Nathan Mladin

A discussion of David A. S. Fergusson’s ‘rudiments’ of a

revisionary account of providence

David Fergusson’s starting point in articulating a revised doctrine of

providence is the suggestion that the doctrine crosses disciplinary lines in theological
reflection, bleeds into and is informed by other doctrinal loci and functions as a
central article of the Christian faith, and therefore cannot be considered as a mere
subchapter of a theology of creation. The link between creation and redemption
demands a doctrine of providence that can describe the way in which the Creator is
involved in upholding and governing the world beyond the initial act of creation out
of nothing. Furthermore, the so-called problem of evil, the appropriation of
providence and providential language by civil religion also signal the need for a
serious consideration of the doctrine. Its enduring pastoral significance goes without
mentioning.1 Anticipating a full-fledged work on providence based on his 2009
Warfield Lectures,2 Fergusson sketches the rudiments of a doctrine of providence that
‘is more intellectually modest and low key than classical formulations’, and more
adequate both to pastoral needs but, more importantly, to Scripture.

The classical doctrine of providence as it emerged in the history of the Church is too heavily indebted
to philosophical resources in the ancient world, particularly Stoicism.3

Fergusson is not arguing that the Fathers appropriated philosophical

orientations and resources uncritically and without modifications. Indeed, they
maintained, against large swath of Greek thought, that providence is not impersonal
and arbitrary, but personal and fatherly. However, the influence that was undeniably
exerted nudged their formulations of providence in a deterministic direction, which
lead to a pernicious acquiesce in ‘the way things are’. In fact, Fergusson takes issue

1 David Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” Theology Today no. 67 (2010): 261.

2 http://www3.ptsem.edu/Content.aspx?id=1419&menu_id=75 (Accessed: 21 February
2013)
3 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 262.

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with the term ‘providence’, which he shows very rarely appears in the Hebrew Bible
or New Testament. His proposal is articulated polemically as a response to the lasting
and pervasive influence of Stoicism in the likes of Theophilus of Antioch, Justin
Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Theodoret of Cyrus and Origen. Fergusson avers
that in its endeavor to counter theories of chance and fortune the early church was
too quick in identifying with, even if modifying, providentialist philosophical
teaching. This arguably led to an ‘overbearing determinism’ which ignored the
theme of resistance and struggle also present in Scripture alongside the theme of
unperturbed sovereignty and victory. These neglected themes, suggests Fergusson,
require a dynamic, fluid approach to providence that makes consistent reference to
the agency of the Holy Spirit. He states: “Divine providence is purposive, particular,
and parental and is not to be confused with fate or fortune.”4 Later articulations of
providence in the Western tradition, most notably in the works of Thomas Aquinas
and John Calvin show their indebtedness to Stoic determinism. In much of Medieval
and Reformed accounts of providence all worldly occurrences are traced back to the
primal will of God and divine permission is conflated with divine willing, even if this
means making God seem inscrutable and even arbitrary.5
Notwithstanding discernible stoic influences, Fergusson corrects Keith Ward’s
verdict on Aquinas’s logic as being heavily deterministic and suggests that the goal of
much of Aquinas writings is Christology. Attention to human freedom, miracles and
petitionary prayers, suggests Fergusson, offers a more ‘dramatic’ account of the God-
world relationship in the thought of Aquinas, in which divine initiative and creaturely
response achieve a degree of mutuality.6 Nevertheless, despite sporadically referring
to the model of God as an artist, the large part of Aquinas’ work is spent expanding a
will-centred account of providence following Boethius.
Fergusson also presents a picture of Calvin which is not unfamiliar to Calvin
scholars. He rightly argues that there is a difference in approach and even in tone
between the Calvin of the Institutes and the Calvin of the commentaries and sermons.
Attention to the minutiae of the biblical text and to the sinuous progression of
redemptive history occasions surprising reflections. Calvin offers an account of
providence where God is presented as more reactive, wrestling with the recalcitrant

4 Ibid., 265.
5 Ibid., 266.
6 David Fergusson, “Divine Providence and Action,” in God’s Life in Trinity, ed. Miroslav Volf

and Michael Welker (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 158.

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human will, which “in order to prevail, must improvise to a much greater degree
than is conceded in the Institutes”.7
After an even-handed yet not uncritical discussion of Aquinas and Calvin,
Fergusson concludes that “criticisms of the Thomist and Calvinist accounts as
determinist, enthralled to philosophical influences, and inadequate to Scripture are at
best partial,” particularly when they are examined against the backdrop of
Leibnitzian rigid determinism and other rationalist accounts of providence in the
early modern period.

The doctrine of providence is misplaced when presented on speculative, introspective, or political

grounds. Grounded in revelation, it is an article of faith that needs to be carefully distinguished from
surrogate accounts.

Fergusson’s contention is that providence is not a philosophical theory based

on an inductive or empiric study of what goes on in the world. Rather, it belongs
among the central articles of faith and is best articulated in the context of worship
and right living before God.
Contrary to popular teaching, not everything that happens in the world is the
best or is for the best. Fergusson registers four problems in connection to what we
may call a fatalistic optimism. First, the past cannot be justified simply because in
time it has been forgotten or overcome. Secondly, from an epistemological
perspective, human finitude and fallenness rule out epic descriptions of individual
events fitting into some larger scheme. This kind exercise assumes an ahistorical,
God’s-eye perspective, which, on this side of the eschaton is simply unavailable to
contingent creatures. Moreover, even if this hermeneutics of providence were
possible, it could still not account for dysteleological suffering, gratuitous evil and “the
surd element in human existence”.8 Thirdly, from a Christological perspective, the
present order of the world is not perfect, but in need of ultimate redemption.
Fergusson states: “The doctrine of providence must also take a cruciform shape
rather than appear as a theology of glory in which everything is already perfectly in
place.”9 A final reason to resist this construal of providence has to do with the

7 Ibid., 160.
8 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 267.
9 Ibid.

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awareness of the way providence has been hijacked for imperialistic and totalitarian
political projects. The usual suspects are Nazism and Fascism, but Fergusson hastens
to mention that Western democracies, most notably America and Britain, have
consistently employed providential rhetoric in their civil religion, which, as Fergusson
wryly puts it, “flourishes on theological minimalism.”10
Philosophically, the most notable modern providential account of history
comes from the pen of Hegel. On his view, an immanent, inner-worldly force
envelops all contingent events and episodes and inexorably propels history forward.
Particulars and, more specifically, particular people and their suffering lose their
significance to the greater historical good. It is in this content that Fergusson is
careful to indicate that the biblical testimony is clear about God’s concern for the
dispossessed, marginalized. This is evidenced in the law, the teaching of the prophets
and most pointedly in the ministry of Jesus. Secondly, all progressive theological
readings of history wrongly presuppose “an immanent purpose being worked out
irresistibly within human events,”11 ignoring the apocalyptic elements in Scripture
that depict an instability and unpredictability which only God can resolve
eschatologically.
Although signs of providence may be discerned through self-examination,
“we should not seek to make our lives microcosms of a Hegelian philosophy of
history or a Stoic account of nature in which every event inherently serves some
wider pattern that God is working within us.”12 Fergusson refers to Jesus’ answer to
the questions raised by the disciples in connection to the blind man or the death of
those killed by the falling of the Siloam tower as instructive in this respect. He takes
the episodes to suggest “there is no direct divine correlation between the merits of our
actions and the fate we suffer.”13

In Scripture, providence narrates an account of the God-world relationship that is often described in
covenantal terms. Although asymmetrical, this relationship is one of codependence and is threatened by
human failure and the turbulence of natural forces.14

10 Ibid., 269.
11 Ibid., 270.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 271.
14 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 271.

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 While God and creation are not equal partners, and Fergusson is careful to
stress this point, the relationship can be described as genuine, entailing a degree of
mutuality or co-dependence and a relative autonomy on the part of creation.
Fergusson is forthright about the implication of introducing the notion of co-
dependence. It is clear that divine aseity and impassibility must either go or be
radically reworked. His insights on the genuine relatedness and co-dependence
between God and the world are informed by the work of Old Testament scholars
Walter Brueggemann and Terence Fretheim.
Fergusson argues “God does not relate to us merely as individuals, but as
persons who exist in relation to one another and to the wider environment.”15 This
“web of life” is neither chaotic nor deterministic. Fergusson expands as follows: “If
we think of creation as an interconnected world established in a continuing
relationship with its Maker and Redeemer, then we can attribute a proper place to
creaturely action, initiative, and power in ways that reflect the codependence of God
without lapsing into synergism or Pelagianism. The divine-human relationship is
asymmetrical in terms of its setting, yet it is one in which God becomes reactive and
in some respects dependent upon what has been made. Within this conceptual space,
activities such as prayer, obedience, rebellion, forgiveness, redemption, and blessing
now become possible.16
Concerning general providence, Fergusson highlights the rhythms and
regularities that bespeak of the goodness of creation and the upholding wisdom of
God. Still, because the project of creation is not yet complete, there are also elements
of randomness, surprise and surd in the present order. As Fretheim puts it: “There is
no little play in the system”.17 This ambivalence and tension present in Scripture
between the world reflecting the wisdom of God and “the social and natural world…
threatened by disruptive elements”18 cannot be properly accounted for in a
omnideterministic reading of providence. What results from taking in the elements of
struggle found in Scripture, notes Fergusson, “is the exercise of providence not as a
simple predetermining of everything that happens”, but rather as “a rule to be
celebrated, but one that is never complete or lacking in conflict.”19

15 Ibid., 273.
16 Ibid.
17 Fretheim as quoted by Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 273
18 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 274.
19 Fergusson, “Divine Providence and Action,” 154.

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 In fact, the language of victory, triumph and enthronement in Scripture
presupposes the manifestations of forces that threaten the rule of God. While they do
not amount to a symmetrical Manichean counterpart to God, they represent real
opposing forces, which generate genuine disorder, even chaos. Such states of affairs
call for struggle and resistance. Fergusson points out that this provisional, partial
dualism has for too long been ignored as an important feature of the Hebrew Bible.20
Surd, disruptive, irregular elements, and corresponding patterns of struggle and
resistance – these are the Cinderella of traditional doctrines of providence that
promise to be dignified with a powerful comeback in the revisionary work on
providence that Fergusson is preparing.21
Particular providence is described “more dialectically”, argues Fergusson, and
is harder to discern, particularly in experiences of wilderness and exile. This calls for
“a more dramatic and interactive account” apparent, for example, in Paul’s remarks
about the foolishness of the cross.22 Divine sovereignty is undoubtedly a central
theme of the biblical narrative, “but this sovereignty is exercised dramatically in a
conquest of evil.”23
The assortment of biblical allusions to divine foresight and provision is a
powerful indicator that providence is informed by and flows into all three articles of
the creed: creation, redemption and eschatology.24

If we know the content and scope of God’s providence from contemplating the history of Israel and its
fulfillment in the person and work of Christ, then the signs of providence will begin here and spread
outward into the cosmos. Yet in discerning these, we remain within the circle of faith 25

With this statement Fergusson qualifies his previous point that providence
cannot be discerned by looking at the external world. The history of Israel and, most
importantly, the person and work of Christ constitute a “circle of faith” in which
God’s providence is concentrated and out of which readings of providence more
generally can subsequently be offered. Fergusson notes: “God’s providence in our

20 David Bentley Hart also argues for a 'provisional dualism' in The doors of the sea: where was
God in the Tsunami? (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2005).
21 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 273.
22 Ibid., 274.
23 Fergusson, “Divine Providence and Action,” 157.
24 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 275.
25 Ibid.

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lives is most evidently displayed not in material success, health, or other forms of
prosperity. It is best evidenced in the knowledge of the forgiveness of sins and in the
power of the sanctifying Spirit.” On this view, providence has more to do with
individual and collective response to ‘what is going on’ rather with ‘what is going on’
as such. The hermeneutical centre or providence is ecclesio-liturgcial: the church’s
life of praise, confession, supplication, and obedience.26 Providential readings offered
from within this context are not to be offered as psychological insights, cosmic visions
or political philosophies, but rather as expressions of faith presented tentatively and
with reserve. Elements of providence may thus be discerned in the rhythms of life,
the gift of friendship, civic harmony, peace and a relative measures of justice and
harmony achieved by political states.

On divine determinism

Fergusson criticizes divine determinism on two related grounds. First,

determinism struggles to distinguish between those events and states of affairs that are
directly willed by God and those which God opposes and which go against the divine
intention. Divine determinism is built on the assumption that all events in the world
are caused and can therefore be traced back to the divine will, which is the necessary
and sufficient condition for all worldly occurrences. This has produced a theology of
divine decrees, spawning a fatalist mentality in which all contingencies are construed
to be expressive of divine purpose. Secondly, determinism presupposes an inadequate
account of human freedom that evacuates choices of their deep significance as
expressions of agency. If freedom is notoriously difficult to articulate positively,
Fergusson sees promise in taking a negative, apophatic approach to arrive at “an
alternative notion of radical choice”. The end result is a modified libertarian notion
of freedom in which “an action is free if it has no complete explanation in terms of
the agent's personality, brain-state or genetic make-up.”27 While physiological,
psychological, socio-political and theological factors condition decision-making, the
decision can be considered free nonetheless if it cannot be exhaustively explained
through recourse to any or all of the conditioning elements. Freedom thus necessarily

26Ibid.
27David A. S. Fergusson, “Predestination: A Scottish Perspective,” Scottish Journal of Theology
46, no. 04 (November 1993): 477.

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includes the ability to act otherwise notwithstanding any conditioning factors.
Elaborating on the problems of the notion of timeless ordination (or foreordination, if
we hold to divine temporality), Fergusson explains how the result of our choices has
been necessarily and sufficiently determined. On this view, secondary causes are
reduced to instruments through which the primary cause is executed.28
Alternatively, an account of freedom that leans in a more libertarian direction
entails an abridgement of divine determinism. Fergusson does not seem to want to
discard, but merely modify the language of causality, taking into consideration
Aquinas’ point about how the concept of cause is analogically predicated of God. He
states: “A causal role is exercised in bringing about, preserving, and securing the final
end of everything that exists. This role confirms rather than destroys the contingency
of creaturely causes… The analogical relationship of the two forms of causality
suggests a relationship of mutual entailment rather than exclusion.”29 It is at this
point that Fergusson introduces the analogy of a play, in which characters “are
moved by a mixture of free choices, temperament, circumstances, and the actions of
others”,30 which function as liberating constraints, enabling, rather than stifling free,
creative acting. Each of the constrains can be assessed in relation to the outcome of
the plot, while the whole play can rightly be called the creation and production of the
playwright and producer/director. However, Fergusson readily perceives the
limitations of this analogy, which points to the relative inadequacy of all theories of
double agency.
Fergusson’s constructive proposal is, first, that God’s differentiated action and
the variety of intra-canonical models for providence calls accordingly for a
differentiated account of providence. Different types of divine involvement in
creation require much more sharper conceptual distinctions between permission and
positive will. Insofar as the world is created and upheld by God, its existence is
inextricably bound up with God’s will. However, Fergusson seems to reject then
notion of permissive will as it inevitably and logically commits us to positing a real
congruence between the divine will and all worldly events. The concept of divine
permission simply does not have the conceptual strength to avoid the sanctification of
the status quo. Similarly, if all events and experiences, however dismal, are either

28 Fergusson, “Divine Providence and Action,” 163.

29 Ibid., 162.
30 Ibid.

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‘blessings in disguise’ or opportunities for some redemptive purpose, to speak of
certain events as lying irrevocably outside the providential rule of God becomes
impossible. Fergusson does not issue any value judgments on this potential
impossibility. It is unclear whether it is salutary or problematic.
Secondly, Fergusson wants the notion of the divine will to be informed and
shaped by God’s redemptive work and purposes accomplished in Christ. This implies
pushing away from notions of an inscrutable divine will predicated on a monadic
God. From a pastoral point of view, what one needs most in times of surd suffering
and searing pain is not answers which cohere with a certain explanatory scheme, but
the strength to carry on in the hope that God will bring eschatological healing and
restoration following the decisive, inaugural work on the Cross. Faith itself appears to
be fortified by experiences of suffering and oppression as the history behind many of
the Germanic hymns shows. Finally, as already intimated, providential assessments,
both inward and external, must be made from within the Christological centre of
faith. This, argues Fergusson, prevents “a lurch into speculation, sentimentality, or a
premature closure on the problems.”31
Fergusson sees promise in giving the Holy Spirit a more prominent place in
our doctrine of providence, as this may “enable one to speak of creation as a project
or a site under construction rather than as a perfect expression of a divine scheme.”
He continues by saying that a pneumatological treatment of providence can avoid
creating a rift between the relative autonomy of the world and divine rule. “In
moving the world to its telos (end), the Spirit is active as decisively shaping the final
outcomes, not in ways that are deterministic.”32 Pneumatologically construed, divine
action can be discussed in terms of persuasion, presence, interaction, influence and
infinite resourcefulness.33 Omnicausality and omnideterminism are replaced with
omnicompetence. However, Fergusson does not elaborate on how omnicompetence
may be best construed but indicates the presence of “an element of improvisation in
God’s dealings with the world.”34 Fergusson explains that this mode of action,
considering the scope of the Spirit’s knowledge and taking into account the doctrine
of omnipresence must not be underappreciated. As concerns divine knowledge,

31 Fergusson, “Theology of Providence,” 278.

32 Fergusson, “Divine Providence and Action,” 164.
33 Fergusson, “Predestination: A Scottish Perspective,” 477.
34 Fergusson, “Predestination: A Scottish Perspective,” 477.

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Fergusson merely suggests it “may need to be abridged in the name of divine love
and patience,” displayed in the vicissitudes of Israel and epitomized in the Cross.35
To conclude, Fergusson is intimating what we may call a modified risk view
of providence. While affinities with open theism are sufficiently clear, to date
Fergusson has not interacted, let alone identified with the movement. Even if echoes
of the theoretical pillars of open theism cannot be overlooked in the works already
published, Fergusson is a much too subtle and creative theologian to subscribe
without reservations to the open theistic construal of providence. A better picture of
the relation between Fergusson’s revisionary account of providence and the open
theistic accounts already in circulation will most likely emerge in Fergusson’s
forthcoming monograph.
Fergusson advocates a Trinitarian approach with a focus on pneumatology, a
divine phenomenology of love (following Vanstone) and the introduction of creation
ex nihilo (definitive beginning) and eschatology (ultimate resolution) as safeguards or
book ends to the doctrine of providence, both of which, as Fergusson argues, attest to
God’s indefeasible power and wisdom to lead creation to its end. He explains:
“Theories of this type can articulate a providential ruling of the world in which not
everything that happens can be perceived as willed by God.”36 There is certainly a
substantial pastoral gain in articulating a doctrine of providence that does not
attribute every occurrence to the divine will. On a revisionary account of providence
articulated along the lines suggested by Fergusson the problem of evil and suffering is
not solved, but it may turn out to be more endurable than in either deterministic or
radical-risk accounts.
All in all, while raising plenty of questions, the ‘rudiments’ of David
Fergusson’s revised doctrine of providence discussed in our paper are deeply fertile
and augur an important, forthcoming monograph, which may creatively move the
doctrine of providence towards greater Scriptural faithfulness, theological coherence
and pastoral sensitivity.

35 Ibid., 477.
36 Fergusson, “Divine Providence and Action,” 164.

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