Political Law Cases - Part1

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I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
A. Constitution: effectivity, definition, nature and concepts
De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)
De Leon, whose term as Barangay Captain was to expire on June 7, 1988, was replaced as Captain by
Governor Esguerra under the Freedom Constitution, which granted the Governor the power to appoint
successors to local government posts until Feb. 25, 1987. However, the Supreme Court held that the
power no longer existed upon effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. In turn, the 1987 Constitution
became effective on Feb. 2, 1987, when the plebiscite was held, and not when the results were
announced.
1. Interpretation of the Constitution
Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)
Francisco challenged the filing of a Second Impeachment Complaint within the same year against SC
Chief Justice Davide, Jr., on the ground that it was barred by Art. XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.
pals political law reviewer
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, and gave the following rules for the interpretation of the
Constitution:
1) Verba legis—whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
2) Ratio legis et anima—the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of the framers.
3) Ut magis valeat quam pereat—the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole.
2. Definition of State (to be related with PIL discussion)
CIR v. Campos Rueda (1971)
Campos Rueda died in Tangier, Morocco, an international zone in North Africa. The CIR assessed her
estate for deficiency taxes. Rueda’s defense was a tax treaty between Tangiers and the Philippines. The
Supreme Court held that Tangier was a state, defining such as “a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a
nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.”
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B. Parts
C. Amendments and revisions
In General (Art. XVII):

By Congress as Constituent Assembly
Gonzales v. Comelec (1967)
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be
held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held. Gonzales challenged the propriety
of the act.
The SC upheld RA 4913. Congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but the power to
amend the Constitution is not included. The power to amend is within the constituent power of the
people. The Congress possesses constituent power as it is a delegation of the people of their constituent
power.
By Constitutional Convention
Imbong v. Comelec (1970)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act was enacted by Congress acting as a legislative body. Imbong
challenged its constitutionality. The SC upheld the act. The power to enact the implementing details of the
Constitutional Convention -- as opposed to the exclusive authority of Congress as a Constituent Assembly
to call for the ConCon -- is within the competency of Congress exercising its comprehensive legislative
power, as long as the statutory details do not clash with any specific provision in the Constitution.
Congress continued to exercise its legislative powers even if it was already the Constituent Assembly and
it did not abandon its legislative duties.
By People’s Initiative
Santiago v. Comelec (1997)
Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation and
national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was
filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the constitutional
provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII § 2) required implementing
legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack
could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative authority
to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do
so under law.
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Completeness on its face
Lambino v. Comelec (2006)
Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via people’s initiative. However, his petition did
not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the
requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
To do otherwise would be deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there
should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their signature to the petition.
Submission of Proposed Amendments

Must be made as a whole. No piecemeal submission allowed.
Tolentino v. Comelec (1971)
The 1971 Constitutional Convention ordered the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment to lower the voting age without submitting the other amendments to the
Constitution for ratification. The SC held this to be unconstitutional.. The language of the 1973
Constitution’s provision on amendments is clear on the matter of how many “elections” may be held to
ratify any amendments proposed by a constituent assembly or constitutional convention: one. It is
important that the parts of the Constitution must have harmony as an integrated whole. In order for a
plebiscite for the ratification of amendments to be validly held, it must provide voters not only sufficient
time but means for said voter to intelligently appraise the nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to other parts of the Constitution with which it forms a whole.
D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

1. Self-Executing
2. Non-Self-executing
E. General provisions
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II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine
B. State immunity
C. General principles and state policies
2. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism
3. Adherence to International Law
4. Supremacy of Civilian Authority
5. Government as protector of People & People as Defenders of the State
6. Separation of Church and State
7. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines
8. A just and dynamic social order
9. Social justice
Calalang v. Williams (1940)
An ordinance was passed preventing animal-drawn vehicles from passing through certain thoroughfares.
Calalang challenged the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that it was a valid exercise of police power, in
the interests of social justice.
Defining Social Justice, it is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. It is the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measure calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the member of the community, constitutionally, through
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments. It is founded upon the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
Labor
Agrarian and natural resources reform
Urban land reform and housing
Health
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Oposa v. Factoran (1993)
Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme Court,
recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II § 16 of the Constitution. While it
is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less
important than any civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. Thus, those
provisions are self-executing.
Women
People’s organizations
Respect for human dignity and human rights
Education
Language
Science and technology
Arts and culture
The family
D. Separation of powers
E. Checks and balances
F. Delegation of powers
G. Forms of government
1. De jure v. De Facto
2. Presidential v. Parliamentary
3. Unitary v. Federal
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III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Who may exercise legislative powers

Congress
Delegation
To local governments
To the People through initiative and referendum
To the President under martial law rule or in a revolutionary government.
Sanidad v. Comelec (1976)
President Marcos, in exercise of his emergency powers, proposed amendments to the Constitution and
proposals to set up the machinery and procedures required for the ratification of his proposals by the
people. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad challenged the validity of the amendments, as the power to amend is
legislative. The SC upheld the amendments, because the governmental powers in a crisis government are
more or less concentrated in the President. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of
martial law is a valid act. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not
convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity
render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose constitutional
amendments.
Although the President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the
constitution, it is permissible to grant more powers to the President in times of emergency in the interest
of restoring normalcy.
Congress
The Senate
Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office
Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991)
Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM Governor.
He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as Representative, was not
able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as Representative again.
It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the
period that an official actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the
certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution
when he was prevented from re-assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may
not be extended or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may
be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer.
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The House of Representatives
Aquino v. COMELEC (1995)
Agapito Aquino filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 2 nd district of
Makati. However, it was shown that he had been a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac, for the previous 52
years. Ruling that Aquino was not a resident of Makati for the 1 year period required in the Constitution,
The Supreme Court held that the residence requirement in Constitution connotes domicile. Domicile is
the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, intends to return and remain. A person may have several residences
but just one domicile. An intention to return is established by determining (1) whether there was
abandonment of domicile of origin, and (2) whether there was establishment of permanent residence in
the district
District Representatives and questions on Apportionment and

Reapportionment
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC APPORTIONMENT-REAPPORTIONMENT case

RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro was assailed on
constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment legislation but that it involves the
division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment
legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4).
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes
in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
LEGISLATIVE CREATION, DIVISION,

APPORTIONMENT MERGER, ABOLITION,
ALTERATION OF
BOUNDARY OF LGUs
Constitutional Provision Article VI, Sec. 5 Article X, Sec. 10
Meaning Determination of the Concerned with
number of representatives commencement,
which a state, country or termination, and
other subdivision may send modification of an LGU’s
to a legislative body corporate existence and
territorial coverage
Requirement  Legislation providing  criteria established in
for apportionment Local Government
 “Each city with a Code
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population of at least  Approval by a

250, 000 shall have majority of the votes
one representative.” cast in a plebiscite in
the political units
affected
Result LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT LOCAL GOV’T UNIT
 No legal personality  Political subdivision
 Purpose:  Can discharge gov’t
representation functions
 Has political and
economic effects on
inhabitants
 Has own IRA; can
generate own
revenue
The Party List System
BANAT v. COMELEC (2009)

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation of party-list representatives released by the COMELEC, as well as the
formula being used. BANAT’s claims were that the 2% threshold is invalid, and that the 20% allotment to
party-list representatives is a mandatory requirement, not merely a ceiling.
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
The Supreme Court, granting the positions, laid down the following guidelines:
The Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters:
1. The 20% allocation---the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
2. The 2% threshold---only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. The three-seat limit--- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. Proportional representation---the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”
How to Allot Slots to Party List Representatives:
1. Find total number of Party List Representatives

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Following the Constitution, the total number of seats allocated to party list is in reference to the
seats for representatives of legislative districts. The combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party-list. This ceiling is provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(2).
2nd level of analysis: Allocation of Seats for Party List Representatives
The allocation of party list seats was left to the wisdom of Legislature. Congress enacted RA 7941
(Party List System Act).
Sec. 11, RA 7941:
1. Parties should be ranked from highest to lowest based on the number of votes garnered.
2. Parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast shall be entitled to one seat.
3rd level of analysis: Allocation of Additional Seats
The Court departs from the Veterans procedure in allocating additional seats. 2% threshold in 2nd
round of allocation is declared unconstitutional. The 2% threshold set by Veterans in the 2nd round of
allocation of seats prevents filling of the seats allocated for party list. The number of additional seats to be
allocated is
[Maximum number of seats for party list] -[guaranteed seats].
In allocating additional seats, even the parties who did not garner 2% could be entitled to
additional seats.
Procedure in second round of seat allocation:

1. Correct formula in determining the number of additional seats:
[Number of votes received/total number of votes] x Remaining available seats
2. Seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed.
3. 3-seat cap is applied to determine to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled.
Participation of major political parties in Party list elections
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. But, by a vote of 8-7, Court decides to continue with the ruling in Veterans, disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party list election.
NOTE: But in Atong Paglaum the Court laid down new guidelines on the participation of major
political parties as follows:
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ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (2013)
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a) national parties or organizations,
(b) regional parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party that field
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in

“well-defined political constituencies.”
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications
Salaries
Philconsa v. Mathay (1966)
Philconsa challenged the appropriation of salaries of the members of Congress set out in the GAA for
1965-1966, which had been increased the year before (1964). The controversy came because the
Senators who took part in the approval of the law would be in office until 1969. The SC agreed with
Philconsa. The “term” mentioned in the provision refers to the term of the Congress as a whole. Members
of Congress who approved the increase will not have the salary increase.
Freedom from Arrest – Article VI, Sec. 11

While Congress is in session (Art. VI, Sec. 15)
Martinez v. Morfe (1972)
An information was filed against Martinez for falsification of public documents, and 2 informations
Bautista for violations of the Revised Election Code. As members of the Constitutional Convention, they
invoked the protection of the Constitution against search and arrest against members of Congress.
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However, the SC held that Martinez and Bautista were not covered by the privilege. Parliamentary
immunity granted to the members of the legislature and the Constitutional Convention was never meant
to shield them from criminal liability, only to protect them from possible harassment. Any privileges
extended to the legislature should not harm the State. Immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace. Here, petitioners are charged with felonies; hence,
the immunity does not apply to them.
Speech and Debate
Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. He caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines, alleging that there
were plans to hold a coup d’état. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang for damages due to the
Cabangbang’s libellous statements. In response, Cabangbang invoked the parliamentary immunity from
suit.
The SC held that he was not entitled to the privileges. The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art.
VI § 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to
Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of
Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does
not include acts not connected with the discharge of their office.
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Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions

a. From holding any other office or employment in Government during term without forfeiting seat
b. From appointment to any office which may have been created or its emoluments increased during his
term
c. From personally appearing as counsel
d. From financial interest in any contract with, or in any franchise granted by the government during his
term
e. From intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office
Duties
f. Duty to Disclose
g. Full disclosure of financial and business interests
h. Notify the House of potential conflict of interest from proposed legislation of which they are authors
Flores v. Drilon (1993)

The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 that allowed the Mayor of Olongapo City to be
appointed as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was challenged on the ground that it
violated the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
The SC agreed and declared the provisions unconstitutional. Art. IX-B § 7 of the Constitution expresses
the policy against concentrating several public positions in one person, so that a public official may serve
full-time with dedication and efficiency. While the provision allows appointive officials to hold multiple
offices within limits, par. 1 for elective officials is more stringent in not allowing exceptions unless the
Constitution itself says so. While the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains
throughout his tenure/incumbency, the official may resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualifications. The respondent does not automatically forfeit his elective
office when he is appointed to another position.
Quorum and Voting Majorities
Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)
Senator Tañada invoked his right to speak on the Senate floor to formulate charges against then Senate
President Avelino. However, Avelino and his camp employed dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Tañada from delivering his piece. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder.
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Avelino banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his
followers.
The remaining members voted to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines
the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding
before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
On the issue of quorum, the SC held that as there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
(including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the
House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”.
There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
Cuenco, one against and one abstained
Discipline of Members
Osmeña Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)
Congressman Osmeña Jr made a privilege speech entitled, “A Message to Garcia,” in which he accused
Garcia of corruption. A Special Committee was formed through House Resolution 59, to investigate and
discipline Osmeña. Osmeña asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement
upon his parliamentary immunity through a petition for declaratory relief.
The SC denied his petition. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body.
Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Arroyo et al., all members of the HOR, claimed that there was a violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. They claimed that the passage of the bill was railroaded.
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The SC ruled that it did not have the power to inquire into allegations that Congress failed to comply with
its own rules while enacting a law when no constitutional provision or rights of private individuals were
violated. Within the limits of constitutional restraints, fundamental rights and a reasonable relation
between the means of proceeding and the intended results, all matters of methods for internal
procedures are open to the determination of the House and cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. There
was no grave abuse of discretion, only a matter of internal procedure.
Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)
A legislative inquiry was carried out regarding the “Hello Garci” tapes in relation to election fraud. The
propriety of the legislative inquiry was challenged based on the non-publication of the Senate rules of
procedure in accordance with Art. VI § 21.
The SC struck down the proceedings for lack of publication of the rules. It would be an injustice if a citizen
is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists of “publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines” (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law
shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered
invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According
to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and
regulations.
The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a
continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every
Senate.
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
Defensor-Santiago was preventively suspended by the SB for 90 days in accordance with RA 3019. She
assailed the SB’s authority to do so, claiming contravention of Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) which provides for
suspension only for 60 days max.
The SC held that the SB had the authority to suspend Santiago. Suspension in Art VI, Sec. 16(3) is different
from preventive suspension under RA 3019, Sec. 13. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and thus is
not a suspension under the purview of the Constitution.
De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)
De Venecia, as House Speaker, was cited in contempt of court for not implementing the preventive
suspension by Sandiganbayan against one of the House Members. While the Supreme Court held the case
moot and academic, since the term of the member expired while the case was pending, further
differences between Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) and RA 3019, Sec. 13 were discussed, to wit:
o Art. VI, Sec. 16(3):
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House-imposed sanction
Penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in proceedings
or vindicate honor and integrity
o RA 3019, Sec. 13:
 Prevent accused from influencing witnesses
 Prevent tampering with documentary evidence
 Prevent committing further crimes while in office
Sessions
Regular Sessions
Special Session
Restrictions
Adjournment for more than 3 days
As to venue
Emergency Sessions
Vacancy in Pres/ VPres office
Ability of President to discharge powers and duties of office
Presidential proclamation of martial law or suspension of habeas
corpus
Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments

Powers of Congress
White Light v. City of Manila (2009)
The City of Manila issued an ordinance disallowing the operation of motels as well as offering quick-time
rates. White Light as well as various other motels challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.
Agustin v. Edu (1979)
LOI 229 was issued by Pres. Marcos, recommending the enactment of local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs and devices. Upon constitutional challenge, the SC held there was no unlawful
delegation of police power.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of police power, there must be a standard which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down the fundamental
policy. The standard lays down the legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out boundaries, and specifies
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the public agency to apply it. With this standard, the executive or administrative agency designated to
carry out the legislative policy may promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
General Plenary Powers
Legislative Power
Substantive Limitations
Express Substantive Limitations
Bill of Rights
Appropriations
Taxation (infra)
Public Money in a Special fund
Increase of appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice
and concurrence
Granting title of royalty or nobility
Implied Substantive Limitations
Delegation of legislative powers
Criterion of valid delegation
Abakada Guro v. Exec. Sec. (2005)
The grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT under certain circumstances was
challenged for being undue delegation of legislative power, as VAT was not mentioned in Art VI, Sec 28.
The SC held that there was no undue delegation.
Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power to
ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law.
The criteria for valid delegation are that:
 Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate
 Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions
Undue delegation of legislative power
Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)
By virtue of several PDs, 33 municipalities were created. Pelaez challenged the constitutionality of their
creation. The SC agreed with him, ruling that while the power to fix common boundaries of adjoining
municipalities to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in nature, the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
The questioned statutes did not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power to fix details in
enforcing a law. They neither enunciated a policy to be implemented by the President nor gave a
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sufficiently precise standard to avoid the violation. The phrase “as the public welfare may require” is
so overbroad that it rests in the President a virtually unfettered discretion that is tantamount to a
delegation of legislative power. For the President to create municipalities will be for him to exercise the
power of control over local government units denied to him by the Constitution.
Proper delegation by express authority of the constitution
Delegation to the president to fix tariffs, rates, etc.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992)

EO 475 (reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% according to their
value, except for crude oil and other oil products which continue to have a 9% additional duty) and E.O.
478 (which laid a special duty on imported crude oil and oil products) were constitutionally challenged.
The SC upheld the validity of the EOs. Under Art. VI § 24 of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the legislative and not the executive
branch. Art. VI § 28(2) allows Congress to authorize the President to fix within specific limits, among
others, tariff rates and other duties. There is explicit constitutional permission to allow the E.O.s to be
issued. The Tariff and Customs Code also laid down sufficiently determinate benefits for the valid
delegation of legislative power.
Delegation to the President in times of war or national emergency
Delegation to Local government
Delegation of power to carry out defined policy to prescribe standards
Rafael v. Embroidery Board (1967)
RA 3137 (creating an embroidery and apparel control and inspection board and providing for a special
assessment to be levied upon all entities engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board) was
constitutionally challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
The SC upheld the law. Article XVI § 4 (2) sets a reasonable basis under which the special assessment may
be imposed. The true distinction between delegation of power to legislate and conferring of authority as
to the execution of the law is that the former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the
latter, the authority as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Osmeña v. Orbos (1993)
PD 1956, which empowered the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or
impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was established to reimburse ailing oil companies in the event of
sudden price increases. The decree was challenged on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
powers to the ERB.
18
The SC upheld the PD. The provision conferring authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petrol products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. The standard to
which the delegate of legislative authority has to conform may be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act, not only spelled out specifically. The challenged law sets forth a determinable standard that
governs the exercise of power granted to the ERB.
Promulgation of Internal Rules and Regulations
Prohibition Against Passage of Irrepealable Laws
Procedural Limitations (see part on Legislative process for more detail)
Oversight
1. Congressional Scrutiny
2. Congressional Investigation –
3. Legislative Supervision –
Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22)

Legislative Investigations
Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)
A legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong

estates was undertaken. During the Senate investigation, one witness, Arnault, refused to reveal the
identity of the representative of the vendor to whom he delivered money, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution holding Arnault in
contempt and ordered him imprisoned in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned. Arnault
petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
The SC did not issue the writ. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The question subject of the refusal for which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is not necessary for the legislative to show that every question
addressed to a witness is material to any proposed legislation, but it is required that each question be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation before the Committee is within
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness relates to the subject, obedience
to the process may be enforced by the Committee by imprisonment. The power to hold a non-member of
Congress in contempt is a power necessary to enable Congress to perform its function without
obstruction. Therefore, the Court finds no sound reason to limit such power which has already been
recognized as an appropriate auxiliary power of Congress.
19
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991)
A Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Investigation was commenced regarding Kokoy Romualdez’
participation in various corporations put up by the Marcoses. The investigation was started based on a
privileged speech delivered by Sen. Enrile. Bengzon, called as a witness, challenged the propriety of the
investigation.
The SC ruled that the investigation did not have a valid legislative purpose. Investigations must be in aid
of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure and must respect the rights of the
persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator Enrile’s privilege speech that prompted the
committee investigation contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a
possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction
of the courts rather than the legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee
to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court.
Senate v. Executive Secretary (2006)
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced, prompting the Senate to conduct public hearings to investigate the said anomalies. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to
speak before the committee as resource persons. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately. EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. EO 464 was challenged for
contravening the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
The SC held that it did. Executive privilege is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
and is one of the exemptions to the power of legislative inquiry. It exempts the executive from disclosing
information to the public, Congress and the courts. To determine the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only if the requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also if that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. Presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
(Question hour vs. legislative inquiry)
On the validity of § 1 of E.O. 464 (which applies specifically to heads of executive departments): the
required prior consent is grounded on Art. VI § 22 or what is known as question hour. ConCom records
show that it was considered distinct from inquiries in aid of legislation. In question hour, attendance is
meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory
question period, it becomes a greater imperative to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in
the performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department
heads can only exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President
on whom the executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power
20
is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For § 1, the requirement for Presidential
consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in
aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary.
Although some executive officials hold information covered by “executive privilege”, there can be no
implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive privilege before an
official would be exempt from the investigation.
Act as Board of Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections

Call special election for President and Vice-President
Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus and
declaration of martial law
Approve presidential amnesties
Confirm certain appointments
Cf. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18)
Concur in treaties (Senate)
Bayan v. Zamora (2000)
The VFA was challenged on the ground of Art. XVIII § 25 on military bases in the Philippines.
The presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines pursuant to the VFA is allowed under Art. XVIII § 25
for 2 reasons:
1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the U.S.
since it was attested and duly certified by a U.S. government representative. That it was not submitted for
advice and consent of the U.S. Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement/treaty recognized by the U.S. since it is a matter of internal U.S. law, where the U.S. submits to
its Senate policymaking agreements for advice or consent, while those that further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress within 60 days of ratification.
2. Joint R.P.-U.S. military exercises fall under the provisions of the earlier R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1951 that was signed and duly ratified with both countries’ senates concurring; the VFA is simply an
implementing agreement to the main Military Defense Treaty, so it was not necessary to submit it to the
U.S. Senate, but only to its Congress. This is why the U.S. certified it as a binding international agreement
(treaty) that substantially complies with Art. XVIII § 25.
21
Declaration of war and declaration of emergency powers

Be judge of president’s physical fitness
(16)Power of impeachment
(17)Amendment or revision of the Constitution (supra)
6. The legislative process
Requirement as to bills
As to title
Embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Lidasan v. Comelec (1967)
R.A. 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur) was challenged
for falling short of the constitutional requirement that bills shall embrace 1 subject that must be
expressed in the title.
The SC ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress
can not conglomerate under 1 statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be
couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title.
Complying with the second directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require Congress to
read a bill’s entire text during deliberations. For H.B. 1247/R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House.
The test of the sufficiency of a title a bill is whether or not it is misleading. If the language is so uncertain
that an average person reading it is not informed of its purpose, or if it is misleading by referring to one
subject when another is embraced in the act or by omitting any indication of its real subject/scope, it is
misleading. It is not required that the title use language of such precision that it fully catalogues all its
contents and minute details, but that it serves its constitutional purpose of informing all interested
persons of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws
Lutz v. Araneta (1955)
Commonwealth Act 567 Section provided for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar
on a graduated basis, while section 3 levied on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to
cultivating sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration a tax equivalent to the difference between
the value of the consideration collected and the amount representing 12% of the assessed value of the
land. The Act was challenged on constitutional grounds.
22
The SC upheld the Act. Commonwealth Act 567 was not purely an exercise of taxing power but was an
exercise of the police power, since tax was levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for
rehabilitating and stabilizing the threatened sugar industry. It is rational that the tax be taken from those
who will benefit when it is spent. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state is free to choose who to
tax.
Tan v. Del Rosario (1994)
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 (Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme)
amending certain provisions of the NIRC and RR No. 2-936 promulgated by respondent pursuant to RA
7496.
The SC upheld the RA. The contention that RA 7496 goes against the constitutional requirement that
taxation be uniform and equitable ignores that such a system of income taxation where single
proprietorship and professionals be taxed differently from corporations and partnership had long been
the prevailing rule. Uniformity of taxation merely required that all subjects of objects of taxation
similarly situated were to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities and did not discount
classification as long as:
● the standards are substantial making real differences;
● the categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose;
●
the law applies, ceteris paribus, to both present and future conditions; and
● the classification applies equally to the same class.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (infra, under Judiciary)
First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)
The Omnibus Investments Code gave the SC appellate jurisdiction over BOI decisions. The SC issued a
circular giving the CA that jurisdiction, on the ground that its appellate jurisdiction could not be increased
without its concurrence.
After the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress was now barred from increasing Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its concurrence. This was done in order to give the Court a measure of
control over the cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. The indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging the Court’s appellate jurisdiction could unnecessarily burden the Court and undermine its
essential function of expounding the law in profound national aspect.
D. Legislative veto
23
IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath

Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications
Presidential Immunity
In Re: Bermudez (1986)
Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief on whether the provisions of the Freedom Constitution
referred to the incumbent President or the previously-elected president.
The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding first that it referred to the incumbent president, and
secondly that a suit cannot be brought against the incumbent President. The petition for declaratory
relief was essentially a suit against President Aquino, and Bermudez had no standing to file it.
Soliven v. Makasiar (1988)
Soliven was sued by Pres. Aquino for libel. Soliven alleged that because the President is immune from
suit, neither can she file a suit.
The SC disagreed. The immunity may be invoked ONLY by the holder of the office. Nothing prevents the
President (and only the President) from waiving the privilege and submitting to court's jurisdiction.
Clinton v. Jones (1997)
Pres. Clinton was charged with sexual harassment by Paula Jones for acts done while he was Governor of
Arkansas. The SC held that the sitting president can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions
not related to his official duties as President, and before his term commenced.
Presidential Privileges
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (2008)
Neri, along with other officers, was invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee regarding
the NBN-ZTE project. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate v. Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for
contempt.
The SC upheld the invocation of privilege. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
24
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
Cabinet. And,
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Aside from these, other executive privileges include:
1. Deliberative process privilege

2. Military or State Secrets
3. Identity of government informers in some circumstances
4. Information related to pending investigations
5. Foreign relations
AKBAYAN v. Aquino (2008)
AKBAYAN and the other petitioners filed a petition asking for the government to release the records of
the negotiations leading up to the JPEPA.
The SC denied the petition. While there was indeed a right to information on matters of public concern,
this was only on a case by case basis. The validity of executive privilege depends on ground invoked to
justify it and context in which it is made. The privileged status of a privileged document rests not on the
need to protect national security but on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate
candidly among themselves if people will find out what they talk about anyway. Here, the negotiations of
the JPEPA falls under the diplomatic negotiations privilege.
Prohibition from holding other appointments

Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office
CLU v. Executive Secretary, supra. (1991)
Dela Cruz v. COA (2001)
The payment of salaries to ex-officio members of the NHA Board who were in the Cabinet, or their
alternates, was denied by the COA. The propriety of that COA decision was challenged.
25
The SC upheld the decision. However, while it was correct to rule that the payment of compensation was
not allowed, the prohibition against multiple offices was not interpreted to apply to posts of executive
officials in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law as required by the primary function of their office
and without additional compensation. The term ex-officio referred to authority derived from official
character, not merely conferred upon the individual character but rather annexed to the official position.
However, since the position is an actual and legal part of the principal office, it followed that the official
concerned had no right to receive additional compensation for services in the same position since the
services were already paid for by the compensation attached to the principal office.
Powers and Functions of the President

Executive Power
Power to execute laws
Ople v. Torres (1998)
AO 308 was issued, adopting a national computerized identification system. Ople challenged the AO’s
constitutionality.
The SC struck down the AO. Executive power to enforce and administer the laws into practical separation
is vested in the President. As Chief Executive, the President is also granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative
power is concerned with the work applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
constitutional organs. However, the administrative order should be issued in relation to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of the government. It should not impair citizen’s rights and privileges or
impose a duty on them, and must not substitute for general policy-making that Congress enact as laws.
Power of Appointment
In general
Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
The SC upheld the appointment. Positions to be filled by the President by appointment are divided into 4
groups:
1) heads of executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in the Constitution,
2) all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law,
26
3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, &

4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only the first group is appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
Customs commissioner was not one of those within the first group.
Manalo v. Sistoza (1999)
Sistoza questioned the constitutionality and legality of the appointments by former Pres. Corazon Aquino
of senior officers of the PNP, who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director
without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
The SC upheld the appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the CA and
require confirmation of appointments to other positions not within the Constitution. The PNP is separate
from the AFP. It is different from and independent of the AFP. Its military ranks are not similar to the
AFP, thus directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring CA confirmation
b. Commission on Appointments confirmation
c. Midnight Appointments

d. Power of removal
Power of Control and Supervision

a. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
b. Control over Executive departments and offices
Lacson-Magallanes Co. v. Paño (1967)
Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao; he later ceded his rights to
LMC of which he is a co-owner. Paño asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands
denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to
the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC challenged the decision
of the Executive Secretary as an undue delegation of power.
The SC did not agree. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. Implicit
is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In
this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes
upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
27
The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President.
Buklod ng Manggagawang EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2000)
President Corazon Aquino created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily
conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year
2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of
EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
“Aduana”, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through
the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review in questioning the
said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the President has no power to abolish a public office, as that
is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to
security of tenure.
The SC upheld the reorganization. As a general rule, the power to abolish an office is lodged with the
legislative. However, the President’s power of control may justify his deactivating the functions of a
particular office or certain laws may grant him the broad continuing authority to carry out reorganization
measures for reasons of economy and productivity.
c. Supervision of Local Governments and Autonomous Regions
Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)
President Ramos issued AO 372 – The Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998, which
required LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% for their authorized regular appropriations of non-
personal services. Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372 reducing
to 5% the amount of the internal revenues allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. The
constitutionality of the directive to withhold 10% of this IRA is challenged for being in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing the
automatic release of its share in the national income revenue.
The SC upheld Section 1, which directed the LGUs to reduce expenditures, as being part of the President’s
supervision over local government. Supervision is meant to oversee, while control meant to power to
alter what a subordinate has done and substitute one’s judgment. The Chief Executive wields no more
authority than that of checking whether local government were performing their duties as provided by
Constitution and statutes. But LGUs continue to be agents of the national government.
28
However, Section 4, which withheld 5% of the IRA from LGUs was struck down for being
unconstitutional. It is a basic feature of local government autonomy that their share of the IRA should be
automatically released.
Military Powers
IBP v. Zamora (2000)
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
The SC upheld deployment of the Marines. Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested
in the President’s wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion
Here, the deployment of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious
incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Article XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution.
Lansang v. Garcia (1971)
Two hand grenades were thrown at a Liberal Party caucus in 1971, killing 8. Pres. Marcos issued PP 889
which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al. were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for
interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al. questioned the validity of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites
The SC found that there was valid basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The requirements for such a suspension are:
1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
2. Public safety requires the suspension.
Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is.
The absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.
29
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (2004)
On July 27, 2003, the Oakwood mutiny took place. Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 47 declaring a
"state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to suppress the rebellion. By that evening,
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of
rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proclamation No. 435.
The SC upheld the declaration of a state of rebellion. Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public
safety are not required for calling out the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a
state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out
of the armed forces is not the same as a declaration of martial law.
Gudani v. Senga (2006)
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al. from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected to Court Martial proceedings for
willfully violating an order of a superior officer.
The SC upheld EO 464. The President as Commander-in-Chief has absolute authority over persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected in
the military. Preventing military officers from testifying before Congress springs from Commander-in-
Chief powers, not executive privilege.
David v. Arroyo (2006)
As a result of the events of EDSA II, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, declaring a state of national
emergency, invoking Article VII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued
General Order No. 5 directing the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress
and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Article II, Sec. 4 of the same, citing elements of the extreme
left and right being in alliance to bring down the President. A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via
PP1021.
Randy David and the petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution
have been violated, thus the case at hand.
In relation to the validity of the declaration of a state of national emergency, the SC ruled that as there is
no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under General Order No. 5 who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Thus, the due process clause
has been violated and that portion of General Order No. 5 is unconstitutional.
30
Pardoning Power
a. Nature and limitations
b. Forms of Executive Clemency
Diplomatic Powers
a. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
b. Deportation of undesirable aliens
Residual Powers
Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)
Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino. She
invoked her rights to travel and abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the
President’s residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for protecting people's general welfare,
preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even
the Resolution proposed in the House urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition
of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and
protect general welfare.

Powers relating to appropriation Measures
Delegated powers
Veto power
C. Rules on Succession
a. Constructive Resignation
b. The Vice President
c. Right of Succession and Membership in Cabinet
Estrada v. Desierto (2001)
After the events of EDSA II, whereby President Estrada left Malacañang and Gloria Arroyo was sworn in
as President, Estrada filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the Ombudsman from proceeding with any
cases against him and to declare him to still be the incumbent president.
31
The SC denied the petition, holding that Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of
resignation were present, namely:
1. Intent
2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening
to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaring
his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.)
As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither was
there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he
would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and
so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.

32
V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Concepts
Judicial Power.
Ynot v. IAC (1987)
EO 626-A banned the killing and intra-province transport of carabao and carabeef. Ynot was caught in
violation of EO 626-A as he was transporting 6 carabaos. He went to trial court seeking to declare EO
626-A unconstitutional. The Trial Court ruled that they cannot answer questions of constitutionality.
However, the SC ruled that it could. All courts in the hierarchy can exercise both judicial power and
judicial review, subject to later review by the SC (Sec. 5 (2) (a))
Judicial Review
a. Definition, nature, principles
Marbury v. Madison (1803)

As outgoing President, John Adams, appointed judges, including Marbury, to positions as justices of the
peace, in Marbury’s case in the District of Columbia,, with the concurrence of the Senate. However, the
commissions were never served upon the offices, so Marbury was never able to carry out his duties. He
appealed to the SC for a writ of mandamus to compel State Secretary James Madison to appoint him as a
judge.
1. Marbury has a right to the commission. Presidential commission has three stages --- nomination,
appointment, and commission. When the President signs the commission, it creates a vested right.
2. Marbury has a relief for his right. Because withholding the commission would be violative of the
vested right, there must be a remedy.
3. The most appropriate relief in this case is a writ of mandamus. According to the Constitution, the SC
can only have appellate jurisdiction over writs of mandamus. However, the law that Adams signed
gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction. Therefore, there was a dispute over which one should be
followed. The Constitution is the paramount law, and it is the judiciary that decides questions of
constitutionality. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what is
law. Using this reasoning, the court held that it was the Constitution that must prevail, and so they
could not award the writ of mandamus.
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1. Requisites of judicial review

a. Actual case or controversy
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.
o An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, and opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest"; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.
o A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
o Ripeness entails that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture. The questioned acts should have already
been carried out
o Exception to the mootness rule: Court will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
 first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
 fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Operative fact doctrine
Moot Questions
Gonzales v. Narvasa (2000)
Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of
the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to
study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of
implementing them.
The SC held that the petition was moot and academic. As the questioned commission had been dissolved,
it was impossible to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. The Court could no longer enjoin a body
that no longer existed from acting. Any ruling regarding the matter would simply be in the nature of an
advisory opinion and definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
Political Question Doctrine

34
Avelino v. Cuenco, supra, under Internal Government of Congress: Quorum
The court did not have jurisdiction over the petition. Due to the separation of powers, the political nature
of the controversy and the Constitution giving the Senate the power to elect its own President, the
judiciary cannot interfere with or take over the matter. The remedy lies with the Senate and not with the
Court.
Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)
RA 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component
city. RA 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. In 1998, RA 8528 amended RA No.
7720 to the effect that the City of Santiago was downgraded from an independent component city to a
component city. Miranda, et al., assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to
submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
On the threshold issue of whether or not the case involved a political question, the Court upheld its
jurisdiction. Questions of whether laws passed by Congress complied with the requirements of the
constitution posed a question only the Court could decide.
A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under the
constitution were
1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or
2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the legislative/executive
branch of government.
Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular measure.
Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or constitutionality could be
determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
Safeguards of Judicial Independence

a. Fiscal autonomy – Art. VIII, Sec. 3
i. appropriations shall not be reduced below the amount appropriated for the
previous year
ii. Appropriations will be automatically and regularly released.
b. Report on the judiciary – Art. VIII, Sec. 16
c. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary – Art. VIII, Sec. 3

35
Judicial Restraint
Appointments to the Judiciary
Supreme Court
En banc and division cases
Procedural Rule-making
Administrative Supervision over Lower Courts
Maceda v. Vasquez (1993)
Bonifacio Maceda falsified his certificate of service saying he had submitted the decisions for all his civil
and criminal cases, when he had not submitted anything. His clerk reported him to the Ombudsman.
The Court ruled that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the matter. Judges are liable under the
Supreme Court, not the Ombudsman. Only the SC can oversee judges’ compliance with the law and take
proper administrative action.
In re Demetria (2001)

Judge Demetria had been trying to intercede on behalf of drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. The Supreme Court
ruled that the evidence against Demetria proved her guilty. However, it is up to the SC to implement the
proper administrative actions.
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions
Macalintal v. COMELEC (2003)
The constitutionality of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) was challenged. The
controversial provisions were:
o Sec 5: allowed immigrants to register by executing affidavit expressing intent to return
 Constitutional. Does not violate Art. V, Sec. 1 (Residency Rule). Rather, it
enfranchises Filipinos abroad domiciled in the Philippines.
o Sec 18.5: empowered COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates
 Unconstitutional. Violates Art. VII, Sec. 4; winning candidates for President and VP
are to be proclaimed by Congress.
o Sec 25: allowed Congress, through oversight committee, to review, revise, amend and
approve IRR of COMELEC.
36
 Unconstitutional. Violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, on COMELEC independence. Congress

may not intrude into the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers.
Brillantes v. Yorac (1990)
Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Brillantes challenged Yorac’s appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987
Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the independence
of ConCom from the executive department.
Powers and Functions of Each Commission
Prohibited Offices and Interests
Flores v. Drilon, supra.

i. Standardization of pay and ban on double compensation
ii. Ban on partisan political activities
iii. Removal or suspension only for a cause
iv. Right to self-organization
v. Right to strike: Government employees, including members of the CSC, do not have
the right to strike.
Jurisdiction of each Constitutional Commission
Tan v. COMELEC (2003)
Tan was designated by COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in Davao for the May
1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic
Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed Congressman
of 2nd Dist. Davao.
Alterado filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation, including an administrative
charge against the Board of Canvassers and Tan for “Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence,
and Acts Inimical to the Service”, before the COMELEC.
On petition for review, the SC upheld the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the administrative case.
COMELEC’s authority under Article IX, Sec. 2(6-8) of 1987 Constitution is all-encompassing when it
comes to election matters. The administrative case is related to the performance of his duties as Election
canvasser, not as a City Prosecutor. COMELEC’s mandate includes the authority to exercise direct and
37
immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of
any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.
Daza v. Singson (1989)
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the
lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew
the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber
elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who
was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDP’s reorganization
was not permanent and stable.
The SC disagreed. The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the
Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a
democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid down in
jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its representation in the
CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary alliances or factional
divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political
alignments of its members.
Guingona v. Gonzales (1992)
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To fulfil the requirement that each party must have a
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political
party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The result of the computation under that formula was
that 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-
PDP-LABAN would be part of the COA. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party; he rounded 7.5 up to 8; and decided that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party in the CoA. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged
that the compromise is against proportional representation.
The SC agreed that the proposed membership was unconstitutional. The proposed scheme does not
comply with the requirement that 12 senators be elected on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties in the Senate; to disturb the resulting fractional membership of political parties in the
CoA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation
since it gave the LDP an added member by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political
party, which is deprived of ½ representation.
Instead, the correct rule is that in Coseteng v. Mitra—a political party must have at least 2 senators in the
Senate to have a CoA representative.
38
Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions

2. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
3. In the exercise of administrative functions
VII. BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Fundamental powers of the state (police power, eminent domain, taxation)

1. Concept, application and limits
2. Requisites for valid exercise
3. Similarities and differences
Due process v. eminent domain
Churchill v. Rafferty (1915)

Act 2339 authorized the CIR to remove any sign or billboard that is offensive to the sight or otherwise a
nuisance, and collect an annual tax of P4 per sqm. The SC upheld the provisions because what was being
regulated was the use of public thoroughfares, and the police power measure validly protected the
comfort and convenience of the public, particularly the prevention of nuisance due to billboards which
were offensive to the sight. Thus, what was involved here was not taking that would require just
compensation, but regulation in accordance with due process.
U.S. v. Toribio (1905)

Toribio was charged for violation of Act no. 1147, because he had a carabao slaughtered for human
consumption. He claimed that the act constituted taking without just compensation. The court held that it
was not taking for public use in the concept of eminent domain, but rather taking in the exercise of the
State’s police power.
4. Delegation
B. Private acts and the Bill of Rights
C. Due process – the rights to life, liberty & property
1. Relativity of due process
2. Procedural and substantive due process
Procedural:
Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca (1918)

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security for his debt. Palanca
left for China and never returned until he died. As Palanca was a non-resident, El Banco had to notify
Engracio about the suit for the foreclosure of his property by publication. The lower court eventually
allowed Banco to execute upon the property. 7 years later, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his
administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due
process as Engracio never received the summons.
The SC ruled against Palanca, holding that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the
matter before it
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
39
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940)

Ang Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU protested this alleged unfair labor practice to the
CIR, which ruled in its favor despite the lack of evidence. The SC in the instant case remanded the case to
the CIR for a new trial, finding that the NLU may have been deprived of some primary rights when it tried
to prove its case before the CIR. This case is considered to have codified the 7 elements of Administrative
Due Process, namely:
1. Hearing
2. Tribunal must have considered evidence presented.
3. Decision must find support in evidence.
4. Evidence must be substantial.
5. Decision must be rendered based on evidence presented at the hearing.
6. Administrative agency must act on its own opinion on the law and facts of the controversy, and
7. The decision must be made in such a manner that the parties know the issues involved and the
reasons behind the decision made.
De Bisschop v. Galang (1963)

Bisschop, an American citizen was allowed to stay in the Philippines for 3 years, until August 1, 1959. His
application for extension of stay was decided by the Board of Commissioners, which ordered him to
depart within 5 days. No decision was promulgated. The CFI ordered Commissioner Galang to desist and
refrain from arresting and deporting Bisschop, until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the
Board in connection with his application for extension of stay.
The SC overturned the CFI. A day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. In certain
administrative proceedings, the right to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.
David v. Aquilizan (1979)

David had a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato, which he left in the care of Felomeno and
Ricardo Jugar. David later withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to return.
Justice Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David. He rendered a decision in favor of
the brothers without any hearing. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but
he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.
The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been
held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation
when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment
has been rendered at all.
Tañada v. Tuvera, supra.

There can be no finding of a violation of a law if the law has not been published, as that would be violative
of procedural due process.
People v. Pomar (1924)

An act was enacted by Congress, providing that employers should grant pregnant female employees
maternity leave. Pomar allowed his employee to take a vacation for her delivery but refused to pay her
the wages during such period. The SC held the pertinent provisions of the Act unconstitutional for
infringing on one’s right to contract.
40
The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is
the liberty to contract. The law would deprive Pomar and all other entities employing women of the said
liberty, without due process of law.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)

Rubi filed a petition for habeas corpus after he and the rest of the Mangyans of Mindoro were relocated
by the Government. The SC did not grant the petition. It held that the relocation of non-Christians was a
valid exercise of the police power.
NDC and AGRIX v. Phil. Veterans (1990)

PVB attempted to foreclose a mortgage of Agrix, but the latter company invoked PD1717, rehabilitating
Agrix and declaring all its obligations cancelled and its mortgages extinguished. The SC struck down the
PD. There was not a sufficient public interest involved. The cancellation of the obligations was violative of
due process, because it extinguished property rights and impaired contracts.
Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (2 Bernas 41) C2 (1988)

The Municipal Board of Butuan City issued Ordinance 640 to address the complaint of parents that it is
too financially burdensome for them to pay the full admission price for their children. The Ordinance
provided that admission tickets for movies, public exhibitions, games, contests, and other performances,
should be sold at half the price for children between 7 and 12 years of age. Violators would be penalized
with imprisonment and/or a fine.
The SC ruled that Ordinance 640 is an invalid exercise of police power and, as a consequence, it violates
the due process clause of the constitution. A valid exercise of police power requires that it should be for
(a.) the public’s interest, (b.) the means employed should be reasonable and it should not be oppressive.
Here, the court did not find a tangible link between the ordinance and the promotion of public health,
security, morals, or welfare. Furthermore, the means employed were judged to be unfair since they
unjustly prejudice the affected businesses by restraining their right to trade and even violating their right
to enter into contracts.
Agustin v. Edu, supra.

The proposed measure to compel each vehicle to supply reflective safety devise is a valid exercise of
police power, it having been issued in order to protect public safety.
Ople v. Torres, supra.

The proposed national ID system violates the right to privacy of each individual, as it does not safeguard
the information therein contained.
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra.

The prohibition against quick-time stays in hotels is unconstitutional, being violative of due process and
the right to privacy. While upholding morals is a valid state purpose, there are other purposes for renting
a hotel for less than 5 hours. As an unreasonable means towards a valid end, the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void.
3. Constitutional and statutory due process
4. Hierarchy of rights
PBMEA v. PBM (1993)

The Philippine Blooming Mills Employees’ Organization carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, against the wishes of
41
the PBM management. PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its officers were ordered to
be dismissed.
The SC did not agree. The demonstration was not a strike; it was an exercise of their rights to “engage in
concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection." Thus, the company’s action constituted as
interference to their right to engage in concerted activity. While it is true that PBM’s right to property
was infringe, such rights must be weighed against the human rights of the workers. In the hierarchy of
rights, human rights outweigh mere property rights.
5. Judicial standards of review
6. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
D. Equal protection
People v. Vera (1937)

Cu Unjieng applied for probation after being convicted by the trial court in Manila. Judge Tuason of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office (IPO). The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because
it is in violation of Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 which granted provincial boards the power to provide a system
of probation to convicted persons. Nowhere in the law is it stated that the law is applicable to a city like
Manila.
The SC struck down the law for being unconstitutional. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the Constitution and the doctrine of the nondelegability of power. Further,
it is a violation of equal protection provided for in the Constitution. The challenged section of Act No.
4221 means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system
of probation within their locality. This would mean that convicts in provinces where no probation officer
is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were
made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. The company filed before the CFI of Leyte a
complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation.
The SC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The equal protection clause applies only to persons
or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
subject to the Cayat requisites. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
People v. Cayat (1939)

Cayat was fined for possessing A-1-1 gin in contravention of the statute prohibiting non-Christian tribes
from possessing liquors aside from native wines and liquors. He challenged the statute on the ground of
violation of equal protection.
The SC held Act constitutional, as there was a valid distinction. This case laid down the classic requisites
for reasonable classification, namely
1. It must rest on substantial distinctions which make real differences,
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
42
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
International School Alliance v. Quisumbing (2000)

A group of local hired teachers working at the International School of Manila claim that the fact that they
are paid less than their foreign hired counterparts violates equal protection. The SC agreed, not on the
ground that local hires and foreign hires should be treated similarly, in fact holding that the foreign hired
teachers were part of a different bargaining unit, but because it upheld the principle of “equal pay for
equal work” as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
1. Concept
2. Requisites for valid classification
3. Standards of judicial review
a) Rational Basis Test
b) Strict Scrutiny Test
c) Intermediate Scrutiny Test
E. Searches and seizures
People v. Malmstedt (1991)

Malmstedt (defendant) entered the Philippines in 1988. In 7 May 1989, defendant went to Baguio and the
following day, went to Sagada and stayed there for 2 days. The NARCOM set up checkpoints near Sagada.
Information was received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
Malmstedt’s bus was stopped and NARCOM members conducted inspection. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on defendant’s waist and suspecting that it was a gun, he asked for defendant’s passport and other
documents but the latter failed to comply. Thereupon, Galutan ordered defendant to bring out whatever
it was that was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be a pouch bag, which contained 4 suspicious-
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. The wrapped object contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Malmstedy was thus convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. The SC upheld the search
and the conviction. There was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime, arising from a) persistent reports of drugs being transported from Sagada,
b) information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that day had drugs, and c) there was a bulge on
the waist of defendant and he failed to present his passport. Malmstedt, at the time of the arrest, was
actually in possession of illegal drugs, and thus caught in flagrante delicto. As there was a valid
warrantless arrest, there was a lawful search even without a search warrant.
People v. CFI (1980)

One week before February 9, 1974, an undisclosed informer told RASAC (Regional Anti-Smuggling Action
Center) that dutiable (taxable) goods will be transported from Angeles to Manila in a Blue Dodge car. As a
result of the information thus gathered, 4,441 wristwatches and 1,075 bracelets of assorted brands were
found in the car. Eventually, Hope and Medina were found guilty of smuggling. On appeal, the SC upheld
the warrantless search. The Tariff and Customs Code grants persons duly commissioned to do
warrantless searches if there is reason to suspect that the code being violated (i.e. suspecting the
existence of smuggled items). The fact that the search was made of a moving vehicle justified the finding
of probable cause all the more.
Roan v. Gonzales (1986)

Roan claimed to have been a victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by military authorities,
evidence acquired thereby being used as evidence in his case for illegal possession of firearms. While a
43
warrant was issued, none of the articles in the warrant were found. Rather, a Colt Magnum and 18 live
bullets were found, which are now the bases of the charges against Roan.
The warrant was void for absence of examination of the applicant. Even consent to the search cannot cure
the invalidity of the warrant. As a result, the evidence gathered thereby is inadmissible. The plain view
rule does not apply here. The weapon did not just appear. It was searched for by the authorities.
Valmonte v. Villa (1989)

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Valmonte et al. sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional.
The SC upheld the LOI. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Aniag v. COMELEC (1994)

In preparation for the 1992 national elections, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering a gun ban and the
summary disqualification of candidates found to be engaged in gunrunning, using/transporting firearms,
etc. Due to this, petitioner was asked by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Reps to surrender the
firearms issued to him by such office. Petitioner ordered his driver, Arellano, to deliver the firearms to
the Batasan Complex. However, the PNP already set up a check-point about 20 meters from the Batasan
entry. The car was searched, the firearms seized and Arellano was detained (but later released for his
meritorious sworn explanation. Petitioner Congressman then went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to
explain that the driver was just returning the firearms and that Arellano was neither a
bodyguard/security officer. However, COMELEC still ordered the filing of Information against petitioner
and his driver.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure was invalid. It may be valid even if not authorized by authority,
provided that the “search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal
per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search.” Also, a warrantless search could only be resorted to if the officers
have probable cause to believe BEFORE the search that either 1) the motorist was an offender or that 2)
the evidence related to the crime will be found in the vehicle searched.
1. Concept
Guazon v. De Villa (1990)

Guazon and the other petitioners claimed to be victims of “saturation drives” held by the military and
police. The SC held that the saturation drives were unconstitutional, for having infringed on the right
of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Warrant requirement
a) Requisites
44
PICOP v. Asuncion (1999)

A raid was conducted on the PICOP compound, pursuant to a search warrant for that purpose. The raid
yielded several illegally possessed firearms, and resulted in the conviction of various officers of PICOP for
possession of illegal firearms. However, the SC found the issuance of the search warrant invalid, because
the judge did not personally examine the complainant and other deponents, and the policeman who
testified during the hearing had no personal knowledge that there were illegal firearms, and the warrants
failed to describe the place to be searched with particularity.
3. Warrantless searches
Manalili v. CA (1997)
Manalili was charged with Illegal Possession of marijuana. He was arrested after being stopped and
frisked, because he had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. He was convicted.
Ruling on the validity of his arrest due to “stop-and-frisk,” the SC upheld the arrest. When dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation where there is no time to secure an arrest or a search
warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-frisk" — which are
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to
respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.
People v. Marti (1991)

Marti was convicted of possession of marijuana. The marijuana had been found by the proprietor of a
shipping company where he attempted to have 4 packages of marijuana delivered abroad. The proprietor
opened the packages, leading Marti to challenge the search as illegal. However, the SC upheld the
conviction. The bill of rights, particularly the prohibition against warrantless searches does not bind
parties other than the government.
Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)

42 search warrants were issued, ordering police officers to search for documents, articles, etc, which
could be used to violate the laws. The evidence found via the searches led to convictions for violations of
Custom Laws, Tax Laws, and the Revised Penal Codes. The SC ruled that the warrants, being general
warrants, were void.
4. Warrantless arrests
Umil v. Ramos (1990)

The petitioners were arrested for various offenses without warrants. They all filed petitions for habeas
corpus. The SC denied the petitions. All the petitioners were arrested for continuing offenses like
rebellion or inciting to sedition. Thus, an arrest of an NPA member while being treated for injuries at
hospital was valid even without a warrant, as the offense of rebellion continued to be committed. The
arrest was thus in flagrante delicto.
People v. Chua Ho San (1999)

Chua Ho San was convicted of possession of shabu. He was arrested after landing on the shore in a
motorboat. Upon landing, he fled the scene until the police caught him. He was searched and a bag
containing 28.7 kg of shabu was found on his person. The SC acquitted Chua, ruling that while a valid
warrantless search may follow as a consequence of a valid warrantless arrest, here, the warrantless
arrest, not being based on probable cause that an offense was committed, was void. As a result, the search
and seizure was also void, and the bag of shabu was inadmissible as evidence.
45
People v. Aminnudin (1988)

The PC officers received a tip from an informant that Aminnudin was bound for Iloilo onboard MV
WILCOM 9 carrying marijuana. Aminnudin was searched and arrested after disembarking from the
vessel. The PC officers found 3 kilos of marijuana in his bag. He was charged and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana by the CFI of Iloilo. The decision was appealed to the SC. The SC ruled that there
was no valid search and arrest so the evidence against him was inadmissible. He was acquitted.
People v. Burgos (1986)

Ruben Burgos was convicted by the Davao del Sur RTC for Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance
of Subversion. He was arrested while plowing his field. The Philippine Constabulary did not have a
warrant. They based their operation on the sole testimony of Cesar Masamlok who allegedly was coerced
by accused to join the NPA using his gun. The SC ruled that the arrest and subsequent search was illegal
because it did not fall under the warrantless arrests covered by Rule 113, Sec. 6. Personal knowledge on
the part of the arresting officer is important. Applying the Stonehill doctrine, the evidence was
inadmissible. Burgos was thus acquitted.
5. Administrative arrests
6. Drug, alcohol and blood tests
F. Privacy of communications and correspondence
1. Private and public communications
2. Intrusion, when allowed
3. Writ of habeas data
G. Freedom of expression
1. Concept and scope
People v. Nabong (1932)
Nabong gave a speech to a gathering of communists, saying that they should overthrow the
government, establish their own government of the poor and that they should use whips on the
Constabulary men, whom he accused of being corrupt. The SC ruled that Nabong’s language advocated
an overthrow of the government through violent means, and was therefore seditious.
National Press Club v. COMELEC (1992)

Three cases were filed, in the hopes of rendering void Section 11 of the RA 6646 or the Electoral
Reforms Act, which prohibits the sale or donation of print, space and air time "for campaign or other
political purposes," except to the Commission on Elections, on the ground of violation of the freedom
of the press. The SC held that since the said section does not restrict news reporting by the mass
media companies, nor does it reach commentaries and opinions of broadcasters and writers, the
petition must be dismissed. The controversial provision has not gone outside the permissible bounds
of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods, which is granted to the
COMELEC by the Constitution under Art. IX-C.
Adiong v. COMELEC (1992)

COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated providing that campaign materials (stickers, printed
materials, decals, leaflets etc.) may be posted only in authorized posting areas, as well as prohibiting
the display of election propaganda in any place including mobile or stationary private/public places,
except those in the allowable areas.
The SC declared the resolution void on the ground that the prohibition of posting of stickers and other
materials on an individual’s property does not only deprive the said individual from the use of his
property (since the owner is not allowed to place campaign materials on his property) but also
46
deprives him of his right to free speech and information, since posting/placing such material or
property expresses his political views or the candidates he believes in.
US v. Bustos (1918)
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, then prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging the
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for
his removal. The complainants charged that the justice of the peace solicited bribe money in
consideration of favorable decisions. Criminal action was filed against the petitioners, charging that
portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous.
The SC acquitted Bustos et al. Express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith
surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The guaranties of a
free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the
law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
In Re: Jurado (1995)

Emil Jurado is a columnist-lawyer who wrote several articles about improper transactions in the
judiciary. CJ Narvasa issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate
corruption in the judiciary. Jurado was one of those invited to appear before the committee and to testify
as to his knowledge as he had a lot to say about the topic in his columns. He refused. Some of the subjects
of his writings also wrote to the SC saying that what he wrote were lies and asked the Court to take
appropriate action.
Doctrine: False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the
cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has
never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination
of patent lies.
a) Prior restraint (censorship)
Franciso Chavez v. Secretary Raul Gonzalez (2008)

After the 2004 National Elections, a controversy came out after cassette tapes that allegedly recorded
conversations involving PGMA and Garcillano went on air. Given that such conversations were being
aired all over broadcast media, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye and the NTC, on separate occasions, issued
warnings against broadcast companies to stop airing such information. Chavez asked that such warnings
be declared null and void for violating freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The Court agreed
with the petitioner given that the warnings, which were content-based restrictions, failed to pass the
strict scrutiny standard and the clear and present danger test. The evidence of the respondents fell short
of satisfying such standards required.
People v. Perez (1923)

Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, met with Ludovice, and during their discussion said
“The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad
thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands. He was convicted of sedition.
The SC upheld the conviction. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the
Filipino people and on American sovereignty. Perez’s words were seditious. Criticism, no matter how
47
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, but
when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws, and the existence of the
State.
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans (1985)

Radio station DYRE, owned by Eastern Broadcasting, filed a petition to compel the respondents to reopen
the station after it was summarily closed on grounds of national security. It was allegedly closed on the
charge that it was used to incite sedition. No hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish
the factual basis for closure.
While the case became moot and academic upon the withdrawal of EBC, the SC issued certain guidelines
for similar circumstances:
1. The seven requisites of administrative proceedings in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a
broadcast station is closed or its operations curtailed.
2. While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable
standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, in each appropriate case, may be valid.
3. Media is entitled to the broad protection of freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for
limitations on freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger rule” – that words are used in
such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
4. Broadcasting has to be licensed. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
in scope than print media. This is because (1) broadcast media is more pervasive, and (2) easily
accessible to children. Because of its pervasiveness, the impact of inflammatory or offensive speech
on people would be difficult to monitor or predict. “Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio (and
television) audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.”
5. The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstance of broadcast media into
account. There has to be a balance between the government’s right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite listeners to overthrow it, and the people’s right to be informed.
6. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
7. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. (Sec. 1 and Sec. 4, Art. III).
SWS v. COMELEC (2001)

SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of national
candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys
covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and
expression. The SC held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
b) Subsequent punishment
2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations
a) Tests
b) Applications
48
Osmeña v. COMELEC (1998)

This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of RA No. 6646, which
prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or airtime for campaign or other
political purposes, except to the COMELEC. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the upcoming
elections, who contend that the events after NPC v. Comelec have shown undesirable effects because the
ban on political ads has failed to level the playing field and has worked against poor candidates. The SC
ruled that RA 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the state to regulate media of communication to
ensure equal opportunity. It merely regulates the time, place and manner of advertising of political ads
and it does not abridge freedom of speech and of the press.
Policarpio v. Manila Times (1962)

Policarpio, executive secretary of the UNESCO National Commission, was charged with malversation of
public funds and estafa through falsification of public documents. The Manila Times ran a story
exaggerating the charges against her. The Manila Times claimed immunity because of the freedom of the
press. The SC ruled that damages should be awarded to Policarpio. The freedom of speech and press
immunity presuppose that the derogatory information they publish are both true and fair and made in
good faith, without comments or remarks.
Ayer Productions v. Judge Capulong (1990)

Ayer Productions wanted to make a film about the EDSA Revolution titled “The Four-Day Revolution.”
Sen. Enrile did not want to appear in the movie and sought to have the continued production enjoined.
The SC did not grant the injunction. The subject matter of the film is of public interest. Even the right of
privacy must yield to the freedom of expression, notwithstanding the fact that the film was made
primarily for profit.
Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak (1985)
Gonzalez, on behalf of Malaya Films, assails the Board’s classification of their production Kapit sa Patalim
as “For Adults Only” and its resolution to issue a permit only if the petitioner makes certain changes and
deletions. It was held that the Board did not commit any grave abuse of discretion because its resolution
was supported by the fact that a number of scenes in the movie are not fit for public viewing. Hence the
Court restated the test to determine obscenity: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
Pita v. CA (1989)
Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines, publications
and other reading materials, including Pita’s “Pinoy Playboy” magazines, believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent were confiscated and burned in public. Pita thus filed a case for injunction to
enjoin the City Mayor and his agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale
or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is
not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press.
The SC dismissed the petition. Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. Using the Kottinger rule, the test of
obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
49
circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense
of the community reached by it."
3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine

4. Tests
5. State regulation of different types of mass media
6. Commercial speech
7. Private vs. government speech
8. Heckler’s veto
H. Freedom of religion
1. Non-establishment clause
Aglipay v. Ruiz (1937)

Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of prohibition
against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges
that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public money for the benefit of any
religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No.
4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps
themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The government’s goal was to promote the Philippines.
There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not
to any church.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1994)
The officers of a civic organization—Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay—launched a fund drive to
renovate the chapel of Bgy Tikay in Malolos, Bulacan. Chairman Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles and solicited P1500 from her. This was done without a license
from the DSWD. Angeles filed a complaint, and because of that, an information was filed against Centeno,
Yco, and Religio Evaristo for violating Presidential Decree 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law.
On the infringement of religious freedoms, the SC discussed the dual nature of legislation on the subject
of religion. On the one hand, it prevents the compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed. On the
other, it protects the free exercise of any chosen form of religion. Thus, there are two constitutional
freedoms regarding religion—the freedom to believe and the freedom to act on the basis of one’s belief.
While the former is absolute, the latter can be subject to regulation for the protection of society.
In this case, the state may protect the public from fraudulent solicitation by requiring those who solicit to
establish identity and authority to solicit. Even though the regulation resulting from such a policy may
infringe religious acts, it is not invalid because the general regulation protecting citizens from unjust
solicitation is not open to any constitutional objection.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (1974)

Victoriano is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo who is an employee at the Elizalde Rope Factory, and a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union. The company and the union are in a closed shop agreement
where all employees must be a member of the collective bargaining union in order to maintain
employment. RA 3350 was passed which states that CBAs shall no longer cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation in any labor organization. The union assails the constitutionality of RA
3350 because it infringes on the right of association, impairs contracts and discriminates in favor of such
members of religious sects. The Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 3350 because (1) the Union
misread the law, which actually does not prohibit association, but only reinforces a person’s right to
refrain from association, (2) the right to religion is superior over contractual rights, and (3) the
50
government may pass laws in pursuit of a valid secular cause even though this may be beneficial to some
religions.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila (1957)

American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation distributing and
selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with Ordinance
No. 3000 (obtain a mayor’s permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period
covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said
Ordinances void and to seek a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as
it merely requires a mayor’s permit. Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS
because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional
guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any
substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent (1993)

Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who were
expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents.
As Jehovah’s Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their religion, should not be
worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their
religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v.
Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in the flag ceremony. The Court
reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious
beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right to free
education.
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)

The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” The Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it
offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC is protected by Art. III, Sec.
4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought
about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of,
other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of
the show. SC also affirmed MTRCB’s power to regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921
case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the Director of Post’s power to check as to whether or not publications are
of a libelous character.
German v. Barangan (1985)

German et al. converged at JP Laurel Street in Manila to hear mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which is near
Malacañang. Respondents Barangan and Lariosa blocked them, saying that (1) their actions show that
they are not there to hear mass, but to stage a demonstration, and (2) the security of President Marcos is
of utmost concern. Petitioners filed a case, saying that Barangan and Lariosa impaired their constitutional
freedom to exercise religion. The SC held that this freedom is not absolute. Good faith is required to
validly exercise this freedom, and the facts show that the petitioners are not exercising good faith. Also, if
the freedom clashes with a social or national interest, which in this case is the safety of the President,
then the former must yield to the latter. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

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1

I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: effectivity, definition, nature and concepts

De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)

1. Interpretation of the Constitution

Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)

2. Definition of State (to be related with PIL discussion)

CIR v. Campos Rueda (1971)

In General (Art. XVII):

Gonzales v. Comelec (1967)

Imbong v. Comelec (1970)

Santiago v. Comelec (1997)

Completeness on its face

Lambino v. Comelec (2006)

Submission of Proposed Amendments

Tolentino v. Comelec (1971)

D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Calalang v. Williams (1940)

Urban land reform and housing

Oposa v. Factoran (1993)

Respect for human dignity and human rights

Science and technology

Arts and culture

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Who may exercise legislative powers

Sanidad v. Comelec (1976)

Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991)

The House of Representatives

Aquino v. COMELEC (1995)

District Representatives and questions on Apportionment and

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC APPORTIONMENT-REAPPORTIONMENT case

LEGISLATIVE CREATION, DIVISION,

population of at least  Approval by a

The Party List System

BANAT v. COMELEC (2009)

pals political law reviewer

How to Allot Slots to Party List Representatives:

1. Find total number of Party List Representatives

2nd level of analysis: Allocation of Seats for Party List Representatives

Sec. 11, RA 7941:

3rd level of analysis: Allocation of Additional Seats

Procedure in second round of seat allocation:

Participation of major political parties in Party list elections

ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (2013)

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in

Philconsa v. Mathay (1966)

Freedom from Arrest – Article VI, Sec. 11

Martinez v. Morfe (1972)

Speech and Debate

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)

Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions

c. From personally appearing as counsel

g. Full disclosure of financial and business interests

Flores v. Drilon (1993)

Quorum and Voting Majorities

Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

Osmeña Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)

Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)

Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments