STATCON Case No.
5 - SAM DOCTRINE:
Pedro G. Peralta vs. COMELEC
March 11, 1979 | Antonio, J. | Presumption of constitutionality
Petitioner: Pedro G. Peralta
Respondent: COMELEC
SUMMARY: The case involves six consolidated petitions assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1296 or
the 1978 Election Code which was enacted on February 7, 1978 by then
president Ferdinand E. Marcos. The court, in its deliberation, stated four
issues regarding the said decree, however, only the first one is relevant and
relative to the topic of the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. The
first issue, as stated in the case, is whether or not Section 140 and 155,
subparagraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, which grants the voter
an option to vote either individual candidates or to vote for all the candidates
of a political group by simply writing the name of the political party in the
spaces provided in the ballot. The petitioner alleged that said provisions are
violated 1.) Section 1 of Article IV, which is the Equal Protection Clause of
the Bill of Rights, of the 1973 Constitution and, in relation to 2.) Section
9(1) of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution, which states that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination. The petitioners contended that the optional straight
party voting provided for in the Code discriminates an independent
candidate in a sense that merely writing on his ballot the name of the
political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of such party,
an advantage the independent candidate does not have. Thus, the
independent candidate is deprived of the equal protection of the law. The
Court ruled that the provisions in question DO NOT violate the mentioned
sections of the 1973 Constitution. The Court, in their decision, invoked the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of the statute, stating that the
factual foundation to demonstrate invalidity must be established by the
litigant challenging its constitutionality. The Court further expounded
stating that the question of the validity of every statute is first determined
by the Legislative Department of the government and that an act of
legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations.
The Presumption of constitutionality – Based on Jurisprudence, every
statute is presumed valid and that questions of constitutionality shall be
construed liberally in favor of the statute. The burden of proof to prove
otherwise rests upon the one alleging its unconstitutionality. Further, there
must be clear and unequivocal proof of a statute’s unconstitutionality (It
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt). Moreover, in the process of
enacting a law, as joint act from the legislative and executive bodies of the
government, would have involved careful study and determination of
constitutionality before the enactment of such law.
Facts:
 Presidential Decree No. 1296 or the 1978 Election Code was enacted
on February 7, 1978
 The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of
the said Code, specifically Sections 140 and 155 thereof.
 The sections not only allowed voters to vote for independent
candidates by writing thier [candidate] names in the spaces provided
in the ballot but also allowed voters to vote for all the candidates in
a political party simply by writing the name of the political party in
the spaces provided in the ballot
 The petitioners contended that such provision violates Section 1 of
Article IV (Equal Protection Clause of the Bill of Rights, of the 1973
Constitution) and Section 9(1) of Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution, which states that bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
 The petitioners contended that the optional straight party voting
provided for in the Code discriminates an independent candidate in
a sense that merely writing on his ballot the name of the political
party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of such party,
an advantage the independent candidate does not have. Thus, the
independent candidate is deprived of the equal protection of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the sections in question are repugnant to the was the victim of discrimination. Hence, the provisions in question do not
Constitution. NO, THEY ARE NOT REPUGNANT TO THE violate Section 9(1) of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.
CONSTITUTION.

Held:

The Court held that the provisions in questions do not violate the
mentioned sections of the 1973 Constitution.

Ratio:

The provisions in question do not violate Section 1 of Article IV

(Equal Protection Clause of the Bill of Rights, of the 1973 Constitution)
because according to Jurisprudence, a reasonable classification based on
substantial distinctions, provided that said classification applies to all those
belonging to the same class do not violate the equal protection clause. In the
case at bar, an official candidate of an organized political party and
independent candidates belong to the same class. i.e. election candidates, and
there is a reasonable classification based on substantial distinction i.e. official
candidates of an organized political party are bound by the rules of said party
and are loyal to the party, its tenets, policies, platforms, and programs of
government. This is not present in independent candidates.

Further, the Court invoked the presumption of constitutionality in

favor of the statute, stating that the factual foundation to demonstrate
invalidity must be established by the litigant challenging its constitutionality.
The Court further expounded stating that the question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the Legislative Department of the government
and that an act of legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to
be within constitutional limitations.

Moreover, the Court stated that joining a political party is a

voluntary act (dependent on the discretion of the candidate). In making his
decision on whether or not to join a political party, the candidate must have
carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages
of either alternative. Thus, the court held that for as long as the application of
the rule depends on the discretion of the candidate, he cannot claim that he