Persons and Family Relations Case Digests

DUNCAN VS. GLAXO

G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004

Facts: Petitioner, Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative. The Contract of employment signed
by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose
to managementany existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees
with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of
interest, to resign from the company. Company’s Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation
that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or
preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur- Camarines Norte area and
entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo’s competition. Before getting
married, Tecson’s District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took
place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him of conflict of interest. Tecson asked for time
to comply with the condition. Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter
to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered
its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed
with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. Upon
appeal for petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for
Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. Hence, the petition.

issue: Whether or not policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor
companies is a valid exercise of management prerogatives

Ruling: Yes.Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature
might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect
its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion
and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in
January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to
Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love you,” “I miss
you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001
complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating
with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings.
Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene,
Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila
where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that
when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.

Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall
not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any
crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334 of
the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any
other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART.
XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he
as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ablaza v. Republic, G. R. 158298, August 11, 2010

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and B.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to
such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code?

RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation
demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted
from the limitation, to wit:

Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under
the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was
the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Bolos vs Comelec Case Digest

Barangay Officials, Operation of Law, Term of Office, Three-Term Limit, Voluntary

Renunciation
Facts:

Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms
(1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He
assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as a councilor he
filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.

Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same office, filed a petition for
disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three term hence no
longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43
(b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991. Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of
the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his
personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added
that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post
as Punong Barangay.

In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his
post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of his last term of service. Pending the resolution of the case before the Comelec, Bolos Jr. won in
the election.

The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the
maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to run for the same office. It further ordered
that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the
Local Government Code.
Issue:

Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos when he assumed
the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms.

Held:

The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that
the sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next
regular election of barangay officials.

Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term.
In Lonzanida vs. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the
clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms,
satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to
have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as
Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking,
Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on
July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.

When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed
resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an
intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was
very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and
proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is
voluntary.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post
as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay.

The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact that
rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected." Black's Law
Dictionary also defines it as a term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities,
devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law,
without the act or cooperation of the party himself.

In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his
office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan
member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay. (Bolos
vs Comelec, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009)

In Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No.

150677, June 5, 2009, the Supreme Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband and
the wife were in a common law relationship for 18 long years, had 3 children, and then got married. The
husband subsequently filed a petition for annulment of marriage based on his wife’s alleged psychological
incapacity.

Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage,
before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in 1975,
1978 and 1984) and established a business.

On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of the nullity
of his marriage with Lorna. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal
requisites. He also claimed that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: Lorna failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him;
did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical, and
psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and refused to enter
into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him.

The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of November 8, 1999. The RTC concluded
that Lorna was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her martial obligations.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological incapacity. According to the CA, Lorna’s
character, faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’
marriage. The CA reasoned out that while Lorna “appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and
loving wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA
further added that although Lorna’s condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an
“Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and
permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying with obligations essential to
marriage.

The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when the latter came home late was “a
normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with
him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him. Finally, the
CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the psychological disorder does
not meet the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the case of Molina.

Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated October 18, 2001.

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Ramon failed to
establish Lorna’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did
not give much credence to the testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. According to the Supreme
Court:

Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not
sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place,
the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner
whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and
interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her
reading may not at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist
appeared at the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono. While this
circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony,
and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.

In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions”
disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are
from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, rather
than a running account of the respondent’s life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see
her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable. . .
 As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and
begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level of stability in the
relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her
Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications business – traits that do not at all indicate an
irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict with employees and in
business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage
Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the
relationship between the petitioner and respondent was going well,and future marriage between the two was not
an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents.”

The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological disorder was incurable:

. . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s behavioral disorder was
medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the
psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. . .

In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause
should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.” In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse “snapshots” of
the respondent’s life showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her
permanent incapacity to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave
rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the
marriage was celebrated.

Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the evidence, psychological incapacity was not
proved:

Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very human
faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the
respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and
incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support
promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one’s situation and on
one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.
When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways.
This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses
only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the
parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy.

GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013 Abbas vs Abbas

Digest
GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Abbas vs Abbas

Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family
Code.

Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on December
1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the
ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until
Gloria told him that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at Carmona,
Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family Code is
the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).

Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the absence of the essential
and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which are solemnized without
a license are void from the beginning in exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and testimonies to prove
the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him
and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter
filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there
being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.

Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in
a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological incapacity—void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously contracted
marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy. Strong reservation on the
ruling that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is contracted before th judicial declaration
of its nullity). Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of marriage. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:

a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage

b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a mental state may not be so
readily evident

c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void

AILEEN A. FERANCULLO, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, JR., Respondent

A.C. No. 7214

November 30, 2006

Tinga, J
FACTS:

Petitioner Aileen Ferancullo filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent, Atty. Sancho
M. Ferancullo, Jr. The two met in February 2004 when petitioner was referred to respondent as she was in need
of legal aid concerning a string of complaints for estafa filed against her. Soon after, the two started their
romantic relationship when allegedly ended up to their marriage on August 4, 2004. In an information filed by
the petitioner, respondent Ferancullo allegedly took advantage of their attorney-client relationship to extort
money from her in consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into
marrying him by concealing his previous marriage.

ISSUE: WON the respondent be suspended or disbarred from being a member of the bar.

RULING:

The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage certificate plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between
respondent and complainant on 4 August 2004, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. The marriage certificate should prevail over respondent’s claim that the marriage certificate
or his signature therein was falsified.

Respondent’s intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It is a time-honored rule that good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.
Thus, the Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is adequate to penalize respondent for his grossly
immoral conduct.

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)

Tenchavez vs. Escaño

FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before
a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two were
unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left
for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.”
A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an
American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31
May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to
which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was
still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband
without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce,
and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s
feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a
decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters written before the suit had
begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence
of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.

WOLFGANG ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez,
a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in
Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987,
respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted to the father.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the
present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?

RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined
by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity
to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who
has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr.
Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
CATINDIG, Respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage
produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain
a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States and both
lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic
which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her
marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be intervenor in
Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?

RULING:
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully
married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved
the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless
of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his
or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless
of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize
such absolute divorce. Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated
abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA,
Respondents.
FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter,
they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years
of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope
in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City
against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the
respondents on the ground of bigamy?

RULING:

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American
citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void
ab initio.

SAN LUIS V. SAN LUISFebruary 6, 2007

(Under Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage)

Two consolidated cases:

Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis, Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad San LuisBackground:The case involves
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his lifetimeFelicisimo contracted three marriages.
From the first marriage contracted in 1942 he had six children, twoof whom are the petitioners in this case. His
first wife died in 1963 and his second marriage to anAmerican citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in
1971. In 1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, therespondent in this case, in the USA. They had no children but
lived together for 18 years until Felicismodied in 1992.After Felicisimo¶s death, Felicidad sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets andfiled a petition for letters of administration. The children of
Felicisimo from his first marriage opposedthis on the grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second
marriage to the American wife subsisting.The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family
Code cannot be given retroactive effectto validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimo¶s legitimatechildren (Article 256 of the Family Code).Issue/Held/Ratio:

Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration?

YES.Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code, there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis in the case of

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

[oo nalang kung di niyo maalala ito, guys]where it was held that a Filipino spouse should no longer be
considered married if the alien spouse validlyobtains a divorce outside of the Philippines. [Remember that in
Van Dorn the Court applied thenationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code] Indeed, in cases like Quita
v. Dandan and Republicv. Orbecido III [again, kung di niyo maalala, oo nalang, haha] it was pointed out that
Par. 2, Article 26 of the Family Code traces its origins to the ruling in Van Dorn.

However,

since Felicidad failed to presentthe necessary evidence to prove the divorce decree (recall Garcia v. Recio: copy
of the law, final decreeof absolute divorce) as well as her marriage solemnized in California, the case is
remanded to the trialcourt for further reception of evidence.

Ev

en assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad

, Felicidad still haslegal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule
79 provides (in part) that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an

interested person.

Felicidad qualifies as an interested person with direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their 18-
year cohabitation. If she proves the validity of the divorce but fails to prove her marriage, she may beconsidered
a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. If she fails to prove the validity of both thedivorce and the
marriage, Article 148 of the Family Code would apply. Article 148 states that coupleswho are incapacitated to
marry but still live together as husband and wife have co-ownership over properties acquired during their
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.*Note: There is another issue raised here, but I don¶t
think Ma¶am will care about it. Felicidad filed the petition for letters of administration in Makati. Petitioners
claimed it should have been filed in Laguna,where the deceased was governor, interpreting ³residence´ as
³domicile.´ The SC did not uphold this,interpreting ³resides´ in Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court to mean
³actual or physical habitation of a person, not legal residence or domicile.

Bayot vs CA G.R. No. 155635

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a
child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed as
Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No.
406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity,

docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental
orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage
between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one, being
born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting
American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her
marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's
property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree
duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone,
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In
determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
HAD8J5EKCNKC

Facts: A became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. a later married

B a Filipino. A worked abroad and when he came back to see B, B was
having an affair. A filed a petition for Divorce in Canada which was granted.

A fell in love with C. A went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (“NSO”) informed him that the
marriage between him and B still subsists. To be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.

RTC- A was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED
CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can
avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, ¶2 of the Family Code.1

Issue: WON Art. 26, ¶2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Held: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, ¶2 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
FILIPINO SPOUSE.

Art. 26, ¶2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art.
26, ¶2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without Art. 26, ¶2, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond.
An action based on Art. 26, ¶2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Lolita Enrico vs Heirs of Spouses Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Medinaceli, Represented by Vilma
Articulo

G.R. No. 173614

September 28, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli was married on June 14, 1962 during their marriage they begot 7
children,herein respondents, Edward, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.During his
marriage with Trinidad, Eulogio lived, openly and publicly, together with one Lolita Enrico (petitioner)and their
union begot 2 children .On May 1, 2004 Trinidad died. Subsequently Eulogio married Lolita on August 4, 2004.
Eulogio died on February10, 2005.

In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the

requisitemarriage license.

Respondents posited further that petitioner’s marriage with their father does not fall under emarriages

that are exempt of the license requirement. . To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of
lack of m

arriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.

As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contractingparties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.On 11 October 2005,
the RTC issued granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action based on A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC in Section 2, par.(a). On Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, RTC reversed its decision andreinstated
the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in

Niñal v. Bayadog.

Petitioner filedfor Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the RTC.Petioner file a Petiton for Certiorari
in the Supreme Court.

Issues:
Which rule in Assailing Nullity , Voiding and Annulment of Marriage applies in the case at bar?

Ruling:

We grant the Petition. In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC
acted

with grave abuse of discretion.We cannot apply the decision in the case of

Niñal

for the reason that the impugned marriage therein wassolemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The Court in

Niñal

recognized that the applicable law to determinethe validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil
Code. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extend to those marriagesentered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.There is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC with the ruling in

Niñal,

because they varyin scope and application.While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may befiled solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without anyrecourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still questionthe validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse ina proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts

TY vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000

FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva both in civil and church ceremony. However, on
August 4, 1980, the marriage was declared null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The
church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Before the
decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty in civil and a church.
Reyes filed a civil case for his marriage with Ty to be declared null and void for having no marriage license
when they got married. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not yet been issued, thus, he was still married to Anna Maria.
Ty pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She
submitted their Marriage License issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question this
document.

The Pasig RTC sustained Reyes’ civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
initio. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals which ruled that a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted
and upheld the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered
into validly.

HELD
Art. 40 Family Code. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.

The Court finds that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case,
for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. Petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. So that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia
P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING

As for the payment of damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment, our laws
do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation

Alcantara vs Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They
met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day.
They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and that Restituto only filed
the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was celebrated, there
was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer”
who arranged everything for them. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was
a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This
certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the
absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the city or
municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he
was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly
and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste
or suited to his lifestyle (Alcantara vs Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007).

Ablaza v. Republic, G. R. 158298, August 11, 2010

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC Masbate a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother A and B.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to
such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil Code?

RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation
demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted
from the limitation, to wit:

Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under
the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was
the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petition

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013 Subject: Preliminary Provisions
of the Civil Code Topic: Effect and Applicability of Laws FACTS: In 2004, Respondent Benjamin Bangayan
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC of Manila. Benjamin alleged that in 1973, he married Azucena in Caloocan City and they had three
children; however, in 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally who was

a customer in the auto parts business owned by Benjamin’s

family. He further alleged that in 1981, Azucena left for the USA; and in 1982, he and Sally lived together as

husband and wife and had 2 children, Bernice and Bentley . Sally’s father was agains

t the relationship, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Benjamin claimed that Sally knew of his marital status and
assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children. During their cohabitation, they also acquired

several real properties, to wit: 1.

TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally; 2.

TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses; 3.

Condominium units CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and 4.
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. The relationship of
Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage /
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of
the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court, including
37 properties listed by Sally in her answer. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not bigamous, but was void nonetheless because of the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to th

e case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not

married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal
age and did not ask for support. On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37
properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that
Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by

Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advanced

inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go"
was merely descriptive of Benjam

in’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT

Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that
Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase.

While the RTC found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656,
and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783, it also ruled that TCT No.
61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The RTC further
ruled that these properties and the rest of the properties were part of the

conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his

conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding. The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to

Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited all of Sally’s share in f

avor of

Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena
. It is worthy to note that throughout the proceedings, Sally hardly produced her own evidence, instead insisting
that Benjamin, who was not around, should be put on the stand. On appeal, the CA mostly upheld the ruling of
the RTC, with the exception of a few properties, and that

Sallyy’s insistence on presenting Benjamin and failure to submit her own evidence amounted to a wa

iver of the right to present evidence. ISSUES: Did Sally validly waive her right to present evidence? HELD:

Yes. While “Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she

waived her right to present her evidence... [and] that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution... XXX
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to

have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure

to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed
with the case. XXX Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed by one of the parties

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano)
as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initiallyunder the Islamic
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage toEstrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and
non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personallaws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13
of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.”

MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001

FACTS:
Herminia Borja Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966. They had 4 children. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before Judge Sanchez. The Judge knew or ought
to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were “separated.”
In his comment, at the time he officiated the marriage the two had been living together as husband and
wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. Had he
known that Manzano was married he would have refused to solemnize the marriage

David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore”

ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of solemnizing a bigamous marriage?

HELD:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a legal impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time is
immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.

Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20, 000.

CHI MING TSOI vs. CA

256 SCRA 324

FACTS:
GINA LAO-TSOI and Chi Ming Tsoi got married on May 22, 1988. Distraught, Gina filed a petition for nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity premised on the following reasons:

There was no sexual intercourse between them on the first night or on the succeeding nights until they separated
in March of 1989;

That the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual;

Results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband’s examination was kept confidential up to this time.

Chi Ming Tsoi married her, to maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.

Chi Ming Tsoi does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons:

That there is no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;

If there are any differences between them, it can still be reconciled and that if either has some incapabilities,
there is no certainty that this will not be cured.

He admitted that since their marriage until their separation they had no sexual contact between them. He
reasoned was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse, his wife always avoided him. He forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation.

HELD:

Both defendant and appellant admitted that they did not have sexual relations after almost ten months of
cohabitation, when both are not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder.

“To procreate is based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation destroys the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity, since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time.

DOMINGO vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against petitioner
Roberto Domingo. They were married on November 29, 1976 unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with
one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing. She came to know of the
prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlinda sued for bigamy.

Since January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia while he has been unemployed
and dependent. Out of her personal earnings, she purchased properties amounting to P350k, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto. In June 1989, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman and he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent.

The petition prayed that 1. temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; 2. their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and 3. Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact—Moises Avera, her brother

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required for the purpose of remarriage. It is necessary for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his partner was not lawfully married thus
free from being charged with bigamy.
The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated while the former’s previous marriage was still subsisting,
thus, bigamous and void ab initio.

Law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes.

There is no need for a separate action of partition of property because it will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

FACTS:

Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed of a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
They were married on April 14, 1985 and begot a son, Andre O. Molina was born. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money. He depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.

Reynaldo was relieved of his job and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner. In October 1986 the
couple had a very intense fight, which resulted to their estrangement until Reynaldo finally abandoned them.
Roridel desires to have the marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.

Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that
their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to Roridel’s strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances.

The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years. The petitioner is not asking support or for damages.
Their common child is in the custody of the petitioner.
ISSUES:

Are opposing and conflicting personalities equivalent to psychological incapacity?

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

The present case, does not show that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more
of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.

Here is the guideline for psychological incapacity to be established:

(The Molina Doctrine)

Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

SIN vs. SIN

G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001

FACTS:
An appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sin’s petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.

January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin, a
Portugese citizen, were married. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed for annulment which was
dismissed June of the following year. She appealed and again dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Florence was given a fair trial.

HELD:
Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose
Danilo C. Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found
no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. The Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates:
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

Decision of the trial court as “prematurely rendered” since the investigating prosecutor was not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the
importance of the participation of the State.

Supreme Court declined to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province of the
trial court upon proper re-trial.

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524

FACTS:

Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate
of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the
grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.

The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors
his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence
this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision
declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld.

ISSUE:

In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail?
Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?

Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:

Petition dismissed

Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in
relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared
null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect
at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between
the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The
fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided
for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by
legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other
hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the

annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes
express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.

The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which
provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and
children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be
covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of
voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson MarcosG.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 20003

rd

Division

FACTS:

Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and hadfive children. After the
downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in1987. Consequently, due to the
respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful employment, theywould often quarrel and the respondent would
hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for
annulment of marriage assailingArt. 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to be
psychologicallyincapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
thedecision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos’ failure to find work to support his familyand his violent attitude
towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children constituted psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The court ruled the negative.

RATIONALE:

The totality of the respondent’s acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There
is absolutely no showing that his “defects” werealready present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Article 36 of theFamily Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time thecauses therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
partyeven before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as todeprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is aboutto assume.

POLICY:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may beestablished by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that therespondent should be examined by a physician or
a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:

On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two
children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family
without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear
again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would
return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July
1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of
evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only
witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing
whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the
investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under
Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision
was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground
that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a
habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of
Article 36 of the Family Co de.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause
of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was
not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting
evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered
Antonio vs Reyes

Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after
their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in
December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not
conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family.
They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null
and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological
incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable
of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have
been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of
nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
NICDAO CARIÑO VS YEE CARIÑO

Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001

[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Co-ownership
regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships; Article 40 - Judicial
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two children. He then
married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as
"death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She
however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:

No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, which
refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due
to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint
contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not
owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs.
And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a
valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute
thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits
and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring
the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage
would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity
is necessary.

Categories: Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code, Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

BOBIS VS. BOBISG.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs.ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

TOPIC AS PER OUTLINE

G. Void Marriages > 1. Kinds of Void Marriages > (a) Bigamous and PolygamousMarriages

FACTS

Isagani Bobis contracted a second marriage in 1996 and allegedly, a third onewithout annulling, nullifying, or
terminating his first marriage in 1985.

Information for bigamy was filed against Isagani Bobis by his second wife, ImeldaMarbella-Bobis (petitioner)
in 1998

After which, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullityof his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

•
Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamyinvoking the pending
civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicialquestion and

to the criminal case of bigamy, to which the trial court had granted.

Imelda filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied

thus, her petition for reviewon

certiorari

before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

WON

the subsequent filing for a declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is aprejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.

HELD

NO,

the subsequent filing for a declaration of nullity of a previous marriage ISNOT a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.

RATIO

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previousmarriage before a party may remarry.

In light of Article 40 of the Family Code, Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validlyentered into the second marriage.

As ruled in

Landicho v. Relova
, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of beingprosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not besuspended on the ground of
the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.

In a recent case for concubinage, the SC held that the pendency of a civil casefor declaration of nullity of
marriage is not a prejudicial question. The rulingapplies to this case by analogy since both crimes presuppose
the subsistence of a marriage.

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declarationof nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.

TEVES V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188775, [August 24, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

FACTS:

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves
(Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the Philippines for
vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita
Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband (Cenon) and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006,
the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with
bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC on June 2006. However, during the pendency of the criminal case for
bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the case for bigamy
was decided) declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36, Family Code.
Said decision became final by a Certification of Finality issued on 27 June 2006. Petitioner Cenon appealed
before the CA contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had already been
extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, “there is in effect no
marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.”

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in
the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy
case was filed in court.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial
declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.

HELD:

YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case
for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous
marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage AT THE
TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

RATIO:

The instant case has all the elements of the crimeof bigamy under Art. 346 of the RPC. Thus, the CA was
correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November
1992. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001. At the time of his
second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five (5) years
after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the
essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage
is bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case
the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information
that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability
provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such
cannot be allowed.