LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATION
Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales
Bar Review Lecturer
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Local Autonomy and Devolution
01. What is local autonomy? Characterize
autonomous regions and their
relations to the national government.
ANSWER: Local autonomy is the granting of
more powers, authority, responsibilities and
resources to the lower or local levels of a
government system. The principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means decentralization. It does not make the
local government sovereign within the state or
an “imperium in imperio.” (Basco vs. PAGCOR,
197 SCRA 52) Under the Philippine concept of
local autonomy, the national government has
not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local
officers are delegated to political subdivisions.
The purpose of delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the
local levels. Policy-setting for the entire country
still lies in the President and Congress.
Municipal governments are still agents of the
national government. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336
SCRA 201) The national government exercises
the power of control through Congress, and the
power of general supervision, through the office
of the President, over all local government units
or territorial and political subdivisions including
autonomous regions. (Article X, Section 16,
Philippine Constitution)
02. What is devolution?
ANSWER: Devolution is the act by which the
National Government confers power and
authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities (RA No. 7160, Section 17[e].
Devolution is the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform
specific functions and responsibilities (RA No.
7160, Section 17[e]. It is the transfer of power and
authority from the national government to
LGU’s as the territorial and political subdivisions
of the State. The nature of power transfer is
political and the approach is territorial or areal.
(Plaza II vs. Cassion, 435 SCRA 294 and Republic
v. Daclan, GR No.197115, March 23, 2015) It
includes the transfer to local government units
of the records, equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices
corresponding to the devolved powers, functions
and responsibilities.
03. Distinguish administrative
decentralization from political
decentralization.
ANSWER: In administrative decentralization,
the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions (provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays) in order to
broaden the base of government power. Political
decentralization involves abdication of political
power in favor of LGU’s declared autonomous.
(Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786) All
powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by the Constituion or by law to the
autonomus regions shall be vested in the
National Government. (Article x, Section 17,
Phil;ippine Constitution)
Powers of LGU’s
04. What are the regulatory powers of the
National Government Agencies
(NGA’s) transferred or devolved to
the LGU’s include the following:
ANSWER: 1) the reclassification of agricultural
lands – DAR to cities & municipalities; 2)
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enforcement of environmental laws – DENR to
all LGU’s; (3) inspection of food products and
quarantine – DOH to cities &
Municipalities; 4) the enforcement of the
National Building Code – DPWH to cities &
municipalities; 5) the processing and approval
of subdivision plans - HLURB to cities and
municipalities; 6) the operation of tricycles -
LTFRB to cities & municipalities; 7) the
establishment of cockpits and holding of
cockfights - Philippine Gamefowl Commission
to cities & municipalities.
The Local Government Code did not fully
devolve the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law to the provincial government, as its
enforcement is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of
carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization of the country’s natural
resources. (League of Provinces of the Philippines
v. DENR, GR No. 175368, April 11, 2013))
In Pimentel v. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July
17, 2012, petitioners argued that the P21 Billion
CCTP Budget be directly allocated to the LGU’s
so that it would have enhanced the delivery of
basic services and not result in the
“recentralization” of basic governmental
functions. The Supreme Court, however,
affirmed DSWD’s full control over the
identification of beneficiaries in the CCTP and
the manner by which the services are to be
delivered or conditionalities are to be complied
with. This is not contrary to the precepts of local
autonomy.
05. State whether or not the following
city ordinances are valid and give
reasons in support of your answers:
(1) An ordinance authorizing the
establishment, operation and
maintenance of three cockpits within
its territorial jurisdiction.
(2) An ordinance which forbids the
running of nightclubs, massage
parlors, karaoke bars and similar
business establishments and
instructs its owners/operators to
wind up business operators.
(3) An ordinance declaring a particular
thing as nuisance per se and order its
condemnation, or declaring a gas
station a nuisance per se.
(4) Ordinances prohibiting the operation
of all bus and jeepney terminals,
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including those already existing, and
allowing the operation of only one
common terminal located outside the
city proper but within its territorial
jurisdiction.
(5) An ordinance requiring all heavy
industries along Batangas Bay to use
sea water in the operation of their
respective facilities, and install
desalination plants for this purpose.
(6) A zoning ordinance which reclassified
the area where the oil depot is
situated from industrial to
commercial and that the continued
operation of the businesses of oil
companies in their present location
will no longer be permitted.
ANSWERS: (1) NO. It is the Sangguniang Bayan
concerned alone which has the power to
authorize and license the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits, and
regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding
of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction.
But its discretion is limited by PD 449, the
Cockfighting Law of 1974, in that it cannot
authorize more than one cockpit per city or
municipality, unless such cities or municipalities
have population of over 100,000, in which case
two cockpits may be established. Cockfighting is
a valid matter of police regulation, as it is a form
of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims
of enhancing national productivity and self-
reliance – limitation on the number of cockpits
in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary
means for the accomplishment of the purpose of
controlling cockfighting, for clearly more
cockpits equals more cockfight. A municipal
ordinance must not contravene the Constitution
and any statute. Ordinance No. 7 contravenes
the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits
in a city. (Tan vs. Perena, 452 SCRA 53)
(2) NO. The Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional an ordinance revoking all
permits and licenses previously issued to
operators of night clubs, cabarets, dance halls
and prohibiting the issuance of new permits and
licenses for such kind of business in the
municipality. The Local Government Code
authorizes the local government units to
exercise police power yet this power does not
include the power to prohibit the establishment
of businesses which are not per se illegal. LGU’s
can only regulate but cannot prohibit, the
ordinance is ultra vires and unconstitutional.
(Dela Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569)
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In City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA
308, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an ordinance which forbids
running of nightclubs, sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars and similar business
establishments, and instructs its
owners/operators to wind up business
operations as it amounts to a closure of the
establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property and is practically confiscatory. An
ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of property
without just compensation. Private property
which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without just compensation.
(3) NO. While a Sanggunian is empowered
under the Local Government Code to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating
noise and other forms of nuisances, it cannot
declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se
and order its condemnation. It does not have the
power to find as a fact, that a particular thing is a
nuisance with such thing is not a nuisance per
se; nor it can authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is
not such. These things must be determined and
resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing
be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined
by a mere resolution of a Sanggunian. (AC
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Corp., 506 SCRA 625)
In Parayno vs. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85, it
was held that a gas station business could not be
considered a nuisance which a municipality
could summarily abate in the guise of exercising
police power. The abatement of nuisance
without judicial proceedings is possible only if it
is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a
nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate
safety of persons and property, hence it cannot
be closed down or transferred summarily to
another location.
(4) NO. The subject ordinances prohibit the
operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within
Lucena, including those already existing, and
allow the operation of only one common
terminal located outside the city proper,
franchise for which was granted to Lucena
Grand Central Terminal Inc. The assailed
ordinances are characterized by overbreadth –
they go beyond what is reasonably necessary to
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solve the traffic problem. Bus terminals per se do
not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. In
the subject ordinances, the scope of proscription
against the maintenance of terminals is so broad
that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are
barred from operating at all. The operation of
bus terminals is a legitimate business which, by
itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights
of property, health or comfort of the community.
Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, however, it
may not be abated via and ordinance, without
judicial proceedings.
(5) NO. The assailed ordinance effectively
contravenes the provisions of the water Code as
it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to
control and regulate the use of ground water
which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water
Code, pertains solely to the National Water
Resources Board. By enacting the assailed
ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the
powers granted to it as a local government unit,
rendering the assailed ordinance ultra vires.
(City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum
Corporeation, G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017.)
(6) YES. The enactment of the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power. Its purpose is
to promote sound urban planning ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare of
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of terrorist attack of the
Pandacan oil terminals. Based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property.
The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGU’s
exercise of police power clashes with a few
individual’s right to property, the former should
prevail. (Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 545
SCRA 92)
Expropriation
06. What is the procedural requisite that
must be first observed by an LGU
before exercising the power of
eminent domain? What is the
rationale of such requisite?
ANSWER: One condition required for the proper
exercise of power of eminent domain by
municipal corporation is that a valid and definite
offer must first be made to the owner and such
offer was not accepted. Unless such a
requirement is satisfied, the expropriation of any
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private property is considered infirm and can be
challenged as invalid exercise of the power of
eminent domain. (Section 19, LGC) The purpose
of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to
be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of
property needed for public purposes in order to
avoid the expense and delay of a court action. It
permits the landowner to receive full
compensation, and the entity acquiring the
property, immediate use and enjoyment of the
property. Single bona fide offer that is rejected by
the owner will suffice. (Jesus is Lord Christian
School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig, MM,
466 SCRA 235)
07. Pursuant to a resolution approved by
the Sangguniang Bayan, the Municipality of
Paranaque filed a complaint for
expropriation of two parcels of land
belonging to VM Realty Corporation. The
corporation argued that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action, because it was
filed pursuant to a resolution and not an
ordinance as required by the Local
Government Code. Decide.
ANSWER: Section 19 of the Local Government
provides that a local government unit may
pursuant to an ordinance exercise the power of
eminent domain In this case the mayor sought
to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the Sanggunian
Bayan. Thus, there was no compliance with
requisite that the mayor be authorized through
an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is different
from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a law-making-body on a
specific matter. The two are enacted
differently. A third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of the members
of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Municipality of
Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA
676) The ordinance must be enacted
prior to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain with the proper court, and not after the
court shall have determined the amount of just
compensation to which the defendant is
entitled. (Heirs of Suguitan vs. City of
Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137)
08. In the event that an LGU exercises the
power of eminent domain, when
must just compensation be
determined?
ANSWER: Just compensation shall be
determined as of time of actual taking. While
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Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
provides that just compensation shall be
determined at the time of filing of the complaint
for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over
Section 19 of RA 7160 which is a substantive law.
(The City of Cebu vs. Dedamo, 380 SCRA 754)
09. When does an LGU be entitled to a
writ of possession authorizing immediate
entry over a property subject of
expropriation as a matter of right?
ANSWER: The requisites for authorizing
immediate entry are the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and in
substance, and the deposit of the amount
equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the
property to be expropriated based on its current
tax declaration. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the petitioner in an expropriation
case is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter
of right and the issuance of the writ becomes
ministerial. (Municipality of Cordova v.
Pathfinder Development Corporation. G.R. No.
205544, June 29, 2016)
Local Taxation and Fiscal Administration
10. Name two fundamental principles of
local fiscal administration
ANSWER: Among the fundamental principles
governing the financial affairs, transactions and
operations of the LGU’s are:
1. No money shall be paid out of the local
treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation ordinance or law;
2. Local government funds and monies shall be
spent solely for public purposes;
The use of LGU funds for the widening and
improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is
unlawful and it directly contravenes Section 335
of RA 7160. Only the construction, improvement,
repair and maintenance of infrastructure
facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled
with local government funds. (Albon vs.
Fernando, 494 SCRA 141, GR No. 148357, June 30,
2006)
Ordinance-making
11. What are the limitations on the
exercise of police power by an LGU?
What are the requisites for the
validity of a municipal ordinance?
ANSWERS: The following are limitations on the
exercise of powers under the general welfare
clause: (1) Express grant by law (e.g., Secs. 16,
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391, 447, 458 and 468, LGC) (2) Exercisable only
within the territorial limits of the local
government unit, except for protection of water
supply (3) Equal protection clause. (The interests
of the public in general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of
the power (4) Due process clause. (The means
employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive on individuals.) (5) Must not be
contrary to the Constitution and the laws.
The following are the requisites for the validity
of a municipal ordinance:
1) must not contravene the Constitution and any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; 4)must
nor prohibit, but may regulate trade which is not
illegal per se; 5) must not be unreasonable; 6)
must be general in application and consistent
with public policy. (Solicitor General vs. MMA,
204 SCRA 837; Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, GR
No. 111097, July 20, 1994) and 7) must not only be
within the corporate powers of the city or
municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law.
(Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 440 SCRA 279 and City
of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308))
12. May an incumbent Governor, while
concurrently the Acting Governor,
continue to preside over the sessions
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(SP)?
ANSWER: NO. Being the acting governor, the
Vice-governor cannot simultaneously exercise
the duties of the latter, since the nature of the
duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a full-
time occupant to discharge them. The creation
of a temporary vacancy in the office of the
Governor creates a corresponding vacancy in the
office of the Vice-governor whenever the latter
acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary
vacancy. This event constitutes an “inability” on
the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-
governor) to preside over the SP sessions, which
thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in
Sec. 49(b) of the Local Government Code – the
election of a temporary presiding officer from
among themselves. The continuity of the Acting
Governor’s (Vice-governor) powers as presiding
officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in
such capacity. (Gamboa vs. Aguirre, GR No.
134213, July 20, 1999)
13. Can an acting presiding officer of a
Sanggunian be allowed to vote? How
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is the required quorum in the
Sanggunian computed?
ANSWERS: NO. A temporary presiding officer
who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding
officer could not have greater power than that
possessed by the latter who can vote only in case
of tie. While acting as presiding officer, a Board
Member my not, at the same time be allowed to
exercise the rights of a regular board member,
including that of voting even when there is no
tie to break. The entire membership, including
the presiding officer and ex-officio members
must be taken into account in computing the
quorum of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
(Zamora vs. Caballero, 420 SCRA 384)
14. How may an ordinance be approved?
What are the grounds for veto of an
ordinance? Is item veto allowed? How
can a vetoed ordinance become a law?
ANSWER: An ordinance shall be approved by
the local chief executive by affixing his signature
in each and every page thereof. The grounds for
veto are: (1) the ordinance is ultra vires, or (2)
that it is prejudicial to public welfare. The
governor or mayor may veto any item in the
following cases: (1) Appropriations ordinance (2)
Ordinance adopting a local development plan
and public investment program (3) Ordinance
directing the payment of money or creating
liability. A vetoed ordinance can become a law:
(1) The sanggunian may override the veto by
two-thirds vote of all its members. (2 )Failure of
the Local Chief Executive to communicate the
veto to the sanggunian within 15 days in the case
of a province and 10 days in the case of city or
municipality. The ordinance shall be deemed
approved as if he signed it.
15. Distinguish initiative from referendum.
What are the limitations on initiative?
ANSWER: Initiative is the power of the
registered voters to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations
through an election called for the purpose. Local
initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
Initiative is a process of law-making by the
people themselves without participation of their
elected representatives, while referendum
consists of the electorate approving or rejecting
what has been enacted by a legislative body.
(Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
Commission on Elections, 262 SCRA 492)
Limitations on Initiative: (1) the power of
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a
 6
year, (2) It shall extend only to matters within
the power of the sanggunian to enact, (3) If the
sanggunian adopts the proposition, the initiative
shall be cancelled. (Sec. 124, LGC)
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
16. What is a boundary dispute? What is
the nature and limitation of the
power of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to settle boundary
dispute among adjoining
municipalities within the province?
ANSWER: A boundary dispute may involve “a
portion or the whole” of a local government
unit’s territorial area. Nothing in this provision
excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the
island is being claimed by different local
government units, there exists a boundary
dispute. (Province of Antique v. Calabocal, G.R.
No. 209146, June 8, 2016)
The power of the provincial boards to
settle boundary disputes is of an administrative
nature – involving, as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix a
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities. The power of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to settle boundary disputes is
limited to implementing the law creating the
municipality and, any alteration of boundaries
not in accordance with the law is not
implementation but amendment of the law,
which would exceed their authority. Thus, the
agreement between the municipalities of
Jimenez and Sinacaban (embodied in a
resolution of a provincial board declaring certain
barrios part of one or another municipality) is
invalid as it would effectively amend EO No. 258
creating the Municipality of Sinacaban. It is
contrary to the technical description of the
territory of a municipality as per EO 258, and
therefore not binding. The Supreme Court
declared that the RTC was correct when it
ordered a relocation survey to determine to
which municipality the barangays belonged.
(Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182)
17. What tribunal is conferred
jurisdiction by law to settle the boundary
dispute 1) involving municipalities or
component cities of different provinces, and
2) between the Municipality of Kanaga and
Ormoc City, an independent component
city, both of the Province of Leyte? 3) over
an island situated between two different
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provinces where one party took all the
necessary steps to settle the dispute within
the procedure set out in the law, while the
other party failed to perform its
concomitant responsibility under the same
law?
ANSWERS: 1) Boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement
to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(Section 118©, LGC) The RTC cannot exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the case since there
was no petition that was filed and decided by the
Sanggunian panlalawigans of Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC
assume original jurisdiction over the boundary
dispute since the LGC allocates such power to
the sanggunian panlalawigans of Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur. (Calanza vs. PICOP, GR No.
146622, April 24, 2009)
2) Section 118(d) of the LGC applies to a situation
in which a component city or a municipality
seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not an independent component
city. While Kanaga is a municipality, Ormoc is
an independent component city. Clearly then,
the procedure referred to in Section 118(d) does
not apply to them. Since there is no legal
provision specifically governing jurisdiction over
boundary disputes between a municipality and
an independent component city of the same
province, the general rule governing jurisdiction
should be used. The applicable provision is
found in Section 19 (6) of BP 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA
7691, which provides the Regional Trial Court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (Municipality
of Kanaga vs. Madrona, 402 SCRA 330)
3) Respondent’s resort to filing a case before the
RTC was warranted under the circumstances of
the case. It must be emphasized that
respondents followed the procedure laid down
in the Local Government Code. They took all the
necessary steps to settle the dispute within the
procedure set out in the law, and by all
indication, was prepared to see the matter thru
in order to lay the issue to rest.Petitioners
cannot demand that respondents now follow the
procedure when they themselves made it
impossible for any party to the same stating that
they are not amenable to any form of settlement.
(Province of Antique v. Clabocal,supra)
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Recall election
18. How is recall initiated? What are the
limitations and prohibitions on the conduct
recall elections? When does recall become
effective?
ANSWER: RA 9244 effectively amended Section
70 of the LGC and thus, eliminated the
preparatory recall assembly as one of the modes
of initiating recall and provided a new procedure
in the conduct of recall initiated through the
written petition of registered voters according to
the following schedule: 25% - where the voting
population of LGU does not exceed 20,000; at
least 20% but not less than 5,000 – for LGU’s
with at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000
voting population; at least 15% but not less than
15,000 for LGU’s with at least 75,00 but not more
than 300,000 voting population; and at least 10%
but not less than 45,000 for LGU’s with over
300,000 voting population. Recall Election. The
official sought to be recalled is automatically a
candidate. (Sec. 71); Prohibition against
resignation. The official sought to be recalled
cannot resign while the recall process is in
progress. (Sec. 73); Limitations. An official may
be subject of recall only once during his term.
No recall shall take place within one year from
assumption of office or one year before the
regular local election. (Sec. 74) The phrase
“regular election” should be construed as
referring to an election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled
will be contested. (Paras vs. COMELEC, 264
SCRA 49) Another limitation is the prohibition
to conduct recall election within one year from
the date of assumption of office of the official
concerned. The purpose of this limitation is to
provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of an elective local official. As long
as the election is held outside the one year
period from assumption from office of the local
official sought to be recalled, the preliminary
proceedings to initiate recall can be held even
before the end of the first year in office of said
local official. (Claudio vs. COMELEC, 331 SCRA
388)
Municipal Liability
19. State the legal basis of liability of LGUs.
(1) Art. 2189 : The local government unit is
liable in damages or injuries
suffered by reason of the
defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings
and other public works.
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For liability to arise under Article 2189 of
the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other public works,
is not a controlling factor, it is sufficient that a
province, city or municipality has control and
supervision thereof. The power of a municipality
to regulate the drilling and excavation of the
ground for the laying of mater or sewer and
other pipes within its territorial jurisdiction can
only mean that a municipality exercises the
power of control, or, at the very least,
supervision over excavations. Such liability
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or
excavation is made on a national road or
municipal road, for as long as the drilling and
excavation is made on a national road or
municipal road, for as long as the same is within
its territorial jurisdiction. (Municipality of San
Juan MetroManila vs. CA, 466 SCRA 78)
(2) Liability for Tort: Under Sec. 24 of RA
7160, local government units and their
officials are not exempt from liability for
death or injury to persons or damage to
property.
a) If local government is engaged in governmental
functions, it is not liable.
In Municipality of San Fernando vs.
Firme, 195 SCRA 692, it was held that the
municipality cannot be held liable for torts
committed by a regular employee, even if the
dump truck used belonged to the municipality,
inasmuch as the employee was discharging
government functions, i.e., road construction.
This ruling was reiterated in Jayme vs. Apostol,
GR 165060, November 27, 2008, where it upheld
the trial court’s ruling that the municipality of
Koronadal, the true and lawful employer of
Lozano may not be sued because it is an agency
of the State engaged in governmental functions
and, hence, immune from suit.
b) If engaged in proprietary functions,
local government unit is liable. In Torio vs.
Fontanilla 85 SCRA 599, The Municipality of
Malasiqui was held liable for the death of a
member of the zarzuela group when the staged
collapsed, under the principle of respondeat
superior. The holding of a town fiesta managed
by the Municipal Council is a proprietary
function. In City of Manila vs. IAC, 179 SCRA
428) the North Cemetery is a property which the
City of Manila owns in its proprietary capacity.
The maintenance of the cemetery is a
proprietary function. Hence, for breach of
 8
contract, the City of Manila is liable for damages.
The City of Manila is liable for tortuous act
committed by its agents who failed to verify the
duration of the contract of lease.
c) Personal liability of local officials.
Where public officers act maliciously and
wantonly and injure individuals rather than
discharge a public duty, they are personally
liable. Thus, the Provincial Governor and the
members of the Provincial Board were held
liable for damages in their personal capacity
arising from the illegal act of dismissing
employees in bad faith. (Rama vs. CA, 148 SCRA
496)
(3) Liability for Contracts
General Rule: A municipal corporation
is liable on a contract it enters into provided the
contract is intra viries. If the contract is ultra
viries, the local government unit is not liable.
Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability. A
municipality may become obligated upon an
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of
the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to
which it has the general power to contract. Thus,
in Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 447, it was
held that the Province of Cebu cannot set up the
plea that the contract was ultra viries and still
retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the
contract as valid for purposes of reaping
benefits, the local government unit is estopped
to question its validity for the purpose of
denying answerability.
Three consecutive terms limit
20. What is the rationale behind the
three-term limit rule? Name the two
conditions which must concur for the
application of the disqualification of
a candidate based on violation of the
three-term limit rule.
The intention behind the three-term
limit rule is not only to abrogate the
“monopolization of political power” and prevent
elected officials from breeding “proprietary
interest in their position but also to “enhance
the people’s freedom of choice.
There are two conditions which must
concur for the application of the disqualification
of a candidate based on violation of the three-
term limit rule: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2) that he
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has fully served the three consecutive terms.
(Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, January 15,
2019)
21. What are the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification by
reason of the three consecutive terms
limit for local elective officials?
ANSWERS: (1) The two conditions for the
application of the disqualification by reason of
the three consecutive terms limit are: (1) the
official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government
post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311
SCRA 602; Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574;
Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 and Abundo vs.
COMELEC, GR No.201716, January 8, 2013))
22. ONG was declared by the Board of
Canvassers as winner for a mayoralty
position in the 1992 elections. He assumed
office but was ordered unseated six months
later by virtue of a successful election
protest filed by ALEGRE. He ran again in
1995 and 1998 for the same position and won
and served his terms. (1) Is he eligible to
run again for mayor in the 2001 elections?
(2) Would your answer be the same if
during the 1992 elections, the order
unseating him was issued after the
expiration of his term?
(1) YES. Though proclaimed as winner by
the Board of Canvassers, he is not considered
duly elected for that particular term because he
was unseated. Voluntary renunciation of a term
of office does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from the office
for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC,
311 SCRA 602)
(2) NO. In Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the
Supreme Court held that Ong’s assumption as
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1,
1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes “service of full
term” and should be counted as full term served
in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the Constitution. While Ong’s
opponent “won” in an election protest in the
1998 mayoralty race, and therefore was the
legally elected mayor, that disposition was
without practical and legal use and values,
having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office has expired. Ong’s contention
that he was only a presumptive winner in the
 9
1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly
elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected
mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise
of the functions thereof from the start to finish
of the term, should be legally be taken as service
for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule.
In Rivera vs. COMELEC, GR 167591ans
GR 170577, May 9, 2007, since respondent
Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001, and assumed the position and
served as mayor until June 30 2001, the Supreme
Court ruled that he was mayor for the entire
period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC
in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner
Dee ousting him as mayor. Such circumstance
does not constitute an interruption in serving
the full term. Whether as “caretaker” or “de
facto” officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys
the prerequisites of the office which enables him
“to stay on indefinitely.”
23. What is the effect of the conversion of
a municipality into a city upon the
three-term limit of its incumbent
officials? Is the second term as mayor
of a municipality interrupted by the
conversion of the municipality into a
component city?
ANSWERS: While a new component city which
was converted from a municipality acquires a
new corporate existence separate and distinct
from that of the municipality, this does not
mean however, that for the purpose of applying
the constitutional provision on term limits, the
office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as
that of the office of the city mayor. Where a
person has been elected for three consecutive
terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end
or termination of such three-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a
city, without the city charter interrupting his
term until the end of the three-year term, the
prohibition applies to prevent him from running
for the fourth time as city mayor thereof, there
being no break in the continuity of the term.
Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred from
running for city mayor under the three-term
limit rule. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574)
This prohibition also applies to the office
of a punong barangay of a municipality merged
with another municipality to create a city as a
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new political unit. The territorial jurisdiction of
such barangay is the same as before conversion
and the inhabitants of the barangay are the
same. The voters who voted for the punong
barangay are the same group of voters. The
prohibition applies to prevent him from running
as punong barangay for the fourth time, there
being no break in the continuity of the terms.
(Laceda vs. Limena, GR No. 182867. November25,
2008)
NO. Election to and service of the same
local elective position for three consecutive
terms renders a candidate ineligible from
running for the same position in the succeeding
elections. The territorial jurisdiction of
Mabalacat City is the same as that of the
Municipality of Mabalacat which did not change
even an inch in the land area. Also, the elective
officials of the Municipality of Mabalacat
continued to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city
officials.The inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected Morales to be their mayor for
three consecutive terms, and over whom he held
powers and authority as their mayor.
Accordingly, Morales never ceased from acting
and discharging his duties and responsibilities as
Chief Executive of Mabalacat, despite
conversionof the Municipality of Mabalacat into
Mabalacat City. (Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
231643, January 15, 2019)
25. Distinguish voluntary renunciation
from office from involuntary severance from
office.
ANSWER: No severance From Office. Where an
elective official was elected for 3-consecutive
terms but was the subject of a preventive
suspension by the Ombudsman for several
months during one of his terms, such suspension
is not a term-interrupting event as the elective
officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the
office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from
exercising the functions of his office during this
period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23,
2009)
Voluntary Renunciation From Office. A
Punong Barangay who had already completed
two consecutive terms of office and ran for a
third term in the Barangay elections of 2002, and
while serving his third term as Punong Barangay,
he subsequently ran and won and assumed the
position of a Sangguniang Bayan member, has
effectively abandoned the position of a Punong
Barangay and he intended to forego of it.
Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
 10

When he voluntarily relinquished his office as a his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004
Punong Barangay, there is voluntary elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. For
renunciation of said office. (Bolos vs. COMELEC, two years, Abundo was a private citizen warming
GR No. 184082, March 17, 2009)) his heels while awaiting the outcome of his
protest. An elected official who was belatedly
Involuntary Severance From Office. SFP declared as winner and assumed office for only a
was elected and served three consecutive term as short period of term is declared eligible by the
municipal councilor. During his second term, he Court,
succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement Because he was deprived of his right and
of the incumbent vice-mayor. His assumption as opportunity to serve his constituents and that an
vice-mayor was considered an involuntary injustice may be committed against the people
severance from his office as municipal councilor of Viga by depriving them of their right to
resulting an interruption in his second term of choose their leaders.
service. It was held that it could not be deemed
to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation Vacancies and Succession
because it was by operation of law, hence
qualified to run again as municipal councillor. I. Permanent Vacancy
(Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50)
This type of vacancy arises when
26. EDWARD was elected City Mayor of the local elective official 1) dies 2)
Puerto Princesa in the elections of permanently incapacitated to discharge
1992, 1995 and 1998, where he fully the functions of his office 3) fills a
served all the three consecutive higher vacant office 4) refuses to
terms. In the 2001 elections he ran for assume office 5) fails to qualify 6)
governor of Palawan but he lost in removed from office 7) voluntarily
such electoral race. A year after, a resigns 8) Retirement
recall election for City Mayor of
Puerto Princesa was called by the 1. Governor and Mayor - succession by the
COMELEC. Is EDWARD eligible to run
for City Mayor without violating the a. Vice Governor and Vice Mayor
constitutional provision on term
limit? Where the office is
vacated by an ineligible candidate
ANSWER: YES. After three consecutive terms, an whose Certificate of Candidacy
elective local official cannot seek immediate re- was invalid at the time of filing,
election for a fourth term. The prohibited the eligible candidate who
election refers to the next regular election for garnered the highest number of
the same office following the end of the third votes must assume the office. The
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like ineligible candidate who was
a recall election, is no longer covered by the proclaimed and who already
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent assumed office is a de facto officer
election is no longer an immediate re-election by virtue of the ineligibility.
after three consecutive terms. Second, the (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 193314,
intervening period constitutes an involuntary June 25, 2013)
interruption in the continuity of service.
(Socrates vs. COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457) The rule on succession in
Section 44 of the LGC cannot
27. What is the effect of interruption of apply in instances when a de facto
service on the three-term limit rule? officer is ousted from office and
ANSWER: In Abundo v. COMELEC, GR No. the de jure officer takes over. The
291716, January 8, 2013, the Court held that the ouster of a de facto officer cannot
two-year period during which Abundo’s create a permanent vacancy as
opponent was serving as mayor should be contemplated in the LGC. There
considered as an interruption, which effectively is no vacancy to speak of as the de
removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the jure officer, the rightful winner in
three-term limit rule. Pending the favorable the elections, has the legal right
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was to assume the position. (Ibid.)
relegated to being an ordinary constituent since

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 11

b. Sanggunian members according Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred

to ranking in the Sanggunian that should be
filled up with someone who
2. Punong Barangay – succession by the belongs to the political party of
a. Highest ranking sangguniang Tamayo. To argue that the
member vacancy created was that
formerly held by the 8th
b. Second Highest ranking Sanggunian member, a Lakas
sangguniang barangay Party Member, would result in
member the increase in that party’s
representation in the Sanggunian
3. Ranking in the sanggunian shall be at the expense of Reforma Party.
determined on the basis of the
proportion of the votes obtained to the Thus, the appointment of
number of registered voters in each Navarro to fill up the vacancy in
district, and not merely on the number of the Sanggunian is valid. The
voters who actually voted. (Victoria vs. reason behind the right given to a
COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269). political party to nominate a
replacement where a permanent
4. Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots. vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian
(Sec.44) is to maintain party
representation as willed by the
5. Sanggunian people in the election. Otherwise,
Reforma Party’s representation in
a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities the Sanggunian would be
and independent component diminished.
cities – appointment by the
President d. Sangguniang barangay –
appointment by mayor
b. Component city and municipality
– appointment by e. Except for the sangguniang
governor barangay, the appointee shall
come from the political party of
c. Under paragraph (a) of Section 45 the member who caused the
of the Local Government Code, it vacancy. (Farinas vs. Barba, 256
is the Provincial Governor who SCRA 396) If the member
fills any permanent vacancy in does not belong to any party, the
the Sangguniang Bayan by appointee shall be recommended
appointment. (Farinas vs. Barba, by the sanggunian. (Ibid.)
256 SCRA 396)
Neither petitioner nor
The “last vacancy” in the respondent is entitled to the
Sanggunian refers to that created vacant seat in the Sangguniang
by the elevation of the members Bayan. While petitioner was
formerly occupying the next appointed by the provincial
higher rank which in turn also governor, he was not
had become vacant by any of the recommended by the
causes enumerated, and the term Sangguniang Bayan. Such
“last vacancy” is thus used in recommendation is a condition
Section 45(b) of the Local sine qua non for the validity of
Government Code, to the appointment. Although
differentiate it from the other respondent was recommended by
vacancy previously created. the Sangguniang Bayan, it was
the municipal mayor and not the
In Navarro vs. CA, 355 provincial governor who
SCRA 672, with the elevation of appointed him. (Ibid.)
Tamayo who belonged to
Reforma Party, to the position of

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 12

f. The appointee for the outside of his jurisdiction for not more
sangguniang barangay shall be than 3 consecutive days, he may
recommended by the designate an officer-in-charge. The
sangguniang barangay. authorization shall specify the powers of
the officer-in-charge except the power to
g. Vacancy in the representation of appoint, suspend or dismiss employees.
the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian shall be filled by the 3. If the local chief executive does not issue
official next in rank of the the authorization, the vice governor, vice
organization. (Sec. 45) mayor, or highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member shall assume his
II. Temporary vacancy powers on the fourth day of his absence.
(Sec. 46)
This vacancy arises when an
elected official is temporarily
incapacitated to perform their duties due However, Executive Order No. 15, issued
to legal or physical reasons such as on December 13, 2018, authorizes the Secretary
physical sickness, leave of absence, travel of the DILG to fill temporary vacancies in certain
abroad or suspension from office. elective offices to prevent hiatus in and paralysis
of local government operations, to wit: (1) for
1. When the governor, mayor or punong temporary vacancies in the office of the Office of
barangay is temporarily incapacitated to the Local Chief Executive, the vice governor, city
perform his duties, the vice governor, or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking
vice mayor, or ranking sangguniang sangguniang barangay member, or in case of a
barangay member shall exercise his barangay, the second highest sangguniang
powers except the power to appoint, barangay member shall automatically exercise
suspend or dismiss employees, which can the powers and perform the duties and functions
only be exercised after 30 working days. of the Local Chief executive; (2) for temporary
Since the Local Government vacancies in the office of the vice-governor or
Code is silent on the mode of succession city or municipal vice-mayor, the highest
in case of temporary vacancy in the ranking sangguniang member or, in case of his
position of vice governor, because of the inability, the second highest ranking
exigencies of public service, the sangguniang member, shall be designated by the
President, through her alter ego, the President through the SILG.
Secretary of Local Government, may --oo0oo—
extend a temporary appointment to
remedy the situation. The appointment
of petitioner is in accordance with the
intention of the LGC, which provides
that in case of permanent vacancy in
the office of the vice governor, the
member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who obtained the highest
number of votes shall assume office. The
contention that it is the SP who should
make the appointment has no merit. As
between the President, who has
supervision over local governments, and
the members of the SP, who are junior to
the vice governor, the former should
prevail. Even if the President has no
power to appoint petitioner, at the very
least he is a de facto officer and is
entitled to compensation. (Menzon vs.
Petilla, 197 SCRA 251)

2. When the local chief executive is

traveling within the Philippines, but

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