First. It is true that, once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land
covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain
and becomes private property, and the Torrens Title
issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of issuance
of such patent.2 However, as held in Director of Lands v.
De Luna,3 even after the lapse of one year, the State may
still bring an action under §101 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 for the reversion to the public domain of land
which has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.5 Such action is not barred by prescription,
and this is settled law. 6
Indeed, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot
be invoked by one who procured the title by means of
fraud.7 Public policy demands that one who obtains title
to public land through fraud should not be allowed to
benefit therefrom.8
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in
finding that he was guilty of fraud in procuring the
issuance of the free patent and the corresponding
certificate of title. He insists that what he stated in his
application for free patent (that the subject land is
agricultural land not claimed or occupied by persons
other than himself and that he had been in actual and
continuous possession and cultivation of the same) were
all true. He also assails the finding of the trial court that
the subject land is foreshore land.

Petitioner puts in issue the findings of fact of the trial
court. But the only errors which are reviewable by this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals are those allegedly committed by
the latter court and not those of the trial court.
Petitioner's assignment of errors is thus misplaced, and
for this reason, the petition should be dismissed.
Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. In the absence of any
showing of lack of basis for the conclusions made by the
Court of Appeals, this Court wiill not disturb the factual
findings of the appellate court.9 In this case, petitioner
has not shown that the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not supported by substantial evidence so as to justify
this Court in departing from the general rule which
regards the findings of the appellate court as final.
At any rate, we have decided to consider the issues
raised insofar as they are pertinent to the appellate
court's decision in order to put them to rest once and for
all.
In his free patent application, petitioner declared under
oath that the land in question was an agricultural land
not claimed or occupied by any other person; that he
had continuously possessed and occupied it; and that he
had introduced improvements thereon. These
declarations constitute fraud and misrepresentation. The
government has proven that, contrary to these
allegations, as early as September 2, 1963, i.e., thirteen
(13) years before the alleged entry of petitoner on the
land, private respondent's predecessor-in-interest,
William Michaell, had already filed a foreshore lease
application over the same; that on February 25, 1968.
William Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application
over the land; that since 1963 up to the present, private
respondent has been continuously in possession of the
land on which he has been operating a drydocking
service under the style of Michael Slipways, Inc.; and
that private respondent Ricardo Michael had made
improvements thereon consisting of the reclamation of a
portion of the land, the construction of the fence
thereon, and the construction of a bridge over a portion
under water. In addition, it has been duly established
that the land in question is foreshore land, not
agrcultural. The fact that the land is being used by
private respondent Ricardo Michael in his drydocking
operations is evidence that the land is foreshore land.
Moreover, there would have been no need to reclaim a
portion of the land if it had not been under seawater.
Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his
application for a free patent thus justifying the
annulment of his title. Sec. 91 of C.A. No. 141 (Public
Land Act) provides:
The statements made in the application
shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any concession,
title, or permit issued on the basis of
such application, and any false
statement therein or omission of facts
altering, changing or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in
such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of
the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or
permit granted. It shall be the duty of
the Director of Lands, from time to time
and whenever he may deem it
advisable; to make the necessary
investigations for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the material facts
set out in the application are true, or
whether they continue to exist and are
maintained and preserved in good faith,
and for the purpose of such
investigation, the Director of Lands is
Page 14 of 27
hereby empowered to
issue subpuenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and, if necessary, to obtain
compulsory process from the courts. In
every investigation made in accordance
with this section, the existence of bad
faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent
and illegal modification of essential
facts shall be presumed if the grantee
or possessor of the land shall refuse or
fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum lawfully issued by the
Director of Land or his authorized
delegates or agents, or shall refuse or
fail to give direct and specific answers
to pertinent questions, and on the basis
of such presumption, an order of
cancellation may issue without further
proceedings.
As already stated, the indefeasibility of a title does not
attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.
The registration of a patent under the Torrens System
merely confirms the registrant's title. It does not vest title
where there is none because registration under this
system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.10
Third. Petitioner assails the trial court's finding, as
affirmed by the appellate court, that private respondent
Michael is the true and lawfull possessor of the subject
land. He argues that private respondent, being a mere
heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael and
not the person who filed the foreshore lease and the
miscellaneous sales applications, has no right to the
land in dispute.
Suffice it to state that it was clearly proven that William
Michael had already been in possession of the land
under a provisional permit to occupy the same in 1963.
Petitioner applied for a free patent only in 1976, thirteen
(13) years later. In addition, William Michael had filed a
sales application covering the land in 1968, i.e., eight (8)
years before petitioner filed his free patent application.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore,
correctly held William Michael and private respondent
Ricardo Michael to be the true and rightful possessors of
the land in question. The fact that private respondent
Michael is merely the successor of the original foreshore
lease and sales applicant, William Michael, does not
make him any less entitled to the possession of the land.
Sec. 105 of the Public Land Act provides that, in case of
his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded in
his rights and obligations by his legal heirs with respect
to the land applied for or leased.11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 127833 January 22, 1999
TEODORO URQUIAGA and MARIA
AGUIRRE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE CASES and ANITA
CRISOSTOMO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
VICENTE CASES and ANITA CRISOSTOMO, spouses,
are the registered owners of Lot No. 6532 with an area of
26,152 square meters situated in Sicayab, Dipolog City,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-16635. They
acquired the property on 23 May 1969 pursuant to Sales
Patent No. 4511. It was originally designated as Lot No.

4443-B-1. On 15 January 1979 they caused the
subdivision of Lot No. 6532 into Lot No. 6532-A
containing an area of 6,275 square meters, and Lot No.
6532-B with an area of 19,877 square meters.
Thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-1424 and
T-1425 were issued for the two (2) lots.
Sometime in 1981 workers of petitioners Teodoro
Urquiaga and Maria Aguirre entered Lot No. 6532-B and
gathered nipa palms therefrom. Respondents called the
attention of petitioner Urquiaga regarding the intrusion
but the latter allegedly assured them that the incident
would not be repeated. However, on several occasions in
June 1984 workers of petitioners again entered the
premises of Lot No. 6532-B this time claiming that the
property was owned by petitioners. They further claimed
that the property was priorly owned and possessed
"since time immemorial" by the parents of petitioner
Maria Aguirre, Jose Aguirre and Cristina Gonzales.
Petitioner Aguirre allegedly took over the subject lot
when it was donated to her by her parents on 5
November 1955. On his part, petitioner Urquiaga
claimed possession of the lot in his capacity as
administrator thereof.
Private respondents Vicente and Anita attempted to
settle the controversy amicably. However, during the
conference before the Barangay Captain, petitioner
Urquiaga questioned the validity of private respondents'
title by ascribing actual fraud in its acquisition. As a
consequence, respondents filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court for quieting of title, recovery of
material possession, damages and preliminary
mandatory injunction.
On 14 August 1985 respondent spouses moved for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order against
petitioner Urquiaga on the ground that he constructed a
dike on the subject property. An ocular inspection by the
trial court confirmed their allegation. Consequently, on
28 August 1985 the trial court issued an order enjoining
petitioner Urquiaga and/or any of his representatives
and workers from further building a dike, a destroying
nipa palms or undertaking any activity that would alter
the status of Lot No. 6532-B.
But petitioners Urquiaga and Aguirre defied the trial
court as shown by the series of written manifestations
with accompanying pictures submitted by respondents:
(a) addition of height to existing dike on 10 September
1985; 1(b) construction of a new dike on 28 September
1985; 2 (c) continuation of construction of the same dike
on 14 October 1985; 3 (d) further continuation of
construction of the same dike on 24 October 1985;4 (e)
cutting down of nipa palms on 26 May 1986; 5 (f)
continuation of the cutting down of nipa palms on 17
June 1986; 6 (g) cutting down of a big piapi tree on 19
September 1986; 7 and, (h) further cutting down of nipa
palms on 27 November 1986. 8
On 13 January 1992 the trial court rendered judgment:
(a) declaring respondent spouses Vicente Cases and
Anita Crisostomo as the absolute and lawful owners and
possessors of Lot No. 6532-B without prejudice to the
provisions of Sec. 90, par. (i), of the Public Land Act as
amended; 9 (b) finding respondents' documents and titles
over Lot No. 6532-B valid and binding, more particularly
TCT No. T-1425, OCT No. P-16635, Patent Award and
sketch map of Lot No. 6532; (c) ordering petitioners to
pay jointly to respondents P5,000.00 representing the
damages sustained by respondents' nipa plantation,
P2,000.00 which was equivalent to the amount
petitioners realized from the nipa palms taken out of the
lot in question, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
P1,000.00 as litigation costs; and, (d) dismissing the
counterclaim of petitioners for lack of merit. 10
Petitioners appealed. Private respondents likewise
appealed due to the failure of the trial court to grant
Page 15 of 27
them their prayer for moral damages of
P500,000.0011 and actual damages of P150,000.00.12
On 31 July 1996 respondent Court of Appeals modified
the decision by deleting the award of actual damages for
lack of proof and explanation on the basis thereof;
instead, it ordered petitioners to pay jointly and severally
to respondents P20,000.00 as nominal damages and
another P20,000.00 for moral damages. The rest of the
judgment was affirmed. 13 On 19 December 1996
reconsideration of its decision was denied by the
appellate court.14
Petitioners now come to us maintaining that respondents
acquired title over Lot No. 6532-B through fraud and
misrepresentation. They contend that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession thereof
long before World War II, which possession has now
ripened into ownership, and that respondents are not
entitled to any award of damages.
We find no reversible error committed by respondent
Court of Appeals. We sustain private respondents'
ownership of Lot No. 6532-B. As between the verbal
claim of ownership by petitioners through possession for
a long period of time, which was found by the court a
quo to be inherently weak, and the validly documented
claim of ownership of respondents, the latter must
naturally prevail. As succinctly observed by respondent
Court of Appeals in assessing the totality of the evidence
-
We do not agree with defendants that
they are also the occupants and
possessors of the subject lot just
because it "is adjacent to their titled
property." Precisely, the boundaries of
defendants' titled property were
determined, delineated and surveyed
during the cadastral survey of Dipolog
and thereafter indicated in their
certificate of title in order that the
extent of their property will be known
and fixed. Since the subject lot was
already found to be outside their titled
property, defendants have no basis in
claiming it or other adjacent lots for
that matter. Otherwise, the very
purpose of the cadastral survey as a
process of determining the exact
boundaries of adjoining properties will
be defeated.
Defendants' own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357
(in the names of Jose Aguirre and
Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their
claim of occupation and possession
over the adjacent subject lot.
Examining said title, we note that: (1)
the cadastral survey of Dipolog was
conducted from January, 1923 to
November, 1925; (2) defendants' titled
property was one of those lots surveyed
and this was designated as Lot No.
2623; (3) during the survey, it was
already determined and known that Lot
No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast,
southeast, southwest and west by Lot
No. 4443 (as we have seen in our
narration of facts, the subject lot is a
subdivision lot of Lot No. 6532 which
was originally identified as Lot No.
4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.:
hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot
No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357 was
issued on October 11, 1965 on the
strength of the judgment rendered on
July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte

in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that
as early as January, 1923 when the
cadastral survey was started, the
boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443
were already determined and
delineated. Since the subject lot was
surveyed to be part of Lot No. 4443, it
means that during that time
defendants' predecessors-in-interest
never claimed ownership or possession
over the subject lot. Otherwise, they
would have complained so that the
subject lot could be excluded from Lot
No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623,
they being adjacent lots. It is obvious
then that defendants' predecessors only
claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued
their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until
O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to them.
The contention of defendants that they
and their predecessors-in-interest
occupied and possessed the subject lot
since time immemorial therefore is not
true.
The judgment of the CFI of Zamboanga
del Norte on July 15, 1941 in Cadastral
Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No.
756 with respect to Lot No. 4443
further negates defendants' claim over
the subject lot. The dispositive portion
of the judgment provides:
In view of the
foregoing, Lot No.
4443 is hereby
ordered subdivided by
specifically delimiting
the perimeter of the
seven-are (sic) portion
thereof occupied by
Elena Casellon and
her children which is
the only elevated and
dry portion of the
whole lot, and this
portion shall be
marked as Lot No.
4443-A . . . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The remaining portion
of this lot 4443 shall
be numbered Lot No.
4443-B and same is
hereby declared public
land with communal
forest belonging to the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
In the above judgment, the only
claimants of Lot No. 4443 were a
certain Elena Casellon and her
children. However, they were only
adjudged to be entitled to a portion
thereof, designated as Lot No. 4443-A.
The remaining portion, Lot No. 4443-B,
was then declared public land. This
judgment was never amended,
supplemented, or modified.
Consequently, there is no doubt that at
the time plaintiffs filed their sales
application, the subject lot was still
public land.
Page 16 of 27
Moreover, in connection with the sales
application of plaintiffs, verification,
investigation and inspection were
conducted by representatives of the
Bureau of Lands. As a result thereof,
the subject lot was found to be free
from any private claim, hence open to
disposition according to law.
Thus, in view of the fact that
defendants' predecessors were never in
possession of the subject lot, the claim
of defendants that said lot was part of
the land donated by Jose Aguirre to
defendant Maria Aguirre is without any
basis. What We find is that the lot
actually donated was Lot No. 2623.
This is shown by the fact that on
October 29, 1986, while this case was
pending before the lower court,
defendants caused the annotation of
the Deed of Donation on O.C.T. No. 0-
357. On that same day, defendants also
presented to and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Dipolog City a
Deed of Sale dated September 20, 1986
executed by defendant Aguirre in favor
of her co-defendant Urquiaga. As a
consequence thereof, O.C.T. No. 0-357
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-5662 was directly issued
to defendant Urquiaga. This act of
defendants in using the Deed of
Donation to transfer ownership over Lot
No. 2623 is an acknowledgment on
their part that it is actually this lot
which Jose Aguirre donated to
defendant Aguirre.
It is clear that the subject lot was
public land at the time plaintiffs filed
their sales application. Thus, the
Director of Lands had jurisdiction to
act on the sales application and to
eventually issue the order of award and
issuance of patent after he was
satisfied that the requirements of law
were complied with. 15
Petitioners' claim of ownership over Lot No. 6532-B
stands on quicksand and its alleged roots do not actually
exist. The parents of petitioner Maria Aguirre could not
have possessed the subject lot for a long duration
because as early as January 1923 when the cadastral
survey was started they did not claim any right much
less interest thereto. Neither were they claimants in the
cadastral case. On the other hand, respondents' avowal
of ownership is supported by a certificate of title issued
on account of a sales patent duly awarded by the
Director of Lands.
Even assuming that private respondents acquired title to
Lot No. 6532-B through fraud and misrepresentation, it
is only the State which may institute reversion
proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land
Act 16 considering the finding that the subject lot was
public land at the time of the sales application. This law
provides -
Sec. 101. — All actions for reversion to
the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall
be instituted by the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
In other words, petitioners have no standing at all to
question the validity of respondents' title. Respondent
court cannot be faulted when it held -

Defendants' claim that
plaintiffs committed
actual fraud in
obtaining their title
need not be passed
upon. It was already
shown that
defendants have no
right or interest over
the subject lot, it
being public land
when plaintiffs filed
their sales
application. Hence,
they have no
personality to
question the validity
of plaintiffs' title.
Granting, for the sake
of argument that
plaintiffs indeed
committed fraud, it is
the State, in a
reversion case, which
is the prayer party to
file the necessary
action. The State has
not done so and thus,
we have to uphold the
validity and regularity
of plaintiffs'
title.17
Again, we uphold respondent court for awarding nominal
and moral damages and affirming the awards for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses against
petitioners. Respondents are entitled to the following: (a)
nominal damages 18 and P20,000.00 for violation or
invasion of the right of respondents as owners of subject
property and disregard of the restraining order of the
trial court, demonstrated by petitioners and their
workers in obstinately intruding into, building a dike
and destroying nipa palms thereon; (b) moral
damages 19 of P20,000.00 for the mental anguish
suffered by respondents due to such unlawful acts; and,
(c) attorney's fees 20 of P5,000.00 and litigation
expenses 21 of P1,000.00 since respondents were
compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their
ownership over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 July 1996
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court dated 13 January 1992 is AFFIRMED.
Respondents Vicente Cases and Anita Crisostomo are
declared the absolute and lawful owners and possessors
of Lot No. 6532-B; TCT No. T-1425, OCT No.
P-16635, the Patent Award and the sketch map of Lot
No. 6532 are declared valid, binding and regular; and
petitioners are ordered to pay respondents jointly and
severally P20,000.00 as nominal damages, P20,000.00
as moral damages, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 as litigation expenses. Costs against
petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 131277 February 2, 1999
Spouses FRANCISCO and ANGELA C. TANKIKO and
Spouses ISAIAS and ANITA E.
VALDEHUEZA, petitioners,
vs.
JUSTINIANO CEZAR, EUGENIO ENDAN, BONIFACIO
ACLE, EUSEBIO ANTIG, JULIO ASENERO, PILAR
ARBOLADURA, JUANA BALISTOY, APOLINARIO
BAHADE, REMEGIO CAGADAS, TEODORO CAGANTAS,
ALEJANDRO DE LA CERNA, NILO DE LA CRUZ,
REMEDIOS F. COLLERA, TERESITA COLLERA,
ANASTACIO DAGANDARA, HEIRS OF SOTERO
Page 17 of 27
ESCOLANA represented by LUZ ESCOLANA, HEIRS OF
FELICISIMO EXCLAMADO represented by ALFREDO
EXCLAMADO CARLOS GOMEZ, ELEUTERIO GUIWAN
HEIRS OF TEODORO JANDAYAN represented by
MARINA ANAYA VDA. DE JANDAYAN, HEIRS OF
GUILLERMO NARISMA, IGNACIO OPAON, ANTONIO
PALMA, ELADIO RAAGAS, HEIRS OF MARTIN
RODRIGUEZ represented by LUZMINDA RODRIGUEZ
ABEJARON, RUFINO SUMAMPONG, HEIRS OF
ASUNCION TACDER represented by EUSEBIO ANTIG,
DOMINGO TORDILLO, LUCIANO UAYAN and JULIO
WALAG, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Equity may be invoked only in the absence of law; it may
supplement the law, but it can neither contravene nor
supplant it.
Statement of the Case
This principle is stressed by this Court in granting the
Petition for Review on Certiorari before us seeking the
nullify of the April 16, 1997 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 in CA-GR CV No. 50025 and its October 13,
1997 Resolution denying reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
considered, the appealed decision is
SET ASIDE and another one entered
allowing plaintiffs-appellants to stay in
the premises pending final termination
of the administrative proceedings for
cancellation of defendants-appellees'
titles and final termination of the action
for reversion and annulment of title. Let
notice of lis pendens be annotated on
Original Certificate of Title Nos. T-
55515 and T-55516.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished
to the Director of Lands and the Office
of the Solicitor General for the
administrative investigation of plaintiff-
appellant's complaint and [for] the
eventual filing of the petition for the
cancellation of defendants-appellees'
title [to] be initiated, expedited if still
pending, and resolved without further
delay. 2
By the foregoing disposition, the Court of Appeals
effectively reversed the February 9, 1995 Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 17,
which disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the complaint filed in this case against
the defendants by the plaintiffs should
be, as it is hereby ordered, DISMISSED,
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
defendants are hereby declared as
owners of the property in litigation as
evidenced by their certificates of title
covering their respective portions of Lot
No. 3714 and the plaintiffs, who are
now possessing and occupying said
parcel of land, are hereby ordered to
vacate the same within ninety (90)
days, so that the defendants can take
possession of their respective portions
and enjoy the same as owners thereof.
 Page 18 of 27

The counter-claims are, likewise, decision has been

dismissed for failure to prove the same. rendered in Cadastral
Costs against the plaintiffs. 4 Case No. 18; G.L.T.O
Record No. 1562
Hence, this recourse to this Court.5 adjudicating Lots Nos.
3714 and 3715 in
favor of Patricio
The Facts Salcedo married to
Pilar Nagac. (Exh UU
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case and VV). If there was
are as follows: such a decision it
would have been with
the records of the
. . . Plaintiffs-appellant [herein Land Registration
respondents] are the actual occupants Commission
and residents of a portion [of land] inasmuch [as] the
consisting of 1 ha. 7552 sq. m. decree was issued
(Appellants' Brief, p. 28, Rollo) of the only on December 13,
controverted lot, Lot No. 3714 of the 1977 so that decision
Cadastral Survey of Cagayan was still available on
[(]Cadastral Case No. 18, L.R.C. Rec. that date.
No. 1562[)] with the improvements
thereon, situated in the Barrio of
Lapasan, City of Cagayan de Oro . . . On the contrary, it
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED was the decision
TWENTY SIX THOUSAND ONE rendered in Epediente
HUNDRED AND TWELVE (126,112) (sic) Catastro No. 18,
SQUARE METERS, more or less G.L.R.P Record No.
(Exhibit "2"; Records, pp. 12-13). 1562, entitled,
"Commonwealth De
Pilipinas, Solicitante,
Plaintiffs-appellants are miscellaneous Antonia Abaday, et al.
sales patent applicants of their Reclamantes,"
respective portions of the rendered on December
aforedescribed lot occupied by them 19, 1940 which was
[(]some as far back as 1965[)] and have found. This decision
been religiously paying taxes on the shows that Lots Nos.
property. The action for reconveyance 3714 and 3715 were
with damages filed before the Regional declared public lands.
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan (Exh. WW-2). Said
de Oro City springs from the fact that decision, rendered by
the lot in question [(]Lot 3714[)] had Judge Ricardo
been titled under Original Certificate of Summers, reads,
Title No. O-740 issued by the then among others.
Land Registration Commission on
December 13, 1977 in the name of
Patricio Salcedo married to Pilar Nagac. xxx xxx xxx
Said OCT was issued pursuant to
Decree of Registration No. N-168305 in Lote No. 3714 —
accordance with a decision of the Declarado terreno
Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. publico por haber sido
18, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1562 dated reclamado
August 6, 1941 penned by the Hon. unicamente por los
Lope Consing (Pre-Trial Brief for Directores de Terrenos
Defendant Spouses Francisco and y Montes.
Angela Tankiko and Spouses Isaias and
Anita Valdehueza, Records, p. 258).
Subsequently, separate titles (Transfer Lote No. 3715 —
Certificates of Title NO. T-55515 and T- Declarado toreno
55516) were issued to defendant- publico por haber sido
appellee Tankiko after the latter reclamado
purchased Lots 3714-B, 3714-C of the unificamente porlos
subdivision plan from the Heirs of Directores de Terrenos
Patricio Salcedo represented by Atty. y Montes. (Exh WW-2-
Godofredo Cabildo, their attorney-in- A).
fact. In turn, defendant-appellee
Francisco Tankiko sold Lot 3714-C to . . . (Emphasis
defendant-appellees Isaias and Anita Supplied)
Valdehueza.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff-appellants contest the
existence of the Consing decision and The Court notes that
cite the decision of the Hon. Eulalio Original Certificate of
Rosete dated April 18, 1980 [in] Civil Title No.
Case No. 6759 involving the [O-]740 covers not
neighboring lot (Lot No. 3715) likewise only Lot 3715, but
(formerly) covered by OCT O-740 which also Lot No. 3714, a
makes the following observation parcel of land which
regarding Lot 3714: has been occupied
and [is] now being
There is no record used by the Don
showing that a Mariano Marcos
 Page 19 of 27

Polytechnic College. Cabildo as attorney-in-fact of the

Before this College, Salcedos (pp. 4298-430, Record).6
the Misamis Oriental
School of Arts and Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Trades, has been
occupying and using
the Lot No. 3714 since The Court of Appeals (CA) found that Patricio Salcedo did
before the war. This not acquire any right or title over the disputed land and,
lot was also declared consequently, did not transmit any registrable title to
public land by the herein petitioners. Never presented as evidence was any
Cadastral Court in copy of the Consing Decision, which had allegedly
Expediente Catastro authorized the Decree of Registration of the property in
No. 18 G.L.R.O. favor of Patricio Salcedo. Evidence also shows that the
Record No. 1562, land that Patricio Salcedo succeeded in registering in his
because only the name had been previously declared public land on
Directors of Land and December 19, 1940, in Expediente Cat. No. 18 penned
Forestry were the by Judge Ricardo Summers. Under the Regalian
claimants (Exh WW-2- Doctrine, no public land can be acquired by private
A). It would seem persons without a grant from the government; since
therefore that Original petitioners did not present any evidence that Patricio
Certificate of Title No. Salcedo had acquired the property from the government
[O-]740 is likewise as a favored recipient — by homestead, free patent or
void ab initio as sales patent — said property could not have been
regards this lot. But, acquired by him.
this Court cannot
make any As the property in dispute is still part of the public
pronouncement on domain, respondents are nor the proper parties to file an
this lot because it has action for reconveyance, as they are not owners of the
not been admitted for land, but only applicants for sales patent thereon.
determination. However, equitable considerations persuaded the CA to
allow plaintiffs-appellants to remain on the land in
(Records, pp. 41-43) question, so that future litigation may be avoided.

In the course of the presentation Statement of the Issues

plaintiffs' evidence in this appealed
case, the parties submitted a In their Memorandum, petitioners claim that the CA
stipulation of facts (Records, pp. 392, erred in its ruling on the following issues:
427, 429) wherein the parties admitted
the existence of Civil Case No. 6646,
Regional Trial Court Branch 24, 1. Respondents' legal personality to
Misamis Oriental; and the Decision- sue;
Adjudicando Lotes No Controvertidos
rendered by Judge Ricardo Summers in 2. Decree of Registration;
Expediente Cat. No. 18 G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 1562 on December 14, 1940 which 3. Petitioners as innocent purchasers
shows on page 6 thereof that Lot 3714 for value;
was "declarado terreno publico".
However[,] defendants asserted that Lot
3714 was subsequently adjudicated to 4. Allowing respondents to stay in the
and ordered registered in the name of premises; and
Patricio Salcedo pursuant to Decree of
Registration No. 168305 issued on 5. Prescription.7
August 6, 1941 by Judge Lope Consing
but the Original Certificate of Title No.
O-740 was actually issued only on This Court believes that the pivotal issue in this case is
December 13, 1977. Parties further whether the private respondents may be deemed the
stipulated to the existence of Civil Case proper parties to initiate the present suit.
No. 6759 referring to the neighboring
Lot 3715 and the decision rendered The Court's Ruling
therein supra declaring null and void
Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 The petition is meritorious.
as regards Lot No. 3715 and containing
the opinion that OCT-O740 was
likewise void respecting Lot No. 3714; Main Issue: Personality to Sue
the existence of Civil Case No. 89-243
entitled Heirs of Bartolome Calderon, et Although the respondents had no personality to file the
al. vs. Salcedo, et al. which was action for reconveyance with damages, the Court of
terminated by a Judgment on Appeals still ruled that the particular circumstances of
Compromise Agreement recognizing this case necessitated the exercise of equity jurisdiction,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 4744 in in order to avoid leaving unresolved the matter of
favor of the Heirs of Bartolome possession of the land in question.
Calderon over a 750 square meter
portion of the land covered by OCT No.
O-740; the existence of tax declarations On the other hand, petitioners insist that respondents
and tax receipts of the plaintiff; the had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, because they
existence of OCT No. O-740 over Lot were not the owners of the land but mere applicants for
3714, Subdivision Plan of Patricio sales parent thereon. Therefore, petitioners argue that
Salcedo over Lot 3714, Extra-judicial respondents, not being the real parties in interest, have
Settlement of [the] Estate of Patricio no legal standing to institute the Complaint in the trial
Salcedo, and the Special Power of court.
Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo

We agree with petitioners. The Court is not persuaded
that the circumstances of this case justify the exercise of
equity jurisdiction that would allow a suit to be filed by
one who is not a real party in interest.
First, equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the
basis of the action filed and the relief sought, has a clear
right that he seeks to enforce, or that would obviously be
violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of
standing. In the present case, respondents have no clear
enforceable right, since their claim over the land in
question is merely inchoate and uncertain. Admitting
that they are only applicants for sales patents on the
land, they are not and they do not even claim to be
owners thereof. In fact, there is no certainty that their
applications would even be ruled upon favorably,
considering that some of the applications have been
pending for more than ten years already.
Second, it is evident that respondents are not the real
parties in interest. Because they admit that they are not
the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales
patents thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is
public in character and that it should revert to the State.
This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act
categorically declares that only the government may
institute an action to recover ownership of a public
land. 8 In Sumail v. CFI, 9 a case involving facts identical
to the present controversy, the Court held that a private
party had no personality to institute an action for
reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, viz.:
Under section 101 above reproduced,
only the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead may bring the action
for reversion. Consequently, Sumail
may not bring such action or any
action which would have the effect of
cancelling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued
on the basis thereof, with the result
that the land covered thereby will again
form part of the public domain.
Furthermore, there is another reason
for withholding legal personality from
Sumail. He does not claim the land to
be his private property. . . .
Consequently, even if the parcel were
declared reverted to the public domain,
Sumail does not automatically become
owner thereof. He is a mere public land
applicant like others who might apply
for the same.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, 10 every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest. It further defines a "real party
in interest" as one who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit. In Joya v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, this Court explained
that "legal standing means a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of . . . the act being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the
interest of the party must be personal and not one based
on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party." 11
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in
interest must be dismissed. Thus, in Lucas v.
Durian, 12 the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent
was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently,
prayed for the annulment of said patent and the
cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared
that the proper party to bring the action was the
government, to which the property would revert.
Page 20 of 27
Likewise affirming the dismissal of a Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v.
Heirs of Alivio 13 noted that the plaintiff, being a mere
homestead applicant, was not the real party in interest
to institute an action for reconveyance. In Gabila v.
Bariga, 14 the Court further declared:
The present motion to dismiss is
actually predicated on Section 1(g),
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of
Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, for it alleged in
paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff
admits that he has no right to demand
the cancellation or amendment of the
defendant's title, because, even if the
said title were cancelled or amended,
the ownership of the land embraced
therein, or the portion thereof affected
by the amendment would revert to the
public domain. In his amended
complaint, the plaintiff makes no
pretense at all that any part of the land
covered by the defendant's title was
privately owned by him or by his
predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is
admitted therein that the said land was
at all times a part of the public domain
until December 18, 1964, when the
government issued a title thereon in
favor of the defendant. Thus, if there is
any person or entity in relief, it can
only by the government.
Verily, the Court stressed that "[i]f the suit is not brought
in the name of or against the real party in interest, a
motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action." 15 In fact, a final
judgment, may be invalidated if the real parties in
interest are not included. This was underscored by the
Court in Arcelona v. CA, 16 in which a final judgment was
nullified because indispensable parties were not
impleaded.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for
reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being the
owners of the land but mere applicants for sales parents
thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit.
Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in
such suit.
Indeed, "[f]or all its conceded merits, equity is available
only in the absence of law and not as its replacement.
Equity is described as justice which legality, which
simply means that it cannot supplant although it may,
as often happens, supplement the law." 17 To grant
respondent standing in the present case is to go against
the express language of the law. Equity cannot give them
this privilege. Equity can only supplement the law, not
supplant it.
Having resolved that the respondents have no legal
standing to sue and are not the real parties in interest,
we find no more necessity to take up the other issues.
They shall become important only if a proper suit is
instituted by the solicitor general in the future.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 91-241 before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 17, is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Magallona vs Ermita
The Antecedents
 Page 21 of 27

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA
3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed
the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying,
among others, the sovereign right of States parties over
their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was
left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960
(UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046
remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for
legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA
5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting
RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change
was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS
III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and
sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a
legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be,
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine
maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article
1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy,
and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s
treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To
buttress their argument of territorial diminution,
petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded
and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of
Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of
regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised
threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for
judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack
of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality
of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA
9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of
UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG
or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522
does not undermine the country’s security, environment
and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’
claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under
international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what
Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of
Paris were the islands and all the waters found within
the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the
Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus
standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and
prohibition are the proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is
unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners
possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2)
the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the
merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522
unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus
standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition
alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by
the passage and implementation of RA 9522.
Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as
citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the
resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly
raises issues of national significance necessitating
urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of
RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other
litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest"
to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements
for granting citizenship standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary
grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the
offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting
that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents
and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil
proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional
power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition,
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper
remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of
statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no
bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry
such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court
inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of
the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-
compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here
is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
 Page 22 of 27

to Demarcate the Country’s Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and
Maritime Zones and Continental drying reefs of the archipelago."24
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role
in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large diminution of territory. Under traditional international
portion of the national territory"21 because it discards the law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under through occupation, accretion, cession and
the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on
encoded in the definition of national territory under the the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones
that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized governed by the rules on general international law.26
at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly
ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine of Regime of Islands to Determine the
sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
of Paris.22 Over these Areas

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or
loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination
of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine
lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours
could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial
sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article
47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest
of the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which
States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),
the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine
territory embraces the islands and all the waters within
the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way
to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III.
The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or
other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS
III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines,
and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime
zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over
that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and
Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine
archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about
15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters,"
prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A
comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn
under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime
space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading
of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under
UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046
and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location
of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and
thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under
RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside
of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the
wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a
statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the
KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this
purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square
nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the
contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime
space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
miles, as shown in the table below:29
Extent of maritime
Extent of
area using RA 3046, as
area using
amended, taking into
taking into
account the Treaty of
UNCLOS III
Paris’ delimitation (in
nautical mile
square nautical miles)
Internal or
archipelagic waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive
Economic Zone 382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the
exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even
extends way beyond the waters covered by the
rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic
zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be
a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies
outside Philippine territory because the baselines that
RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA
9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which
the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted
under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough
Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Page 23 of 27
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires
that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III
requires that "the length of the baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%)
of the total number of baselines which can reach up to
125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed
sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal
for several decades, these outlying areas are located at
an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest
of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough
Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we
put them inside our baselines we might be accused of
violating the provision of international law which states:
"The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila
sa atin although we are still allowed by international law
to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our
configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by
the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline.
Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas,
that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa
ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na
sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang
dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong
dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi
na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that
it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew
exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the
location of basepoints using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to
enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its
maritime zones including the extended continental shelf
in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As
defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf
(from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point)
is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the
maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of
the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length
of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total
number of baselines enclosing any archipelago
may exceed that length, up to a maximum
length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At
least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted

from the baselines system. This will enclose an
additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from
maps existing in 1968, and not established by
geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of
the points, particularly along the west coasts of
Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-
water line and drying reefs as prescribed by
Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision
to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
"‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance
of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water
at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of "regime of islands," whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its
failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in
North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446,
which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for
drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial
sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this
Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522,
petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
"converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear
and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under
Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters"
under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it
and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III
affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air
space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and
subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State
extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with
article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed
Page 24 of 27
and subsoil, and the resources contained
therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic
waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise
by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over
such waters and their air space, bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the
operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law
principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in
the competent discharge of their constitutional powers,
may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for
sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law
norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations
and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the
right of innocent passage is a customary international
law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of
Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international
law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic
waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser
footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage
rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for
their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed
by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own
maritime zones, placing the waters between islands
separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the
States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to
the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional
provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as
mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling
legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve
as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing
legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions
of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated
the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under
Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present
petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed
constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners
cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article
XII, Section 2, paragraph 251 ) and subsistence

fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by
RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the
Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS
III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III,
the international community will of course reject it and
will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the
Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new
rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the
resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional
freedom of navigation of other States that attached to
this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive
text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of
UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option
belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the
luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep
price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is
measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first,
it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it
weakens the country’s case in any international dispute
over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law
for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines
in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
Cruz vs Secretary
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this
suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules). chanrobles virtual law
library
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court
required respondents to comment.[1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement
its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment
to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality
of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for
lack of merit. chanrobles virtual law library
Page 25 of 27
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the
view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part. chanrobles virtual law library
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors,
composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier,
et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. Theyin
the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition. chanrobles
virtual law library
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is
an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that
the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed. chanrobles virtual law library
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon,
et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition
and mandamus be dismissed. chanrobles virtual law
library
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted. chanrobles virtual law
library
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999.
Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during
the hearing. chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution: chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides
that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous
peoples; chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which
defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains; chanrobles virtual law library

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands; chanrobles virtual law library
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein
for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 25 years; and chanrobles virtual law library
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation.2 chanrobles virtual
law library
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3 chanrobles virtual law
library
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the
IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
and making customary law applicable to the settlement
of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.[4 chanrobles virtual
law library
These provisions are: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and
which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands; chanrobles
virtual law library
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain
and upon notification to the following officials, namely,
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates; chanrobles virtual law
library
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and chanrobles virtual law library
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples.5 chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1998, which provides that the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
for purposes of policy and program coordination. They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents
Page 26 of 27
power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6 chanrobles
virtual law library
Petitioners pray for the following: chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58,
59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional and invalid; chanrobles
virtual law library
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease
and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules; chanrobles
virtual law library
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998; chanrobles virtual law
library
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and chanrobles
virtual law library
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
comply with his duty of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.7 chanrobles virtual law
library
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of
the Court voted as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan
filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiagoin, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice
Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and
should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy
and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371. chanrobles virtual law
library
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8,
and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must
await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also
filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De
Leonin in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban
and Vitug. chanrobles virtual law library
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
 Page 27 of 27

voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule

56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition
is DISMISSED. chanrobles virtual law library

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the

separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban. chanrobles virtual law library