Calanze v PICOP
authority under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7076 is vested with the Provincial
April 24, 2009
Chico-Nazario
Digest by: Aeron Halos
General Facts:
1. Petitioners filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Service, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XI, of Davao City,
applications for small-scale mining permits for the purpose of extracting gold.
2. On 22 December 1992, the governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Y. Lopez, approved
the applications and issued six small-scale mining permits in favor of the
petitioners.
3. Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners were within the respondent
PICOP’s logging concession area under Timber License Agreements (TLAs) that
covered large tracts of forest lands of the Provinces of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del
Sur, Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte, petitioners negotiated with PICOP for their
entry into the mining site at Barangay Catihan, Municipality of Boston, Davao
Oriental.
4. PICOP refused petitioners’ entry into the mining area.
5. On 7 May 1993, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Restraining Order against PICOP and its officers before the RTC of
Banganga, Davao Oriental.
6. RTC granted but on appeal, the CA reversed.
Petitioners (Calanza):
 The subject mining area is within the territory of the Province of Davao
Oriental. Pursuant to Section 465, paragraph (b), Sub-paragraph (3)iv of
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 which states to
the effect that the governor has the power to issue licenses and permits, the
governor therefore is vested with the power to issue the small-scale mining
permits to the petitioners.
Respondents (PICOP):
 that petitioners’ mining permits are defective since they were issued by the
governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay
Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur
 The RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the
provinces of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since the resolution of the
boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans of the
two provinces and the RTC has only appellate jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991.
 The governor has no power to issue small-scale mining permits since such
Mining Regulatory Board.
 Mining permits cannot be issued over areas covered by forest rights such as
TLAs or forest reservations unless their status as such is withdrawn by
competent authority.
Issues:
1. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint given that the case involves a
boundary dispute over LGUs
2. WON the governor had the power to issue the small scale mining permit
Held:
1. No. There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a
Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or more LGUs.
Under paragraph (c) of Section 118 of LGC, the settlement of a boundary dispute
involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly
referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians or the provincial boards of the
different provinces involved. Section 119 of the Local Government Code gives a
dissatisfied party an avenue to question the decision of the sanggunian to the RTC having
jurisdiction over the area.
Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing The Local Government
Code of 1991 outlines the procedures governing boundary disputes, which succinctly
includes the filing of the proper petition, and in case of failure to amicably settle, a formal
trial will be conducted and a decision will be rendered thereafter. An aggrieved party can
appeal the decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate RTC.
Clearly, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no
petition that was filed and decided by the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary
dispute since the Local Government Code allocates such power to the sangguniang
panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Since the RTC has no original
jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its
decision is a total nullity.
2. No. Petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under
Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are processed with the
Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076,
which took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and
for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board.
Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining
sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a representative from an
environmental group, this body is tasked to approve small-scale mining permits and
contracts.
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Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte.
Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the
same permits are null and void.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 June
2000 and its Resolution dated 10 November 2000 reversing the 26 November 1993
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Banganga, Davao Oriental, Branch 7, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC
September 10, 1999
J. Ynares-Santiago
Digest By: Plaza
Topic: RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over boundary disputes among LGUs
General Facts: (chronological)
1. There was an existing boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the
City of Pasig City over several parcels of land. Both claimed ownership over the
territory in question. Because of this dispute, there was a case pending before the
RTC of Rizal.
 Significance of boundary dispute: The territorial boundaries of a LGU must be
clearly delineated. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of LGU. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these
limits, its acts are ultra vires.
2. While the case was still pending, 2 ordinances were passed creating new Barangays
and calling for the conduct of plebiscites. These new Barangays involved areas,
thatwere subject of the dispute in the RTC.
a. City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite was set for June 22, 1996.
b. City Council of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, creating Barangay
Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite was set for March 15, 1997.
3. Municipality of Caintamoved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites
scheduled, and filed Petitions with COMELEC. It called the attention of COMELEC to
a pending case before RTC for settlement of boundary disputes.
c. COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to
be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the boundary
dispute involving the two municipalities
d. COMELEC dismissed the other Petition on Barangay Napcio for being moot in
view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the
creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast.
4. Hence, the present case which is two (2) consolidated petitions which both
questionthe propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings, pending the
resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local governments?
Arguments of the City of Pasig
 The areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within
its territory.
 There is no prejudicial question since a prejudicial question contemplates a civil
and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the
instant case.
Arguments of the Municipality of Cainta
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 The proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of a the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay
pending case; the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is
the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the
boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in
Arguments of COMELEC Civil Case No. 94-300.”
 Bgy. KARANGALAN: The boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question, which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. The plebiscite
on BgyKarangalan was not yet conducted, so it is still a justiciable issue.
 The issue on Bgy. NAPICO is already moot and academic because a plebiscite had
already been held!
Supreme Court and Ratio:
On the prejudicial question
 The boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for
the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
 The general rule is a prejudicial question does not come into play if both cases are
civil, however in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend action on one
case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to it
(Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental)
 While the City of Pasig claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays are
within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the RTC. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with
finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only
be an exercise in futility.
On the holding of the plebiscite
 Considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more
prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of plebsicites, pending final determination
of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.

 If the court does not annul the plebiscite already conducted will set a dangerous
precedent, and parties will just argue fait accompli when the problem rises again.
Held:
 Plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta by the RTC.
 The plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico,
Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
Dispositive Portion:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The
COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and
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CASE: Municipality of Kananga, represented by its Mayor, Hon. Giovanni Napari v Hon. agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality
Fortunito Madrona, presiding judge, RTC of Ormoc, and the City of Ormoc, represented and an independent component city of the same province, respondent
by its Mayor, Hon. Eufrocino Codilla Sr. court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the MTD. RTCs
have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
DATE: April 30, 2003
expressly withheld from their plenary powers.
PONENTE: Panganiban, J. HELD:
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED. No
FACTS: pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
 A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kanangana and the City
of Ormoc. They submitted the issue to amicable settlement but none was
reached.
 To settle the dispute, the City of Ormoc filed a complaint before the RTC of
Ormoc.
 September 24, 1999: Petitioner municipality filed an MTD.
 RTC: Denied the Municipality of Kananga’s MTD, holding that it had jurisdiction
of the case under BP 129. It further ruled that Sec. 118 of the LGC had been
substantially complied with because both parties had already had the occasion
to meet and thresh out their differences. It also held that Sec. 118 governed
venue, hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Sec. 4(b) of Rule
4 of the ROC. Unsatisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
 Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim?
RATIO:
 YES, it does.
◦ Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and authority to hear
and determine a cause. It is a question of law.
◦ Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the
complaint is Sec. 118 of the LGC. Under this provision, the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other – or between two or more highly
urbanized cities – shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the LGUs involved.
◦ There is no question that Kanaga is a municipality constituted under RA
No. 542. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent
component city created under RA No. 179. RA No. 179, Sec. 89, prohibits its
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent
of the province. Sec. 118 contemplates a cituation in which a component
city or municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute. Clearly then, the
procedure referred to in Sec. 118 does not apply to them.
◦ Since Sec. 118 finds no application here, the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in BP
129:
▪ Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
◦ Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
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Abraham Rimando (petitioner) v Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc.,
represented by its president Rosemarie Llarenas and CA (respondents)
July 23 2012
J. Reyes
Leigh Siazon
Topic: Police power; General welfare clause and limitations on the exercise thereof (Sec.
16, LGC)
Facts:
Naguilian Emission Testing Center (NETC) claimed that its business is being conducted
on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the national government but later on
certified by the DENR as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. NETC
had operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January
18, 2008, NETC filed an application for the renewal of its business permit. However,
petitioner Rimando, the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union, refused
to issue a business permit unless and until NETC executes a contract of lease with the
Municipality of Naguilian. NETC was amenable to signing such contract subject to some
proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to Rimando. NETC filed a
petition for mandamus and damages before the RTC against Rimando. The petition
prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel Rimando to issue a business
permit in favor of NETC.
RTC denied the petition for lack of merit:
(a) the Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by
virtue of a tax declaration
(b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the
municipality has the right to require NETC to sign a contract of lease because its business
operation is being conducted on a real property owned by the municipality
(c) a mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be
enforced by a mandamus writ.
NETC appealed. CA held that the appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness
considering that the period for which the business period was being sought had already
lapsed. Nonetheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the issues for academic purposes, and
reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It found that the factual milieu of the case
justifies the issuance of a writ of mandamus:
(a) the tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require
the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a
business permit.
(b) Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored
its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements
of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
(c) Rimando may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction was done in
the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good
faith. Also, the civil action filed against Rimando had already become moot and academic
upon the expiration of his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.
Petitioner Rimando:
- (same as RTC)
- Sangguniang Bayan Resolution is valid
- petition for mandamus is not the proper vehicle to determine issue on ownership of
land
Respondent NETC: (same as CA)
Issue: Can Rimando be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit? NO
Dispositive: CA decision SET ASIDE. RTC decision REINSTATED.
Ratio:
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and
academic owing to the expiration of the period intended to be covered by the business
permit. While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot
appeal of the respondent, we find that the decretal portion of its decision was
erroneously couched. The CA’s conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject
land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being
unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of
the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the
appeal was its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along with the
petition for mandamus that spawned it.
[pertinent to topic]
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business
permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in
nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor
where a determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant
business permits under the Local Government Code, viz:
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues,
and apply the same to the implementation of development plans,
program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of
this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for
agro-industrial development and country-wide growth and progress,
and relative thereto, shall: x x x x
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits
had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
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 As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue
licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police
power to local governments. Local government units exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the LGC is unequivocal that the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had
been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. xxx
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to
issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police
power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be
deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the
matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent
is incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business
permits.
EMILIO GANCAYCOv. CITY GOV’T OF QUEZON CITY AND MMDA (G.R. No. 177807)
MMDA v. JUSTICE EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (Retired)
(G.R. No. 177933)
October 11, 2011
Sereno, J.
Digest by Itchie Yap
Topic & Provision: Gen Powers & Attributes of Local Govts> Police Power > Gen
Welfare Clause & Limitations on the Exercise Thereof (Sec 16, LGC)
Facts:
 In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of titled land
(374sq.m.) along (EDSA), Quezon City (QC)
 On 27 March 1956, the QC Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled “An
Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be
Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of QC, and
Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.”
 An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting
over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians
against rain or sun.
 UnderOrdinance 2904, the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the
ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus,
the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the
property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect,
property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians,
instead of using it for their own purposes.
 Note that at the time Ordinance 2904 was passed, there was yet no building code
passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of
buildings was left to the discretion of LGUs.
 The ordinance was amended several times, granting exemption to certain properties
along different points of EDSA and reducing the prescribed width of the arcade from
5 to 3 meters.
 The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Sometime in 1965,
Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from
constructing an arcade on his property, which request was granted by way of
resolution “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner
shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own
expense when public interest so demands.”
 Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in
QC pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28. It authorized
the MMDA and LGUs to “clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks
and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.”
 A notice of demolition was sent to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his
building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code) in
relation to Ordinance 2904.Gancaycowas given 15 days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.
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  Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. MMDA proceeded to demolish the
party wall or “wing walls,” of the ground floor structure. At the time of the
demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
 The ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law
and just compensation because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5
square meters from his 375 square meter property.
 In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its
scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the
Quezon City-San Juan boundary to CubaoRotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to
construct arcades at their option.
Petitioner’s Prayers / Remedy Sought:
 Declaration of nullity of Ordinance 2904 and payment of damages.
Alternately,payment of just compensation should ordinance be held valid.
Respondent City Government’s Arguments:
 The ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in
a business zone.
 In addition, Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
Respondent MMDA’s Arguments:
 Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already
violated
 The ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality.
 The questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of
pedestrians.
 MMDA was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No.
2904.
RTC Ruling (2003): In favor of Petitioner, Justice Gancayco.
 HELD: The questioned ordinance was unconstitutional. It allowed the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. Because 67.5 square
meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being taken
without compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and
oppressive. It likewise violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws.
 ORDER: Respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing
the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is directed to immediately restore
the portion of the party wall or wing wall of the building of the petitioner it
destroyed to its original condition.
CA Ruling (2006)
 Appeal is partly granted. Ordinance No. 2904 is valid. The injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance is lifted.
 HELD:
(1) The ordinance is a valid exercise of the right of the LGU to promote the general
welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.
(2) The ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard
to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the
location.
(3) There was no taking of private property since the owner still enjoyed the
beneficial ownership of the property
(4) Nevertheless, the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the
subject property. Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets,
avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus
excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. The MMDA is not clothed with
the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
Issues/ SC HELD:
(1) Whether or not Justice Gancayco was estopped from assailing the validity of
ordinance no. 2904? NO.
(2) Whether or not ordinance no. 2904 is constitutional? YES.
(3) Whether or not the wing wall of Justice Gancayco’s building is a public
nuisance? NO.
(4) Whether or not the MMDA legally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco?
NO.
Ratio:
On Estoppel…
 Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to
determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a “taking” of private property
without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was
allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the
building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no “taking” yet to
speak of.
“Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are
null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra
vires.”[Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA]
“The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner
estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional
question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the
fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later.” [British American Tobacco v. Camacho]
On Equal Protection…
 Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection
when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco
himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965
and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at
the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer.
Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of
properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper
person to do so.
On Police Power…
 Zoning and the regulation of theconstruction of buildings are validexercises of police
power.
 “Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for
7
 the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
[MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association]
 Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative
boards as well as the law-making bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national law-making body.
On Constitutionality…
 To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first
determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can
determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of
the delegation.
 It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city
council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the
Revised Charter of Quezon City, which states:
“To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with
such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under
the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.”
 Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the
construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city
government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and
structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of
constructing and repairing them.
On LGUs Power to Issue Zoning Ordinances…
 Social Justice Society v. Atienza, the case of the Oil Depots being affected by a
2001 ordinance of the City of Manila reclassifying the subject areas from
industrial to commercial
“In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of
the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However,
the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall
arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health,
morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in
view
“…A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future
projection of needs… The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of
a locality.”
 Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development
“…property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.”
“Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will
suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the
alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no
basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.”
 In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of
Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of
arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion
of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage
along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents
of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is
located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.
 Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, which was passed after the Quezon
City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904.
[see Section 102 and Section 1004 of the Building Code]
On Nuisance Per Se and Abatement…
 The “wing walls” of the building are notnuisances per se. The fact that in
1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from
constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the
building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per
se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property.
The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance. [see Article 694, Civil Code]
 The MMDA does not have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a
nuisance.
 AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.
“…under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, the SangguniangPanglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating
noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that
the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a
8
 nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks.
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize “MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing
things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its legislative power.”
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution
of the Sangguniang Bayan.”
“...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
On the Impropriety of the Demolition…
authority". It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
 MMDA illegally demolishedthe property of Justice Gancayco.
policies and coordinating with the various national government
 The Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may
be demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations
lies with the Building Official. [see Section 205 and 207 of the Building and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
Code] basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. — When any administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or charter itself…”
ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or On the Power to Enforce the Building Code…
demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or  The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the
safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA [see Section
taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the 201 of the Building Code]
Civil Code of the Philippines.  There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to
implement the Building Code.
 Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does
not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of
violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of “a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not
more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the violation is
committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the
Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with the
management thereof shall be held responsible therefor.” The ordinance
itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine
whether there was a violation of the ordinance.
 There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the
claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its
hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer, the city government
stated that “the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without
the participation and/or consent ofQuezon City.” Therefore, the MMDA
acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of
the portion of Justice Gancayco’s building.
On the Powers of MMDA and Its Limitations…
 MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

“It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify
the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other
advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to

9
The Learning Child Inc. andSps. Alfonso v. Ayala Alabang Association et al.
July 7, 2010
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
By: CateAlegre
POLICE POWER
Facts:
 This case involves 3 consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning the
operation of a preparatory and grade school in Ayala Alabang Village
 1984 – Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to Sps. Yuson who sold the same
to Sps. Alfonso (Petitioners)
o A Deed of Restrictions was annotated to the title as had been required by
ALI stating:
2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and
kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for
school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.
 ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions to respondents
Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA)
 Sps. Alfonso opened The Learning Child Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school.
However TLC was expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the
Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels
 AAVA filed an action for injunction against petitioners alleging breach of contract
particularly the Deed of Restrictions.
Petitioners
 With the passing of Municipal Zoning Ordinance 91-39 reclassifying the property
as “institutional”, there ceased to be a legal basis to uphold the Deed of Restrictions
on the title of Sps. Alfonso
 The Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its SangguniangBayan, passed Resolution
No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel
of land under the heading “Institutional Zone” in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-
39, adjusting the description “Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang” to “Lot 25,
Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang.”
 TLC is located in Lot 25, Block 3
 Ortigas& Co. Lmtd. Partnership v. Feati Bank should apply.While non-impairment
of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it
has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power by the
municipality.
Respondents
 Petitioners committed a violation of Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance
81-01 which classified Ayala Alabang Village as a low-density residential area thus
limiting the use of the property to the establishment of a nursery and kindergarten
school.
 Regardless of the passage of Ordinance 91-39, this did not have the effect of
nullifying the Deed of Restrictions inasmuch as there is no conflict between the
Ordinance and the Deed.
 The exercise of police power is valid, the same does not operate to automatically
negate all other legal relationships in existence since the better policy is to
reconcile the conflicting rights and to preserve both instead of nullifying one
against the other.
Issue:WON Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance 91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa
Resolution 91-179 ha the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions
Held: NO! There is a way to harmonize the 2 provisions.
Dispositive:
The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2,
1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the
defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the
Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two
classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom
restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the
Learning Child School’s grade school department, be allowed to finish their elementary
studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The enrollment of new
students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
Ratio:
 The restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory (nursery and
kindergarten) school, without regard to the number of classrooms. The two-
classroom limit is actually imposed, not by the Deed of Restrictions, but by MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01.
 In the Ortigas case, the SC in upholding the exercise of police power attendant in
the reclassification of the subject property therein over the Deed of Restrictions
over the same property, took into consideration the prevailing conditions in the
area
 HERE: the subject property, though declared as an institutional lot, nevertheless
lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots.
o The area surrounding TLC did not undergo a radical change.
o The lot occupied by TLC is located along one of the smaller roads (less than
eight meters in width) within the subdivision. It is understandable why ALI,
as the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller, preparatory
school that will generate less traffic than bigger schools.
o Foreseeably, the greater traffic generated by TLC’s expanded operations will
affect the adjacent property owners enjoyment and use of their own
properties. AAVA’s and ALI’s insistence on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions or (2) the obtainment of the approval of the affected residents for
any modification of the Deed of Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand,
10
 the then Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have any special
justification for declaring the subject lot as an institutional property.
o In other words, the municipality was not asserting any interest or zoning purpose
contrary to that of the subdivision developer in declaring the subject property as
institutional.
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO
Dec. 14, 1979
SANTOS, J.
AZORES
Topic: General powers and attributes of locgov – police power
(I tried to make it one page. Pagbigyannaangkalahating page nalumampas. Lol)
FACTS:
 Ortigassold 2 parcels of landof the Highway Hills Subdivision to Padilla and
Angeles which was eventually transferred to Emma Chavez
 Upon completion of payment, Ortigasexecuted the corresponding deeds of sale
in favor of Emma Chavez. It contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
o The land shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes,
(there were other restrictions but this is the relevant one)
o These restrictions were also annotated in the TCTs
 Eventually, Feati Bank acquired the lots and was issued TCTs in its name and
the building restrictions were also annotated therein.
 Feati Bank began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on lots to be devoted to banking purposes
 Ortigasdemanded that Feati Bank stop the construction of the commerical
building on the said lots because the lots are only to be used for residential
purposes. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the
building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations
 Ortigas filed a complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against Feati Bank
 TC sided with Feati Bank
Plaintiff’s arguments:
 the restrictions annotated on TCTs were imposed as part of its general building
scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills
Subdivision which forms part of their big landed estate where commercial and
industrial sites are also designated or established.
 Feati Bank is duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in
its favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the TCTs
 the Municipal Council had no power to nullify or supersede the agreement of
the parties embodied in the sales contract, as thatwould impair the obligation
of contracts in violation of the Constitution. (cited American Jurisprudence)
Respondent’s arguments
 the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River,
has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27,
dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.
 Ortigascompletely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said
subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it
more than 2 years after the area had been declared a commercial and industrial
zone
ISSUES/ HELD”
WON Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power - YES
WON the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed
by Feati Bank– YES
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the
complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
ISSUE 1
 the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation
of facts when Ortigasdid not dispute the same.
 But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late for Ortigasto raise the issue of
the invalidity of the municipal resolution, the said resolution is still valid
 Section 3 of RA2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a Municipal Council "to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations". The law does not
restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance or regulation.
Resolution No. 27 is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of
the word "regulation" under the provision.
 Section 12 of the same law prescribes the rules for its interpretation reveals
that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its
favor" and that "Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed
to exist." The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights
arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand
and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions
of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case
at bar.
ISSUE 2
 while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
 Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of
powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
11
 police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it
is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past
conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life."
(Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al.)
 Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA, for short from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the
exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial notice may be
taken of the conditions prevailing in the area
 The lots in the case at bar are not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic
artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents
in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong,
through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under
the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
 The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances
 Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort health and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim
of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
 The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable,
and it being a " legitimate response to a felt public need," not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not
bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power.
 Furthermore, laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties. (Philippine American Life Ins.
Co. v. Auditor General)
 Reliance of Ortigas to American Jurisprudence is misplaced. American authority
is not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily
be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such
intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other
local legislation related thereto.
Social Justice Society, Vladimir Cabigao and Bonifacio Tumbokon vs. Jose Atienza,
Jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila
March 7, 2007
Corona, J.
Bahjin
Topic: General Powers of Local Governments – Police Power
GENERAL FACTS:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication. This
Ordinance reclassified an area in Sta. Ana and Pandacan from Industrial II to Commercial
I. The Ordinance also gave the owners and operators of industries 6 months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which has now been disallowed by the reclassification. It was enacted “for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare
of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas…”
Among the businesses situated in the area that should be removed due to the
reclassification are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex,
Petron and Shell. However, due to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
City of Manila and the Department of Energy, the removal of the Pandacan Terminals
was delayed. Instead, the MOU provided for a program to “scale down the Pandacan
Terminals” and the “decommissioning process of 28 tanks”. It also provided for the
“development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones” surrounding the
Pandacan Terminals.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In a later
resolution, the validity of Resolution No. 97 was extended to April 30, 2003.
Petitioners then filed this action for mandamus seeking to compel Mayor
Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner Social Justice Society is a political party with offices in Manila and
with many members residing in Manila. Petitioners Cabigao and Tumbokan are residents
of Manila. Petitioners contend that the Mayor has the mandatory legal duty, under
Section 455 (b) (2) of the LGC1, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of
the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
1Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. – xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city xxxx
12
 Mayor Atienza’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by
the MOU and the resolutions. The ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each
other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance
remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent
him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be
considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.
ISSUE: WON Mandamus should be granted and the Mayor should fully enforce the
Ordinance.
HELD: YES. The petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Mayor is directed to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
RATIO:
When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. As
residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s
ordinances.
The LGC imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. He has the duty to enforce the Ordinance as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to
do so.
Officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted
in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties
upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to
obey it. (Dimaporo vs. Mitra)
Even assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest
of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers
of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect
the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of
a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective
measure should be delayed.
Social Justice Society v Atienza
Feb, 13, 2008
Corona, J.
Digest by Jobar Buenagua
Facts:
- Petitioners sought to compel Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This
ordinance reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil
companies.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
- The said ordinance is a valid exercise of police power under the LGC. This
empowered the LGUs to enact and enforce laws and ordinances that will benefit
the general public.
- The current location of the Pandacan terminals endanger many citizens and
residents of Manila. It poses a great threat to their security and livelihood.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional since it deprives the Oil companies
from regularly conducting their business.
- Granting that it is within the power of the LGU to enact such ordinance, it is still
unconstitutional since it was done in arbitrarily. The ordinance singled out the
oil companies having depots in the Pandacan area making it unfair and
oppressive.
Issue:
WON Ordinance 8027 is constitutional. YES.
SC Ratio:
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid
- The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027
13
 - Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in
the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This
power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare
of the people is the supreme law). While police power rests primarily with the
national legislature, such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC,
known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power
to local governments.
- LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city
council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the city. This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of Police Power
- Local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
- Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted “for the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare” of the residents of
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which Amounts To
Taking Without Compensation
- In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to
protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation
to the end in view.
- The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate
zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the
businesses and industries in the zones it established.
- The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is
not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public. Property has not only an
individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but
also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other
members of society.
February 23, 2005
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. vs. JAC LINER, INC.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Topic: General Welfare Clause
FAST FACTS: The City Council of Lucena passed Ordinances 1631 and 1778 which
prohibited outside buses and out-of-town jeepneys from entering the city and instead
load/unload only in the common terminal which LGCT was granted exclusive franchise
of. As such, all terminals, including those existing are prohibited from operating within
the city. The Court held that there was a lawful subject in the form of traffic congestion.
However, there was no lawful means employed as the Ordinances go beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. The questioned ordinances are
characterized by overbreadth.
FACTS:
 JAC Liner is a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and
from Lucena City. They filed a petition for prohibition against the City of
Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena assailing City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional. With the aim of localizing
the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within
Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one
common terminal located outside the city proper. The common carriers plying
routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing
terminals and use the facilities of Lucena Grand Central Terminal which was
granted the exclusive franchise to operate a common terminal. Moreover, all
buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys are prohibited from
entering the city, instead they are to proceed to the Grand Central Terminal.
 These ordinances were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic
congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and
jeepney terminals within the city. JAC, who had maintained a terminal within
the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances. LGCT, as the grantee of
the exclusive franchise, was allowed to intervene.
JAC: The ordinances are unconstitutional on the ground that it constituted an invalid
exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies. Moreover, the Court should look behind
the explicit objective of the ordinances which, to it, was actually to benefit the private
interest of LGCT by coercing all bus operators to patronize its terminal.
LGCT: The grant of franchise to it has been issued in the exercise of police power o the
City Government. The Ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to “regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit
encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public
welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places. Also, other solutions for the traffic problem have already been tried but proven
14
ineffective. Lastly, they claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven
effective in easing traffic congestion.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it
enacted the subject ordinances. NO.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
RATIO:
 As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
 Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.
 That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be
gainsaid. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest
warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper
exercise of police power is thus present.
 As to the second requirement, the Court held that the ordinances assailed
herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use
of the terminal operated by LGCT would subject the users thereof to fees,
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive.
 The Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be
the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets
of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the
proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
 Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. The outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart
from that franchised to LGCT, cannot be considered as reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers
are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside
the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be
instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to
meet the specifications.
 The scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad
that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
 Moreover, grant of an exclusive franchise to LGCT has not been shown to be the
only solution to the problem.
 While the Sangguniang Panlungsod previously directed bus owners and
operators to put up their terminals “outside the poblacion of Lucena City,”
LGCT informs that said ordinance only resulted in the relocation of terminals to
other well-populated barangays, thereby giving rise to traffic congestion in
those areas. Assuming that to be true, the Sangguniang Panlungsod could have
defined, among other considerations, in a more precise manner, the area of
relocation to avoid such consequences.
 Absent any showing that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they
are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload
passengers on the city streets are. The power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Moreover, the terminals’ operation is a legitimate business which, by itself,
cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the
community.
 But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect
effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per
se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an
ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
 Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is
reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears
upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen
to be effective.
 The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City
supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of
support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court
by LGCT. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that
of an individual’s rights.
15
Parayno v Jovellanos
July 14, 2006
CORONA, J.:
JDG
Facts:
 P Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
 Some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said
municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location.
o The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police,
Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for
investigation. Thereafter, they advised the SB which recommended to
the Mayor (through a resolution) the closure or transfer of location of
the filling station.
 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but was denied.
Hence, she filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with RTC
Dagupan.
 RTC ruled for the miunicipality saying that Section 442, of the Official Zoning
Code includes gasoline filling station, following the principle of ejusdem generis
Petitioners:
a) The gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it
was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section
21 thereof. The legal maxim ejusden ply to her case.generis does not apply.
b) Res judicata argument. There is a previous decision of HLURB against her predecessor
which barred the grounds invoked by R municipality in Resolution No. 50. In the HLURB
case. Jovellanos also used the grounds being used by the municipality in this case.
c) The closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an
invalid exercise of the latter's police powers
Respondents (which were contained in the resolution): There are five points but they
can be summed up to
a) The gas station is a violation of
 the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44 particularly involving the
distances of the nearest school building and church. The distances are less than
100 meters and no neighbors were called as witnesses when actual
measurements were done. (Section 44 includes gasoline filling station,
following the principle of ejusdem generis)
 Building and Fire Safety Codes because the station has 2nd floor storey building
used for business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls.
2 Section 44. Gasoline Service Stations:
In business or industrial zones, no gasoline service station, commercial gasoline bus
station or public parking lot shall be allowed within one hundred (100) meters away
from any public or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital based
on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot
if there are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station; records,
pp. 69-70. (italics supplied)
b) It is in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses close to
each other which endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire. Further, the
residents complain of the smell which tend to expose the residents to sickness. Further,
it hampers the flow of traffic
ISSUES:
1) W/N ejusdem generis principle applies thus Sec 44 includes “filling stations”.
NO.
2) W/N the is a valid exercise of police power. NO
3) W/N there is res judicata. YES
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of
the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of
Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against
petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another
location.
Ratio:
1. The ordinance intended that “ filling stations” and “service stations” be separate
and distinct from each other.
 Filling stations are mentioned under Section 213, while Service Stations are
mentioned under Section 424. Further, even the municipality in the hearing
judicially admitted that there are certain distinctions between the two.
2. Even if LGC gives the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the
health and general welfare of its constituents, the municipality should have given
due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. In this case, the LGU failed to
comply with the due process clause when it passed the resolution.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are
3 Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with
gasoline and oil only
4 Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car
accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the following services
may be rendered and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;
b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor
mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and
the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising the motor
16
 reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
AS APPLIED IN THE CASE: There was no attempt to measure the distance even if
there is an investigation. Moreover, the business is not a nuisance which respondent
municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers.
Further, Parayno has secured the necessary building permit and approval of [her]
application for authority to relocate as per the letter of the Energy Regulatory
Board. As regards the hazardous complaints, the ERB believes that the project being
hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual.
3. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.21 For res judicata to
apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and (4) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.
City of Manila vs Laguio Jr.
April 12, 2005
J. Tinga
Digest by: De Veyra
Topic: General Welfare Clause and limitations on the exercise thereof
Facts:
- Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
- It filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order praying that the Ordinance No.
77835, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

All requisites are met. Although PPayrano may not have been impleaded in the first case, Petitioners’ arguments:
the assailed resolution of respondent municipality raised the same grounds invoked (1)
that the resolution aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline station to another
location due to the alleged violation of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and (2) that
5AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
the hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public. The
HLURB had already settled these concerns and its adjudication had long attained finality. PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary

notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-
Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the
East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D.
499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women
are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
17
 - The City Council has the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in
order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for
in the Local Government Code. The power of regulation includes the power to
control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement.
- The Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power
of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units
provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and
conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. It is a valid
exercise of police power and enjoys the presumption of validity.
Respondent’s arguments
- The Ordinance erroneously and improperly included motels and inns
considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or
"entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment,"
nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they
"disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community."
- It is invalid and unconstitutional because (1) The City Council has no power to
prohibit the operation of motels as per the Local Government Code of 1991
which only grants to the City Council the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments; (2) It does not constitute a proper
exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no
reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be
protected; (3)It violates MTDC's property rights and (4) It constitutes a denial
of equal protection
Issue: WON Ordinance 7783 is valid
Held: No. Court declared it ultra vires and therefore, null and void.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
Not a valid exercise of police power
The means employed have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in
itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring
within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. The enumerated
establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of
the community.
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing
those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid
to those therein employed. The City of Manila can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for
these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are
other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City
Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare.
The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether
the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
Petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It cannot be said that
motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a
legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
Violates the Equal Protection Clause
There are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. All are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists
for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments.
18
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM
January 20, 2009
Tinga, J.
Digest by Kiko del Valle
Topic/Provisions: General Powers and Attributes of Local Governments > Kinds of
Power > Police Power > General Welfare Clause
Short Summary: The City of Manila enacted an Ordinance that prohibits short-time
admission and wash-up rates in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments. Petitioner Corporations operating motels in Manila contests the
constitutionality of the ordinance arguing that it is an invalid exercise of police power
and that it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement. SC ruled that the
Ordinance is invalid and unconstitutional. The Ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The promotion of public welfare
and a sense of morality among citizens are valid only insofar as they do not trample upon
constitutionally-guaranteed rights.
Facts:
 Petitioners in this case are three companies are components of the Anito Group
of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila. The petition assails a City Ordinance 7774 that prohibits those same
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
“wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays. Previously, the court in City of
Manila v. Laguio, Jr. affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the
operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-
Malate area.
 Dec. 1992: City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance. (For the full copy of the ordinance, see original case). Essentially,
the ordinance provides:
o Sec. 3: “short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels,
inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.”
o Sec. 4: “short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of
room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the
renting out of rooms more than twice a day.”
o Sec. 5: penalty of “fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or
imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.”
 Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief praying that the Ordinance be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to
intervene and a complaint-in-intervention.
 RTC declared the ordinance null and void noting that the ordinance “strikes at
the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution.”
 CA affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
o First, ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement.
o Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims
to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate.
o Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the
well-being of its constituents in general.
o Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City
Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
Arguments of the Petitioners:
 MTDC claimed that, as owner and operator of the Victoria Court, it was
authorized by PD 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to
charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
 Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
the freedom of movement
 Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and
oppressive interference in petitioners’ business.
Arguments of Respondents:
 the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458
(4)(iv) of the LGC which confers on cities, among other local government units,
the power to “regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.”
 The ordinance is a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III,
Section 18(kk)6 of the Revised Manila Charter.
Issues/Held:
1. WON petitioners have standing? YES.
2. WON the ordinance is a valid and constitutional? NO. SC ruled in favor of petitioners.
Dispositive:
Petition is GRANTED. Ordinance No. 7774 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
6 “to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for
the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment,
or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.”
19

Ratio:
1. Petitioners have standing.
The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in thePhilippines, the
doctrine of transcendental importance. For this particular set of facts, the concept of
third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate.
The right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties is recognized, provided
three important criteria are satisfied:
 the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
 the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and
 there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her
own interests.
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the
Ordinance.
Also, in this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion
into the right to liberty of their clients. Based on the allegations in the petition, the
Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
2. The ordinance is unconstitutional.
 The test of a valid ordinance is well established. It must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
 The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is
evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the LGC through such implements as the general welfare
clause.
A. Police Power
 The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
 The desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people under the bill of rights.
B. Due Process
 The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process
grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test in U.S. v.
Carolene Products. Footnote 4 acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to
the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a “discrete and insular”
minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.” Consequently, two standards
of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis
standard of review for economic legislation.
 A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on
gender and legitimacy.
 The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty. It
cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the
subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution,
adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’” Whether or not this depiction of
a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual
behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.
 Court cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would
proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting
the room out for more than twice a day.
 That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of
a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure.
 It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work.
 A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. It prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare
or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it
makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to
illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified
prohibition.
 The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on
the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
 It is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying
the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from
20
 their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms
and even apartments.
 Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
However, in this case, the Ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.
The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting
out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
 The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens
deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such
measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.
Aniano Albon v. Bayani Fernando, Alfonso Espirito, Anaki Maderal, Natividad
Cabalquinto
June 30, 2006
Corona, J.
Digest by Doms Gana
Topic and Provision: Police Power, General Welfare Clause and limitations on the
exercise thereof, Sec. 16 LGC
Facts:
 In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen,
clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Green heights Subdivision. It
was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993
like other infrastructure projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks
previously undertaken by the city.
 On June 14, 1999, Petitioner Albon filed with the RTC of Marikina a taxpayer’s
suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with damages against
respondents (who were at that time officials of Marikina), namely, City
Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, City Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City
Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer NatividadCabalquinto.
 RTC, CA denied petitioner Albon’s TRO and preliminary injunction and
dismissed Albon’s petition. Albon appealed to the SC.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
 Ordinance No. 59 was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents
government officials (Bayani et al) to use government equipment and property,
and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for the grading, widening,
clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks
of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision, which resulted in using public funds for
private purposes.
 The sidewalks were private property because Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city
government could not use public resources on them.
 In addition, the respondents violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and alleged that there was no appropriation for the project.
Respondent’s Arguments:
 The city of Marikina is authorized to carry out the contested undertaking
pursuant to its inherent police power. Invoking this Court’s 1991 decision
inWhite Plains Association v. Legaspi,the roads and sidewalks inside
the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were deemed public property.
 The improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. 59,
s. 1993 was well within the LGU’s powers. On these grounds, the petition was
dismissed.
Issue: May a LGU validly use public funds to undertake the widening, repair and
improvement of the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision?
21
Held:YES, IFthe LGU has ownership over the open spaces and sidewalks of the subdivision, he was under the obligation to reimburse to the city government
subdivision. If not, then it may not do so. the expenses incurred in land-filling the streets.
Dispositive:WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the RTC  Moreover, the implementing rules of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, provide
of Marikina City for the reception of evidence to determine (1) whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. that it is the registered owner or developer of a subdivision who has the
responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road lots and
has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks of Marikina Green
open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the concerned LGU.
heights Subdivision or has donated them to the City of Marikina and (2) whether the The owner or developer shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of
public has full and unimpeded access to, and use of, the roads and sidewalks of the maintaining the road lots and open space only upon securing a certificate of
subdivision. The Marikina City Regional Trial Court is directed to decide the case with completion and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces
dispatch. SO ORDERED. to the LGU.
 Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of
Ratio: privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section
335 of RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support from the language
 Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for
of Section 17 of RA 7160, which mandates LGUs to efficiently and
the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is
effectively provide basic services and facilities. The law speaks of
expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general
infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the
welfare clause of RA 7160.With this power, LGUs may prescribe
residents of the LGU and “which are funded out of municipal funds.” It
reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
particularly refers to “municipal roads and bridges” and “similar
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
facilities.”
territorial jurisdictions.
 RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction, improvement, repair and
 Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and
maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled
discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate
with local government funds.Clearly, the question of ownership of the open
or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and
spaces (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights Subdivision is
facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the
material to the determination of the validity of the challenged appropriation
needs of their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These
and disbursement made by the City of Marikina.
infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar
facilities.
 In the 1998 in White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals: Citing Young v. City of
Manila,this Court held in its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged to
the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon
payment of just compensation.
 Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to the
subdivision owner/developer until it is either transferred to the
government by way of donation or acquired by the government through
expropriation.
 Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property
shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance
with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local
government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes.
 In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test of validity of
a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the
interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the State resulting from the
promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business does not justify their aid by the use of public money.
 In Young v. City of Manila, the City of Manila undertook the filling of low-lying
streets of the Antipolo Subdivision, a privately-owned subdivision. The Court
ruled that as long as the private owner retained title and ownership of the
22
City of Manila v. Chinese Community
October 31, 1919
Johnson
Digest by: CG
Topic: Power to Open and Close roads, factors to consider in vacating a street
General Facts:
City of Manila presented a petition to the CFI praying that an extension of Rizal avenue
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. CFI sided with
the respondents.
Petitioner: City of Manila
1. That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire
ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of
Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district.
2. That it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may
desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the
value of the land in question;
3. That neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable
purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the
necessities therefor
Respondent: Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting
1. It was the owner of parcels one and two described in the complaint
2. It was neither necessary nor expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for
street purposes.
3. Existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the
public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation.
4. Other routes were available which would not disturb the resting places of the
dead. It would also be very costly to exhume the dead and would also destroy
the monuments.
5. City of Manila was without right or authority to expropriate the said cemetery.
6. Tambunting had offered and still offers to grant a right of way for the said
extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the
sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the
land so offered, free of charge, would answer every public necessity on the part of
the plaintiff.
Issue: WON the courts can look into the City of Manila’s act of expropriation/YES
Dispositive: For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the
lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Ratio:
RE: Power of the Courts to look into the reasons behind expropriation
Legislative Basis: Act No. 190, Section 243 provides that if the court shall find
upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint
commissioners. Section 248 gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into
the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall
determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of
First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the
property and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the
possession of the plaintiff.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When
the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present
case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the
court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of
them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a
question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and when the
legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain
upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that
the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon those questions.
The taking of private property for any use, which is not required by the necessities, or
convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case
is that the authority must be strictly construed.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity,
and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land.
As applied:
The cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which
would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the
petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no
authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the
uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its
maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation
should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest
necessity exists therefor.
Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the
record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered
to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
23
Sangalang vs IAC
December 22, 1988
Sarmiento J
Martin Lagmay
Topic and Provisions
Facts:
 Plaintiffs are all either residents of Bel Air Village or the Bel Air Village Association
(BAVA)
 In the 1950's Bel Air Village property was sold by Makati Development Corporation
which was later merged with Ayala Corporation
 The lots were subject to certain restrictions namely: 1)All lot owners would
automatically be a member of BAVA and 2) The lots may only be used for domestic
purposes, which would last for a period of 50 years
 At the time the area was open to all kinds of people and even animals. The residents
decided to build a wall along the commercial side of Jupiter Street
 Eventually Ayala Corporation decided to sell the lots on the commercial side of
Jupiter Street to the public. In 1972, BAVA and Ayala agreed that the lot owners
would be members of BAVA and would be subject to the same deed of restriction of
other residents in the subdivision
 On April 4, 1975, the Municipal Council of Makati enacted Ordinance No 81,
providing for the zonification of Makati. Under this ordinance, Bel Air Village was
classified as a Class A Residential Zone
 The Office of the Mayor wrote to BAVA that in order to ease traffic congestion,
Jupiter Street would be opened up to the public. BAVA requested for the indefinite
postponement of the plan because of the concern of the residents. Finally on August
1977 the officials of Makati removed the gates in order to open the entire length of
Jupiter Street to the public. Because of this there was a huge increase of traffic along
Jupiter Street
 The commercial establishments on the southern side of Jupiter Street broke down
the wall as it was no longer necessary and set up shop.
 Even the residential lots on the northern side of Jupiter Street some chose to use as
commercial due to the increase in traffic in the area.
 On March 1981, the 'comprehensive zoning ordinance' was passed by the MMC as
Ordinance 81-01. This ordinance made Bel Air village bound by Jupiter Street and
no longer the center line. Significantly the other side of Jupiter Street was classified
as High Intensity Commercial Zone
 Several residents as well as BAVA filed suit claiming against 1) Ayala Corp for
breach of contract in allowing the wall to be broken down ushering in a full
commercialization of Jupiter Street and 2) some residents that had used their lots as
commercial in violation of the restrictions
Argument of Petitioners:
 The petitioners contend that the opening of the thoroughfare had opened, in turn,
the floodgates to the commercialization of Bel-Air Village. The wall, so they allege,
was designed precisely to protect the peace and privacy of Bel-Air Village residents
from the din and uproar of mercantile pursuits, and that the Ayala Corporation had
committed itself to maintain it
Argument of Respondents:
 Ayala's liability, if one existed, had been overtaken by the passage of Ordinances
Nos. 81 and 82-01, opening Jupiter Street to commerce
Issue: WON Ayala Corp is liable for damages
Held: No
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, these petitions are DENIED No
pronouncement as to costs
Ratio:
 It is our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact
acknowledged by the authorities of Makati and the National Government and by the
petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association
itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by
both -the commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally constructed,
therefore, for the exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air
Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished from the general public
 When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not
for the purpose of physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala
Corporation, it was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better control of
the security in the area, and as the Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill " a view
we find acceptable in the premises. For it cannot be denied that at that time, the
commercial area was vacant, "open for animals and people to have access to Bel-Air
Village." There was hence a necessity for a wall
 In any case, we find the petitioners' theory, that maintaining the wall was a matter
of a contractual obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. The records
do not establish the existence of such a purported commitment. For one, the
subdivision plans submitted did not mention anything about it. For another, there is
nothing in the "deed restrictions" that would point to any covenant regarding the
construction of a wall. There is no representation or promise whatsoever therein to
that effect
 With the construction of the commercial buildings in 1974, the reason for which the
wall was built- to secure Bel-Air Village from interlopers had naturally ceased to
exist. The buildings themselves had provided formidable curtains of security for the
residents. It should be noted that the commercial lot buyers themselves were forced
to demolish parts of the wall to gain access to Jupiter Street, which they had after all
equal right to use
 In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment
it did not make, much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it. The
records, on the contrary, will show that the Bel-Air Village Association had been
informed, at the very outset, about the impending use of Jupiter Street by
commercial lot buyers
 The alleged undertaking, finally, by Ayala in the deed of donation (over Jupiter
Street) to leave Jupiter Street for the private use of Bel-Air residents is belied by the
very provisions of the deed. We quote:
 IV. That the offer made by the DONOR had been accepted by the
DONEE subject to the condition that the property will be used
as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE, their
families, personnel, guests, domestic help and, under certain
reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general
public, and in the event that said lots or parts thereof cease to be
used as such, ownership thereof shall automatically revert to the
DONOR. The DONEE shall always have Reposo Street, Makati
Avenue, and Paseo de Roxas open for the use of the general
24
 public. It is also understood that the DONOR shall continue the
maintenance of the street at its expense for a period of three
years from date hereof."
 The donation, on the contrary, gave the general public equal right to it
 The court absolves the Ayala Corporation primarily owing to our finding that it is
not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public. Insofar as these
petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only
because of the fact that Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive easements
based on the "deed restrictions" but chiefly because the National Government itself,
through the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into
high density commercial (C-3) zone, pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence,
the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the said deed
restrictions
 It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the
easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air
subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But
they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and
interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate
exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and
is said to be the "law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it
cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at
the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary
 Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other
than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which,
as we have declared, is secondary to the more compelling interests of general
welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that
connection, we find no reversible error to have been committed by the Court
of Appeals
Figuracion v. Libi
November 28, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J.:
Digest by: Perry
Summary:
Cebu City expropriated a piece of property which was to be used for the construction of a
public road. This plan was abandoned hence Cebu City reconveyed the expropriated
property to the former owners by virtue of their right to repurchase. The SC upheld the
reconveyance made by the LGU by saying that Congress has delegated this Legislative
Power to the LGUs by virtue of Section 21 of the LGC.
Facts:
In 1948, Cebu City expropriated a piece of property owned by Galileo Figuracion in order
to turn it into a portion of N. Escario Street. Decades later, in 1989, Cebu City approved
the reconveyance of an unused portion of the subject property, consisting of 89 sqm. to
Isagani Figuracion, successor-in-interest of Galileo. Upon resurvey, it was found out that
the unused portion consisted of 130 sqm. so it was amended accordingly.
Respondents herein, thereafter, questioned the resolutions for reconveyance approved
by Cebu City. They first alleged that they should be granted a right of way over the
subject lot, but later amended their complaint and sought to annul the reconveyance
made by Cebu City. The RTC ruled that the resolutions passed by Cebu City were null and
void, and this was affirmed by the CA.
Petitioner’s Position:
The respondents have no legal capacity to question the reconveyance by Cebu City and
as an LGU, Cebu City is empowered to dispose of its property in the way it deems fit.
Since it has not been used for the construction of N. Escario Street and had long been
vacant, the reconveyance was proper.
Respondent’s Position:
Cebu City exceeded its authority when it reconveyed the property to the former owner as
this is an essentially, legislative power.
Issue / Held:
WON the respondents had standing. NO.
WON the resolutions should have been declared null and void. NO.
Ratio:
As to standing
25
The SC ruled that the respondents did not have the legal standing to initiate the
proceedings. The SC found that, more than it is a complaint to annul the deed of sale
executed by Cebu City, it is actually a suit for reversion.
In a suit for reversion, it is set apart from all other actions involving possession or title to
property by the fact that there is a positive averment in the complaint of state ownership
of the property in dispute. Since this is an action for reversion, the respondents cannot be
considered as the proper parties. They have no personal, material, and substantial
interest in the outcome of the case. At most, all the respondents have is a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
As to the validity of the reconveyance
The SC ruled that as a general rule, local roads used for public service are considered
public property under the absolute control of Congress; hence, local governments have
no authority to control or regulate their use. However, under Section 21, Chapter II of the
LGC, Congress delegated to political subdivisions some control of local roads.
Moreover, the revised charter of Cebu City delegated to the said political subdivision the
authority to regulate its city streets.
“… Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used
or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the city may be lawfully used or conveyed.
However, what happens when private land is expropriated for a particular public use
and that particular public use is abandoned? One of two things may happen and this
depends on the character of the title acquired by the expropriator.
First, if the title acquired by the expropriator is for a specific purpose, then the
subsequent abandonment of said purpose causes the reversion of the expropriated
property to the former owner. On the other hand, if the expropriator acquires a fee
simple title, then of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator
and the non-use of the property for that purpose does not have the effect of defeating the
title acquired by the expropriator.
Finally, Cebu City recognized the right to repurchase of the former owner, and this was
thoroughly discussed by the SC in Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority,
wherein the SC ruled that when there is a preponderance of evidence of the existence of
a right to repurchase, then the former owner is entitled to exercise such right. On the
other hand, when there is insufficient evidence, then the former owners may not insist
on repurchasing the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 2002 Decision and August 20,
2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the February 23, 2000 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, are ANNULLED and SETASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No.
CEB-21193 is DISMISSED.
Spouses Yusay v CA, City Mayor and City Council of Mandaluyong City
April 6, 2011
Bersamin, J.
Digest by: Monique Lee
Topic and Provisions: General Powers and Attributes of LGUs: Power of Eminent
Domain
General Facts:
The petitioners, Sps. Yusay, own a parcel of land half of which they used as their
residence and the rest, they rented out to 9 other families. The Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552 Series of 1997 to authorize the
mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land for the purpose
of developing it it for low cost housing. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC praying for the annulment of the Resolution. RTC ruled in
favor of the private respondent City of Manadaluyong. But then it reversed itself
ruling that the petition was not premature because the passage of the Resolution would
pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners of their property, that there was no
due process in the passage of the Resolution because the petitioners were not invited to
the subsequent hearings, and that the expropriation was not for public use. The CA
reversed the RTC and denied the petitioners’ MR.
Petitioners’ Arguments:
1. Resolution No. 552 was unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force
and effect
2. The Resolution’s validity can be assailed even before its implementation
3. A citizen should not be made to wait the takeover and possession of his property by
the LGU before he can go to court to nullify an unjust expropriation
Respondent’s Arguments:
1. Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the mayor to initiate the legal
steps towards expropriation, hence the suit filed by petitioners was premature
Issue / Held:
WON the petitioners’ case will prosper / NO. Procedurally, Certiorari and Prohibition
cannot be availed of against a body that does not exercise either judicial or quasi-judicial
powers. Substantively, in view of the absence of proper expropriation Ordinance
authorising and providing for the expropriation, the petition was dismissed for lack of
cause of action.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, We affirm the decision of the CA.
Ratio:
26
In order for a petition for certiorari or prohibition to prosper, the petitioner must allege
that the writ is against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions and that there was an act committed that was without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The Court found that Certiorari thus does not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod
which is not part of the Judiciary. Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552.
According to the Local Government Code (LGC), a City needed to pass an ORDINANCE,
and not merely a Resolution for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.
As stated in Sec. 19 of the LGC, “a local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless upon payment of just compensation… Provided that a valid and definite
order has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted”. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the Legislative, which may delegate the power to LGUs, other public entities
and public utilities.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law,
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through mere resolution,
it would have simply adopted the language of the previous LGC. Accordingly, the
manifest change in the legislative language - from “resolution” under BP 337 to
“ordinance” under RA 7160 - demands strict construction.
Province of Camarines Sur v CA (and the San Joaquins)
1993
Quiason, J.
DIGEST BY Cocoy
TOPIC and Provisions: Requisites for exercise of power of eminent domain
General Facts:
The SangguniangPanlalawigan of CamSur passed Resolution No. 129-1988,
authorizing Provincial Governor Villafuerte (petitioner) to expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol, upon which authority he filed 2 cases for
expropriation against the San Joaquins (respondents). The private respondents filed
several motions to dismiss but were denied by the Trial Court.
Upon appeal to the CA, the respondents were able to have the RTC decision set
aside, and expropriation proceedings suspended until the province of CamSur was able
to obtain the requisite approval of the DAR to convert the private property of the
respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
 Price offered by the Province of CamSur is grossly inadequate
 Solicitor General’s Comment (which was instrumental in having the RTC decision set
aside)
o Under section 9 of the LGC, an LGU’s power of eminent domain does not need
approval by the Office of the Pres.HOWEVER, the province must first secure
approval of the DAR in expropriating agricultural lands for use as housing
projects
Respondent’s Arguments:
 The province has authority to initiate expropriation proceedings under Sec. 4
and 7 of the LGC
 The Expropriation is for public purpose
Issue: WON expropriation of agricultural lands by local governments is subject to the
prior approval of the Sec. of Agrarian Reform?
Held: NO, prior approval by DAR is NOT required.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the TC order allowingCamSurto take possession of
respondents' property; (b) orders the suspension of the expropriation; and (c) requires
CamSur to obtain the approval of the DAR.
Ratio:
On the necessity of such Expropriation being for “public purpose”
There has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or
"public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. Under the new
27
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a
resort complex for tourists or housing project. In this case, the creation of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur, by making available to the community invaluable information
and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.
On the requirement of prior approval by the DAR
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines
Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by
delegation. While the power of eminent domain is a delegated power, and the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restrains in the exercise thereof,
such power as possessed by Local Governments is already complete within its
limits. Moreover, such limitation upon the power must be expressly made.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units
must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion
of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law that expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by
local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
DAR to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which
it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the DAR
the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications
for reclassification submitted by the landowners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot
be broadened or constricted by implication. To sustain the Court of Appeals would
mean that the local government units would no longer be able to expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first
applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it
would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
MASIKIP v. City of Pasig
January 23, 2006
J. Sandoval – Gutierrez
Ortiz
Topic: Eminent Domain
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
4.5k square meters located at Caniogan, Pasig City.
The City of Pasig notified the petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square
meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational
activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan pursuant to an ordinance enacted by
the City Council of Pasig.
The purpose of the expropriation was then changed to “in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.”
The respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. Respondent
prayed that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the
condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of
determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the report
of the commissioners.
Petitioner:The intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
The respondent failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation
of her property. There is already an established sports development and recreational
activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its
residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan
Respondent:Reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is
“to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.”
Issue:WON the expropriation was valid
Held:NO
Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The
28
complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig,
docketed as SCA No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED.
Ratio:
Power of eminent domain (US v. Toribio): “the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it,
which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.”
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the
government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other
public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional
limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and
may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.Section 19 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by
Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down
the parameters for its exercise.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of
concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c)
the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
The court adopts the position of the petitioner as regards necessity. There is no “genuine
necessity” to justify the expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the
necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land. Necessity contemplated is only reasonable or practical necessity,
which is the balance of: (1) greatest benefit to the public; (2) least inconvenience and
expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit.”
City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property. The intended beneficiary of the expropriation is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association and not the residents of Caniogan. It can be
gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own
private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative
facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Brgy. Sindalan, Pampanga v CA.
May 22, 2007
Velasco, Jr, J
Digest by: Jonathan Pabillore.
Topic and Provisions: IV. Gen. Powers and Attributes of LocGovs; B. Kinds of Powers;
Requisites for Exercise. (Sec. 9, Art III, 1987 Consti; Sec. 19, LGC; Art. 32 & 36, IRR; Rule
97, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; DILG Opinion No. 11-1996).
Facts:
 On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council,
petitioner Barangay Sindalan, represented by Brgy. Capt. Ismael Gutierrez, filed
a Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III
and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of land.
 Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay
Sindalan’s feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the
expropriation were stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6.7
 The subject lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix
David and his wife.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
 Eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty.
 It is for public purposes that the lot is being expropriated for.
 It is the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road.
Respondent’s Arugments:
 It is for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision, in other words,
for private use.
 Under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner (Dr. Felix
David and his wife) who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the subdivision
residents.
Issue: WON eminent domain may properly be exercised?
Held: NO,.
7WHEREAS, said parcels of land shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the
agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their basic needs;
WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road before they can reach the
concrete provincial road, entailing so much time, effort and money, not to mention possible damage
and/or spilage [sic] on the products consigned to or coming from, the market outside the barangay;
and
WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute greatly to the general welfare of
the people residing therein social, cultural and health among other things, beside economic.
29
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, liable.
“Firstly, based on the foregoing transcript, the intended feeder road sought to serve the
Ratio: residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of
In general, eminent domain is defined as “the power of the nation or a sovereign state to Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated
take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s road...
consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation.”[10] It is acknowledged as “an XXX
inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the subdivision’s owner who will be able to
property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the whole circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction
community.” with his development permit and license to sell from the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way… it
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them
provisions: (Section 29, PD 957)… To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling
(1) That private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the
under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9; and power of eminent domain and is patently illegal…
 “public use” – “whatever is beneficially employed for the community.”
(although the SC also enumerated other meanings ascribed to the term8). Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed
“Public use” is the first essential requisite for eminent domain. condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private
 The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes individual without any legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute
public use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to
malversation.
particular individuals.
 “Just compensation” – “the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator.” Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioner’s proper remedy is to require the
 The gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. Davsan II Subdivision owner to file a complaint for establishment of the easement of
 “Just” - real, substantial, full, and ample. Also, the payment must be made within right-of-way under Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code.”
a “reasonable time” from the taking. Delay will incur the government 12% per
annum.
(2) That no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due
process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
 The property owner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on
the issues of public use and just compensation and to present objections to and
claims on them.
 Taking of property for a private use or without just compensation is a
deprivation of property without due process of law.

As applied
As a basic political unit, petitioner’sSangguniang Barangay is clothed with the authority
to provide barangay roads and other facilities for public use and welfare.

However, in this case, the expropriation was not for public use.

8Limited meanings such as “use by the public,” “public employment;” but the more generally
accepted view is that public use is “public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything
which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive
power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the
growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which]
contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.”
30
Henry Sy v. QC
June 5, 2013
Perlas Bernabe, J.
Pabiona
Topic and Provisions: General Powers and Attributes of Local Governments; Power of
Eminent Domain
General Facts:
On November 7, 1996, the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint
for expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned
and registered under the name of Sy (subject property), which was intended to be used
as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground and community
activity center for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon
City. The requisite ordinance to undertake the aforesaid expropriation namely,
Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted on April 12, 1994.
On March 18, 1997, pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Government Code, the City
deposited the amount of P241,090.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court, representing
15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration.
During the preliminary conference on November 8, 2006, Sy did not question the City’s
right to expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation
remained at issue.
On July 6, 2006, the RTC appointed Edgardo Ostaco (Commissioner Ostaco), Engr. Victor
Salinas (Commissioner Salinas) and Atty. Carlo Alcantara (Commissioner Alcantara) as
commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid by the
City for the subject property. Subsequently, Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara, in a
Report dated February 11, 2008, recommended the payment of P5,500.00 per sq. m., to
be computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation complaint, or on November
7, 1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a separate Report dated March 7,
2008, recommending the higher amount of P13,500.00 per sq. m. as just compensation.
RTC: ruled that the Ostaco and Alcantara valuation should be used (5,500/sq.m.), 6%
legal interest until full payment of just compensation
Petitioner Arguments: Petitioner is mainly contesting the 5,500/sq.m. valuation by
Ostaco and Alcantara which was adopted by the RTC
A P13,000.00 per sq. m. valuation made by independent appraisers Cuervo and Asian
Appraisers in 1995 and 1996 should be used.
Petitioner claims he is entitled to damages because the expropriation affects his plans for
a housing project in the vicinity
Respondent Argument:
The RTC justified their decision to use the cheaper valuation by citing the principle that
just compensation must be fair not only to the owner but to the expropriator as well.
On the independent appraisal claimed by petitioner: (a) the fair market value of the
subject property in the amount of P4,000.00 per sq. m. based on the September 4, 1996
recommendation of the City Appraisal Committee; (b) the market value of the subject lot
in the amount of P2,000.00 per sq. m. based on several sworn statements made by Sy
himself; and (c) Sy’s own tax declaration for 1996, stating that the subject property has a
total market value of P2,272,050.00.
ISSUE/HELD: A. What should be the proper amount (for just compensation)?
Remanded the case to the lower courts
B. What should be the proper legal interest to be applied in this case? 12% and 6%
per annum, owing to the nature of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance.
Ratio:
A. The Court cannot sustain the amount of P5,500.00/sq. m. as just compensation
which was set by the RTC and upheld by the CA. The said valuation was actually
arrived at after considering: (a) the September 4, 1996 recommendation of the
City Appraisal Committee; (b) several sworn statements made by Sy himself;
and (c) Sy’s own tax declaration for 1996. It is well-settled that the amount of
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. However, the
above-stated documents do not reflect the value of the subject property at the
time of its taking in 1986 but rather, its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the
case must be remanded to the RTC in order to properly determine the amount
of just compensation during such time the subject property was actually taken.
B. In the case of Republic v. CA, the Court ruled that the debt incurred by the
government on account of the taking of the property subject of an
expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance which therefore, warrants
the application of the 12% legal interest rate
As to the reckoning point on which the legal interest should accrue, the same
should be computed from the time of the taking of the subject property in 1986
and not from the filing of the complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996.
Records show that the City itself admitted in its Appellee’s Brief filed before the
CA that as early as 1986, "a burden was already imposed upon the owner of the
subject property x x x, considering that the expropriated property was already
being used as Barangay day care and office."Thus, the property was actually
taken during that time and from thereon, legal interest should have already
accrued.
31
Ortega v. City of Cebu
October 2, 2009
Nachura, J.
RR
Topic/Provisions: Power of Eminent Domain – Requisites for the Exercise
Facts:
 One-half of the land owned by the Ortega spouses was expropriated by the City
of Cebu through Ordinance No. 1519 (giving authority to the Mayor to
expropriate and appropriating P3, 248, 400.00 or P1, 150.oo/sq. meter)
 The amount will be charged against Account No. 8-93-310, Continuing
Appropriation, Account No. 101-8918-334, repurchase of lots for various
projects. The value of the land was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal
Committee in Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994.
 A complaint for Eminent domain was filed with the RTC by the City of Cebu
o March 13, 1998 Decision: declared that Cebu had authority to take
the property and fixed the just compensation at P31, 416, 000.00 or
P11, 000/ sq. m
o This became final and executory for failure of the City of Cebu to
appeal.
o A Writ of Execution was issued. RTC subjected Account No. 101-8918-
334 under garnishment to collect P3, 284, 400.00 pursuant to Ord.
No. 1519.
 City of Cebu filed Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment
and Withdrawal of the Case.
o They contended that the price set by the RTC as just compensation to
be paid to the Spouses Ortega is way beyond the reach of its intended
beneficiaries for its socialized housing program.
o DENIED. MR: ALSO DENIED (thereafter they appealed to the CA)
 While the appeal was pending with the CA, a Notice of Garnishment to
Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch Cebu City, was
served garnishing Cebu City’s bank deposit therein.
o The City of Cebu filed before the RTC a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or
Recall the Writ of Garnishment.
o Contended that Account No. 101-8918-334 is not actually an existing
bank account and that the garnishment of Cebu City’s bank account
with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds
and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of public
policy.
o DENIED. MR: ALSO DENIED
CA: partially granted appeal
 Motion to Stay Execution was granted
 Motion to Modify Judgment and Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings
was denied.
Petitioner’s arguments:
 Decision dated March 13, 1998 was already final and executory.
 Garnishment was proper for they were entitled to compensation based on the
March 13, 1998 Decision
Respondent’s arguments:
 Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal
of the (Expropriation) case should be allowed.
o The just compensation fixed by the RTC is too high, and the intended
expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas’ property is dependent on
whether Cebu City would have sufficient funds to pay for the same.
 The garnishment of accounts with the Philippine Postal Bank was illegal.
o It appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang
Panglungsod
o The government funds and properties may not be seized under writ of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason
of public policy.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to
Modify Judgment and to be allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
2. WON the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a
different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as
payment for the expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance No. 1519.
Held: NO, the CA did not err. NO, the deposit cannot be subjected to garnishment.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and 181583-84 are
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80187 and
00147 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio:
1. NO, the CA did not err in denying the Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and
Motion to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
 Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Expropriation9 shows that basically
there are 2 stages in expropriation proceedings: 1) Determination of the
9
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. – If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to
be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the
proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
32
 authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; 2)
Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.
 An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its
end then paves the way for the second stage—the determination of just
compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order by the trial court fixing just
compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation.
o Thus, the Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment
(March 13, 1998), much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to
appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.
 Cebu City cannot claim that it is entitled to withdraw just because the
compensation fixed by the RTC is allegedly too high.
o It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative.
o Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial
prerogative, the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings
of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may
substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid
reasons; that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
2. NO, the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank cannot be
subjected to garnishment.
 The proper remedy of the Spouses Ortega is to file a mandamus case against
Cebu City in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an
appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of their claim.
 It should also be noted that the Philippine Postal Bank issued a Certification
certifying that Account No. 8-93-310 (Continuing Account) and Account No.
101-8918-334 are not bank account numbers with Philippine Postal Bank.
 It is a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious
consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
 the trial court has no authority to garnish the Municipality’s other bank
account absent any showing that an ordincance has been passed appropriating
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Municipality of Malvar
February 18, 2014
Carpio, J.
Digest by Clark Uytico
SUMMARY
The Municipality of Malvar imposed an ordinance where it aims to regulate the
establishment of special projects. It assessed Smart an amount of 389,950.00 for the
telecommunications tower that the latter constructed in Malvar. Smart contends that the
same is a tax, and is unduly oppressive and ultra vires. CTA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction because the same is NOT a tax. Court agreed with CTA, and held that LGUs
have the power to impose fees
FACTS
Smart constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality. The construction of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and
transmitting cellular communications within the covered area.
On 30 July 2003, the Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18, series of 2003, entitled "An
Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects."
On 24 August 2004, Smart received from the Permit and Licensing Division of the Office
of the Mayor of the Municipality an assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the
total amount of P389,950.00 for Smart’s telecommunications tower. Due to the alleged
arrears in the payment of the assessment, the Municipality also caused the posting of a
closure notice on the telecommunications tower.
On 9 September 2004, Smart filed a protest, claiming lack of due process in the issuance
of the assessment and closure notice. In the same protest, Smart challenged the validity
of Ordinance No. 18 on which the assessment was based.
In a letter dated 28 September 2004, the Municipality denied Smart’s protest.
RTC partially granted Smart’s petition, but did not rule on the legality of Ordinance No.
18. It declared that Smart is only liable for fees starting October 1, 2003, and null and
void insofar as the assessment made from 2001 to 2003. MR denied. CTA denied. CTA
MR also denied. CTA en banc denied. CTA en banc likewise denied.
SMART’s arguments:
CTA erred in refusing to take cognizance of the case and for dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction considering the “unique” factual circumstances involved.
The fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes since they are not regulatory but
rather, revenue-raising.
Municipality is encroaching on the regulatory powers of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). Smart cites Section 5(g) of Republic Act No.
7925 which provides that the NTC, in the exercise of its regulatory powers, shall impose
such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for
33
the regulation and supervision of the operations of telecommunications entities. Thus,
Smart alleges that the regulation of telecommunications entities and all aspects of its
operations is specifically lodged by law on the NTC.
Malvar’s arguments:
Said Ordinance is not a tax ordinance but a regulatory fee imposed to regulate the
“placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric,
telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus, and provide for
the correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous,
defective or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitant.
It was also envisioned to address the foreseen "environmental depredation" to be
brought about by these "special projects" to the Municipality. Pursuant to these
objectives, the Municipality imposed fees on various structures, which included
telecommunications towers.
The fees are not imposed to regulate the administrative, technical, financial, or
marketing operations of telecommunications entities, such as Smart’s; rather, to regulate
the installation and maintenance of physical structures – Smart’s cell sites or
telecommunications tower.
ISSUE
1. WON the fees are taxes.
2. WON CTA should have take cognizance of the case.
HELD
1. NO. The fees are NOT taxes.
2. NO. CTA correctly refused to take cognizance of the case.
3. WON the fees are unjust and unreasonable.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO
Issue #1
Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities
of the identified special projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications
towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not
primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the
Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18
are not taxes.
Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City: if the generating of revenue is the
primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does
not make the imposition a tax.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias: the purpose and effect of the
imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for
such imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
Ordinance No. 18 expressly provides for the standards which Smart must satisfy prior to
the issuance of the specified permits, clearly indicating that the fees are regulatory in
nature.
These requirements are as follows:
SECTION 5. Requirements and Procedures in Securing Preliminary Development Permit.
The following documents shall be submitted to the SB Secretary in triplicate:
a) zoning clearance
b) Vicinity Map
c) Site Plan
d) Evidence of ownership
e) Certificate true copy of NTC Provisional Authority in case of Cellsites, telephone or
telegraph line, ERB in case of gasoline station, power plant, and other concerned national
agencies
f) Conversion order from DAR is located within agricultural zone.
g) Radiation Protection Evaluation.
h) Written consent from subdivision association or the residence of the area concerned if
the special projects is located within the residential zone.
i) Barangay Council Resolution endorsing the special projects.
SECTION 6. Requirement for Final Development Permit – Upon the expiration of 180
days and the proponents of special projects shall apply for final [development permit]
and they are require[d] to submit the following:
a) evaluation from the committee where the Vice Mayor refers the special project
b) Certification that all local fees have been paid.
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Even if the fees do not appear in Section 143 or any other provision in the LGC, the
Municipality is empowered to impose taxes, fees and charges, not specifically
enumerated in the LGC or taxed under the Tax Code or other applicable law according to
Section 186 of the LGC. Thus they don’t encroach on NTC’s powers.
Issue #2
Considering that the fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not in the nature of local taxes, and
Smart is questioning the constitutionality of the ordinance, the CTA correctly dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, Section 187 of the LGC, which outlines the
procedure for questioning the constitutionality of a tax ordinance, is inapplicable,
rendering unnecessary the resolution of the issue on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Issue #3
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness
though is open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal
authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the
amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or
confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an
inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made
subject to imposition.
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency
of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to
invalidate [a law] based on xx x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only
of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it." This
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty
it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
GSIS VS. CITY TREASURER AND CITY ASSESSOR OF MANILA
2009 December 23
Petitioner: GSIS
Respondent: City Treasurer and City Assessor of Manila
Petition for review of a suit to nullify the assessment of real properties
Instrumentalities of the national government are outside the purview of local
taxation
Facts:
City Treasurer of Manila sent a letter to the GSIS President and General
Manager informing him of unpaid real property taxes on the following properties of the
GSIS for the years 1992-2002: a. Katigbak property, P54M; b. Concepcion-Arroceros
property, P48M
Letter warned of inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled public
auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should unpaid taxes remain unsettled
GSIS wrote back emphasizing its tax exemption. Two days later, GSIS filed a
petition praying for the nullification of the assessment thus made and that respondents
be permanently enjoined from proceeding against GSIS property. They amended their
petition to include: a. Katigbak property has been leased and occupied by the Manila
Hotel Corporation since 1991, which has contractually bound itself to pay any real
property taxes that may be imposed; b. Concepcion property partly occupied by GSIS and
MeTC of Manila. RTC dismissed GSIS petition; hence this petition
Petitioner:
1. Both its old charter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and present charter, RA 8291
or the GSIS Act of 1997, exempt the agency and its properties from all forms of taxes and
assessments, inclusive of realty tax.
b. The full tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored under RA 8291, the operative
provision being Sec. 39
Respondent:
1. That GSIS may not successfully resist the city’s notices and warrants of levy on the
basis of its exemption under RA 8291, real property taxation being governed by RA 7160
or the Local Government Code of 1991
2. The foregoing notwithstanding, the leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant
to the “beneficial use principle” under Sec.234 (a) of the LGC
Issue 1: Whether GSIS under its charter is exempt from real property taxation
Held: Yes
1. RA 8291 restored GSIS full tax exemption. Said RA also states that the RPT assessed
and due from the GSIS are considered paid
2. Also, GSIS is considered an instrumentality of the National government, hence outside
the purview of local tax
SC:
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1. RA 7160 lifted tax exemption, but RA 8291 reenacted the full tax exemption a.
PD 1146, Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, was issued. Section 33 states
that “…the System, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits
paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds”
b. Then came the enactment in 1991 of the LGC. Of particular pertinence is the general
provision on withdrawal of tax exemption privileges in Sec. 193 of the LGC, and the
special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in the
last paragraph of the succeeding Sec. 234. There can be no doubt that the full tax
exemption granted to GSIS under PD 1146 was deemed withdrawn.
c. However, PD 1146 was further amended and expanded by RA 8291. Under it, the full
tax exemption privilege of GSIS was restored, the operative provision being Sec. 39, a
virtual replication of Sec. 33 of PD 1146.
2. RPT assessed and due from the GSIS are considered paid. The all-embracing
condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39, for all intents and purposes, considered as
paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act.”
3. GSIS is an instrumentality of the National Government
a. While a non-stock corporation, GSIS is not a GOCC, for GSIS’ capital is not divided into
unit shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of. And by members, reference is to
those who make up the non-stock corporation, and not to the compulsory members of
the system who are government employees.
c. The subject properties under GSIS’s name are likewise owned by the Republic. The
GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by
the Government or acquired for the enhancement of the system.
d. Third, GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, disability benefits etc
of all government employees and beneficiaries. This undertaking constitutes an essential
function of the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities.
Issue 2: Whether GSIS is liable for real property taxes for its properties leased to a
taxable entity
Held: No. Beneficial Use Doctrine is applicable; the GSIS is liable to pay taxes.
However, because of controlling jurisprudence and the contractual arrangement
between the lessor GSIS and the lessee, the MHC, the latter is the one liable to pay
RPT
SC:
1. The provisions allow the Republic to grant the beneficial use of its property to an
agency or instrumentality of the national government. Such grant does not necessarily
result in the loss of the tax exemption. The tax exemption the property of the Republic or
its instrumentality carries ceases only if the “beneficial use has been granted, for a
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.”
2. GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person under Sec.
133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however, lost that status with respect to the Katigbak property
when it contracted its beneficial use to MHC, a taxable person. Thus, the real estate tax
assessment of P 54M covering 1992 to 2002 over the subject Katigbak property is valid
insofar as said tax delinquency is concerned as assessed over said property.
3. However, MHC ought to pay. The unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable
against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it
regardless of whether or not he is the owner.
4. Actual use refers to the purpose for which the property is principally or predominantly
utilized by the person in possession thereof. Being in possession and having actual use of
the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable for the realty taxes assessed
over the Katigbak property from 1992 to 2002.
5. Also, MHC has obligated itself under the GSIS-MHC Contract of Lease to shoulder such
assessment. Stipulation l8 states that “the Lessee agrees and obligates itself to shoulder
and pay such tax, assessment or levy as it becomes due.”
6. Since MHC has not been impleaded in the instant case, the remedy of the City of Manila
is to serve the realty tax assessment covering the subject Katigbak property to MHC and
to pursue other available remedies in case of nonpayment
Issue 3: Whether properties of GSIS are exempt from levy
Held: YES. Sec. 39, Par. 3 of the GSIS charter says so
1. Issue is now moot and academic. A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax
liability.
2. Nonetheless, it will not be remiss to note that it is without doubt that the subject GSIS
properties are exempt from any attachment, garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal
processes. This is the clear import of the third paragraph of Sec. 39, RA 8291.
Dispositive: Petition granted. RPT assessments against the GSIS by the city of Manila are
declared void.
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