Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.
GOVERNMENT
Elements of the State
DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
Co Kim Cham has a civil case in CFI Manila instituted
under the Republic of the Philippines during the period of
Japanese occupation. Judge Dizon alleges that the case
shouldn’t be continued because:
1. The PEC and RP under Japanese
military
occupation were not de facto governments.
2. McArthur’s proclamation invalidated
all
judicial proceedings and judgments of Philippine Courts
under the PEC and the RP.
3. Lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue
pending judicial proceedings with the absence of an
enabling law to grant such authority.
A writ of mandamus was issued to the judge ordering him
to take cognizance and render final judgment of the case.
The first issue involved was whether or not the PEC and
the RP were de facto governments. And the SC held that
they were by expounding on the different kinds of de facto
governments (which are listed below) and pointing out that
all acts and proceedings of the PEC/RP (which was
classified as a de facto government of the second form) are
good and valid.
1. Government that USURPS by FORCE or
BY
THE VOICE OF THE MAJORITY the rightful legal
government.
2. Government of PARAMOUNT FORCE.
3. Government established by the native
inhabitants who rise in INSURRECTION against the parent
state.
The second issue revolved around McArthur’s
proclamation. It did not have the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of
Philippine Courts under the PEC and the RP by virtue of
the principle of POSTLIMINY in international law.
Postliminium is a principle in international law which
considers valid, except in a very few cases, the acts done
by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within
his competence to do so, notwithstanding the fact that the
territory which has been occupied by him comes again in
the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty.
The last issue was the question of whether or not an
enabling law was required. It isn’t. Conquest or colonization
is impotent to amend laws. Laws remain unchanged until
the new sovereign by a legislative act creates such
change.
In Re: Saturnino Bermudez
(1986)
A lawyer questions Article 18 of proposed 1986
Constitution regarding who the provision refers to when it
says President and Vice President. The court dismisses it
outright for lack of jurisdiction and a cause of action.
Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a
matter of public record and common public knowledge that
the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
H. Laurel, and to no other persons
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon
C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government.
In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynate Puno
This is an administrative matter in the SC. Puno was
elevated in the seniority rankings of the CA from no. 12 to
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.2
no. 5. This, however, caused Javellana and Campos to file
a motion for reconsideration. Puno countered by saying
that Aquino had pledged that “no right provided under the
1973 Constitution shall be absent from the Freedom
Constitution” and thus by virtue of Section 2 E.O. 33, Puno
can claim seniority. This was debunked by the SC on the
ground that a revolution changes everything because it
went in defiance of the then existing 1973 Constitution. The
core issue at hand was precisely WON the existing legal
order was overthrown by the revolutionary government. It
was. The little resistance met by the new government,
control of the state, appointment of key officers in the
administration, departure of officials of the previous regime,
and the revamp of the military and judiciary signaled the
point where the legal system had ceased to be obeyed by
the Filipino people.
Estrada v. Desierto
(2001)
Erap alleges that he is still the President, albeit on-leave,
where as Arroyo merely claims to be President. He sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
criminal complaints against his office until after the term of
his presidency was over and only if legally warranted. The
first issue raised by the respondents is that the case is a
political question and therefore outside the jurisdiction of
the SC. To determine whether or not the question is
political, the court looks to the most authoritative guideline
in determining such issues: Justice Brennan’s words in the
1962 case of Baker v. Carr. The Philippines’ leading case is
Tanada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions
refer:
“to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The court held that the Arroyo government was not a
revolutionary government as compared to its Aquino
counterpart. EDSA I involved extra-constitutional exercise
of people power revolution (and is thus a political question
and not subject to judicial review) whereas EDSA II
provoked the resignation of the sitting president which
resulted in the succession of the vice president (which is
intra-constitutional and thus justiciable). EDSA I overthrew
the whole government. EDSA II sought to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected
the office of the President.
CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS
ACCFA v. CUGCO
ACCFA is being sued by CUGCO because of alleged
violations of a collective bargaining agreement,
discrimination against members, and refusal to bargain.
The CIR favored the complainants but ACCFA petitioned to
the SC questioning WON the CIR has jurisdiction over the
case depending on WON ACCFA exercised governmental
or proprietary functions. The court ruled that the
implementation of the land reform program of the
government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most
certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The
CIR has no jurisdiction but nevertheless the collective
bargaining agreements must be enforced.
The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in
governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions
may not be strictly what President Wilson described as
"constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as
those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property
rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under
this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not
merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people — these letter functions being ministrant he
exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however,
have rendered this traditional classification of the functions
of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to
enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped
to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their
well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.3
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization
of economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning
the promotion of social justice.
PARENS PATRIAE
Gov. of Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad
(1916)
Contributions were collected during the Spanish Regime
for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Part of the
money was never distributed and was instead deposited
with the defendant bank. In an action for its recovery later
filed by the government, the defendant questioned the
competence of the plaintiff (PI government), contending
that the suit could be instituted only by the intended
beneficiaries themselves or by the heirs of the victims. The
issue of concern here is WON the PI has the right to file a
case in behalf of its citizens. It does in its capacity as the
guardian or parens patriae of the people.
SOVEREIGNTY
Elements of the State
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
There was no change of sovereignty during the period of
Japanese occupation. Possession of sovereignty remained
with the Americans while the exercise of the acts of
sovereignty belonged to the belligerent invaders.
Macariola v. Asuncion
(1992)
In a civil case of the CFI Leyte, Judge Asuncion ruled a
partition of lots of one deceased Francisco Reyes among
Macariola (sole child of Francisco’s first wife) and the
children from his second marriage. A year later, the judge
bought one of the lots he settled from a certain Galapon.
Macariola charges Asuncion with a complaint of committing
“acts unbecoming a judge.” The main issues are twofold:
the first is WON he violated Article 1491 (5) of the CC; and
second is WON he violated Article 14 (1) & (5) of the Code
of Commerce.
The prohibition of the article in the first issue has already
been decided in recent cases by reasoning of: ". . . for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property"1 Thus, no violation of said
provision took place. As for the second regarding the
violation of the Code of Commerce provision:
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law
which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations
of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
Perfecto). It may be recalled that political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative
law including the law on public officers and elections.
Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business; hence,
political in essence.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and later on from the United States to the Republic
of the Philippines, Article 14 of the Spanish Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not
with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs that:
"'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by
one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their nature
and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government
immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.' 2
"While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in
conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in force
without the express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not. 3
1
The Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., [1979]; Rosario
vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, [1978]
2
Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899
3
Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.4
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto, this Court stated that: "It
is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated."
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued
the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff
(1946)
Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine
Constabulary, instead of surrendering to the Japanese
forces, disbanded his company, retreated to the mountains
and led a guerilla unit. Lieut. Col. Jurado, recognized by
the United States Armed Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy
but was slain by the latter and his companions. The same
people who killed the replacing officer claim that they were
not subject to military law at the time when the offense was
committed. But the rule suspending political laws only
affects the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory and
is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus,
members of the armed forces continued to be covered by
the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and other
laws relating to the armed forces even during the Japanese
occupation. By the acceptance of the petitioners’
appointments as officers in the Philippine Army they
became amenable to the Articles of War.
Peralta v. Director of Prisons
(1945)
Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was
prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined by the
National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve
time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7
promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition
for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court’s
existence was void ab initio because it was created as a
political instrumentality under the command of the
Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said
ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the penalties
provided for are much more severe than the RPC. SolGen
is of the opinion that the petition should be granted
because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said court is
“tinged with political complexion”, that the procedure does
not afford a fair trial and violates constitutional right of
accused persons under a legitimate Constitution. The court
is of the opinion that:
As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the
only factor to be considered is the authority of the
legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance.
It is well established in International Law that "The criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied
territory finds its source neither in the laws of the
conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely from
the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The
authority thus derived can be asserted either through
special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined
in the military code of the conquering state, or through the
ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district."
(Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant,
had therefore the power or was competent to create the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No
question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a
political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency
charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling
within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be
of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature
or character of the law so applied. There is no room for
doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the
court in question.
The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes
life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon
the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which
said petitioner was convicted.
It appears clear that it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate,
through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which
penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.5
imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the
imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as
minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum.
Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal
Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65
with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and
offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state
of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the
belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army
of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of
its operations.
The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of
the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth
Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of
postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now
serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time.
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all
judgment of political complexion of the courts during the
Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of
the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium.
Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence
which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be
valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the
Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearms. The CA modified the sentence from arresto mayor
to prision correccional. Petitioner questions the validity of
the CA on the sole ground that the court was a creation of
the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation. In Co Kim Cham v. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, the court ruled that the RP and the
PEC were governments de facto and that judicial acts were
good and valid and remained good and valid after the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government. The CA that
existing during Japanese occupation was the CA after the
restoration. And even if the CA was a new court, its
judgments would still remain good and valid provided that
they do not have a political complexion.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political
complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined
in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the
latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but
taken out of the territorial law and penalized as new
offenses committed against the belligerent occupant,
incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of
the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than
private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid
or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare,
safety and security of the belligerent occupant. As
examples, the crimes against national security, such as
treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as
rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the
Commonwealth or United States Government under the
Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the
belligerent occupant.
STATE IMMUNITY
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUIT
Begosa v. Chairman, Phil. Vet. Assoc.
(1970)
A veteran, Begosa, suffering from permanent disability was
being denied what has been granted him specifically by
legislative enactment (which certainly is superior to any
regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine
Veterans Administration). Although the respondent
relented, the amount released was far less than what the
veteran was legally entitled to. He appealed. The doctrine
of state immunity cannot be invoked by the PVA.
Where litigation may have adverse consequences on the
public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or
loss of property, the public official being tried cannot be
held liable by virtue of state immunity. However, where the
suit against such a government official had to be instituted
because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by
statute appropriating funds for the benefit of the plaintiff,
then the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied.
Republic v. Feliciano
(1987)
Feliciano allegedly owns a parcel of land through his
possession of informacion possesoria. But this same land,
by virtue of Proclamation No. 90 of President Ramon
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.6
Magsaysay, became reserved for settlement purposes.
Feliciano seeks to prove that his ownership of the land as
evidenced by his informacion is valid and makes a claim to
recover said property. However, the court ruled that the
state did not give its consent to be sued and thus immune
from the complaint. Although the proclamation stated that it
shall be “subject to private rights if any there be”, this
cannot be construed as an express waiver of immunity.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will
not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi
juris4. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act.
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.
RATIONALE FOR IMMUNITY
Sanders v. Veridiano
(1988)
Rossi and Wyer, gameroom attendards, are suing Sanders
and Moreau (superiors of the attendants) for libelous
imputations committed by the latter which eventually cost
them their jobs. However, the court ruled that the alluded
acts were official and not personal and that the acts
petitioners are called to account were performed in the
discharge of their official duties.
Given the official character of the above-described letters,
we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts.
4
STRICTISSIMI JURIS. The most strict right or law. In
general, when a person receives an advantage, as the grant
of a license, he is bound to conform receives an advantage,
as the grant of a license, he is bound to conform strictly to
the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a
strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in
case of a dispute, it will be strictly construed.
The doctrine of state immunity is applicable not only to our
own government but also to foreign states who are subject
to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it,
is that "there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends." In the
case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle
of the sovereign equality of states which wisely
admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium5 and
that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally
expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where
we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land."
The acts of petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith, which has not been overturned by the private
respondents. Mistakes concededly committed by such
public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. Exceptions to the doctrine of state
immunity as enumerated in the case are:
Officer is sued to compel him to do an act required by law
[such as restraining a Cabinet member from enforcing a
law claimed to be unconstitutional].
When the government violated its own laws.
When an officer acted without or in excess of authority in
forcibly taking private property without paying just
compensation thereof, though the property was converted
for the public good.
United States v. Guinto
(1990)
Three main cases dealing with the doctrine of state
immunity are consolidated in this case with the fourth being
remanded due to a lack of information.
(1) Respondents file for a case of cancellation of a
barbershop concessionaire. The State herein can be sued
5
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.7
because barbershop concessionaires are commercial in
nature and the state entering into such a proprietary
contract implicitly gave its consent to be sued.
(2) A cook was found guilty of pouring urine in soup and
was subsequently relieved from duty. He files a complaint
against the club manager who invokes state immunity. The
State can be sued since restaurant operation is a
commercial affair, however, it does not necessarily mean
that the state is liable.
(3) Luis Bautista was caught in a buy-bust operation; he
was then subsequently relieved from duty. He now sues
with the complaint of illegal dismissal. The respondent
State cannot be sued because it performed acts within its
official capacity.
There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no
such waiver may be implied.
Even without such affirmation [in Art. 16, Sec. 3 of 1987
Constitution], we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine
of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated
in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations.
Upon its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in
its relations with other states.
XXX
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal
prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants
the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply
invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in
democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant
unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the
doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not
be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule
says that the state may not be sued without its consent,
which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied
in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when
the state enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit
is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
action between private parties." In Merritt v. Government of
the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable
a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files
a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express
consent is effected only by the will of the legislature
through the medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government
will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for
the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will
result only where the government is claiming affirmative
relief from the defendant.
The Holy See v. Rosario
(1994)
The Holy See, represented by the Papal Nuncio, sold
certain parcels of land to two buyers. However, because
the petitioners were unable to evict the squatters, a dispute
arose as to who held the responsibility of clearing the said
parcels of land of squatters. Respondents filed a complaint
for the annulment of the sale of the land but the DFA filed a
motion to intervene claiming that it had a legal interest in
the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner.
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has
no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.8
sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent
insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore
absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a
cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial
transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the
Philippines.
Private respondent’s opinion is untenable. Aside from the
privilege of sovereign immunity established by the DFA, the
Holy See is nonetheless immune from suit because the
transaction entered into was not for profit or for gain. It
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the
squatters living there made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation
(construction of Papal Nuncio’s residence). The fact that
squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and
that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity,
each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States
of America v. Ruiz)
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and
transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as
constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with
our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such
an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical
question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign
state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made
for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the
site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
Sayson v. Singson
(1973)
Singson filed a money claim against the Highways Auditor
General petitioning the latter to be compelled to pay the
balance due to Singson. Sayson failed to pay the
corresponding balance to Singson after discovering that
the equipment being sold by Singson was overpriced.
To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand
taken by the Republic. The lower court was unmindful of
the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it was
stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General
Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's
cause of action is a money claim against the government,
for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare
parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.
Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although
as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause
or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy,
mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of
such claim against the State..., but an ordinary action for
specific performance... Actually, the suit disguised as one
for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which
cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with
the consent of the State
Republic v. Purisima
(1977)
Yellow Bell Freight Lines brought a suit against the Rice
and Corn Administration for an alleged breach of contract.
Rice and Corn moved to dismiss the suit by using the
doctrine of state immunity. Respondent judge dismissed
the motion to dismiss. The SC held that the courts do not
have jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the claims
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery
of the national government.
Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere
counsel of the government but must be effected through a
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.9
duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come
under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
Amigable v. Cuenca
(1972)
The government used a portion of the land owned by
Amigable for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues without prior negotiation/expropriation. Amigable
sues Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways seeking payment for the appropriated land. The
court ruled in favor of the state by virtue of applying state
immunity. However, the SC set aside the lower courts
decision on the basis that “immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for penetrating an injustice on a citizen.”
Ministerio v. City of Cebu
(1971)
Petitioners seek just compensation for a registered lot
alleging that the government took physical and material
possession of it and used it for the widening of Gorodo Ave.
in Cebu City. CFI dismissed the case on the ground of
immunity of the state to be sued without its consent.
The SC held that: where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent. The SC there said:
". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be
compensated for property taken for public use were to be
respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should
not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at
the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only
upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment,
or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public
use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance
of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely
because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just
as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked."
Santiago v. Republic
(1978)
Santiago filed an action in the CFI naming as defendant the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines represented
by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). His
plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed
by him and his spouse in 1971, with the BPI as the donee.
Petitioner alleges that the donee failed to comply the terms
of the donation. Petitioner then is led to conclude that he
was exempt from compliance with such an explicit
constitutional command, which prohibits a suit against the
Republic without its consent. The issue is WON the RP
gave its consent when it accepted the terms of donation
given by Santiago, thereby allowing itself to be sued based
on the high dictates of equity and justice.
In the case at bar, the Republic, as donee, gave its implied
consent to perform the conditions of the donation. In such a
case as this, the court held that the donor, with the
Republic as donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He (the
donor) has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances,
the fundamental postulate of non-suitability cannot stand in
the way. The government being the beneficiary manifests
its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can
only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the
people.
Lim v. Brownell
(1960)
Lim is claiming ownership over certain lots of land that
were reclaimed by the US government and subsequently,
turned over to the RP. Lim claims these lands originally
belong to his deceased mother but were illegally
possessed by Japanese troops. The US was able to take
possession of said lands after the war by virtue of the
Trading with the Enemy Act.
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.10
The immunity of the state from suit, however, cannot be
invoked where the action, as in the present case, is
instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an
enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or
interest in vested property, and of recovering his ownership
and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has
expressly been given by the United States.
United States v. Ruiz
(1985)
Respondent was able to win a bid for a project for the
repair of the wharves/shoreline of the Subic Bay Area.
Petitioner asked for a quotation but later on denied the
respondent the project stating that the respondent was not
qualified. The latter files suit for awarding the project to him
and for damages as well.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized
for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
Republic v. Villasor
(1973)
Respondent Judge Villasor is alleged to have acted in
excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of
an alias writ of execution against the properties of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and thus, the Alias Writ of
Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant
thereto are null and void. What was done by respondent
Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing
from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as
well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so.
In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not
dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency
and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle
were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy
were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on
the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle
that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well
be imagined."
Justice Malcolm: "A rule, which has never been seriously
questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not
liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its
sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to
be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of
public policy forbids it."
SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Phil. National Railways v. IAC
(1993)
Baliwag Bus and an express train collided resulting to
death and damages. Baliwag sues PNR; but PNR raises
the defense that it was the bus driver who was negligent
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.11

and the doctrine of state immunity exempts them from suit.
IAC ruled in favor of Baliwag, hence this appeal.
Although PNR is a government formed department, PNR
engages in a purely commercial action. PNR was created
not to discharge a governmental function but to operate a
transport service which is essentially a business concern.
When the government enters in a commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other private corporation.
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
article shall be applicable." It is, therefore, evident that the
State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only
liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers
and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the
chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not
such an agent.

National Irrigation Administration v. Fontanilla

(1991)

The NIA group was on its way to a campsite. In a hurry to

reach their destination, they ran over someone and did not
even stop to check what happened. It turned out to be the
son of herein respondents who subsequently filed suit. NIA
avers that they were an agency of the government and
therefore not liable for the acts of the driver who was a
special agent. The SC ruled, however, that the NIA is a
government agency with juridical personality that is
separate and distinct from the government. Therefore it is
not immune from suit. Besides, the NIA’s charter
specifically allows the NIA to sue and be sued.

SUITABILITY V. LIABILITY

Merritt v. Gov. of the Phil Islands

(1916)

Plaintiff Merritt on a motorcycle collided with an ambulance

which did not warn of its impending approach. As the
negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed
by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at
once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the
damages resulting therefrom. The government, by no less
than an Act, authorized Merritt to bring suit in the CFI
Manila in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital.

Did the government simply waive its immunity from suit or

did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “The

state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused
by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.12
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS 6
Gonzales v. COMELEC
November 9, 1967, Concepcion, C.J.
Facts:
The House of Representatives passed a bill which allowed
for proposals in Resolution 1 (increasing max number of
representatives from 120-180) and Resolution 3
( authorizing Senators and Representatives to be
delegates in a constitutional convention) to be passed. This
was subsequently approved by the President as R.A. 4913
which provided for amendments to be made subject to the
people’s approval at the general elections of Nov. 1967.
Gonzales, a taxpayer, filed a class suit and prayed that: (1)
COMELEC restrain from performing acts that would result
in the holding of the plebiscite for ratification; and (2)
declare the Act unconstitutional.
PHILCONSA (Philippine Constitution Association), on the
other hand, prayed that the decision in this case be
deferred until an identical case pending (which was
expected soon) was decided on. COMELEC dismissed the
petition which instigated the association’s filing of a review
by certiorari. SolGen maintains that the SC has no
jurisdiction upon the ground that the same is "merely
political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.
It was urged by the petitioners that said resolutions are null
and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the
proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a
convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto
Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives
propose — amendments or call a convention therefore but
may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendment
and call a convention — at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the
Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a
special election, not a general election, in which officers of
6
No digests for the first two sections of this chapter:
Separation of Powers and the Non-Delegation Doctrine
the national and local governments — such as the
elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 —
will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election,
in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to
the people for ratification, must be held under such
conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist — as to give the
people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the
nature and implications of said amendments.
Senator Arturo Tolentino objected to the PHILCONSA
petition on the following grounds: a) that the Court has no
jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or
to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of
Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in
effect, render in operational the legislative department; and
c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid
reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of
rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the SC has jurisdiction.
Yes. "The judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof." – Dr. Jose
P. Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission.
The force of the precedent in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito
declaring the issue to be “merely political” has been
weakened by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,
Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs.
Commission on Elections. In the first, we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are
under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth,
we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting
to apportion the representative districts for the House of
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.13
Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment
had not been made as may be possible according to the
number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected
the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the
issues therein raised were political questions the
determination of which is beyond judicial review.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress
— acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence,
subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view
may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified
accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on
this point.
(2) WON R.A. 4913 is unconstitutional.
No, it is constitutional. Even though it is urged that the
Congress became unconstitutional because the
Apportionment Act was deemed illegal (act was not made
according to the number of inhabitants of the different
provinces of the Philippines), this argument isn’t tenable.
Failure to make the apportionment does not dissolve
Congress or makes it illegal.
On the argument that the acting congress was
unconstitutional because it failed to apportion itself within
three years, this is untenable. The fact that Congress is
under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not
justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with
such obligation rendered Congress illegal or
unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto
officers.
On the argument of the petitioners that Congress may only
amend or call a convention but not do both, the SC ruled
that this was a question of wisdom and not authority and
hence was a political question.
On the choice between a special election and a general
election, a majority of the SC, but not enough to constitute
a qualified majority needed to declare a law
unconstitutional, was of the view that the spirit of the
Constitution demanded that “election” be read as “special
election” in order that the transcendental importance of a
constitional amendment could command the undivided
attention of the electorate. The minority but prevailing view,
however, said:
“This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the
attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal
conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether
the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for
amendment to the people except under such conditions, is
another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in
this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves
unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into
the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon
and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since
the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer
speculation. “
On the issue of insufficiency of the publicity and time for
discussion afforded by the mechanism of ratification
provided by the legislature, again the minority but
prevailing opinion said:
“We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that
Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-
matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of
human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no
legislation would be constitutional and valid.”7
Tolentino v. COMELEC
October 16, 1971, Barredo, J.
Facts:
After the Constitional Convention of 1971 came into being
and after its election of delegates, the convention, on Sept.
28, 1971, approved its first formal proposal to amend the
Constitution by Organic Resolution No. 1 (Lowering the
Voting Age to 18 in Article V). Arturo M. Tolentino filed a
petition for prohibition to restrain COMELEC from holding a
plebiscite on November 8 at which the proposed
amendment could be ratified by the people.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON only Congress can call a plebiscite for ratification
of amendments.
7
Despite this decision of the SC which cleared the way for
the plebiscite, the plebiscite nevertheless, overwhelmingly,
rejected Resolutions 1 and 3. – Mars.
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.14
The SC chose not to answer the question on whether or
not the power to call a plebiscite was exclusively
legislative. “In the view the Court takes of the present case,
it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that
question, grave and important as it may be Truth to tell, the
lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the
members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the
need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the
essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8,
1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is
calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any
pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question
until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the
basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any
can be.”
ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by
a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
(2) WON Sec. 1 Article XV is violated by the act of the
Convention in calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1 and is
thus unconstitutional.
Yes. “The Court holds that there is [a violation], and it is
the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be
proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be
submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the
Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being
called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification
of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of
the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that
direction are null and void.”
Barredo reasoned out his grammatical argument by saying
that partial amendments do not reflect a study of the whole
Constitution in its entirety which is necessary in order to
amend a fragment or portion of its parts. Thus, a single
election of these amendments ensures that all the
proposed and accepted amendments are compatible with
the entire Constitution and not just within the provision’s
scope.
“We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should
be submitted to them not separately from but together with
all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.”
Occena v. COMELEC
April 2, 1981, Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Occena and Gonzales filed an action of prohibition against
the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments, thereby implying the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental
law, regardless of the recent Javellana ruling.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law of
the land.
Yes. It is too late to deny the applicability of the 1973
Constitution. This was already decided on by a 6-4 vote in
Javellana v. Executive Secretary. “There is no further
obstacle to the new constitution being considered in force
and effect.”
(2) WON the Batasang Pambansa has the power to
propose amendments:
Yes it does. The existence of the power of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar
as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.15
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the
Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments.
Petitioners would argue that the amendments proposed are
so extensive as to constitute a revision. “At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or
revised or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.”
Regarding the issue of votes necessary to propose
amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission, petitioners have not made out a case that calls
for a judgment in their favor. The language of the
Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required
when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed.
Teehankee, J. (Dissenting):
1. Under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec
that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from
the constitutional agency vested with the constituent power
to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in
the Transitory Article XVII which would then have to be
convened and not from the executive power as vested in
the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent
power has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the
controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the October 1976
constitutional amendments which created the Interim
Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the Interim National
Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein,
constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the
procedure or manner of amending the fundamental law are
binding upon the Convention and the other departments of
the government (and) are no less binding upon the people"
and "the very Idea of deparcing from the fundamental law
is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and
repugnant to the essence of the rule of law." The proposed
amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of the invalid October,
1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same
congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity
of the proposed amendments, I reiterate my stand in
Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission firs
enunciated by a simple majority of six Justices (of an
eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution which
increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) in
Gonzales vs. Comelec and subsequently officially adopted
by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the
Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in
the case at bar. The three resolutions proposing complex,
complicated and radical amendments of our very structure
of government were considered and approved by the
Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the
plebiscite for thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981 which is
totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period
fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to
"sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted
upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express
their will in a genuine manner."
4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order
that there can be a proper submission to the people of a
proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired
Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his separate opinion in
Gonzales bears repeating as follows: "... we take the view
that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification,'
if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution – a
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the
people, an expression of their sovereign will – is that it can
only be amended by the people expressing themselves
according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution.
Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the
people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to
be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They
must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original
provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments,
and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their
conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or
possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every short to inform
every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and
effects thereof. ... What the Constitution in effect directs is
that the government, in submitting an amendment for
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.16
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency
within its structural framework to enlighten the people,
educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is
submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these
safeguards the people still approve the amendments no
matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the
people decree their own fate."
Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt
citation that "... The great men who builded the structure of
our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good
Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said 'A good
Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary
excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for
stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought
evolved in excitement, or hot blood, but the sober second
thought, which alone if the government is to be safe, can
be allowed efficacy ... Changes in government are to be
feard unless benefit is certain.' As Montaign says: 'All great
mutation shake and disorder a state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a
worse."'
Almario v. Alba
January 25, 1984, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
The Filipino electorate will go to the polls to approve or
reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by
resolutions of the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioners seek to
delay the date of ratification/rejection in order to give ample
time to study the ramifications of the two questions stated
in Question No. 3 and No. 4 .
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON Questions No. 3 and No. 4 have been properly
submitted to the people.
Yes. The Constitution provides, under Sec. 2, Art. 16, a
period of three months for an information campaign
regarding the intended amendments. The sufficiency of the
period during which amendments are submitted to the
people before they vote to either affirm or reject depends
on the complexity and intricacy of the questions presented.
The petitioners have failed to show that the addition of the
one word "grant" to Section 11, Article XIV or that the
addition of two paragraphs including one on urban land
reform to Section 12 of Article XIV result in amendments of
such nature that when the people go to the polls on
January 27, 1984 they cannot arrive at an intelligent
judgment on their acceptability or non-acceptability.
More important, however, is that the necessity, expediency,
and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the
power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not
"grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or
improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments
are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can
decide. The questions are presented for their
determination. Assuming that a member or some members
of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of
disposing of public land or an urban land reform program,
the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed
amendments by denying to the millions of voters an
opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue
before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the
proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of
the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the
voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the
dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a
case that the average voter does not know the meaning of
"grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."
Teehankee, J. (Dissenting):
The doctrine of fair and proper submission to the people of
proposed constitutional amendments as enunciated by the
Court in Tolentino vs. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729)
mandates that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification
of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time, but ample
basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
 Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007 Constitutional Law I Digests (Pre-Legislative Compilation) v1.5 Page No.17

amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts

of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious
whole." There must be fair submission and intelligent
consent or rejection.

As the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez stressed in his

separate opinion in the earlier case of Gonzales vs.
Comelec, concurred in by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar, (21 SCRA 774, 817),
the people must be "sufficiently informed of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously
deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine
manner."
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND
STATE POLICIES
8
Lim v. Executive Secretary
2002, De Leon, Jr. J
Two years after the VFA was approved in 1999, the terrorist attacks 9/11 prompted America to
declare an international terrorist campaign. Pres. GMA pledged the country’s support to the
endeavor.
On January 2002, members of the USAF (United States Armed Forces) arrived in Mindanao
to, along with the AFP, take part in the “Balikatan 02-1” exercises. The next month, the
Senate, after conducting a hearing on the military exercise, approved the Draft Terms of
Reference upon presentation by then VP Guingona.
Petitioners Lim and Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. They filed suit as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. Two
party-list intervenors, SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGAGAWA, aver that some of their
members are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu and thus are directly affected by operations
conducted in Mindanao.
They argue (a) that the Abu-Sayyaf bandits do not constitute an external armed force and
thus, the Philippines is not subject to armed external attack contemplated in the MDT (mutual
defense treaty) of 1951 to warrant US military assistance. They also claim that the VFA signed
in 1999 does not authorize US soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory,
not even to fire back if fired upon.
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have legal standing.
No. They cannot file suit as taxpayers because the military exercise does not involve
Congress’ taxing or spending powers. Being lawyers does not invest them with personality to
8
A lot of dissenting opinions. Too lazy. Will get back to them when I have time.
initiate the case and they have failed to demonstrate the requisite of suffering proximate injury.
Issues raised premature and based on a fear of future violations of the Terms of Reference.
(2) WON the “Balikatan” exercises violate the Constitution.
No. Petitioners claim that it violates the Renunciation Clause of the Constitution (The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy) but neither the MDT nor the
VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The VFA permits
the USAF to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities”. The word was used to give
leeway in negotiation by both parties. In this manner, the US may sojourn in the Philippines for
purposes other than military. Combat-related activities, as opposed to combat, are authorized
by the MDT and the VFA.
Although international laws are adhered to, as expressed by the Indoctrination Clause, it does
not imply primacy of international law over national law. The Constitution espouses a view that
has marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country. The Court, if it sees
that the treaty runs counter to Congress or goes against the fundamental law, can nullify such
an agreement. But in the case at bar, the question is WON American troops are engaged in
combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of alleged training and exercise. The Court
cannot answer this question because it lacks sufficient information. Newspapers or electronic
reports per se cannot be considered apt support for petitioner’s allegations. Facts must be
established according to the rules of evidence. WON Pres. GMA is engaged in doublespeak
involves a question of fact… the question is thus not fit for a special civil action for certiorari.
Petition is thereby dismissed.
Lasco, et. al. v. UNRFNRE
Feb. 23, 1995, Quiason, J.
Facts:
Lasco, et. al were dismissed from the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations.
The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United
Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. They filed suit with the Labor Arbiter for illegal
dismissal and damages.
Respondent UNRFNRE filed a motion to dismiss claiming the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
because the respondent enjoyed diplomatic immunity (citing the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations).9
Labor Arbiter subsequently dismissed the claim made by the petitioner. With their motion for
reconsideration denied, they proceeded to appeal with NLRC which affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. Without seeking a reconsideration of the resolution, they filed an instant
petition for certiorari in the SC.
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official
functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that
private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private
respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of
employment with petitioners.
Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full
protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered by the
mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a specified agency of the United Nations.
Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations. 10
9
In support thereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs
dated August 26, 1991, which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that
private respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine
Government was an original signatory (Rollo, p. 21).
10
"1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
"2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization
shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization."
Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to which the Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1,
Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621.) We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:
Issues/Held/Ration:
WON the respondent is immune by virtue of its diplomatic status.
As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being
a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized
agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law.
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its
immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence
here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and United
Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural
resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people,
including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioners have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each
specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes
arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency
is a party."
"Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution mphasis supplied).
"Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets
of the specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from
search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by
executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action".

Mejoff v. Director Of Prisons
1951 (Jackie Espenilla)
Nature:
a 2nd petitition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff (a Russian who was brought to the country
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese)
Facts:
Mejoff was arrested as a Japanese spy upon Phil liberation by the US Counter Intelligence
Corps; he was handed to the Commonwealth for disposition according to Commonwealth Act
No. 682. The People’s Court later released him.
The Deportation Board found that he had no travel documents and was thus an illegal alien.
The Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that he entered the country illegally in
1944 and was ordered deported immediately
Has been in detention ever since (failed attempts to deport him) while authorities try to make
new travel arrangements
The Court held that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of expulsion of
undesirable aliens and said detention for a reasonable length of time is a Government right
 No period was fixed within which immigration authorities would
carry out the deportation
 “Reasonable time” depends on the circumstances
Issue/Held/
WON Mejoff should be discharged from custody
Writ will issue commanding petitioner’s release w/ terms: shall be placed under surveillance;
will put up a bond as surety
Ratio:
Non-enemy Foreign nationals against whom no charge has been made other than the expiry
of their permission to stay may not be indefinitely kept in detention
Protection against deprivation of liberty without due process is not limited to Filipinos (extends
to everyone except enemy aliens)11
Art 2, Sec. 3 – the Phils adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the Nation
Phils was part of UN General Assembly that approved Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 Said Declaration outlined:
 All human beings are born free and equal in rights
 Everyone is entitled to the freedoms set forth in this Declaration w/o making any
distinctions
 Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent tribunals for acts
violating fundamental rights granted to him by the Consti or law
 No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile
Philippine law on immigration was copied from US law, thus the reasoning in Staniszewski v.
Watkins applies (writ of habeas corpus was sustained. Petitioner was released w/ condition to
inform immigration officials of his whereabouts every month until he can be properly deported)
Further, petitioner has no pending charges against him and the prospects of bringing any
against him are slim and remote.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
(Jackie Espenilla)
Nature:
Petition to declare EO No. 6812 invalid/ petition to prohibit proceeding with the case
Facts:
Kuroda was formerly a Lt. General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese forces in the Phils. he is now charged before a military commission convened by
11
Note: Petitioner’s entry in to the Phils was not unlawful as was brought in by a de facto
belligerent Jap govt (decrees were law)
12
EO No. 68 – established a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals.
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with having failed to discharge his says that participating lawyers have to be qualified in the Phils. Common in military tribunals
duties 13 that counsels are usually military personal

Kuroda now petitions SC to establish the illegality of EO No. 68 because (a) it violates local Spirit of comity esp. since US is a party in interest
laws and constitution and (b) because the Phils. is not a signatory of the Hague Convention
on Rules and regulations covering Land Warfare EO No. 68 is valid. Military commission can proceed.

Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid

Yes. SC says it is valid and constitutional

Art. 2, Sec. 3 of Consti – Phils. renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation
Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General
The Hague Convention and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the (Jackie Espenilla)
generally accepted principles of international law.
Nature:
Since both US and Japan signed them, their principles form part of our law even if Phils. was Appeal from a decision of lower court denying petition for naturalization of Eremes
not a signatory Kookooritchkin
Phils. was under the sovereignty of the US at the time the crimes were committed so we are
equally bound to uphold the principle Facts:
Kookoo applied for citizenship under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended by Act 535
Rights and obligations were not erased by assumption of sovereignty
Established at the hearing that he was a native born Russian and grew up in Russia under the
International jurisprudence established that all persons who have been guilty of planning or czars. When Bolsheviks took over, he fled the country and found his way to Manila in 1923
staging a war, committing atrocious crimes and offenses, etc are to be held accountable 14
Permanently established residence in Camarines Sur on May 1925
(2) WON respondents Hussey and Port can participate in prosecuting petitioner’s case  Remained a resident except from 1942-1945 because he
became an underground guerilla officer. After the liberation, he
Yes. It is not violative of Consti because the Military Commission is a special military tribunal went back to Camarines
governed by a special law and not by ROC which govern civil courts. Nothing in EO. 68 which  Has resided in Phils. for about 25 years

Married to a Filipina with whom he has a son

13
letting those in his command to commit atrocities and other high crimes against civilians and
prisoners in violation of the laws and customs of war Works as a shop superintendent with about 80 Pinoys under him. Gets income

14
EO No. 68 is in conformity with this
Can speak English and Bicol dialect. Intermingles with Pinoys. Has good moral character and
believes in the Phil Constitution
Applicant could have been chummy with the Japanese but instead, chose to fight in guerilla
movement

Although a Russian by birth, he disclaims allegiance to the present Communist govt of Russia.
He is thus STATELESS and a REFUGEE of this country

Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen is invalid and insufficient as a
basis for the petition for naturalization

Sec. 5 of Revised Naturalization Law – No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent Yamashita v. Styer
residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of (Jackie Espenilla)
arrival has been issued
i. Only a reconstituted declaration was presented as the records Nature:
of the Bureau of Justice were destroyed during the battle for the Petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Styer (Commanding General of the
liberation of Manila US Army Forces)
ii. Even if reconstituted, declaration is still valid coz proven by
other competent evidence Facts:
Yamashita was the commanding general of the 14 th army group of the Japanese army in the
(2) WON Kookoo established a legal residence in the Phils and WON he can speak and write Phils and is now charged before the American military commission for committing heinous
in Phil. Languages acts against Americans and Pinoys

Testimonies on the record show that he was a legal resident for a continuous period of not Was originally classified as prisoner of war but was later changed to war criminal
less than 10years as required by Sec. 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
Yamashita now wants to be changed back to prisoner of war and that the military commission
Lower court found that he could speak and write English and Bicol. Besides, no specific be prohibited from further trying him
standard has been set on the use of the principal Phil. Languages
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(3) WON Kookoo is really stateless and WON he is disqualified from citizenship WON Yamashita may seek writ of habeas corpus

Lower court is upheld in pronouncing Kookoo stateless. Nope. Petition DENIED.

Appellee’s testimony is uncontradicted and it is a well known fact that modern dictatorships
have scattered stateless refugees all over the world. Untenable. He doesn’t seek discharge from confinement, just restoration to old status as POW
i. Degree of confinement is a matter of military measure, beyond
Kookoo owes and feels no allegiance to Russia jurisdiction of civil court

Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.15

15
Jackie: Kookoo is Pinoy!
 ii. Military Commission has been validly constituted and has
jurisdiction over petitioner (coz Yamashita fell into the hands of
the US army)
Under Par. 356 of the Rules of the Land Warfare, a Military Commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals must be designated by the belligerent (the belligerent’s
representative in this case is Styer)
According to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific, the trial of
persons, units and organizations accused as war criminals will be the Military Commissions to
be convened by or under the authority of the Commander in Chief, US Army Forces.
Articles of War Nos. 12 and 15 recognized the military Commission appointed by military
command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of
the war not ordinarily tried by court martial.16
Further, it is alleged that Spain (Japan’s protecting power) as not given due notice before trial
was begun against petitioner, contrary to provision of Geneva convention. 17
IBP v. Zamora
August 15, 2000, Kapunan, J.
Facts:
IBP alleged that Erap, in ordering the military deployed in Manila, committed grave abuse of
discretion because: (a) no emergency existed, and thus no military deployment was
warranted; and (b) through Letters of Instruction formulated by the head of the national police,
the joint exercise of ‘Task Force Tulungan’ (as visibility patrols) conducted by the marines and
the PNP was a violation of civilian supremacy because the task of law enforcement was
civilian in nature.
16
Yamashita is charged with permitting atrocities like rape of young girls, massacre of
noncombatants, destruction of property – offenses described in Par. 347 of the Rules of Land
Warfare
17
Nothing in Convention saying that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of military
commissions appointed by victorious belligerent. Spain has also severed diplomatic relation with
Japan
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the IBP has standing.
No. They failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.
“Upholding the rule of law and the constitution” is not sufficient to clothe it with standing. This
is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
(2) WON the President’s decision is subject to judicial review.
Yes. When the President calls out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, the
Court cannot question the wisdom or substitute its own. However, it can still conduct an
examination on whether such a decision was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether or not it was exercised constituting grave abuse of discretion.
In lieu of such a decision made by the President, it is incumbent for the petitioners to show
that the decision was without factual basis. No evidence of such nature was adduced.
(3) WON grave abuse of discretion was committed in calling out the military when no
emergency existed.
In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
“More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the
peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace
is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling
of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring
martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.”
(4) WON in deploying the marines, the President violated the civilian supremacy clause.
IBP contends that with the said agreement, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized
and is thus in violation of Sec. 3, Article II of the Constitution.
Court rules that there is no breach. The joint exercise merely constitutes a permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement; military participation in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed as evidenced by the LOI. Furthermore, leadership is
vested in the PNP, a civilian institution, and their assigned role specifically gives them the
responsibility of directing and managing the deployment of the marines.
There is no incursion of the military because the marines weren’t incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP - the marines, in effect, merely provided assistance in these visibility
patrols; hence, such deployment does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
As evidenced by the long history of military and civilian agencies working in tandem with each
other, the joint visibility patrols instead of showing the alleged derogation of civilian
supremacy, shows mutual support and cooperation in the deployment of the marines.
Puno, Separate:
He contends that the executive branch’s decision to cloud its activities under the political
question doctrine will not suffice.
Mendoza, Dissenting, Concurring:
There being no actual controversy manifest yet, the case should not be heard, but he concurs
with the dismissal of the petition because of the lack of standing.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary
Facts:
The Rome Statute was signed by the Philippines through the DFA. Its’ provisions, however,
required that it be subject to ratification, acceptance and approval of the signatory states.
Pimentel, as senator, files a petition for mandamus claiming that the ratification of a treaty
(under domestic and international law) is a function of the Senate, hence, the Executive Dept.
has a duty to transmit the signed statute to the Senate for ratification.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON the ExecSec and DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the
Rome Statute.
No. As chief architect of foreign policy, President is the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. In the realm of treaty making, President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states; ratification is under his/her authority. The Constitution, however,
provides a limitation to such power to ratify by vesting in the Senate, the power to concur with
the President’s decision. It does not the agency delegated to ratify but the agency to concur or
not with said decision. The duty being in the province of the President’s official duties, the
court cannot compel the Executive branch by means of mandamus because it is beyond its
jurisdiction.
Bayan v. Executive Secretary
October 10, 2000, Buena, J.
Facts:
The VFA, after being ratified and concurred with, was put into effect on June 1, 1999.
Petitioners contend that such an agreement is in violation of Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the
Constitution. Respondents claim that the applicable provision is Article VII Sec 21. since the
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves temporary visits engaged
in joint military exercises.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have standing.
No. As concerned citizens, taxpayers, and legislators, they fail to show that they have
sustained or in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
VFA. As taxpayers, the VFA doesn’t involve the exercise by Congress in taxing/spending
powers.
(2) WON the applicable provision is that stated by the petitioners or that stated by
respondents.
When the respondent says that temporary visits doesn’t make it a basing arrangement and
thus invalidates the applicability of Article XIII Sec. 25, the Court considers this untenable
since the Constitution does not make a distinction between transient and permanent bases.
When the respondent avers that said Article shouldn’t be controlling because no bases are
involved but merely troops and facilities, the Court finds it irrelevant because the provision’s
prohibition involves either one of the independent situations.
“It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other,
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in
the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section
21 opens with the clause “No treaty x x x,” and Section 25 contains the phrase “shall not be
allowed.” Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to
render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective.”
“The fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply
with the strict constitutional requirements” regardless of what provision is deemed applicable.
The only thing to consider now is whether all the requirements of Article XVIII Sec. 25 have
been complied with:
(a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
Petitioners say that there must be concurrence by the US Senate as well as illuminated by (c).
Respondents claim that the only thing necessary is US recognition of the treaty which was
given when the US Ambassador stated the VFA was binding.
The Court says : “To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this
case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.”
“Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.”
Silva v. CA
Facts:
Married businessman Silva cohabited with an unmarried actress Gonzales without benefit of a
marriage. Although they had two children, they eventually parted ways. Gonzales refused to
allow Silva to be with the children on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights before
the RTC. Petition was opposed by the mother of the children on the ground that Silva was a
womanizer and a gambler and such behavior would have detrimental effects on the children.
The RTC granted visitation rights which Gonzales still contended despite her marrying a
Dutch national and emigrating to Holland with the children. The CA ruled in favor of Gonzales
because it saw that the rotation of custody would not be conducive to the welfare of the
children.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON visitations right should be granted.
Yes. The Constitution doesn’t specifically mandate the “natural and primary rights of parents”
to those who have legitimate relationships with their children. And such visitations, contrary to
the CA’s ruling, would not affect the children to such an extent that it would be detrimental to
their upbringing.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Married for 11 years, wife, former teacher of the husband in college, files petition for
annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity for failure to support the family and
contribute to the management of the household. She alleges that he spent most of his time
drinking with his friends and that because of his extramarital relations, he infected her with an
STD – testament to which was confinement of both parties in a hospital for treatment. RTC
dismissed the petition saying: “The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances
mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically
incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the
grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.” CA affirmed the decision of the RTC citing Santos v.
CA: “It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of
prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.”

Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON the instant case with the circumstances presented can serve as a ground for
psychological incapacity.
No. In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish
the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no
evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations.
PT&T v. NLRC
Facts:
A woman’s (Grace de Guzman) employment was terminated by PT&T because of alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds. De Guzman argues that the real
reason she was fired was because she contracted the married during employment which is
against company policy. She admits, however, that when she applied to work she indicated
she was single when, in fact, she was already married. She was reminded by correspondence
of the company’s policy of not accepting married women as employees. She subscribed to the
defense that she wasn’t aware of such a policy and thus, had no intent to hide the fact that
she was already married. The labor arbiter decided that she was discriminated against
because of having contracted marriage while employed with the company. PT&T appealed to
the NLRC but the latter upheld the decision of the labor arbiter modifying the decision by
saying the woman’s dishonest nature warrants a 3-month suspension from work.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON PT&T’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts a marriage, is discriminatory and thus contrary to the Constitution?
Yes. Although PT&T asserts that it dismissed Grace because of her dishonesty; records, not
to mention the letter reminding her of her company’s policy, say otherwise; proving that she
was terminated because of her civil status. Furthermore, it was the policy itself which was the
cause of Grace’s secretive conduct (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.) PT&T’s allegations of misappropriation is insincere and self-serving.
CMTC v. Alcala, Sec. DENR
June 13, 1997, Mendoza, J.
Facts:
CMTC’s timber concession was approved by Marcos after it was previously cancelled;
however, said concession, operating on TLA no. 106, was under another concession (TLA no.
360) operated by FLDC – after issuance by Ministry of National Resources. TLA no. 360 was
given primacy over the TLA no. 106 allegedly because of Marcos’ sister who was behind
FLDC. Two years later, however, on June 1986, Ministry head suspended TLA no. 360 and
cancelled the license of FLDC (because in spite of previous suspension order, logging still
continued). CMTC, learning of the cancellation, sought to revalidate TLA no. 106 by writing a
letter to the said government agency.
DENR declared TLA no. 106 as no longer having force and effect, the petition being barred
because of latches: CMTC did not immediately file an opposition when FLDC was awarded
the said concession and because it had waited for two years before filing such a petition. In an
appeal to the Office of the President and after its second motion for reconsideration, CMTC
claims that it had written a letter dated on the day to oppose FLDC’s grant of TLA. The Office
of the President, however, again denied the petition on the basis of a “new policy of
consideration on forest conservation and protection.”
CMTC appeals to the SC saying that there were no latches and that the new public
consideration averred to by the Office of the President denied the CMTC due process. There
being no total log ban in the country (Congress still needing to make an announcement
regarding the issue), any notice to this effect “must be stated in good form, not implied”; and
that in any case, any new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot
affect petitioner’s vested rights in its TLA no. 106.
Main Issue/ Held/Ratio:
WON the new policy of forest conservation and protection could affect the previous TLAs
mentioned.
As evidenced by reports, it would seem that CMTC was one of those whose TLAs were
terminated in 1983, a year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. Since petitioner failed
to protest the grant of concession within a “reasonable time”, action is barred by latches.
“because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the
process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of
the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing grave abuse of discretion
courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.”

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under
the previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and
growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their
crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can
hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as
in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
Guingona v. Carague
April 22, 1991, Gancayco, J.
Facts:
The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service)
and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted
for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential
Decrees 81, 117, and 1967.
Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the
Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the
Constitution, it shall be void.
They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became
functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one
man-legislature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current
appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable.
Moreover, they content that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the
ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with
Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by
Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees
violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, 11
otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in
advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.
SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First,
for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market
conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from
short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes.
Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising
from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service
estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or
matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's
which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis
of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has
to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer
be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically
changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened,
only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the
intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of
Marcos."
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B
for education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will
attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration
and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There
are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to
education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the
mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The enormous national debt, incurred
by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor
but because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt
service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional.
(2) WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitutional.
Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the
Constitution recognizes that:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to
preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized.
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution
or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
(3) WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation.
No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable
the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall
become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the
need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment
and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being, addressed, the amounts nevertheless
are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to
pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness
sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.
No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as
shown by the books of the Treasury.
Cruz, Dissenting:
He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for
release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this
requirement. As to the ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided by law”, Cruz
says no such regulatory boundaries exist.
Padilla, Dissenting:
He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that
a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum or
sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be
construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch.
Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for
the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve
the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in my opinion,
pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.
Paras, Dissenting: Any law that undermines our economy and therefore our security is per se
unconstitutional.

Tanada v. Angara
May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J.
Facts:
The Philippines, by ratification of the President and concurrence of the Senate became a
member of the WTO. Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution
mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the “parity provisions” and “national
treatment” clauses scattered in the agreement, annexes and other parts of the treaty. These
allegedly place foreign nationals on equal footing as Filipinos in contravention of the
Constitution’s Filipino-first policy. Main provisions which are supposedly violated by the WTO
agreement are the following:
(1) Art II, Sec. 19 – Self-reliant, independent economy.
(2) Art. XII Sec. 10 – Capital owned by Filipinos; grants, privileges, concessions for national
economy gives preference to qualified Filipinos.
(3) Art. XII Sec. 12 – Preferential use of Filipino labor, material and goods.
These provisions are allegedly desecrated in the areas of investment measures, trade
selected aspects of IPR, and in the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
The SolGen, on the other hand, argues (a) that the charter provisions are not self-executing
and are mere general policies; (b) that the provisions shouldn’t be read in isolation but in
conjunction with Art. XII Sec. 1 and 13, which when read properly as a whole, ensures that the
WTO agreement doesn’t violate the Constitution; and (c) that WTO contains sufficient
provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of trade
liberalization.
By praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners
are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the petition presents a jusiticiable controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld."
(2) WON the WTO agreement and its three annexes contravene the respective provisions in
the Constitution.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies."
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of
the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato , the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not
"self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to attain Balanced
Development of
Economy
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic
development, as follows: (1) A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth; (2) A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and (3) An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality
of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism
(1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" and in the use of "Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt
measures that help make them competitive; and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." In similar
language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires
the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity"; and speaks of industries
"which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of
"Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable."
However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the
grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and
not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The
issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to
allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that
there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages
to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members.
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN
Security Council.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO
than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than
outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating
strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development."
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy"
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community."
As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional
policy:
"Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities."
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based
on "equality and reciprocity," the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers
and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a
policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition.
Oposa v. Factoran

Facts:
Petitioners, minors represented by their parents, filed a complaint in the RTC; it was a
taxpayer’s class suit representing themselves, the countless multitudes, and future
generations of those who are entitled to the benefits of the country’s virgin tropical forests.
The plaintiff’s complaint was specified as follows: that a balanced and healthful ecology in the
Philippines is evidenced by 54% forest cover and 46% everything else.
Twenty five years ago, tropical virgin forests amounted to 53% of our land area but in 1987,
satellite images showed that only four percent of the land was covered by forests. Recent
surveys, in the meantime, show that only 2.8% of the country’s land area is composed of
tropical virgin rainforests.
Public records reveal that at the present rate of deforestation, the Philippine Islands will be
bereft of national resources after the end of the decade, if not earlier. Plaintiffs assert their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and claim that they are entitled to
protection of this right by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The complaint was filed against Factoran, then head of the DENR; it would order the DENR to
cancel all existing timber licensing agreements (TLAs) in the country, and cease and desist
from accepting, processing, renewing, and approving TLAs. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and the judge stated that the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs) cannot be done
because it would not allow due process. The amended petition to the SC repeated its earlier
right to a sound environment, and added that (a) TLAs were not contracts and even if they
were considered protected by the non-impairment clause, the State may still revoke such
agreements when public interest demands it; and (b) in granting more TLAs to cover more
areas of land than what is available is an act constituting grave abuse of discretion, and is
therefore subject to judicial scrutiny.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have standing.
The petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means
the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
(2) Is there a specific right violated that would serve a the petitioner’s cause of action?
Yes. Sec. 16, Article II of the Constitution provides the right. A cause of action is therefore
present but as far as cancellation of TLA’s is concerned, there is a need to implead the
guarantees of the same for they are indispensable parties.
(3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they protected by the non-impairment clause?
No. Even if a law is passed mandating cancellation/modification of the TLAs, the same cannot
be stigmatized as a violation of non-impairment clause because it is within the State’s
exercise of police power to protect its ecology.
Feliciano, Concurring:
Although the petitioners are in fact entitled to a balanced and healthful ecology as stressed by
the Constitutional right, one cannot classify such a right as “specific” without doing excessive
violence to the language. The implications of making the Sections in Article II self-executory
are not the subject of this case. Petitioners should seek a specific legal right. It is his
understanding that the Court’s decision implies that within the collection of statutes, there is a
specific right which the petitioners can use.
Chavez v. Phil. Estates Authority 18
18
As you’ll gather from the last few deplorable digests (and this last one) … I’ve run out of juice.
Feel free to fix/update/mock them at your convenience. – Mars.

Facts:
PEA, as authorized by its charter created by Marcos, was mandated to reclaim land, develop,
improve, etc… sell, and lease these reclaimed lands. During the time of Cory, more land was
transferred to PEA under its name. Transfer Certificate of Titles of the then reclaimed
Freedom Islands were given to PEA during this time. During Ramos’ tenure as President,
PEA, entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation without
public bidding. The JVA intended to develop the reclaimed Freedom Islands and reclaim an
additional 250 hectares surrounding said islands. In 1996, Senate President Maceda, in a
privileged speech, called the JVA “the grandmother of all scams.” An investigation ensued with
the report concluding the following:
(1) The lands being sold to AMARI were lands of the public domain which the government has
not yet classified as alienable, and therefore the PEA has no authority to sell yet.
(2) Transfer Certificate of Titles of the Freedom Islands are then void; and the
(3) JVA entered into is illegal.
In 1997, a Legal Task Force was formed by the President to study the JVA; but contrary to the
Senate investigation that decried the JVA, the task force upheld its legality. This prompted
Chavez, in 1998, to file suit as a taxpayer, contending the following:
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain
to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of
pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
The Amended JVA, however, pushed through after being signed by PEA and AMARI, with the
approval of then President Estrada. After such a maneuver, Chavez prayed that the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void based on constitutional and statutory grounds.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the case is academic and moot after subsequent events.
Respondents – Yes; satisfied petitioner’s prayer for disclosure of renegotiations; moot,
because already signed.
Petitioners - counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply
fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
Court - PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner’s principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation
of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating
lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands
from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the
right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141
(“CA No. 141” for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public
corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase
under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by
AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither
AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect
title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to
portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to
AMARI the latter’s seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the
entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
(2) WON the petition should be dismissed because judicial hierarchy wasn’t respected.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from
the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual
questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual
issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance
to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to
the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to
exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
(3) WON the petition should be dismissed because of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Respondent – they didn’t ask us for the information before proceeding to Court to issue a
mandamus; this is in violation of the rule of mandamus. Tanada v. Tuvera is different from the
current situation because there, the ExecDept had an affirmative statutory duty to publish the
President Decrees and thus, the mandamus was warranted. In the instant case, PEA has no
affirmative duty to disclose such information.
Court - The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal
duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended
JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this
legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands
of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
(4) Do petitioners have standing?
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative
duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that
he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended
JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to compel
PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here.
First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of
pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The
thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,[28] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public, thus -
“Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
is an issue of ‘transcendental importance to the public.’ He asserts that ordinary taxpayers
have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of ‘paramount public
interest,’ and if they ‘immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the
people.’
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved public interest.
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of
the Manila International Container Terminal, ‘public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.’ We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority
for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access
to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule
that the petition at bar should be allowed.”
(5) Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people’s right to information on matters of
public concern in this manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.”
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any
restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential
to hold public officials “at all times x x x accountable to the people,”[29] for unless citizens
have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the
Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.
“An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.”
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to “definite propositions of the government.” PEA maintains the right
does not include access to “intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the ‘exploratory stage’.”
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or
before the closing of the transaction.
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will
hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they
decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to
release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and
without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its
property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property
being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the
minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them
to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the
contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make
this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the
bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken
by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no “official acts,
transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its
official recommendation, there arises a “definite proposition” on the part of the government.
From this moment, the public’s right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the
non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG, the
Court ruled as follows:
“Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to
definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier –
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.”
Contrary to AMARI’s contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for
the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if
no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which
may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will
prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”
The right covers three categories of information which are “matters of public concern,” namely:
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government
agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording,
evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to
research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference
and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However,
the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The
exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the
public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused,
which courts have long recognized as confidential. The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.
(6) Whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only
then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is
contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on
this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
1. Calderon vs. Carale
G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992
Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
x x x
From the three (3) cases above-mentioned (Sarmiento III vs. Mison, Mary Concepcion
Bautista v. Salonga and Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, et al.,), these doctrines are deducible:
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit,
Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law.
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442)
was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated
the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be
subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and
Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors.
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to
those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: No.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is
a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully,
however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor
Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the
Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
banc.
. . . The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the
date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The
settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretado legis vim obtinent" � the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.
ISSUE 2: Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has
interpreted it?
In Endencia and Jugo vs. David, the Court held:
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task
and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard
to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific
portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained
its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion
and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court
determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may
be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of
the Constitution by the Legislative department that would be neither wise nor desirable, being
clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must estimate the scope of its
constitutional powers when it sets out to enact legislation and it must take into account the
relevant constitutional prohibitions.
. . . The Constitution did not change with public opinion.
It is not only the same words, but the same in meaning . . . and as long as it it speaks not only
in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came
from the hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the people . . .
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is to "lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former" and to "announce its considered judgment upon the
question."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
2. Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006) - Digest
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (”Lambino Group”)
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On
25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and
(c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The
proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.
1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
direct proposal by the people
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to
adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before - not after - signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect
of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of
text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a
question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless,
and unelected individuals.
2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third
mode, applies only to “amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as
shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A people’s initiative to change
the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In
contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There
is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years
is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also
affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the
three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A
change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,
as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-
and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered
principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative
bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the
other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not
revisions.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative
test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether
there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan† includes “change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the
nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.”
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary,
and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,
the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances
within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between “amendment” and
“revision” is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that
when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called “revisions” because members of the deliberative body work full-
time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative,
are called “amendments” because the changes are made by ordinary people who do
not make an “occupation, profession, or vocation† out of such endeavor. The SC,
however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and
the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such
categorical intent and language.
3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary
The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. It’s settled that courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be
complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following
provisions of RA 6735:
a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million
signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only
Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition and amended petition.
b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions,
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
Source: http://jlp-law.com/blog/lambino-vs-comelec-gr-174153-25-october-2006-digest/
3. Sanidad vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
The Commission on Elections, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be
a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. � During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional on the ground
that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
HELD:
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is
the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in
terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required
to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b)
R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate
would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to
take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the
prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and
prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The
evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain
in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter
unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or
against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he
may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement.
We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by
the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio
time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of
information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is
hereby made permanent.
4. Leyson vs. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 134990 April 27, 2000
On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed
with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar
A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly
committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract - unilateral cancellation of valid and
existing contract; (b) bad faith - falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of
MT Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia; (d)
unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of
MT Marilag; (f) engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is
not the owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only
P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to
Cocochem.
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and
CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged
irregularities and corrupt practices. The OMB dismissed the complaint, based on the finding
that the case involved breach of contract.
ISSUE: Whether the OMB committed GADLAEJ in dismissing the complaint
HELD: Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a
government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell within the
jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that �
While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or
controlled corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or
controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its
private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to
perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the
economic life of the nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to
perform essential government or government-related functions, as the marketing arm of the
PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and
maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply.
But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF
companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without
resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par.
(13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition
mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized
as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24%
of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. 15
Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the
definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited
to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.
Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is
no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in
Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public
respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by
petitioner.
A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive Secretary v. Gordon
16 is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper
because the cause of action herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is
collection of a sum of money plus damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the ; October 16, 1971
Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M.
Leyson Jr., as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1�wphi1.n�t ; January 22, 1973
SO ORDERED.
PRELIMINARIES JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
; March 31, 1973
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION
SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA ; October 12, 1976

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; April 4, 1981
“ ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION” LAWYERS’ LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V AQUINO
ROBERT CLINTON (1987) EN BANC; May 22, 1986

“ CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND FACTS/ISSUES

CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS” - Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government.
TIMOTHY ZICK (2003) - Her gov’t was said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973 Consti.
- Proclamation No. 3- “…Aquino gov’t is installed through direct exercise of power of the
ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION Filipino people, in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.”
- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.
“ MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC” - April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that they would pursue it by extra-judicial
TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997) methods.

“ FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION: HELD

DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM” Petitions have no merit.
VICENTE MENDOZA (1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action.
(2) Legitimacy of gov’t is NOT justiciable, and is a political question where people are the only
(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER) judge.
(3) People have already accepted such gov’t, which is in effective control of the country,
MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO making it a de jure gov’t.
(4) Community of nations has also accepted it.
(5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her gov’t.
GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; November 9, 1967 IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ
;October 24, 1986
TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DE LEON V ESGUERRA August 31, 1987
SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DAVIDE; March 19, 1997
FACTS
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution through a
people’s initiative. In his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6, Sec 4 of Article
7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of all elective government officials. He
asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting
up signature stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The
COMELEC took cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator Raul
Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, on the
other hand, filed a special civil action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar
as the initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She further alleges that what the
petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK
and MABINI filed their motions for intervention, arguing on the same points.
ISSUES
1. WON the court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before the
COMELEC
2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for people’s initiative
3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid
4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin petition
HELD
1. Yes. Comelec’s failure to act on roco’s motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the
petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court
- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didn’t come up with
the minimum number of signatures
- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance.
2. No. The law is inadequate.
- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word Constitution was a
delayed afterthought. The word Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said
section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the constitution.
- Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
constitution.
- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution.
- Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of national
and local laws. It failed to provide for details in implementation of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a
sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power.
3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it does not have the power to
prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires jurisdiction upon
filing of the petition. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.
Decision Petition granted
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [concur and dissent]
RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to provide for a law for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)
VITUG
The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since it did not have the required number
of signatures.
FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]
looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly intends to include amendments
to the Constitution.
PANGANIBAN
RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300,
it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives.
RESOLUTION
;
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
FACTS
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos
voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long
time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords.
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he
accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson
from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still
from Gov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the
Committee on Justice for joint investigation
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to
impeach Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada
to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos
joined the chorus as well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for
Estrada's resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According
to J. Puno: "The heat is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and
corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115
representatives to the Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as
judges with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of
Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he
affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment
account with their bank on Feb 4 2000.
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more
bombshells were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources
Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.
> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2 nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos
in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass
resignations ensued
- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as
the President of the Philippines.
> Estrada left Malacañang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves
Malacañang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation.
> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was
transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. The SC issued a
resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present
to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House of Reps. passed House
Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution
No. 82 confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of
the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the
impeachment court is functus offictio.
- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this
case as per Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have
compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president
4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the
extent of the immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was
done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente
differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency
was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done
to an element of the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA
swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better understanding.
Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this
case so look at those provisions too.)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both
Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political
one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA
as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision
without violating the principle of separation of powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure.
(Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or
from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000
FACTS
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR was created by then President
Joseph Estrada on Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to “study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner
of implementing the same.”
> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19,
1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of the
PCCR’s work until Dec 31 1999.
> The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on Dec 20, 1999 and was
dissolved by the President on the same day.
- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds:
> it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law
> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally
excluded by the Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter.
- In this regard, Gonzales:
> seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from
acting as such
> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and
recommendations
> seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the
PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on
certain matters.
ISSUES
1. WON the case has become moot and academic
2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen
3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer
4. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the President and
appoint presidential consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)
5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to
provide petitioner with names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government,
copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the
Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacañang.
HELD
1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead. It is beyond the scope of
judicial power to give advisory opinion.
Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as the PCCR has already ceased
to exist. Relief prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an
inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the
PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion.
2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.
Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.19
3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that
public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution, the
action of which is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR, the amount of P3 million is
“appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the
President.” The appropriations were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact,
there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury.’ The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25
(5) Art VI of Constitution.
4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.
- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment, and he has
not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s
interest.
5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, “the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.”
- The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied
by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which
possesses the right.
- “matters of public concern” is a term which “embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”
Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to
furnish petitioner with information requested.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
19
in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office
(ART I, II, IV, V)
STATE DEFINED
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDA
FERNANDO; October 29, 1971
FACTS
- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of
the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P 161,974.95 as deficiency
estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco
from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955.
- Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not
reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption.
However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign
power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not
impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing
therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not
necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the
petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary
for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to
fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
HELD
- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeal’s Ruling.
- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's
formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.
- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically
organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within
it and maintaining its separate international personality.
- State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted
area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to
enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not
exact independence as a condition of statehood.
- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in
the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein,
hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category.
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates form them.
ART V SUFFRAGE
Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage
Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot.
TANADA V ANGARA
PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997
FACTS
- Petition for Certiorari
- DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of the
Philippines
o To submit the WTO agreement to competent authorities for their approval
o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions
(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the
interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development.)
- The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for
their concurrence
- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he submits the Uruguay Final Round Act,
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which expresses their concurrence in the
ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
and the agreements and associated legal instruments of that agreement.
- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand, embodies not only the WTO
agreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions and the understanding on
commitments in financial services.
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also claim that since the Senate
only concurred with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act, they
impliedly rejected the Final act.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO agreement
violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (“economic
nationalism” clauses).
3. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits, restricts and impairs legislative power of the
Congress.
4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.
5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO agreement and not in the final act
implies rejection of the final act.
HELD
- Petition dismissed.
1. Yes.
- The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress
2. No
- The declaration of principles are not intended to be self-executing, rather, they are
just aid and guides by the judiciary in judicial review, and by the legislature in
enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative enactments to implement them.
- The economic nationalism provisions should be read with other constitutional mandates,
especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12.
- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are specific provisos in the agreement with
respect to tariffs, domestic subsidies and protection from unfair competition which are
intended to help developing economies.
- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. Independence refers to the freedom
from undue foreign control of the national economy.
- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with total prescription of foreign competition.
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They
should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.
3. No
- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to restrictions and voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines.
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country.
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict its soverign rights under the
concept of auto-limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue)
- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment
of the other contracting states granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens.
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. It is still on the patent
owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product.
- The new rule should not really present any problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
present law on the subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar presumption in cases of
infringement of patent design.
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.
5. No.
- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the
proceedings. The final act only required that the senate concur with the WTO agreement,
which they did.
- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the member’s
deliberations.
REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FERNANDO; December 27, 1969
FACTS
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
Petitioner: William Reagan –civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical
assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
July 7, 1959 –Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base
April 22, 1960 –He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at $6,443.83
July 11, 1960 –petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car which was granted
provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizen employed in the
Philippine military bases. On the same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson,
Jr. of the US Marine Corps.
- As a result of the transaction, respondent, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well
as petitioner’s personal exemption, fixed his net taxable income arising from the sale at
P17,912.34 rendering him liable for P2,979.00 income tax. After paying the sum, petitioner
sought a refund claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the
case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his petition.
- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income tax. He contends that in legal
contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond its
jurisdiction to tax.
- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue:
“While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation
of law on foreign soil.” The court resolved this by pointing out that the statement was merely
obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot be invoked in this case.
ISSUE
WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory
HELD
Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases
Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory.
- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Likewise,
it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a *The ff account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks,
restriction of its sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate previously held the funds:
in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no 1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their 2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, Avertina-Foundation accounts
but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by 3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory. 4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts
- Therefore, the Philippines’ jurisdictional rights over the bases, certainly not 5. Maler Foundation accounts
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an
appropriate exemption was provided for. b. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded
- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not take part) the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the legitimately acquired property. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko
income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG.
- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN Ferdinand R Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
CORONA; July 15, 2003
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
FACTS - Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements
- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. dated Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family
PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the - The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the
Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos , inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
pursuant to RA 137920. conditions contained therein.
- PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 - It was stated in one of the “whereas clauses” the fact that petitioner Republic “obtained a
by then President Corazon Aquino, and was charged with the task of assisting the judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in
President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met….” The
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the various
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be
during is administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
relationship.” - Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) Agreements.
sought:
a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 - Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
million inclusive of interest as of the time of decision) deposited in escrow 21 in the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition.
Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth. - Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise
agreement “(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment”
20
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the
Procedure Therefor.
21
Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the
third party, the money or instrument is said to be “in escrow”. (Random House Webster’s Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)
- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for
approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the
remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
The Fund Transfer
- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an
additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB.
This was granted.
- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attorney of
Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998.
The Petition for Summary Judgment
- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment “pertaining to the
forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds:
a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admitted by respondents
in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course of the proceeding
b. respondents’ admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or
ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to any
material fact in the present action
- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by co-respondents Marcos
children.
- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted
- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, stating that
there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds,
which were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the State.
- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000; Marcos children followed.
- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that
“the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the
Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as
to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds”, and thus denied petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment. Hence, the present petition.
- Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss
Federal Supreme Court decisions and their “authenticated translations” have not been
submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the
Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that
nowhere in the respondents’ motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever
challenged.
- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be denied.
Analysis of Respondents’ Legitimate Income
- the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of
20 years from 1965 to 1984.
- This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos’ salary as Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and
as President from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-1985 at P100,000/year),
Imelda Marcos’ salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year),
income from legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources.
- Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before
he became President, and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after
- Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years
1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal practice is valid)
- The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner Republic’s action for certiorari is proper.
2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate
summary judgment.
3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
HELD
1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy
and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
availability of the remedy of appeal.
Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
reversion of ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long
overdue.
2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at
a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment
Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
pleadings. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently
lacking in substance.
- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition
for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). Their answers include “they have no sufficient knowledge” or “they could not
recall because it happened a long time ago” or “the funds were lawfully acquired” without
stating the basis of such assertions.
- Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents’ answer qualifies as the specific denial
called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically
charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did
not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.
- The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits, not having been
specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11
Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
a. Propriety of Summary Judgment
- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact in the action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that the
issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious.
- motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the
issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of
substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.
- It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the
pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.
b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had legally waived
right it had to move for summary judgment.
- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the
respondents’ answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the
litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it
from moving for summary judgment.
c. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000,
estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or
asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or
public policy.
- estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.
- in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not
only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result
unless the action is barred.
3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired
when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and
proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of
income.
Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show by clear and
convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other
legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and,
unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand
as proved.
- the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made admissions in
their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to present sworn statements of
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses’ participation in the illegal acquisition
of funds.
RESOLUTION
CORONA; November 18, 2003
- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new matters for the
Court to resolve.
Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of due process?
- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence they are entitled to
constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused.
- SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. There must be a
compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in order that a particular act
may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause.
- substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with
the rights of a person to his property
- there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
Respondents were not deprived of their property through forfeiture for
arbitrary reasons.
- procedural due process means compliance with procedures or steps, even
periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play
and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer
it.
- forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil in nature, contrary to
respondents’ contention that they are penal in character. The proceedings under
RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture
in favor of the State of properties illegally acquired.
- Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven
by preponderance of evidence. The Government is required only to state the
known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal
provenance to attach. Petitioner Republic having established this presumption,
 burden of proof shifted to respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. Respondents failed on this part.
- essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit one’s evidence in support of his defense
- Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their
case, defenses and pleadings. They obstinately refused to do so and have
tried to confuse the issues and the Court and to delay the disposition of the
case
- “the people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the
ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner – that is, the Republic of the
Philippines – in the shortest possible time.”
Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.
DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
HOLMES; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application of
registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.
- Carino’s ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts
for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is
also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom.
- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was
issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the
lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title.
- Procedure
- Court -– application of land registration granted (March 4, 1904 )
- CFI of Benguet – appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and US having taken
possession of property for military and public purposes; application dismissed
- Philippine SC – affirmed decision of CFI Benguet
- Federal SC – writ of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC
- Respondents argue:
- Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the
Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make
the title good
- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)
- Plaintiff’s land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the
Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under
Spanish laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important
Island of Luzon
ISSUE
WON Carino owns the land
HELD
Ratio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: “Where such possessors
shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.”
- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be deemed owners;
cultivated land 20 years, uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiff’s father was owner of land by the very
terms of this decree.
- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United
States are to be administered “for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and
appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
- Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.
- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white
race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is
to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain.
- The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law.
Decision REVERSED
- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA
MORAN; November 15, 1947

FACTS
- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of Deeds of
Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction.
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta.
- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion to withdraw the appeal.
- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being prepared.
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal
after the briefs have been presented.
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor General was
agreeable to it.
- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the Department of Justice (Circular No. 128)
dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens.
- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.
ISSUE
Jurisdiction:
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said
circular of the DOJ
Primary Issue:
WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
HELD
The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawal of appeal is
discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented.
- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only because the constitutional
issue should be avoided.
- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances, particularly (1) the
circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and
ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens,
together with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again
before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a
majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the
constitutional question.
- To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to
the constitution, offense that may be permanent.
- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including
residential lands. (The votes were: 8-3)
- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more
comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO
ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND
WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
- This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens' hands.
- This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated" and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.
- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino
citizens.
- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal if such a
withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution.
- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to
acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a consequence,
all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution became
effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
LEE HONG HOK V DAVID
FERNANDO; December 27, 1972
FACTS
- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK, petitioners
- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of
Lands and Court of Appeals
- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void David’s Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because
they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m2 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the
Naga Cadastre) through accretion .
- Jun 18, 1958 – Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot
- Aug 26, 1959 – Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209
- Oct 21, 1959 – Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. 510
ISSUES
1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion, therefore a private –
not public - domain (this court says it does not warrant any further consideration)
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the government to dispute
the validity of a grant (this court says it does)
3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year should not be
recognized (this court says it should be).
HELD
1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately
embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominium is the state’s capacity to own or
acquire property. Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of lands
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all lands – in
Spain and its earlier decrees – were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds
that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cariño v Insular Government). In Valenton v
Murciano (1904), all lands held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the
Spanish state) according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to
us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares,
ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not
only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming in them
in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain
the sole power is vested in Congress.
The land in question is not private property; the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof by
virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim).
Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud committed by respondents.
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open – notices were published, sale and
awarding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer.
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a public land.
2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant
to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials, and therefore
cannot institute for the nullification of David’s Torrens Title, since they are not the registered
owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of
Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Maninang v Consolacion states that “[t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is
undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant (in
this case, the respondents) cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between
the grantee and the government.”
Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.
3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the proceedings in
connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto . This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --- RA 496 § 48 says that
any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title
based thereon becomes indefeasible.
In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), “[t]he proceedings under the Land Registration Law
and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are
against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree
of registration issued is conclusive and final.
In Cabacug v Lao, “a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated
than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and
effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his
favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years.”
David’s application was a renewal of his deceased wife’s application, wherein his deceased
wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938.

The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 and its resolution of March 14,
1969 are affirmed
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
FACTS
- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible encroachment by the President
on the legislative prerogative
- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and
style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to awaken our people’s consciousness in the
nation’s cultural heritage and encourage its preservation, promotion and development
- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by the Center as
coming from donations and contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation
- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and that 2) this is
supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National Commission on
Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the requisite personality to contest as a
taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations
and contributions and not one centavo came from taxation
- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has standing
2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative
3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and academic
HELD
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive acts that do
not involve the use of public funds
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust created by an
agreement with a foreign country
3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has assumed a moot and academic
character
Obiter
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations and
contributions and not by taxation
-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest
(2) –As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs, in
behalf of the estate as parens patriae, the President has authority to implement for the benefit
of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to
administer the private contributions and donations given not only by the US government but
also by private persons
-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently exercised by the
President and Congress
Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still no encroachment and that it is
already moot and academic
CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RES
PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)
- Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)
-Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory;
- Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA)
- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,...
including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, and tree
lots.
- Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA)
- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICC/IP,
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial
continuously to the present... including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively
by ICC but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are
still nomadic or shifting cultivators.
- Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpayers (upon the plea that
questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION (directing
NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR; DENR Secretary to cease from
implementing Circular 2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and
MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ISSUES
The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned -
(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's
ownership over LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other
natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE.
(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS.
(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and lands, violate the DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution.
(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination", is
invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of control over executive
departments.
HELD
There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The
case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the
petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
- Those in favor of dismissing petition:
J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza
- Those in favor of granting petition:
J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PUNO [dismiss]
- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System
A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish
Crown.
B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the right of the
occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain
from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."
C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the PLA, "public land" referred to
all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government . The Torrens system
requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the
person named is the owner of such property described. The certificate of title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible.
D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was established 1935 Constitution, and it
was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti.
-Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution
(1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do not constitute part of the
land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE
(AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL).
a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case
that specifically and categorically recognizes native title.
b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA
expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
necessary implication is that AL is private.
(2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD.
a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But the AD is owned in common by
the ICC/IP and not by one particular person. Communal rights to the land are held not only by
the present possessors but extends to all generations of the ICC/IP.
b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP; in accord with
customary laws; and subject to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if
transferred to a non-member of IP.
c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title.
(3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the right of ICC/IP to develop
lands and NR within the AD does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR,
and of control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the Implementing Rules of IPRA included
the term "natural resources" in such rights of ownership which is CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12
of the 1987 Consti.
b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12
of the 1987 Consti. Managing and conserving these resources, by their very nature,
necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may be harmonized with par.1 and 4,
Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior
entity that owns these resources and who has the power to grant such preferential rights.
(4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the International Indigenous
Movement.
VITUG [grant]
(1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the ancestral domains, as the notion of
community property involves matters of proprietary interest AND also some forms of self-
governance over the property.
(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular Government cannot override the
collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.
(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get Congress to look closely into the
customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them
part of the stream of laws." There should be a balancing of interests between specific need of
IP and imperatives of national interest.
KAPUNAN [dismiss]
~Preliminary issues-
(1) The petition presents an actual controversy.
(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing.
As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated
and diminished in violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, (petition
should have been filed in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the
importance of the issues raised.
~Substantive issues-
(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the ancestral lands and domains
are not unconstitutional.
a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since
time immemorial.
b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which are "absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the State.
c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did
not intend Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private property, as they have
acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property.
(2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the
natural resources within the ancestral domains.
a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a
right or title. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private
property of the IP.
b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has NOT been
recognized in the Philippines.
(3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional.
a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale utilization of natural resources by its
citizens. The State retains full control over such activities, through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the NR.
b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and are limited :
 to manage and conserve NR within territories;
 to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of NR;
 to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NR in the area (refers only to
the preliminary activity of search and prospecting of mineral resources);
 to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of
any project that will affect AD;
 to receive just and fair compensation for any damages sustained by such projects;
 to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with these rights
c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said priority rights is not a blanket
authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations.
~Corollary issues-
(1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should be protected")
belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous. Where the law
does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of IP does not mean that the
NCIP is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-IP.
c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the AD, where ALL parties involved are
members of IP.
(2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President's power of
control over the Executive Department.
Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was placed by Congress "under the
Office of the President" and as such, is still subject to the President's power of control and
supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.
MENDOZA [dismiss]
(1) It is not a justiciable controversy.
Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or
controversies without upsetting balance of power.
(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest.
But in this case, “what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not
apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens??”
PANGANIBAN [grant]
- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that-
A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain
which are owned by the State."
B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources" which should under be the full control and
supervision of the State."
(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Because of the
State's implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned
have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership .
(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a collective right, still perpetually
withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens
of the Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people.
(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12
hectares of alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral
lands and domains. Based on ethnographic surveys, solicitor general estimates that AD cover
80% of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land
in the country.
(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake exploration,
development and utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 60% Filipino-owned
(and such agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371 relinquishes this power in favor of
ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right without any time limit.
(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD and AL but they should not be
granted perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to the exclusion of
other law-abiding Filipino citizens.
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent
SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO; November 27, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member
of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS
1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for
approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. her application
was forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shauf’s work
experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to
the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then informed by
CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the
rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977.
By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida Shauf filed an equal
employment opportunity complain against respondents for alleged discrimination against the
former by reason of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of
Appeals reversed decision.
ISSUES
1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance
with the powers vested in them under the Philippine American Military Bases
Agreement are immune from suit (even w/o consent of the State).
2. WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner Shauf.
3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory damages.
HELD
As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the state may not be sued without its
consent. This is a generally accepted principle of International law under Art II, Section 2. The
case at hand may be construed as a suit against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be
taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Unauthorized
acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials by one
whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is not a suit against the State covered by
the rule of immunity. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity.
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. A public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and
Sarmiento.
1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the consent of the State.
2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf. Despite Shauf’s
qualifications, Persi did not even consider the former’s application. Since the
petitioner was able to prove the discrimination in the non-consideration of her
application, the burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however
answered with mere denials of the charges.
 3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There was no proof that she
really was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the time. Damages which are
merely possible are speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss.
WYLIE V RARANG
GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992
FACTS
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding
officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an
employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard.
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the “Plan of the Day” a daily
publication that featured among others, an “action line inquiry”. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was
published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by
the merchandise control inspector and that a certain “Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the
office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action
for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed
the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the
inadvertent publication.)
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as
officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit
being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties involved.
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US
government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign
country can’t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.
ISSUES
1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official
duties, are immune from suit.
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still
covered by the principle of state immunity from suit?
HELD
1. Yes, they are immune.
Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from
suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions.  this is part of the
second issue)
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But
even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation 22. The doctrine
is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for
acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties.
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them ––
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts
jure imperii.
There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the
features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S.
officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow
that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their
alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.
2. No.
Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of
crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official
duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from
suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status
not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation
against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself
admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the
name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because
under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act
or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed
the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the
damages they caused the private respondent.
22
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon
its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO
CRUZ; February 26, 1990
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the
RTC of Angeles City
- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all involving state immunity.
G.R. No. 76607
- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U.S. Air Force in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering
services in the said base.
- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and individual
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct rebidding and to allow
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating concessions pending
litigation.
- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to maintain the status quo.
- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was a suit against the United States, which
has not waived its non-suability, and that as officials/employees of the U.S. Air
Force, defendants were also immune from suit.
- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction as well as the motion to
dismiss.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 79470
- Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for
his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City. After investigation, the ff: facts were ascertained:
- Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking vegetables served to club
customers.
- Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove and referred the case to the Board of
Arbitrators, which found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
- Defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force, was immune
from suit, and that the suit was in effect against the United States, which has not
given its consent to be sued.
- Said motion was denied.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 80018
- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnel, an extension of Clark Air
Base.
- He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by individual petitioners King, Dye
and Bostick, officers of the United States Air Force and special agents of the United States Air
Force Office of Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425, or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Bautista was dismissed from employment.
- He then filed a complaint for damages against individual petitioners.
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained
of and that the suit was against the United States without its consent.
- Motion was denied by respondent judge.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 80258
- Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for injuries sustained as a result of the
acts of herein petitioners.
- According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendants (herein petitioners) beat them up,
handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused them extensive
injuries.
- According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs
because they were struggling and resisting arrest.
- The United States of America and the individually named defendants moved to
dismiss the case and argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United
States which has not given its consent to be sued. The defendants also claimed
immunity for acts done by them in the performance of their official functions.
- Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC.
ISSUES
1. WON the cases against the petitioners were suits against the United States, to which it has
not consented
2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity from suit by mere assertion that the
acts were done by them in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of
the United States
HELD
1) Ratio If the case involves the state entering into a contract in the discharge of its
commercial, proprietary and private function, then the state will be deemed to have impliedly
consented to the suit.
Reasoning
- The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent now expressed in Article XVI,
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international
law.
- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over the other.
- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it
may be sued if it consents.
- Consent may be express or implied.
- Express-embodied in a general or special law
- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation
- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-suability—a distinction must be made
between contracts entered into in a state’s governmental and sovereign capacity or private,
proprietary and commercial capacity
- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former does not.
* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of
their official functions as officers or agents of the United States, then they may not invoke
immunity form suit.
- The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
- The fact that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the
performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States is a
matter of evidence, and charges against them may not be dismissed just by mere assertion.
If the individual petitioners are found liable for personal torts in which the US itself is not
involved, then they alone must satisfy the judgment.
2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases)
G.R. No. 76607
- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US are commercial enterprises operated
by private persons. The contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners cannot plead any
immunity.
- Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 79470
- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business
enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity. Petitioners cannot
invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them.
- However, notwithstanding these considerations, complaint in the court below must still be
dismissed. Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because of the strength of evidence
that they acted properly in terminating Genove for his disgusting offense.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
G.R. No. 80018
- Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions, and not in
their private or unofficial capacity.
- It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
G.R. No. 80258
- The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the record is too meager to indicate if the
individual petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official functions, or had actually
exceeded their authority.
- Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the
individual petitioners were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of state immunity is
applicable.
- Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and
decision.
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC
PUNO; December 15, 1994
FACTS
- Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP)
working at JUSMAG Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs (1969-1992); was
dismissed on April 27, 1992
- He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment (March 31, 1992) on the
ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed; asked for reinstatement
- JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of US;
also alleged lack of employer-employee rel’p and it has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued
- Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of jurisdiction
- NLRC reversed—JUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG
failed to refute the employer-employee rel’p under the control test and 2) it has waived its right
to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramento’s services.
 - NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (“US Govt waived its immunity from suit by
entering into a contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of local courts”)
- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the labor arbiter’s decision, in saying that JUSMAG waived its immunity from
suit, in finding an employer-employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento, and in
considering JUSMAG estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for failure
to present proof.
ISSUE
Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from
suit?
HELD
Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts.
Reasoning
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was performing a governmental function
on behalf of the US pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit is, in effect, one
against the US and, considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit, the
complaint cannot prosper.
- Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law
that the Phils. Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. This is anchored on the
principle of sovereign equality of states (an equal has no power over an equal).
Discussion
- Historical Background of JUSMAG
- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947
between the Philippines and the US; primary task was to advise and assist the
Philippines on air force, army and naval matters
- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide funds to cover the salaries of SASP
and security guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of utilities
- Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and JUSMAG-Phils
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP
- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total operational control of the Chief
JUSMAG-Phils; AFP to assume the severance/retirement pay liability for all
appointed SASP
- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the US. Hence, the suit is, in effect, one
against the US Government.
- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a universally accepted principle. Immunity is
understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of
another state.
- A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, without its consent or waiver. An
exception to the doctrine, however, was recognized in Santos, et al vs. Santos, et al:
“the state itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a
contract, the sovereign state has descended the level of the citizen and its consent to be
sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.”
- it was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons vs. USA was decided
- Exception evolved: existence of contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign
states may, at all times, be sued in local courts.
- US vs. Ruiz: “...does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions”
- US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: “petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity...the reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove
in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.”
- SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently contended by JUSMAG, thus it is not
estopped from denying employer-employee relationship
Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRC is reversed and set aside
PNB V CIR
FERNANDO; January 31, 1978
FACTS
- Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which was served upon its branch on QC by
an authorized deputy sheriff of the court
*** What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at the petitioner’s branch in QC in order to satisfy the decision of the
respondent court
- PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2 grounds:
1. the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to
serve the writ of execution was contrary to law
*** PNB contends that the service of notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of this court
contravenes Sec. 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 10523
23
“All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial sheriffs or by any person authorized by this court, in
the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance
*** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of this court who is its Ex-
officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment and that the actual
service of the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order
2. the funds subject of the character “may be public in character”
- COIR denied PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment
ISSUE
WON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying, for lack of merit, petitioner
PNB’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment 24 can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD
No. There’s no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio
1. RA No. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is
now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. Therefore, the Clerk
of this Court has the authority to issue writs of execution and notices
2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even irresolute. And 2 nd, the People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued.
The premise that the funds spoken of are public in character may be accepted in the sense
that it was government-owned. However, it does not follow that they were exempt from
garnishment.
SSS v CA
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983
FACTS
- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cancio Cruz applied for and were
granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto.
Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2000 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant to this real estate loan said spouses executed on March
26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which
was later increased to P48,000.00 covering said property.
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others
that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the default on
the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal
debt and the interest thereon, and all of the monthly installments due and payable thereafter
24
Garnishment – a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to satisfy a debt
-- also the attachment of such property
up to the present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged property was initially
published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public
auction of the said mortgaged property. Despite plaintiff’s letter to defendant demanding the
latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their
property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their monthly amortizations,
defendant SSS still went on to publish second and third publications of foreclosure.
- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly
amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment against
defendant SSS. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court’s decision. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES
(1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the
SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of as would have foreclosure
(2) WON the SSS is immune from suit
(3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.
HELD
(1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence, factual findings of the lower court are
not subject to review by this Court.
Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this ratio. Applying the rule, it can be
said therefore, that the findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-debtors have not in
fact violated their contract because SSS accepted their installment payments although given
late will not be disturbed on appeal.
(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of
an enabling law, is deemed to have waived immunity from suit, although it does not thereby
concede its liability.
Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, (110 SCRA 457), which involved the National Power Corporation as an
entity performing governmental functions. In that case it said, “It is sufficient to say that the
government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to site and
be sued in any court under its charter.” The enabling law is R.A. No. 6395. Applying this rule in
the present case, the SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in
Court, the enabling law being R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24. Hence, there’s a statutory consent by
the SSS to waive right of immunity from suit.
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be adjudged against a party which
commenced foreclosure proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of his
installments.
Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is true that the payments of the
monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the
appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date and current in the payment
of their monthly installments. Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly
installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors
apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages.
Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
MAKASIAR [dissent]
 What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly negligent bordering on malice
or bad faith) of the employees of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage of the wrong
mortgage-debtor
 SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its employees in
the performance of their regular functions
 SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is immune from suit despite its Charter
provision that it can sue and be sued.
 SSS exercises purely governmental functions and cannot be sued without its consent for
the tortious acts of its personnel
COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOS
DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
- The facts of the case is as per above except that the compensation determined is now the
issue. The value of the property was pegged at P 2.37 per square meter based on the price
used in the conveyance of several pieces of property in the same area at about the same
time. However, the court a quo in determining due compensation, considered the value of the
pesos to the dollar at the time the case was being decided. So instead of just P14,615.79 the
amount awarded became P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79 divided by 2 {the
exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2.00 to US$1.00} and the product being
multiplied by 6.775). Based on this amount, the court determined interest to be P145,410.44.
Total due from the government, including attorney’s fee of ten percent amounted to
P214,356.75.
- Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the compensation, relied on Article 1250 of
the New Civil Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from
what has been agreed on because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation.
- The government, through the Solicitor General, appealed the decision contending that the
court a quo erred in applying its method and violated the high court’s order to make as a basis
of compensation the price or the value of the land when it was taken. The Solicitor General
also took issue with the award of ten percent as attorney’s fees as exhorbitant considering
that Amigable only sought P5,000.00.
ISSUES
1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is proper
2. WON the attorney’s fees awarded were exorbitant
HELD
1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New Civil Code, the Court noted that the provision
applies only if there was a contract or agreement. Using the precedent, Velasco vs Manila
Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971), the court expressed the view that the taking of private
property by the government in the exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a
contractual obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of because the obligation of the
government sought to be enforced does not originate from contract, then Article 1250 does
not apply. The just compensation is the value of the property at the time it was taken.
- Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of the land as there was no motion of
reconsideration from the Solicitor General before the decision became final.
2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5,000 attorney’s fees and hence the
amount requested is reasonable.
Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of determining the price of the
land. And the price of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is P14,615.79 plus six percent
per annum interest reckoned from the time the property was taken to the time the
compensation is paid.
GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES V DORR
LADD; May 19, 1903
FACTS
The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with
the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of
the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based
upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission 25. The alleged libel was published as an
editorial in the issue of “Manila Freedom” of April 6, 1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil
Commission and its members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the
peace and the branding of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera as a coward and a rascal, were
explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression “the Insular Government of the
Philippines”?26
2. Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292?
HELD
1. Ratio The term “government” as employed in Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine
Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from
the concrete organism of the Government – the Houses of Congress and the Executive.
Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the term “government” provided: a. in a
general and abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or b. the
aggregate of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is, for the time being,
administered. The first admissible definition is derived from the act of (the U.S.) Congress on
July 14, 1798, commonly known as the Sedition Act) 27
2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. 292 of the United
States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to
produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to its laws.
- The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine Commission and its
members is not a libel upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission.
Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the government system of the
U.S., and though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its
25
“Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.” (Italics mine) 
26
N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve the next issue.
27
“It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to procure to be written, printed, uttered, or published or to knowingly and willingly assist or aid
in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either House of said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either
of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States…"
individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which authority of
the U.S. is enforced in these Islands. Furthermore, it is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into
disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private
morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article therefore, no seditious
tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)
Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted.
TERRITORY
ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and water
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea,
the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046
An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines
- Approved: 17 June 1961
Whereas clauses –
1. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils:
 All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris (1898), US-Spain treaty (1900), and
US-Britain treaty (1930).
 All waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the archipelago.
 All waters beyond outermost islands of archipelago but within limits of boundaries set
forth in such treaties.
2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of Philippines is determined consist of straight
lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago.
Section 1 – It defines and describes the baselines for the territorial sea of the Phils.
Section 2 – All waters within the baselines provided in sec1 are considered inland or internal
waters of the Phils.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446
R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining
the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. It further says that the definition of the
baselines of the territorial seas of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils. has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. Approved September 18, 1968.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596
June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring certain area (the Kalayaan Island
Group or more commonly known as the “Spratly Islands”) as Philippine territory as well as
providing for its Government and Administration.
 said area is vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and much
of it is part of the continental margin of the Phil. archipelago
 the area does not legally belong to any state or nation and by reason of history,
indispensable need, effective occupation and control established in accordance with
international law, said area (including its sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin and air
space) must be deemed to belong to and subject to the sovereignty of the Phil.
 other states’ claims to some of the area cannot prevail over the claims of the
Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds
 named it “Kalayaan” and constituted it as a distinct and separate municipality of
Palawan
 administration and government shall be vested in the Secretary of National Defense
or in other Civil govt. or AFP officers as may be designated by the Pres.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599
Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other Purposes
- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a state has special rights over the
exploration and use of marine resources – Wikipedia
- It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the
territorial sea
- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries shall be determined by countries
- What can be exercised in EEZ?
o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and
management of the natural resources
o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of
artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of
the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution, and scientific
research
o Other rights recognized by international law or state practice
- It also restricts other countries from exercising the rights above in our EEZ.
- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs
- The President may authorize a government agency to promulgate rules for the purposes of
this decree
- Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be subject to a fine (P2,000-
P100,000) or imprisonment (6 mos – 10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or articles
used shall be confiscated.
PEOPLE
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
and humane society and establish s Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil
service.
Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful
ART III BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec 2:
Sec 7:
ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec 4:
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 2:
ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Sec 25:
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
VITUG; March 3, 2004
FACTS
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen.
- His real name was stated to be “Fernando, Jr.” or “Ronald Allan” Poe, born in Manila
on August 20, 1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJ’s parents were foreigners – his mother Bessie Kelley Poe
was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
marrying Bessie Kelley according to an “uncertified” copy of a supposed
certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936.
- Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley
only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage
reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan
was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American.
- FPJ’s earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in
September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos,
Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The
birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an Español father and to a mestiza
Español mother.
Procedure
- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following
pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
- Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed
a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)
English translation of (b)
- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe
- Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives Office
stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907
- Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives stating that
there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:
- Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the name of
Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that
the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during
World War II
- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and Fornier
filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was denied by the
COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004.
- February 10, 2004 – Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
- The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially
misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?
HELD
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue
- The COMELEC’s decision on disqualified cases involving a presidential candidate
could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court.
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before
it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Reasoning
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
- Fornier petition - Yes
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on the
following:
- “A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false…”
(Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78)
- “…the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
enduring free, orderly and honest elections…” (Sec. 52, same)
- “any interested party” authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same)
- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that,
according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, “any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt thereof.”
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality
of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution).
- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No
- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in
assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition
because the “Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
- A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election
protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner
from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:
- “Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests…relating to qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.” (Rule 12)
- “An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition
for quo-warranto against the President or Vice-President.” (Rule 13)
- “Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President
or the Vice-President…by filing a verified petition…within 30 days after the
proclamation of the winner.” (Rule 14)
- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates
for President or Vice-President.
2. Ratio FPJ’s citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7 dissent, 1 abstention and 1 separate
opinion)
- The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only remain in the sphere
of civil law and should not unduly impinge on the domain of political law.
- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
regardless of whether such children are legitimate of illegitimate.
Reasoning
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially
misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?
- Concept of citizenship
- Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in the administration of justice and
in the holding of an office and the state would be composed of such individuals in
order to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
- Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the one hand and with concomitant
obligations on the other.
- Citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries.
- In the 18th century, the concept was civil citizenship which established the rights
necessary for necessary for individual freedom (eg. Rights to property, personal
liberty and justice)
 - In the 19th century, it expanded to include political citizenship which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.
- In the 20th century, there was the development of social citizenship which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.
- Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing development.
- Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish times to the present
- During the Spanish period, no such term as “Philippine citizens,” only “Spanish
subjects.” In church records, natives were identified as “indios.”
- Spanish laws on citizenship included:
- Order de la Regencia of 1841
- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined the political status of children born
in the Philippines)
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended to the Philippines because the
colony was to be governed by special laws.
- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the following were Spanish citizens:
- Persons born in Spanish territory
- Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside Spain
- Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers
- Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of
any town of the Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the native
inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish subjects and natives
who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a year from the date of the
ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held
renounced and they would have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the Philippines became
Spanish subjects.
- They did not become American citizens but were issued passports describing
them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to protection of the US.
- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 – first appearance of the term “citizens of the
Philippine islands.” A citizen of the Philippine islands under this Act was:
- An inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899.
- An inhabitant meant:
- A native born inhabitant
- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain
- An inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11, 1899.
- Controversy as to the citizenship of a child born between April 11, 1899 and July
1, 1902 as there was no citizenship law in the Philippines. The common law
principle jus soli (principle of territoriality) was said to govern those born in the
Philippines during this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) – A native born inhabitant of the Philippines
was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if:
- A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899
- Residing in the Philippines on the said date
- Since that date, not a citizen of another country
- 1935 Constitution – provided that jus sanguinis (blood relationship) be the basis for
citizenship, as stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution
- Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption
of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands
- Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
- Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- 1973 Constitution – Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which, when
taken together with the existing civil law provisions would provide that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands.
This was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from
transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973 Constitution state that the following are
citizens of the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935
Constitution
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her
act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law.
 - 1987 Constitution – aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution which outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that
the following are Filipino citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
- The Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines should be, among the
many requirements, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2).
- Natural born citizen – citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship
- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo Pou’s citizenship and father
Allan F. Poe’s citizenship
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino.
- Conclusions with some degree of certainty to be drawn from the documents
presented:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley.
- FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September
16, 1940.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou.
- At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
- The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy.
- The three documents (birth certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate of
Bessie and Allan and the death certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true
copies of the originals.
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state that when the subject of the
inquiry is the content of the document, no evidence shall be admissible
except the original document itself. One of the exceptions however is
when the original is a public record in the custody of a public office is
recorded in a public office.
- As public documents, the three documents are prima facie proof of their
contents as stated in the Rules of Court (130, Section 44) that the entries
in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is grounded on:’
of official duty in the preparation of the statement made. The penalty
affixed to a breach of that duty. Routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements. Publicity of the record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred
- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou’s place of residence at the time of death
was the same as his residence before death in the absence of evidence that
would attest otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This
citizenship would then extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJ’s father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during the Spanish colonization period.
- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in the Philippines during the crucial
period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existing record to attest to that
claim.
- Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the country during that
same time period.
- Lorenzo’s residence at the time of death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory rules of civil law would not apply
in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJ’s
maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the
children in one house as one family) would be accepted.
- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under civil rule should apply because
FPJ was an illegitimate son.
- Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. Acknowledgement
in the birth certificate by signing name)
- In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth
certificate of FPJ.
- 1950 Civil Code – acknowledgement of illegitimate children of three
types which had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent:
- Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will or a statement before
the court in authentic writing)
- Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate
child who was recognized as natural)
- Compulsory (demanded generally in cases when the child had in
his favor any evidence to prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Articles 172,
173 and 175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255).
These provisions are there to govern the private and personal affairs
 of the family. There is little indication that this should also govern his
political rights.
- This should be taken in the context of civil law, being that branch of law which
is concerned with the organization of the family and regulation of property.
The relevance of citizenship is exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of determining citizenship status should be
deemed independent from those prescribed for civil code purposes. The
ordinary rules should govern.
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to.
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot inherit his father’s
citizenship.
- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, Allan’s citizenship would
not have been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage between
his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a prior
existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the veracity of
this marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful.
- Fornier also contended that even if Allan and Bessie’s marriage was not
bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate because his parents were married after he
was born. Fornier based his arguments on the cases of Morano v. Vivo,
Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v. Republic.
- In the cases cited above, it is important to note the lis mota in each case.
If the pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the lis mota, it would
constitute doctrine courtesy of stare decisis. If not, it is mere obiter
dictum.
- In all of the mentioned cases, there was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota
of the cases. If there was jus sangunis mentioned, it was mere obiter
dictum.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the father’s
citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates the equal
protection clause.
- For jurisprudence that regarded an illegitimate child to inherit the mother’s
citizenship, it was there to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child with the
assumption that the mother would gain custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time period
and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
Decision
1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJ’s citizenship but the evidence
preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
Jurisdiction
- SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction
- Tecson and Valdez petitions – petitioners cannot invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution
because the word “contest” means that the Court can only be invoked after the
election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no “contest”
before a winner is proclaimed.
- Fornier petition – as a review under R64 in relation to R65 of the RoC, Court has
jurisdiction.
- COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to
prove by substantial evidence that FPJ deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizan in his CoC
- Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC decisions is a limited power
- Can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on the ground that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or capricious)
- The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to disqualify respondent Poe is based on
substantial evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or capricious
- Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC – misrepresentation must not only be material but
also deliberate and willful
- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show that (1) respondent made
misrepresentation in his CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is material to the position to
which he is candidate and (3) that material misrepresentation was made deliberately
and willfully
- Analysis of petitioner’s evidence
- Certificate of birth – only proved the date of birth of FPJ, not that he is not a natural-
born citizen
- Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan Poe with bigamy and marriage
license of between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez, presented thru Dir. Manapat – pulled
out because they were fabricated
- Respondent submitted affidavits that show that the files submitted by the
petitioner are fabricated by Manapat’s instructions
 - Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be considered because of technical
grounds
- SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial body and are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence.
- Birth certificate of Allan Poe – also fabricated; does not prove anything besides birth
- Certification of Dir. Manapat that the National Archives has no record that Lorenzo
Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before 1907 – manufactured
- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives Div that the Register of Births that
there is no information on the National Archives on the birth of Allan Poe to the spouse
Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes – lack of information is not proof
- Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always conducted himself as Filipino
- “For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, Poe is entitled to an
outright dismissal of the Fornier petition.” Poe does not need to present contrary
evidence for the burden of proof is not shifted to him.
- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and the issue of whether
respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier petition
need not be remanded to the COMELEC for further reception of evidence
- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second opportunity to prove his case is a
palpable error
- “In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae, it is daylight clear that petitioner
Fornier is not only wring with his facts but also wrong with his law.
- Remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings
have long been closed and terminated; to give another chance to prove facts which he
failed to prove before
- Favors of remand cannot be extended to the litigant because of political neutrality
- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by judicial legislation, hence,
unconstitutional
- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation
in his CoC when he wrote that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
- Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the character of a S78 proceeding
(WON FOJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue and not just an issue
incidental to the issue of material misrepresentation)
- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is something only legislature can
change by another law
- Remand will violate respondent Poe’s right to due process, hence, unconstitutional
- If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the body is no longer an impartial tribunal
is there are three of the seven members of the commission that have given firm view
that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino citizen
- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is qualified. Delay
will also prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political opponents.
- “The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The
right to run is empty if the chance to win is diminished of denied a candidate.
- To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue and declare respondent Poe as a
natural-born citizen on the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC
- Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in determining his status as natural-born
citizen --- that is the law.
- The law does not make any distinction in applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate
children.
- Morano v Vivo – WON the stepson was to file the natural cerebral house.
- Chiongbian v de Leon – a legitimate son whose father became Filipino because of
election to a public office before the 1935 constitution
- Serra v Republic – an illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
- Paa v Chan – Quintin claims that his father is Filipino because his grandmother is a
Filipina. The court ruled that since there is no proof that his grandmother is Filipino
then his father is not Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well. The court’s ruling
should have stopped here but the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if
Quintin’s father were Filipino, he would not be Filipino because he was illegitimate.
- The statements on the illegitimate child were unnecessary and were just obiter
dicta and not ratio decidendi, therefore do not constitute stare decisis.
- Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if repeated endlessly.
- Reasons why court should create new doctrine:
- There is no textual foundation
- It violates the equal protection clause
- People v Cayat – established the doctrine on constitutionally allowable
distinctions. Such distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law.
- Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor – “The duty of this Court is to forsake and
abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.”
- Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus , especially if the distinction
has no textual
- Merlin Magallona – transmissive essence of citizenship
- To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen, all that is needed is proof of his
filiation to his father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen --- that is the critical fact.
- Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondent’s father is well established.
- To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will violate our treaty obligation.
Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves
a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down the
middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult
by the interplay of national and international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the
members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the
next President. For on political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people will not.
To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to
elect in behalf of the people.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are
DISMISSED.
DAVIDE
FACTS
- January 9, 2004 – Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of
candidacy for the May 10 elections because of he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen
- January 23, 2004 – COMELEC dismissed the case declaring that its jurisdiction is limited to
all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and
city officials, but not those of national officials like the president.
- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under
sec 78 of OECon petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on
the ground of false material representation.
- Findings:
- Fornier evidence is not substantial
- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge
jurisdiction of COMELEC over the issue of FPJ’s citizenship. They claim that only the Sc has
jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti)
- January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff issues:
- Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitions to deny due course or cancel
certificated of candidacy of Presidential candidates
- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of Tecson, Velez and Fornier
- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if he’s a natural-born Filipino citizen
Jurisdiction
- Tecson and Velez petitions
- The provision in the constitution only refers to past-election remedies, they should
have resorted to pre-election remedies in the OEC which are implemented by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure
- Pre-election remedies are not within the jurisdiction of the SC
- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original jurisdiction to determine whether a
candidate for an elective office ineligible for the office for which he filed his certificate
of candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for disqualification.
- Fornier petition
- SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A S7 Consti )
- SC can take cognizance of issue of WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the challenged resolution by
virtue of (ArtVIII S1 Consti)
WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen
Facts:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not
shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ratio For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate child whose father is Filipino and
whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the
citizenship of the father
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino
citizen pursuant to Art IV S1 per 3 consti. The provision did not make any distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers.
Petitions are dismissed.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a candidate before the election?
- Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose their candidates.
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
- Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion said,
“In my view, the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to
be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be
questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest in the appropriate forum.”
- Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion.
- Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed against the “masses,” a situation not
allowed by the Constitution. The SC may become like the Iranian Guardian Council.This
Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a
genuine, free and fair election.
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissinG Fornier’s
petition for disqualification against respondent
- Salcedo v COMELEC – the only instance when a petition raising the qualifications of a
registered candidate is before election (S78 OEC)
 - To justify the cancellation of CoC, false representation mentioned must pertain to
material matter
- There must be deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide fact which would
render a candidate ineligible
- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP – where COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6 resolutions holding that “considering the evidence presented by
the petitioner is not substantial, we declare that the respondent did not commit any material
misrepresentation when he stated in his CoC that he is a natural born Filipino citizen”
Allegations in the COMELEC petition:
1. Respondent Poe committed false material representation by stating in his Certificate
of Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino citizen; and
2. He knowingly made such false representation.
- FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are aliens.
- Director Manapat of the National Archives falsified the marriage contract of FPJ’s
parents and his father’s birth certificate.
- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat . – he who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove; S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo – burden of proof is on the party
asserting the affirmative of an issue
- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of certiorari can only be granted if it can be
proven that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion;
-Grave abuse of discretion – capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross that it amounted to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
- We cannot discern from the records any indication that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing Fornier’s petition. Indeed, his availment of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari is grossly misplaced.
Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation when he declared in
his CoC that he is a natural-bron Filipino citizen
- COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material misrepresentation in his CoC
because his father is a Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935 constitution.
- Valles v COMELEC – Philippine law on citizenship adheres to jus sanguinis
- FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father
- Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain because his
- Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his parents are citizens of Spain.
- The marriage certificate was shown to have been falsified.
- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of FPJ
- Allan’s father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject and an inhabitant of the Philippines
on April 11, 1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and
Jones Law)
- In re Bosque – expiration of the term of 18 months without making an express declaration of
intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter and thereby
becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner as the natives of these islands
- Palanca v Republic –
- “A person, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject
of Spain on the 11th day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of
Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of
29 August 1916. Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines
because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”
- Constitution did not specify in referring to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens as
to whether this only applies to legitimate children or not.
- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus , especially if the distinction has
no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes
an injustice on an innocent child. (Fr Bernas)
- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of the child
vis-à-vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive
essence of citizenship in blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)
In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in rendering its
assailed Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004.
WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with Senior Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING Fornier’s petition
CARPIO-MORALES
Issues for Resolution:
1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
presidential candidates;
2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issues its Resolutions
of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for Disqualification;
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek election as President.
1) Jurisdiction:
- Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for President:
paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc , shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
- refers to this Court’s jurisdiction over electoral contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the President, and not to the
 qualifications or disqualifications of a presidential candidate. FPJ is still just a
candidate; petition: premature.
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that the issue of FPJ’s qualification for the
Presidency may also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, specially considering that the instant case is one of transcendental
importance.
- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not available
where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law—like in this case: (to intervene in the Petition for Disqualification)
- in determining whether procedural rules, such as standing, should be relaxed
on the ground of “transcendental importance,” the following should be
considered: the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest
in raising the questions being raised. Considering that the substantive issues
raised by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634,
respectively, are virtually identical to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R.
No. 161824, this Court is not convinced that the “transcendental importance” of
the issues raised herein justifies a direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court or the exercise of its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under
Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
- Petition in G.R. No. 161824
- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari questioning the
Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of
Art. IX-A of the Constitution vests this Court with the power of review over decisions,
orders, or rulings of the COMELEC.
- COMELEC’s Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Petition for Disqualification
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
- not really a constitutional question…
2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
Petition for is qualification for Lack of Merit.
- the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing them:
- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for Disqualification without stating the
factual bases therefore:
- Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “[n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.”
- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualification without ruling categorically on
the issue of FPJ’s citizenship.
- To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue of citizenship, the
COMELEC relies on this Court’s ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,
and held that held that Fornier should have presented “proof of misrepresentation
with a deliberate attempt to mislead” on the part of FPJ— confined the issue in the
Petition for Disqualification to whether FPJ “must have known or have been aware
of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing on his certificate.”
- Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was
aware of a false material representation in his Certificate of Candidacy without first
determining whether such material representation (in this case, his claim of natural-
born citizenship) was false. The fact alone that there is a public document ( i.e., his
birth certificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in averring natural-born
citizenship does not automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is other
evidence to show that such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of such
evidence.
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
- Five crucial factual questions
(1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a Filipino citizen at the time of the
birth of his son, Allan F. Poe;
- the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts covering the
Philippine Islands. (no evidence as to his residence, only prima facie evidence.)
(2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was a Filipino at the time of the birth
of the latter;
- Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship independently of his father’s by
virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in the Philippines on
November 27, 1916.
- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was born in the Philippines on
November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not suffice to prove that he was a
citizen of the Philippine Islands absent a showing that he was judicially declared to
be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that the
principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by place of birth was never extended or
applied in the Philippine Islands:
(3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;
- FPJ’s birth certificate indicates that his parents were married, and that he is a
legitimate child. However, the Marriage Contract of his putative parents, Fernando
R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he
was born out of wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract, the two contracting
parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry
therein with respect to the date of their marriage should be given greater weight
than the birth certificate, which was executed by a physician who had to rely on
hearsay as regards FPJ’s legitimacy.
- FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an illegitimate child at birth.
(4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming
arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship)
 - As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the stipulation by petitioner Fornier,
both before the COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of
FPJ; (2) the declaration of Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an
affidavit of “Fernando R. Poe” for Philippine Army Personnel.
- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proofs of filiation under Article 172 of the
Family Code.
(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
- Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-mother
who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born
citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth , thus leaving the
illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship (nothing
more to do to acquire citizenship = natural born).
- no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge
FPJ as his own son at birth
- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father,
the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable
conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and
161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004
and February 6, 2004, rendered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3)
DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation.
IN RE: CHING
KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar
- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and
Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils
- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935 Constitution. Father’s citizenship is
followed, with a right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the ’98 Bar Examinations.
- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil
citizenship
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Cert
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC.
- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required
to submit more proof of citizenship.
- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance.
- OSG commented that Ching being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil
citizenship, it would already be beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence
- Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from OSG):
1st – the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen
2nd – election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable
time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted
that this pd not inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs not reasonable time)
- Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special circumstances: continuous and
uninterrupted say in the Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected public official
ISSUE
1. WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time
and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.
2. WON Ching’s special circumstances entitle him to citizenship
HELD
1. No, Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd
w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he was already 35 yrs old when
he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June ’99. He was already more then 14
yrs over the age of majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudence compel
the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude.
2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as
the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Decision Court denies Vicente D Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar
BENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001
FACTS
- Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: “no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen.”
- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac on April 27,
1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence
he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may
lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization
as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.
- May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630.
- He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his
opponent was Bengson.
- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz, not being a
natural-born citizen by the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines natural-born
citizens as “citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship, was not eligible to be member of the House.
ISSUES
1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via
Repatriation, so that the question of WON he is eligible to be a member of the House might be
addressed
2. - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse of discreation amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen
HELD
1. Yes.
Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship
o By birth – natural born citizens
o Naturalization – Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications
- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens:
o Natural born
o Naturalized
- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation
or by direct act of Congress.
o Naturalization – mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
o Repatriation – available for those who have lost their citizenship due to
desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the allied forces in
WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity. Process:
taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil
Registrar of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
- Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen because of his repatriation.
Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with the Local
Civil Registry
- 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or
naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for reacquisition.
- Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire
his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
2. No.
Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating
to the elction, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. Court’s jurisdiction is
merely to check WON there has been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
SEPARATE OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Additional Facts:
- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor declaring himself
to be a naturalized Filipino citizen
- Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself as natural-born
- Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase “from birth” in Art IV,
Sec 2 of the Consti
- Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite point and must be continuous, constant
and without interruption
- Respondent contends: refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
“natural-born”
- J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:
- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts. To repatriate,
Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen.
Therefore, he does not reaquire natural-born citizenship
- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of
being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years, more
stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar reverses the historical trend and
 clear intendment of the Consti, a matter which can only be accomplished through consti c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy
amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion. d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)
e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable contagious disease
f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473
customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinos
An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenship by Naturalization, and to g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the Philippines are at war – during such war
repeal Acts 2927 and 3448 h. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER THAN US!] whose laws don’t grant Filipinos
right to become naturalized citizens/subjects
Sec 1: Title: “Revised Naturalization Law” Sec 2: Qualifications: Who may become Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is his bona fide intention to
citizens of the Philippines by naturalization? become a citizen of the Philippines
1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the petition - under oath
2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS period of >10yrs - 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine citizenship
3. of good moral character of the Bureau of Justice
+ believes in principles underlying the Philippine Constitution (1935 Consti)
-contents+ name
+ conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during entire period of residence in
+ age
the Philippines in relation with constituted government and community with community in
+ occupation
which he is living
+ personal description
4. (must own real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or Philippine currency or lucrative
trade/profession/lawful occupation + place of birth
5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any one of the principal Philippine language +last foreign residence and allegiance
6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any of the public schools/private schools +date of arrival
during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of +name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to the Philippines
his petition +place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration *to be valid:
…School: establish lawful entry for permanent residence + issued certificate showing date, place, and
- recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines manner of arrival
- teaches Philippine history, government and civics and prescribes it as part of the school *also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school (see sec2(6))
curriculum *2 pictures of himself
Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year qualification required in Sec2(2) Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after declaration of intention not
could be reduced to a continuous 5 years? required to file declaration of intention
1. had honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines/ under that of any of the Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with competent court
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof [aliens, particularly American
*a petition in triplicate
citizens, were the ones who were governing the country prior to the Commonwealth]
2. established new industry/ introduced a useful invention in the Philippines contents of petition:
3. married to a Filipino woman +name and surname
4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrs +present and former places of residence
school: public/recognized private school + not established for exclusive instruction of children +occupation
of persons of particular nationality/race +place and date of birth
5. born in the Philippines +status; if married and the father, include name, age, birthplace and residence of wife and
Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons… each child
a. opposed to organized government/affiliated with any association or group of persons who +approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized gov’t +name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if remembered)
b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of violence/personal assault/assassination for
+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification
the success and predominance of their ideas
 +declaration that he has complied with sec. 5
+declaration of continuous residence in RP from date of filing petition to admission as RP
Citizen
*2 photographs of petitioner
*petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least 2 credible persons (see
provision for requirements)
Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner has resided for at least 1 yr
immediately preceding the filing of the petition
Sec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court
…publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in one of gen circulation newspapers in
the province where petitioner resides
…post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain name, birthplace and residence of
petitioner, date and place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the petition)
*hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last publication of notice
…forward copies of the petition, sentence, naturalization certificate and pertinent data to
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial Inspector of the Philippine
Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner resides
Sec 10. Hearing of the petition.
*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election
*public hearing
*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for Commonwealth at all
proceedings
*upon belief of court of qualifications and non-disqualification of petitioner, court order proper
naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753)
Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC
Sec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30 days after and from date of
notice to the parties (in case of appeal, SC confirmed deci), clerk of court issue naturalization
certificate
contents of certificate of naturalization”
*file no. of petition
*number of naturalization certificate
*signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of court
*personal circumstances of the person naturalized
*dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition
*date of decision granting petition
*name of the judge who rendered deci
*photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition
*oath declared in open court [refer to the original]
Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1) record of petition and declarations
of intentions in chronological order; (2) record of naturalization certificate
Sec 14. Fees.
*P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings + issuance of certificate)
*P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services rendered)
sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children
*on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just married or also naturalized)
*on minor children:
…if born in the Philippines: Filipino
…if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines during naturalization of parent:
Filipino
…if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines during naturalization of parent:
Filipino during minority, unless resides in the Philippines permanently and still a
minor, then legally Filipino upon age of majority
…if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino unless fails to register and
take oath 1 yr after age of majority
Sec 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners_who_have _died: continue
proceedings, same legal effect
Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless w/ express consent of the
National Assembly
Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates issued
*upon motion made in proper proceedings by Solicitor-General/representative/proper
provincial fiscal
*cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:
a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegally
b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after
issuance of naturalization certificate
c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention
d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of
parents either by neglect to support or by transferring them to another school(s)
e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate constitutional or legal provision
requiring Philippine citizenship
Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or
both, naturalization cancelled
Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from detection/discovery of commission of
offense
Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks.
*Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations
 *Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice: naturalization certificate
blanks, etc.
Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as amended by Act No. 3448
[Naturalization Law]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530
An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization
- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also required by previous law, prob. Act
423, below)
- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after the publication
- Decisions granting the application become executory only after 2 years, and
- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that during the intervening time, applicant
has:
 NOT left the Philippines
 Dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling or profession
 NOT been convicted of any offense or violation of govt. rules
 NOT committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
govt. announced policies
- After the finding, the order of the court granting citizenship will be registered and the oath
taken by the applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of citizenship.
- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423.
- Approved, June 16, 1950.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship may be lost or
reacquired
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost.
(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or laws of foreign country upon
+21y.o.: a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship while the RP is at war;
(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the armed forces of foreign country:
rendering of service to/the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of RP, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. is present:
(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or
(b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory w/ consent of RP:
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or acceptance of said
commission, & taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only
in connection with his service to said foreign country : & provided that any Filipino citizen
who is rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the armed forces of foreign country
under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of RP during
period of service to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country.
automatically entitled to full enjoyment of civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon
his discharge;
(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;
(6) having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the AFP in time of war, unless
pardon or granted amnesty; &
(7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country,
she acquires his nationality.
*** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June 2, 1947
*when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:
…acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from Iberian/democratic Ibero-
American countries/ United Kingdom if the law of that country grants same privilege to its
citizens –agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and foreign country from which
citizenship is acquired.
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.
(1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in sec 2, Act No.
2927 (repealed by CA 473 – so sec 4)
(2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may
be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the
marital status;(see PD 725 for more details)
(3) direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Apply Act No.
2927 (now CA 473) to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for
in the next preceding sec: Provided, qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in sec
3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be required (sorry guys, I can’t find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so
I don’t know what these sections are in CA 473): further, applicant…
(1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he applies for naturalization;
(2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during
+the entire period of his residence in RP
+in his relations with the constituted government
+with the community in which he is living; and
(3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all
faith and allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of which he was a citizen or
subject.
Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Ratio
Commonwealth of the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil registry. (used in the - Renunciation – made known distinctly & explicitly and not left to interference or implication
Bengzon Case) (BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese
Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473 citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese even after he has acquired
Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation.
YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO - He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity to show proof of continued
PADILLA; January 24, 1989 Philippine citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due process.
- Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to petitioner’s insistence, SC had
FACTS
to do it.
- Petition for Habeas Corpus
- Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
- 1971 – Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for same
suppressed when convenient.
period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer
- Feb. 10, 1978 – He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen
SEPARATE OPINION
- April 1980 – signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shun
Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese
CRUZ [concur]
- July 21, 1981 – He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport
Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as naturalized Filipino
will expire July 20, 1986.
by obtaining Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only to nationals. No proof
Procedural Facts:
of Yu’s unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its
- July 4, 1988 – He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained because the
significance & consequences as provided for in CA No. 63. Commercial documents signed are
Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his
not proof enough of renunciation.
acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
- July 20, 1988 – oral arguments
FERNAN [dissent]
- Nov. 10, 1988 – SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issued on
Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to reach such
jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest & detention.
decision. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for interference or implication. In a
Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent motion for issuance of restraining order, denied.
deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship w/substantial evidence, he’s entitled to
- Dec. 5, 1988 – Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order.
have his status determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown
- Dec. 7, 1988 – SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease & desist from deporting Yu pending
trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is not a trier of facts.
conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID.
- Dec. 13, 1988 – Respondent commissioner filed motion to lift TRO saying the commission
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
already issued a summary judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88.
Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important as denaturalization should be
- Dec. 13, 1988 – Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention. Opposed
filed & prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due process clause. When a
vigorously to lifting of TRO.
person pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizenship, he should at least be
- Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He complied. His reply
given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous
revealed aforementioned substantive facts.
precedent to allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship based
on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express renunciation. He may
ISSUE
have passport for other purposes (employment, convenience). Some high gov’t officials have
WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
done acts w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than mere use of passport or
different citizenship has been signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yu’s morality is beside the
HELD
Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted. point. He deserves his full day in court.

CORTES [dissent]
CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yu’s Filipino citizenship has not been
established. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper Philippine consul, thus not
substantial and are inadequate.
PEOPLE V AVENGOZA
RELOVA; December 7, 1982
FACTS
- Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of Camarines Sur
- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese, together with the former’s mother
Gavina Avengoza and Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law on transactions for the spouses to own agricultural lands in the Philippines.
- Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam, acquired Chinese citizenship
- The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may own local agricultural land.
- Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away.
- Upon Go Gam’s passing, Anselma executed an oath of allegiance to the RP and filed it with
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her citizenship by
repatriation, averring by reason whereof that her criminal liability is thereby extinguished; and
that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and academic
- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion that Anselma had validly
reacquired Philippine citizenship
ISSUES
1. WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing an oath of allegiance to the RP and
filing it with the Municipal Treasurer
2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted her from liability for the violation of
the Anti-Dummy Law
HELD
1. No.
Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
Would-be repatriate should show conclusive proof that she has the qualifications to be so
repatriated. Anselma became an alien by reason of her lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen;
however this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage.
2. No.
Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like an alien who became a naturalized
Filipino citizen, her repatriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the
Anti-Dummy Law.
JAO V REPUBLIC
VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983
FACTS
- Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she was born of a Chinese father and
an illiterate Filipina mother who were not legally married. - She married a Chinese man and
therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he is now dead.
- Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as an alien and she was issued an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR).
- She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a petition for repatriation filed in CFI of
Davao.
- CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as “judicially repatriated,” and ordered cancelled her
ACR.
- Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the case.
ISSUE
WON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for repatriation.
HELD
Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as “judicially repatriated” are a complete nullity. There
is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a judicial proceeding.
Reasoning In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held that “there is no proceeding
established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.” All that is needed
for a female citizen of the Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil.
citizen, upon the termination of her martial status, “is for her to take necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register the said oath in the proper civil registry.”
Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside. 5 Justices concur.
Obiter Petitioner’s claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being allegedly an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be established in an action
where the mother or her heirs are not parties. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction that
Phil. citizenship may not be declared in a non-adversary suit where the persons whose rights
are affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as an action for declaratory relief,
petition for judicial repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an alien.
VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
MALCOLM; March 25, 1919
FACTS
- Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing of the city’s
red light district. The brothels were closed and the workers (170 women) were rounded up and
kept confined to their houses in the district by the police for a little more than a week. On the
night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and
Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent, without opportunity to
consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4 days later and were
met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael
Castillo, etc.
- During their voyage, the women’s relatives and friends initiated an application for habeas
corpus, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief), and others
deprived the women of their liberty. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and
ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before the court. Although they returned with
none of the women, they were given another chance. The court issued another order this time
calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The respondents were
only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the issuance of the writ.
ISSUES
1. Re: the proper granting of the writ:
a. WON the petitioners had standing
b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty
2. WON there was compliance with the court orders
3. On contempt of court
HELD
1a. Yes
Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the w of hc, another
person may submit it in his/her behalf.
Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for habeas corpus with
the way their expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from society and then
shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
1b No
Ratio The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable
to (whether before the SC or before a lower court).
Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. The case involves parties from different
parts of the country. Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint.
1c. Yes
Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women is constitutive of deprivation of
freedom of locomotion.
Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person from
such restraint if it is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
2. 1 st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the women before the court on the day
named. The court could have sent the respondents to jail however, the court forebore drastic
action because it did not want the public to see a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary and because it wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
2 nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8 women. The
mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. However, the court decided that there was
substantial compliance, noting the effort (placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to
Manila was provided) and the fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident
finally closed.
3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions were commendable, his methods
were unlawful. An officer’s failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of
habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of events and had
under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila
but failed. The rest of the respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of contempt. Some
were merely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was
merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.
Disposition No further action on the w of hc. Lukban found in contempt of court and shall
pay Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt of court.
KURODA JALANDONI
MORAN; March 26, 1949
FACTS
Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged by the Military Commission
with failure to perform duties as commander in preventing crimes/atrocities against civilians,
and POWs. In defense, he is alleging that Executive Order No. 68 (EO68) which established a
Natl. War Crimes Office is unconstitutional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port
(both American) have no authority to practice law in the country. As such, the respondents
should be prohibited from proceeding with this case.
ISSUES
1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional
2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port
A. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with the Rules of Court
B. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of the Constitution
HELD
1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate an
unfinished aspect of war which is the trial and punishment of war criminals through the
issuance and enforcement of EO68.
Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to establish a Natl. War Crimes Office and
provide for rules and regulations in trying accused war criminals. It conforms to the generally
accepted principles/policies of international law, including the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention, which are part of the law of the nation. Its promulgation was an exercise
of the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed forces. Iin
Yamashita v. Tyer, the court held that “the power to create a military commission for the trial
and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. A military commission has
jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues.”
2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal governed by a special law and
not by the Rules of Court.
Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that counsel appearing before said
commissions must be attys. qualified to practice law in the Phil. in accordance with the Rules
of Court.
2B. No
Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our national
sovereignty.
Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which has submitted the vindication of
crimes against her govt. and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes.
Disposition The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68,
and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody,
this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Petition
denied. With costs de oficio.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957
FACTS
- Injunction and Mandamus
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled ”An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” It
prohibits aliens and associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned
by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail
business.
- Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and
Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City
Treasurer of Manila.
- Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
A. Police Power
- the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable
- necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
B. Equal Protection Clause
- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions
- is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
- Criteria for Test of EPC
1. presence of public interest and welfare
2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means
3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made
C. Due Process clause
- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power
- Questions for test:
1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature’s purpose;
is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an unjustified
interference with private interest?
ISSUES
1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.
2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of
law.
3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the
bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.
HELD
1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the
Constitution if there is a question of public interest involved or pursued and the classification
or distinction used by the legislature, in this case between nationals and aliens, is actual, real
and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded.
Reasoning
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers
and the people on whom he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for
the country. Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable practices
like the ff:
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands
- believed to have evaded tax laws
- bribing public officials
b. Economic reason – alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country’s economy and increase national wealth.
c. precedents
Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van
Winkle, Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners
- Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley
- held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were
found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial
antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or
pursued.
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Reasoning
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a
strangle hold upon our economic life\
- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic
control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.
b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution
- Section 8 of Article XIV provides that “no franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines”
c. Provisions of law not unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its
provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold
views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess
of the legislative power.
3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the
use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law.
Reasoning
a. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these
have always been included within the term regulation.
4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA
CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963
FACTS
- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice procurement
committee. Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed petition.
Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain
implementation of decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were required to file
answer and hearing was set.
- on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
Petitioner’s stand:
- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn
Administration and any other gov’t agency.
Respondents’ stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available before coming to court.
- Petitioner’s action is not sufficient and not governed by RA 3452 because importation was
authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such,
Pres must prepare for threats without waiting for any special authority.
- Also, they say it’s not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by
“government agency” and not the government itself.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it can still be permitted because it is for
the benefit of the people.
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with contracts for purchase of rice with
Vietnam and Burma. In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts, the contracts
should prevail because it came later. These contracts have been consummated bec. the
Phils. has already paid.
ISSUE
WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
HELD
- RA 3452 says that the gov’t policy is to purchase basic foods directly from farmers in Phils.
Petitioner has sufficient interest.
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the exemption from
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers “all
importations of rice and corn into the Phils.”
- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec. RA 2207 talks
about imports authorized by the President, by and on behalf of government. RA 3452 also
indicates that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. These RAs are only in
addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 which says that in all purchases by gov’t, incl. those
for armed forces, preference is given to materials produced in the Phils.
- The “benefit of the people” argument can’t be accepted because there is no local rice
shortage. And the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not for the civilian population.
- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive agreements. Even if they were,
they are unlawful, being against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not render this
case academic. The contracts may have already been entered into and the payment may
have been made but the actual importation has not yet taken place.
Disposition - For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed for is DENIED.
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize importation in question and he
exceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is
contrary to its provisions.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF DAR
CRUZ; July 14, 1989
FACTS
- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," especially the, less privileged.
- In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil."
- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments, also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. One of its sections:
- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right
of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
- R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been
enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which
was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners.
- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation.
- With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally convened on
July 27, 1987) took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations,
including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The
result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.
ISSUES
1. WON petitions are justiciable.
2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A.
6657 contravene the Constitution on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
Sub issues
a. The determination of just compensation may be made only by a court of justice and not by
the President of the Philippines.
b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in money or in
cash but not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O. No. 228 deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process.
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the agrarian problems is
placed on the owners only of agricultural lands.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by
them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, they contend
that she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the period.
g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro,
not in esse, i.e., it has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at that time.
h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group with problems exclusively their
own and by being lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, their right to equal
protection has been violated.
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the
exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the
expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of
the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation, he
is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the
uniformity rule.28
k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject,
to be expressed in its title.
HELD
28
This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 1 above. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation would
be.
1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied
but even if they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.
2a. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the
said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. (Sec. 16f)
2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely
in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain.29 This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by virtue of P.D. No. 27.
It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof
of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation.
Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance
payment for the land.
2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these
two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. 30
2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is not
correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for,
like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
29
The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. It is the power “to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner.” It is inherent because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not sanctioned by any law or
even the Constitution, the State may exercise it. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other two are police power and taxation.
30
Frankly, I don’t like the way this ponente argues. He’s like saying, now I don’t want to explain why. If you can’t see the reasoning it’s your fault. Anyway,
we’re infallible remember?  His next sentence: There is no need to elaborate on this matter. Tsk…
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the Congress she is against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 compensation to their respective owners.
whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of recognized.
said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
agrarian reform. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular pronouncement as to costs.
reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)
reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate
appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR
legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as PARAS; December 4, 1990
it were, both houses of Congress.
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification FACTS
have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same Reform
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on - 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be includes the raising of livestock, swine and poultry
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the 1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here Production and Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32)
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. - 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations implementing S11 (commercial farms)
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The limitation is found in the -Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just 6657
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of -petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is also prayed that a preliminary
this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction denied)
and (2) just compensation.31 8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive relief
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the -Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA 6657:
Constitution and under P.D. 316 which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. 27.  S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of “Agricultural Enterprise/Activity”
2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Sec. 6 of the law, which in fact is one of  S11: defines “commercial farms” as “agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
its most controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. 3 hec may be awarded poultry and swine raising
to each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly managing the land)  S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3% of gross sales & 10% of gross profits
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will to workers as additional compensation)
 S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine compensation to be paid for lands
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other.
covered by RA 6657
Decision  S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: -the constitutional provision under consideration is A13, S4, “Agrarian and Natural Resources
Reform”
31
There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why the State did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the Constitution’s “the
just distribution of all agricultural lands” clause. Then he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first.
which grants farmers and farm-workers who are landless, the right to directly or collectively
own the land they are tilling
-livestock and poultry raising is different from crop farming in that land is not a primary input in
the former
ISSUE
WON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and
Guidelines
HELD
Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said
law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its
Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent
Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional construction; in construing any ambiguous
provisions, the courts may look to the debates of the concon
-the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the meaning of the word “agricultural” (its
dictionary meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock and poultry industries in its
coverage;
there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in agrarian reform
-S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is thus violative of due process
SEPARATE OPINION
SARMIENTO
-agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue is one of consti construction and
interpretation
A13, S4: “..in case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof…”—this
phrase provides a possible coverage of livestock, poultry and swine
-every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute
ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection clause of the consti
-clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms are not similarly situated, hence the
inclusion of the former in CARP would be violative of the equal protection clause
GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CRUZ; December 2, 1991
FACTS
Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that:
- It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices
- He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives
them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own
land with the complicity of their own government
- Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or
invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval
o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single
proprietorship
o “The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on the
extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in the Act”
- Under Section 7, “non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of
domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by
existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 hereof."
- However, the system of negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive aspect of
regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so long
as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list, such investments are not
detrimental to but are good for the national economy.
o List A – merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippine nationals
by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws
o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law
and includes small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export
enterprises which utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in
equity capital of less than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for
Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to go big.
o List C - contain areas of investment m which "existing enterprises already serve
adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further
foreign investments."; However, existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino, if
not, it shall protect foreign enterprises too
- Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine national believes that an area of
investment should be included in list C, the burden is on him to show that the criteria
enumerated in said section are met
- Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA
7042.
- By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, RA No.
7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important
requirements for doing business in the Philippines.
- The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign
investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment
Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino
enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country.
Sol-Gen answers:
- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone
o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine national could,
without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1) any
enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises
not registered under Book I, to the extent that the total investment of the non-
Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital
o On the other hand, under Article 47 thereof, if an investment by a
non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the
total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof
exceeded 40%, prior authority from the BOI was required.
- With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15, the areas of investments
not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined; hence, registration with the
SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the initial step to be taken by foreign investors.
- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments.
Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first comply with certain
requirements before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines.
- Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market
enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by
law to protect Filipino ownership and interest.
- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas
of investments. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where
existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer.
o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their
rights and interests over the national economy.
o List A – The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws regulate or limit the
extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity reserved for
Filipinos
o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant to law already makes it clear that it
is regulatory. It channels efforts at promoting foreign investments to bigger enterprises
where there is an acute lack of Filipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to
supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises.
o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities which do not adequately meet-the
needs of the consumers should not be included in list C; if not, consumers would be at
the mercy of unscrupulous producers
o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042
necessarily come within the protection of the law.
- Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of
investment for inclusion in List C
o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will
have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves the
economy and the consumers."
o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy
the criteria inclusion in List C.
- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus Investment Code
o purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment open to
foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and
recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9
of the Act
- Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List
o it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section
5", and the “SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if
the existing joint venture enterprises, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can
reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic
market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant.
Senator Paterno as Intervenor:
- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the
provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos
- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with
the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution
of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.
ISSUES
1. WON there is actual controversy
2. WON petitioners have legal standing
3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case
4. WON this entails a political question
HELD
1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly because of the absence of
the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect
a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory
2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and particularly as a member of the House of
Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained
or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact, as just remarked,
prematurely.
- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there is an indubitable
ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it.
a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments
c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law
has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally enacted.
- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner
d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner has mentioned
4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter
on which we are not competent to rule.
a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."
b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of the political departments
simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.
c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Decision Petition dismissed.
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
LAUREL; December 2, 1940
FACTS
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with modification the
recommendation that originated from the National Traffic Commission (NTC), which was
favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue
be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from 7
a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
enforcement, all animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.
- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director of PW, Acting
Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of Police of Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion.
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being of all the people.
HELD
1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action depend.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southard – it was held here that discretion
may be delegated to executive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain
acts, final on questions of fact.
2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that “….the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads…”, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
3. practicality
The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the subjects of govt’l
regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the law give rise to the adoption,
within certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of
the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations.
2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and - Considering transcendental public interest and the Court’s duty to check on limits of other
with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the branches of gov’t, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the
public. (police power of the State) petition.
Reasoning Substantive Issues:
1. precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar) 1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But prohibition does not mean that gov’t
2. Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its can’t regulate it in exercise of police power. Police power is “state authority to enact
preservation legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare.” PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to gov’t, but to society as well.
3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the greatest
2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes, its
number.
power to tax must always yield to a legislative act. Municipal corporations are mere creatures
of Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
grant a municipal corporation the power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take
PARAS; May 14, 1991
back the power. Also, Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. The power is now vested exclusively on national government.
FACTS
Local governments, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities of national government, such
- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was granted franchise under PD 1067-B
as PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes.
to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a potential
The power of local gov’t to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limits w/c Congress
source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD
may provide. It can’t be violative, but consistent with principle of local autonomy.
1869 was passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all
Local autonomy doesn’t make local gov’t sovereign w/in state; it simply means
games of chance, giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
decentralization. The local gov’t has been described as a political subdivision of state
PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of gov’t revenue, next to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign
sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects and at that time employed 4,494 employees
subdivision of a sovereign nation, it can’t be an imperium in imperio.
in its 9 casinos.
3. Equal protection doesn’t preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded diff.
Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 treatment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact that some gambling
activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races, cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are
ISSUES
prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869 unconstitutional.
Procedural Issue
Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. But as of now,
WON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek the annulment
every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there
of PD 1869
must be a showing of clear and unequivocal breach of Constitution.
Substantive Issue/s
4. If PD 1869 runs counter to gov’t policies, it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its
WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds:
repeal or amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues.
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license
fees
OPOSA V FACTORAN
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of
DAVIDE; July 30, 1993
gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away from monopolistic and crony economy
FACTS

HELD
Procedural Issue:
- The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
- In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the Philippine
Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new
secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint was instituted to be a taxpayer’s class suit as it alleges
that all citizen’s of the Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of the country’s
virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also alleges that this suit represents people who are
sharing the same sentiment towards the preservation of our natural resources (since not all of
them could go before the court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representative of
the current generation and generation that are yet to be born.
- The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on its behalf to, 1. Cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and 2. to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, and renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
- The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the country, the country’s islands, its
natural resources, and scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the country to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses). They asserted that
deforestation resulted in, a. water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion and loss of soil
fertility d. extinction of some of the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of
indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g. drought h. increasing velocity of
typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlands j. siltation and shortening of the life span of dams k.
reduction of earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide.
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action, of being political
question, and of causing the impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for certiorari hence
this case. They contend that there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code (the right to a sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls
for the creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to
safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that
recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the concept
of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation in natural law.
ISSUES
1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit?
2. WON minors can assert that they represent other generations and those succeeding
theirs?
3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction by declaring the petitioners to have no legal right?
4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the non-impairment clause found in the
Constitution?
HELD
1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest to all citizens of the Philippines and that it would be impracticable to bring them all to
court. The plaintiffs in this case are numerous and representative enough to ensure that all
interests is protected.
2. Yes they can, following the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful environment.
3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
because it failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners which is the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology that is incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under Section 16 Article II.
- Moreover, this rights need not be written in the Constitution for this deals with rights that are
assumed from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why it was written was because
the framers feared that without a mandate as stated in the state policies future generations
would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced
healthful ecology and the right to health. Given that it could also be said that this right is
further supported by Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 making
the cause of action existent.
4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because licenses are not contracts,
properties or a property right that is protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
As the court held in Tan v. Director of Forestry, a license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief
Executive may validly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when national interests so
require.
Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in the case still does not affect it given
that no law or action by the Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses so
it is could not as of the moment be invoked. And furthermore, if there would be a law passed it
would not be considered as a violation of the non-impairment clause as the very nature of the
law deals with the exercising of the police power of the state to advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to the police power of
the state.
Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
DECS V SAN DIEGO
CRUZ; December 21, 1989
FACTS
- decided en banc, unanimous decision
- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BS Zoology graduate from UE. He has taken
the NMAT four times and flunked it as many times. His application to take a fifth examination
was denied by petitioner DECS on the basis of the “three-flunk rule” under MECS Order #12,
Series of 1972.
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela RTC, invoking his constitutional
rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended complaint, he raised the
additional grounds of due process and equal protection and also challenged the
constitutionality of the aforementioned order.
- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he was allowed to take a fifth attempt at
NMAT. This attempt he also failed.
- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition and declared the challenged order
invalid. It held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE
WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to
take it again.
Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police power of the State
HELD
Ratio Measures, such as admission exams and the three flunk rule, designed to gauge the
academic preparation of an applicant fall within the valid exercise of the police
power of the State.
Reasoning
1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of
the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who
have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.
- analogy: Tablarin case & case at bar – issue is academic preparation of the applicant.
Admission test and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the regulation of the
medical profession. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches is a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine also includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
2. The police power of the State is validly exercised if
- (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State <lawful subject>; &
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished, not unduly oppressive upon individuals <lawful method>
- The case at bar complies with this requisites...
<subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.
<method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
3. The right to quality education is NOT absolute. The Constitution also provides that
"every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
- It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
4. What the equal protection clause requires is equality among equals. A law does not have
to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution.
- A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the
very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more
vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so
need not be similarly treated.
- There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance.
Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. The Court suggests the notion of appropriate calling. It is
time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education
by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests
and evaluations.
Decision Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela RTC reversed. Costs against private
respondent San Diego.
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
MALCOLM; February 23, 1909

FACTS
- An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands which
affirmed a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet, dismissing an
application for the registration of certain land.
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the registration of a certain land in the
Province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, in 1899, the
applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it
and maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and
had used parts for pasturing cattle. He had received the land from his father in accordance
with Igorot customs and had used it for pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of
the land by the Igorots. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish crown
and although I, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the
royal decrees then in force, nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition, alleging
ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process
establishing only a possessory title.
- Applicant claims that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the
Philippine Commission’s Act No,496 of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with
jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and authorized in general terms
applications to be made by persons claiming to own the land.
- The government claims that Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as
it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the
crown and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited
time to make the title good; that the applicant’s land was not registered, and therefore became
public land; that he United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and that the he has no rights
that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
ISSUE
WON the applicant owns the land
HELD
- Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired by the United
States are to be administered for the benefits of the inhabitants of the Philippines. Thus,
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under
a claim of private ownership, it shall be presumed to have been held in the same way before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
- Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he does not own the land. Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitant of the Philippines into trespassers or even into
tenants at will. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers
of Spain.
- Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 – Where such possessor shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as valid title by
prescription. As prescription, even against the Crown, was recognized by the laws of Spain,
the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard
to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 – For private ownership, there must have been a grant by
competent authority. For all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain times
shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, 20 years; for uncultivated, 30 years. When this
decree went into effect, the applicant’s father was owner of the land by the very terms of the
decree. This being the case and the fact that his possession was not unlawful (no attempt at
any such proceedings against him or his father was ever made), the regulation for the
registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him. Moreover, the decree
was not calculated to the mind of an Igorot Chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
Disposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted
what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what by practice and belief of those among
whom he live, was his property.
RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
FACTS
- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain
there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the
resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is
approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of
the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the
provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they
are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
- The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of
Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr..
The law’s primary objective is the advancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of
Mindoro. In one of the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the
opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes
to live on. Pursuant to the Governor’s powers under section 2077 of the Administrative Code,
800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable
Secretary of the Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall
refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of
the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.
ISSUES
1. WON the Mangyan’s were deprived of due process when their liberty to choose their homes
were limited by the law.
2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandating the forcible
transfer of the Mangyanes.
HELD
1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the
United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of
"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of
law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where
much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and
blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in
furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and
justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.)
"Due process of law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law
shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens
of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances it varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs.
Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does
not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same
rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
law?
- But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty
is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way?
- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent
state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true
and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in
the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with
humanity and with national conscience.
- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their
ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the
right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and
destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. To allow them to successfully invoke
that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue
the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a
permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt,
may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law, has not
been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot
fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual
exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
- As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case of doubt, would
lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should
assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in
full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every
really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on
that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line
of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law
and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARSON
- The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the
standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its
removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is
used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life
within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which
control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life,
furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to
expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the
members of the tribe.
- So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a
particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a group must be found
to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced within
the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally
and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence
to a "non-Christian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a
tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-
Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that
maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or
general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in
contact.
- The contention that in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute,
the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as well as the rest of the
fifteen thousand Manguianes by the reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard before
any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a
contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.
MOIR
- I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of justice will not
permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong dissent from the
opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to
analyze the opinion or to go into the questions in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may
be the legal and human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
- The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of
the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are
accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are
Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country.
And when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from
their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he
deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied
the equal protection of the law. The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines." They are to be made to accept the civilization
of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in
culture and must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "brought
under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners charged with any
crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of
any crime having been committed by these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
- It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary
body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its
institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people
have, through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control
exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any
arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
- As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or
which singles out any particular individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating
legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and
especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further
discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.) When we
consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which
they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to
conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true,
that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of
final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political,
no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the
pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims
of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in
securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in
the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth 'may
be a government of law and not of men.' For the very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)
- It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine
Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its
constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law tends to
deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion
the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Administrative
Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in
all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to
take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow
confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death.
- From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less
magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a
wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more
fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields-than it
would be to order their decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are
"non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If
the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a
reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who
have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
- There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-
nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department have the power under
this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes and
put them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
the courts will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would
hold their liberty, and their lives, may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial
governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once established might not a
provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would
be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial,
he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within
reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
- There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in
exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their
native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the
Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may
the Moros.
- I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of
1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their
liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the
respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.
PIT-OG V PEOPLE
FERNAN; October 11, 1990
FACTS
- Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
- There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province called the tayan. It was owned by
the tomayan group whose members were descendants of the original owners thereof named
Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants, Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the tomayan
to act in their behalf in selling the 400-sqm residential portion of the tayan, in order that the
tomayan would have something to butcher and eat during a celebration called ato. The sale
was made in consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of Edward Pasiteng, whose
house had been built thereon. It was agreed that the unregistered property would be
registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344.
Besides Cullalad, several members of the tomayan affixed their signatures or thumb marks on
the notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for taxation
purposes and paid taxes thereon.
- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og (aka Mary Pit-og) and her companions
destroyed the fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and took away the sugarcane worth
P1,000 and the banana fruits valued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the matter
to the police. Three days later, the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the
Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc.
- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the tayan belonged to her, her father
Lobchoken being a descendant Jakot. She did not declare the land for taxation purposes
because no one in the tomayan was allowed to declare the land as his own. However, any
member of the tomayan could make improvements on the land and claim them as his own.
Anyone who abandoned the land would be succeeded only by other members. No person
outside the tomayan could succeed to the cultivation of the tayan.
- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when he died, his widow Pidchoy
and their children continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary thereon. The land
was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to
build a house behind the place where Pit-og and her family used to have a house because
Edward was Erkey's uncle being the brother of her father. Erkey planted the bananas and
avocado trees in the area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented her from
cutting the sugarcane and the other plants.
The municipal trial court discredited Pit-og's story emphasizing that her claim of continuous
occupation and possession of the land was baseless as she had "no papers to show" or prove
such claim. It found that an the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were present
and accordingly rendered the judgment of conviction.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts with the following
findings and observations:
- Pasiteng’s claim of ownership is documented by a Deed of Conveyance, a public document
which was executed between him and the members of the tomayan group. The validity of this
public document has never been questioned by any one of the previous owners belonging to
the tomayan group. Furthermore, the tax declarations in the name of and the realty tax
payments by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of ownership, are, nevertheless, prima
facie evidence of his possession of the land in question. In contrast to these documentary
evidence, petitioner offers nothing better than her bare claim. The personal property taken by
accused-petitioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng, and she gained from the taking
thereof without the consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime of theft.
ISSUES
1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and the bananas.
2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature.
HELD
1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she took the sugarcane and
bananas believing them to be her own.
- Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary evidence to prove ownership over the
sugarcane and bananas. A careful study of these documents, in conjunction with the
testimonial evidence extant in the record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of
doubt upon Pit-og’s culpability. The deed of sale describes the property as containing an area
of 400 sqm, while the tax declarations show that the property contains an area of 512 sqm.
The testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas cultivated
by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each other that the possibility of
confusion as to who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before the filing of this case,
Pit-og had sued Pasiteng's son, Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had planted in
the area. The fact that Edward had built a fence around the area he claimed as his does not
necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square meters he had purchased from the
tomayan. After all, he had declared as his own for taxation purposes 112 square meters more
than the area he bought.
- There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter area claimed by Edward but there
are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this case. Proof on the matter,
however, is important for it means the Identification of the rightful owner of the stolen
properties. It should be emphasized that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and
indispensable to clearly Identify the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his
knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.
2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard to claims of ownership over the tayan
should be threshed out in an appropriate civil action.
- Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re Indigenous Community
- We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claim of ownership founded on customs
and tradition and another such claim supported by written evidence but nonetheless based on
the same customs and tradition. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it can never be
too careful More so in this case, where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be
expected to resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to lose her liberty on account of an
oversight in the court's appreciation of the evidence.
Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she
committed the crime of theft. No costs.
KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO
MENDOZA; November 16, 1995
FACTS
- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case
Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in
operating an on-line lottery, and these questions can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed their votes did not act according to law
and that the two new appointees regardless of the merits of the case must of necessity align
themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute
the new majority in the second lotto case.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of
the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that
the first decision in the first case was later reversed.
- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split decision) which was overturned in
People v. Yang.
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17)
invoked by the petitioners may be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which
are inconsistent with them
2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional grounds, given that the
Constitution guarantees to people’s organizations “effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political and economic decision making (Art XIII Sec 16).
3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended)
cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-
line lottery.
HELD
1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer
rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or
executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO
may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is
not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit ." (Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries.
It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case,
therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners,
not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
- Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not give it the requisite personality to
question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall
respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be
abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)
- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or
those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the
political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
- Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case does not
involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit
because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are
members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended) cannot enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in
operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE
LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT
FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY
STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF LEASE
DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE.
Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were
considered to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new
contract.
VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR
CORTES; February 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm reports that certain members of the
Batasang Pambansa, including some members of the opposition, were granted “clean” loans
from the GSIS before the February 1986 elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed a special civil
action for mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his
capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to:
1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS immediately prior to the
February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos.
2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing said loans.
3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the subject information.
 desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of
ISSUES mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain right to the thing
Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies? demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required.
Substantive:
CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under “matters of public concern”?
PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998
2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS and its borrowers?
3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to its insurance function, private
FACTS
in nature?
- These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin
respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing
HELD
any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and
Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved. The issue raised by
abroad – including the so-called Marcos gold hoard”; and (2) to “compel respondents to make
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, can be passed upon by the court more competently than GSIS or its Board of
public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents
related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
Trustees.
heirs.”
Substantive:
- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general, brought this action in response to
1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
news reports in September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported
2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and not to public
execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs,
and governmental agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities, as
on how to split or share these assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a
a corporation has no right to privacy in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an
temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
representatives from “entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the
ground for relief. However, even the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten
chose to invoke this right. Public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions
wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed
in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
before the Court a motion for intervention. They aver that they are “among the 10,000
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.
claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate is recognized
3. No. The “constituent-ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long
by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos”.
been repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running
some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. That the GSIS was
ISSUES
exercising a proprietary function in granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Transactions entered
Procedural:
1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and
into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation, are
2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.
within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
Substantive:
1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
 Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject to reasonable regulations. The
petition is held to be meritorious as to the 2 nd and 3rd alternative acts sought by agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
petitioners. 2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the
 The same cannot be said, however, of the 1st act sought. Although citizens are entitled to Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
“access to official records”, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their HELD
Procedural:
1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution
of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of
the action.
2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus. The argument of respondent that petitioner should have properly sought relief
before the Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of the compromise agreements was pending
resolution seems to have merit, if petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public
the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the
public disclosure of “all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected,
and documents related or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG
and the Marcos heirs”. In other words, the petition is not merely confined to the
Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future
undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to
the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on “public
transactions”.
Substantive:
1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. “Ill-gotten wealth”, by its very nature,
assumes a public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from
the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that “transactions” contemplates
inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a transaction, it is incumbent upon
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG
and the Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws.
i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general
sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the
present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of
EO No. 14 as amended by EO No. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the
requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses,
who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before
the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information
or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of
taxes the property to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts the law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on
their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under
the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will
constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall be
uniform and equitable”.
iii) The government binds itself under the General Agreement to cause the dismissal of all
cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a
direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well
settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction,
the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge.
Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the
justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG
cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the
courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, “whether past, present, or
future, matured or inchoate,” against the Marcoses. This all-encompassing stipulation is
contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. This is a
palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It
effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.
v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the
parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses
submit an inventory of their total assets.
vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets
shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the
Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the
$356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement
pertains only to the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the
other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for
the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos’ approval of the principal Agreement, an
express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable.
Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999
FACTS
Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before
the court a motion for leave to intervene and a motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that
they were parties and signatories to the General and Supplemental Agreements which this
Court declared “NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Consitution.” They claim to
“have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an
interest against both as to warrant their intervention.” They add that their exclusion from the
instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal
protection. They also the raise the “principle of hierarchical administration of justice” to impugn
the Court’s cognizance of petitioner’s direct action before it.
ISSUES
Procedural:
WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be allowed.
Substantive:
1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings regarding the Agreements to
which they were parties and signatories was a denial of “their property right to contract without
due process of law”;
2. WON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical administration of justice by ruling upon
the validity of the Agreements;
3. WON the issue of right to information raised by petitioner was rendered moot and academic
by the submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements to
the Sandiganbayan;
4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by partial implementation; and
5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual case and a justiciable question.
HELD
Procedural:
No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be
filed before rendition of judgment. Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already
terminated by final judgment.
Substantive:
1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to
protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Moreover, the movants are merely incidental, not
indispensable, parties to the instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to
enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been
acting within the bounds of its authority.
2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual
questions, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts . Inasmuch as the petition at bar
involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved
to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.
3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded terms contained in the
Agreements, but likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and
agreements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered moot and academic simply by the
public disclosure of the subject Agreements.
4. No. The PCGG’s grant to the claimants’ mother of access rights to one of their sequestered
properties cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they are not subject to
ratification.
5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a
citizen to enforce a public right. There is no political question involved. The power and
authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue. But, clearly, by violating the
Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused its discretion.
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V ZAMORA
BUENA; October 10, 2000
FACTS
- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces
Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)
- March 14, 1947 – The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, formalizing,
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel.
- August 30, 1951 – The Philippines and USA entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye… but Mutual Defense Treaty still in effect.)
- February 10, 1998 – President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of
conferences and negotiations.
- October 5, 1998 – President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.
- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VFA.
(Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers,
Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmeña, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla,
Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmeña III, Pimentel,
Legarda-Leviste. Total=5)
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating circumstances and conditions under
which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is
an agreement which defines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines . It
also defines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA.
2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the
members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and
when Congress requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State)
3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty.
a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses
committed by the US Military personnel.
b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua or higher.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in
ratifying/concurring with the VFA?
5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition
against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no public funds
raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus
standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the
institution to which they belong. HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of
paramount importance and of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL
importance, so the Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the
petitions.
2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically
deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The ‘or’ is important to
take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can just be an
agreement covering only troops – not bases—like the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII
makes no distinction whether the troops or facilities will be “transient” or “permanent”, so the
VFA is covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability
with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required
to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of
the Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says “duly concurred in by the Senate” with no
specified number).
- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with?
Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFA as a treaty.
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so required by the
Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum.
-- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP) .
Requirement of ratification in a national referendum unnecessary since Congress has not
required it.
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).-- Complied
with. Ambassador Hubbard’s letter states that the VFA is binding on the US gov’t and
that in international legal terms such agreement is a ‘treaty’.
- A ‘treaty’, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an “international
instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by the international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.”
- In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers.
3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the “xxx Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx” (this doesn’t really
answer the issue above, but the ponente didn’t really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an
abdication of sovereignty.. oh well… here goes…)
- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound
by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to
be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. We cannot
readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations,
duties and responsibilities under international law.
- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law
Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations.
Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in
ratifying/concurring with the VFA? No.
- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despostic
manner.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or
International agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of the members of
Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of
the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted
by the Constitution.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate
alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an
abuse of power.
Decision Petitions Dismissed
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [dissent]
- Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (see
requirements above).
- POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do not apply as the VFA contemplates a
temporary visit of the troops, while the provision applies to a permanent presence of foreign
troops.
The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand. Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense
Treaty between RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the duration of the visits. VFA
does not provide for a specific and limited period of effectivity.
- POINT 2: The requirement that it be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state” is
crystal clear and was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the anomalous asymmetry
of the 1947 Military bases agreement where we recognized it as a treaty but the US treated it
as an executive agreement.
- The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in the US. The Court will be standing
on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same
constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still questions on the constitutional basis and
legal effects of sole executive agreements under the US law.
- “With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole executive
agreements under the US constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for the sovereignty
of our country by drawing a bright line between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast
with a sole executive agreement. However we may wish it, The VFA as a sole executive
agreement cannot climb to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach.
Consequently, it falls short of the requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Phil soil must be
‘recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state’. I vote to grant the petitions.”
KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR.
DAVIDE; May 5, 1994
FACTS
Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary
injunction, to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" between PCSO and
PGMC in connection with on-line lottery system a.k.a. "lotto".
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO decided to establish an online
lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources
of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that PCSO was interested in
operating an on-line lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company in
Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO and organized
with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation known as the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC).
2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the
Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery system for PCSO. Considering the citizenship
requirement in the RFP ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least 60% of its
shares owned by Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to
reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
stockholdings to local investors.
3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the
Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and
its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President. (This was
preceded by complaints from the Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given PGMC the go-
signal to operate the countr's on-line lottery system. Announcement was published in
Manila Times, PDI, and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.
5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos strongly opposing
the setting up of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical
considerations. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to “lotto” at the meeting
of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993
6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that despite the opposition, Malacanang will push
through with operation of lotto, that it is actually PCSO which will operate the lottery while
winning corporate bidders merely lessors.
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery
award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who informed KILOSBAYAN that
the documents will be transmitted before the end of the month. However on the same
date, an agreement denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by PCSO
and PGMC.
8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop
Malacañang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February
1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
PETITIONERS' CLAIM
- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the
PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line
lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or
domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent
PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to
establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the
territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to
construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as
amended.
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be
granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to
about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully
enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them
— are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign
Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed.
- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to
establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications systems.
RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a
piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the
lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association
or joint venture' with PGM.
- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the
Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to
the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and
that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject
contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona,
and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of the
phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow,
strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity,
is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or
contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the
PCSO charter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership
where there is "community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and losses, and a
mutual right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." They
further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the
Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate
a public utility
- They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that
the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that
the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond
the ambit of judicial review."
Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES
Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi.
Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of RA 1169 as amended
by BP Blg. 42, which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
association, or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether
domestic or foreign."
HELD
1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in
their favor. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'
- The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public.
The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of
2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the
least will be conducting lotteries “ in collaboration or association” and in the most “in joint
vernture” with PGMC. The manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are indespensible to
the operation of the on-line lottery system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot
share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither
can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise.
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights,
privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee ....
[o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must
prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot
enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not
unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication."
- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the
contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the
contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the
instrument.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the
contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in
reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a
piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in the
least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties.
(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. Association
means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for some special purpose or
business. Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks .
) MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither
funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that
although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the
government." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and
assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a
suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate
and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion
expenses and risks."
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concurring]
- PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law no matter how the assistance is
called or the contract denominated.
PADILLA [concurring]
- Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint venture because each part
contributes its share in the enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities, technology and
expertise, while PCSO contributes the market through the dealers and in the totality the mass
of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC will get its 4.9% of gross receipts; the residue of the
whole exercise will go to PCSO, this is a joint venture plain and simple.
MELO [dissenting]
- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a statute nor an attempt to restrain
expenditure of public funds. The contract involves strictly corporate money.
- By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not cure the lack of locus standi on the
part of the petitioners. The contract does not involve an illegal disbursement of public funds.
No public fund raised by taxation is involved.
PUNO [dissenting]
- Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to
open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.
- It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been jettisoned by the Constitution for
it still commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only “actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”/
- Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of
the case, and perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination
of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO
FACTS
- As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232
SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the
ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into
negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO]
charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
- On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called
ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in
consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the
PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental
computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be computed
and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual
minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the
proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169,
§ (B) )
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation
of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3)
- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is
responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of
their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the
option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million.
- A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its
manifestation in the prior case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the
ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified in the first case. Petitioners seek
the declaration of the amended ELA as null and void.
- The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they question the petitioners'
standing to bring suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in its petition as
"composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed
to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their
individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other
petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are
members of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens."
- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being
parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and
substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the
other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge
the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case". and
therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the
Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the employment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy. (§5)]
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (§12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nacionalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
The state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development. (§17)
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)
ISSUES
1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?
2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the “law of the case”, thus
precluding respondents from assailing the legal standing of petitioners?
3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies be readily invoked
by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., self-executing)?
HELD
Ratio
1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in that case is
concerned. Parties may be the same but cases are not.
2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-executing.
General Reasoning
- Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case", nor that of conclusive of
judgment poses a barrier to a determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit.
- Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in decisional law
does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous
ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled
rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standing to a party who, in questioning
the validity of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer,
citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716,
Sept . 22, 1987) Only recently this Court held that members of Congress have standing to
question the validity of presidential veto on the ground that, if it true, the illegality of the veto
would impair their prerogative as members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not
grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress, legislators do not have stnding the
question the validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution Association v
Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994))
- There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling on standing. The voting on
petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members
sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The
majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent
litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the members of the Court, with the
retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and
Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling
as to petitioners' standing.
Specific Reasoning
1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA
is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare
invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into
by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375)
that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the
parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.
- Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is,
strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY
INVOLVED. 32 The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest"
within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest."
- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they are the real party in interest.
They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the PCSO would directly injure
or affect their rights.
2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of
"law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this
case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when
a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
- The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, ,merely expresses
the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res
judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first
judgment is generally, if not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is
confined in its questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in
the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 (1979) )
- It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in
G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case."
The parties are the same but the cases are not.
- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of
"conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed
upon the and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future
action between the same parties involving a different of action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil.
303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960))
- It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or
collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims
are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222 (1979);
BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v.
32
COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now becomes clearer: The concept of legal standing is a constitutional law
concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases where no constitutional
issues are raised the governing principle should be the concept of “real party in interest” in the Rules of Court.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife
interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his wife for
the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income, this
determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his
wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax
purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other
contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the
second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the
controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L.
Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though
they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which
occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or
transaction identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first
proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard which can give rise to
a cause of action in the courts.
- They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of
contract law. More specifically, the question is whether petitioners have legal right which has
been violated.
SEPARATE OPINION
FELICIANO [dissent]
- I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority opinion written by my distinguished
brother in the Court, Mendoza, J.
- I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my esteemed brothers Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ. In respect of the matter of locus standi, I would also reiterate the concurring
opinion I wrote on that subject in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors which, to my mind,
pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case,
still exist and demand, with equal weight and insistence, such recognition in the present or
second Kilosbayan case, I fear that the Court may well have occasion in the future profoundly
to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today clamped on our own limbs.
PADILLA [concur]
- I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case. It is the duty of the
Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and approved by the President,
(unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Member's
personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law.
- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case (G.R. No. 113375), expressed the
view that the rule on locus standi, being merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as the
issue then was of paramount national interest and importance, namely, the legality of a lease
contract into by PCSO with PGMC whereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery,
undeniably a form of gambling, the terms of which clearly pointed to an "association,
collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC.
REGALADO [dissent]
- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now evolved other adjective theories which
are represented to be either different from or ramifications of the original "standing to sue"
objection raised in the first lotto case. I will hazard my own humble observations thereon.
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the "law of the case" doctrine in the
original majority ponencia. It is contended that this doctrine requires, for its applicability, an
issue involved in a case originating from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate
court, that case being then remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with the
prior resolution by the higher court of that issue being the "law of the case" in any other
proceeding in or a subsequent appeal from the same case. It is insinuated that said doctrine
exists only under such a scenario.
- It may be conceded that, in the context of the cited cases wherein this doctrine was applied,
two "appeals" are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first appeal cannot be
reexamined in the second appeal. If so, then what is necessarily challenged in the first
recourse to the higher court is either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on an
original action for certiorari or an appealable adjudication which nonetheless did not dispose
of the entire case below because it was either a special proceeding or an action admitting of
multiple appeals.
- That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines which, unfortunately, does not
appear to have been taken into account when the double-appeal procedure involved in one
particular American concept was cited as authority in the majority opinion. No attempt was
made to ascertain whether in the American cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or
even substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of review by a higher court on either
an appeal by certiorari or writ of error, or through an original action of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. Yet on such unverified premises, and without a showing that the situations are in
pari materia, we are told that since the case at bar does not posses the formatted sequence of
an initiatory action in a lower court, an appeal to a higher court, a remand to the lower court,
and then a second appeal to the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply. I
have perforce to reject that submission as I cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused
by this majority view.
- I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the factual and procedural situations
where such doctrine may apply, through its undue insistence on the remedial procedure
involved in the proceedings rather than the juridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher
court. Even in American law, the "law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to
express the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5 and,
thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final
determination of the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic role that it was
conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of res
judicata and conclusiveness of judgment.
- Accordingly, the "law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on
a writ of certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the same
case, but also in a subsequent suit between the same parties. 8 What I wish to underscore is
that where, as in the instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was
handed down in an original action for certiorari, it has the same binding effect as it would have
had if promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in our jurisdiction an original
action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be
commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that for its ruling therein to
constitute the law of the case, there must first be a remand to a lower court which naturally
could not be the court of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be taken.
2. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the locus standi bar to petitioner's suit is not
an ironclad guaranty against it, the majority position has taken a different tack. It now invoked
the concept of and the rules on a right of action in ordinary civil actions and, prescinding from
its previous positions, insists that what is supposedly determinative of the issue of
representation is contract law and not constitutional law. On the predicate that petitioners are
not parties to the contract, primarily or subsidiarily, they then are real parties in interest, and
for lack of cause of action on their part they have no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot
maintain the present petition.
As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the syllogism of the majority can claim the
merit of logic but, even so, only on assumed premises. More importantly, however, the
blemish in its new blueprint is that the defense of lack of a right of action is effectively the
same as lack of locus standi, that is, the absence of the remedial right to sue. As the
commentators of Castille would say, the objection under the new terminology is "lo mismo
perro con distinto collar." That re-christened ground, as we shall later see, has already been
foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto case.
It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its
purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest
based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to perceive, but
nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases
should not be straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.
Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there is the caveat that "the adoption of
provision requiring that an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest does
not solve all questions as to the proper person or persons to institute suit, although it
obviously simplifies procedures in actions at law. . . There is no clearly defined rule by which
one may determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has there been found any
concise definition of the term. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of
each separate case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole real party in
interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author but unfortunately fails to put the
proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I believe should be that which should correctly
be stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce:
It is important to note. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underspinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the
real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require
a partial consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have its way in
this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or excesses in
government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue. This legal
dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a suggestions submitted in the majority
opinion, to wit:
Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived
illegality in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of
public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised
in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In
addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be
thought that a government corporation . . . has offended against its corporate charter or
misused its franchise. . .
- The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners
are not the real parties, hence they cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or
suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with
those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now
sustain the assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the
Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to
bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex relatione, not only because one has
to contend with that official's own views or personal interests but because he is himself the
counsel for respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only
the legalities in the case but also the realities of life.
3. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and replacement of two members of the
Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous judgment of the Court
may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible basis is the change of membership and
known positions of the new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not
sit well with the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to the situation where a
judgment promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which
motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for the resolution thereof,
stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind
criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not
unknown to this Court.
- I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this action -
whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of action - has
already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case, G.R. No. 113375. If the
majority refuses to recognize such right under the "law of the case" principle, I see no reason
why that particular issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res
judicata. 11
It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. there is identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the merits, and has long become final and
executory. There is, to be sure, an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first action is
different from that in the instant case, since the former was the original contract and the latter
is the supposed expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered distinction.
The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract, which nevertheless
continues to operate under the same basis, with on the property, fore the same purpose, and
the same contracting parties does not suffice to extinguish the identity of the subject matter in
both cases,. This would be to exalt form over substance. Furthermore, respondents
themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same as the original one, with just
some variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The
contrary assumption now being floated by respondents would create chaos in our remedial
and contractual laws, open the door to fraud, and subvert the rules on the finality of
judgments.
- Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in the expanded lease
agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the
Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively resulting in a disparate actionable
wrong or delict, that would merely constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the
former and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, we would
still have a situation of collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness
of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be
conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that definitely includes at the
very least the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue
respondents on the contracts concerned.
In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I insist, or of conclusiveness of judgment,
which I assume arguendo - what is now being primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to
sue, aside from the postulated invalidity of the contract for the government-sponsored lottery
system. It does seem odd, if not arcane, that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos
standi or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that matter, were likewise so
recognized in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now mysteriously
divested of the "place of standing" allegedly due to, for legal purposes, a compelling need for
reexamination of the doctrine, and, for economic reasons, an obsession for autarky of the
nation.
4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on
substantive considerations, not on dubious technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into
the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the benefit of
a duly clarified and translucent transaction, just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and
should even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any suspicions or lingering doubts
arising from the fact that the sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different.
- On the merits, to obviate unnecessary replication I reiterate my concurrence with the findings
and conclusions of Mr. Justice Davide in this dissenting opinion, the presentation whereof is
completely devoid of strained or speculative premises, and moreover has the virtue of being
based on his first-hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provisions of the law now in
dispute. In this instance and absent any other operative data. I find the same to be an amply
sufficient and highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract.
- One concluding point. I am not impressed by their stance of the majority that our taking
cognizance of this case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite others to unduly
overburden this Court with avoidable importunities. This sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since
the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-made
constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice and paramount public
interest.
On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the beguiling locos standi or right of action
doctrines posited by the majority in this case would only not be an abdication of a clear judicial
duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious
government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for
such stultification. This is a contingency which is not only possible, but probable under our
oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant within a just regime of law
still in posse.
DAVIDE [dissent]
- I register a dissenting vote.
- I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona,
et al. 1 referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the
exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as
amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the
contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and
stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers
and litigants, in the certainly and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the
floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this
Court's judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to
impse sanctions for their opposite conduct.
- It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was unconditionally accepted by the
PCSO and the PGMC, as can be gleaned from their separate manifestations that they would
not ask for its reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a new equipment lease agreement
consistent with the decision and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the Court a
copy of the new agreement. The decision has, thus, become final on 23 May 1994. 2
- As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the exception to paragraph B, Section
1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments
adduced in the majority opinion it justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case. While
there are exceptions to the aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to
upsetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming considerations of justice and
irresistible desire to rectify an error, none of such considerations and nothing of substance or
weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions.
- In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, and in no uncertain terms
declared:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in
many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country
and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system
are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing than of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
- In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed substantive
grounds or considerations of importance which strengthened the legal standing of the
petitioners to bring and maintain the action, namely: (a) the public character of the funds or
other assets involved in the contract of lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of
a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specified interest in raising the questions involved therein; and (d)
the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation.
Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia, 3 this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Camilo D. Quiason who had joined in the dissenting opinions in the first lotto case the
petitioners, locus standi therein, invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first lotto
case. He stated:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations
allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and
to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and
Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 [1989].
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but
to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present
action.
- Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in the first lotto case on the issue
of locus standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in this case, also invoked the locus standi ruling in the
first lotto case to deny legal standing to Tatad, et al. He said:
- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens. In the cases in which citizens
were authorized to sue, this Court found standing because it though the constitutional claims
pressed for decision to be of "transcendental importance," as in fact it subsequently granted
relief to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in
the Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the majority for
upholding petitioner's standing, this Court took into account the "paramount public interest"
involved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people . . . and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line
lottery system." Accordingly, the Court invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery.
- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo,
Reynato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his concurring
opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took part in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco
who was not yet a member of this Court at the time, the rest of the Justice who joined the
concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza had dissented in the lotto case on the said issue.
- Under the principle of either the law of the case of res judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are
bound by the ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the
application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid to rest under the
doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of
the Civil Code which provides: 'Judicial decisions applying interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall from part of the system of the Philippines."
- These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. They are based on public
policy and other considerations of great importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned
in a cavalier fashion. Yet, they are now put to naught in this case.
- The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. There
would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court
to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its members."
7
- It is, however, contended that the law of the case is inapplicable that doctrine applies only
when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court.
While indeed the statement may be correct, it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but a
sequel to and is, therefore, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case.
By their conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO
submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners commenced
the instant petition also in the said case. Our resolution that the validity of the ELA could not
be decided in the said case because the decision therein had became final does not detract
from the fact that this case is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the
raping controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC,
on the other, on the operation of the on-line lottery system.
Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the related doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment of the ground that the question of standing is a question, as this
case involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of locus standi which was
resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every
subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or holding
of lotteries by the PCSO in collaboration, association; or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity. And, the contract in question is not different from or unrelated
to the first nullified contract, for it in nothing but a substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato
was even candid enough to admit that no new and separate public bidding was conducted for
the ELA in question because the PCSO was of the belief that the public bidding for the
nullified contract was sufficient.
Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8 that preclusion or collateral estoppel
does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved, is
misplaced. For one thing, the question of the petitioners' legal standing in the first lotto case
and in this case is one and the same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same
and not substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract between the PCSO
and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system.
The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited regarding the
exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law, 2d Judgments $ 28), the
second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis
may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply
means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which
has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in
other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability in the law and does not require identity or privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly
fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume the
same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become,
to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of
those called upon to aside thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
thereto."10 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons -
which I do not find in this case - otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictabiity which is
expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the
stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.
The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of locus standi and a re-
examination of the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B,
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
effects of judgment expressly provides:
(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter cases the judgment or
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to other matter that could have
been parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceedings, litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same
capacity.
This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular
facts of issues in action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 11
Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as well
as the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments: that
controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent judicial
decisions shall not be made on the same set of facts; and that there be an end to litigation
which, without the said doctrine, would be endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but
recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty as to
individual rights and gives and respect to judicial proceedings. 12 The justifications given in
the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to ultimately discard it are
unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the majority opinion contends, that "[t]he previous
sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact be considered a departure from settled ruling on
real party in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved."
It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in interest was
never put in issue in the previous case. It was the clear understanding of the Members of the
Court that in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced therein, only locus
standi deserved consideration. Accordingly, the majority opinion and the separate dissenting
opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast array of
authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed in the concurring opinion of Justice
Feliciano, both constitutional and legal issues were involved therein. Finally, as shall hereafter
be discussed, in public law the rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of
locus standi.
- Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's contention that the ruling locus standi in the
first lotto case may not be preserved because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners'
standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation, and that
there had been changes in the membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices
Isagani A. Cruz and Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza
and Ricardo J. Francisco. It has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was reiterated in
Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his concurring opinion in the Tatad case, Justice
Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because their case did not have the same
importance as the lotto case, he thereby accepted the concession of standing to the
petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices who had dissented in
the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for the
concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and
strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case.
The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not whether the petitioners
have locus standi but whether they are the real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold
move to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring
strict compliance with the rule on real party in interest in ordinary civil actions, thereby
effectively subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not prepared to be a
party to that proposition.
- The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the restrictive rule on real party in
interest cannot be justified by the claim that is involved here is contract law, not constitutional
law. True, contract law is involved. We are not, however, dealing here with an ordinary
contract between private parties, but a contract between a corporation wholly owned by the
government - hence, an instrumentality of the government - and a private corporation for the
contract of the lotto, which is invested with paramount and transcendental public interest and
other public policy considerations because the lotto has counter - productive and retrogressive
effects which are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise and provokes
issues that immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. We
said so in the first lotto case.
GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990
FACTS
- A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/ Department
of Trade and Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed petrochemical plant from
Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
- P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in Lamao, Libay, Bataan for the
Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management and ownership of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and one of the terms and conditions for
registration was the use of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for its plant,
which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on
Feb. 24, 1988.
- BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other incentives, like, (1) exemption
from taxes on raw materials, (2) eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it
is used as raw materials for the petrochemical plant.
- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in
BPC expressed to DTI Secretary his desire to amend the original registration certification of its
project by changing the job site from Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and
unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned
by Philippine Shell Corporation. Other requested amendments are as follows: (1) increasing
the investment amount from $220 million to $320 million; (2) increasing the production
capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG.
- On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating that, The BOI recognizes and respects
the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis
provide the funding or risk capital for the project.
- In the petition entitled “Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. The Board of Investments”, this
court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records on
the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the
respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers
containing its trade secrets and other business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing
the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application in order that he may present at such
hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site
of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas.
- Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to rule on whether or not the investor
given the initial inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site
may change simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that
the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the hearing
that was set by BOI.
- A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed, asking that the Court resolve
whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-
attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision was not yet final and
executory, and therefore petitioner has not waived his right. Court resolution stated that BOI,
not the investor has final choice on the matter and that even a choice approved by BOI may
not be ‘final’ for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may
dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the project will not fail.
However, petition was denied.
- Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of final choice.
ISSUES
1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to
Batangas
2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or LPG the
approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC)
3. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of
the site and the decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI
to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding
HELD
1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The Court has constitutional duty to step
into this controversy to determine the paramount issue.
2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the use of feedstock is unjustified.
- The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.
- The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in
Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the plant site in Batangas.
- The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned Filipino corporation, can provide the
feedstock requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the country is short of LPG and there is
a need to import for the use of the plant in Batangas. Transfer will divert scarce dollars
unnecessarily.
- R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad valorem tax but excluded LPG from the
exemption. This law was specifically for the petrochemical industry. Neither BOI nor a foreign
investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from
naphtha to LPG.
- Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the
project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha.
- With the plant site in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner, thus giving the government
participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational
corporation.
3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other
circumstances to the contrary not withstanding.
- The government has already granted incentives for this particular venture. Through the BOI
decision, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice
free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in
the best interests of the Filipino people.
- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous
laws (i.e. Art. 2, 1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution (Sec. 1 and 10, Art.
XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
Disposition: Petition granted. Decision set aside as null and void.
SEPARATE OPINION
GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting the amendment of the
investor’s application for registration of its project, neither does the law prohibit the BOI from
approving the amended application.
- The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investor’s project is a political and
economic decision which only the executive branch, as implementer of policy formulated by
the legislature, is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to determine what is, or should
be, the BOI’s “final choice” of plant site and feedstock.
- The petitioner’s recourse against the BOI’s action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36,
1987 Investments Code), not to this Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting]
- [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy determination and has unwittingly
transformed itself into what might be termed a “government by the Judiciary,” something never
intended by the framers of the Constitution when they provided for separation of powers
among the three co-equal branches of government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-
making.
ART VI: LEGISLATURE
TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
MENDOZA; August 25, 1994
FACTS
- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality
of RA 7716.
- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National
Internal Revenue Code.
- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC
relative to VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c
recommended for approval H No 11197.
- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third
and final rdg.
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The
Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution
of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197
- Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and
1 abstention.
- H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4
times, recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees.
- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled
bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May
12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28.
- RA 7716 amended § 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations.
However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation
income of print media. Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT.
- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses.
Implementation was stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
- Petitioners contend:
Re: Art VI Sec 24
 1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was
consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb
“shall originate” is qualified by the word “exclusively”.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senate’s power in revenue bills to compensate for
the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No
1129). Senate merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630.
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)
1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing
budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country.
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197.
Re: BCC acted within its power
1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the
HB or SB and these were “surreptitiously” inserted. BCC met behind closed doors.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses.
3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because
Report didn’t contain “detailed and explicit statement of changes”
4. It is required that the Committee’s report undergo three rdgs in the two houses.
- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends:
Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)
1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL
transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected
in the title.
2. Besides, amendment of PAL’s franchise may be made only by special law which will
expressly amend the franchise (§24 of PD 1590).
- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:
Re: Art III Sec 1
1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric
cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal
protection of law.
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:
2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation.
- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
Re: Art III Sec 4
1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn.
Although exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says there’s possibility that exemption
may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance.
Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross
receipts on advertisements.
2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored
treatment.
3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more
than P750,000 is discriminatory.
4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press.
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
Re: Art III Sec 5
1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested
in Congress and the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of
religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience.
- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:
Re: Art III Sec 10
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of
contracts
- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends:
Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize
education
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House
of Reps)
2. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days)
3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power
4. WON there’s violation of Art VI § 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in
title) / WON amendment of § 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no
mention is made therein
Substantive:
5. WON Art III § 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated
6. WON Art III § 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated
7. WON Art III § 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated
8. WON Art III § 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated
9. WON Art VI § 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated
10. WON Art VI § 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated
11. WON Art II § 17 (gov’t priority on education, science and tech) is violated
HELD
- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt
depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti.
Procedural
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor.
An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing
more than “surreptitiously” inserting provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill.
SC gives due respect to other branches of gov’t.
1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24
a. It’s not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of
Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a
revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senate’s
power to concur with and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative
power of the two houses.
b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an
exercise of check on executive power.
c. There’s no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one
hand and on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter.
Consti simply says that it’s the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The
Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs.
Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr
House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only after
Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee
on Ways and Means.
2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)
a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing
and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the
necessity…” qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days
and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To
construe that the “except” clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules
and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill.
Example is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified
urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the
Court.
c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres
likewise certified H No 9210 then pending.
3. YES the BCC acted within its power
a. “Give and take” often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in
the executive sessions of the BCC.
Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a
difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in
nature of substitute, the only requirement that the 3 rd version be germane to subject of the HB
and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC
is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographer’s limitations or to incoherence that
sometimes characterize conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice
in bill-drafting.
Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek
modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills
introduced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report.
4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the
base by withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to § 103 of NIRC be
mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of
franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress
when common good requires.
Substantive
- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom
of law should be in Congress.
5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated
- When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when
property is imperiled, lawmakers’ judgment prevails.
 a. This is actually a policy argument. Padilla, Separate Opinion
b. This is a mere allegation. Vitug, Separate Opinion
c. This is also short of evidence. Regalado, Dissenting Opinion
Davide, Dissenting Opinion
6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated Romero, Dissenting Opinion
a. There’s no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion
the State. Puno, Dissenting Opinion
b. It’s not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously
granted to it by law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA
that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of goods AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. FACTS
This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales. - The increasing budget problems of the government in the form of fiscal problems, revenue
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is generation, and fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to create a law to address
a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of such problems. This gave way to the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as
privilege or right. Republic Act No. 9337. The case revolves around the constitutionality of the Republic Act
9337 that increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. In this case there
7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated were 4 different petitioners: Abakada Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell
a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./ Estrada, J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/
religious materials by religious org. Osmeña, Congressman Escudero, and Governor Garcia. All of them question the
8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated constitutionality of RA 9337.
a. Parties to a contract can’t fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of - Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):
sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order. > VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange, or
9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in lease of goods or properties and services.
reach of higher income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 > It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller of goods or services may pass on the
are exempted. amount of tax paid to the buyer. VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and end-
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we “evolve” a consumers.
progressive taxation system. - RA 9337’s legislative history is as follows:
10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on the 27 th of January 2005 and House
religious materials by religious org. Bill 3705 that was approved on the 28 th of February 2005 and Senate Bill 1950 that was
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17 approved on the 13th of April 2005. This was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference
a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press. Committee. The Bicameral Conference Committee inserted and deleted some of the original
provisions. The Bill was approved on the 11th of May 2005 by the Senate and 10 th of May 2005
Decision Petitions are dismissed. by the House of Representatives.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, it’s equal to 10% of
gross selling price ISSUES
Procedural
Narvasa, Separate Opinion 1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has strictly complied with the rules of both
Cruz, Separate Opinion houses thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by congress.
2. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated Article VI Sec 26 that states that no
amendment would be done after three readings.
3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause as stated in Art VI Sec 24.
Substantive
4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and Secretary of Finance.
5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation of the Constitutional provision Art VI
Sec 28 (1) that requires taxation to be uniform, equitable and that the Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
HELD
1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on the violation of the senate and house
rules unless there is a showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional provision or of the
rights of private individuals. (favorite ratio Ü)
2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house
of Congress with regard to bills in each of the said respective houses before the bill is
transmitted to the other house for its concurrence and amendment.
3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed amendments after the House Bills
were approved. The Bill still originated through the House of Representatives.
4. No, because the President is just executing the law and is still working within the standard
and policy of the law. The Secretary of Finance is also not given undue delegation as he is
considered as an alter ego of the president thus following the same logic, he is only executing
the law.
5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is directed towards a goal of a
progressive taxation.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the increase of tax rates on domestic,
resident foreign and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the increase of tax credit against
taxes due from nonresident foreign corporations on intercorporate dividends, and 3) the
reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense were not really part of the House
version of the E-VAT Law therefore in violation of the origination clause in Article VI Section
24.
BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
PADILLA; November 20, 1991
FACTS
- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, “RP vs. Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez, et
al.”
-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of
their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to
enrich themselves at the expense of the
Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:
-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to
PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject
to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc.
8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market
value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquino’s brother-
in-law, Ricardo Lopa
–Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or
consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government
-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue
Ribbon Committee)
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on “what they know”
about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations
-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process
clause, and both averring that such testimonies would “unduly prejudice” the defendants of
civil case no.0035
-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction
and legislative purpose
-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from
making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting
Angara v. Comelec)
-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to
delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue
Ribbon Committee
ISSUES
1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.
2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of
government.
3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.

HELD
1. NO Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is not in aid of legislation
- Sen. Enrile’s inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the
alleged sale of the Romualdez corporations—there was no intended legislation as required by
A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the
Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress’ power of inquiry is broad but limited,
that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate
task of congress—no inquiry is an end in itself.
2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government
- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by
Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinions—as held in
Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary.
3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process
- It has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, including…the Bill of Rights”. As
held in Hutcheson v. US, it can’t be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by
public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states
that the Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by
law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused.
Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and
produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if
pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and
the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.
SEPARATE OPINION
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.
-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual grant—
even so, it is expressly granted by A6 S21.
Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry
does not limit the power of inquiry
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to determine WON to
legislate on a particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act.
US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can legislate, a
legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be “in aid of legislation” is easier to establish here where
Congress’ legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not necessary that every
question be material to the proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject of the
inquiry.
-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose; Congress may
investigate for its own purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently
under trial.
Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
-A6 S21 provides that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.”
However, such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such investigations
where a violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be
respected.
-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are
posed, but the witness may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at bar,
no incriminating questions had been asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is
premature.
CRUZ [dissent]
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w/
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the
contrary.
-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible violation of RA
3019 in the disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an indispensable duty of the
legislature
Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation …
expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation
Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke
the right against self-incrimination only when such a question is posed, and cannot refuse
taking the witness stand outright.
SENATE V ERMITA
CARPIO-MORALES;
FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of E.O. no. 46433 issued Sept. 28, 2005
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated : Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28;
Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to
appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the
NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings
for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a
more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests
because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have
already been completed.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O.
464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not
allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written
approval) from the President, which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend
due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several
cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent
Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.
ISSUES
Primary Issue
1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:
a. Legal standing of petitioners:
G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL
G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG)
G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)
b. Actual Case or Controversy
33
E.O. 464 “Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public
officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes.”
3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD
Primary Issue
1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by
the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating
reasons therefor.
- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless
has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O.
464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere
expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to
any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed to be valid.
Reasoning
Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain
types of information of a sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21
This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimony that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to
compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was
intended to be distinguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is
merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to
appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes
it valid on its face.
- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on
what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other
branches of government. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres.
regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464
Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such
determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting
the official from appearing before Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the Pres.
that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional
nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the
Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by
the highest official in the executive hierarchy.
- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per
se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does
not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for
Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry.
Secondary Issues
2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:
Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance there must
be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct
and specific interest in raising the questions raised.
The Senate of the Philippines
- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for
intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an
executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of
such a controversy.
Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)
- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464
infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public concern)
- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws
must be direct and personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding
involves assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)
- There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific
interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP-Laban no standing.
b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)
- A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its implementation and
where such results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication.
- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing themselves from
attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would
refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public
concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations deprives the people of information.
4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect
on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt
from the need of publication. Due process requires that the people should have been
apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented.
Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared
void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.
GUINGONA V CARAGUE
GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991
FACTS
- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service)
and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted
for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential
Decrees 81, 117, and 1967.
- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the
Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the
Constitution, it shall be void.
- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they
became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the
one man-legislature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current
appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable.
- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the
ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with
Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress
to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate
Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in
advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.
- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First,
for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market
conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from
short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes.
Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising
from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service
estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or
matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's
which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis
of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has
to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer
be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically
changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened,
only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
- Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the
intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of
Marcos."
ISSUES
1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B
for education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitutional.
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation.
HELD
1. The Court disagrees that Congress’ hands are hamstrung by the provision provided.
There are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount
allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets thereby
complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The
enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration, however, still needs
to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at
stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot
be considered by this Court as unconstitutional.
2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the
Constitution recognizes that:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to
preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized.
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution
or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
- Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they
shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as
the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the
country.
- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless
are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to
pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness
sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.
No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as
shown by the books of the Treasury.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for
release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this
requirement. As to the ponencia’s reference to “legislative parameters provided by law”, Cruz
says no such regulatory boundaries exist.
PADILLA [dissent]
- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies
that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appropriating a particular
sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be
construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch.
- Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for
the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve
the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his opinion,
pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ
QUIASON; August 19, 1994
FACTS
- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993.
- On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act No. 766334, the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994. On the
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either
House of Congress to override the vetoes.
- In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al. prayed for a
writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article 41 on the Countrywide
Development Fund or “pork barrels,” the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS;
and (c) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994
- In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's) and (f) State Universities and Colleges
(SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt service.
- In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Tañada together with the Freedom from Debt
Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers, challenging the
constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt
service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
- In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Tañada contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
- In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the
Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene
Cortes as Amicus Curiae.
G.R. No. 113105
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing35
Substantive
34
Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
35
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other
petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or “pork barrels” is an encroachment by
the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of a law
3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education 36 as the highest priority in
the allocation of budget unconstitutional
4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category is unconstitutional, as it is contrary to
Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution 37
HELD
Procedural
1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto
or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress.
Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. Macaraig) and a US case (United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. Then in
forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v.
Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae.
Substantive
2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad
as Congress wants it to be.
Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries…" It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the
appropriation. Executive function under the CDF involves implementation of the priority
projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to
propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of
the GAA of 1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF, it is the President
who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of
Congress are merely recommendatory.
3. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education is merely directory.
Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Carague. While it is true that under
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education” it does not thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its
36
Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment."
37
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives.
4. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the
allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment.
Decision
Procedural
1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi
Substantive
2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, hence
constitutional
3. No. Congress’ act is not unconstitutional. It simply exercises its power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
4. No. It is not unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
ISSUE
WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for
debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutional
Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution38
HELD
Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” 39 which can be
vetoed separately from an item.
Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as precedent. It also cited another case,
Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the
provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
38
Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: “The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object.”
39
Also included in the category of “inappropriate provisions” which are intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an
appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional.
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Citing Henry v.
Edwards: When the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill,
such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's (President’s) item
veto power over general appropriation bills.
Decision
Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the Special Provision of the item on debt
service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no
case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators."
The said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a direct
connection with the item on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of
said provisions is void.
G.R. No. 113174
G.R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
ISSUES
1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) is
unconstitutional
2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and
Highways on 70% (administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance is
unconstitutional
3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by AFP is unconstitutional
4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military
equipment is unconstitutional
5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds is
unconstitutional
6. WON the President’s directive that the implementation of the Special Provision to the item
on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an
administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to
dissolve the CAFGU's, therefore unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment 40)
7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in the appropriations for the
Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional
HELD
40
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue . Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of
Funds, Harvard Law Review)
[1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which
can be vetoed separately from an item41
Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the previous section is applied in the 5
issues in this section. Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. (Notice how the
ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive)
6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate substantive bill.
Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from journals 42 in discussing the issue of
Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case.
7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by
Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are
faithfully executed.
Decision
1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions.
2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.
3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of
medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also
vetoing the said item.
4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring
legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.
5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) 43 and 29(1)44 of the Article VI of the Constitution. Thus
veto is not unconstitutional.
6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws.
Impliedly, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.
41
Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I formulated there. This can be implied from, “Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws.” Hence, this is an “inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately.
42
Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law
Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal
43
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. "
44
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law"
7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the President is simply exercising his
constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully.
Dispositive
Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766
only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service
specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and
interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofar
as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2 nd paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of
the item of appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of
medicines by the AFP which is GRANTED.
Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur and dissent]
- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms
the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto
power of the Executive.
VITUG [concur]
- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his
colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is
not objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in
whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.
GONZALES V MACARAIG
MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990
FACTS
- The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of special and general
provisions, particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill for 1989
- The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the ground of:
- being member and ex-officio members of the Finance Committee
- substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be affected
- The respondents in this case are member of the Cabinet who are sued in their official
capacity for the implementation of the General Appropriations Act of 1989
- December 16, 1988 - The House of Representatives passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989)
- eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed Budget of the President
- presented to President for approval
- December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law (became RA 6688)
- The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec. 55
- February 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate Resolution No. 381 that the veto of
Sec. 55 was unconstitutional
- April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed
- assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55
- enjoined the implementation of RA 6688
- No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme Court
- September 7, 1989 - Court resolved to give due course to the petition
- Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplementary Petition which raised
the same issue as the original petition (questioning the presidential veto)
- The vetoed provisions include:
- Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item submitted by the President which has
been reduced by Congress cannot be restored/increased. An item is deemed disapproved
if there is no corresponding appropriation in the Act.
- Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations
Act except that this was lumped together with the use of savings
- The basic difference between both provisions is that in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the
"use of savings" is in Section 12, apart from Section 55 whereas in the 1990 \Appropriations
Act, "use of savings" and the vetoed provision are both in Sec. 16
- The reason for the veto:
- Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)
- Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the President, the Senate President,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
Heads of Con-Coms to augment any item in the General Appropriations law
- If allowed, the President and the other abovementioned officials cannot augment any item
and appropriation from their savings even if special circumstances like calamity
- Petitioners' arguments:
1) The president's line veto power regarding the appropriations bill is limited to item/s and
does not cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority (Sections 55 and 16 are
provisions)
2) When the president objects to provisions of an appropriation bill, it is not possible to
exercise the item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well
 3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation already (violative of separation of powers)
4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is provided by law so Congress has
prerogative to impose restrictions in the exercise of that power
- SolGen's arguments:
1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a political remedy which is to
override the veto.
2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and should merit a veto.
3) The power of the president to augment items in appropriations for the executive
branches already provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45 of PD 1177 as
amended by RA 6670)
4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of other distinct and severable parts.
ISSUES
1. WON the issue is justiciable
2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its
counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without effect
HELD
1. The issue is justiciable, not political.
a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Senate and the Executive
that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The Demetria v. Alba case declared that
the Supreme Court has the duty to declare acts of a government branch void if beyond that
branch's powers
b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress the imperative need for
definitive ruling by the Court
c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a taxpayer's suit. The Sanidad
ruling (the Court may or may not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the Tolentino v.
COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have personality when a Constitutional
issue is raised) were used. This is also not the first time that the veto power was
discussed.
i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the veto but reversed by the US
Supreme Court because of the Appropriations Bill was not involved.
ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto in an Appropriations Bill
2. NO the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart
Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional
*The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing of provisions.
- Art. 6 Sec. 27 - Veto power of the President
Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and if exercised would veto the entire bill
Paragraph 2 - the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto over a particular item in an
appropriations, revenue or tariff bill. The president may not veto less than all of an item (no
authority to veto part of an item and approve the remaining portion of that item).
- Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916
- 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was more expansive since it included
provisions and items in revenue and tariff bills
- 1973 Constitution - more compact version and refers to the Prime Minister as the only official
who has the power
- 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973 provision except that a different public
official (the President) was now involved and eliminated the reference to a veto of a
provision
- The Court held that even if there was an elimination of any reference to the veto provision,
the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has
not changed.
- An item in a bill relates to the particulars, details, distinct and severable parts of the bill
whereas a provision is of a more general nature.
- A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of the bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks
the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate
specifically to some particular appropriation and that any such provision shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
- A provision does not relate to the entire bill.
- The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative power as stated in the Bengzon
case:
- The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature.
- The President finds its authority in the Constitution.
- The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same
way that they presume constitutionality of an act passed by the Legislature.
* Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.
- Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, Sec. 55 and Sec.
16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense.
- Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement.
a) no relation to a particular or distinctive requirement. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in the Bill.
c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs. 55 and 16 are
 inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the veto power.
*Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are therefore susceptible to a veto.
- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and
where conditions are attached, veto powers do not have the power to strike them
out.
- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can impose conditions on expenditure of
funds and that the Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation while allowing the
appropriation itself to stand.
- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the real sense of the term. Restrictions
should exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditures. The test is appropriateness.
- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions.
- Actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and therefore separate
legislation.
- Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Items reduced or
disapproved by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be detected when
compared with the original budgetary submittals of the President.
* The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto
- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they nullified the authority of the Chief
Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations (with reference to Art. 6, Sec. 25(5)).
- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law.
- The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from
savings in another item in the appropriation of a government branch so as to afford
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds.
- Separation of powers is endangered in no way.
- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair the constitutional and statutory
authority of the President in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
- The special power of augmentation from savings is merely incorporated in the GA Bill. The
GA Bill is one of primary and specific aim to make appropriation of money from the public
treasury. The power of augmentation from savings is not considered a specific appropriation
of money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
- To sanction this practice would withhold the power from the Executive and other officials and
put in jeopardy the exercise of that power.
- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, a veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the members of Congress.
But Congress made no attempt to do so.
ATITIW V ZAMORA
TINGA; September 30, 2005
FACTS
- This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief as taxpayers, seeking the
declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA 8760 (General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned provision. However, the 2000 GAA has
long been implemented, the issuance is already moot and academic. But the Court shall pass
upon the constitutional issues.
- Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR):
- President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with insurgency in the Cordilleras.
These dialogues focused on the establishment of an autonomous government in the
Cordilleras.
- Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, and Section 18, Article X mandates the
congressional enactment of the organic acts for each of the autonomous regions.
- President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July 15, 1987, creating the CAR, which is
the interim and preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the
Cordilleras.
-Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989, Congress enacted RA 6766 ( An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region ). A plebiscite was held
where the people of the Cordilleras could ratify the Organic Act. However, the creation of an
autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao
province. The Court ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR and upheld the
disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and
effect.
-February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the
assailed Special Provisions:
“1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be used to wind up the activities
and operations of the CAR, including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of
all affected officials and employees…”
-July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the implementation of the
winding up of operations of the CAR.
ISSUES
1. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional
2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O.
No. 220
3. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO 220.
HELD
1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider TF it is constitutional
a. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane to the subject of the bill in which it is
incorporated. 2 provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec 25(2) “No provisions or
enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein…” and Sec 26(1) “Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be embraced in the title thereof”
- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the hands of Congress: it simply
requires that all the provisions are either appropriation items, or non-appropriaton items which
relate specifically to appropriation items.
- Test: It must be 1) Particular – if it relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation; 2)
Unambiguous – when its application is apparent on the face of the bill and needs no reference
to details/souces outside the bill; 3) Appropriate – when its subject does not necessarily have
to be treated in a separate legislation.
- The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes the above test.
Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and appropriate to the appropriations bill
to which it belongs, it shall not be considered to be a rider
b. Petitioners allege:
- that instead of providing a budget for the CAR, it had the effect of
abolishing the CAR
- since a special law created the CAR, the 2000 GAA is not the place for
amending or repealing a standing law.
- However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been deactivated.
- Abolish – to do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy completely, office ceases to exist;
- Deactivate – render inactive, break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, office
continues to exist, albeit dormant.
- But even if the limitation of the CAR’s budget had the effect of abolishing certain offices, the
Congress has he power to do so.
- creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function
- office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may abolish
the office if it sees fit.
c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. EO 220 has not established an autonomous regional government; rather, it has
only created an administrative region. It can be considered a regional coordinating agency of
the National Government.
2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed paragraph is a rider, the rest of the arguments
look into the wisdom and efficacy of said provisions. Political questions
Still
1. Contention that Congress can’t unilaterally amend or repeal EO 220: Rejected. There is no
such thing as an irrepealable law.
2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds to
support CAR’s activities is legislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot
correct the acts of the Executive or Congress.
ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- Petition for review of the decision of the HRET
- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the
lone district of Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS files an election protest
before HRET, seeking revision and recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts. His grounds:
alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. JA files
counter-protest questioning residence qualification of AS; dismissed by HRET.
- HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious irregularities found. Justice Gancayco’s Report
and Recommendation confirm irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET
officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were consistently reduced … while Syjuco was always
constant…”
- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA submits certified true copies of the
Revision Reports and election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of documentary
evidence, “mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated by comparison with the original
documents or identification by any witness…."
- In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original posture (revision and recount
of ballots) to what he calls a “truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" — the
PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES.
- By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which broaden the scope of
his protest, change his theory of the case or introduce additional causes of action in violation
of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest
should not be dismissed.
- 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against the three
Justices-members), HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the
examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and thereafter to decide the case on
the merits.
- JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted thereafter.
- 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed Decision annulling
JA's proclamation, & declaring AS as the duly elected congressman. Said decision also refers
the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions.
- Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC.
ISSUES
1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS’ “precinct level document based
anomalies/evidence" theory;
b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the
evidence was procured; &
c. annulling election results in some contested precincts.
2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
HELD
1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
a. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory
- This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what AS originally
sought. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by
Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory
was sensed by majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protest…
this a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion . No further hearings were
conducted…JA's right to due process was clearly violated.
- Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the
filing of the election protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after
the proclamation of the winner. The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or
counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended
pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter
protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and
cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and
adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.
<principle of estoppel>
b. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured
- Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received which is merely
substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence can be had. Certain vital election
documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered voters per precinct and
photocopies of statements of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the
majority decision, never offered in evidence by either of the parties.
- Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the participation of
any of the three (3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of the contested
signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be
submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is
required to constitute a valid quorum).
c. Nullification of election results
- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2 mandatory requisites
for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism:
i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts
were involved, &
ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud,
irregularities or terrorism.
- Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the duty of the court to
sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair
expression of the popular will, and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent
fraud, mere irregularities or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the
expression of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results. Corollarily,
the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the
whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result
was affected thereby, even though the circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to
punishment. 32 These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered
voters had taken place in the questioned precincts.
- General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error
through a motion for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the members of the
Electoral Tribunal having been shown, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes
nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental
principle of due process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if
petitioner's fundamental right to due process was violated.
- Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the
most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules
should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same internal rules expressly makes the
Rules of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory
application.
- Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of experience as the most
effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and uniformity of
procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anything else.
- Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its majority decision
in the election protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyo’s proclamation as the winning congressman of
the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been challenged at all.
2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
- Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of counsel appear to
seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the Court
- Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the language
employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and established rule that derogatory
words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers
Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and
public respondent HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Private
respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby
fined the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from
receipt of this decision.
BONDOC V PINEDA
GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991
FACTS the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the majority in the Tribunal.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party - March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991
(NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the in HRET Case No. 25.
province of Pampanga. - March 13, 1991 – Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28,
- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. 1991 LDP had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly
In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invited LDP
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the Supreme members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the HoR,
Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional
through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the prerequisite.
party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows: - March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated
March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and
Associate Justice, SC rescind the election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal .
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member - Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of
this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
Associate Justice, SC
because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a
Associate Justice, SC motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was also
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member said that:
Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP > Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members
Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC
Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP > Suggestions:
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member + The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP election, returns and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member would be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution
Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP of election contests.
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member + There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of
Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).
affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity. (like that’s possible)
- July 1989 – Bondoc filed petition - During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the
- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members decision in HRET Case No. 25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5 members
in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and,
delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months. The reexamination and re- therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. - March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be relieved of their membership
Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner in the tribunal and directed them to do their duties. The court even said that all members of
of the contest. these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of
- March 4, 1991 – Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-
that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges.
The term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc
against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice
Rep and HRET praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of
Camasura from assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge
his functions as a member of the HRET; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress' is the
sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole
power to remove any member whenever the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity,
removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal member's term of office is not
co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party
affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and
the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political
question beyond the reach of judicial review.
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against
him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET.
Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable
party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET.
> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous
because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of
the HoR of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a
member of the HRET.
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its
decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol was
impleaded as one of the respondents because after the HoR had announced the termination
of Cong Camasura's membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR
would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasura’s seat in the Tribunal.
ISSUE
WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party
HELD
- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional
representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members
from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
- The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the
1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as
judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a
non-political body in a sea of politicians.
- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of
its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
+ Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —
The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
+ Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents
in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail
to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political
party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it
violated his right to security of tenure.
- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the legislature, may
not be interfered with by the House
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted.
The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null
and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-
0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25
("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in
the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective
upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs
against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are
distributed among three (3) great departments. Each separate from, yet coordinate and co-
equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law.
- This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and
treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them,
as nugatory and not binding in every other department.
- The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal provided
that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
- The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal must necessarily include the power to remove said
member.
- The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the
House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House
of Representatives should have done what it has done.
- The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional authority of the
legislature The judicial department has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it
by the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of
powers.
SARMIENTO [dissent]
- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of
Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in
which the Court cannot intervene.
- The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.
- Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political
maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should
be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
independence.
LOZADA V COMELEC
DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983
FACTS
- Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus as a representative
suit45 to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing
vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on
Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution 46.
- Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient
voter of Quezon City, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while Igot
alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special
election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege
that they are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and that they filed this petition in
behalf of all other Filipinos since subjects are of profound and general interest.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners had standing to file for petition for mandamus
2. WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition
3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
HELD
1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for mandamus
- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that
tax money is being illegally spent. Action complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call
a special election, and therefore involves no expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act
complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal
expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
45
for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation
46
Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
- As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to
maintain and prosecute the present petition, for to have legal standing is to have personal and
substantial interest in the case, or sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Interest
held in common by all members of the public is of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be
sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element for one to have personality in a dispute.
2. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition
- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the
latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section II of the
1973 Constitution47. In this case, there is no such decision, order or ruling. Even from the
standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC
has unlawfully neglected or refused the performance of a ministerial duty, it is not shown that
petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a special election which is equally the clear and
ministerial duty of COMELEC.
- Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for special elections,
and this power of the may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan
Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for
the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from said
body, not the COMELEC. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of
the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for
mandamus.
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasang
Pambansa
- The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to apply to the Interim Batasang
Pambansa.
- The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim Batasang Pambansa was to be
composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent
President and Vice-President, and the members or the Senate and House of Representatives
of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. With such number of representatives representing
each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt
absolutely no need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering
the uncertainty of the duration of its existence.
- The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang Pambansa, because a province or
representative district would have only one representative in said body. The need to fill up the
Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither imperative nor urgent, as there would always be
47
Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof.
adequate representation for every province which forms only part of a certain region, specially
considering that the Body is only transitory in character.
- That the provision is found in the main body of the Constitution and not in included in
Transitory Provisions adds to the intention that the provision applies only to the regular, and
not interim, Batasang Pambansa.
Decision Petition dismissed.
PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION
FERNANDO; July 23, 1971
FACTS
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on
August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on
September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment was made during
recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session
in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President
and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a
congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then
Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner
was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission
on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration
of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received.
ISSUES
1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments (CA),
without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim
appointment.
2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA being an independent organ of the
Constitution.
HELD
1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force and effect.
Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter of then
Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment
duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.
Reasoning
a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: “Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not
more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to
grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case,
Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would
dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the
members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission.
In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for
reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for
reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no
effect whatsoever.
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of
reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved.
b. “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until
the next adjournment of Congress.”
- A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former,
the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office.
As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is
effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must
either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.
2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court is untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its
legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded.
- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment
submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers
as will constitute a denial of due process.
AVELINO V CUENCO
PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949
RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC
FACTS
- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature.
The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the Senate’s constitutional
power to elect its own president
Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Tañada and
Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges 48 against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order, and
except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States,
all the Senators were present.49
- TAÑADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAÑADA from
delivering his privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other
senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair
and proceeded with the session. The remaining senators unanimously approved, among
others, a resolution “declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and
designating… Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the
President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President.
- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate
President and oust CUENCO.
ISSUE
WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD
NO (6-4 vote)
Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political
question.
Reasoning
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them . If
the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
48
BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government (particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to
which AVELINO was a member); questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINO’s assumption of office; and
justification of electoral fraud.
49
Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal
to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved
that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens . It is
furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes
it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
Decision Petition dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The power to adjourn is one of the
exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single
individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and
its opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual
without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established
in a democratic social order.
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly
authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the
presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary
practice and experience in this country and in the United States of America, upon which ours
is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision.
- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said
effect was properly made and met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support
AVELINO’s claim. The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and
the walk out of AVELINO and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of
defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against
AVELINO and of his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCO's group.
- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to
transact business. – The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business…” [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the
provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words
"each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of
Congress. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less
than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority.
Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.
FERIA [concur]
- If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted?
Yes. At the beginning of the rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of the
absence from the country of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a
majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring
less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum.
RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino
group to return to the session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them),
reversed its original decision and now assumed jurisdiction over the case
ISSUES
1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case
2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid
HELD
1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention.
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds
stated by Feria [and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a
quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice
[Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing
from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCO's election as
Senate President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitutional]
formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no
avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes.
For this reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with
substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION

FERIA [concur]
I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among others, the
amendment of the quorum provision from "the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the
majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or
incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
House or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even
through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.
PERFECTO [concur]
- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the
National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of
Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National
Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one
who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean
only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the
members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half
(1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said
senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group
composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince
anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers
combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the
two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority. Majority
presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators
composing the Senate.
- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the
purpose of choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12
senators was enough quorum. The Constitution provides: “A majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum…, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House
may provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has
to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions specifically vested
in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. The collective body
constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of
absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative
chamber. Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a
quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy
is restored.
- At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to
renounce the position of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the
sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow
AVELINO to preside over the sessions. AVELINO’s refusal to attend the sessions,
notwithstanding CUENCO’s commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should
logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.
OSMENA V PENDATUN
BENGZON; October 28, 1960
FACTS
- On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before
the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. The House of
Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special committee of 15 members to
investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmeña to appear
before it to substantiate his charges.
- On July 14, 1960, Osmeña filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada
Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said
resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so,
he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmeña alleged: (1) the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the
House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour
for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined
therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House
provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words
in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House
- Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving
Osmena a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved
on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
- Thereafter, Osmeña took the additional position that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court
to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that
Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the
sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.
ISSUES
1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunity for
words spoken in the House
2. WON the Speech of Osmeña constituted unruly behavior for which he could be punished
3. WON Osmeña can be held to answer for or be censured by the House, given that other
business had intervened after gave the speech in question
4. WON the House has the power to suspend its members
HELD
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate"
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1
of the Constitution of the United States, wherein the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself .
- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly behavior,
it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere.
- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval amounted
to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may
be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure."
4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or
could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take,
disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have
been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974
FACTS
- Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction
- HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without amendments in the
House of Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested a minor
amendment on HB 9266. However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate
during its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto Sen. Tolentino’s substantial
amendment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM.
- After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been
passed by the Senate with amendments. However, the attached amendments were not Sen.
Tolentino’s but Sen. Roxas’amendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB No. 9266 (with
Roxas amendment) and printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the Secretary
of the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate President.
The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines,
who affixed his signatures by way of approval – enacted the bill into R.A. No. 4065 50
- The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a
press statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is not the version
passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendments he made. The Senate
President then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the signed HB 9266 was not
the bill duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect, and
could not validate the bill which was not the version approved by the Congress. The President
then withdrew his signature on the HB 9266.
- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and the President of the
Philippines, Villegas issued circulars ordering city government officials and operators of
business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the
Chief of Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vice-mayor presumably under the
said RA.
- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction
and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel
respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
- Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since (1) it was not the bill approved
by Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official
trip, Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as
Acting Mayor under the RA 4065.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court could resolve the issue regarding the “enrolled bill doctrine”
2. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the bill and
validates it into a law
3. WON in the absence of the attestation of the presiding officers, the “journal entry” in the
Journals of Congress could constitute proof of due enactment
4. WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not become a law
HELD
1. Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon the Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as
evidence for the due enactment of a bill.
Obiter
- compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to resolve the
issue of WON a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto had been passed by a “vote for three-
50
An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No.
409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” pursuant to
Article XV of the Constitution, saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doctrine)
which is not in the province of the judiciary.
- using J. Bengzon’s separate opinion in the same case, J. Makalintal said that the case at bar
is justiciable since enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive
upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of
due enactment of provisions of acts.
- basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and independent departments which
requires the judicial department to “accept, as having passed the Congress, all bills
authenticated by it.
2. Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking process and the
certification/attestation of the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress
which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect already present upon it.
Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of authentication; signify the Chief
Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is
ready for his approval or disapproval
3. Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the Constitution for the
validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment.
Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in the Constitution as a proof of
due enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the Congress’ proceedings [comparison of
Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI,
sec 27(1)]
4. Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolled
bill doctrine, (2) that the Court could use the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress
and, in the absence of the latter, the records of the proceedings of the Congress entered
into the Journals of Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is
deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3 rd reading and the attestation of the
presiding officers just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that, upon referring to
the journal entries of the proceedings of congress, the Court discovered that substantial
and lengthy amendments were introduced to the HB but were not incorporated in the
printed text which was signed by the President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President
of the Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their signatures, then RA 4065 was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. TRO made permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I don’t know the
difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]
MARTINEZ V MORFE
FERNANDO; March 24, 1972
FACTS
- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates of the 1971
Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecution
o Martinez was charged with falsification of a public document for stating under oath in his
certificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on
June 20, 1945, when in truth he was born on June 20, 1946
o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the Revised Election Code in that he
gave and distributed free of charge, food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meetings
- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against them to be quashed, by virtue
of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the
Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest
2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be construed together with Article 145
of the Revised Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional immunity
HELD
1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests.
 Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative.
 Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: “The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech o debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.”
 Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of
peace
o Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering to enemies and giving them
aid and comfort
o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law
o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by RPC or any special statute
 History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members
of the National Assembly from criminal arrest
 The power or right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to
carry out its function without obstacle
 In England, operation of parliamentary privilege excludes all crimes, applies only to
prosecutions of civil nature
 There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of the Congress, and
likewise, delegates of the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge responsibilities
 However, when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
same.
 A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well without the need
for any transgression of criminal law.
 If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal prosecution, he should be treated like any
other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that a crime
should not go unpunished.
2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative .
 Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee who shall, during the session of
Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
 RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the enforcement of the 1935 Constitution
 Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: “All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until
amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines…”
 Article 145 which accords legislators a generous treatment exempting them from arrest
even if warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent with the Constitution, and is
consequently inoperative.
JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG
CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966
FACTS
- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang
- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged communication and not
libelous since he was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of House
Committee on National Defense
- The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958
while congress was presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.
- The open letter was an exposé on allegedly three operational plans. The first plan is said to
be an insidious plan or a massive political build up of then Sec. of Nat’l Defense, Jesus Vagas,
by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to become candidate
for President in 1961. (Plan II – A coup d’etat;Plan III – A modification of Plan I)
- The letter also implicated that the “planners” have under their control the following : (1) Col.
Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt.
Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna…….” It is of course possible that the officers mentioned
above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.”
- Lower Court dismissed
- Petitioners appealed
ISSUES
1. WON the publication is a privileged communication
2. (if not) WON it is libelous
HELD
1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open letter to the
President published by the defendant when the Congress was not in session. And in thus
causing it to be published he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any House Committee.
- The phrase “speech or debate therein” as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution
refers to utterances made by congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such
as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in
session, as well as bills introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in
the discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its function as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for damages. Although
the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant likewise
added that it was possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may have
absolutely no knowledge. The statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of
entitling them to recover damages.
PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL
CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965
FACTS
- During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities.
- RAC Section 68
- provides, among others, that the President may by executive order define the boundary of
municipality, increase or diminish its territory provided that the authorization of the
Congress of the Phil shall first be obtained.
- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void because of RA 2370 Section 3
which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed” except by Acts of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition
of a majority of the voters in areas affected” and the “recommendation of the council of the
municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated.”
- Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against
the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
- The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs intervened in the case.
- Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amici curiae.
ISSUES
1. WON the executive orders are null and void upon the ground that Section 68 of RAC, which
was the basis of the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA 2730.
2. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under RAC amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power.
HELD
1. Yes. RA 2370’s denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several
barrios.
2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
There could only be a due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a) complete in itself – it
must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the “delegate” - and
(b) fix a standard – the limits of which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
- Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects of the power the President.
Reasoning
a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. US)
- It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an undue delegation of legislative power
because it supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and inconsistent with RAC)
- Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by LAW. (take
note: such control does not include the authority either to abolish or create)
Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent are
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Eos or any disbursement by the municipalities concerned.
ARNAULT V NAZARENO
OZAETA; July 18, 1950
FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows:
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the
Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase
option was exercised by the then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0
million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with
the accrued rentals of P 324,000.
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-
resident American for P 5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance
payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed.
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, the Tambobong
estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as
generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however no other payment received
from Burt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same
property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a
notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with
Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the
cancellation of Burt’s title and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress
Administration.
- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already owned both
the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000
(P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initially P
1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through
two corporations acting as Burt’s attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the
trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.
- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the
Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the
institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.
- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate adopting
Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates deal.
- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:
a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase
b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal
- During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them
and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt in the
transactions.
- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and
withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When
asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name
despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also
said that answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate
approved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found
him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant at arms
until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three
days later. The work of the Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.
- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme
Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds:
a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested information is
not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or
obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already approved bills related to the
transactions.
b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative
session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating
- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general principles of law with
regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt
as this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the
Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact that the
Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices.
The discussions were as follows:
a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to
investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power of
inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the body to wisely
and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of information
that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have
 them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate or complete. Given this,
Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such information.
b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress
has jurisdiction to inquire.
ISSUES
WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted
HELD
a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as
contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the
transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined
by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the
Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent to the
matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a
clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to
be elicited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within
their scope.
- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate
for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the
Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he
so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him
until he complies with said requirement.
b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termination of
the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido
Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez terminates when the House of
Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike
the House of Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term is
only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for
a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two
years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat
of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail
parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court.
c. Arnault’s claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a precedent.
The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any question which could incriminate
him. Arnault’s testimony was obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he
gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt.
Decision Petition is denied
SEPARATE OPINION
TUASON [dissent]
- The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the necessity for its
attainment of the ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where
disagreement occur.
- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to
the contemplated legislation. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the
question as to who received the money is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the
persons suspected of getting the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother
of President Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forum for such vindication. The Senate
investigation seems to have only one objective and this is to prepare the way for court action
since they could not expect the Justice department to take the initiative to investigate and
prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department had
a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department.
- The Committee’s report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a matter of fact
three bills were passed by the Senate in connection with the investigation. This being the case
there is no need to extract names. The importance of names is when it comes to a criminal
prosecution.
- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and
legal. His main objection lies in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and
trespassed on the territory of other braches of government “when it imprisoned a witness for
contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot”.
LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967
FACTS
- On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic
Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities
and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be
 known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government
of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected
in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of
Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of Parang, Cotabato, prays that
Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15,
1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
ISSUES
1. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional requirement that the subject of a
bill shall be expressed in the title NO
2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO
3. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute YES
HELD
1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8
- projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation
of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts
will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts of the statute are
so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. When the foregoing bill was
presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios - not nine barrios
- was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the
bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which
is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a
number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large
aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still
apply to a motely group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one?
3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His right to vote in
his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be
considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town; he
may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy
the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new
town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote
should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional
direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the
community affected thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to
vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
MILLER V MARDO
BARRERA; July 31, 1961
FACTS
- These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical question
- 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a
driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without separation pay
- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on ground that
HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case
- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that
conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor
standards
- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not
being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company
- same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the
cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.
- 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company
for being underpaid, not being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a
seamstress
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have jurisdiction as money
claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an
answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor Administrator Hernando
refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to
be heard
they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional
- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as he
was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient notice.
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no power to adjudicate
money claims
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well – that Reorg Plan is null and void
insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
ISSUES
1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authority of RA 997 as
amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay,
etc.
2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress
HELD
1. No it is not valid.
- While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it referred merely to
administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power
rests exclusively on the judiciary
- While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident
to the exercise of administrative dunctions
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to
create functions in connection with reorganization of the Executive
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress
- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a)
of RA 997
- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two houses are to
hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determination of the one upon a
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.
TANADA V TUVERA
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985
FACTS
- Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.
- Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this
case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further
contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE
WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of
the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates
HELD
Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to
official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art.
IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or
otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does
not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The
publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability” is a
requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
informed of its contents.
Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and
effect.
Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are
in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos
both executive & legislative powers.
- The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this
case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure
for ignorance as an excuse.
- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
TANADA V TUVERA
CRUZ; December 29, 1986
FACTS
- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
 "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect."
- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first decision, specifically, on the
following questions:
ISSUES
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
HELD
1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or,
at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.
3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree,
the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.51
4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication
of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.
5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible,
to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
51
This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TINGA; February 24, 2004
FACTS
- LDP together with other political parties formed a coalition called Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
- KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the President of the Phils in the
May 2004 elections
- LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination of candidates for the upcoming
elections
- on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a Manifestation informing the COMELEC
a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo Angara or his authorized representative
may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates
b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General, Representative Agapito Aquino, on “indefinite
forced leave” and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was the Acting Sec-Gen
- Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does not have authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to disregard the Manifestation
- pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination was filed with COMELEC, naming Sen.
Panfilo Lacson as LDP’s Standard Bearer for president; the certificate was signed by Rep.
Aquino
- the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal party matter and that the period for
filing for the Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted the petition for both Petitioner
(Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates nominated by both
parties as the official candidates of the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the “Angara
Wing” and the “Aquino Wing”
- Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion
ISSUE
WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied equity and divided LDP into
“wings”
HELD
YES there was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue to be resolved by the Commission
was who as between the Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the
certificates of candidacy. To resolve the issue, the COMELEC need only to refer to the Party
Constitution. Equity is applied only if there absence of law that can be applied to resolve the
issue which is not the case here.
 - as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC has the authority to ascertain the
identity of the political parties and its legitimate officers; consequently it has the power to
settle any controversy regarding leadership of the party as an incident to its power to
register political parties. This matter is important in determining as to who between Aquino
and Angara had the authority to certify LDP’s candidates
- According to the Party Constitution, it is the Chairman who has the power to sign
documents in behalf of the party; the Sec-Gen has power to sign documents only when
authorized by the Chairman. That Aquino had been given authority in the past, as found by
the COMELEC during the 2001 elections, it does not follow that said authority is still
existing since it can be gathered in Angara’s Manifestation that Aquino’s authority had been
revoked, which the Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his authority to grant
such power
- However, the lack of authority of Aquino to certify candidates does not cancel the
certificates he signed. The candidates named will only be treated as independent
candidates following COMELEC Resolution No. 6453, section 7
- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate their own candidates, confused the
electorate as to which set of candidates truly represent the ideologies that the LDP
represents
- The constitutional policy towards a free and open party system envisions a system that
shall “evolve according to the free choice of the people” and not one molded by the
COMELEC
BRILLANTES V COMELEC
CALLEJO; June 15, 2004
FACTS
- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local elections for May 11 ’98. Also
allowed the acquisition of automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices to adopt
new electoral forms and printing materials. However, the failure of the machines to read
ballots correctly deferred implementation of modernization plan.
- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a three-phase modernization
program for the 2004 elections.
o Phase 1 – computerized registration and validation
Encountered problems in implementation because machine was reverting to old listing of
voters
o Phase 2 – computerized voting and counting
Scrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual voting and counting system due to
the problems encountered with validation
o Phase 3 – Electronic transmission of unofficial results (which is challenged in this case)
- Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through its commissioners still decided to
implement Phase 3
- GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to fund the AES for the May 10 ’04
elections. Also issued EO 175, giving an additional P500M budget for the AES project.
- Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed electronic transmission of
results because according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress has the sole authority
to canvass votes for President and VP. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the
authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional authority
- Aside from Drilon’s apprehension, there were budget problems for implementation because
the money allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1 and 2. COMELEC,
however, still conducted a field test of the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on
04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found on p. 277. Read just in case.)
- COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local elections, approved RESOLUTION 6712
stating the implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of each city/municipality shall
be electronically transmitted in advance to COMELEC, Manila. They established a National
Consolidation Center (NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality
and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters. (procedure p. 278). Note that the
results garnered in the procedure are of unofficial character.
- Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention brought their misgivings to SC.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have locus standi
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing RA 6712
HELD
1. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and since the Resolution obviously involves
the expenditure of funds, they do have the requisite standing to question its validity. Most of
the petitioners-in-intervention are also part of NAMFREL, the citizens’ authorized arm to
conduct an unofficial quick count during elections. Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of
Congress, the sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP.
2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election
returns the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass votes for President and VP.
COMELEC’s claim that it is not prohibited because it is an unofficial vote is unacceptable.
- the resolution goes against the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art VI). Because the
tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in character, it is not an appropriation made by law. In
fact, it may be considered a felony under Art 217 under the Penal Code (malversation of
public funds/property).
- it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting of votes is done by NAMFREL by
using a copy of the election returns. Not even COMELEC is authorized to use a copy of
election returns for counting.
- COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates of the proposed use of technology for the elections under Sec 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code. There are 2 conditions that COMELEC must comply with before undertaking
technology for electoral purposes: take into account the situation prevailing and the funds
available, and notify authorized representatives. These conditions give the affected people an
opportunity to object if need be. Details on p 302-303.
- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate
and unofficial tabulation of results. It also doesn’t make sense that Phase 3 of the program
should go on when the first two phases have been scrapped. They should be taken as a
whole and not independent of each other. In the first place, there is a great possibility that the
unofficial results will differ greatly from the official count so what is the use of spending all that
money for something uncertain, something that the NAMFREL had always undertaken? It is
an unnecessary waste of government funds and effort.
- COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a reason for the resolution. Accdg to
them, modernization of the election will decrease the possibility of dagdag bawas but it
doesn’t make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of human intervention. No matter how
modern the technology for electoral purposes is, there will always be the need for human
intervention so the problem will not be eradicated.
Decision PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is NULL AND VOID.
PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975
FACTS
- September, 1964 – the Public Service Commission assessed several public utilities for
supposed supervision and regulation fees for that year
- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company - P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics
Corporation - P11,610.40; Philippine Stearn Navigation Company - P23.921.60; and General
Shipping Company - P33,146.80
- The assessed fees were based upon the value of the respective properties or
equipment pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act
3792
- After paying the demanded amounts, the said corporations sent Separate letters to the
Commission, (except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition
instead) requesting for reconsideration of the assessments  their ground: under the
said Section 40(e), such assessments should be based not on the value of the
properties but upon the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations .
- 28 September 1966—Public Service Commission denied request for reconsideration. Their
reason:
o the clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher" in section 40(e) of
the Public Service Act as an alternative base for supervision fees collectible, applies to
both stock and non-stock corporations.
o to use the value of property and equipment as an alternative base for fixing the rates only
in case of public services not issuing shares would result in unreasonable discrimination
against the latter
o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or paid" and another after the words
"Capital invested," immediately preceding the clause "property and equipment, whichever
is higher," indicates the intention of the legislature to constitute the latter as an alternative
of both stock and non-stock corp.
ISSUES
1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public utilities issuing shares and those that
do not as the capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares have been issued.
Thus, the value of their property or equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for
this class of operators
2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation should have bearing
3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be collected as supervisory fees
HELD
1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital investment of public service
operators that do not issue stocks. These companies are required to submit annual reports of
finances and operations
2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of statutory construction
- the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no alteration at all
- the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed to reinforce its main argument that
nothing in the law justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the property or
equipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators not issuing shares of capital stock.
3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed were designed to raise revenue
for the general expenses of the Commission, and were not limited to reimbursement of actual
expenditures in supervision.
- we are in accord with petitioner operators that the Commission was in error in collecting the
fees in question on die basis of the original cost of their property and equipment without due
allowance for depreciation.
Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the supervision fees payable under Republic
Act No. 3792 should be computed upon present values of properly and equipment in use; the
appealed resolution of the Public Serviice Commission is AFFIRMED

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to applicants for the
establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants— issuance would violate PCA’s
Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas
- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No.018-93 providing for the
withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of coconut product processing industry; registration
would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and admin of quality
standards
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut
processing plants
ISSUE
- Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for
that is what the resolution in question actually is.
HELD
- The power given to the PCA “to formulate and adopt a general program of dev’t for the
coconut and other palms oil industry” is not a roving commission to adopt any program
deemed necessary to promote the dev’t of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to
be exercised in the context of the regulatory structure.
Reasoning
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to take over the powers and
functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil. Coco
Research Institute
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent public corp...charged with
carrying out State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coco and
other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and
beneficiaries through a regulatory scheme set up by law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 gov’t temporarily prohibited the opening of new coco processing
plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing ones--- because of overproduction in the
industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the export performance of coco-based products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87 authorizing establishment and operation of
additional DCN plants because of increased demand in world market
- The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law
“to promote rapid integrated dev’t and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to
ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the virtual
dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Code—the role of the PCA is to “formulate and adopt a general
program of dev’t for the coco and other palm oil industry in all its aspects”
o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring volumes of production and admin. Of
quality standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to
market forces how the industry will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires
o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the gov’t. The regulatory
system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to
dismantle it.
Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO [dissent]
- The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid exercise of delegated legislation.
Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sough to be achieved by the laws regarding
the coco industry, particularly “to promote accelerated growth and dev’t of the coco industry”
and “the rapid integrated dev’t and growth of the coconut industry”
- The time has come for admin policies and regulations to adapt to ever-changing business
needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the legislature
- Trimming down an admin agency’s functions of registration is not an abdication of the power
to regulate but is regulation itself
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998
FACTS
- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the
eleventh Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with
Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared the
duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as
president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.
- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader, with the
agreement of Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."
- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter
signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo
warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. They allege that Senator Guingona
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition
2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution
3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority
leader
HELD
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives
- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been
observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
"expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is,
questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law,
including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the
Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature,
whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It
speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.
- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem.
And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the
exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude
into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying
into the internal workings of the Senate.
3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader.
- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by
one without color of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding
to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested
office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by
the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such
formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a
caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM
CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioners : John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo Carino Foundation Inc., Center
for Alternative Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin represented and joined by
her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk,
Katherine Pe represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia
Pacalso alias “Kevab,” Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez alias “Ba-yay,” Edilberto
Claravall, Carmen Caromina, Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc
- Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion and Development Authority; John
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, City of Baguio, TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR
- Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injunction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, “Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area
Covered by the Former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7227”
- RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive
Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing
Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR “Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992”
> setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conversion into alternative
productive uses of former military bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States of
America Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark and Subic military reservations including
extension Camp John Hay Station in Baguio
> created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic
(and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ)
> granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
businesses from local and national taxes
> gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the
concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio)
- Aug 16, 1993 – BCDA entered MoA and Escrow Agreement with TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD, private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in preparing for a joint
venture for development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist
destinations and recreation centers
- Dec 16, 1993 – BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) binding themselves to put up a joint venture company called Baguio International
Development and Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and
Poro Point for tourism and recreation
Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio City’s Resolutions to BCDA
> Sept 29, 1993 –to exclude all the barangays partly and totally located within Camp John
Hay from the reach and coverage of any plan or program for development
> Jan 19, 1994 – abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over homelots being
occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH
> Feb 21, 1994 – 15-point concept of the development of CJH which includes protection of
the environment, making of a family-oriented tourist destination, priority in employment of
Baguio residents, free access to base area, guaranteed participation of the city government
in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned 9
bgys, liability for local taxes of businesses
BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response
> modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a condition to its full
development according to RA 7227
- May 11, 1994 – sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor to order determination of
realty taxes which may be collected from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real
properties exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and national taxes
- June 1994 – sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) seeking and
supporting subject to its concurrence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential
proclamation declaring area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA
7227
- July 5, 1994 – Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp John Hay which
reads
 Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City
Council of Baguio… create and designate… former Camp John Hay… as John Hay Special
Economic Zone
Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of 677 hectares surveyed and
verified by DENR
Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) is established to govern JHSEZ, authorized to determine
utilization and disposition of lands subject to private rights and in consultation and
coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants , and
to promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone
thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing arm
for its economic development and optimum utilization
Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the
JH Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement necessary policies, rules and
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with
pertinent government departments. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the
SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export
Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of
1991, and new investment laws that will be enacted.
Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of
departments, etc of the government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or
implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite
programs.
Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain basic autonomy and
identity.
- April 25, 1995 – petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief challenging Proc.
No. 420’s constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of MoA and JVA between BCDA
and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
- Petitioner’s Allege:
1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an unconstitutional
exercise by the President of a power granted only to the Legislature
2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the City of Baguio is
invalid, illegal and unconstitutional
3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform
and equitable
4. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal
5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal
6. the conceptual development plan of respondents not having undergone environmental
impact assessment is being illegally considered without a valid environmental impact
assessment
- a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city
government from implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from
proceeding with their plan respecting CJH’s development pursuant to the JVA
- Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio) Allege
1. issues are moot and academic because in November 21, 1995 BCDA formally notified
TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA
2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to the JHSEZ economic incentives
to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the proclamation merely
implements the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of
business activity or investment
3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the
equal protection clause
4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpayers in the absence of an actual
controversy
5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
- Petitioners Reply
1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since they are invoking
the exclusive authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin or restrain
implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas
2. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot and academic
3. WON present petition complies with the requirements of SC’s exercise of jurisdiction over
constitutional issues
Substantive
4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption
within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local autonomy of Baguio
City
HELD
1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or direct resort to it
except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional
and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of SC’s primary jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the power
to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military
reservations therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition.
Reasoning
- Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition. Besides,
remanding this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues
- transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple re-classification of an area TF a
crucial issue. Conversion involves
> focal point for investments by local and foreign entities
> site for vigorous business activity spurring country’s economic growth
> like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment
center
> critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns affecting communities are
located and nation in general
> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable
transition for city in CJH reversion to government property e.g. problem of scarcity of water
supply in Baguio City
2. Revocation of the agreements with private respondents made issues regarding them as
moot and academic.
3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial review.
Reasoning
- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review
1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case
> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete; parties pitted against each
other due to their adverse legal interests
> in present case, there is a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and
respondents arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting a portion of CJH into a
SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the
respondents claiming otherwise
> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without an overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken judicial duty
2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question
> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation
of SEZs and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent to
vesting a legal standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of communities in the
utilization of such base areas)
> as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No. 420, is personal and substantial
that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act
being challenged; material interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No.
420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City
> Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay, Bataan where SC characterized
their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual,
real, vital and legal for it would affect not only their economic life but even the air they
breathe
> Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected councilors of
Baguio at the time; duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents on
the question of concurrence to Proc. No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which
supported Proc. No. 420
3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity
4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
- 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth constitutionality issues
4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no express extension of tax
exemption and other economic incentives granted by law, any presidential proclamation
granting such extension through implication is unconstitutional because it violates Art VI Sec
28(4) which gives the legislature, not the executive, the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its
power to tax.
Reasoning
- Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
- Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: … the zone shall have all the applicable
incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the
Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act
of 1991 and new investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted
> Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ
(b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties, national and local taxes of business
entities
(d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties
(f) liberalized banking and finance
(g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
- deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment
privileges
(discussing Sec 12 RA 7227)
Angara: … we must confine these policies to Subic and provide that “THE SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
 THE FOLLOWING POLICIES”… it is very clear that these principles and policies are
applicable only to Subic as a free port
… so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of pweors and description of the
zone to Subic but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic
zones within the baselands
… the provision now will be confined only to Subic
> RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
- privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment
and raw materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions
> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987
- tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives
> RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991
- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines
- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was granted by Congress
with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like and no express extension of the
aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation ;
also grant of privileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3
Proc. No. 420 which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the
enactment of RA 7227
- SC can void an act or policy of the political departments of the govt on two grounds –
infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion – and clearly, Proc. No. 420
infringes upon the Constitution
5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions is
has been granted.
Reasoning
- under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following
(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace
Air Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station… which may be transferred to it by the President
- such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually
has control over it subject to certain limitations of law
Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force and effect.
Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003
FACTS
- June 16, 2000 – NTC, pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers , issued
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and regulations on the
billing of telecommunications services:
1. Billing statements shall be received by the service subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days
from the end of each billing cycle . In case it is received beyond 30 days, SS shall have a
grace period within which to pay the bill. During such period, SS shall not be
disconnected from service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE).
2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt,
recorded message or similar facility excluding the customer’s own equipment.
3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards .
Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first
use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date it is fully
consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of first use to replenish SIM card. The
validity of an invalid SIM card shall be installed upon request of the SS at no addtl
charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call
using the cards.
5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT service whether postpaid or
prepaid shall be reduced from 1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The authorized rates per minute
shall be divided by 10.
- The MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP Law Center.
- June 22, 2000 – MC was published in the Philippine Star; MC provisions regarding sale and
use of prepaid cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity of MC
- August 30, 2000 – NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT service operators (SO)
which contained measures to minimize incidence of stealing of cell phone units . It
directed CMT SO to:
1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and
addresses of prepaid SIM card customers
2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to comply with MC
3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers using stolen cell phone units or cell
phone units registered to somebody else when properly informed of all information
relative to the stolen cell phone units
4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to all other CMT SO in order to prevent
their use
5. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid
identification cards.
- October 6, 2000 – NTC issued another Memorandum addressed to all PTEs, which
was “for strict compliance.”
1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on Oct. 7,
 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from date of first use.
2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October 7, 2000.
- Procedure
 October 20, 2000 – ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC an action for
Declaration of Nullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the Oct. 6 Memorandum ,
with prayer for injunction and TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds that-
a. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction
belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils
b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process Clause (deprivation of property)
c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of prepaid service by unduly prolonging
the expiration of prepaid SIM and call cards
d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement
are unreasonable
 GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention
 October 27, 2000 – RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing MC
 November 20, 2000 – RTC denied NTC’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Injunction is
granted, pending finality of the decision of the case.
 October 9, 2001 – CA granted NTC’s petition for certiorari and prohibition.
 January 10, 2002 – Motions for Reconsideration were denied by CA
ISSUES
1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case
2. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable
HELD
Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
 Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations, which should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to such
administrative agency. The regulations must be germane to the purposes of the law, and
not in contradiction to the standards prescribed by law.
 Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an administrative agency when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive nature, where the power to act
in such a manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
administrative duty entrusted to it.
1. Yes.
Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency
in the performance of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE function, the regular courts have jurisdiction.
The power of JUDICIAL REVIEW is vested in the courts by the Constitution. The Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction is only applicable when the administrative agency is exercising its QUASI-
JUDICIAL function.
- Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the gov’t.
- Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the admin. tribunal to determine technical matters of fact.
2. No.
Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an administrative
agency, in exercise of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE powers, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. Only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the
exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).
- Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable, records show
that petitioners have complied with such requirement:
- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered their protests and submitted
proposed schemes for the Billing Circular.
- After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the suspension and
reconsideration of the MC.
- Such letters were not acted upon and instead, NTC issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. This
was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of their requests.
Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of CA and its Resolution are
reversed. The case is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for continuation of the proceedings.
ART VII: EXECUTIVE
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
CORTES; September 15, 1989
FACTS
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to them and to
enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners state that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to travel may be impaired
by any authority/agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. They also
invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1) Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his own country, and (2) Art. 12, par. 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that “no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.” Respondents contend that the issue
of whether the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the state to security and safety of its nationals involves a political
question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof, they cite Sections 4 and 5 of the
Constitution. They also point out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from returning to
the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents.
ISSUES
1. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
HELD
1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
“executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of the specific powers so enumerated.
- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in light solely of the constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare.
2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country and the precarious state of the economy were the factual
bases for the President to conclude that the return of the Marcoses during that time would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more
chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive
action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. The preservation of the State – the fruition of the people’s
sovereignty – is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and
defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNAN [concur]
History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive
Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many
terms are applied to these powers: “residual,” “inherent,” “moral,” “implied,” “aggregate,”
“emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if
the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently.
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be
impaired only upon lawful order of the court, not of an executive officer, not even the
President. I do not think that we should differentiate the right to return home from the right to
go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more
preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.
CRUZ [dissent]
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that Aquino then invoked.
PARAS [dissent]
The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return to his own country, except
only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security.
PADILLA [dissent]
With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the
interest of national security, public safety, and public health. Power of the state to restrict the
right to travel finds abundant support in police power. The government failed to present
convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’ right to return to this country.
SARMIENTO [dissent]
The right to return to one’s own country cannot be distinguished from the right to travel and
freedom of abode. While the President may exercise powers not expressly granted by the
Constitution but may necessarily implied therefrom, the latter must yield to the paramountcy of
the Bill of Rights. Under the new Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only within
the limits provided by law. The President has been divested of the implied power to impair the
right to travel. The determination of whether the Marcos’ return poses a threat to national
security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive; the Court itself must be satisfied that
the threat is not only clear but also present.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
(SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION)
VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
LAUREL; April 21, 1939
FACTS
- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain the Secretary of the Interior (SI) and
his agents from proceeding with the investigation against him until this case was settled by the
SC.
- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice
conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena. He was found to have committed bribery,
extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession.
- Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that Villena be suspended so as to prevent
the coercion of witnesses. The President verbally granted the recommendation on the same
day.
- Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and instructed the Provincial Governor of
Rizal to advise Villena of his suspension.
- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against him and notifying him that
Emiliano Anonas was the special investigator of the case.
- Feb. 17, 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the formal investigation would begin. But
eventually postponed to March 28,1939 due to several incidents and postponements.
- Hence, this petition for Prelim Injunction. Villena contends that:
> SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to file administrative charges against
him, and to decide the merits of the charges because the power to suspend, to try and
punish municipal elective officials is lodged in some other agencies of the government.
> SI’s acts are null and void because:
+ SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to the President when SI suspended
him (Villena).
+ SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance with the provisions of law and
the provisions of law governing the trials and charges of against elective municipal
officials are those contained in sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.
+ SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and at the
same time the judge of the charges he filed against him.
+ SI’s action didn’t follow the procedure under Sec. 2188 of the AC, which requires that a
complaint be based on a private person’s or citizen’s sworn statement.
- Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to stop the SI and his agents from
proceeding further with the investigation until this case is heard; that SI be declared as without
authority to suspend him and order his reinstatement in office; that SI be declared as without
authority to file charges against him and to investigate such charges.
- His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was denied.
- The Solicitor General contends that:
> Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC expressly empowers the SI to
“order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department” and in connection therewith to “designate an official or person
who shall conduct such investigation.”
> Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena, doesn’t preclude SI from exercising the
powers stated in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec. 86. Also, that invoked section, must be read
in relation to sec. 37 of the Reorganization Law of 1932.
> Villena didn’t question the jurisdiction of the SI at the start of the investigation but merely
contended that such charges were not in accordance with law for the reason that they didn’t
bear the oaths of the complaints.
> The authority of a department head to order the investigation of a subordinate necessarily
carries with it by implication the authority to take such measures as he may deem
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, including suspending the officer;
plus, the President authorized the suspension.
> Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials by injunction from performing
any official act, which they are required by law to perform, or acts, which are not in excess
of the authority, and discretion reposed in them.
ISSUES
1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an investigation, by a special investigator
appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity against Villena.
2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena pending the investigation of the
charges.
HELD
1. The SI is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the
petitioner, Villena, and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
- Sec. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control, direction and supervision over bureaus
and offices under the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in relation to sec. 86 of
the same Code which grants to the Dept of Interior “executive supervision over the
administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political
subdivisions.”
- Citing Planas v. Gil: “ Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious
and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon knowledge of actual facts
and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.”
2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation.
- NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal approval or acquiescence of the
President to the suspension. It was said that if the justices were to accept that the President
had the authority to suspend the petitioner, then the suspension made by the SI, since the
President approved it, should be sustained. Then this was followed by the discussion
regarding certain acts of the President that could not be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive
that should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and
proclamation of martial law and the exercise of pardon.) But there were doubts regarding the
verbal approval by the President of the suspension if such could be considered as ratification
in law (with law giving the power to suspend being the Chief Exec.) Hence, the ratio.
Ratio “xxx…under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by par. 1, sec.
12, Art.VII of our (1935) Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or the law to act personally , the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the Gov’t, there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that it is,
the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
- The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines.”
- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality
is reality but the projection of that of the President.
- Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ “each head of a department is, and must be, the
President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law
to exercise authority.”
- As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain
matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in
the particular field.
- The President should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive
Department before his own conscience
Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT
BUENA; February 27, 2002
FACTS
- On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued Memorandum
Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to “effect the transfer of regional functions of that office
to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office…”
- On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC Secretary and LTFRB chair,
praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared “illegal and without
effect.”
- On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining DOTC
Secretary from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on April 8, 1996.
- On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo issued Department Order
No. 97-1025 establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office “as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR…”
- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order Nos.
96-735 and 97-1025 “null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the
provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative
department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other
office or employment in the Government.”
ISSUE
WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the DOTC Regional Office as an LTFRB
Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative power.
HELD
- The President may, through his/her duly constituted political agent and alter ego, legally and
validly decree the reorganization of the National Government in exercise of authority granted
by law.
- A public office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the Constitution
(fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the
third mode.
- The President, through Administrative Order No. 36 directed the various departments and
agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their
regional offices in CAR.
- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary directly and merely sought to implement
the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order.
- The President’s control over all executive departments come from Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, while the continuing authority to reorganize the national government is
vested by Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 (as
ruled in Larin Vs. Executive Secretary).
- Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: “without minimizing the importance of the heads of
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.”
Thus, their acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”
- The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB in CAR and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the
President to effectively reorganize the DOTC (and other departments).
- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. A
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this case was decreed “in the interest of
service” and “for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions
in CAR.”
- The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and 8 of Article IX-B of the
Constitution since the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, in effect, merely designated
to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the
direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular
LTFRB Regional Office.
BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
FERNANDO; February 28, 1977
FACTS
- Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against a domestic Mining
corporation’s (Benguet Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three mining claims
in Benguet, Mountain Province.
- Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim
- Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource maintaining the
sufficiency of her adverse claim
- At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a second motion for reconsideration and
ordered a formal hearing of the case
- Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review
ISSUES
1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary, upon a
question of fact, is justiciable
2. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can be precluded from
conducting his own inquiry
3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed to abide by the requirements of the
law
HELD
1. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the
courts unless there is a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of
evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so
long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made
Reasoning
Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumably the acts of the Chief
Executive
2. The State acting through the legislature through its power of imperium acting as a
sovereign regulating property to come up with rules with which to exercise its power of
dominium as owner of the property cannot act arbitrarily but in accordance with law
Reasoning
Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired
3. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of Mines “when affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive,” in which case the
aggrieved party may file a petition for review with this Court where only questions of law may
be raised
Reasoning No such affirmance by the secretary that’s why he ordered a hearing. It is but a
right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be
conducted
Decision : petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Unanimous
LANSANG V GARCIA
CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971
FACTS:
- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.
Other petitions:
L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense
L-33973 David vs Garcia
L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia
L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia
L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia
L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago
L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia
L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia
- August 21, 1971 – Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died, several injured
- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII
Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was that “lawless elements have created a
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State…” and
that “public safety requires immediate and effective action”
- Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on “reasonable
belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion.”
- August 30, 1971 – Proclamation 889-A amended Proclamation 889.
- September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 -- Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some provinces, sub-provinces,
cities, EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao,
North and South Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, Tarlac,
Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON it complied with ART III Section 1
par 1452 and ART VII Section 10 par 253 of the Constitution?
3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889
4. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON petitioners detained should be released
HELD
1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and
Montenegro v Castañeda (determination by the President of existence of any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be
conclusive upon the courts. The President, with all the intelligence sources was in a better
position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant of power to
suspend the privilege is neither absolute no unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege
of the writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so because it is stated in the negative –
“shall not be… except”), and like the limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by courts of justice.
- The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, and the
Executive is supreme within its own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes hand in
hand with the system of checks and balances. The authority to determine whether or not the
Executive acted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary.
2. YES.
a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-A, declared the existence of an
uprising -- “lawless elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for the avowed
52
“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.”
53
“The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof
when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”
purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection
and rebellion xxx”
b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be ‘invasion, insurrection, or rebellion’
or ‘imminent danger thereof’ and b) ‘public safety must require the aforementioned
suspension’ are PRESENT.
c. The 1st condition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already –
HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the existence
of a rebellion.
d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA (its infiltration of
several mass-based organizations, various killings and bombings, encounters with the military,
etc) and the threat it poses to the public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP and
its front organizations are capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there was a plan
of a series of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of property, etc.
3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession of intelligence reports, he
consulted his advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was critical. The suspension
of the privilege of the writ in the entire Philippines was justified as he could not have
ascertained the places to be excluded at the time of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted
the suspension.
4. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to them, the issue is moot and
academic. As to petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosario and Sison, still
under detention, they have been charged with violation of the Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of
overt acts covered by the PN 889. The PN 889 being valid, their release may not be ordered
by the SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary
investigation of the charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable cause is
found or otherwise , to order their release.
Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not unconstitutional. Petitions L33964,
L33965, L33982, L34004, L34013, L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to conduct investigation
and issue warrants of arrest or order of release as to petitioners still under detention.
All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [dissent]
- I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners still under detention should be
set free.
- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of
arrest for whatever offense they may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding
of probable cause. That is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable
search and seizure.
- To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes of the law are to be availed of is to
ignore the safeguard of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE
MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974
FACTS
- September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No. 1081,
proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines
- September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed by the President which provided an
order to the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals
named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in
the country and to take over the government by force
- Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the arrest of the
herein petitioners
- Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for habeas corpus
- Respondents filed their “Return to Writ and Answer to the Petition” and prayed that the
petition be dismissed
- Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners, except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr.
and Sen. Jose Diokno), were released from custody on different dates under a “Conditional
Release”
- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, imputing delay in the
disposition of his case, and asseverating that because of the decision of the Court in the
Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court in taking an oath to support the
New Constitution, he cannot “reasonably expect to get justice in this case”
- The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that there is a public interest in the
decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue,
unfair and contemptuous.
- The Court denied Diokno’s motion with a vote of 5 to 7
- Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Muňoz-Palma, Aquino and Barredo
voted to grant Diokno’s motion to withdraw petition
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the
proclamation of martial law
2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the
Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law
3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus
HELD
All petitions dismissed except those which have been previously withdrawn by the respective
petitioners with the approval of this Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons for his concurrence in the dismissal of
all the petitions.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the
proclamation of martial law (justiciability of the martial law proclamation)
CASTRO [justiciable]
- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the power to inquire into the “existence
of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to
determine the sufficiency thereof.”
- The judicial department can determine the existence of conditions for the exercise of the
President’s powers and is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But whether in the
circumstances obtaining public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is initially for the President to decide. The
President’s findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.
FERNANDO [justiciable]
- The action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the form of a legislative act
or an executive order could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary
has the duty to look into its validity. A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government may not be and obstacle to judicial inquiry. Its improvident
exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Necessarily then, it
becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches
have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political.
- The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by the Court is necessarily limited to the
ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension, in the light of the credible information
furnished by the President, was arbitrary. The question before the judiciary is not the
correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken.
- Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court sustained the presidential proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there was no showing of arbitrariness
in the exercise of a prerogative belonging to the executive, the judiciary merely acting as a
check on the exercise of such authority. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the
exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check, not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or the determine the wisdom of his act.
TEEHANKEE [justiciable]
"it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [stated in the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the country
under martial law as the case may be, since the requirements for the exercise of these powers
are the same and are provided in the very same clause] in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof."32 The Court stressed therein that "indeed, the grant of
power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred
upon by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is
limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as
an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress
its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended x x x.' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege
'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'-or under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent
danger thereof-'when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.' Far
from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essential to its existence, but also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be
exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and
define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist.
And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon
would be meaningless. Surely, the frames of our Constitution could not have intended to
engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility."
BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]
- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the determination of the constitutional
sufficiency of a proclamation of martial law by the President should not go beyond facts of
judicial notice and those that may be stated in the proclamation,, if these are by their very
nature capable of unquestionable demonstration.
- While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive, the Court’s inquiry into its
constitutional sufficiency may not, contrary to what is implied in Lansang, involve the reception
of evidence to be weighed against those on which the President has acted, nor may it extend
to the investigation of what evidence the President had before him. Such inquiry must be
limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what accords or does not accord with facts
of judicial notice.
- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own constitutional prerogatives vis-à-
vis the proclamation and the existing martial law situation, given the reasons for the
declaration and its avowed objectives.
1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all
the powers of the government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest
emanate from it.
2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate
arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means.
3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the Constitution, the
President is the specifically assigned protector of the safety, tranquility and territorial
integrity of the nation. This responsibility of the President is his alone and may not be
shared by any other Department.
4. The Constitution expressly provides that “in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, the Executive may place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law”
5. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the
Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial power vested in the
Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very whole of that power, without any
limitation or qualification.
6. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law readily reveals that the Constitution’s concern for individual rights and liberties is not
entirely above that for the national interests, since the deprivation it enjoins is only that
which is without due process of law and laws are always enacted in the national interest
or to promote and safeguard the general welfare.
7. Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution explicitly enjoins that the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is no similar injunction whether
expressed or implied against the declaration of martial law.
- Political questions are not per se beyond the Court’s jurisdiction…but that as a matter of
policy, implicit in the Constitution itself, the Court should abstain from interfering with the
Executive’s Proclamation.
ANTONIO [political question]
- The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of
sovereignty. To protect the nation's continued existence, from external as well as internal
threats, the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the
time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as
such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions"
- These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's protection and security have been
lodged by the Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the
Philippines, who is clothed with exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which the
powers shall be called forth.
- Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of
the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated the principle that when the
Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5 of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists,
and by reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas
corpus, this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the government.
And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist justifying the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts will presume that such conditions continue to
exist until the same authority has decided that such conditions no longer exist. These
doctrines are rooted on pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The
"doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any
person, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable
authority." The political department according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the
sole judge of the existence of war or insurrection, and when it declares either of these
emergencies to exist, its action is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial
department of the State.
MAKASIAR [political question]
AQUINO [political question]
FERNANDEZ [political question]
- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaim martial law. It is
similarly explicit in specifying the occasions for its exercise. "In case of invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public Safety requires it, he (the President
as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
- The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the President. The proclamation
and its attendant circumstances therefore form a political question.
- Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislature is justiciable
there can be no clearer example of a political question than Proclamation No. 1081. It is the
exercise by the highest elective official of the land of a supreme political duty exclusively
entrusted to him by the Constitution. Our people have entrusted to the President through a
specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a powerful
weapon. The people have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are so ominous and
threatening that this ultimate weapon of our duly constituted government must be used.
- The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the determination of the
occasions for its exercise. It is not given the authority by the Constitution to expand or limit the
scope of its use depending on the allegations of litigants. It is not authorized by the
Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater
Manila. Much less does it have the power nor should it even exercise the power, assuming its
existence, to nullify a proclamation of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by
the Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally charged. The Court's function in
such cases is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out whether the issues
constitute a political question or not. Its function is to determine whether or not a question is
indeed justiciable.
- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but justiciable, it is still valid because the
president has not acted arbitrarily in issuing it.
ESGUERRA [political question]
- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding; that the veracity or
sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by the Courts and that the question
presented by the petitions is political in nature and not justiciable. Whether or not there is
constitutional basis for the President’s action is for him to decide alone.
- Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia
MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]
With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon itself the grave responsibility of
checking executive action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and despotic exercise of the
presidential power granted under the Constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law; that responsibility and duty of the Court must be
preserved and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as the last bulwark of
democracy in this country.
WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the
Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law
CASTRO [valid]
- Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial law in cases not only of actual
invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of “imminent danger” thereof.
- The so called “open court” theory does not apply to the Philippine situation because our
1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of martial law even where
the danger to public safety arises merely from the imminence of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too simplistic for our day, what with the universally
recognized insidious nature of Communist subversion and its overt operations
FERNANDO [valid]
While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution stipulates, in a transitory provision, that:
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding,
and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless
modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions,
or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly.
TEEHANKEE [no pronouncement]
BARREDO [valid]
The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of anesthesia, since a major
surgery is needed to save the nation’s life.
MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]
The extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire country under martial law
was necessary. The President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary. An arbitrary act is
one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of the
actor, one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason, is without adequate
determining principle, nonrational, and solely dependent on the actor's will. Such is not the
case with the act of the President, because the proclamation of martial law was the result of
conditions and events, not of his own making, which undoubtedly endangered the public
safety and led him to conclude that the situation was critical enough to warrant the exercise of
his power under the Constitution to proclaim martial law
WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the relief of habeas corpus
CASTRO [legal]
- Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law, the arrest and detention of those
reasonably believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh beyond
questioning.
- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the arrest and detention of the petitioners
on the ground of reasonable belief in their complicity in the rebellion and insurrection. Except
Diokno and Aquino, all the petitioners have been released from custody, although subject to
defined restrictions regarding personal movement and expression of views. As the danger to
public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the continued detention of Diokno and Aquino
and the restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other petitioners are arbitrary, just as I am
not prepared to say that the continued imposition of martial rule is unjustified.
FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not automatically carry the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus]
It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be traced to the wishes of the
President himself, it carries with it a presumption of validity. The test is again arbitrariness as
defined in Lansang. While the detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered, as
dictated by the very proclamation itself, if it continued for an unreasonable length of time, then
his release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding.
BARREDO [legal]
- The imposition of martial law automatically carries with it the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in any event, the Presidential order of arrest and detention cannot
be assailed as deprivation of liberty without due process.
- The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to maintain order and to insure the
success of the battle against the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient means without
loss of time and with the minimum effort. This is self-evident. The arrest and detention of
those contributing to the disorder and especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and
comfort to the enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to mean anything at all.
ANTONIO [legal]
- The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality of arrest and detention of petitioners.
Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21, 1972 by the
President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and
detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the
President, as amended by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, may not now
be assailed as unconstitutional and arbitrary.
- It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of martial law, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on
the subject view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as an incident, but an important
incident of a declaration of martial law.
FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended
upon a proclamation of martial law]
MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the proclamation of martial law did not carry with it the
automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus]
- First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which as stressed in the early portion
of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and most immediately available
safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere implication.
The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec. 1(14), 1935 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution)
categorically states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except for causes therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is not one of those
enumerated.
- Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause, either under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935
Constitution, or Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constitution, provides specifically for three different
modes of executive action in times of emergency, and one mode does not necessarily
encompass the other, viz, (a) calling out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness,
etc., (b) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) placing the country or
a part thereof under martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes for the executive
action are the same, still the exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension of the
privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of martial law and vice versa.
- Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ when, with the
declaration of martial law, there is a total collapse of the civil authorities, the civil courts are
closed, and a military government takes over, in which event the privilege of the writ is
necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there is no court to issue the writ; that,
however, is not the case with us at present because the martial law proclaimed by the
President upholds the supremacy of the civil over the military authority,and the courts are
open to issue the writ.
IBP V ZAMORA
KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000
FACTS
- In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President Estrada, in a
verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
- The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the
PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order.
- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000, which contains the ff:
> Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national
security
> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary
criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former
police/military personnel. The police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence
of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include
those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/military
personnel
> Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations:
a. Conducted jointly by the National Capital Region Police Office and the Philippine
Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of
the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although
the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rest upon the AFP.
b. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a
focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention.
c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized to provide the mechanism,
structure and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and
assessing the security situation.
d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM City North Edsa, Araneta Shopping
Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations
and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
- On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Marines, null and void and unconstitutional because no emergency
situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for law
enforcement work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3), deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the
military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and deployment creates
a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government. It
also makes the military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution.
- The President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief.
The President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila
through more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. He further
stated that to heighten police visibility in the Metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with
each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only.
ISSUES
1. WON the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review
a. WON petitioner has legal standing
2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy , over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP
HELD
1. On Judicial Review
Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure.
a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
> Definition of locus standi
+ a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged
+ “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest
+ gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions
> The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case
> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. It
has not shown any specific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned government act.
2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines
Definition of political question
- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or
measure being assailed
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive department; if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the
Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to
the people themselves then it is held to be a political question
- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held to be a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
the one question
Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected,
is justiciable—the problem being one of legality or validity.
Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
- grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
- There is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out
the armed forces. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the proposition that grave
abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1 of the Constitution to
bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine
the necessity for the exercise of such power The full discretionary power of the President to
determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further
reinforced in the rest of the said provision.
- Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. There is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to
call out the armed forces
- Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
- Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief; when he exercises
this lesser power of calling on the armed forces, when he says it is necessary, his judgment
cannot be reviewed by anybody
- Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. On the other hand, the President has a vast intelligence network to gather
information.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it
infringe the civilian character of the police force
Constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement
- limited participation by the Marines
- real authority belongs to the PNP
Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the civilian character of the police force
- the real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution,
the PNP, and not with the military
- since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of
- the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols;
there can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution
 Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction
- Military assistance in: elections, administration of the Phil. Red Cross, relief and
rescue operations, conduct of licensure exams, sanitary inspections, conduct of
census work, etc.
- Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and, yet, never before questioned
- Mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy
Decision Petition dismissed
- 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, De Leon)
- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing)
- 1 on official leave (Bellosillo)
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
- Political questions are defined as those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government They have
two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.
- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one department has no authority to
inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the other
department. Whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute constitutes him the sole judge of the
existence of those facts. The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts. Once a
determination is made by the executive and legislative departments that the conditions
justifying the assailed acts exist, it will presume that the conditions continue until the same
authority decide that they no longer exist. The executive branch, thru its civil and military
branches, are better situated to obtain information about peace and order from every corner of
the nation, in contrast with the judicial department, with its very limited machinery
- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from
the exercise of his office. The Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to
make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. The Philippine Legislature or any
branch thereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any
judicial process
- (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to determine who shall be admitted to its
membership
- (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
- (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative process and the legislature’s exercise
of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference
- (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with Congress’power to discipline its
members
- (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light of the
subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existence of a quorum
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon is subject
to constitutional limitations, which are mandatory in nature.
- (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and
its power does not come from Congress but from the Constitution
- (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution was held to
be justiciable and not a political issue. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As
a constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive their authority from the fundamental
law and they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within or beyond constitutional
limits
- (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing
amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a constituent
assembly
- In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon
the Legislature
- The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive Power
- (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-
General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better position to know
the needs of the country than any other member of the executive department, and with full
confidence that he will perform such duties as his judgment dictates
- (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation of powers, it ruled that it was not
intended by the Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the field
of duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its
part within certain discretionary limits.
- (Forbes v. Tiaco) The President’s inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is
universally denominated as political, and this power continues to exist for the preservation
of peace and domestic tranquility of the nation
- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress except those resulting
from the need of securing concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the
exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the given appointive
office
- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President
has the power to determine whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has
terminated. It is within the province of the political department and not the judicial
department of government to determine when war is at the end
- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen
requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and his decision is final
and conclusive on the courts.
- (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political
question. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither
absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive
discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended
except only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and
(2) when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the
power, which may be inquired into by courts is defined by these limitations. The function of
the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the
President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
- (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the Court held that the issue of
whether or not the 1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the decisive
issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or without
constitutional ratification, was a political question
- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the President’s declaration of martial law. On
whether the validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable question,
the Court was almost evenly divided.
- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order by the
President was not subject to judicial inquiry. In times of war or national emergency, the
President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and government is in
peril
- (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review, the Court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of a person’s detention from the moment he was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition
- The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts
amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of
government
- It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines,
may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary;
and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these
conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective
sought to be attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional parameters
of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters is a
justiciable issue and is not a political question.
- On the use of Bernas’ opinion: The Constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the
people.
- When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume
jurisdiction even though questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.
VITUG
The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces of the Philippines, an executive
prerogative, to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis, does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its
extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.
MENDOZA [concur and dissent]
- The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an
actual case involving real parties with injuries to show as a result of the operation of the
challenged executive action
- A citizen’s suit challenging the constituti0onality of governmental action requires that (1) the
petitioner must have suffered an “injury in fact” of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this Court
- Only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best
position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented.
- Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do not
have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers
- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner and the consequent lack of an
actual case or controversy
SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TINGA; February 3, 2004
FACTS
- July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions
and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation
of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.
- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both
declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.
- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations.
- August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration.
- PARTIES
> Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)
o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces
o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation
had ceased.
> Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar
reviewers
o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous
public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional
rights of citizens
o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial
law
o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President
> Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected
o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and
therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2
> Sen. Pimentel
o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that
has no constitutional basis
> Solicitor-General
o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties
b. WON petitioners have legal standing
2. WON issuances of the President are valid
HELD
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was
merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These
are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.
- Justiciable even if moot
- Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review
- Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality
- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the
Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury,
then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)
- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury
from the governmental act that is being challenged. People’s organization status would not
vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances
(Kilosbayan v. Morato)
- SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation
2. Presidential issuances are valid
- Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend writ
of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law.
- 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires
the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora)
- It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The
Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and
foremost, Executive powers
- US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become
more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of
office
- President’s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers
- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists
and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson)
- President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without
factual basis.
- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law.
DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006
FACTS
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction ; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
- The declaration is premised military and police intelligence containing concerted efforts of
Left and Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo Government.
- On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017 (hence, the
same premise as PP1017), thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers
vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and
Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress
acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the
officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency
and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017.
ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members
of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. [4] They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the
facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS
NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS’ COUNSELS.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny
Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group
indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In
a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called
upon the people to “show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us
demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red
bands on our left arms.” [5]
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled “ Oplan
Hackle I ” which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military
Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets
including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. [6] Upon the advice of her
security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the
height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in
Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of
the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People’s Army (NPA),
a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents. [7]
Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the “ Magdalo’s D-Day would
be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that
members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately
ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to “disavow” any defection. The
latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: “ All SAF units are under the effective
control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable
loyalty.”
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco,
President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted
moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported
that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group’s
plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon
identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said
“it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo. ”[8]
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen.
Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge
number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to
the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers,
there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the
chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has
remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately
took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines
Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work
within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members
and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio “Ka Roger” Rosal declared: “ The Communist
Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the
coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of
rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it .”[9]
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front
(NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: “ Anti-Arroyo groups within the military
and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families
of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the
field.” He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo
conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June
2005, it is probable that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of
2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the
death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines
ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.[10]
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and
several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation.
She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain
of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible
trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in
the entire National Capital Region.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the
grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to
avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co.,
Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of
“censorship” or “prior restraint.” They also claimed that the term “emergency” refers only to
tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is “ absolutely no
emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485 , petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including
Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel
Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute “ usurpation of legislative
powers”; “violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration of martial law.” They alleged
that President Arroyo “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without
clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there
is necessity to do so.”
In G.R. No. 171483 , petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred
that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President
Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and
(3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to
redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400 , petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4[15] of Article II,
(b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article III, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section
17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017
is an “arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers .” And
assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that “ it
amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional
approval.” In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 “goes beyond the nature and
function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.”
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 are “ unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression,
including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution.” In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully
prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
- In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the
petitions should be dismissed for being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400
(ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz
et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President
Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017
does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the moot and academic principle precludes the Court from taking
cognizance of the cases
2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI),
171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal
standing
Substantive
3. WON Supreme Court can review the factual basis of PP 1017
4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
HELD
Procedural
1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34]
Reasoning
- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.[34]
- All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect
the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of
the protection given by constitutional guarantees. [35] And lastly, respondents’ contested
actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In
their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36] However,
they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot”
case may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or
continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. ” The present case
falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case
is of transcendental importance.
Reasoning
- Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” [37]
In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest .”
Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. ”[38] Succinctly
put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
5. or legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
- Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
- The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is
beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares
and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
- In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of
legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress
is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is
in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic
rights.
- In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60]
Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan ,[61] Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform ,[62] Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, [63] and Tañada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the
issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws.
- In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to
peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may
be granted standing to assert the rights of their members .[65] We take judicial notice of
the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits
for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
- In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential
injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the
issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, [66]
the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that
petitioner have locus standi.
- In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant
petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she
is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the
allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no
showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation.
Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect
the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental
importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
- It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the “liberality
doctrine” on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the
ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
“transcendental importance” doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the “PP 1017 cases.”
- This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
- Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT ARROYO AS RESPONDENT.
SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE
OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY,[67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE,
AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from
any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people[68] but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.[69]
Substantive
3. The President’s “calling-out” power is a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
However, “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” This ruling is based on Section 1,
Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government. [81] It speaks of judicial prerogative
not only in terms of power but also of duty.[82]
- However, “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s
decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid
down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. [83] It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis ” and that if he fails, by way
of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
- Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing
PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance
of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing
to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise of the
President of his/her calling out of power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the
factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally
permissible limits or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise. (This
interpretation was based on Article VIII, section 1
a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidation of laws (overbreadth doctrine) shall not be resorted
to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech; (2)
that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3) the Court has no
other alternative remedies available.
- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law shall be facially invalid only if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Reasoning
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim
that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.
- A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and
foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,[104] the US
Supreme Court held that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment” (freedom of speech) . Moreover, the
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.” Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful”
and “constitutionally unprotected conduct.”
- Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be
used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”[107] The reason
for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is
the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations not before the Court. [108]
- And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show
whether this situation exists.
- Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that
“a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. ”[110] It is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes
in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute
on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not
even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to
establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of
PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to
suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these
powers can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid
declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- The take care power of the President, which includes the power to enforce obedience of
laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts and the like.
- The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make “decrees” with the
same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos.
- In the absence of delegated authority from Congress, the authority of the President to
declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
- Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be punishable in the
absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor.
Reasoning
Calling-out Power
- The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated
powers. These are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of
the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the
armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion .”
Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue
PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the country.
- Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal
or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the
wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
- It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to
declare a “state of rebellion” (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national
emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” emanates from
her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4,
Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations
which shall have the force of an executive order.
- President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary
power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of
Sanlakas.
- Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial
Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein
that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.
- In his “Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice ” on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief,
the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong
medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics
of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him
to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual
freedoms.
- Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more
than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As
such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be
done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done
contrary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by
the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law
or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.
It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
“Take Care” Power
- The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
- As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, [115] the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing
laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect
that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, “execute its laws.” [116] In the
exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his
office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, [117] including the
Philippine National Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government. [119]
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?
- PP 1017 states in part: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. ”
- The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order
No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which allows her to issue executive orders,
administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders/circulars, general or special
orders. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the
period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. [121]
- The assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military ?
- As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she
cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She
can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders,
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and
as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a state of national emergency.
- The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency
under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to all
decrees x x x” but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she
issued PP 1017?
- During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
- This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect at the time of its
approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972
instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over “ the management, control and
operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National
Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present
national emergency.”
- Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President
Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s
emergency powers.
- A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the
second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
- Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of
a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to
war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national
emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress
(like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided
so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he
can declare a “state of national emergency.” Therefore, President Arroyo could validly declare
the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
- Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject
matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. [123] Considering
that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI relate to national emergencies, they
must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
- Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers . This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.[124]
- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.
The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
“the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
- Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying
the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.
Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies,
as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a)
economic, b) natural disaster,[129] and c) national security.
- “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe
of nationwide proportions or effect.[131] This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional
Commission.
- Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing
PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
- Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation , the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. Applied Challenge. The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the basis of their
misapplication or abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to implement them.
- The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to the parts of the
laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without prejudice to
the filing of necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions against specific abuses
committed by authorities.
Reasoning
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these
illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
- Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may
be abused and misabused [135] and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner
of application.[136] The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular
case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP
1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct
illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.
- Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its
implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of
the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power,
and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.[138] This is logical.
- President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General
orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.” They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his
subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and
regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who
receives them.[139] They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is
their source, and obedience, their object. [140] For these reasons, one requirement for these
rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
- G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.”
- Unlike the term “lawless violence,” the phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and
vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.
- The absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and oppression on the
part of the police or military.
- So far, the word “terrorism” appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835
dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime.
- P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws,
however, do not define “acts of terrorism.” Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it
is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts
constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions.
Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No.
5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the
due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the “acts of terrorism”
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY AUTHORITIES PURSUANT TO PP
1017 AND G.O. NO. 5
- In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he
was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP
1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted,
photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by
policemen who “held his head and tried to push him” inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was
charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 880 [145] and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he
was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was eventually released for insufficiency
of evidence.
- The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no person shall be arrested without
warrant. The recognized exceptions are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
- Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880,
all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists
were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[146] Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He
noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that
there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even
known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.[147]
- But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right
against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.
- “Assembly” under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution means a right on the part of the citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence
of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. This right is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, the right to assemble is
not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior
issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the
assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not
for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
- The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising
their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a
showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be
gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880
were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify
the arresting officers’ conduct.
- On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest
of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Their dispersal was done
merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously issued by
local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is
a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent.”[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the
exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it.With the blanket revocation of permits,
the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.
- Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the
local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits
after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present
danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.
The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a
fatal defect. When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a
democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
procedure.
- G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e.,
the freedom of the press. Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to
refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched without
warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the
search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the
search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily
Tribune offices.
- Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was “meant to show a ‘strong
presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the
rebels in bringing down this government.” Director General Lomibao further stated that
“if they do not follow the standards –and the standards are if they would contribute
to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General
Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’” National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to
“cooperate” with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He
warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast
outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national
security is threatened .
- The search is illegal. Rule 126, Section 4 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that
the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence
of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And
Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction
may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated
by the CIDG operatives.
- Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free
and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v.
Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of
the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum” newspapers. As a consequence of the
search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued .
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry .
- While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the “ Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG
operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for
publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and
the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak
only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.[153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This
Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most
defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should
always be obsta principiis.[154]
- Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the
Tribune’s offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal;
and that the same are inadmissible “for any purpose,”
- The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Suffice it to reiterate
that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O.
No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the
Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
- In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached
hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia.
Decision
- WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.
- G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. ” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence
of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
BAUTISTA V SALONGA
PADILLA; April 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission on Appointments
- Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chair of CHR, who took
oath of office before CJ Fernan. She discharged functions/duties of Chair of CHR.
- Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit info and
docs in connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR.
- Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her presence at a meeting to deliberate on her
appointment.
- Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on Appointments, saying why she considered Comm
on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment.
- As conveyed in a letter to the Exec Secretary, Commission on Appointments disapproved
Bautista’s “ad interim” appointment as Chair.
- Bautista’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
- A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres designated Mallillin as Acting Chair of CHR
pending resolution of Bautista’s case.
- Bautista filed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of restraining order to enjoin Commission of
Appointments not to proceed w/ deliberation on her appointment.
- Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order impleading Mallillin as respondent. She
also filed ex-parte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair and fr demanding courtesy
resignations fr officers.
- Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding Commission on Appointments, being
instrumentality of coequal branch.
- Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent appointment as Chair on Dec 17, 1988. This
appointment was for Pres solely to make.
ISSUES
1. WON appointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o
confirmation of Commission on Appointments
2. WON Pres could extend another appointment to petitioner on Jan 14, 1989 an ad interin
appointment or any other kind of appointment to same office of Chair of CHR that called for
confirmation by Commission on Appointments.
3. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make, the Pres can voluntarily submit such
appointment to Commission on Appointment for confirmation.
4. WON the petition has become moot and academic.
HELD
1. NO
- CHR Chair position is not among positions mentioned in Sec 16 Art 12 of Consti. Therefore,
appointment must be w/o review of Commission on Appointments.
- Unlike Chair/Members of CSC, COMELEC and CoA, the position of CHR Chair does not
have express provision that appointment should be with consent of Commission on
Appointments.
- Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c Pres is authorized by law to
appoint.
2. NO
- Bautista’s appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was a completed act on the part of the
Pres.
- No new appointment could be made to position already filled by a previously completed
appointment, accepted by appointee through qualification and assumption of duties.
- Even if Pres could submit to Commission on Appointments an appointment that belongs
solely to her, still, there was no vacancy on Jan 14 1989.
- Nor can respondents contend that the new appointment on Jan 14 was an ad interim
appointment bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to make. It extends only to
those where review of Comm on Appointments is needed. That is why those types of
appointments remain valid until disapproval by Commission on Appointments or until next
adjournment of Congress.
3. NO
- To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can from time to time move power
boundaries in Consti.
- Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where Consti confers none. If Consti made
appointment exclusive for Pres, Pres can’t grant power of participation in Commission on
Appointments. Nor can Commission on Appointments create power to confirm appointments
that Consti has reserved to Pres alone.
4. NO
- Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation, Bautista can be removed fr office anytime
at pleasure of Pres. And w/ disapproval of appointment/nomination by Commission on
Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal. Thus, issue is moot and academic.
SC disagrees and says petitioner came in timely manner and didn’t show intention of
abandoning her petition.
- EO 163 speaks of term of office (7 yrs without reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of
tenure in office (at pleasure of Pres). The diff bet term and tenure is impt. Consistent w/
CHR’s needed independence, tenure in office can’t be later made dependent on pleasure of
Pres.
Obiter
- Sarmiento III V. Mison
- Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are to be w/ and w/o review of
Commission on Appointments?
- Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1 st sentence of Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed
by Commission. Other appointments by President are to be made w/o participation of
Commission.
- Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs head is valid.
- Marbury V. Madison
- Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres’ power over the office is terminated in all cases,
where by law the officer is not removable by him.
Decision Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent against Mallillin; Petitioner Bautista is
lawful Chair of CHR, she may be removed only for cause.
Gutierrez Jr., Dissenting Opinion
Cruz, Dissenting
Griño-Aquino, Dissenting
SARMIENTO V MISON
PADILLA; December 17, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and Constitutional Law professors seeks to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. In addition, they would
want to enjoin Budget Secretary Guillermo Carague from disbursing Mison’s salary and
emoluments. The grounds for the petition was that Mison’s stay in Office is unconstitutional as
there was no confirmation coming from the Commission on Appointments that is “required” by
the Constitution. The Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene in the court
proceeding.
- The case was considered justiciable given that there is great public interest such as the need
for stability in public service. This disposed the question of whether this is the proper remedy
to question respondents right to the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
also that of the legal standing of the petitioners.
- The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is Article VII Section 16, which states
that:
“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”
ISSUE
WON Mison’s stay in Office was Constitutional
HELD
- Yes it is constitutional.
- Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers who the President is able to
appoint. The first group would be the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
The second group is composed of those officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law. The third group are those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Lastly, the fourth group, are those officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
- To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to look at the previous constitutions, the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all appointments is subject to the
approval of the Commission on Appointments while this was removed in the 1973 Constitution
wherein the President is able to appoint without the need for the approval of the Commission
on Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935 provision became a venue of “horse-
trading” (used for political leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too much power to the
President. The court held that the 1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground that
was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
- Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission they said that the clear
and positive intent of the framers were to make those officers in the first sentence the
individuals that are subject to the approval and confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments while those on the second and third sentence need not seek such confirmation.
Given that the position as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not under those
specified in the first sentence but the second, therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the
approval of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to exercise full
authority and functions and be entitled to his salary and emoluments.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-
Herrera, Sarmiento- concurring (11)
Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2)
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. The focus of the records was merely on
the first sentence of the provision and the not on the following sentences. Those are crucial
given that the position in question falls under the latter. Also, the records of the Constitutional
Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily
conclusive. In addition, strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it
gives Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President the power to
appoint those who are lower in rank. An irony arises when those in a lower position require the
approval of the Commission on Appointments while those who are higher in position would
not.
PIMENTEL V ERMITA
CARPIO; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session
- 8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments (composed of members of Congress) was
constituted
+ meanwhile, GMA issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments:
Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE)
Avelino Cruz (DND),
Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor (DENR)
+ the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office and assumed their duties as
acting secretaries
- 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen. Pimentel, filed this present petition for
certiorari and prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to declare these
appointments by GMA unconstitutional
- 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments, replacing respondents’ acting
capacity
- Sol Gen argues
+ petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad interim appointments after the recess of
Congress; prohibition may not enjoin acts already done.
+ the power to appoint is executive in nature—the Commission of Appointments, though it
be composed of members of Congress, is a body independent of Congress, and its
executive power emanates from the Consti.
+ only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada and Osmena, as members of the
Commission, possess standing in the present petition.
- Petitioners’ Argument
+ petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such appointments because no law grants such
a power
S10 Ch2 B4, EO 292: “…in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an
Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary…”
+ while Congress is in session, no appointments can be made w/o the consent of the
Commission
Respondents’ Argument:
-respondents assert that GMA can issue such appointments for the reason that no law
prohibits it
S16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: “The Pres. shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as
provided by…the law”
S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: the Pres. may appoint an officer already in service or any other
competent person
ISSUE
WON GMA’s appointment of respondents as acting secretaries w/o the consent of the
Commission of Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional
HELD
- the court held that the President may make such appointments, as the law expressly
provides it
 S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292 : “… the President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the function of
an office in the executive branch…”
- EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President by law—Congress is not the only
source of law
S17(3) of the previous provision states: “In no case shall a temporary designation exceed
one (1) year.” Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a safeguard against the
abuse of such appointments
- a department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President, that is, it holds a position
of great trust and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the undersecretary
automatically be appointed—the Pres. must appoint an alter ego of her choice.
J. Bernas, SJ.: “acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy; ad
interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress and require
submission to the Commission of Appointments for approval or rejection.”
- notwithstanding Bernas’ textbook definition, the court finds no abuse of appointments in the
present case as such were issued immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the
lapse of one year.
Decision Petition DISMISSED
MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
CARPIO; April 2, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim injunction and TRO. Petitioner
questions the appointment and the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC
- On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc
as “Acting Director IV” of the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her appointment was
renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a “Temporary” capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15, 2001
in the same “Temporary” capacity.
- On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, respondents Alfredo Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC
commissioners respectively, for a term of 7 years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their
oaths and assumed their positions with the President submitting their ad interim appointments
to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for confirmation. The Commission on
Appointments, however, did not act on their appointments.
- On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad interim appointments with the term and the
expiration remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2, 2008). The new appointees
took oath a 2nd time and the same was transmitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation on June 5, 2001. The Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on
the appointments resulting in the renewal of their ad interim appointments by the President for
the 3rd time on June 8, 2001.
- Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-in-charge of
EID and reassigned petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested reconsideration
for, citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees
prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and
citing COMELEC Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, filed an
administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the
complaint was pending, she also filed this action. She claims that ad interim appointments
violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, and on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails her
reassignment to the Law Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made
by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments in favor
of respondents.
- PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason for a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008.
ISSUE
1. WON Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and assumption of office as COMELEC chairman
is constitutional
2. WON issue is justiciable
3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully, WON the renewal of their
appointments and subsequent assumption of office was constitutional
4. WON petitioner’s removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of the COMELEC
as a collegial body)
5. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services Dept, in making disbursements
in favor of the new appointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD
1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment made by the Pres. in the meantime
that Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
Reasoning
- Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the Constitution says, “In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity,” an ad interim
appointment is not a temporary appointment. A distinction was made between the two in
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was held that an ad interim appointment
as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge
the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.
But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Phil. law. Ad interim is used
to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President,
in the meantime, while the body, which is originally vested with the power or appointment, is
unable to act.
- Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or acting
appointments, this Court then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Bautista
as unconstitutional declaring that, “It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and
aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate
one to act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the present Constitution,
this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of Haydee
Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC.
- Art. IX-A §1 should be harmonized with Art. VII §16. for to hold that the independence of the
COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointments
before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim
appointments.
- The original draft of Art. VII §16 did not provide for ad interim appointments, however, it was
reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would result from prolonged
vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim appointment has since been practiced by Presidents
Aquino, Ramos and Estrada.
2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the justiciability of the case by tackling the
requisites of judicial review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be lacking (actual
case/controversy was not raised)
> personal and substantial interest of the party
Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case. If Benipayo’s
appointment is unlawful, petitioner’s reassignment is without legal basis; if it is lawful,
then she has no cause to complain provided that it was done in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. Because of her personal and material stake in the resolution of the
constitutionality of respondent’s assumption of office, she has locus standi to raise it as a
constitutional issue
> exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity
It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue
was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional
issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same,
such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.”
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments when she filed
her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the
constitutional issue before a competent body.
> the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case
The Respondents claim that the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the
Law Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that unless the constitutionality of
Benipayo’s appointment is determined, the legality of petitioner’s assignment cannot be
determined, therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.
3. The phrase “without reappointment” in Art. IX-C §1(2) applies only to appointments by the
President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, regardless of WoN such
person appointed completes the term of office.
Reasoning The phrase “without reappointment” does not apply to the renewal of
appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and Borra because there were no previous appointments
that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
- The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. It
was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session of Congress. There was no final
decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired
term. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-
passed appointee as recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, their appointments were all for a fixed term expiring on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in
breach of the 7 year term limit.
4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel and the person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. He
has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim
appointment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC
en banc, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election
period.
5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did
not act in excess of his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave.
Consti Provisions cited:
Art. IX-A §1 The Consti Commissions… COMELEC… shall be independent
Art. IX-C §1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec chairman and commissioner: (7
years w/o reappointment). In no case shall there be appointment in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Art. VII §16 power of Pres. to make appointments during recess of Congress… effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
CONSTANTINO V CUISA
TINGA; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were
entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992. It seeks
to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto.
- The Financing Program was devised under President Corazon Aquino to manage the
country’s external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by means of two
debt-relief options: 1) cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or
2) allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds/securities.
- Petitioners challenge the Program as follows:
1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the
Constitution:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines…
That buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither “loans” nor
“guarantees,” and hence, beyond the power of the President.
2. That assuming the above as constitutionally permissible, it is only the President who may
exercise the power to enter into these contract and such power may not be delegated.
3. That the Program was made available for debts fraudulently contracted or void.
Petitioners rely on 1992 Commission on Audit report identifying several “behest” loans
contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the Marcos regime. That since these were
eligible for buyback or conversion, they would be void for being waivers of the Republic’s
right to repudiate the void or fraudulently contracted loans.
- For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. They also question the
standing of petitioners and the justiciability of the issues presented.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi.
2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication
Substantive
3. WON the scope of section 20, Article VII includes bond-conversion and buyback
4. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the
person of the President and may not be delegated
5. WON there has been grave abuse of discretion and violation of constitutional policies
HELD
1. The Court’s cognizance of this petition will not only determine the validity or invalidity of the
subject pre-termination (buyback) and bond-conversion of foreign debts but also create a
precedent for other debts or debt-related contract executed or to be executed in behalf of the
President by the Secretary of Finance. Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the
issues herein cannot be doubted.
- Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged facts, procedural
questions acquire a relatively minor significance. By the very nature of the power wielded by
the President, the effect of using this power on the economy, and the well-being in general of
the Filipino nation, the Court must set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the
justiciable issues presented by the parties.
2. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for adjudication.
One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation that respondents waived the Philippines’
right to repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not justiciable.
- Records do not show whether the so-called behest loans were subject of the debt-relief
contracts.
- Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans begs the
question of whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. Petitioners’
theory depends on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of the pre-existing loans, which
thus far have not been submitted to this Court.
- As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of the right to
repudiate void contracts. Respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not waive
any such right, it having incorporated a “no-waiver” clause in the agreements.
- Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should renege on obligations that are considered
as “illegitimate.” However, such course of action would have adverse repercussions. Among
the consequences is that the standard cross-default provisions in Philippine foreign loans may
come into effect, in which case, default even in one loan would be ground for other creditors to
declare default on other loans.
- In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the Courts but with the executive.
3. On Bond-Conversion
- An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the issuer, and the bond represents
the issuer’s contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal according to specific
terms. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the
President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of
certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous
than others.
- The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside from the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this
regard, it is noted RA 245 as amended by PD 142 entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of
Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes,
allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of bonds thus:
… the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the President… after consultation with the
Monetary board, is authorized to borrow… and to issue therefore evidences of
indebtedness… may be of the following types: Treasury bonds…
- Also under the foregoing provision, sovereign bonds may also be provided for the purchase,
redemption, or refunding of nay obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine
Government.
On the Buyback Scheme
- It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress that manages the country’s coffers
by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has
promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing. The
Court in Guingona v. Carague, held:
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefore
already exists under RA 4860 and 245, as amended, and PD 1967. In the light of this
subsisting authorization, Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation
by the Executive. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have
delegated its wisdom to the Executive.
- Specific legal authority for the buyback even without further action from Congress is
established under Section 2 of RA 240 thus:
… the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any moneys in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated… any interest falling due, or accruing on any portion of
the public debt authorized by law. He shall also cause to be paid out… the principal
amount of any obligations which have matured… or, if redeemed prior to maturity, such
portion of the face value as is prescribed by the terms and conditions under which such
obligations were originally issued.
- Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.
- Also, the Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate – let alone enumerate all – the acts
which the President (or any other public officer) may not do, and the fact that the Constitution
does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not mean that he or she
does not have that power.
4. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the
realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded, and
would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government.
- Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency. Though the President
is the Executive of the Government and no other, the heads of the executive department
occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity and should be of the
President’s bosom confidence and alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority subject to the direction of the President. And
it is upon the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with matters
regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of Government.
- And although there are powers vested in the President that may not be delegated are only
those that call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-
equal branches of government, e.g. power to suspend the write of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law (Par. 3 Sec 11, Art VII) and the benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec
11, Art VII), the power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not fall within the same
exceptional class.
- Another important qualification is that the Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of
the President is bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his
acts. A lack of showing that President Aquino countermanded the acts of respondents leads
us to conclude that the said acts carried presidential approval.
5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under the Program a best case scenario
would give a yield significantly lower than estimated by the Program and a worst case
scenario where what can be gained in the best case is lesser than what can be lost in this
worst case. In addition, petitioners postulate a more simple rescheduling agreement in place
of the debt-relief package. Petitioners allege therefore that the Program violates constitutional
state policies to promote a social order that will “ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation” and free “the people from poverty, foster social justice in all phases of national
development,” and develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.”
- The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution as litanized are not a panacea that
can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down. Insofar as the case at bar, the
court can make no conclusion other than that respondents’ efforts were geared towards debt-
relief with marked positive results and towards achieving the aforementioned constitutional
policies.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
- Indubitably, former President Aquino’s decision to honor outstanding debts of the Republic
was purely an executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For this reason, neither can
respondents be faulted for implementing the Program executed pursuant to that constitutional
executive policy.
- Also, that petitioners question the legality of several foreign loans necessitates a review of
the assailed contracts. Because the petitioners failed to substantiate the charges, the
argument cannot be addressed. A determination of the validity of such allegations requires a
review of factual matters. The Supreme Court is not a trier or facts. The proper action for
petitioners is to file their petition in the lower courts, which had concurrent jurisdiction over the
subject matter and which are better equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual
evidence in support of their allegations. This notwithstanding, there is nothing in this decision
to preclude the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman from initiating an
investigation of the alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily, probable cause must be shown in
order that prosecution may be brought to bear.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTER
FERNANDO; October 30, 1981
- Free Telephone Workers Union, herein petitioner, attacks the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 13054 (BP 130) in so far as it amends Art. 264 of the Labor Code delegating to
the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or
certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in
effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining. Petitioner contends that [a] BP
30 is an undue delegation of legislative powers [b] such conferment of authority may also run
54
"In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public
utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same."
contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-organization and collective
bargaining.
- Procedure
+ Sept. 14, 1981 notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the
following grounds: 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal
terminations and suspensions of officers and members as a result of the implementation of
said Code of Conduct; and 3) Automatic treatment as of sick leaves as AWOL with
suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement
+ Sept. 15, 1981, notification to the Ministry of compliance with the 2/3 strike vote and other
formal requirements of the law and Implementing Rules. Conciliation meetings called by the
Minister followed.
+ Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent's establishment.
+ Hearing at NLRC was set on Sept. 28. Petitioner filed petition to SC the next day. Court
issued resolution for respondents to file answer. After parties were duly heard y SC on Oct. 8,
case was ripe for decision.
ISSUES
1. WON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor
disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest
and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is unconstitutional for being violative
of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power
2. WON there is unconstitutional application of BP 130
HELD
1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to assume jurisdiction in a labor
dispute likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitration
does not constitute undue delegation of legislative powers.
Reasoning:
First. It lays down the premise. The power which would be denied the Minister of Labor by
virtue of such principle is within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best
determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. Such admission is qualified
by the assumption that the President "can make law." But what possesses significance for the
purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who "shall have control of the ministries." It
points that the adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended
Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. 55 Then it cites the expanse of
55
Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its
last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers vested in the President of
the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are
hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
the powers of the President by the provisions in the Constitutions both of 1935 and 1973.
(Note: My reading here is that the power by the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction in a
labor dispute is an executive function)
Second. The ponencia cited precedence to develop its argument. Villena v. Secretary of
Interior says that "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive.” In other words, without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
(Note: It used this doctrine in a later case Phil. American Management Co. v. Phil. American
Management Employees Association)
Third. Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of
a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation of such power may be discerned.
It cites Edu v. Ericta: To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted.
The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. [a] Distinction between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made;
[b] To avoid unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of' principle and lays down fundamental policy; [c]
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In People v Exconde: regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. BP 130 did not
violate these guidelines.
Fourth. The ponencia stressed the ruling in People v. Vera, saying that though scholarly and
erudite, it aroused apprehension for being to rigid. The liberal approach in the ruling in Edu v.
Ericta as reinforced in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices recognized that: “It would
be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope with the grave social and
economic problems of the present and foreseeable future would founder on the rock of an
unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-
delegation.”
- Also quoting Professor Jaffe: “The occasions for delegating power to administrative offices
[could be] compassed by a single generalization. Thus: Power should be delegated where
there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by
the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great
as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly
indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation
requires a course of continuous decision.”
2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the Ministry of Labor and the NLRC), this Court
is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is unconstitutional application.
Decision
[1] No. BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor
disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest
and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional
since there was no undue delegation of legislative power.
[2] There is no ruling on the question of whether or not BP 130 has been unconstitutionally
applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective
bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for
judicial determination
Dispositive Petition Dismissed.
Voting 11 concur, no dissent.
AYTONA V CASTILLO
BENGZON; January 19, 1962
FACTS
- December 29, 1961 – Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed Aytona as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank. Aytona took his oath of office on that day.
- December 30, 1961 – President-elect Diosdado Macapagal took his oath of office
- December 31, 1961 – Macapagal issued Administrative Order # 2 recalling, withdrawing and
cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date
Macapagal was proclaimed as the elected president by Congress)
- January 1, 1962 – Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim governor of the
Central Bank
- January 2, 1962 – Both Aytona and Castillo exercised the powers of their office but Castillo
informed Aytona of his appointment. The next day, Aytona was prevented from holding office
- Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged Castillo's right to exercise the powers of
Governor of Central bank. Aytona claims he was:
1. validly appointed
2. qualified for the post
3. and that the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void because
the occupation was occupied by him
- Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by AO 2.
ISSUE
WON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to issue the order of the cancellation of
the ad interim appointments made by the past President (Garcia) even after the appointees
had already qualified.
HELD
Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank.
- December 29, 1961 – Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments (not yet in session) a
communication submitting for confirmation ad interim appointments of several officials
including the Central Bank Governor in the person of Aytona. There were three other
communications regarding the same matter submitted on the same day.
- All in all there were 350 midnight appointments by Garcia.
- In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based on the following reasons:
1) outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new
President the opportunity to consider names in the light of new plicies
2) Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments
3) Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust because they were issued only upon
the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall
by the incoming President which would result to those deserving the appointment of
the new President to be declined and by-passed
4) Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire
on the part of the outgoing President to merely subvert the policies of the incoming
administration
- Many of the persons mentioned in the December 29 communication did not qualify.
- It is Malacanang's practice to submit ad interim appointments only when the Committee on
Appointments is in session so that only those who have accepted the appointment and
qualified are submitted for confirmation.
- It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of Macapagal,
Garcia's administration was no more than a caretaker administration. He was supposed to
prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President and he should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.
- The appointment of 350 people in one night could be regarded as abuse of Presidential
prerogatives.
- When the President makes appointments with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments,
he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his
selection either by previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter
explaining to them the reason for such selection.
- But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful because:
– the Commission that would consider the appointments is different from the one
existing during the time the appointments were made
– the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not fully approve of the
appointments
- The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order 2 and cancelled the midnight
appointments. There are precedents that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be
reconsidered. But none of the precedents have involved mass ad interim appointments.
QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT
BARRERA; February 29, 1964
FACTS
- May 20, 1960- Quimsing designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City
- Dec. 20, 1961- Pres. Garcia extended an ad-interim appointment to Quimsing to the same
position
- Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office, continued discharging functions of Chief of
Police
- May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s appointments were confirmed
- May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for
reconsideration of all the confirmed appointments was approved, and the Commission was
adjourned with no future date fixed for its next meeting
- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of
Police of Iloilo.
- Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the
position of Chief of Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been appointed and
duly qualified and the functions of which he was actually discharging.
ISSUE
WON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the motion for
reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon
HELD
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and
void, because said position was not vacant.
- The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments provide:
“SEC. 21: …Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table,
and this shall be a final disposit on such a motion
“SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the
President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while
a motion for reconsideration is pending.”
- The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s appointment, it was merely under intervention.
reconsideration. It has been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s appointment was - 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to
delivered to Malacanang. This, as well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that execute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said
judgment.
the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding
- 19 August 1937 is the date set for hearing on the various motions for CFI’s consideration. On
the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the appointment. In this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what they alleged
fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed. was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation case may look into the
PEOPLE V VERA circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse
LAUREL; November 16, 1937 the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its
own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the
parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
FACTS
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would
- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case “People v. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.” filed in
result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the Philippine judicial system>
CFI Manila. In the said case, HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as private
prosecutor.
ISSUES
- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing
1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings
MCU to imprisonment.
2. if YES, WON said Act is constitutional
- 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a slight modification of the duration of
a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive
imprisonment.
b. WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power
- 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by MCU denied by Phil SC.
c. WON the Probation Act violates Bill of Rights provisions on equal protection of the laws
- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil SC. MCU seeks to elevate the case
3. WON the entire Act should be avoided
to US SC.
- November 1936: US SC denies petition for certiorari.
HELD
- 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCU’s petition for leave to file a 2 nd alternative MFR or
1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
new trial; & remands the case to CFI Manila for execution of the judgment.
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
- 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221
determination of the case. <lis mota> The question of the constitutionality of an act of the
of the Phil Legislature. CFI Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, refers the application to
legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions BUT resort may be made to extraordinary
the Insular Probation Office (IPO)
legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available,
- 18 June 1937: IPO recommends denial of MCU’s application for probation
are not plain, speedy and adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action of quo
- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila, 7th branch with Judge Jose O. Vera
warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an application for injunction to restrain action
presiding. HSBC & the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate oppositions to the granting of
under the challenged statute, & even on an application for preliminary injunction where the
probation. HSBC attacks constitutionality of Act No. 4221 on the following grounds: equal
determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case, or through
protection of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue
petitions for prohibition and certiorari.
delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows prov’l boards w/ power
- Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516: Philippine SC is granted
to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces).
concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or
- 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Vera of CFI Mnla promulgates resolution with a finding that
persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising
MCU is innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latter's petition for
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction.
probation.
- General rule: the question of the validity of the criminal statute must be raised by a
- 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution denying probation & notice of
defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. BUT in
intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions for new
cases where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights,
reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed
and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to
by 33 (34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a
bring the issue of the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly
petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion
administration of justice.
was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without
- The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.”) HSBC files opposition to motion for
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. General rule: the merit of
prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of
prohibition from enforcing that statute. A CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court of
limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221
of the Philippine Legislature. It is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been
squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court
by the private prosecution.
- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. The
authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in
advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements
of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the
right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by
it provided belongs to the executive department.
- Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not consider any attack made on the
constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are
not affected by its operation. The power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which
the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any
case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility.
- General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a
statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a
court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of
the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought
to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.
- General rule: the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so
that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised
in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. BUT courts, in the exercise of sounds
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any
stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Same is true in civil cases if it
appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. Also, a
constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves
the jurisdiction of the court below
- General rule: the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having Act No. 4221 set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that
the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to
its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. The state is always interested
where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
- A judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of
constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine
the right of a party litigant. An officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its
provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute
unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the
statute be unconstitutional. Executive officers (e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer)
should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
- The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that
time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary,
has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People
of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination,
and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and
treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to resolve the
instant case? While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to
waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points.
- General rule: the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a
statute the validity of which is attacked. There is no doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his privilege
to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
- Moreover, the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never
before been passed upon by the courts; many persons accused and convicted of crime in the
City of Manila have applied for probation; some of them are already on probation; more
people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first
conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of
suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now
resolved.
- Also, in Phil SC’s ruling in an analogous situation in Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court
said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are
affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted
by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we
have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide
the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the
general rule." Phil SC’s ruling on this point was sustained by the US SC. “A more binding
authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.”
2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1,
and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature
invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme
law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith.
- Fundamental criteria: all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed
to be within constitutional limitations. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive
have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been
true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to
violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the
solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. The judiciary
ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an
elective Chief Executive.
- The President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionality of the Probation Act. In a message dated September 1, 1937, he
recommended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the
NA repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said
bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish. In vetoing the
bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the
reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding
upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination.
Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our
judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper
course of action to take in a given case. We are independent of the Executive no less than of
the Legislative department of our government — independent in the performance of our
functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and
unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we
understand it.
- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said
Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221 vests in the Governor-
General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines
and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines (A7, s11(6)). Our
Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive
to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he
may deem proper; and to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But the pardoning
power has remained essentially the same.
- Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the
power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. Where the pardoning power is conferred
on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with
or control the proper exercise thereof.
- Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: US SC ruled in 1916 that an order
indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. Under the common law the power of the court
was limited to temporary suspension and the right to suspend sentence absolutely and
permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary.
But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded.
- US v Murray: when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to
serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant
him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In
this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was
assumed. US SC denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentence. The court pointed
out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the
future.
- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit held that the constitutionality of
Probation Act of March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the same was held in no manner to encroach upon the
pardoning power of the President.
- 1916: US SC, in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the
requisite power to enact probation laws. A federal probation law was actually enacted in 1925.
The constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the US SC in 1928 and consistently
sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases. The Philippine
Legislature, like the US Congress, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to
fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has
defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has
demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts -- particularly the trial courts -- large discretion in
imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice
can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best
determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer.
<Revised Penal Code, Indeterminate Sentence Law, Parole Act, Juvenile Delinquency Law,
(Adult) Probation Law, etc show the intention of the legislature to “humanize” the penal laws.>
- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend
the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the
pardoning power of the executive. Other cases, however, hold contra. Phil SC elects to follow
the long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however
characterized.
- Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district
and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. Probation, the power to suspend
sentence, was always a part of the judicial power. It simply postpones the judgment of the
court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil
disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. The power to grant
reprieves and pardons, on the other hand, was always a part of the executive power. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It
releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity.
- Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
Snodgrass vs. State: the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of
the Governor to grant reprieves. A reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day
certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. A commutation is but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment.
- State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the
power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a remission
of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense. "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. "Reprieve" or
"respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time, a postponement of
execution, a temporary suspension of execution.
- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
b. Under the Consti, gov’t powers are distributed among 3 coordinate and substantially
independent organs: legislative, executive and judicial. Each department derives its authority
from the Constitution, the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance
of the matters within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (A6,s1). The
Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities
by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest , an
accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to local authorities;
(2) to such agencies in US territories as Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and
(4) to those whom the Constitution itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the
President). The case before us does not fall under any of these exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of
any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent matters of detail
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer
or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province,
all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the
executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The legislature may
delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain
facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from
Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may
be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then may provide that a
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the
specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in
practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in
their respective provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may
not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular
localities. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature
can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is manifestly
contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our
constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are
denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses,
damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to
other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which
should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances.
While we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to
pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of
criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be
vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a
law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what
may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this
power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are
no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect.
(Angara case)
- We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void.

c. This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision
thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. BUT what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated.
- Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
- In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result
in every case. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment
of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But
whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation
in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed.
- There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits
of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it
permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. Statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and
the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
- Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in
a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. What remains must express the
legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.
- In the case at bar, section 11 (which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation
officers) is so inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of
the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical
benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of
that system.
- Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us
to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said
regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We
are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any
purpose — not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity. The clear intention and
policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation
officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the
Probation Act apply thereto.
- Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation
laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call
the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It takes advantage of an opportunity for
reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform.
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the
writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
TORRES V GONZALES
FELICIANO; July 23, 1987
FACTS
- an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres,
presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
- Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (two
counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs, (10) mos and (22)
days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These
convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000.
- On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."
Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
- On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of
Prisons and Espuelas us. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The petitioner had been charged with
20 counts of estafa, which were then pending trial before the RTC, and convicted by the RTC
of the crime of sedition, which was then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges
have been brought against the petitioner, although some have been identified as dismissed.
- On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing her of
the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously
granted to petitioner.
- On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
- On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence.
- Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that
he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment.
Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was
arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights
under the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD
- Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the determination if the parole had been
breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and that such
determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his
liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, the Court held that "he
[could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which
his recommitment was ordered." Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGen's determination
(rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his
parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive
upon him.
- Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is extended upon the conditions
named in it, and it is accepted upon those conditions. The governor may withdraw his grace in
a certain contingency, and the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has
arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had
expressly contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had
violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to
prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales
rulings. "Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and
been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to
sedition with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence
and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous
exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine
whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been entrusted."
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the
following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no judicial pronouncement
of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial
and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is
not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
- A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of
course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which
he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed
upon him. Since Art 159 RPC defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict
who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Art 159.
- In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art 159 RPC,
upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC.
Decision Petition dismissed
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
- As many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction,
without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon.
- Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima
facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond
reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction.
- The executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it through pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
indubitable evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation of presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
commission in a judgment of conviction. - If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense
The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Sec 64(i) RAC, the President may in his judgment committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the
determine whether the condition of the pardon has been violated. defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not
- I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as the condition does not involve the do so.
commission of a crime but, say, merely requires good behavior from the pardonee. - (This case is under “Executive” of our outline, and the following, although really obiter, is
most relevant to this section)
BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ
FERIA; January 21, 1949 Difference of Amnesty from Pardon
Pardon Amnesty
FACTS -granted by the Chief Executive, thus a -by proclamation of the president with the
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life private act which must be pleaded and concurrence of the Congress, and is a public
imprisonment, while Barrioquinto’s trial was delayed because he was arrested later than proved by the person pardoned and which act of which the courts may take judicial
Jimenez. Both submitted their cases to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission pursuant to the courts may not take notice of. notice.
Proclamation No. 856 which the said commission remanded to the CFI of Zamboanga without Granted to one after conviction Granted to classes of persons or
deciding if they were entitled to amnesty or not on the ground that neither of them has communities who may be guilty, generally
admitted to the commission of the offense. before or after institution of prosecution and
sometimes after conviction
ISSUE -looks forward and relieves offender of -looks backward and abolishes and puts into
WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the benefits of Proclamation No. 8 consequences of crime; abolishes and oblivion the offense itself, as though he had
(grant of amnesty) forgives punishment, but doesn’t abolish civil committed no offense
liability
HELD Doesn’t restore rights to hold public office, Rights not affected as the offender is treated
- In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, suffrage, unless expressly restored by pardon as if he committed no crime at all
1946, it is not necessary that he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense
Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the applications for amnesty of petitioners
with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense. For whether or not he admits
unless courts have already decided WoN they are entitled to benefits of amnesty.
or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should
conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on
SEPARATE OPINION
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
PERFECTO [concur]
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable
services to the nation”.
To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission
- Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts and Amnesty Commissions
only the following elements are essential:
should apply the benefits granted to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
1. that he is charged or may be charged with an offense penalized under the RPC, except
those against chastity or for purely personal motives;
56
2. that he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy;
Proclamation No. 8 (dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of
the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
3. that it was committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when the
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 area where the offense was committed was actually liberated from enemy control and
to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes
against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives. occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission,
the latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the
proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the
acts constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be charged.
TUASON [dissent]
- As to the determination of the pretended right of the defendants, to the benefits of amnesty,
the two orders of the Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and final as far as the
Commission is concerned. The fact that the defendants denied having committed the crime
imputed to them was cited by the Commission as ground for its decision to turn down their
application. That circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act. The Commission
has thus amply performed the duties required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the
matters of investigating and deciding.
- The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the
President. They are not courts; they are not performing judicial functions, and this Court has
no appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez) - The Court
can order the Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission how to act. How or for
whom a case should be decided is a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to
control or review. The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and the duty
to exercise judgment. In reference to any matter in which he is required to act, it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical
Examiners)
- Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not
committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the
Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove
the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he
is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency for
one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is not
responsible.
MONSANTO V FACTORAN
FERNAN; February 9, 1989
FACTS
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion
A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment and payment of fine. Petitioner appealed her conviction to the SC which
affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration, but while the motion was pending,
she was extended absolute pardon on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos, which
she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote Calbayog
City Treasurer requesting that she be reinstated to her former post. The Finance Ministry ruled
that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment
not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon, but she still has to pay.
Seeking reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed
on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted, and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of
her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982. Petitioner contended that:
 she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
 she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
ISSUES
1. WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
2. WON petitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities notwithstanding pardon.
HELD
1. Ratio Pardon is defined as “an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of
the executive magistrate xxx and not communicated officially to the Court. “This was governed
by the 1973 Constitution.
Reasoning
- People v. Lising
“xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendent elite.
“In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. xxx “
- The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable
during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict
from public office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.
- In the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
the conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction
by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof, as opposed to
the Ex Parte Garland, Pelobello, and Cristobal cases. It involves forgiveness, and not
forgetfulness.
- While the Court is prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of
a criminal indictment if only to give a meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the
fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he
should be treated as if he were innocent. Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the
crime.
- Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit
of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character.
2. As for the exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity, the Court cannot oblige her.
Civil liability is governed by RPC, and subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Decision The assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. is affirmed.
1. Petitioner is not automatically reinstated, and must apply for appointment to her former
position.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to any backpay, and must pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50.
MACAGA-AN V PEOPLE
FELICIANO; July 39, 1987
FACTS
- The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of various municipalities of Lanao del Norte
and Lanao del Sur, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Treasurer's Office of Lanao del
Sur, as well as the Provincial Auditor and the Assistant Provincial Auditor of Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners were charged and convicted in 33 cases for estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents (Article 315, in relation to Article 17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a
decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total amount of
Government funds (treasury warrants) involved was somewhat over P2.7 million.
- The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty
Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2 February 1985, they were
granted conditional amnesty by the said Commission, subject to the approval or final action of
the President of the Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1082, dated 2 February 1977. The
Amnesty Commission, the petitioners continue, endorsed the amnesty applications of the
petitioners to the President, recommending approval thereof or grant of executive clemency to
the petitioners. The petitioners' amnesty applications are said to have been submitted to the
Office of the President by the then Presidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Former Governor
Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, the petitioners further state, made written representations dated 27
January 1986 with former President Marcos concerning the petitioners' applications during a
political rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22 January 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently
wrote on the upper righthand corner of former Governor Dimaporo's letter the following:
"Approved" and signed the same with a partly illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that
the original copies of the amnesty papers were in the possession of then Presidential Adviser
Joaquin Venus and were lost or destroyed at Malacañang "during the February 1986
bloodless military revolution" and could not now be located.
- The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty were never available to the
petitioners under P.D. No. 1182 as amended by PD 1429. They further contend that the
applicable law to them is PD 1082, which granted amnesty to those resisting the duly
constituted authorities in several parts of Mindanao.
ISSUE
WON President Marcos’ grant of amnesty to the petitioners is in accordance with law.
HELD
NO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws, which he himself promulgated in the
exercise of his concurrent legislative powers, are void and of no effect.
Reasoning
The benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners under PD 1182.
- Under said law, the crimes to be amnestied must have been for violations of subversion
laws or for crimes against public order under the RPC. Among those disqualified from
amnesty under PD 1182 are those “who, while holding public office or employment…
diverted public funds from the lawful purpose for which they had been appropriated .” In the
instant case, petitioners were charged with and convicted of Art. 315 viz Art 171, RPC. Art.
315 is under Crimes Against Property, while Art. 171 is under Crimes Against Public
Interest. Clearly, petitioners are among those expressly disqualified under PD 1182.
Neither were petitioners able to avail of amnesty under PD 1082.
- The offenses for which amnesty may be granted under PD 1082 are acts “penalized by
existing laws in the furtherance of… resistance to the duly constituted authorities of the
 Republic…” by members and supporters of MNLF, Bangsa Moro Army and other “anti-
government groups with similar motivations and aims.” The “resistance” referred to is
typified by the offenses of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or conspiracy to commit rebellion
or sedition, all offenses with a political character and all of which are embraced in the RPC
under Crimes Against Public Order. On the other hand, the acts of which petitioners were
convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and consisting simply of
diversion of public funds to private profit.
- We do not discount the possibility that the former President did in fact act in contravention
of PDs 1082 and 1182 by granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that by such act,
he may indeed have aroused expectations (however unjustified under the terms of existing
law) in the minds of the petitioners. If such be the case, then the appropriate recourse of
petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any other court, but rather to the Executive
Department.
Decision Petition denied.
ARANETA V DINGLASAN
TUASON; August 26, 1949
FACTS
- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in
virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive
Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192,
which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a
writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the
Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials
refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from
the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive
Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic
uf the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of
the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is
Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in
connection with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in
November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this
Court to prevent the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that
amount or any part of it.
- Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring
a State of Total Emergency as a Result of War involving the Philippines and Authorizing the
President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to have
any force and effect, thereby rendering the assailed Executive Orders null and void.
ISSUE
WON the emergency powers delegated to the President had ceased when Congress held its
regular session
HELD
YES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session
on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law.
- Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The
intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be published, the purpose
to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution.
- Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
- The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean
restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers,
"must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory
would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.
- The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with
the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation,
the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which
was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law; for Congress
might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of
the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this
would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier
for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and
ought not to be, the law.
- Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express
provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear
manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to
provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency
Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to make a provision for its
termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects, and incidents of the
delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations
promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the
President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones
already annulled by the legislature.
- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when Congress
is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative
bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually
nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested,
be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the
anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders
promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could
treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. In entire
good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former
President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill
on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive
order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.
- Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the
inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the
President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy
action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by
him under the powers herein granted."
- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at
which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each
meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National
Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to be the first and last and
did not think that upon the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what
reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of
subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in
the form of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as unimportant, as
the initial one.
- As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act
No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and
in the carrying out of the law. Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was
not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his
autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would
become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatic extinction of the law
upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify
that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.
- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He
said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident
that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers
upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National
Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the
delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its
authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of
democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a
complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. The period that
best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of
the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment,
was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the
convening of that body.
- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly is given effect. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation
or only such subjects as the President may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the
Constitution.) In a regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
- After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the
separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of
government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers
in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have
given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all
its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is
preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious.
Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been
copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or
when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under
our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act,
are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.
Decision Petitions GRANTED.
QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARD
BARRERA; September 30, 1963
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus
and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by the petitioner-appellants
- The petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board (DB) with having purchased
$130,000.00 US dollars without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines
and having remitted the same to HK; and three of the petitioner-appellants with having
attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and US Governments in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars.
- After filing of deportation charges , presiding member of the DB issued a warrant of arrest
for the said aliens but upon filing of a surety bond and cash bond, the petitioner-appelants
were provisionally set free.
- The petitioner-appellants then filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds
that (1) deportation charges do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens and (2) the
DB has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges, but was denied by the DB. The petitioner-
appellants then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition which was remanded
to the CFI of Manila. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining DB from
hearing the deportation charges against the petitioners, pending final termination of the
habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. DB filed its answer to the original petition,
maintaining that the DB, as an agent of the Prexi, has jurisdiction over the charges and the
authority to order their arrest. CFI dismissed the petition , hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the deportation charges constitute legal ground form deportation of the petitioner-
appellants
2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the
alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the DB
HELD
1. Yes. The act of profiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing of US dollars violate Central Bank
regulations and could be treated as ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, which is a ground for
deportation under RA 503 amending Sec 37 of CA 613.
2. No. Official functions requiring the exercise of discretion such as the power to arrest cannot
be delegated to an agent of the President.
Obiter
2 ways to deport an undesirable alien:
 Section 37, CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940) : Commissioner of Immigration
empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefore BUT did
not concentrate exercise power to deport to the Commissioner, as seen in Sec
52 [which is the repealing clause of the Immigration Act, which expressly exempted Sec
69 of Act 2711
 Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Act No. 2711): only indicates that
the Executive or his authorized agent could only deport/expel/exclude from RP aliens
upon conducting a prior investigation of the ground of such action and the rest of it
indicates the procedure concerning the protection of the said alien during the deportation
proceedings. [indication of the recognition of the existence of power of the executive to
deport aliens]
President’s power under Sec. 69, Act 2711 may be delegated: proofs through history
 EO No. 494 (first EO of Gov-Gen Murphy, 1934): constitute a board to take actions
on complaints against foreigners, conduct investigations and make recommendations
 EO No. 33 (Quezon, 1936): creation of DB to receive complaints against aliens, to
conduct investigations (under Sec 69, Act 2711) and make recommendations –
authorized by President
***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO ORDER ARREST OF THE
ALIEN
 EO 69 (Roxas, 1947): orders respondents in deportation proceedings to file a bond
with the Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their appearance and facilitate execution
of deportation order whenever the President decides the case against the respondent
***TAKE NOTE: Filing of BOND, NOT AUTHORIZE ARREST OF THE RESPONDENT
 EO 398 (Quirino, 1951): reorganized the DB and authorized the DB, upn filing of
formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue warrant for the arrest of
the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless
he files a bond (so here, PRESIDENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED ARREST OF
RESPONDENT ALIENS)
On rights of the accused: Sec 1, ART III of 1935 CONSTI = Sec 2, ART III, 1987
CONSTI
This provision specifies that the probable cause must be determined by the judge after
examination under oath of the complainant and the witness produced unlike that of the 4 th
Amendment, Philippine Bill, or Jones Act which does not determine who exactly would
determine the probable cause for the order of arrest. The Consti is silent on whether a
warrant of arrest may be issued upon determination of the probable cause by other
authority besides the Judge.
*DURING INVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE ALIEN BE ARRESTED. IT
IS ENOUGH THAT A BOND BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THE APPEARANCE OF THE ALIEN
DuriNG THE INVESTIGATION.
Decision EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest
upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the
conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal.
Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed cancelled. Decision appealed from affirmed
with modification.
ART VIII: JUDICIARY
DEMETRIA V ALBA
FERNAN; February 27, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977” on the ff. grounds:
o it infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public
moneys
o it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for
which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
o it allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by
the Constitution in approving appropriations
o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers
o the transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget
Minister and the Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction
- Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He
further contended that:
o The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of
the 1973 Constitution
o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to
enjoin the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of responsibility
- On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment
- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold
the resolution of the present case in abeyance
- The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as ground
therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution, rendering the petition moot and academic
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES
- The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that: “This Court will not disregard
and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become
moot and academic.”
- As regards taxpayers’ suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not
- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by
the Constitution “in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.”
2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to
Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is null and void .
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: “The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.”
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.”
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical
- For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway
- The purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred were specified
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5),
and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office cases that during the eight year period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription did
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard to not run. (cases decided: Day v. CFI, Republic vs. Hernaez.
WON the funds to be transferred are savings, or WON the transfer is for the purpose of - Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An unconstitutional act, for that matter an
augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the
- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
delegation of legislative power - SC said, in Agbayani vs. PNB that orthodox view is unrealistic and that until after the
judiciary declares its invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect.
DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FERNANDO; April 29, 1971 DE LA LLANA V ALBA
FERNANDO; March 12, 1982
FACTS
- Francisca De Agbayani obtained a P450.00loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939 maturing on FACTS
July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage - The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing
- As of November 27, 1959 the loan balance was P1,294.00 the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purposes". BP 129 mandates that
- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of Justices and Judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except
Pangasinan Provincial Sherriff for the recovery of the unpaid loan balance the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the
- August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit against PNB and Sheriff alleging that 15 years having inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the Judiciary. The
elapsed from the date of maturity the mortgage have prescribed. intent of this Act is to attain (1) more efficiency in the disposal of cases, (2) improvement in the
- PNB prayed for the dismissal since the defense of prescription would not be available in the quality of justice dispensed
period of March 10, 1945 , when EO 32 providing for a moratorium on debts was issued, to by the court, (3) democratization of social and economic opportunities and the substantiation
July 26, 1948 when RA 342 which extended the period of moratorium was declared invalid, of the true meaning of social justice.
were to be deducted from the time during which PNB took no legal steps for the recovery of - Procedure De La Llana,a judge, together with other petitioners filed a Petition for
the loan Declaratory Relief and/or Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget,
- Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from
taking any action implementing BP 129.
ISSUES
1. WON a statute subsequently adjudged as invalid should be deemed to have force and ISSUES
effect before the declaration of its nullity. 1.WON the petitioners have legal standing.
2. (if yes) WON prescription ran during the eight year period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in 2.On Constitutionality of BP 129
force. a. WON there was lack of good faith on the part of Legislature in its enactment.
b. WON the abolition of an office by the Legislature is valid.
HELD c. WON the provision of BP 129 (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances of
1. YES Prior to the declaration of nullity a challenged legislative or executive act must have members of Judiciary by the Executive) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
been in force and effect. power.
- The actual existence of a statute, prior to the determination of unconstitutionality is an d. WON BP 129 is violative of the security of tenure (Art. X Sec 7 of 1973 Constitution)
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. enjoyed by incumbent justices and judges and the Supreme Court's power to discipline and
2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response remove judges.
to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferer the SC has made clear its view in a series of
HELD
1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the bar and officers of the court and taxpayers, The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges must prevail over the
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust judges. Such subjection of a judge
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. to public "harassment and humiliation ....can diminish public confidence in the courts." The ills
2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and evaluation of the judicial system in the the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence: they will not be cured by
country, found out that institutional reforms is both pressing and urgent. totally destroying their independence. It would be ironical if Judges who are called upon to
b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within the competence of a legitimate body and if done in give due process cannot count it on themselves.
good faith suffers from no infirmity.
Reasoning BARREDO [concur]
0 adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial Gov and in Zandueta v. De La Costa,
the Court also held that the abolition of an Inferior courts are mere creatures of law (of the Legislature) . It follows that it is within the
office is valid) legislature' s power to abolish or reorganize them no matter what the cost is. He personally
- Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2 of 1973 Consti "vests in the NA the believes that the present situation in the judiciary calls for its reorganization. He believes that
power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the Constitution is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of
certain limitation in the case of SC." In short, the NA has the power to abolish an office that it obtaining circumstances (realist approach in interpreting the Consti)
created.
c. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the law is complete and provides AQUINO [concur in the result]
for a standard.
Reasoning For him the suit is premature, but affirming expressly that the abolition was in good faith.
- In this case, the Act provides a clear standard. The President may be authorized to fix the CONCEPCION (concurs in the result)
allowances and compensation but guided by the
Letter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD 985. GUERRERO [concur]
d. NO. Removal from office is different from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. In Social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality is the ratio
the case of abolition, there is in law no occupant. There can be no tenure to a non-existent decidendi of this case. For him, inquiring into the wisdom of the law is a political question.
office. Public office is a privilege in the gift of the State and not a right. Dura lex sed lex, even though
Reasoning it is harsh.
- Conflicting constitutional provisions, the power of the NA to abolish an office on one hand
and the security of tenure, on the other, must be reconciled and harmonized. Reconciliation ABAD SANTOS [concur and dissent]
and balancing is well high unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separation of
powers. Concurs but dissented on the ground that the statute being free from any constitutional
- Political theory (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more truism and actuality of interdependence infirmity, the "Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill the newly created
among different branches of government judicial positions without any obligation to consult with the Supreme Court and to accord its
than in independence and separation of powers. views the fullest consideration.
Decision : Dismissed. The unconstitutionality of BP 129 has not been shown.
DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified]
SEPARATE OPINION
The power of the Legislature to create courts also includes the power to abolish them. When
TEEHANKEE [dissent] there is a conflict between public welfare(the duty of the legislature to provide a society with a
fair and effective judicial system) and personal benefit (security of tenure), the latter must of
necessity to yield to the former. The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into
which no judicial inquiry is proper. Petition is premature. No actual controversy yet. Not until
the abolition of courts is not done, can there be possibly a violation of the security of tenure.
"Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]
Tenure of Judges is different from tenure of Courts. A legislature is not bound to give security
of tenure to courts. The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their
Courts exist.
ERICTA [concur]
No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish them.
"Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
PLANA [concurs and dissent]
Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended its enactment. His qualification being
that the "President is under no obligation to consult with the SC and the SC as such is not
called upon to give legal advice to the President."
PEOPLE V CUARESMA
NARVASA; April 18, 1989
FACTS
- On the basis of affidavits of Luz Lumacao and her witness, Soledad Tanilon, both dated
August 21,1978 which were sworn to before the First Assistant City Fiscal of Dumaguete City,
said Assistant Fiscal filed on the same day an information with the City Court Judge of
Dumaguete City charging Rosie Cuaresma with oral defamation. The complaint was docketed
as Criminal Case Number 7238.
- Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending that the case had been commenced
by an information by the fiscal instead of a complaint of the offended party as required by
Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The said article provides that criminal action for
defamation cannot be prosecuted de oficio except at the instance of and upon the complaint
expressly filed by the offended party.
- The Judge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on the basis of the Supreme Court ruling
in Fernandez v. Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 (1976) , which stated that the error can be corrected by
the filing of the sworn statement of the complainant, assuming it contains all the information
required under the Rules, with the Court to comply with Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code. Alternatively, the fiscal can file with the court a verified complaint of the offended party.
In the order denying the quashal, the judge, however, required the fiscal to file the verified
complaint within ten days. The fiscal complied with the order by filing the needed document on
the same day.
- Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months later alleging that the offense had
prescribed since the filing of the original information o August 2, 1978 did not interrupt the
running of the period of prescription of the crime ( two months from discovery) and that said
prescriptive period had long lapsed prior to the submission of the corrective complaint on
august 4, 1980. Judge granted her the motion stating that “it was the filing of the verified that
conferred jurisdiction upon the Court and this was on August 4, 1980”.
- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on Jube 26, 1981 which was denied for
lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.
- Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court as filed by the Second Assistant City
Fiscal on May 31, 1984 or three years after the dismissal of the motion to reconsider.
ISSUE
WON the Supreme Court should give due course to the application for certiorari
HELD
1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final order having been disposed of by the
Court. The appeal, if taken in a timely fashion, could have succeeded as the order of the Court
was tainted by an error of law. The filing of the complaint in the form of an affidavit, the
investigation by the fiscal, and the subsequent filing of the information with the Court did
indeed toll the period of prescription.
2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in several counts:
a. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor General instead of the Second
Assistant City Fiscal and was dismissible on this account [Republic v Partisala , 118 SCRA
870 (1982)].
b. Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or officer exercising
judicial functions or of any judge which are claimed to be without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the
correct procedure is the filing of an appeal as the judgment rendered is an error in law and
not grave abuse of discretion.
c. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs (e.g. certiorari, mandamus,
etc.) is not exclusive and granted to lower courts. There is also a hierarchy that
should be followed in matters of this nature. Direct action to the Supreme Court will be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore. And these reasons
should be clearly set out in the petition.
Decision Petition dismissed.
YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
CRUZ; March 20, 1987
FACTS
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January
13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised
by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The thrust of his
petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His
claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains
that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There
is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WON the SC impliedly affirmed the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A
2. WON lower courts have authority to rule on constitutionality of statute
3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process
4. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid exercise of police power
5. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid delegation of legislative power
HELD
1. NO. While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not
applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the
measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the
requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not,
as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.
2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases
may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon
his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of EO No. 626-A.
But while the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive
order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that
there be a lawful method. To strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing.
5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: “The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in
the case of carabaos.” There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

BENGZON V DRILON
GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992
FACTS
- Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992
- Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who were receiving monthly pensions
under RA No.910 as amended by RA No. 1797
- Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of the Executive, involved in the
implementation of the release of funds under the GAA
- RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA
who have rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary or in any branch of govt, or
in, both, or having attained the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge
the duties of the office; he shall receive until his death the salary which he has received at the
time of his retirement
- RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement benefits were given to Consti
Commissions and the AFP, under RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578, respectively
- Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically readjusted the retirement pensions
of military officers and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the Consti Commissions
were not included in this automatic readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic
readjustment provisions (Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti
Commissions
- Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed provisions by
approving a bill on the matter (HB16297 and SB740)
- Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would erode the foundation of the policy on
standardization of compensation under the Salary Standardization Law, RA6758
- On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and Enriquez filed a petition for
readjustment of their pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out that PD644
repealing RA1797 did not take effect as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v
Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published only in the OG in 1983; Court
authorized it as a result
- As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included in the GAA appropriations for
the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates for the retired justices
- In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the entire Section 4 of the Special
Provision for the SC and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed the HB on
the matter already, and such appropriation would erode the policy of salary standardization
ISSUE
WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the
Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pension of the retired Justices of the
SC and the CA
HELD
- The President did not veto items but provisions of the law in the GAA.
- While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it
does not hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills.
o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to
an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure; only a particular item or items
may be vetoed
o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts; it
is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill
o The President did not veto the general fund adjustment of 500M, to meet certain
obligations WHICH is an ITEM.
o What she vetoed were provisions – methods and systems placed by Congress to
insure that obligations would be paid when they fell due
o Thus, augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement
benefits is a provision and not an item
o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and the Resolution of the SC dated
Nov 1991. WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO.
- The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the automatic readjustment for the
judiciary never became valid law because it was never published, pursuant to the Tanada v
Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 to
restore it so even the president’s veto of the HB does not even have any effect in the
continuing implementation of the law
- The Veto by the president trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to
the Judiciary
o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require
o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding
highest rates authorized by law
o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be utilized
- The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to RA1797
o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice competent men and women to
enter the government service and retire with relative security
GARCIA V MACARAEG
BARREDO; May 31, 1971
FACTS
- Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Judge of
the CFI of Laguna Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge,
for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation
of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and
58 thereof.
- Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City with station
at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches,
had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of
Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, he decided to accept the
offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices
of the court, to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government
for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to rely on the national
government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial government The
provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed him that the province was not in a position to
do so).
- As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured him that
the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon
as the office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location.
When the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the
treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested
Macaraig to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that
the municipal government will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice
was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed
when the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable
space selected by Macaraig was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a
month's negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on
October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government could release the
amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a
big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for
the assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon Macaraig's representations, the provincial
government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials
needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the
necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the DOJ but, unfortunately, the appropriation
for the equipment of the CFI was released only on December 23, 1970 and the procurement
of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way.
- When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his
court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the DOJ,
Macaraig had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the
law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon him to forego his leave and
instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not
busy attending to the needs of his court.
- Complainant Garcia alleged:
> That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, respondent has not submitted
his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or
resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three
months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day.
> That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised
1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive.
> That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully
well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to
his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July 1970 to February 1971 in
flagrant violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
> That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports on the accomplishments of the
Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge, gross
incompetence and violation of Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of
Justice and RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 particularly Sections 5, 55 and 58
HELD
- Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 of the Department of Justice
are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties. Respondent's inability
to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances does not constitute incompetence.
Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to
assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala,' but
forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial
duties. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because
aside from the time, effort and money he spent in Organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked
in the Department of Justice.
- None of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of
long standing of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working
with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government
must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of
powers on which our government tests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good
intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the
necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the
specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long
been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing
governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the Judiciary
under our present constitutional scheme of government that no Judge of even the lowest court
in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted
to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still,
reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it
is best that this practice is discontinued.
Decision Complaint dismissed. (8 votes to dismiss, Castro & Teehankee took no part.)
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur]
- Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise accountable. No taint of bad
faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in accordance with the
practice heretofore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the statute in force,
under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice
Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance with what
previous secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the
statutory authority of the Department of Justice over courts of first instance and
other inferior courts. While a distinction could be made between the performance of judicial
functions which in no way could be interfered with by the Department and the task of
administration which is executive in character, still the conferment of such competence to a
department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my mind, not only unwise but of doubtful
constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and regulations over matters deemed non-
judicial, they may trench upon the discretion of judges which should be exercised according to
their conscience alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them is
magnified. It is already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they court his
goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion
of independence becomes even more difficult. it is thus objectionable in principle and
pernicious in operation. That certainly is not the way to reduce to the minimum any
participation of the executive in judicial affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even
when the government as the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is
in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked upon with suspicion.
The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so.
- The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to my
mind, anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power granted the department head,
respondent Judge in this case could not have been called upon to assist the Secretary of
Justice. Considering that the Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be
hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is to be totally freed from any
supervisory authority of an executive department. (Take note guys that this case was
decided just a day before the Manila Hotel inaugural session of the con-con that created the
1973 Consti. And remember that the supervision of the CFI and other inferior courts (under
the DOJ in the 1935 Consti) was transferred to the SC under the new Consti which provision
was copied in the 1987 Consti. I guess this case was influential in making that change
possible. By the way, Macaraig was a former UP law prof.)
BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION
GRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991
FACTS
Respondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land which he
mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He was able to redeem the property but only after 22 years. On
the other hand, petitioner spouses claim the property was sold to them by Dra. Valera.
Quema filed a case before the Barangay Council but when it failed to settle, he filed a
complaint in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. (The disputed land is located in Villaviciosa,
Abra) The tribal court decided in favor of Quema. But as the spouses did not immediately
vacate the land, they received a warning order from the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
(CPLA). Petitioners filed this action alleging that respondent Cordillera Bodong
Administration’s decision is void for lack of judicial power or jurisdiction. Respondent
contends the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are not part of
the judicial system.
ISSUE
WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory
decision
HELD
NO. Decision of tribal court is annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was rejected in a plebiscite by the provinces and cities of the Cordillera
Region hence the Cordillera Bodong Administration, the indigenous and special courts for the
indigenous cultural communities and the CPLA as a regional command of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court not being constituted into an
indigenous court, it is but an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of
an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are not part of the Philippine
Judicial System which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which
have been established by law. They do not possess judicial power.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT OF APPEALS
ROMERO; February 5, 1996
FACTS
- Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) entered into three contracts regarding various services at
the South Harbor:
> With Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OTSI). OTSI was granted exclusive right to manage
and operate stevedoring services at the South Harbor
> With Marina Port Services Inc. (MPSI). MPSI was granted exclusive management and
operation of arrastre and container handling services at the South Harbor
> With 7-R Ports Services. 7-R was granted warehousing services
- On November 28, 1991, the contract with MPSI was renewed. Part of the contract required
the MPSI to cause integration of storage, arrastre and stevedoring services at the South
Harbor. Consequently, OTSI and 7-R assigned their respective stevedoring and warehousing
services to MPSI. In effect MPSI had the duty and responsibility to manage, operate and
render the following services:
- Arrastre- receiving, handling, checking as well as custody and delivery of cargo services.
These are services done on land.
- Stevedoring- all work performed on board vessel, that is, the process of loading and
unloading cargo, stowing inside hatches, compartments and on deck or open cargo spaces on
board vessels.
- Container Terminal Handling- the services of handling container discharged or loaded
unto vessels.
- Storage- storing of containers, bulk and break bulk cargoes in all storage areas at the South
Harbor.
- April 2, 1992, PPA entered into a contract with petitioner Manila Floating Silo Corporation
(MAFSICOR) whereby the latter was granted right, privilege, responsibility and authority to
provide, operate a floating bulk terminal facilities for bulk cargoes bound for the South Harbor
with a proviso that use of such facility shall not be compulsory to bulk shippers or importers.
Contract would be enforced for 5 years and shall be on an interim basis until an actual land
based bulk terminal plant for the Port of Manila.
- Sept. 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a supplemental agreement stating that
manpower needed for stevedoring services shall be hired from OTSI.
- MPSI filed a petition against PPA and MAFSICOR for “declaratory relief, final injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory injunction claiming that said
contract was in complete derogation of their rights under their contract with PPA.
- RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO directing PPA to maintain status quo
and enjoining MAFSICOR from bringing in the floating terminal and set a hearing on the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
- PPA filed an opposition to the issuance of said writ stating PPA-MAFSICOR contract actually
supports PPA-MPSI contract as stevedoring manpower would be hired from MPSI. And that
on a 2-day public hearing, most of the registrants agreed to the operation of the floating
terminal.
- MAFSICOR also filed an urgent motion for the lifting of the TRO and a denial of the the
preliminary injunction on the ground that an injunctive relief is not available in an action for
declaratory relief. They filed another motion to dismiss complaint stating that declaratory relief
was not available to MPSI because MAFSICOR was not a party in the PPA-MPSI contract
therefore they were not a party-in-interest.
- AUGUST 25, 1993, trial court denied writ of preliminary injunction and lifted TRO stating that
first, the right to operate a floating terminal was not on the PPA-MPSI contract and there
would be no conflict between contracts with MPSI and MAFSICOR since MPSI is not the sole
entity authorized to render stevedoring services in the South Harbor and besides, stevedoring
services for MAFSICOR shall be provided by OTSI. Second, contract with MAFSICOR was
noon-exclusive meaning MPSI could also operate a floating terminal. Third, injunctive relief
may not be granted for an action for declaratory relief. Further, MPSI could not question PPA-
MAFSICOR contract they being not a party thereto.
- MPSI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court on Sept. 15, 1993.
- Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (KAMADA) the
bargaining agent or the 4000 stevedores employed by MPSI, filed a complaint against MPSI,
PPA and MAFSICOR for the annulment of PPA-MAFSICOR contract alleging that the
operation of the floating bulk would duplicate their function of stevedoring in the South Harbor.
They also alleged that MAFSICOR had not contacted them on the matter regarding the hiring
of their services in the supplemental contract. Also, KAMADA said that the requirement of
MAFSICOR of trained and qualified stevedores (since services in the floating terminal would
be done by machine), certainly some of their member employees would be deprived.
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay. Court granted TRO stating great
and irreparable injuries upon the applicant would result before the matter can be heard on
notice.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion to dismiss civil case and for the lifting of the TRO (complete
reasons in p.224-25). Reasons included Court Circular No. 13-93 which prohibits the issuance
of injunction against certain government agencies including public utilities. Motion was denied.
- Sept. 10, 1993, MAFSICOR filed a supplement to its motion to dismiss and to lift TRO,
raising as an additional reason, Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which states that:
“no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving
an infrastructure project… including among others public utilities for the transport of goods
or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons,
entity or government office from proceeding with… the operation of such public utility…”
- MPSI opposed stating MAFSICOR is not a public utility nor is performing a public function
and thus non public interest may be affected.
- Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICOR’s motion.
- Sept. 28,1993, KAMADA case was resolved by Judge Mabunay in which writ was denied
due to failure of KAMADA to present clear and convincing evidence of any damages it will
suffer.”
- Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a case for injunction with provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction involving the same PPA-MAFSICOR contract. This was filed
by the Chamber of Customs Brokers Inc., the only accredited association for customs brokers
in the country, stating that they were never informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains
terminal and that operation of such would adversely affect and prejudice its members (reason
in p.226-227).
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon. Court issued a restraining order. In
due course, on October 1, 1993, lower court issued a preliminary injunction upon the filing of
MPSI of an injunction bond.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for an issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Petition impleaded Judge Verdiano as
a public respondent. Petition also prayed Judges Mabunay and Bayhon be administratively
dealt with for disregarding Circular No. 13-93.
- Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SC referred case to Court of Appeals.
- October 13, 1993, CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction finding that MPSI has exclusive
stevedoring rights at the South Harbor and that the operation of a floating grains terminal by
MAFSICOR would overlap on the rights of MPSI. On the applicability of PD 1818 and Circular
No. 13-93, court stated that what is being stopped temporarily is private respondent’s
operation of the floating bulk terminal facility that would lessen MPSI’s stevedoring services as
it infringes on the latter’s contractual right.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
- On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary injunction is made permanent and that
Judge Bayhon be permanently enjoined from issuing injunctive orders during the trial of the
case in the court.
- Thus, CA affirmed the exclusivity of the stevedoring contract in favor of MPSI. That being so,
it precluded infringement of the PPA-MPSI contract by the PPA-MAFSICOR contract. CA
explained that the floating grains terminal is simply a mechanized unloading of grains cargo
from the vessel to the barge or other transport facilities. And also that what is solely done by
stevedores is substituted by machines complemented by needed stevedores. With respect to
the supplemental agreement which states that stevedores would be hired by MAFSICOR from
OTSI, court stated that it was just an adjustment in order not to violate PPA-MPSI contract.
And that MAFSICOR can legally excuse themselves from the contract because OTSI already
assigned its stevedoring services to MPSI. As regards to forum shopping allegation of
MAFSICOR (filing of separate petitions by MPSI, KAMADA and Chamber), court said that
there was no forum shopping because petitioners had separate and distinct legal
personalities. There also was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop. On the
applicability of PD 1818, CA affirmed its Oct.13 ruling.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed a motion for review on certiorari alleging that Court of Appeals
decision: a) violates PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the constitutional principle of separation
of judicial and executive powers and prescription against forum shopping, b) supplants the
discretion of the trial court to pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and c) is
contrary to the evidence on record.
ISSUE
WON PD 1818 applicable to the case
HELD
YES
Ratio “no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project… including among others public utilities for the
transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any
person or persons, entity or government office from proceeding with… the operation of such
public utility…”
- Clearly, the prohibition in PD 1818 does not cover infrastructure alone. It includes among
others stevedoring services. The law being clear, there is no room for interpretation or
construction. A verbis legis non est recendum (from the words of a statute there should be no
departure).
- PD 1818 applies “in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical
cases.” It is founded on the principle that to allow courts to determine such matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.
- In Republic v. Capulong discretion was defined as “a power or right conferred upon them by
law of acting officially under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others.
- Entering into a contract for the operation af a floating grains terminal notwithstanding the
existence of other stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor is undoubtedly an
exercise of the discretion on the part of the PPA. No other persons or agencies are in a better
position to gauge the need for the floating terminal than the PPA; certainly not the courts.
Courts have no brooding of such administrative agencies (Hon. Reinerio Reyes et al v. Hon
Doroteo Caneba et al). courts will intervene only to ascertain whether a branch or
instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries (Bureau
Veritas v. Office of the President). Under the separation of powers, the courts may not tread
into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and
legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office abused his
or its discretion. In this case there is no showing that the PPA abused its discretion in
entering into the contract with MAFSICOR. Judge Veridiano correctly concluded that
there is no provision for the putting up of a floating grains terminal in the PPA-MPSA
contract. All it covers are the general services of stevedoring. While the operation of
a floating grains terminal may be considered as part and parcel of stevedoring as
such operation merely entails the mechanization of stevedoring, it was considered
by the PPA, in the exercise of its discretion, as necessary to improve the services
rendered in the South Harbor in the meantime that no land-based bulk terminal is
yet operational.
- There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not find application. These are a) where
there is clear and grave abuse of discretion b) where the effect of the non-issuance of an
injunction or a restraining order would be to “stave off implementation of a government
project.” In this case the operation of a floating bulk terminal would augment and improve the
over-all operations at the port of Manila and/or stevedoring services awarded to MPSI.
- Another contention against the applicability of PD 1818 is that MAFSICOR is a private entity.
Such contention betrays a failure to comprehend the functions of the PPA. One of the duties
of the PPA is to provide services (whether on its own, by contract or otherwise) within the Port
Districts … to make or enter contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge its
functions under its decree.
- Section 1 of PD 1818 clearly states that an injunction may not be issued to prevent any
person or persons, entity or government official from undertaking the protected activities
enumerated. The prohibition therefore applies regardless of whether or not the entity or
person being enjoined is a public or private person or entity, provided that the purpose of the
law to protect essential government projects in pursuit of economic development is attained.
- court did not resolve main issues offered (such as the exclusivity of the PPA-MPSI contract)
for resolution therein which necessitates trial on merits. However court took note of the
allegations against two judges
Decision Petition on certiorari granted decision of the CA is reversed and set aside.
IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA
NARVASA; November 9, 1998
FACTS
- The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets out the relevant
facts.
- Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively.
- received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998
- view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, who had
been a member of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the
Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the
Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the
Court of Appeals. Without any extended discussion or any prior research and study on the
part of the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted
to the President for consideration, together with the Council's nominations for eight (8)
vacancies in the Court of Appeals
- April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of
which had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President
- In view of the fact that all the appointments had been signed on March 11, 1998 - the day
immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution - which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did not
agree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered by said ban,
the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the vacancy in the
Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco
- May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the President, addressed to the JBC,
requesting transmission of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later than
Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up
the vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days from February 13, 1998, the date the present vacancy
occurred."
- May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief Justice for
"guidance" respecting the expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a
meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the Court in line with the President's letter . The
Chief Justice advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was drafting
- May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the President-- stating that no sessions had
been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections because of the "need to
undertake further study of the matter," prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional
issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to Malacañang May 6,
1998, and a copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello
- Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action –on May
6, 1998 they came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew attention to Section 4 (1),
Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) as well as to the
President's letter of May 4, with an appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council for the
purpose "on May 7, 1998
- CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of May 7, 1998
- May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from President: "the election-ban provision
applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of
government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and
respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit . . . the
final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."
- May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on
the President which is the general rule, the only exception being only as regards "executive
positions"(judicial positions are covered by the general rule)
- Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is not
specifically imposed on the President
- normally, when there are no presidential elections Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall
apply but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section
15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments
- requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council to defer action on the matter
until further advice by the Court
- May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a resolution that "the constitutional
provisions be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action
- May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacañang the appointments of two (2) Judges
of the Regional Trial Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the obligation of
transmitting the appointments to the appointees so that they might take their oaths and
assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of
acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution)
- the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the court
on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon.
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given
any effect and said appointees shall refrain from taking their oath of office and the Judicial and
Bar Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter of nominations
- Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his "Explanation" he stated that he did so
because on May 7, 1998 he "received from Malacañang copy of his appointment . . ." which
contained the following direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the
performance of the duties of the office"
- The Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Section 15, Article VII:
"Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or endanger
public safety."
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof ."
Section 9, Article VIII:
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list."
ISSUE
WON during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
HELD
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were unquestionably
made during the period of the ban. Such appointments come within the operation of the first
prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying
votes or influencing the election.
Reasoning
- While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest there is no
showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during
the period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition
against appointments made within the period of the ban.
- Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies
in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article
VII.
- journal of the commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses: desire to make
certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result
of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY
VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE
THEREOF." was proposed
- Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called
"midnight" appointments
- the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have
to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as
they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be
made by the outgoing President
- The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously,
the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
- Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and
the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a
general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter
- the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single instrument; instances may be
conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in
the executive but also in the Supreme Court.
- concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for duty"--
Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciary to be sent by the
Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to
the appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, in the Chief Justice's behalf, who thereafter advises the individual appointees
of their appointments and also of the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation
seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V OCURT OF APPEALS
MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998
FACTS
- Oil & Natural Gas Commission (petitioner)- a foreign corporation owned and controlled by
the Government of India
- Pacific Cement Company (respondent) -a private corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
- The two parties entered into a contract on Feb 26, 1983, where respondent undertook to
supply the petitioner (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement; petitioner to pay ($477,300.00)
- The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA in Surigao City, for
delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India.
- respondent had already received payment but failed to deliver the oil well cement  due to
a dispute between the ship owner and respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did
not reach its point of destination
- so they just agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil
well cement with Class "G" cement cost free. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement
did not conform to the petitioner's specifications.
- The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an
arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract
- July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra) resolved the dispute in petitioner's
favor
- Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6% interest
- To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a Petition before the Court in India
praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India which the said
court granted
- The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant US$899,603.77 with 9% interest per
annum till the last date of realization
- However, respondent refused to pay
- Petitioner filed a complaint to RTC of Surigao
- RTC and CA dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent under Clause 16 of the contract; phrased differently, WON the non-delivery of the
said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16
2. WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction
HELD
1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in the contract is for Clause
16 to be confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing,
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and for
Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
- For the sake of argument, granted that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a proper
subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of
the contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16.
2. YES.
- This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra
Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the
same must be accorded respect
- if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise
- the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a foreign judgment, has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
Decision Petition GRANTED
ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CORTES; November 10, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other taxpayers in Mindanao, filed this petition to(1)
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the
Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that
purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional
- The 1987 Constitution provides for regional autonomy through Article X, section 15 which
provides that "there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
- To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law
to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months
from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility
of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on
August 1, 1989.The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
ISSUES
1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
2 .WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution.
HELD
1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
SC finds it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli
Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public
international or internal Philippine law. The Constitution itself provides for the creation of an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A.
No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict
between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not
have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would
then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A.
No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same
class as the latter.
2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987 Constitution.
a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region
in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates
that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the
constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions
(Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements
embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of
Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90)
days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That
only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall
take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if
an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
b. Equal protection of the law – Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and
Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and
cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly
share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which
Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by
these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common
attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. SC cannot do this without doing
violence to the separation of governmental powers
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The guarantee of equal
protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress
on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.
c. Free exercise of religion – Petitioner questions the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground
that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The
objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any
conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the
one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same
Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived
from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-
made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible
instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an
application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be
exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. In the present case, no
actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. The Court in
this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
TANO V SOCRATES
DAVIDE; August 21, 1997
FACTS
- special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying to:
1. declare as unconstitutional:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Puerto Princesa
(b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City
Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan;
2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and
3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan
from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order.
- Ordinance No. 15-92
 - took effect on January 1, 1993
- entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND
LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY
1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF,"
- Purpose: to effectively free our water from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance
- unlawful for any person, business enterprise, company to ship out from Puerto Princesa
City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish (all alive,
breathing not necessarily moving, used for foor and for aquarium purposes) and lobster
except SEA BASS (apahap), CATFISH (hito-hito), MUDFISH (dalag), AND MILKFISH
FRIES.
- Penalty: fine of not more than P5,000.00, imprisonment of not more than 12 mos and/or
cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa
- Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993
- pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74 (requirement of mayor’s permit) and
Ordinance No. 15-92 (banning of shipment of live fish and lobster), authorized and directed
to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster to
ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by this Office
and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau
of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
- Resolution No. 33
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno,
panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper,
tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five years
- WHEREAS
- studies disclose only 5% of the corals of Palawan remain to be in excellent condition
- cannot be gainsaid that destruction and devastation of the corals of our province were
principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing,
use of other obnoxious substances
- need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow
the devastated ones to regenerate within 5 years
- RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties e.g. to dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing
- Ordinance No. 2
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno,
panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper,
tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five years
- Policy Considerations:
- Sec. 2-A (RA 7160: policy of the state that subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to be self-reliant communities, more
responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.
- Sec. 5-A (RA 7160): Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power
shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned
- Sec. 5-C (RA 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to LGU in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
- Sec. 16 (RA 7160). Every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare.
- Policy of the Province of Palawan : to protect and conserve the marine resources of
Palawan
- Penalty: fine of not more P5,000.00, and/or imprisonment of 6 mos to 12 mos and
confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalia
- Petitioners Allege:
- Ordinances deprived them of due process of law (no consultation), their livelihood (all the
fishermen of Palawan), and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade (Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan), in violation of Art XII Sec 2 (2) (3) 57 and Art XIII Sec 258,
759 (1987).
- Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or condition under which the Mayor's permit
could be granted or denied (Mayor - absolute authority WON to issue permit)
- Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling
and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was
caught or gathered through lawful fishing method
- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways
57
Art XII Sec 2 (2): The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its
use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
(3) The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fisherworks in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
58
Art XIII Sec 2: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-
reliance.
59
Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine
and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend
to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fisherworks shall receive a just share form their labor in the utilization of
marine and fishing resources.
 - members of Airline Shippers Association were unduly prevented from pursuing their
vocation and entering contracts essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion
- if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal cases against Tano et al have to be
dismissed
- Interests of petitioners
- Tano et al: to prevent prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until
constitutionality or legality of the said Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been
resolved
- Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and 77 fishermen: declaratory relief because
Ordinances adversely affects them
ISSUES
1. WON SC has jurisdiction
2. WON Ordinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2 of Resolution 33 are constitutional
HELD
1.NO because there is clear disregard for hierarchy of courts and petitioners have no cause of
action BUT SC opt to resolve this case because of the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is
about to end (1993-1998).
Reasoning
Petitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action
- no cause of action because there is no showing that the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
the information in their respective criminal cases that would have this remedy proper therefore
the petitioners cannot allege the lower courts of having acted in excess of their jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion
- If petitioners filed motion to quash information, it should have contained that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional.
BUT if their Motion to Quash was denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses and if an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal
should have been the proper remedy. And if there is an exceptional circumstance where
special civil action for certiorari may be filed, the lower court must be accorded a Motion for
Reconsideration to allow itself to correct any errors
Petitioners Airline Shippers et al WRT Declaratory Relief
- SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved being settled that the SC merely exercises appellate jurisdiction
over such petitions
People v Cuaresma
- There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition . This is established policy…
strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part
of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs…
directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land...
Santiago v Vasques
- judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
BUT, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under
the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are
thus novel and or paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed.
2. YES, since it is settled that laws, including ordinances of LGUs enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and the petitioners did not present clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence to overthrow this assumption.
Reasoning
Peralta v COMELEC
- presumption of constitutionality of laws including ordinances of LGUs and to overthrow
this presumption, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen
- There is no showing that any of the petitioners qualify as subsistence or marginal
fishermen
> Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private association composed of marine
merchants
> Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants
> the rest of petitioners: fishermen without any qualification to their status
- Since consti does not provide for the definition of subsistence or marginal
Marginal Fisherman
- Generally, an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest
of fish is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering fish
- Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence fishing which shall be limited to the
sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his
immediate family
Subsistence Fishermen
- Generally, one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood
Art XII Sec 2
- aim primarily not to bestow any right of subsistence fishermen but to lay stress on the duty
of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth
 - provision merely recognizes priority to subsistence fishermen
Sec 149 of LGC
- only provision of law which speaks of preferential right of marginal fishermen
Joint Administrative Order No. 3 (1996)
- prescribed guidelines concerning preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to
fishery right in Sec 149 but this case does not involve such fishery right
Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal Fishermen
Art XIII Sec 7
- speaks not only of communal marine and fishing resources but of their protection,
development, and conservation
Art XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine)
- marine resources belong to the State and EDU shall be under full control and supervision
of the State
Constitutional Commission
- between Rodrigo and Bengzon
- marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations and local laws
Oposa v Factoran
- even though balanced and healthful ecology is under Declaration of Principles and State
Policies it does not follow that is less important the civil and political rights enshrined in the
Bill of Rights… for it concerns self-preservation and self-perpetuation… this basic right
need not be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind
Sec 16 LGC
- right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology in General Welfare Clause
Realization of the General Welfare Clause, Decentralization and Exercise of Police Power
Sec 5(c) LGC
- general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
the LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
Fishery Laws
- that LGU may enforce under Sec 17 in municipal water include
- PD 704
- PD 1015 – closed season
- PD 1219 – exploration, exploitation, utilization, conservation of coral resources
- PD 5474 – unlawful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during closed season
- PD 6451 – prohibits and punishes electrofishing
Memorandum of Agreement (1994)
- between Dept of Agriculture and DILG
- issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather aquarium fishes, gather kapis shells,
gather/culture shelled mollusks, establish seaweed farms, establish culture pearls,
transports fish and fishery products and establishment of closed season
RA 7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act
- comprehensive framework for sustainable development of Palawan compatible with
protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the
province which shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan nd the government
agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects
affecting Palawan
Principal Objectives of Ordinances
1) establish closed season for the species covered in the said ordinances for a period of
five years
2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto Princesa and Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities
Jurisdiction of BFAR or LGU
- Bellosillo: Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact
Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility
of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act
of 1975 TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res)
- Majority: BFAR jurisdiction over management, conservation, development, etc not all-
encompassing; excludes municipal waters; BFAR no longer under DNR, now under DoA TF
incorrect to challenge that ordinances unenforceable because no approval of Sec of DENR
but of Sec of DoA instead; BUT this can be dispensed with because of Repealing Claus of
LGC insofar as those provisions are inconsistent and power to enact ordinances to enhance
right of people to a balanced ecology contained in the General Welfare Clause in the LGC
Decision Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TRO lifted
Voting 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA [concur]
- fully concurs with the decision
- two important points: uphold presumption of validity of the ordinances in view of total
absence of evidence that undermine their factual basis AND need not allow shortcircuiting of
the normal process of adjudication on the mere plea that unless we take cognizance of
petitions like this, by-passing the trial courts, alleged violations of constitutional rights will be
left unprotected, when the matter can be very well be looked into by trial courts and in fact it
should be brought there

BELLOSILLO [dissent]
- Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance 15
Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility of BFAR
(Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975
TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res)
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO
CALLEJO; May 30, 2004
FACTS
- EO 48 – issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled “Establishing a Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization”:
 Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created
 DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee
based on appraisal surveys by DILG
 Oversight Committee (which was constituted under Local Gov’t Code of 1991) has
been tasked to issue implementing rules and regulations governing equitable allocation
and distribution of the said fund to the LGUs
- GAA of 1999 – In this General Appropriations Act, the program was renamed as Local
Gov’t Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF)
 Php96.78B was the allotted share of the LGUs in the IR taxes
 “Special Provisions” included that the amount of Php5B shall be earmarked for LGSEF,
and it shall be released to the LGUs subject to the IRR (Implementing Rules and
Regulations) prescribed by the Oversight Committee
 Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the DBM to the LGUs concerned
- OCD Resolutions – Oversight Committee allocated Php5B as follows:
 Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme prescribed under LGC of 1991
 Php2B allocated with a modified CODEF sharing scheme
 Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative action projects and other priority
initiatives; proposals were to be submitted by the LGUs to the Oversight Committee
subject to its approval (OC prescribed a Criteria for Eligibility)
- GAA of 2000 – Also contained a proviso earmarking Php5B of the IRA for the LGSEF
(similar to GAA of 1999)
 Php3.5B shared by the LGUs using a percentage-sharing formula agreed upon by the
various Leagues of LGUs
 Php1.5B to be earmarked for projects, which are to be endorsed to and approved by the
Oversight Committee
- GAA of 2001 – GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted and OC allocated Php5B LGSEF as
follows:
 Php3B according to the modified codal formula
 Php1.9B is earmarked for priority projects
 Php100M for capability building fund subject to OC’s approval
- Procedure
Province of Batangas, represented by Gov. MANDANAS filed a petition for CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION, and MANDAMUS to declare as unconstitutional the assailed provisos in GAA
of 99, ’00, ’01 and OCD Resolutions and was issued against Exec. Sec. ROMULO
(Chairman of Oversight Committee on Devolution), Sec. BONCODIN (Dept. of Budget and
Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA (DILG)
- Petitioner’s grounds –
 Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share must be automatically released to the
LGUs)
 Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in determining distribution and release of
LGSEF is contrary to the principle of local autonomy
 Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified sec.285 of LGC) resulting to an illegal
amendment by the Executive branch of substantive law
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON petitioner has legal standing
2. WON petition involves factual questions properly cognizable by lower courts
3. WON petition has been rendered moot and academic
Substantive
4. WON assailed provisos violate constitutional provision on local autonomy
5. WON the assailed provisos result to a proper amendment of sharing scheme provided in
LGC
HELD
1. Yes.
- The petitioner seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate its own interests, which
pertains to the LGUs’ share in the national taxes (IRA). The potential injury it stands to
suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, which is clearly “a plain, direct and adequate
interest.”
2. No.
- It involves a legal question (on what is the proper legal interpretation) which is to
be settled by the SC. Also, the facts necessary to resolve the issue need not be determined
by a trial court since they are not disputed.
3. No.
- Even if the LGSEF for ’99, ’00, and ’01 have already been released, there is still compelling
reason for the SC to resolve substantive issues.
- “Even in cases where supervening events, whether intended or accidental, had
made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional
issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.”
Obiter
- Sec.25 Art.2: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
- Sec.2 Art.10: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
- President’s power over LGUs is one of general supervision, and this excludes power of
control. (Drilon v. Lim: “The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them.”)
- Autonomy is either DECENTRALIZATION of ADMINISTRATION or decentralization of
POWER.
- LOCAL AUTONOMY means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization. LGUs are subject to regulation, however
limited, for no other purpose than to enhance self-government.
- Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE (autonomy in the exercise of its functions)
and FISCAL AUTONOMY (power to create own sources of revenue, in addition to equitable
share in national taxes.)
4. Yes.
- Sec.6 Art.10 mandates that -
o LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the NATIONAL TAXES
o “Just share” shall be DETERMINED BY LAW
o “Just share” shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED to the LGUs
- As such, the LGUs are NOT required to perform any act to receive the “just share”
accruing to them from national taxes (Sec.286 LGC: It shall be released to them without
need of further action.”) The provision is IMPERATIVE. Any retention is prohibited.
- Ratio To subject the distribution and release of the LGSEF to implementing rules and
regulations, including mechanisms prescribed by the OC, as sanctioned by the provisos in the
GAAs of ’99, ’00, ’01 and the OCD Resolutions makes the release NOT automatic, which
violates the Constitution.
- OC exercising jurisdiction and control contradicts principle of local autonomy. There is also
NO STATUTORY BASIS for this power since the OC was created merely to formulate rules
and regulations for efficient implementation of the LGC (only ad hoc character)
- As evident from the Con-Com deliberations, the Automatic release provision was intended to
GUARANTEE principle of local autonomy.
5. No.
- The sharing scheme provided for in the LGC is fixed and may not be reduced
except “in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public
sector deficit.” (Sec.285 LGC: Provinces – 23%, Cities – 23%, Municipalities – 34%,
Barangays – 20%)
- Congress may amend LGC but should do so through a separate law, and not just
through an appropriations law.
Decision Petition granted.
 Provisions relating to LGSEF declared unconstitutional.
 Respondents are directed to rectify unlawful distribution of LGSEF.
 Entire IRA to be released automatically without further action by LGUs.
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
PUNO; September 16, 1999
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction.
- Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time of filing of petition, and residents of
Santiago City (located in Province of Isabela)
- Respondents are executive, local government and budget secretaries, and public officials of
the province of Isabela
- Intervenor is winner of additional seat in provincial board brought about by the “reallocation.”
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 8528 –AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO
AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.)
- The RA deletes the word “independent” and treats Santiago City just as a
component city. Its territory and territorial jurisdiction remains unchanged.
- Petitioners believe that this amounts to a conversion of Santiago City and must
therefore be decided by the city’s citizens in a plebiscite, of which the RA has no provisions
provided for. Respondents, on the other hand, deem that this is a mere reclassification.
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON a plebiscite must be provided
HELD
1. Ratio The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution shall include any
material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit(s) directly
affected.
- Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the powers of the mayor and the voting
exercise of residents.
- Not a political question. Petitioners claim that under Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution
they have a right to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced.
The Court has the duty to ensure that Congress complies with the Constitution in law-making.
2. Ratio The change from independent component city to component city shall amount to a
conversion which therefore requires a plebiscite as contemplated in Rule II, Article 6,
paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
- Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, or abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.”
- Respondents emphasize that the change provided in the RA is not among those enumerated
in the foregoing provision. Moreover, the territory and boundaries of Santiago City remained
unchanged.
- But the ponente points out that there is a common denominator among those enumerated in
the provision –all of them result to a material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government units directly affected and the people therein. The same applies to the
present case.
- As the petitioners mentioned, the change of Santiago City from independent component city
to component city will have the following effects:
 From being directly under the Office of the President, the city will be reverted to the
Provincial Government of Isabela, thereby increasing its land area and subsequently
increasing its share in the internal revenue allotment.
 Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be redefined and may be shared with
the province.
 Allocation of operating funds will now come from the Province which amounts to a
decrease in the city’s funds.
 Registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials
 City officials, especially the mayor, will now be under the control of the Provincial
Governor
 Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will now be subject to
review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
- Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade of Santiago City.
- Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
- “(f) Plebiscite –(1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.”
Decision Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ
of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said
law.
Voting 10 concur; 4 dissent
TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY
MELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987
FACTS
- Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba, a member of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of the same city contend that Batas Pambansa (BP) 56, creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, violated Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973
Constitution: No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners argue that under the said
provision, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria of the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province,
municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as
of the date BP 56 was passed, the statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria
when respondent Municipality was created. Hence, it is null and void.
- The Local Government Code was enacted only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56
was enacted, the Code was not yet in existence. A plebiscite had also been conducted among
the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed
approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and
had assumed there respective positions as such.
ISSUE
WON BP Blg 56 is unconstitutional.
HELD
- No. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail
nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Sec. 3,
Art. 11 of the 1973 does not prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions
before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the
Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for creating a new municipality, in much
the same way that creating a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local
Government Code. What the constitutional provision means is that the once said Code is
enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform to
the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such code, the
legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit
should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
- The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was
conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the
new local government unit. Further, it is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a
municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. Absent any constitutional limitations,
a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient
administration of government. The creation of the new municipality of Sibagat was a valid
exercise of the legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa.
TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ALAMPAY; July 11, 1986
FACTS
- A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided the province of Negros Occidental
into two – Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental.
- The petitioners, residents of the province of Negros Occidental, challenge the
constitutionality of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the act which created Negros del Norte. The
said law provides that some cities from the island of Negros would be separated in order to
create the new province, subject to a concurrence of the majority in a plebiscite.
- The petitioners contend that the act is not in accord with the Local Government Code as in
Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite be held “in
the unit or units affected”. The petitioners said that Negros Occidental is a unit affected by the
creation of the new province, thus, they should be allowed to vote. Also, they contend that the
minimum requirement of 3500 square kilometers for the creation of a new province (as
provided by the Local Government Code) has not been complied since the Negros del Norte
is only comprised of 2856.56 square kilometers. They pray that the plebiscite be declared null
and void, and that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct another plebiscite which includes
Negros Occidental.
- The respondents, meanwhile, argue that the term “unit or units affected” does not include
Negros Occidental. As such, they cited a Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, where the court
ruled that only the members of the newly created barangay are allowed to vote in the
plebiscite. Also, they contend that Negros del Norte actually is comprised of 4,019.95 square
kilometers, thus, it has met the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they argue that since the
plebiscite has already happened, the case is moot and academic.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the act complied with the constitutional requirements
HELD
1. No. The case cannot be truly viewed as moot and academic. The legality of the plebiscite
itself is being challenged by the petitioners. The Court has the duty to repudiate acts which
run counter to the Constitution, done by whatever branch of government.
2. No.
Plebiscite
- The province of the Negros Occidental should be allowed to vote in the plebiscite. It is clear
that they are part of the “units affected” by the creation of the new province, it being the
“parent province”.
- The case cited by the petitioners, Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, is different with the case
at bar. It merely includes the division of a barangay, the smallest political unit. This case refers
to a division of the largest political unit, a barangay, thus there will be more problems involved.
The Court also looked at the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in that case, which
mimics they decision of the Court in this case.
- Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein BP Blg. 885 originated, it clearly said
that a plebiscite “shall be conducted in the areas affected”. BP Blg. 885, on the other hand,
says that a plebiscite “shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected”. The Court found no legal basis for the change.
- The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes vs Executive Secretary is
abandoned.
- However, the act being unconstitutional, the Court cannot direct the conduct of a new
plebiscite, there being no legal basis to do so.
Minimum area requirement
- Upon examining the certification issued by the Provincial Treasurer, the new province, at
most, has a land area of only 2765.4 square kilometers. Respondent’s contention that the
term “land area” is meant to include not only land, but water also cannot be appreciated. The
Court looked at the last sentence of the first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGC which states
that “the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands”. It is clear that
the use of the word territory has reference only to land mass since it speaks of territory not
needing to be contiguous or adjacent to each other.
Decision Petition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared unconstitutional. The plebiscite is void as
well as the proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new province and the appointment of its
new officials.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE
- congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision.
- Additional facts: Act was approved in “deep secrecy and inordinate haste” in
the last day of session, Dec 3, 1985. Though the act provided that a plebiscite be conducted
120 days its approval, but the plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986. The petitioners filed the case
in Dec 23, 1985, even as no printed copies of the Act were available, since its has not been
published. Since it was Christmas break at that time, the petition was only acted upon by the
Court only on January 7, 1986, after the plebiscite has been held.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORTES; January 29, 1990
FACTS
- Note Read first sec. 15-21, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution for this case.
- The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15,1987, which created the
Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by the Congress (see sec. 18, Art. X) and the creation of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.
- Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2].
- It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the
establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3].
- Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services
in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in
identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5)].
- It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects
in the region.
- The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy formulating body and a
Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm (secs. 7, 8 and 10].
- The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec. 17].
- Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic
act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing
administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the
constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region
on a permanent basis.
- During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act
recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature.
ISSUE
1. WON EO No. 220 is unconstitutional because it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act
by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on
the approval of the said organic act through a plebiscite
2. WON EO No. 220 created a new territorial and political subdivision with CAR
3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces
HELD
1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional.
- Petitioners’ assertions that the President has pre-empted Congress from its mandated task
of enacting said organic act.
- EO No. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act
and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
- The President is acting on a contingency. The complex procedure in Art. X of the
Constitution will take time.
o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not
yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of
the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created.
- The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera
Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras."
o EO No. 220 created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes
with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs
and services [secs. 2 and 5].
o The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the
agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-
governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.
- The Congress was convened. It enacted Republic Act No. 6658, which created the
Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art. X). The President then
appointed its members.
o The commission prepared a draft organic act, which became the basis for the
deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The result was
Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which
was signed into law on October 23, 1989.
o A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete
the process outlined in the Constitution, in the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in
force and effect for more than two years and despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous
 region in the Cordilleras is still to be created. Events have shown that petitioners' fear
that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
2. It did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a
larger subdivision.
- The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have
a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
o Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations,
e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the
power to create its own sources of revenue, etc.
o As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
- Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the
offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of
the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than
anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the
regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution (Art. X,
see. 14).
o These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the units in the region."
3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department
and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
- The concept of local autonomy:
 It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority
[Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 11.]
 The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.
Decision Petition to declare EO No. 220 as unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Voting All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr. concurring in the result since for him
the issue has become moot and academic because Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766
superseded the assailed EO already.
ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990
FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in
a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in
the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and
as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for
the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating
COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably –
then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao
on first Monday of March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a
memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that
the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under
Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more
than one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary
of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and
restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the
purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another
organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the
same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more
than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution,
as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that
the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the
Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of
the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V,
sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI
sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and
cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common
regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the
letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and
illogical.
Decision Petition (both a and b) granted.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT GAMING CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers. Petitioner Basco is the Chairperson of the
Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila. On July 1981 PAGCOR was created under
P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law
- Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of PD 1869 and they pray for its annulment
based on the ff. grounds:
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person willing right recognized
bylaw. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which
is recognized by law.
"B. The law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR -
conducted gambling. while most other forms of' gambling are outlawed. together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
"C. It violates the avowed trend of the government away from monopolistic and crony
economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
2. WON PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy of Manila
3. WON PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
HELD
1. Yes, petitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD 1869.
- Considering the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or riot the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities
of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before the
Supreme Court, it holds that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because
each of them has sustained or is in danger of' sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of." And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.
2. No, PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy of Manila with regard to its exemption
clause.
 a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation hits no inherent right to impose
taxes. Its "power to tax" must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having
been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"
b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. The City of Manila's
power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 197.5, the
power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise. licenses or
permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for
the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is
a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of
Manila.
3. No, PD 1869 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
- The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall. The mere fact that some gambling
activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R -A. 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under
certain conditions. while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869
for one. unconstitutional.
JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORONA; December 11, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, was formerly assigned in the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court.
- His salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the
budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, he received a monthly allowance from the local
funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.
- March 15, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the
opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary
limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner judge.
- May 7, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution 101, increasing
petitioner judge’s monthly allowance starting May 1993.
- February, 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal
Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the
monthly allowance and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid. Her
directive was based on the following:
1. Section 36, RA No.7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
2. National Compensation Circular No. 67 of the Department of Budget and Management
- Petitioner Judge appealed to Commission on Audit, Regional Director upheld opinion of
Provincial Auditor Dalisay and added that Resolution No. 101 Series of 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of the Local Budge Circular No.
53 outlining the conditions for the grant of the allowances to judges and other national officials
or employees by the local government units.
- Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the
Commission on Audit.
- September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its decision affirming Resolution of the
Regional Director.
1. the main issue is whether or not the municipality can validly provide RATA to its
municipal judge
2. Section 36 of RA 7645 states:
- Payable from the programmed/appropriated amount and others from personal services
savings of the respective offices where the officials or employees draw their salaries;
- Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General Appropriations Act;
- Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve other offices or
agencies shall be paid from their parent agencies
- No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
2. The municipal government may provide additional allowances and other benefits to
judges and other national government officials or employees assigned or stationed in
the municipality, provided, that the finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof
pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that similar
allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national government to the
official/employee assigned to the local government unit as provided under Section 3(e)
of local Budget Circular No. 53.
3. Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and void. The Honorable Judge Tomas
C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to receive additional RATA
from the local government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the General Appropriations
Act and National Compensation Circular No. 67.
- Position of Commission on Audit
> The municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA already received
from the Supreme Court
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67
- the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable from the programmed
appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where such officials or
employees draw their salary and
- no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source
2. General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645)
- the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the programmed appropriations of
their respective offices
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53
 - prohibits local government units from granting allowances to national government
officials or employees stationed in their localities when such allowances are also
granted by the national government or are similar to the allowances granted by the
national government to such officials or employees
- Position of Petitioner
> Municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code of 1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other benefits to
judges stationed in its territory.
> DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the Local Government Code 1991
through mere budget circulars.
ISSUE
WON Judge Leynes can validly receive allowance from municipality
HELD
- Ratio When a national official is on detail with another national agency, he should get his
RATA only from his parent national agency and not from the other national agency he is
detailed to.
-Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the monthly allowance by the Municipality of
Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes
- Reasoning
 RA 7645 is amended by NCC No. 67. No, administrative circular cannot supersede,
abrogate, modify, or nullify a statute.
 The Constitution guarantees the principle of local autonomy
- Article 10, Section 2
 An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in
accordance with the law.
ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PER CURIAM; September 27, 2005
FACTS
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on Justice, represented by Its Chairman,
Rep. Simeon Datumanong, The House of Representatives, represented by Its Speaker, Rep.
Jose de Venecia and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
MINUTE RESOLUTION
- Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2005: DENIED WITH FINALITY as
no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the questioned resolution
- Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 September 2005 DENIED for lack of merit
- Letter dated 26 September 2005 NOTED WITHOUT ACTION
FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.
CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003
FACTS
- Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution – Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.
- November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding
the Rules approved by 11th Congress
> Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member
of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such
official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings . – Within a period of one
(1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the
same official.
- July 2002 – House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice
to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund
- June 2003 – Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7
associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other
high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen  House Committee on
Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance
- October 2003 – Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was
signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12 th Congress is
constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid
HELD
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review.
o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been filed and the 2001 rules had
been promulgated and enforced.
o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
o Judicial Restraint – not an option because the Court is not legally disqualified; no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution.
o Interpretation of the term “initiate” – takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear.
o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI – once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year.
o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DACOYCOY
PARDO; April 29, 1999
FACTS
- Respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was charged with habitual drunkenness, misconduct and
nepotism before the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the Commission conducted a
formal investigation, and thereafter, promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence
to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Commission
found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two
sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
- The Commission denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction to set aside the Civil Service Commission’s resolutions. The Court of Appeals then
reversed and set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent
did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of
nepotism. The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person who recommends or
appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act." It likewise
declared null and void the Civil Service Commission’s resolution dismissing him from the
service.
- The Commission then filed an appeal via ceriorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism
2. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected by the decision" of the Court of
Appeals who may file an appeal therefrom
HELD
1. YES
- Under the definition of nepotism (Section 59 of Executive Order 292), one is guilty of
nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
- the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or
issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief
of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
- Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades,
Allen, Northern Samar. He did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of
driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag,
Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito.
Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as
watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for
short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and
approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions
shall be under Mr. Daclag’s immediate supervision. Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS
Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. Mr. Daclag
also appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy
who certified that “funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and
even rated his performance as “very satisfactory”. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his
position description form that his father was “his next higher supervisor”. The circumvention of
the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag
to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision.
Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s two sons and placed them
under respondent’s immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school.
Both positions are career positions.
- To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the
appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty
of nepotism.
- Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.
The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that
the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict
and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not
within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated
whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now
is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug
the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with
existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."
2. YES
- There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official
meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service
Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce
the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
- Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission
and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of
the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely
affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By
this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the
phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against
whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the
form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and
not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30)
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule
prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges."
- The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, to support its
ruling is misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is
covered by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original
appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely abused its
discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after
the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly
limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority
for appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59
"means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied
in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor
inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a
distinction there."
Decision Petition granted. The Court of Appeals' decision is reversed and the resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission are revived and affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [dissent and concur]
- Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in which the issues
relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the majority
opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an
administrative case involving nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by allowing
even a private complainant – and by implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision
exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of charges against, or even imposing a
penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in several cases.
- The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of nepotism. From
such “adverse decision”, the Civil Service Commission, through its Office for Legal Affairs,
interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Under existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled
in the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the Court, the present decision might
be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
- A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as “The Philippine Civil Service Law” shows
that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges.
- Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
- "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. "
- Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 (should be
807) which contemplates:
"Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision."
- The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee
against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found
guilty of the charges against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as
in the case, there is no occasion for appeal.
- Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an
administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the
person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for
more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is
even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days’ salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of
the decision.
- It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this practice of disallowing
appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or not, exclusively belongs to Legislature.
The Court cannot and should not arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself,
not even in the guise of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987
Constitution. Only Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law,
should it find any, especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to disallow the
State to appeal from judgments of exoneration. Any attempt by the Court to transgress this
most basic principle in the separation of powers between these two branches of government
would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial legislation.
- Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from
awards, judgments or final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency
(which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although in
general, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court (where pure
questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly raised), an appeal involving a
judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an
administrative case, in particular, falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39,
paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as
Presidential Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure such as Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.
- Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which could result in
the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office, constitutes a
proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature. Being such, provisions of law pertaining
thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State, just as penal laws are strictly
construed strictly against the State. Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in
favor of the respondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected" should
not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving nepotism.
- To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against civil service
employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. It
should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary
people, working under supervision and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and
the influence of peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding, they are not easily
cowed and intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints, transfer of station, or
demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can,
therefore, understand why the law and our jurisprudence disallow appeal by the complainant
from decisions in administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee
may be hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his self-respect and honor
by successive appeals.
- What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government employee is initially exonerated
or given a light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting that the employee is guilty
or that he deserves a heavier penalty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes
out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court
of Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in the physical and financial
exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of the
ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit wrongs may somehow hereby
benefit, but then we shall be content in concluding that we decided in favor of the many, that
the good of the majority prevailed.
- A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a judgment of
exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection
Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government agency concerned and
eventually to the State as a whole. This is especially so when there had been lapses in the
interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding, the
right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the
law does not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises its prerogative to amend
such law, this Court is bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same.
Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter failed to invoke the foregoing
general rule. In a similar case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to
interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right.
- Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote to grant the petition as stated
in the dispositive thereof.
PUNO [concur]
- Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party
adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person of the respondent employee who has
been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil
Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by
law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
- By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.
- The phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee
against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office.
- With humility, I make the submission that is time to strike down the doctrine disallowing
appeals to the Civil Service Commission when the decision exonerates a government official
or employee from an administrative charge. The doctrine is principally based on a constricted
interpretation of Section 39 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states:
“Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected
by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. x x
x”
- According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase “party adversely affected by the
decision” refers alone to the respondent government official or employee against whom the
administrative case is filed. They excluded from its compass the party complainant whose
charge is dismissed. Hence, when the respondent government official or employee is
exonerated, the decision is deemed final as the party complainant is precluded from
appealing.
- I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation which is not only too narrow but is
subversive of the essence of our civil service law. In the case at bar, private respondent is the
Vocational Administrator of the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. His charged with the
offense of nepotism for the appointment of two sons as driver and utility worker under his
immediate control and supervision. It is beyond argument that nepotism is prohibited by our
civil service law for it breeds inefficiency, if not corruption, in government service. The critical
question, therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the violation of this law and protect
public interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for
he has an interest that “appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness x x x.” A taxpayer has a right to good government and good government cannot
result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The Civil Service Law itself recognizes
that there are offenses which can be the subject of a complaint by any private citizen. Thus,
Section 37 of the law allows any private citizen to file a complaint against a government
official or employee directly with the Commission. Section 38 also recognizes that
“administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by
the head of the department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs
of agencies, or regional directors or upon sworn written complaint of any other persons.”
The general rule is that one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek review
of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a private citizen has the right to file an
administrative complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint,
unless the law clearly precludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy reasons . A
contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. The cases of Paredes, Mendez
and Magpale do not give any policy reasons why the dismissal of a charge of nepotism
cannot be appealed. They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to
appeals. Such an approach goes against the rule that “preclusions of judicial review of
administrative action . . . is not lightly to be inferred.
- In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil
Service Law. For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies
involving suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days
salary. But there is a clear policy reasons for declaring these decisions final. These decisions
involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by
government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless
overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the
expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism,
however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-
emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic
acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from
review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some
decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, even a
decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be
appealed.
- Similarly, the doctrine barring appeal cannot be justified by the provision limiting the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to review decisions involving: (1) suspension for
more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3)
demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Again, there is
nothing in this provision indicating legislative intent to bar appeal from decisions exonerating a
government official or employee from nepotism. Statutory preclusion of appeals is the
exception rather than the rule, for as stressed by Mr. Justice Douglas, "tolerance of judicial
review has been more and more the rule against the claim of administrative finality." Yet the
cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale precisely barred all appeals despite lack of an
explicit, positive provision in the Civil Service Law.
- Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party adversely affected to resort to judicial
review. This case does not involve the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission,
i.e., whether or not it has the power to review a decision exonerating a government official
from a charge of nepotism. The facts show that it was the Civil Service Commission that at the
first instance found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism. It was Dacoycoy who appealed the decision
of the Civil Service Commission to our regular court, more exactly, the Court of Appeals
pursuant to the Rules of Court. As Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of
Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission should also be impleaded as party
respondent. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Commission as it cleared Dacoycoy from
the charge of nepotism. The question therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded from
reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again,
I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. Indeed, under the Constitution,
the jurisdiction of this Court has even been expanded "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government." The question is not our lack of jurisdiction but
the prudential exercise of power. In certiorari cases alleging grave abuse of discretion, our
given task is to determine how much is too much of an abuse.
- To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that the petition of thus Court was filed by the
Civil Service Commission. The records will reveal that Suan, the original complainant, wrote to
the Civil Service Commission urging it to make the appeal ostensibly for lack of means. But
even without Suan, I submit that the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its
impact on the effectiveness of government give the Civil Service Commission the
standing to pursue this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is basically a legal one, i.e.,
the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court
has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws. Administrative agencies have always
conceded that the final interpretation of laws belongs to regular courts. And the issue has
broad implications on the merit and fitness philosophy of our civil service system. Under Sec.
3, Article IX (B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service Commission that has oversight of our
civil service system. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the diverse dimensions of the
issue. It is also the most affected, for it has the duty not to stand still when nepotic practices
threaten the principle of meritrocacy in our government. It seems to me self evident that this
type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by the Commission and not by a private
person.
- There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the doctrine of non-reviewability of
decisions exonerating government officials from charges of nepotism. For one, the doctrine
unduly favors officials charged with nepotism, for while we allow further review of their
conviction, we disallow review of their exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distorted rule
contravenes our distaste against nepotism, a practice whose continuance can fatally erode
faith in government. For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be extirpated
wherever found, can never be the intent of our legislators who crafted our Civil Service Law.
For still another, completely cutting off access to judicial review goes against the
spirit of the 1987 Constitution expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up
borders of non-reviewability weakens the judiciary’s checking power. Indeed,
shielding abusive administrative actions and decisions from judicial oversight will
ultimately erode the rule of law. As Justice Brandeis opined, "supremacy of law demands
that there shall be an opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law
was applied and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted
regularly."
- I join the majority opinion.
ROMERO [dissent]
- Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a decision of the
Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an administrative case, which decision,
in effect, reversed and nullified the Commission’s finding that the respondent employee is
guilty as charged?
- After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as the Civil
Service Law), Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I
find no legal basis to support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal
personality.
- The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government. Corollarily,
it is equipped with the power and function to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices and the agencies attached to it. This is in consonance with
its authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or
by law. It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted as a disciplining
authority.
- Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 provides the answer as to who may appear before the Commission, thus:
"Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or
employee by the following officials and employees:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other Person."
- Consequently, the complaint can either be the Secretary of department, head of office of
equivalent rank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency, regional director or any
other person or party. The phrase ‘any other party’ has been understood to be a complainant
other than the head of department or office of equivalent rank or head of local government or
chiefs of agencies or regional directors.
- The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or employee. Nowhere can be
found, expressly or impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one of the parties, either as complainant or respondent
in an administrative case. Logically and by necessary implication, it cannot considered either a
complaint or a respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one
person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Based on the foregoing,
there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service Commission is not a party to an
administrative proceeding brought before it. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court, now to the Court of Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved party. By inference, an
aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complaint before the Commission or the
respondent, the person subject of the complaint. In fact, the question as to who is an
“aggrieved party” has long been settled in a litany of cases. An aggrieved party in an
administrative case is the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is
filed. The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an
agency against whom an administrative charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a
sense, the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative proceedings before the
Commission, it nevertheless is not the "aggrieved party" contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or
the Civil Service Law.
- Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much less an aggrieved
party, then indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate the case to the appellate authority.
The Commission, therefore, has no legal standing to file the instant petition.
- While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party when its
decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural formality. As with
appellate processes, a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is
based primarily on the fact that the decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or
assailed and secondarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in the
performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should "detach himself from
cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’etre for such
doctrine is that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and for the appellate court to decide the
issues without his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be
judicial and has become adversarial instead."
- I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusion that the Commission may appeal a judgement of
exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism in light of the foregoing disquisition.
ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PANGANIBAN; April 3, 2001

FACTS
- Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLB Assoc Prof., who went on vacation LOA w/o pay, during which
he served as official rep to the Centre on Integrated Rural Devt for Asia and the Pacific
(CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for extension of LOA but was denied by Director of
ACCI of UPLB. The Director advised De Torres to report for duty. Also. UPLB Chancellor de
Guzman apprised him on rules of Civil Service and possibility of being considered AWOL.
When De Torres wrote that he will continue with CIRDAP, Chancellor warned that UPLB would
be forced to drop him fr rolls of personnel.
- After almost 5 yrs of absence w/o leave, De Torres wrote that he was reporting back to duty
at UPLB. Chancellor Villareal said he should have come fr an approved leave. ACCI Director
said De Torres was considered AWOL and advised him to reapply. But Chancellor Villareal
reversed his stand and said De Torres may report bec records do not show that he had been
officially dropped. ACCI requested ruling from Civil Service Commission.
- CSC ruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service. Petitioners sought recourse before
the CA but the petition was dismissed.
ISSUE
WON De Torres’ automatic separation from civil service was valid
HELD
NO. Automatic dismissal was invalid.
- Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules speaks of automatic separation even
w/o prior notice and hearing.
- Quezon v. Borromeo: chief nurse of Iligan City Hospital requested for two extensions of
leave. Both granted. She sought third extension. It was not acted upon. It was ruled that
she violated Sec 33. She was dropped.
- Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o official leave ought to have known that he was
deemed automatically separated.
- Ramo v. Elefaño: Petitioner was dropped fr service for her failure to return to duty after
expiration of leave of absence.
- There is sufficient notice when Chancellor advised petitioner and warned of possibility of
being considered AWOL. But in those three cases, the petitioners were actually dropped.
Here, De Torres was never actually dropped. He remained in the rolls. His salary was even
increased several times during his absence. His appointment was also reclassified. These
are acts inconsistent w/ separation. UP has chosen not to exercise its prerogative to dismiss
petitioner.
- Here, UP exercised academic freedom. It has power to determine who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, who may be admitted to study. CSC has no authority to
dictate UP the outright dismissal of its personnel.
CUEVAS V BACAL
MENDOZA; December 6, 2000
FACTS
- Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty. Demaisip v Atty. Bacal
- This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the
legality of the appointment and transfer of Josefina Bacal to the Office of the Regional Director
of the Public Attorney’s Office. Josefina Bacal is a Career Executive Officer III which she
alleges entitled her to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office.
- Bacal passed the Career Executive Services Examinations in 1989 and on 1994 was
conferred CES eligibility and was appointed as Regional Director of the PAO. On January 5,
1995 she was appointed to the rank of CESO III and on November 5, 1997 the Secretary of
Justice appointed her as Chief Public Attorney that was confirmed by President Ramos on
February 5, 1998, wherein she took her oath and assumed office.
- On July 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public Defender by Pres. Estrada
while Bacal was appointed Regional Director without her consent. Demaisip took her oath of
office on the 7th of July. Bacal filed a petition quo warranto that questioned her replacement to
the Supreme Court that was dismissed without prejudice for it to refiled in the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals ruled in Bacal’s favor.
ISSUES
1. WON the case should be dismissed for its failure to exhaust administrative remedies
through an appeal to the Office of the President
2. WON Bacal’s removal amounted to a removal without cause (which is illegal)
3. WON by the mere fact of being appointed would enable the individual to acquire security of
tenure
4. WON a Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted from one office to another
without violation of their right to security of tenure as their status and salaries is based on their
ranks and not on their jobs
5. WON Demaisip has a security of tenure
HELD
1. No, because the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President
himself. No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a
department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. In addition,
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the question raised is purely legal.
2. No, her appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney requires her to be appointed to
a CES Rank Level I which never materialized. If the rank of an individual is not appropriate to
the position her appointment is deemed to be temporary and she cannot claim security of
tenure. The right to tenure is conferred upon the individual filling the position based on the
possession of required qualifications. The general rule would be that those who were qualified
would be appointed, but as an exception, those with insufficient qualifications may be
appointed but merely in an acting capacity.
3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the rank and not to the position. In
addition, the guaranty of security of tenure is applicable only to those in the first and second
level in the civil service.
4. No, reading through PD No. 1 that created the Integrated Reorganization Plan, the Career
Executive Service provides that reassignments or transfers are allowed provided that it is
made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in the rank or salary of the
individual and that this should not be done more oftener than two years. If the individual
deems it as unjustified s/he may appeal to the President. The rule that an employee can claim
security of tenure is applicable only to Election Registrars, Election Officers, also in the
Commission on Elections, and Revenue District Officers in thew Bureau of Internal Revenues.
Bacal was just CESO III therefore, she is meant to qualify in the position where she was
subsequently appointed to which is Regional Director.
5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not permanent following the same logic that
was used for Bacal, Demaisip having not acquired the qualification of CES Rank Level I
implies that her stay in the position is temporary.
CANONIZADO V AGUIRRE
GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000
FACTS
- PETITITON to declare RA 8851 (RA 8551) unconstitutional
- the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) was originally created under RA 6975
entitled “An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department
Of The Interior And Local Government, And For other Purposes”.
- under RA 6975, petitioners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres, Rogelio Pureza, and
respondents Jose Adiong and Dula Torres were appointed as NAPOLCOM commissioners on
Jan. 1991 for six year terms
- 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998” took effect, declaring the terms of the current commissioners expired
- the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of RA 8551 which amends S13 of RA
6975, altering the composition of NAPOLCOM as well as S8, which removes them from office
and allegedly violates their security of tenure.
- as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot be removed from office except for
causes “provided by law”, that is, with legal cause and not merely for reasons deemed fit by
the appointing power
- the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function; Congress may
abolish any office w/o impairing the officer’s right to continue in his position. This power may
be exercised for reasons such as a lack of funds or the interests of the economy; abolition
must be made in good faith, not personal or political reasons
ISSUES
1. WON there was a bona fide reorganization of NAPOLCOM
2. WON there was a valid abolition of the petitioners’ offices
HELD
1. NO. Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as “a collegial body w/in the DILG”,
and under RA 8551 it was defined as “an agency attached to the Department for policy and
program coordination.” This increase in the agency’s autonomy does not result in the creation
of an entirely new office. S4 of RA 8551amends the NAPOLCOM’s composition by adding the
PNP Chief as an ex-officio member, requiring the membership of 3 civilian commissioners, a
fourth commissioner from the law enforcement sector and at least one female commissioner.
Such changes are trivial and do not affect the nature of the NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers
and duties of NAPOLCOM remain unchanged. Reorganization only takes place when there is
an alteration of the existing structure of the office including lines of control and authority and
may involve a reduction of personnel or abolition of offices if done in good faith (economic
purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite the new law, NAPOLCOM continues to
exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and
adjudicatory functions.
2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA 8551 discloses legislative intent to abolish
NAPOLCOM pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. As held in UP Board of Regents v. Rasul ,
the removal of an incumbent is not justified if the functions of the old and new positions are
the same, that is, if there is no true reorganization. The court finds that RA 8551 does not
expressly abolish the petitioners’ positions upon examination of the changes introduced by the
new law. In the event of a reorganization done in good faith, no dismissal actually occurs
because the office itself ceases to exist. If the abolition merely seeks to enact a change of
nomenclature or attempt to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
personnel, then the abolition is void ab initio. In the case at bar, no bona fide reorganization
had been mandated by congress; hence, petitioners were removed from office with no legal
cause, making S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional, and entitling them to immediate reinstatement.
Decision -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of declaring S8 of RA 8551
unconstitutional for violating the petitioners’ rights to security of tenure. Petitioners are entitled
to reinstatement.
GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
PARDO; December 13, 2000
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two “decisions” of
the Commission on Audit (COA)
- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as ad interim Commissioner
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a term expiring Feb. 2, 1999.
She assumed office after taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by Congress.
- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office
of the Pres. as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (now Associate Justice) Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioner’s term would expire
on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying
on the said advisory opinion.
- On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon, requested opinion from the COA on
whether petitioner and her co-terminous staff should continue to be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the fact that their appointment had already expired. COA General Counsel
issued an opinion that the petitioner’s appointment had indeed expired.
- CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments
pertaining to petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner appealed to the COA en
banc. The appeal was dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and held that the issue of
petitioner’s term of office may be addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper
which had Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that the Commission is bereft of
power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the
Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, she was again denied; hence
this petition.
ISSUE
WON petitioner Atty. Gaminde’s term of office, as CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999
or on Feb. 2, 2000
HELD
It expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term) the count is:
Feb.02, 1987---Feb.02, 1992---Feb.02, 1999---Feb.02, 2006…
Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date
of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of vacancy
every 2 years consistent in the previous appointment intervals.
Reasoning
- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973 Constitution introduced
the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII Sec. 1(1),
1973 Consti). It was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935
Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the
Commission on Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended).
- In Republic v Imperial, it was said that “the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions: (1) that the terms of the first (3) Commissioners should start on a common date,
and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.”
- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the
variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees , in order that the
expirations of the firs terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-
year interval between the expiration of the terms.
- In the law of public officers, “term” of office is distinguished from “tenure” of the incumbent.
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is
not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.
- Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members of the Constitutional
Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution,
unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office or appointed to a new term, what it contemplates is “tenure” not “term.” The term
“unless” imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that
the incumbent members of the Consti Commissions shall continue… for 1 year after
ratification of the Consti under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing
power who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reasons stated therein. However, they
do not affect the “term” of office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational interval for
the 1st appointees.
Decision Term of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However, petitioner served as de facto
officer in good faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered. COA decision disallowing salaries/emoluments is
reversed.
Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the parties, Puno, concur (In the
result), De Leon, Jr., Concurring and Dissenting opinion
Mendoza, Joins De Leon’s dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
DE LEON [concur and dissent]
Dissents:
-the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia.
-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under the 1987 Constitution
commenced on the Feb. 2, 1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987.
Concurs:
-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2,
1999 should not be disallowed by COA.
BLAQUERA V ALCALA
PURISIMA; September 11, 1998
FACTS
- G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are cases for certiorari and prohibition,
challenging the constitutionality and validity of AO 29 and 268
- Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies
who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292 otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.
- In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized the grant of productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition
under Section 7 of AO 268 (issued by President Aquino) , enjoining said grants without prior
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed “all departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount
authorized under Section 1 hereof to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess.” In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government
concerned, who are the herein Respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries
or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
- To prevent the Respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or
allowances, the Petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
- In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the
other consolidated cases. The Petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (“ADEPT”), is an association of employees of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (“PTA”) who were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year
1992 pursuant to RA 6971, otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990.
Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was
prohibited under AO 29. The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on
appeal to the Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON with regard to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under RA 6971 are applicable to ADEPT
employees
2. WON AO 29 and 268 (being Presidential pronouncements) are violative of the provisions of
EO 292 (being a law passed by the legislature), and hence null and void, and WON AO 29
and 268 unlawfully usurp the Constitutional authority granted solely to the Civil Service
Commission
3. WON the forced refund of incentive pay is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual
obligation
4. WON assuming arguendo that the grant of incentives was invalid, the same should be the
personal liability of officials directly responsible therefore in accordance with section 9 of AO
268
HELD
1. There are generally two types of GOCCs:
1. Those incorporated under the general corporation law. Employees of this type
have the right to bargain (collectively), strike, and other such remedies available to
workers of private corporations. Functions are mainly proprietary.
2. Those with special charter (a.k.a. original charter), which are subject to Civil Service
Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively). Incorporated in pursuance of a State
Policy.
- Only GOCCs incorporated under the general corporation law, and thus performing
proprietary functions, are included under the coverage of RA 6791. GOCCs created in
pursuance of a policy of the state and those whose officers and employees are covered by the
Civil Service are expressly excluded.
- The legislative intent to place only GOCCs performing proprietary functions under the
coverage of RA 6971 is also gleanable from the other provisions of the law making reference
to remedies available only to laborers akin to the private sector.
- Also, pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the
establishment of Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives Award
Systems for GOCCs with original charters, it is thus evident that the PTA is already within the
scope of an incentives award system.
2. In accordance with EO 292, the functions of the Civil Service Commission have been
“decentralized to the offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed;”
specifically, the implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System
ahs been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency (as
his/her alter ego).
- The President is the head of government. His/her power includes control over executive
departments. Control means “the power to alter what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” In
issuing AO 29 limiting the amount of benefits, enjoining heads of departments from granting
benefits without prior approval from him/her, and directing the refund of any excess over the
prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments. Specifically, seeing that the incentives program was producing demoralization
instead of the original goal of encouragement, owing to the fact that employees not receiving
the incentives felt slighted and underappreciated, the President merely exercised his power of
control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President.
- Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Civil Service
Commission to grant benefits to government employees. AO 29 and 268 did not revoke, but
rather only regulated, the grant and amount of incentives.
3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The acts involved in this
case are governmental. Besides, incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, which is not a
demandable or enforceable obligation.
4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not personally liable for damages resulting
form the performance of official duties.
Decision In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268 and 29, the Court reiterates the
doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to
be preferred.
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, the Court cannot
countenance the refund of the incentives which amount the petitioners have already received,
as a corollary, further deductions from salaries are thus enjoined.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PADILLA; May 5, 1994
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and
use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law
- 18 April 1994: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays, represented
by petitioner Alex David (as taxpayer and as president and secretary-general of the
organization) filed this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
- 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the same issues were filed.
- Petitioners question what they perceive as “the threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and
use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law” relative to the
conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections. They claim that in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) of 1994, only P137,878,000.00 were appropriated by the Congress for the holding
of the said elections. The petitioners claim that by early 1994, Congress itself has made the
assessment that the money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the elections. Petitioners
allege that in order to augment said amount, respondents have threatened and are about to
transfer/re-allocate certain moneys to be sourced from the executive and legislative branches
of government to COMELEC, which in turn will use it to fund the elections: [a] P180M from the
appropriation of the DILG, [b] P160M from the Countryside Development Fund; P70M from
the Senate; P30M from the HReps; and [c] P43M from the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA)
of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities ( Note: This is the scheme that is being assailed in the
issue of this case)
- 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondents to submit comment on the petition
within the non-existentiable period of 5 days
- 26 April 1994: Respondents through the Solicitor General filed their comment. They claim
that petitioners acted solely on the basis of reports made in the newspaper (“Barangay Poll
Funds Found” article from the Manila Bulletin) and did not bother to confirm the veracity of
article. They also claim that said reports were mere unofficial proposals/suggestions made in
the process of searching for funds. COMELEC further alleges that that it intends to fund the
barangay elections from the money allotted by Congress for the purpose and from its own
savings resulting from unused funds. The Solicitor General supports the stand of the
respondents, as it is according to Sec. 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution and Sectoons 17
(Use of Savings) and 19 (Meaning of Savings and Appropriations) of the GAA for Fiscal Year
1994.
- Respondents also maintain that funds from LGUs may also be used to help defray the cost
of the forthcoming barangay elections. They cite Opinion No. 51 of the Secretary of Justice,
dated 19 April 1994, which says that under Sec. 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are
required to appropriate funds for barangay elections
ISSUE
WON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the impleaded public respondents are
attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of funds which would be in direct contravention
of Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution60
HELD
60
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Any threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds scheme that exists only in newspaper
reports is not sufficient factual basis to render such scheme by the COMELEC
unconstitutional.
Reasoning
1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was one, existed only in newspaper
reports which could have misled the general public, including the petitioners, into believing
that the same emanated from impeccable sources. [b] Court acknowledges petitioners have
displayed vigilance and acted with the best of intentions, but they should have first obtained
an official statement or at least confirmation from respondents as to the veracity of the report
instead of relying on the newspaper article.
2. The court went further in saying – actually, in affirming the arguments of the respondents –
that consistent with Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the following may be availed by the
COMELEC to defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay elections:
[a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that LGUs should appropriate funds for
the barangay elections. COMELEC may make arranges with local governments to comply
with this article pursuant to its constitutional authority to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections. COMELEC may also issue an appropriate
directive for the province city, or municipality to advance election expenses that are
chargeable to it. Since the President exercises general supervision of all local governments,
the COMELEC may course its directives to local governments through the Office of the
President and to be implemented by DILG. ( Note: This is based on the Opinion No. 51, s.
1994 of Sec. of Justice which was cited as authority)
[b] Sections 17 and 19 of GAA for FY 1994 where it was stated that the Heads of
Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution…are hereby authorized to
augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
Decision Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Voting 14 concur, no dissent.
LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PUNO; April 14, 1999
FACTS
- RA 8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated election system
> Was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in the ARMM which includes Sulu
> Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELEC Task Force in Sulu
- Sulu voting readily peaceful except that there was a problem with the automated counting of
votes
> Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998) between the election returns and the votes
cast for mayor in the muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed when checked by Atty.
Tolentino)
> The automated counting of ballots in Pata were suspended and the problem was
immediately communicated to the COMELEC technical experts
> The problem was caused by the misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of
candidates in the local ballots but nothing was wrong with the machines.
- Emergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino participated in by military police officials and
local candidates. Petitioner Loong was among those who attended along with private
respondent Tan.
> Discussed how ballots should be counted.
> Shift to manual count recommended by Brig. Gen. Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director
Alejandrino, gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and congressinal candidate
Tulawie
> Automated count insisted by gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri. Written position
papers were required to be submitted.
> Local ballots in five municipalities were rejected by automated machines (Talipao, Siasi,
Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo). Ballots rejected because of the wrong sequence code.
> COMELEC issued Minute Resolution 98-1747 ordering manual recount in Pata. By 12
midnight of May 12, Atty. Tolentino had sent an en banc report to the COMELEC
reommending manual recount in the whole province of Sulu because it is possible that the
same problem would extend to other provinces in Sulu.
> The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentino's recommendation with the following
implementation procedures:
+ Counting machines from Jolo be transported to Manila in the PICC to keep
COMELEC away from bloodshed between AFP and MNLF
+ Authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers concerned for the conduct of
the automated and manual operations of the counting of votes at PICC
+ To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized representative of the political
parties concerned and the candidate watchers both outside and inside the perimeters
of the PICC
> May 15, 1998 – COMELEC laid down rules for manual count through Minute Resoln 98-
1796
> May 18, 1998 – Loong filed objection to Minute Resolution 98-1796
+ Violates provisions of RA 8436 providing for automated counting of ballots in ARMM.
Automated count is mandatory and could not be substituted by manual counting.
+ Ballots were rejected because ballots were tampered with and/or the texture was
different from the official ballot
+ Counting machines designed in such a way as only genuine official ballots could be
read by the machine
 + Other counting machines in other municipalities were in order.
> COMELEC still began with the manual count on May 18.
> Loong filed petition for certiorari with Supreme Court:
+ COMELEC issued Minute Resolutions without prior notice and hearing to him
+ Order for manual counting violated RA 8346
+ Manual counting gave opportunity to election cheating:
< Counting by human hands of fake, tampered and counterfeit ballots which
machines were programmed to reject
< Opportunity to substite ballots in PICC
< 22 Board of Election Inspectors for 1,194 precincts gives sufficient time to
change and tamper ballots
< Opportunity to delay the proclamation of winning candidates through dilatory
moves in pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and certificates are
already made by man
> Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3rd highest votes.
ISSUES
1. WON petition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to invalidate COMELEC resolutions
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdisction in
order manual count
a. Is there legal basis for manual count?
b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC ordered manual count?
3. Won it is proper to call for special election for the position of Sulu governor assuming the
manual count is illegal and result is unreliable.
HELD
1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution
- Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the COMELEC's broad power in Art. 9,
Section 2(1) “to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.”
- Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respondent and intervenor so there are enough
considerations for the certiorari jurisdiction.
2. No grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of jurisdiction because the post election
realities show that the order for the manual count was not arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
a. There was legal basis for the manual count.
- RA 8436 cannot be insisted upon after the machines rejected the local ballots in five
municipalities of Sulu. The errors were not machine related by were because of the
ballots.
- Congress failed to provide for remedy when the error in counting is not machine-
related. The vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating the
problem. Article 9, Section 2(1) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power
“to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”
b. There was reasonable factual basis.
- Automated machines failed to read the ballots correctly in Pata. Local ballots in Jolo,
Siasi, Tapal, Indanan and Talipao were rejected.
> Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELEC experts and found nothing wrong
with the machines but with the ballots.
> To continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous result.
- COMELEC had to act derisively in order to restore peace and order, especially since
past election tensions have been created by failures in automated counting. Military and
authorities recommended manual counting to preserve peace and order.
c. There was no denial of due process when COMELEC ordered the manual count.
- They were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of local ballots in Sulu.
> Orally heard
> Written position papers
> Representatives escorted transfer of ballots and automated machines to Manila
> Watchers observed manual count
- The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were transferred from Sulu
to Manila and when they were manually counted.
- Manual count is reliable because when the COMELEC ordered manual count, it issued
corresponding rules and regulations to govern the counting and the ballots were not
difficult to understand.
3. A special election for Sulu governor is improper.
- A special election only governs exceptional circumstances. The plea can only be
grounded on a failure of election.
> A failure of election applies when “on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the dosing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody of canvass thereof.”
> A plea for special election must also be addressed to the COMELEC not to the SC
(Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to RA 7166).
> Grounds for failure of election involve questins after the fact. They can only be
determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice and hearing to the parties.
Loong did not do this in the present case. His plea for special election was an
 afterthought.
- To hold a specal election would be discriminatory.
> All elected officials in Sulu now discharging functions.;
> Tan's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
In addition
- COMELEC was organied under Comm. Act 607 in August 1940. The power to enforce
election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised through the Dept. of
Interior.
- 1940 amendments to 1935 Constitution transformed the COMELEC to a constitutional body.
COMELEC was granted power to have “exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.”
- 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELEC by making it the sole judge of all
election contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the
national legislature and elective provincial and city officials. It was given judicial power asde
from the traditional administrative and executive functions.
- 1987 Constitution added powers to the COMELEC by allowing it to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiative, referenda
and recalls. It also includes contets involving elective municipal and barangay officals.
SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982
FACTS
- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for Mayor of San Fernando,
Pampanga
- Biliwang was proclaimed winner
- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and void the local elections due to
alleged large scale terrorism
- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting was over in the local elections,
terrorism and irregularities were committed- counters were threatened by armed goons and
policemen into making spurious election returns in favor of Biliwang.
- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:
1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting aside of the proclamation of
Biliwang
2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of
election, so that remedial legislation may be enacted, and pending such enactment, the
President/PM may appoint municipal officials in San Fernando
- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution certifying the failure of
election, and praying instead that COMELEC call a special election in San Fernando
- COMELEC denied reconsideration
- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which were consolidated into the
following issues:
ISSUES
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of
post-election terrorism
2. WON the COMELEC has the authority to call for a special election
HELD
1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials
because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests
relative to elective municipal officials is vested in the CFI
- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting COMELEC with authority to annul an
election. Under the 1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not have this power,
and that instead the power lay with the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. Now, however, it is “the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials.” The COMELEC must be deemed possessed of the authority, in line with its plenitude
of powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections.
2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the holding of a new or special election,
because the actual election itself took place, and in a proper, orderly fashion. According to
COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or
special election only in a failure of election, but in this case, there was a failure to gauge the
true and genuine will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election (tainted casting of
ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will))
- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
because elections did take place is too tenuous a distinction. In practical effect, no election
has been held; there has been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This interpretation only
hampers the effectiveness of the COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to cast
their votes.
Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the COMELEC to annul an election
and to call for a special election.
UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BARREDO; April 3, 1981
FACTS
- Appeal by the UNIDO (a political org campaigning for "NO" votes to amendments to the 1973
Consti proposed by the Batasang Pambansa), from the resolutions of COMELEC dated March
18 and March 22, 1981.
- 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions providing for Rules and Regulations
concerning the plebiscite campaign:
(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal opportunity on free public discussions and
debates;
(2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio &
TV) <equal as to duration and quality…at the same rates or given free of charge>; &
(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal space on the use of the print media; but
COMELEC recognizes the principle of self-regulation & shall practice only minimal
supervision.
- 10 March 1981: UNIDO writes to COMELEC re: news that Pres. Marcos will lead the
campaign for "Yes" votes in his 2-hr nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-TV
program on March 12, which will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio stations
throughout the country. Citing the said COMELEC resolutions, they demand exactly the same
number of TV and radio stations all over the country to campaign for 'No' votes.
- 17 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter to COMELEC, stating that on March 21, they
will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, & requesting that it covered
by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. They expect COMELEC to direct the radio &
TV facilities to comply with their request.
- 18 March 1981: COMELEC issued Resolution saying UNIDO’s request "cannot be granted
and is hereby denied" & that
(1) 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political or partisan vehicle but an innovative system
of participatory democracy where the President as leader of the nation enunciates certain
programs or policies…. Its format is intended to result in effective multi-way consultation
between the leader of the nation and the people; and that
(2) UNIDO, not having the same constitutional prerogatives vested in the President/Prime
Minister, has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos but
is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned.
COMEMEC cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities.
- 20 March 1981: UNIDO writes another letter as MFR. Denied by COMELEC for lack of
merit. Hence, this appeal before SC. Petitioner raises the following grounds:
(1) COMELEC resolutions in question are contrary to the Constitution and the law, for being
unjust, unfair & inequitable. They violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair
play, & are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections;
(2) UNIDO’s request/demand for equal broadcast media of its public meeting/rally at Plaza
Miranda was arbitrarily denied. The campaign for NO votes should be granted the same
right & equal use of facilities granted Marcos’ campaign for YES.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
HELD
“…for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations
contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty,
obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign
people when the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing circumstances,
and for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, thereby
depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act , and for these alone among other reasons which
there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be granted. “
- The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep and transcendental importance and the
more the people are adequately informed about the proposed amendments, their exact
meaning, implications and nuances, the better.
- Denial of due process is considered generally as the first and the most valued right of
everyone under the Bill of Rights. UNIDO should have made the television and radio stations
(who will be directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec upon SC’s orders) parties to
this case. Said parties are indispensable without which the Court cannot proceed properly.
- In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently they have not done so, that they have
requested any TV or radio station to give them the same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as
that which they afforded the President. Also, there are other groups and aggrupations not to
speak of individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner who would also want to be heard.
- The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of the Constitution is applicable also to
plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. It is indispensable that they
be properly characterized to be fair submission: the voters must of necessity have had
adequate opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient
understanding of what they are voting on.
- Nothing can be of more transcendental importance than to vote in a constitutional plebiscite.
It is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations
insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all contending views.
- Curtailment of the freedom of speech and the press of television and radio stations is
permissible for election purposes.
- The head of state of every country in the world must from the very nature of his position, be
accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him. When the
head of state wants to communicate on matters of public concern, no government office or
entity is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities. They have to avail themselves of
their own resources.
- In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party
that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he
dialogues with the governed. When the President spoke in "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" he
spoke as President-Prime Minister and not as head of the KBL, the political party now in
power.
- The petitioner had not adequately shown that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media with
respect to the equal opportunity provisions, but such authority arises only when there is a
showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to
which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the media.
- There are other political parties similarly situated as petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it
wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties should also be granted. That would be
too much to expect from the media that has also its own right to which it or he is entitled.
Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the media.
Decision Appeal dismissed.
CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BIDIN; July 3, 1992
FACTS
- Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming the 24 th highest
senatorial candidate.
- May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case "Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.,"
disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. The
petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its
agents and the general public the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the
name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election
returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of
Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."
- May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all
"Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in
the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the
list of qualified candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV
ordering that all “Chavez” votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the
precincts
- Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA
7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the
Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.
- Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the
Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in favor of
petitioner.
- May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city election
registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and
to credit all the "Chavez" votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in
favor of petitioner.
- Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the
various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes of voting
did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated.
- May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the
latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the
ballot boxes to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3)
make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend
the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
- Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed this
urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, enjoining
the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first
implementing Comelec's resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner's
letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner
alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of
discretion.
- June 8, 1992, Sen Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition on the
ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of
members of the Senate.
ISSUE
1. WON SC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD
1. Jurisdiction
- The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the list
of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial review.
The Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave
abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and
not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions.
- Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. Comelec has
ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the official list of candidates, but
also on the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner's
allegation that respondent Comelec failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.
- Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a pre-
proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.
- Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the
case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
xxx xxx xxx
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on
the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or district
board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings."
What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before
the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
- The petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest error's in the certificates of
canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and
appreciation of the ballots contained therein. He has not even pointed to any "manifest error"
in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none,
the proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal.
- The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to their respective Members is therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction
to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a
member of the Senate. Petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.
- Petitioner argues that a recount before the Senate Electoral Tribunal would force him to shell
out the expenses imposes not only a property requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be
voted upon but also a price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign
will.
- The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to
abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter
the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases
like the one at bar must be faithfully followed. The proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not
this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial measures.
- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: "… (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the
board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or
reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the
board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the board election
inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the
issues enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete election returns whose authenticity is
not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same
and proclamation of the winning candidates.
"The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that
may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of
"Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and
authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute
has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of
election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity
(Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."
- Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election
returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction.
Decision Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition
for lack of merit.
Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Notes Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any question pertaining to or affecting
the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." [Sec.
241, Omnibus Election Code).
BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CAYETANO
PUNO; January 26, 2004
FACTS
- Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the COMELEC to
take cognizance of contests involving the conduct of a plebiscite and the annulment of its
result.
- In April 1988, a plebiscite was held to ratify the cityhood of Taguig (converting Tagiug into a
highly urbanized city). The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the
canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating
that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the
COMELEC, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite
returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
- Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, Buac and
Bautista filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of
the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the
petition as an election protest.
- Cayetano intervened in the case. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He
alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest, and such must be within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
- COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and ruled that it had jurisdiction over the
case, but this was overturned completely upon the MFR of Cayetano.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide cases regarding plebiscite contests.
HELD
YES
Ratio COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscite contest contests as power to decide such
cases is part of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC under Art. IX(C)
Sec. 2(1)61.
Reasoning: there are 7 reasons given.
1. Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. Under the
present case, there is no involvement of the violation of any legally demandable right, for it
merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig.
2. Jurisdiction of RTC is only on civil actions. A Plebiscite is NOT a civil action but a
determination of public will.
3. To grant jurisdiction to RTC would result to jumbled justice. There would be confusion if
plebiscite contest cases were given to the RTC for what if the plebiscite was a national one.
Every RTC in the Philippines would have jurisdiction over nationwide plebiscite, which runs
contrary to the principle that jurisdiction of an RTC is limited to their region.
4. The Consti gives jurisdiction of contests involving only election of officers to the courts (part
of judicial function) or to administrative tribunals (exercising quasi-judicial power). As such,
jurisdiction over plebiscite contests is not vested on the courts.
5. The Constitutional mandate to COMELEC to enforce and administer laws and regulations
relative to conduct of plebiscites (among others) includes the power to ascertain the true
results of such plebiscite. It includes the power to do all that is necessary to achieve honest
and credible plebiscites.
*The provision granting COMELEC jurisdiction over contests re: elected officials is not
limiting in the sense that it only limits quasi-judicial power of COMELEC to such cases. The
power to ascertain true results is implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of plebiscite.
6. COMELEC is best suited to have jurisdiction over such cases because of their indisputable
expertise in election and related laws.
7. MFR of Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not the prescribed 5 days, after receipt of
the Order or Resolution of COMELEC).
61
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
Decision COMELEC directed to reinstate the petition to annul the results and decide it
without delay.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES [dissent]
- Quasi-judicial function of COMELEC is limited to contests involving election of regional,
provincial, and city officials (limited to what the provision in the Consti said). As such,
jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC, since no other court or agency has jurisdiction over it.
- Present contest is based on allegations of fraud and irregularities, which involves a legal
question that is determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
- There is also the involvement of a demandable right (right to a canvass free from fraud,
anomalies, and irregularities) which arose from their right to to vote in a plebiscite.
- Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoN there is involvement of a judicial controversy or
a purely administrative function. In this case, it is clearly judicial.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS V MINISTER OF LABOR
GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983
FACTS
- Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the
other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the
following offices, schools, or government-owned or controlled corporations: PNB, MWSS,
GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The workers in the respondent institutions have not directly
petitioned the heads of their respective offices or their representatives in the Batasang
Pambansa. They have acted through a labor federation and its affiliated unions. The workers
and employees are taking collective action through a labor federation which uses the
bargaining power of organized labor to secure increased compensation for its members.
- The petitioners contend that they should be included as recipients of the P.D. 851 Christmas
bonus which states:
SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of not more than P 1000 a month, regardless of the nature of
their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every
year.
SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13 th-month pay or its
equivalent are not covered by this Decree.
- Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 provides:
“Section 3. Employees covered. – The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:
b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, except those corporations operating essentially as private
subsidiaries of the Government;”
- The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under legislative authority must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. A legislative act cannot be amended by a rule and an administrative officer
(Minister of Labor) cannot change the law.
ISSUE
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case;
2. WON branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government included
among the “employers” under PD 851 are required to pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of less than P1000 13th-month pay;
3. Whether or not branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government
are allowed to collectively bargain for wages and benefits.
HELD
1. The Court does not have jurisdiction over the petition.
Reasoning The petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for
declaratory relief, an action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for petitioners’ statement that the SC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are
concerned.
HOWEVER, the petition has far reaching implications and raises questions that should be
resolved.
2. Government employees are not entitled to 13 th -month pay as provided in PD 851.
Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any legislation or
decree (STATCON).
Reasoning The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a
general term like “employer” unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that
effect.
In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
PD 851 that Government subdivisions, etc. are not covered by the Decree. The benefit is
extended only to employees of private companies/ corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of PD 851
bars the petitioners from receiving the bonus, since government offices have instituted an
across the board wage increase.
3. Public officers and employees may not join associations which impose the
obligation to engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits,
and other emoluments higher than or different from that provided by law and
regulation.
Reason ing Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law¸
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector
to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private
industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. In
government employment, it is the legislature and the administrative heads (when properly
delegated the power) of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment.
- Under the present Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations are specifically
mentioned as embraced by the civil service (Section 1, Article XII-B). This was to correct the
situation where more favored employees of the government could enjoy the benefits of two
worlds. Salaries and fringe benefits of those embraced by the civil service are fixed
by law. As such petitioners have no standing to bargain collectively (or to bargain at all) for
wages.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice]
- This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of statutory construction that unless so
specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any legislation or decree.
- ART. XIII Sec. 1: “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility xxx”
> Under the Constitution there can be no right to strike by them nor to take a mass leave
which is a way of doing indirectly what is not legally allowable.
- Government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from employers (terms are fixed by law).
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- All the “whereases” are the premises of the decree requiring all employers to pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1000 a month. All working masses,
without exception whether private sector or public, are also suffering from ravages of inflation,
and are entitled to properly celebrate Christmas every year.
- Both the employees of the respondents and the employees of the private sector are similarly
situated and have collective bargaining agreements with their respective employers.

NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRC
PADILLA; November 29, 1988
FACTS
- Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC.
- Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil service under the 1987 Const does
not cover employees from GOCCs organized as subsidiaries under the general corporation
law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs are under NLRC’s jurisdiction. By further
implication, the auditing power of COA does not apply over said GOCCs.
- Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a corporation that provides manpower
services to PNB and its agencies. Because of certain administrative charges against her such
as discourtesy and insubordination, she was dismissed from NASECO in 1983. In the same
year Credo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was eventually decided by the NLRC
in 1984 in her favor.
- NASECO contends, among others, that the NLRC 62 has no jurisdiction to order Credo's
reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a GOCC [by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the PNB, which in
turn is a GOCC], the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites
National Housing Corporation vs. Juco [134 SCRA 172 (1985)], where SC held that
"employees of GOCCs are governed by the civil service law.”
ISSUE
For the purpose of determining whether the case falls under the NLRC or CSC, WON
NASECO (without original charter) covered by the civil service as defined in the 1987
Constitution
HELD
- GOCCs without legislative charter shall not be deemed to be embraced by the term civil
service under the Constitution. By implication, labor disputes in said GOCCs shall fall within
the jurisdiction of the NLRC. By further implication, the auditing power of COA shall not apply
to them.
Reasoning In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCCs, the 1987 Constitution
starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC is based. Under the 1973 Const, it
was provided that
"[t]he civil service embraces every… instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporation."
62
BRYAN_SJ: NLRC does not have jurisdiction over those covered by the CSC. It had jurisdiction on labor issues of private corporations or
broadly speaking, private businesses.
- On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)]
“[t]he civil service embraces all… instrumentalities… of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."
- Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and the NHC case
regarding subsidiary corporations created under the Corporation Code, whose "officials and
employees would be… free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree
and the regulations of the Commission on Audit,” appear relegated to relative insignificance by
the above 1987 Constitutional provision. By clear implication [of Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)], the Civil
Service does not include GOCCs which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCCs under the
general corporation law.63
- On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the
Constitution in place at the time of [ SC’s] decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord
relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the
NASECO is a GOCC without original charter.64 NLRC decision affirmed.
CRISTOBAL V MELCHOR
MUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977
FACTS
- Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office
in Malacañan, having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of
P4,188.00 per annum. On the second week of January, 1962, the then Executive Secretary
Amelito Mutuc, thru a letter, informed the plaintiff that his services as private secretary in the
President's Private Office were terminated effective January 1, 1962. A similar letter was
addressed by Sec. Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President (OP). The
dismissed employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated January 3, 1962
and January 26, 1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter
dated February 21, 1962, their request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc,
acting 'by authority of the President'.
- On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a
civil action before the CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the Cash Disbursing Officer
of the OP praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries effective as of January
1, 1962. From a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said employees appealed to the
Supreme Court which rendered a decision promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the
dismissal of their complaint and declaring their removal from office as illegal and contrary to
63
BRYAN_SJ: A corporation can be created generally in two ways: by incorporation under the Corporation Code , or by special law .
Corporations created by special law are also called corporations with special/original charters.
64
BRYAN_SJ: What the Court seems to mean is that although PNB has an original charter, and hence covered by civil service law, NASECO
(as PNB’s sub-subsidiary) was organized under the Corporation Code. Hence, NASECO is under NLRC’s jurisdiction.
law, and ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962
up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
- Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul Ingles, et al was still pending in
the CFI of Manila, the dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their
positions in the OP, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action. With respect to
the other employees who were not reinstated – Cristobal included, efforts were exerted by
Sec. Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañan so that they may be reemployed.
Cristobal waited for Sec. Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the
service, until the latter was replaced by other executive secretaries who likewise assured the
plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at the opportune time.
- After the decision of the SC promulgated on November 29, 1968, the plaintiff addressed a
letter to the OP dated January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former position and
the payment of salary from January 1, 1962 up to the time of actual reinstatement, supposedly
in accordance with said decision. This request was denied repeatedly by the OP in successive
letters addressed to the plaintiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970,
May 23, 1970, and May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter 'definitely closed',
- Consequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with the CFI of Manila a complaint against
then Exec. Sec. Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, Cash Disbursing Officer of the OP,
and praying for the following: 1. Declaring his dismissal as illegal and contrary to law; 2.
Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify his name in the payroll of the OP, to be retroactive as of
January 1, 1962, the effective date that he was illegally dismissed from the service; 3.
Ordering Arcala to pay all the emoluments and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled
effective as of January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering them to allow him to continue with the
performance of his duties in the Secretary Office Staff, Office of the President of the
Philippines.
- The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General alleged that Cristobal had no cause of
action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper
proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec.
16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of more than
nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to
any salary from termination of his employment.
- On May 18, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint reasoning
that: Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an action against a
public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiff’s ouster from office unless the same
is commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold
much office or position arose. This period of one year is a condition precedent for the
existence of the cause of action for quo warranto. The rationale of this doctrine is that the
Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an
office or position in the civil service, as against another actually holding- it, so that the
Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the
person actually holding the office although illegally, and another for one not actually rendering
service although entitled to do so. The fact that the petitioner sought to pursue administrative
remedies to secure his reinstatement does not excuse the failure to file the action within the
one year period.
ISSUE
WON Cristobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint
within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
HELD
NO. The Court agrees that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action
must be instituted within the period of one year from the time the cause of action arose;
Persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of
one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.
However, this doctrine of laches (laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it) which is invoked to defeat Cristobal's suit, is not applicable in this case.
There are certain exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule.
Reasoning
1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to
abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.
> Upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962 advising him of his separation from the service,
Cristobal, with the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter dated
January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Sec. Mutuc that he was a civil eligible
employee with eight years of service in the government and consequently entitled to security
of tenure under the Constitution. This was followed by another letter of January 26, 1962.
Reconsideration having been denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the CFI of
Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for reinstatement and payment of salaries as of
January 1, 1962, wherein the SC held that the removal of the plaintiff-employees was illegal
and contrary to law and that they were entitled to be reinstated with payment of their salaries
from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
> Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is
not fatal to his cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case, Cristobal continued to
press his request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the
complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More
importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily spending time and money by
going to court - to relic upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to protect his
interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein and the
identifical relief being sought.
2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Sec.
Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's
present complaint for reinstatement.
> After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included,
continued to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Sec. Mutuc assured the
employees that without prejudice to the continuation of the civil action, he would work for their
reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees were recalled to their respective
positions in the OP among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who
were not parties therein. Sec. Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the Malacañan
Office. In the meantime, however, Sec. Mutuc was replaced by other Exec. Secretaries to
whom Cristobal over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave
the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune
time".
> It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led Cristobal to
bide his time and wait for the Office of the President to comply with its commitment.
Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which
he believed should be applied in his favor. But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters,
received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President denying his reinstatement
and declaring the matter "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in court
within one year from his separation, it was only then that he saw the necessity of seeking
redress from the courts.
> Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and injustice, if after Cristobal relied and
reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries who
dealt with him and who preceded the herein respondent Sec. Melchor, that the court hold that
he lost his right to seek relief because of lapse of time.
3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of the Supreme
Court's decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc.
> In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the principal issue in the case was whether or not
the employees were occupying positions primarily confidential in nature and therefore subject
to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that this issue was to be resolved in
the affirmative. The Court held: that one holding in the government a primarily
confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and that "officers or employees in the
unclassified" as well as "those in the classified service" are protected by the
provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII,
1935 Constitution); that while the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds
office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such pleasure turns into
displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" but that his term merely
"expires"; that there was no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of the
dismissed employees were "primarily confidential" in nature and on the contrary the
compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely or at least mainly
clerical nature of their work; and consequently, considering that the dismissed employees
were admittedly civil service eligibles with several years of service in the Government, their
removal from office was "illegal and contrary to law".
> No evidence was adduced by the government to show that Cristobal's position was
"primarily confidential". On the contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the
compensation attached to his item and the designation of the position indicate the purely
clerical nature of his functions. In fact, none of the letters sent to him from the OP ever
indicated that he was holding his position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that his
services were terminated because his term of office had "expired". The only reason given -
and this appears in the letter of September 1, 1969 from the OP - was that he failed to institute
the proper proceeding to assert his right, if any, to the position within the period of one year
from the date of termination and under settled jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned
his right to said office or acquiesced in his removal.
> In granting relief to the Cristobal on the matter of back salaries, however, there is no proof to
show that from January 1, 1962 up to the promulgation of this decision, Cristobal at no time
worked or was employed at some other office. The court cannot ignore the probability of
Cristobal's having sought employment elsewhere during that period to support himself and his
family. Considering the lapse of almost nine years before he filed this suit, the resolved to
grant back salaries at the rate last received by him only for a period of five (5) years without
qualification and deduction.
> The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate Jose Cristobal, either in the OP or in
some other government office, to any position for which he is qualified by reason of his civil
service eligibility, subject to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and to pay him
back salaries for a period of 5 years at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum without qualification
and deduction.
Decision Decision set aside.
ACOLOLA V TANTUICO
SANTOS; June 27, 1978
FACTS
- Nature ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction.
- Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial Auditor of Capiz on April 16, 1972.
Sometime before December 12, 1972, an administrative complaint was filed against him
charging him with various irregularities in connection with the discharge of his duties .
The complaint was subsequently dismissed.
- On December 27, 1974 he was again administratively charged with offenses ranging from
"misconduct, neglect of duty to incompetence in the performance of official duties ,"
which charges were likewise dismissed.
- On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as Acting Highway Engineering
District Auditor of Romblon, private respondent Horacio A. Martinez, a contractor of
Public Works Project in the province of Romblon, filed another complaint against petitioner
charging him, this time, with
(1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers.
(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of accomplished work:
(3) Refusal to assign an auditor's representative to check deliveries of materials at job sites
at the time of deliveries;
(4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers:
(5) Demanding free transportation and meals when on inspection of materials delivered or
work accomplished, and
(6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin daughter's trip to the United States.
- Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of the Commission on Audit, an
entrapment scheme was devised and executed on December 15, 1976. Petitioner was
apprehended by the PC Provincial Command in the act of receiving from complainant Horacio
A. Martinez, the amount of P2,000.00 in marked P20 bills as bribe money, while he was about
to enter his room at the Seaside Hotel.
- On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative charge was preferred against him. At the
same time the preventive suspension of petitioner was ordered by the respondent pursuant
to Section 41, Presidential Decree No. 807. Respondent, now petitioner, answered the
charge.
- On May 12, 1977, petitioner was summarily dismissed from the service , pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 807 , dated October 6, 1975. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
praying for a formal investigation denied, appeals to Court, seeking: (1) the review and
reversal of the order of May 27, 1977 of the Acting Chairman Cormnission on Audit, (Hon.
Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.) summarily dismissing him from the service, on the grounds that
respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
and the said order is violative of his constitutional rights; and (2) his reinstatement to his
former position. Petition was given due course, respondents required to file their comments,
TRO issued.
- On March 18, 1978, the Solicitor General for and in behalf of respondent Tantuico, Chairman
of COA, filed the required comment and prayed that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed his rejoinder (should be reply) to the said comment on April 20, 1978.
ISSUE
WON the respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, could summarily dismiss
petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807.
HELD
Ratio Yes, the respondent Chairman of COA could summarily dismiss petitioner Pursuant to
PD 807.
Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically provides:
"SEC. 40. Summary Proceedings.-No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent
may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is
reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
- Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity
and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal
except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to the
Commission."
- Petitioner was caught red-handed by agents of the Philippine Constabulary in the
entrapment operations, and the evidence against him was over whelming which warranted his
summary dismissal from the service under PD 807. The seriousness of the offense charged,
the circumstances surrounding its commission and the evidence of guilt, being overwhelming
and indubitably strong, the interest of the public service demanded the drastic remedy of
summary dismissal, which respondent Chairman of the Commission -on Audit judiciously took
against petitioner.
Decision Petition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TRO LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Voting 4 concur: Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Aquino
1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr.
SANDIGANBAYAN
NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO; January 30, 1982
FACTS
- Petitioner Rufino Nuñez was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-
accused, all public officials
- Informations were filed on February 21 and March 26, 1979
- On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds
- Respondent court denied the motion, as well as the MFR
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC, assailing the validity of PD
1486, as amended by PD 1606, creating the Sandiganbayan
ISSUE
WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal
protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution
HELD
Petition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1606.
Ratio
On the equal protection clause of the Constitution…
- Petitioner’s premise is that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to
equal protection because:
> Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into a matter of discretion
> Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a review of facts and trial evidence
> There is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the
traditional two chances
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering questions
of law and of facts, and to two appellate courts (CA and SC)
- Classification satisfies the test announced by this court in People v. Vera
> Must be based on substantial distinction
> Must be germane to the purposes of the law
> Must not be limited to existing conditions only and must apply equally to each member of
the class
- The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, in response to
problem, namely, the dishonesty in the public service.
- Petitioners, should therefore have anticipated that a different procedure that would be
prescribed for that tribunal would not be violative of the equal protection clause
- The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give way to specific provisions of the
Constitution, for the promotion of the general welfare, which is the end of the law
On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution…
- Petitioner’s contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post
facto law is premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is being diluted or
eroded efficacy wise.
- Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision, defined an ex post facto law as one
which:
> makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act
> aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed
> changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed
> alters the legal rules on evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense
> assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful
> deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty
- the “lawful protection” to which an accused “has become entitled” is qualified, not given a
broad scope
- the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal can hardly be argued to
be embraced therein
- the test to whether the ex post facto law is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in
Thompson v. Utah, is “taking from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him”
- the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive the petitioner of a right
vital to the protection of his liberty
- his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge court, where a unanimous vote is
required
- if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any error of law was committed
- the SC in determining whether to give due course to the petition for review must be
convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome
- SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has
been satisfied
- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the CA as a reviewing
authority results in the loss of “vital protection of liberty.”
On the due process clause of the Constitution…
- Petitioner alleges lack of fairness
- In Arnault v. Pecson, the court declared that what is required for compliance with the due
process mandate in criminal proceedings is “a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of defense
- In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is “informed as to why
he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to
rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the
sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law.”
- If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of
a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.
ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; May 19, 1988
FACTS
GR Nos. 79690-707
- Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar (Antique Governor) sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal
cases Nos. 12159 – 12161 and 12163-12177
- Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional
authority since the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the Ombudsman (not the present
Tanodbayan) the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan
GR No. 80578
- Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same grounds as first petition, sought to
restrain Tanodbayan Gonzales from conducting preliminary investigations and filing similar
cases with the Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1, WON the Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, have the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and direct the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan
HELD
NO. The incumbent Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution is without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan
- The Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, has been transformed into the Office of the
Special Prosecutor which shall continue to function and exercise its powers provided by law,
EXCEPT those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the sam
Constitution (1987).
- The 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman as distinguished from the
incumbent Tanodbayan has the duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
- The Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is thus a subordinate of the
Tanodbayan(Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter’s
authority or orders.
Obiter Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman in as much as he has not been
replaced because he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a
new creation under Article XI of the 1987 constitution different from the Office of the
Tanodbayan created under PD 1607.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992
FACTS
- Nature Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the
Commission on Human Rights
- P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and
General Trias, Cavite, as the “Cavite Export Processing Zone” (CEPZ). The area was divided
into four four Phases and Phase IV was bought by Filoil and was later sold to EPZA.
- Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals, had entered the
premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or Filoil. To
convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA paid a P10K-financial assistance to those
who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo
Aledia, the father of the respondent Loreto Aledia.
- Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHR a joint complaint praying for “justice and
other reliefs and remedies”. The CHR conducted an investigation.
- According to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP, bulldozed and level the area, despite
the fact that the occupants presented a letter from the Office of the President of the Phil
ordering postponement of bulldozing.
- Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction to desist from committing further acts
of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further orders from the CHR and to appear
before the Commission for a dialogue.
- However, the same group again bulldozed the area and allegedly handcuffed private
respondent Valles, pointed their firearms at others and fired a shot in the air.
- The CHR issued another injunction Order reiterating the same order.
- Procedure
1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of injunction for lack of authority to issue
injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders but this was denied.
2. EPZA filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for issuance of
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. It was granted by the Court.
3. CHR filed a Motion to lift the restraining order contending that CHR has the power not
only to investigate but also to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection (Art. 13 Sec.
18, 1987 Consti)
ISSUE
WON the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the
acts complained of
HELD
NO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, for it may only be issued by the judge of
any court in which the action is pending (within his district), or by a Justice of the Court of
Appeals, or of the Supreme Court or by the judge of the Regional Trial Court.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
- In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHR the Court held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a
quasi-judicial body. Fact-finding function is different from adjudication and cannot be likened to
a judicial function.
2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning
- The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to “ provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection” may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. “Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by la.” It is never
derived by implication.
- “preventive measures and legal aid services” refer ti extrajudicial and judicial remedies which
the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims.
Decision The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Orders of injunction of CHR
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. TRO which the Court issued is made PERMANENT.
ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
MORAN; November 15, 1947
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS
BELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997
FACTS
- Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC which owns the historic Manila
Hotel. In a closed bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter
dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-
three Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division.
- The petitioner argues the following:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become
a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippines heritage and culture. To all
intents and purpose, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, the hotel
 business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part
of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the
MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony
and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
- Respondents maintain that:
1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions
under which business may be done."
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine
zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. While
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall
under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own
separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it
had lost in the bidding.
4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of the bidding rules which provides that
if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not
yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares.
5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since
respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if
ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition
for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by
petitioner.
ISSUES
1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is non-self-executing
2. WON the Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony
3. WON 51% of the equity of MHC can be considered part of national patrimony
4. WON petitioner should be allowed to match the highest bid
5. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD
1. NO. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. The argument of respondents that
the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered
"state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function"; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved
or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its
share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action."
Therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction
of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide
by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties. Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that
[i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. The constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. Where a foreign
firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning
that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no
Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the
foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of
the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the
apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a
cause of action.
5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Voting Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur with the main opinion.
Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur]
- Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of the natural resources provided
by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of land, sea, and air. The
concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The Manila Hotel is very much a part of
our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it
and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's
history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does,
as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and
others.
- "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are
peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the existing
order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the national
patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the
higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the
qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly
be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified
Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
VITUG [separate]
- The provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(i)n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-executory. The provision does not need, although it
can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
- The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark”, Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of
Philippine heritage.
- The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling
51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the Constitutional
mandate.
- On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," the only meaningful
preference would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid. The
magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand
exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
MENDOZA [separate opinion in the judgment]
- The only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm
Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
- We are dealing here not with common trades or common means of livelihood which are open
to aliens in our midst, but with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of
government largess or benefits. Therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential
treatment to our citizens.
- Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest
bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then do would
be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has
submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible
under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid
required. If the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid,
he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege
allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids."
TORRES [separate]
- History, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of events,
customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our
history, culture and heritage. The Manila Hotel is witness to historic events which shaped our
history for almost 84 years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction
block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of
our people.
PUNO [dissent]
- The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
1. Whether Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII is self executing, whether the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement Sec.
10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution;
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner,
a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;
5. Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.
- 1st issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self executing, rather
than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily
ignored and nullified by Congress. Case law also lays down the rule that a constitutional
provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers
the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect. The first
paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a categorical
command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of
investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned
Filipino enterprises. The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are
directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of
our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and
patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain
areas of investments." Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason
whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now.
- The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel
Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its
meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to
our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes
beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national
cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our
national patrimony.
- The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent
GSIS. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created
by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. As a state-owned and
controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution
especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies
is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command.
- To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents Committee on
Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a
qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A look at the rules and regulations will show that they are
silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. However,
they cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. I
submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad.
In that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder should be
preferred. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the
highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason has arisen that will prevent
the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a bidder. It complied with the procedure of
bidding. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is
final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the
petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the
rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand.
- Petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. It knew that the rules
and regulations do not provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after
submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners
qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it
wins and disregard them when it loses.
PANGANIBAN [dissent]
- The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding
process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest
foreign bid, and thus to win. No statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid
and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's
strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation,
which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can
win.
- Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short-sighted and,
viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It encourages other
countries - in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation - to discriminate
against us in their own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and
defeat the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar
bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their nationals.
- In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only
where all the bids are equal. The Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only
when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted
the highest score.
MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V SECRETARY
ROMERO; January 16, 1995
FACTS
- Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on
the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources.
Utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no
longer allowed in the present Consti.
- With the state in full control and supervision, the only options for mineral exploration
development and utilization is only through direct undertaking or by entering into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement
with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
- The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils…
- In view of these provisions, the President issued Executive Order No. 211 and No. 279. The
former prescribes interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Consti. The latter
authorizes the DENR secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or
production-sharing agreements, and prescribed guidelines for these agreements and those
with foreign-owned corporations
- To implement the legislative acts, the DENR Secretary promulgated AO Nos 57 and 82. The
former converts all existing mining leases or agreements prior to the 1987 Consti into
production-sharing agreements except small-scale mining leases and those pertaining to
sand, gravel and quarry resources cover an area of 20 hectares or less. The latter laid down
the Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement Through
Negotiation (MPSA).
- It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition
- They contend that:
o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rule-making power under EO279
o The AOs violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Art 3, Sec 10 of the
1987 Consti as
 AO57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining agreements
and converts it into production-sharing agreements within a year of its effectivity
and
 AO82 declares that failure to submit Letter of Intent and MPSA within 2 years of
effecitivity of guidelines shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and
gravel permits
o AOs have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of EO279 as the Eos merely reiterated the acceptance
and registration of declarations of location and all other kinds of mining applications by
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under PD 463, as amended, until Congress
opts to modify the same
- A TRO was given enjoining the implementation of the AOs. The Continental Marble Corp.
also intervened as its DENR refused to renew its mining permit
ISSUES
1. WON DENR Sec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating AOs 57 and 82
2. WON PD 463 continues to subsist insofar as it allows licenses, concessions and leases for
the exploration, utilization and development of mineral resources
3. WON AO 57 and 82 impairs vested frights as to violate the non-impairment of contract
doctrine as guaranteed by Art 3, Section 10 of the Consti
4. WON AO 57 and 82 authorizes automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti into production sharing agreements
HELD
- There is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has transcended the bounds demarcated by
EO279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
o The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment
o By such regulations, the law cannot be extended. So long as the relate
solely to carrying into effect the provision of law, they are valid
o The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted
o In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails as rule or regulation cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law
o Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized the said official to promulgate such
supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the
provisions of the law. More so, the subject sought to be governed and regulated is
germane to the objects and purposes of EO279, specifically issued to carry out the
mandate of the 1987 Consti
- PD 463 is not the governing law anymore as it pertained to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through license, concession or lease which
has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti., except those provision in
PD463 that are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO279
o To continue the licenses, concessions or lease would be inconsistent witht raison
d’etre of EO279 and contravening the express mandate of the Article XII, Section 2
the 1987 Consti.
o The Consti only orders that the State have full control and supervision of the mineral
resources and the only mode for its exploration, utilization and development is through
a direct act, or may enter into co-production, joint venture, production sharing
agreements or into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country.
- The AOs do not unduly preterminate existing mining leases in general as it does not apply
retroactively to license, concession of lease granted by government under the 1973 Consti or
before the effectivity of the 1987 Consti but to those granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Consti and shall be subject to modifications and alterations which Congress may adopt
o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly modified or altered the privileges
granted as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases under EO211
o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or agreements granted by the State
such as those granted by EO211, these are still subject to alterations through a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State and even the court recognizes the
superiority of police power over the sanctity of the contract especially when such
power is exercised to preserve the security of the state and the means adopted are
reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary
or oppressive.
 o The State may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of
contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements
granted under PD 463 or EO211
o The object of this police power is clear – the exploration, development and utilization
of mineral resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of
the people
- There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the conclusion of an authorization of automatic
conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti
pursuant to EO211, into production-sharing agreements
o The use of the term production-sharing agreement implies negotiation and cannot be
presumed as a unilateral declaration on the part of government
o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations are arrived
at in good faith and in accordance with procedure as laid out in AO 82
Decision AO 57 and 82 are valid and constitutional
REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND DELA ROSA
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
FACTS
- Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province on February 11, 1965 on his own behalf and on behalf of his
children. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose dela Rosa and Lots 6-9 to
his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively in 1964. Balbalio and
Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription.
- It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation
as to portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic through the Bureau of
Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet opposed on the ground that June Bug mineral
claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934 by the successors-in-interest of
James Kelly who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909.
Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930 and recorded
on January 2, 1931 in the Office of the mining recorder of Baguio. The locations of the
mineral claims were made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
- The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the land sought to be registered was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February
16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973.
ISSUE
WON the Benguet and Atok Mining Companies have exclusive rights to the property in
question.
HELD
YES. Though the property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property into mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive
rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land became the private
property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and
Atok.
- There was insufficient evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants to support their claim of ownership. They acquired the land only
in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965.
- This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is intended for the benefit of the State,
not of private persons. The rule reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public
and even private land. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which mineral is
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said
minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
- Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use
could be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and
mineral purposes.
Voting Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, concur.
ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF APPEALS
PARAS; January 18, 1991
FACTS
- Fredia Mineral claim was located in Itogon, Benguet by A. I. Reynolds in 1930. The mineral
claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder. In 1931, the mineral claim was
sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner. Since then petitioner has been in continuous and exclusive
ownership and possession of said claim.
- In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house in the land where the claim was
located. It was only in 1984 when he was told that said lot belonged to Atok. Respondent
contends that he had been paying taxes on said land which his father had occupied before
him. Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry. The MTC dismissed the case. The RTC decided
in favor of Atok. Upon appeal by Consi, the CA dismissed the forcible entry action ruling that
both Consi and Atok are holders of possessory titles, the former through long term occupancy,
and the latter by virtue of its being the claim locator.
ISSUE
WON an individual’s long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such
rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim
HELD
NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. As the land had become private
property of the locators (A.I.) they had the right to sell it to Atok. Where there is a valid
location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and the
property of the locator. (Note however that the sale in the case took place in 1931) Atok
then have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution prohibited alienation of all
lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption.
- Neither could Consi argue long term possession. His possession was not in the concept of
owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land. Since the subject lot is a
mineral land, private respondent’s possession did not confer upon him possessory rights,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI INVESTMENTS
MADIALDEA; January 31, 1989
FACTS
- On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved for an advanced hearing of Lot No.
1851-B, Floridablanca Cadastre. Evidence was presented and Kalahi’s title was to be
registered under the provisions of Act 496.
- It was later on found out that this lot was a vast land of mountain ranges covering an area no
less than 886,021,588 square meters. This lot contains the alleged 123 mineral claims of
Kalahi. It was also found out that the said lot was labeled as timber land under RA 3092. in the
land classification of the province of Pampanga and Zambales, these lands were also
considered part of the Project No. 11, Timber Land.
- The Bureau of Forestry’s opposition on the registration of the lot is based on the ground that
these lands are part of the vast public forest known as TIMBER LAND. These lots are not yet
released as alienable agricultural lands and were even declared by the President of the
Philippines under Proclamation No. 82 as part of the Mt. Dorst Forest Reserve.
- Kalahi thus abandoned its former claim over Lot No. 1851-B. it limited its claim to two land
which when combined, cover an area of 1,730 hectares. This land contained the 123 mining
claims of Kalahi and where the alleged 500,000 coffee plants were planted. Kalahi claimed
and presented evidence that it had located in 1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in
Floridablanca Mountains; made annual assessments work thereto; made declaration of
location and paid annual assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed roads traversing the
mountains and hills and planted 500,00 coffee trees. These however were not considered by
the court as basis sufficient in law and in fact for the registration of title under act 496.
- Kalahi thus contended that these mineral lands were now segregated from government
lands and its mining claims thereon deemed property rights. These were based on an opinion
of the Secretary of Justice dated August 31, 1956 which stated that “the legal effect of a valid
location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to
grant the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law… the area is segregated and
becomes the property of the locator.”
- Citing the San Mauricio doctrine
“Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a right or rights acquired by a holder of
unpatented but valid and existing claim located and registered under its provisions becomes
the property of the locator… the right of the locator to enjoy the surface ground and the
minerals within the limits of his claim becomes exclusive as against the whole world, limited
only by extralateral rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to purchase the claim or
secure a patent and as long as he could comply with the mining laws, his possessory rights of
ownership are as good as though secured by patent.”
- It also claims registration of title based on its actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous,
adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years or confirmation of
imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141 as amended by RA No. 1942.
- In its decision, the court a quo denied the claim for registration ruling that a) the 123 mining
claims are governed by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines which
is the proper agency to enforce the claims and to adjudicate the rights of the claimants, which
in fact Kalahi recognized when it filed an application for lease with said Bureau, and b) that the
claim for confirmation of imperfect title based on the evidence of Public Land Law provisions:
- The lands in the public domain are classified under three main categories: Mineral, Forest
and Agricultural lands in the public domain that title could be issued… the Public Law never
governs private lands.
- The Public Land Law is not applicable to forest lands nor to mineral lands. The confirmation
of imperfect land title can not be basis for registration of titles over forest and/or mineral lands.
- On appeal Kalahi assigned as errors the following:
1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for the registration of land in question
sufficient in law and in fact.
 2)the lower court erred in declaring that the doctrine of the Supreme Court and the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice never contemplate of a procedure that will entitle the claimants
to the registration of the lands in question.
3)the lower court erred in denying the claim for registration of the claimant’s title over the
land in question at last a portion thereof covered by the mining claims and their gaps.
- On the other hand the Director of Lands contended:
“Kalahi admitted that the land in question is a mining property consisting of mining claims
located and registered under the provisions of the Act of the US Congress of July 1, 1902. and
as such, said Act requires Kalahi as holder of mining claims to do no other act except to
proceed with the acquisition of mining patent in the Bureau of Mines. The Act prescribes an
explicit and definite procedure by which mining patents are to be secured administratively…”
- CA thus certified the following questions (issues) for SC resolution:
ISSUES
1. WON mining claims acquired, registered perfected and patentable under the Old Mining
Law matured to private ownership would entitle claimant-appellant to the ownership thereof
2. who has the authority to examine process and find out WON the requirements of the Act of
Congress of 1902 have been complied by applicant- the Court or the Bureau of Mines
HELD
1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v Hon Minister of Natural Resources
Jose Leido jr. and Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC ruled that while it recognized
that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, this right is not absolute. It is
merely a possessory right more so when petitioner’s claims are still unpatented.
“Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the located claim. It merely
segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators
from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein… the
intention of the lawmaker is that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the
requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claims.” This case
modifies the San Mauricio doctrine in that while a perfected location of a mining claim has the
effect of segregating said land from the body of public domain, the area covered does not
thereby become the private property of the locator.
- Concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v Rodriguez and Abadilla:
“… my opinion is that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures the beneficial
ownership or the dominum utile, the government retains the bare ownership or the dominium
directum, until the locator’s claim ripens into full ownership upon full compliance with all
requirements of the law for the issuance of a patent.”
- Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. case: ”To give a
broader meaning and give a greater effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend that
location is all that is necessary to acquire absolute ownership over a located mining claim.
This is not the law. Location without more,confers only the right of possession… I maintain
that in prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any existing right, the Constitution
does not refer to the right of location or the inherent right of possession, or any inchoate or
contingent right which are only means to bring about another right; it refers only to the right to
obtain a patent.”
- It is not clear if Kalahi has fully complied with the requirements of Act of Congress of 1902.
this is a factual issue which is beyond the issue of the Court. Nonetheless, even assuming
claimant to be a holder of a subsisting and valid patentable mining clai8m, we hold that it can
no longer proceed with the acquisition of a mining patent in view of PD No. 1214 issued in
October 14, 1977, directing “holders of subsisting an valid patentable mining claims located
under the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1902 to file a mining lease application within
one year of the approval of the Decree… non-filing of the application within the period
prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all his rights to the claim.
- Records show that claimant has already filed a mining lease application.
2. Having filed a mining lease application, its mining claims therefore, are deemed covered by
PD 1214 and the Bureau of Mines may accordingly process the same as a lease application,
in accordance with PD 463, pursuant to PD 1214. As to whether or not the Bureau of Mines is
qualified to rule on whether there has been full and faithful compliance with the requirements
of Philippine Bill of 1902, SC ruled that the Bureau is empowered as a corollary function in the
processing of mining lease applications.
Decision The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is affirmed, with the modification that Kalahi’s
mining claims may be processed as a mining lease application by the Bureau of Mines.
TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
MAKASIAR; October 27,1983
FACTS
- Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
- Respondents-appellees: Sec. of Agri. And Nat. Resources (DANR) Jose Feliciano, Director
of Bureau of Forestry (BOF) Apolonio Rivera
- Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao Happick, Atanacio Mallari
- April 1961 – the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice advertising for public bidding a tract of
public forest land (6,420 hectares) in Olongapo, Zambales. It was located within the former
US Naval Reservation.
- May 5, 1962 – petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his application plus nine other applicants
- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the are declared as a forest reserve
or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder
- June 7, 1961 – then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Dir. Of Bureau of Forestry
to prepare a draft proclaiming the said land as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and to
reject the bids they have received
- Sec. Fortich (DANR) however sustained the recommendations of the director of BOF who
concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest of the are is made available for
exploitation. The Director said that to the declare the forest are as a forest reserve rather than
to open it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than good
to the public interest since it might just become a “Free Zone and Logging Paradise” to the
problem loggers of Dinalupihan, Bataan – an open target for timber smugglers and
kaingineros; also, rejecting the received bids would cause the department huge
embarrassment
- The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the BOF against the other bidders,
Rovago Commercial Company and Jorge :Lao Happick
- May 30, 1963 – DANR Sec. Gozon (who succeeded then Sec. Fortich) issued a
memorandum authorizing the grant of new ordinary timber license for areas not more than
3,000 hectares each and the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding
5000 hectares
- Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced by acting Sec. Jose Feliciano, who upon
assumption of office he revoked the memorandum.
- But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was signed by acting Director of (BOF),
Estanislao Bernal, without the approval of the Secretary of DANR
- Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick then wrote a letter to the Sec. of
DANR praying that the license issued to Tan be cancelled on the ground that it was irregular,
anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations
- The license was declared void ab initio
- Petitioner Tan claims that respondents unlawfully, illegally, whimsically, capriciously and
arbitrarily acted w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion by
revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner Tan of the
equal protection of the laws and by depriving him of his constitutional right to property w/o due
process of law by impairing the obligation of contracts
- His petition was dismissed because it did not state a sufficient cause of action
ISSUE
WON the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action
HELD
cause of action – 3 essential elements
1. legal right of the plaintiff
2. correlative obligation of the defendants
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right
NO.
- the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted; the timber license relied upon by the petitioner was void ab initio
- also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been declared a forest reserve on April 39,
1964
- what is important for the validity of a timber license is the date of release of the license and n
the sate of signing. Before the release, not tight is acquired by the licensee. Tan’s license
was signed Dec. 9, 1963 and was released Jan. 6, 1964 – by January 6, the Director of
Forestry no longer had any authority to release the license
- the petitioner had not acquired any legal right under such void license
- the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. He should have appealed
the order of the DANR Secretary to the President, who has the power to review on appeal the
orders/acts of the said secretary – where administrative appeal is available, special civil action
of certiorari cannot be availed
- moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his administrative remedies, he also
failed to note that his action is a suit against the state which under the doctrine of immunity
from suit, cannot prosper unless the state gives it consent to be dued
- Next, granting that the license granted to him was valid, still the respondents can validly
revoke this license
REPUBLIC V QUASHA
REYES; August 17, 1972
FACTS
- The case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the rights acquired
by American citizens and corporations controlled by them under the Parity Amendment
appended to the Constitution as of Sept. 18, 1946
- William Quasha is an American citizen who purchased a land in Forbes Park on
Nov.26,1954. He filed a petition on March 1968 where he averred the acquisition of the said
land; that the RP claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment (PA) on July 3, 1974,
rights acquired by US citizens shall cease; that this claim affects his right and interest and that
the uncertainty as to the status of his property after the PA ends reduces the property’s value
and precludes him from having improvements made on it; and so he contends that the
ownership of properties during the effectivity of the PA continues despite its
termination
- Sol.Gen. Antonio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha is private agri. land and that the
acquisition violated Sec.5 Art.XIII of the Constitution which prohibits the transfer of private
agricultural land to non-Filipinos except by hereditary succession ; and assuming validity of
acquisition, his rights acquired through the PA will expire on July 3, 1974
- CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that acquisition was valid and he has a
right to continue in ownership of property even beyond July 1974.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine Constitution Quasha could validly
acquire ownership of the private residential land which is concededly classified private
agricultural land
2. On the assumption that Quasha’s purchase of the private agricultural land is valid and
constitutional, WON his rights will expire on July 3, 1974
HELD
1. NO. The Parity Amendment gives Americans no right to validly acquire ownership of private
agricultural land in the Philippines.
-examination of the PA reveals that it only establishes an express exception to 2 provisions
—Section 1 Article XIII (disposition, exploitation, etc. of public lands) and Section 8 Article
XIV (operation of public utilities)
> no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 & 5 of Art.XIII
-Quasha argues that since PA permitted US citizens/entities to acquire agricultural lands of
the public domain, then such citizens/entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural
land in the Phils., even without hereditary succession
> this argument does not rest upon the text of the PA but upon a mere inference;
if it was ever intended to create an exception to Sec.5, it would have bee
mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8 were mentioned
-whether from the Phil. Or the American side, the intention was to secure parity for US
citizens only in: 1)exploitation, development and utilization of public lands and
other natural resources, and 2) the operation of public utilities
-Quasha further contends that when the Constitution was adopted in 1935, US citizens
were already qualified to acquire public agri land, so even without hereditary succession
transfer of private agri lands to Americans is permitted
> such capacity could exist only during the American sovereignty over the Islands
(before the RP is established)
2. His rights will expire. All the exceptional rights conferred upon US citizens and business
entities owned or controlled by them, under the Parity Amendment, are to last during the
effectivity of the agreement entered into on July 4, 1946, but in no case to extend beyond July
3, 1974.
-text of PA: “in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974”—in conformity with Article X, Section
2 “this agreement shall have no effect after July 3, 1974. It may be terminated be either the
US or the Phils at any time...”
-Quasha argues that the limitative period should not be applicable because under Art.428 of
the Civil Code, “the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law”
> this limitation already existed when he purchased the land
> The can’t complain of deprivation of due process because PA is part of Consti, the highest
law of the land
> if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its alienable public agricultural lands
beyond that date under PA, then, logically, the Constitution, as modified by PA, only
authorizes either of two things: a) alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or b) a
resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not later than the specified period.
Discussion
Historical Background
• Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources
Sec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain...belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corps. At least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens...
Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess
of 1,024 hectares...
Sec.5 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
• Article XIV General Provisions
Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, 60% of the
capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines...
• nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions
• 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs: when the Philippines do
become independent next July, they will start on the road to independence with a country
whose commerce, trade and political institutions have been very damaged; internal revenue
have been greatly diminished by war.
• in 1946, US enacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing the President of the US to enter into an
Exec. Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which should contain a provision that
—“the disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the US and
to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens.”;
and that “the gov’t of the Phil. Will take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment
of the Constitution so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Phils. Of such part of the
provisions
• Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President of the Phils. To enter into the
Executive Agreement
•proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in Nov. 1946
• Parity Amendment: “Notwithstanding the provision of section 1, Article 13, and section
8, Article 14, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement
entered into...on July 4, 1946...but in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974, the disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms
of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.”
• Laurel-Langley Agreement (revision of PA enacted in June 1955): establishes some sort
of reciprocity rights between US and Phils.
--no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by Quasha of the property in
question was made in 1954, prior to the effectivity of this agreement
LAUREL V GARCIA
GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990
FACTS
- The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with
Japan in 1956, the other lots being: Nampeidai Property , Kobe Commercial Property, and
Kobe Residential Property. The properties are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people
for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
- The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be
payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed
by the Philippine and Japanese governments. Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law,
prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development
loans. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the
Second Year Schedule.
- On August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
- On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has been pushing its decision to sell the
reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. Petitioners have filed two petitions to
stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
ISSUES
1. WON the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine
Government
2. WON Executive Order No. 296, which entitles non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
reparations' capital goods and services, is constitutional. WON EO 296 violate the following
constitutional provisions:
a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony stated in the
Preamble of the 1987 Constitution
b. reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to
Filipino citizens
c. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony
d. WON there is protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade
practices
e. WON there is guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public
concern
f. WON there is declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest
HELD
1. NO, the Roponggi property is public domain. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi
lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective
needs, and resides in the social group.
2. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions
are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination
of the case. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the
application of a statute or general law.
Decision Petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents
from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan.
RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ
ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982
FACTS - the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testator’s widow of a usufruct over
- APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, 1/3 of the free portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the
died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries: testator’s express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to ½ of the estate “en
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez pleno dominio” as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
- widow entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will
- French who lives in Paris run counter to the testator’s intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her
- received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a
- two grandnephews vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or
- lives in Malate incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.
- received the ½ (free portion) BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Wanda de Wrobleski Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary
- companion substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
- Austrian who lives in Spain originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit
- received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts
- vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties be
- Maria Luisa Palacios - administratix subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and naked owners.
- Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo - Art XIII67 Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s usufruct is INVALID because first heirs shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
(Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator acquire or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines. 68
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession
heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC by operation of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5 provision does not apply to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for
d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and naught and meaningless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
appellants violates testators express will to give this property to them Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alien may be
- LC: approved partition bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the
usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to the
ISSUE land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
WON the partition is valid insofar as proscribed by the Constitution.
a. widow’s legitime Decision: ½ Marcelle (as legitime), ½ Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked
b. substitutions ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan
c. usufruct of Wanda Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez

HELD CRUZ V NCIP

a. YES, appellants do not question ½ because Marcelle is the widow 65 and over which he PER CURIAM; December 20, 2000
could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever 66
66
Art 904 (2) CC
67
Art XIII (1935): Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources
68
65 Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private [removed agricultural] lands shall be transferred or conveyed [1935: assigned]
Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to ½ of the hereditary estate except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain [removed in the Philippines].
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V WESTERN MINING CORPORATION
PHILIPPINES
CARPIO-MORALES; January 29, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING
ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and
of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995
by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.
- July 25, 1987 –President Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In
entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the
proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale
mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements
for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital in
a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States currency (US
$50,000,000.00).
- March 3, 1995 –President Ramos approved 7942 to govern the exploration, development,
utilization and processing of all mineral resources. RA 7942 defines modes of mineral
agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for filing and approval,
assignment/transfer, and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. These also apply to FTAAs.
- The law also prescribes the contractor’s qualifications, grants certain rights such as timber,
water, easement rights and right to possess explosives. Surface owners or occupants are
forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from entering private lands and concession
areas. A procedure for settlement of conflicts is also provided for.
- The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It regulates the
transport, sale and processing of minerals, and promotes the development of mining
communities, science and mining technology, and safety and environmental protection.
- The government’s share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, taxes and fees are
imposed, incentives granted. Aside from penalizing certain acts, the law likewise specifies
grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits.
- April 9, 1995 –RA 7942 took effect.
- March 30, 1995 –Shortly before RA 7942 took effect, the President entered into and FTAA
with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato.
- August 15, 1995 –DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) 95-23,
s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942. This was
later repealed by DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
- January 10, 1997 –Counsels for petitioners sent letter to DENR Secretary demanding that
they stop the implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving them 15 days from receipt to
act thereon. DENR has yet to respond or act on petitioners’ letter.
- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order.
- Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in excess of jurisdiction:
1) In signing and promulgating DAO 96-40 implementing RA 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that:
 It allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit
mineral resources in a manner contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution
 It allows the taking of private property without the determination of public use and for
just compensation
 It violates Art. III, sec. 1
 It allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully foreign owned corporations of
the nation’s marine wealth contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2
 It allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources contrary to Art. XII
2) In recommending approval of and implementing the FTAA between the President and
WMCP because the same is illegal and constitutional
- They pray that the Court issue an order permanently enjoining the respondents from acting
on any application for an FTAA; declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other similar
administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and, canceling the FTAA
issued to WMCP as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
- Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners’ contentions, argue that the requisites for
judicial inquiry have not been met, the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition
and mandamus, and there has been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
- WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on
January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60% of the equity of which is owned by Filipinos
and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an
Australian company.
- Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001, approved the transfer
and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was
appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto). Because there is no final judgment
yet, the case cannot be considered moot.
ISSUES
1. WON case is justiciable
2. WON EO 279 took effect
3. WON the WMCP FTAA is constitutional
4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional
HELD
1. Case is justiciable.
Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with whether
petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal standing.
- Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal B’Laan Tribal
Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous people’s cooperative organized under Philippine
laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members
of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of
WMCP. Even if they are not the actual parties in the contract, they claim that they will suffer
“irremediable displacement” as a result of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining
activities in their area of residence.
- And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered
into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication. RA 7942 explicitly makes certain
provisions apply to pre-existing arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any term
and condition favorable to FTAA contractors resulting from a law or regulation shall be
considered part of the agreement.
- The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the appropriate remedy. Public
respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract.
Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract
is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.
- The contention that the filing of the petition violates the rule on hierarchy of courts does not
likewise lie. The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if
not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and
compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. Indeed, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure.
2. YES.
Ratio When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure.
- Petitioners contend that EO 279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity
came after President Aquino had already lost her legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution. But it was explained that the convening of the first Congress merely precluded
the exercise of legislative powers by the President –it did not prevent the effectivity of laws
she had previously enacted.
3. NO.
Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative
powers by the President and did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously
enacted.
In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constitution, FTAAs should be limited to “technical or
financial assistance” only. However, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP
FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere
financial or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate
every aspect of the mining activity.
- WMCP nevertheless submits that the word “technical” encompasses a broad number of
possible services, perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus posits that it may
well include the area of management and operations. The Court is not persuaded. Casus
omisus pro omisso habendus est –a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was
precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.
- Respondents insist that “agreements involving technical or financial assistance” is just
another term for service contracts. The proceedings of the CONCOM indicate that the
members used the terms interchangeably. The Court is likewise not persuaded. While certain
commissioners may have mentioned the term “service contracts”, they may have been using
the term loosely and not in the context of the 1973 Constitution. Also, the phrase “service
contracts” has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on National Economy and
Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973
Constitution, it could have simply adapted the old terminology instead of employing new and
unfamiliar terms (“agreements… involving either technical or financial assistance”).
- The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same terminologies. And the UP Law
draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial
ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory,
the State owns these natural resources –and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries –service
contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and
utilize the same. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of
nationalization of natural resources. But the proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need
for capital and technical know-how in the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization
of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a compromise –technical or financial agreements.
4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Ratio Financial or technical agreements as contemplated in Art. XII, sec. 2 shall refer to
financial agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to service contracts.
- Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements”, it actually
treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to fundamental law.
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Court hereby declares unconstitutional
and void:
1) The following provision of RA 7942
a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq)
b) Section 23,
c) Section 33 to 41,
d) Section 56,
e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
f) Section 90.
2) All provisions of DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision,
and
 3) The FTAA between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC
Philippines, Inc.
Voting 8 concur –including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took no part
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG
- It could not have been the object of the framers of the Charter to limit the contracts which the
President may enter into, to mere “agreements for financial and technical assistance; The
Constitution has not prohibited the State from itself exploring, developing, or utilizing the
country’s natural resources, and, for this purpose, it may, enter into the necessary agreements
with individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible operation.”
PANGANIBAN
- The petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness. The dispute claiming the right
to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and
Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified
Filipino company.
- The word “involving” signifies the possibility of inclusion of other activities. If the intention of
the drafters were strictly to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance
and nothing more, their language would have been unmistakably restrictive and stringent.
- The present Constitution still recognizes and allows service contracts (and has not rendered
them taboo), albeit subject to several restrictions and modifications aimed at avoiding pitfalls
of the past.
- In the minds of the commissioners, the concept of technical and financial assistance
agreements did not exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts duly modified to
prevent abuses –“technical and financial agreements” were understood by the delegates to
include service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses.
- Current business practices often require borrowers seeking huge loans to allow creditors
access to financial records and other data, and probably a seat or two on the former’s board
of directors, or at least some participation in certain management decisions that may have an
impact on the financial health or the long-term viability of the debtor, which of course will
directly affect the latter’s capacity to repay it’s loans.
- If the Supreme Court closes its doors to international realities and unilaterally sets up its own
concepts of strict technical and financial assistance, then it may unwittingly make the country
a virtual hermit –an economic isolationist –in the real world of finance.
- The commissioners fully realized that their work would have to withstand the test of time, that
the Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past experiences and lessons painfully
learned, would have to be a living document that would answer the needs of the nation well
into the future.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition
- Ponente: Panganiban, J. (take note: major dissenter in part1)
- All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development and utilization
(EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State. More
specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU
activities, the State may secure the help of foreign companies in all relevant matters –
especially financial and technical assistance –provided that, at all times, the State maintains
its right of full control. The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and
entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence it may be given reasonable management,
operational, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to protect its investments and enable the
business to succeed.
- The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to
strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be
construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to
enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people
and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace.
- On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine
Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations –insofar as they relate to financial and
technical agreements –as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA).
ISSUES
1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius
and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius
2. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, WON it would still be proper to resolve
the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP
FTAA
3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution?
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The courts will decide a question –otherwise moot and academic –if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
- The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two
Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA
would still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company. The plea to nullify the Mining Law
has become a virtual petition for declaratory relief, over which this Court has no original
jurisdiction.
- Petitioners argue that the sale of shares and transfer of the FTAA is invalid. Government
cannot enter into FTAA with Filipinos.
- It does not take deep knowledge of law and logic to understand that what the Constitution
grants to foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos.
2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof
is subject to several safeguards.
- Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a case becomes moot and academic when
there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits, what is at issue is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA but also
the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts
of private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to
divest this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes upon the
Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any law that offends the Constitution.
- But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the mining
industry, which is even now scaring away foreign investments. It is evident that strong reasons
of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now. And citing Acop v.
Guingona, the courts will decide a question –otherwise moot and academic –if it is “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.”
3. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, the ponencia reiterated the well settled
principles of constitutional construction:
 Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
 Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
 Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
- Petitioners claim that the phrase “agreements… involving either technical or financial
assistance” simply means technical assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing
more and nothing else.
- But if that was the intention, then what is the point of requiring that they be based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country?
- It is also unclear how a verba legis approach leads to the conclusion that “the management
or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service
contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.
If the framers had intended to put an end to service contracts, they would have at least left
some transitory guidelines.
- The drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatism and savvy to know that these
foreign entities will not enter into such “agreements involving assistance” without requiring
arrangements for the protection of their investments, gains and benefits.
- Using ratio legis est anima, we may now examine the CONCOM deliberations. It may be
observed that the members use the terms “financial and technical assistance agreements”
and “service contracts” interchangeably. From their statements, it may be concluded that
FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject
to several safeguards (in accordance with law, President as signatory, reporting to
Congress…)
- With ut magis valeat quam pereat, we may notice a contradiction between the State’s full
control and supervision and the safeguarded service contracts with foreign contractors. It must
be pointed out that the full control and supervision cannot be taken literally to mean that the
State controls and supervises everything involved, down to the minutest details, and makes all
decisions required in the mining operations. Control by State may be on the macro level –
establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc.
- To further disabuse the notion of these “new service contracts”, the government’s share in
these operations will not be limited to taxes, duties and fees to be imposed. Those only
consist of the basic government share. The law provides for an additional government share
to be determined using formulas presented in DAO 96-40, either of which results to at least
50% of the net benefits from the mining.
Decision WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents’ and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s January
27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring
CONSTITUTIONAL 1) RA 7942 (Phil. Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations
contained in DAO 96-40 –insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance
agreements referred to in par. 4 of Section 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution; and 3) the FTAA
dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and WMCP, except Sections 7.8 and 7.9
of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for
being grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Voting 10 concur –including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took no part
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO
- Provisions of RA 7942 abdicate the State’s constitutional duty to control and supervise fully
the exploitation of mineral resources.
- The change in language in the Constitution was a clear rejection of the old system of
“license, concession or lease.”
- The State as owner of the natural resources must receive income from its exploitation –
taxes, fees and charges cannot substitute.
- State must receive at least 60% of the net proceeds in FTAAs, which share is equivalent to
the Filipino equity requirement.
- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is entitled to what the entire mining
industry is willing to pay the State.
CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente]
- The phrase “natural resources are owned by the State” simultaneously vests the legal title to
the nation’s natural resources to the Government, and the beneficial ownership of these
resources in the sovereign Filipino people.
- In the EDU of natural resources, Government acts as trustee. So it cannot, without violating
its sacred trust, enter into any agreement or arrangement which effectively deprives the
Filipino people of their beneficial ownership of these resources.
- Art. XII, sec. 2 in mentioning “based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country articulates the value which the Constitution places on natural
resources, and recognizes their potential benefits.
- Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because the motherland’s natural resources are
the birthright not only of the present generation of Filipinos but of future generations as well.
- “Involving” as the majority construes it runs counter to the restrictive spirit of the provision.
- “Either” refers to one of two items and “any” is required when more than two items are
involved.
- “Either” is not merely descriptive but restrictive.
- Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est –a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
- It is understandable, however regrettable, that a government, strapped for cash and in the
midst of a self proclaimed fiscal crisis, would be inclined to turn a blind eye to the
consequences of unconstitutional legislation in the hope, however false or empty, of obtaining
fabulous amounts of hard currency; As always, the one overriding the consideration of this
Court should be will of the sovereign Filipino people as embodied in their Constitution.
- The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine natural resources now belongs to
another generation.
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC AND MERALCO
TINGA; January 15, 2004
FACTS
- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order assailing the Order dated
November 27, 2003 of respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), provisionally
authorizing respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an
average amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) argues
that the said Order of the ERC is void for having been issued without legal basis or statutory
authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4 of the Implementing Rules of the “Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA) is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
legislative power. FDC further asserts that the Order is void for having been issued by the
ERC with grave abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance
of injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate
increase will result in irreparable prejudice to the FDC and others similarly situated unless the
court restrains such implementation.
- On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urgent Motion to Grant Restraining or Status
Quo Order. On Jan. 9, 2004, the ERC issued an Order clarifying that the provisional rate
increase granted to MERALCO in its Nov. 27, 2003 Order should be applied beginning Jan. 1,
2004. The Court En Banc issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution ordering ERC and
MERALCO to file their respective Comments on the Petition. The Court also enjoined ERC
and MERALCO to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition and set the
case for oral arguments on Jan. 27, 2004. On Jan. 26, 2004, ERC, MERALCO, and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments on the Petition.
- In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments of the OSG and insists that it is
authorized to issue provisional orders under the law. ERC argues that it must not have been
the intention of Congress to expand the functions of the ERC, as the successor of the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip its powers at the same time. The ERC also asserts that it is
authorized to issue provisional rate increases ex parte, and that it may base its provisional
order on the verified application and supporting documents submitted by the application, and it
is not required to wait for the comments of consumers or local government units (LGUs)
concerned before issuing a provisional order. The ERC also denies that the Nov. 27, 2003
Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, it claims that the Order is
supported by substantial evidence. Finally, ERC contends that the filing of the instant Petition
is premature because it was denied the opportunity to have a full determination of the
Application after trial on the merits, and is violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
- For its part, MERALCO asserts that the Order is valid, because it was issued by the ERC
pursuant to Sec. 44 of the EPIRA which allows the transfer of powers (not inconsistent with
the EPIRA) of the old ERB to ERC. It also denies that the assailed Order was issued by the
ERC with grave abuse of discretion, asserting that on the contrary, the issuance thereof was
based on the Application, affidavits and other supporting documents which it submitted earlier.
ISSUE
1. WON ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under RA No. 9136,
otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA)
2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional orders, WON the grant by the
ERC of the provisional rate adjustment in question constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
HELD
1. Yes. The ERC is endowed with statutory authority to approve provisional rate adjustments
under the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:
Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. — The powers and functions of the Energy
Regulatory Board not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby transferred to
the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all applicable funds
and appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel as may be necessary.
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause — The applicability provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the “Public Services Act,”
Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as
amended, referred to as the National Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise
known as the “Department of Energy Act;” Executive Order 172, as amended, creating the
ERB; Republic Act 7832 otherwise known as the “Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004;” shall continue to have full force and effect except
 insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act. The provisions with respect to electric power
of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section 5(f) of Republic Act 7277
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
- Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
The principal powers of the ERB relative to electric public utilities transferred to the ERC
are the following:
1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies;
2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the operation of electric power utilities;
3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.
- It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of the power to grant provisional rate
adjustments is not inconsistent with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers of the ERB
transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are in addition to the new powers conferred upon the
ERC under Section 43.
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the continued efficacy of
the applicable provisions of the laws referred to therein. The material provisions of the
Public Service Act which continue to be in full force and effect are contained in Section
16(c), which states thus:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing.
The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the
rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and
saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll charges, classifications, or schedules
thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall
be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the
Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally
and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerned parties operating in the territory
affected: Provided, further, That in case public service equipment of an operator is used
principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said
private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for
the purposes of fixing the rates.
- Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EO No. 172 or the ERB Charter continue to be in full force by
virtue of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. Said provisions of the ERB Charter read:
SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. — The Board may, upon the filing of an
application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the
basis of the supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on
motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision
after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits,
documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion,
substantially support of the provisional order; Provided, That the Board shall immediately
schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication
and notice to all affected parties.
SEC. 14. Applicability Clause — The applicability (applicable) provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the “Public Service Act;” Republic Act No.
6173, as amended, otherwise known as the “Oil Industry Commission Act;” Republic Act
No. 6395, as amended, revising the charter of the National Power Corporation under CA
120; Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, also referred to as the “National
Electrification Administration Decree,” and Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended,
creating the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full force and effect, except
insofar as inconsistent with this order. (Words in parenthesis supplied).
- Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws were expressly repealed or modified.
Sec. 8 of EO No. 172 and Section 16(c) of CA No. 146 which both grant the regulatory body
concerned the authority to approve provisional rate increases are not among the provisions
expressly repealed or modified. This clearly indicates the law’s intent to transfer the power to
ERC.
- Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our jurisdiction. Thus, a statute will not be
deemed to have been impliedly repealed by another enacted subsequent thereto unless there
is a showing that a plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy exists between the two.
- Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the power to grant provisional rate
adjustments runs counter to the statutory construction guide provided in Sec. 75 of the law.
This section ordains that the EPIRA shall be construed in favor of market competition and
people power empowerment, thereby ensuring the widest participation of the people. To the
Court, the goals of market competition and people empowerment are not negated by the
ERC’s exercise of authority to approve provisional rate adjustments. The concerns are taken
care of by Sec. 43 of the EPIRA and its IRR. Again for one, even if there is a ground to grant
the provisional rate increase, the ERC may do so only after the publication requirement is met
and the consumers affected are given the opportunity to present their side. For another, the
rate increase is provisional in character and therefore may be modified or even recalled
anytime. Finally, the ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-setting methodology “in the public
interest” and “to promote efficiency.” For that matter, there is a plethora of provisions in Sec.
43 and related sections which seek to promote public interest, market competition, and
consumer protection.
- All the foregoing undeniably lead to the conclusion that the ERC, under Sections 43(u), 44,
and 80 of the EPIRA, in relation to Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Sec. 8 of EO. No.
172, possesses the power to grant provisional rate adjustments subject to the procedure laid
down in these laws as well as in the IRR.
2. Yes. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically,
capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. What makes the challenged
Order particularly repugnant is that it involves a blatant and inexcusable breach of the very
rule which the ERC is mandated to observe and implement. The violated provision which is
Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise its power to issue
provisional orders pursuant to Sec. 44 in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the
application for rate increase must be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
locality where the applicant operates; second, ERC must consider the comments or pleadings
of the customers and LGU concerned in its action on the application or motion for provisional
rate adjustment. Since the IRR was issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part
of the IRR has the force and effect of law and thus should have been complied with.
- In view of the infirmities which attended the November 27, 2003 Order, particularly: 1) the
failure of MERALCO to publish its Application or at least a summary thereof; 2) the failure of
ERC to resolve the Motions for Production of Documents filed by the oppositors to
MERALCO’s Application before acting on the motion for provisional rate adjustment; and 3)
the failure of the ERC to consider the arguments raised by the oppositors in their respective
pleadings prior to the issuance of the assailed Order, the Court declares void the November
27, 2003 Order of the ERC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
PANGANIBAN; March 30, 2004
FACTS
- The petitioners, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the
mountains of Biak-na-Bato, succeeded in discovering marble deposits in Mount Mabio, which
forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain range. The petitioners then applied with the Bureau of
Mines for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License
No. 33 was granted to them. Shortly after respondent Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister
of the Department of Energy, he cancelled the petitioner’s license through his letter to
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation dated Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the
cancellation, the original petition was filed on August 21, 1991.
- The trial court granted the petition and said that the privilege granted under the license had
already ripened into a property right, thus the cancellation of the license without notice or
hearing was against the Constitutional right of the petitioners against deprivation of their
property rights. It was unjustified because that could be covered by four separate application
is 400 hectares. Finally, they ruled that Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation
of the license, was an ex post facto law. Thus, they were allowed to continue their operations
until the expiration of their license.
- On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license covering 330.3062 hectares to the
respondents was valid because it was covered by four separate applications, each for an area
of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under PD 463 - that any quarry license
should not cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province – was supplanted by RA
7942, which increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463,
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the license is valid
3. WON Proclamation No. 84 is valid
HELD
1. No. With the shift of constitutional policy (Art 12 Sec 2) toward full control and supervision
of the State over natural resources the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines vs
Factoran declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to the Constitution.
- RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional
mandate. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent with any of its provisions. However, it
does not apply retroactively to a license granted by the government under the 1973
Constitution. The Court therefore needs to determine WON the license of the respondents
falls within the type of licenses wherein the new law cannot be applied.
2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463.
Proclamation No. 2202, which awarded the license to Rosemoor, expressly states that the
grant is subject to “existing policies, laws, rules and regulations”. The license is thus subject to
Section 69 of PD 463, which states that a license cannot cover more than 100 hectares in any
one province. The law does not provide any exception to the number of applications for a
license. Moreover, the license was issued solely in the name of Rosemoore Mining and
Development Corporation, rather than the four individual stockholders.
3. Yes. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs. Balite Portal Mining
Cooperative, Tan vs. Director of Forestry and Ysmael vs. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled
that licenses may be revoked by executive action when national interest so requires, because
it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause. The
license merely evidences the privilege granted by the state and does not vest any permanent
or irrevocable right. The license likewise contains a provision which says that the license “may
be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when in his
opinion, public interest so require”. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice to say
that while the cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the said director, the latter
is subject to the department head.
- Moreover, granting that the license is valid, it may also by revoked by the State in the
exercise of police power. The exercise of power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in
accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources.
- Proc No. 84 is also not a bill of attainder since the declaration of the license as a nullity is not
a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation a punishment within the purview of the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
- Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It does not fall under the six recognized
instances when a law is considered as such. Also, an ex post facto law is limited in its scope
only to matters criminal in nature.
Decision Petition granted
DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V SECRETARY
CHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006
FACTS
- Nature Prohibition and mandamus
- Assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant
thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No.
96-40, s. 1996.
- 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EO No. 279 which authorized the DENR
Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
- 3 March 1995 ~ President Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled, “An Act
Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and
Conservation,” otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
- 15 August 1995 ~ DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942.
- 23 January 1997 ~ DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on after due publication
superseded DAO No. 23, s.1995.
- Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA
with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya
and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
- Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that
now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling
99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
- 7 September 2001 ~ counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason
that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional.
- The Office of the Executive Secretary was also furnished a copy of the said letter.
- There being no response to both letters, another letter of the same content dated 17 June
2002 was sent to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
- This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and eventually referred to the Panel of
Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. 02,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
- 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received a letter from the Panel of Arbitrators
of the MGB requiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of the Panel of Arbitrators before
the letter may be acted upon.
- Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo another demand letter dated 8
November 2002. Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary who referred the
same to the MGB, Quezon City.
- In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners
for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.
- Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order. They pray that the Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners' eminent domain claim is a justiciable issue.
Substantive
2. WON RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void becausethey allow the unjust and unlawful
taking of property without payment of just compensation, in violation of Art III Sec 9 of the
Constitution
3. WON the mining act and its implementing rules and regulations are void and
unconstitutional for sanctioning an unconstitutional administrative process of determining just
compensation
4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated its primary responsibility
to the full control and supervision over natural resources
5. WON the respondents interpretation of the role of the wholly foreign and foreign-owned
corporations in their involvement in mining enterprises, violates Art XII Sec 2 (4) of the
Constitution
6. WON the 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts
HELD
1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following considerations:
a. Locus Standi~ In the case, there is a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has
been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into.
Petitioners embrace various segments of the society, like DESAMA representing a
community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other
residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. These petitioners have
the standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a
personal and substantial injury. They are under imminent threat of being displaced
from their landholdings as a result of the implementation of the questioned FTAA.
b. Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
c. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public
interest involved will have a bearing on the country’s economy, which is to a greater
extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also affected by the resolution of this case
are the proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining contract areas as well as
the social existence of indigenous peoples, which are threatened.
2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO 96-40
- PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RA No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 allow the
"unlawful and unjust "TAKING" of private property for private purpose in contradiction with
Sec. 9, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken
except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation."
- They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow
taking of land without payment of just compensation.
- They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to illustrate the concept of taking of
property for purposes of eminent domain to wit:
> "“taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more
than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. "
- Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no absolute, physical
taking, at the very least, Section 76 establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners,
occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area sufficient to deprive them of
enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls
within the purview of eminent domain.
(NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege or advantage, which one man may
have in the lands of another, without profit; it may arise by deed or prescription)
- PUBLIC RESPONDENTS argue that Section 76 is NOT A TAKING provision but a VALID
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic
exploitation of private property.
- Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would
compel the government to regulate by purchase.”
- Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering private lands and concession
areas, FTAA holders do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial
enjoyment of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal easement upon
surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area.
- Hence the distinctions below:
1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power
 The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation.
 On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
 Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare
for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as
an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.
 Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. (NOTE: noxious= harmful)
 Jurisprudence shows: WHERE A PROPERTY INTEREST IS MERELY RESTRICTED
BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE THEREOF WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC
WELFARE, OR WHERE PROPERTY IS DESTROYED BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED
EXISTENCE WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC INTEREST, THERE IS NO
COMPENSABLE TAKING. However, WHEN A PROPERTY INTEREST IS
APPROPRIATED AND APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC PURPOSE, THERE IS
COMPENSABLE TAKING.
 In the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of private
property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights, which constitute
ownership, is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. (-Bernas)
 TAKING MAY INCLUDE TRESPASS WITHOUT ACTUAL EVICTION OF THE OWNER,
MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY OR PREVENTION OF
THE ORDINARY USES FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH AS THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASEMENT.
 In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in
eminent domain, to wit:
1. the expropriator must enter a private property;
2. the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
 4. the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected;
5. the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
 Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way.
THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A SIMPLE RIGHT-OF-WAY
WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE.
Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining
activities such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders
build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds,
storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems. On
top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build
warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary
for mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected
areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. WITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS ONCE
MINING OPERATIONS COMMENCE.
1. On Section 76 of RA No. 7942 as a Taking Provision
 Brief History of Mining Laws:
 First found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137
 A similar one was found in a provision of Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise
known as “The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974”
 Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface rights for the entry into
private lands for purposes of mining operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19
July 1974 was passed into law in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral
resources development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new system
of surface rights acquisition by mining prospectors and claimants.
 Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent
domain may only be exercised in order that the mining claimants can build, construct
or install roads, railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power of
eminent domain may now be invoked by mining operators for the entry, acquisition
and use of private lands.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified mining
operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed
incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
provision is a taking provision.
o The taking to be valid must be for public use.
o Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is
now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience.
o It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as
traditionally understood as “actual use by the public” has already been abandoned.
Decision THEREFORE, the Mining Law and the CAMC FTAA are not void because Sec. 76
of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just
compensation based on the agreement entered into by the holder of mining rights and the
surface owner, occupant or concessionaire in accordance to PD 512.
Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue:
3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just Compensation
The question on the judicial determination of just compensation has been settled in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the Court declared that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even as
the executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations, the same
cannot prevail over the court’s findings. (NOTE: I think this is the ratio already.)
 There is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its
implementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to
determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.
 There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by
the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary
matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants.
 The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less
“original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the
judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.
4. On the Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining Operations
 Citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos: The Court held that RA 7942
provides for the state’s control and supervision over mining operations.
o The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the
FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners’ contention
that the setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 relegates the State to the role of a
“passive regulator” dependent on submitted plans and reports.
 On the contrary, the government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or
disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and
the corresponding minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration,
development and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
- Considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations just discussed, the Court
believes that the State definitely possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word
in the operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives, and detect deviations and
noncompliance by the contractor; likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to
impose sanctions, should the occasion therefore arise.
 In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away
with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the
enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more
than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining
operations.
5. On the Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase "Agreements Involving Either
Technical or Financial Assistance"
 Citing La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:
 Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly
mentioned, could be made part of the agreement.
o The use of the word “involving” implies that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in
sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose “agreements for technical or
financial assistance” against “agreements including technical or financial assistance.”
This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
o The word “involving” as used in this context has three connotations that can be
differentiated thus: one, the sense of “concerning,” “having to do with,” or “affecting”;
two, “entailing,” “requiring,” “implying” or “necessitating”; and three, “including,”
“containing” or “comprising.”
 If the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or
technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so
unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone’s mind about
their true intent.
o For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely
prohibited from involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar
ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields
negative results.
- The meaning of the phrase “agreements involving either technical or financial assistance”
must not be construed in an exclusionary and limiting manner since there was a conscious
and deliberate decision by the drafters to avoid the use of restrictive wording.
6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized
 The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State;
this time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past
regime.
 Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals:
a. "The phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance,
referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973
variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the
one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or “owner” of the works."
b. "xxx..From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph
4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other,
the government as principal or “owner” of the works. "
- "As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the
continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations -- as contractors who would invest
in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision
of the State -- sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and
utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large scale for the immediate and
tangible benefit of the Filipino people." (id.)
Decision The petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 – insofar as they relate
to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V BALITE PORTAL MINING
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002
FACTS
- Diwalwal Gold Rush Area – rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-
Surigao Forest Reserve. It is located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and
Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been embroiled in controversy since mid-80’s due to
the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
- March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP
No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area.
- June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Act which established a People’s Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the
secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the
DENR Secretary’s direct supervision and control. It also authorized the PMRB to declare and
set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award
mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.
- December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran issued Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest
land open to small-scale mining. This was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR
Secretary by Proclamation No. 369 which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve.
- Petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional
Executive Director (RED Mines Case)
- February 16, 1994, while RED mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133
to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an
integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered SEM’s integrated
MPSA application. Several small-scale miners filed their opposition (MAC cases).
- March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to
this, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve
disputes involving conflicting mining rights. RPA took cognizance of the RED Mines cases
which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
- April 1, 1997 Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series
of 1997 authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners
operating in the Diwalwal mines.
- May 30, 1997, petitioner SEM filed complaint for damages against DENR Secretary and
PMRB-Davao, alleging that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and
hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckload from SEM’s mining claim.
- Meanwhile, June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in
an Omnibus Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is reiterated and all adverse claims
against MPSAA No. 128 are dismissed.
- June 24, 1997 the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided
among others, that:
a. DENR shall study…the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the
Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area…
b. Study shall include… studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management
agreements or operating agreements…
c. Such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing… including profit-sharing
arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous
cultural communities…
- July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the CA for the nullification of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground
that the “direct state utilization” espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights
under EP No. 133, among others
- January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines cases, setting
aside the judgment of the RPA. This decision was then elevated to he Supreme Court by way
of consolidated petition.
- March 19, 1998, the CA dismissed petition of SEM ruling that:
a. DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03
since it was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the
government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.
b. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt “direct state utilization” as official
government policy on the matter, but was simply a manifestation of the DENR’s intent to
consider it as one of its options, after determining its feasibility through studies.
c. Petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133 are not inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable and,
being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the permit can be revoked,
amended or modified by the Chief Executive when the national interest so requires.
- Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in upholding the questioned acts of the DENR Secretary which petitioner
allege as violative of mining laws and in derogation of vested rights of petitioner over the area
as covered by EP No. 133.
2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity of ore transport permit (OTP) is
vested in the Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA).
HELD
1. SC agreed with CA that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt “direct state
utilization” as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly
indicate that what was directed was merely a study of this option and nothing else. It did not
grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any
party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies
to determine its feasibility.
- Petition was premature. The MO did not impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any
legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute. Petitioner can show
no more than a mere apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would directly take over
the mines, and until the DENR actually does so and petitioner’s fears turn into reality, no valid
objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and
anticipatory.
2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still
an indefinite and unsettled matter, as the EP’s validity is still being disputed in the
Consolidated Mines cases.
- Whether or not respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC) and the
other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a factual matter
that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines Cases.
- SC also pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner’s rights under EP No. 133
be regarded as total and absolute, as EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the
State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires.
This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural mineral resources are matters impresses with great public interest.
- Looking into Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the SC said that the State may pursue the constitutional policy
of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into
agreements with qualified entities. The State need be guided only by the demands of public
interest.
- In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR Secretary violated the law or
abused his discretion, he is presumed to have regularly issued the memorandum with a lawful
intent and pursuant to his official functions.
- With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule on it as the grounds invoked by
petitioner for invalidating the OTPs are inextricably linked to the issues raised in the
Consolidated Mines cases.
Decision Petition was denied; CA ruling affirmed.
CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY
CARPIO; July 9, 2002
FACTS
- Nature original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA)
to disclose all facts on PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to
enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such recalamtion.
- 1973-The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
- 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating the PEA. And was
tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve,
acquire x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos
issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
- 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP
which stated that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP
- 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of
land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the
three reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands”
- 1995-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding
- President Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA
- 1996-Senate President Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced
the JVA as the “grandmother of all scams”. As a result, investigations were conducted by the
Senate. Among the conclusions were: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of the title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal
- 1997-President Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the
JVA in view of the Senate Committee report.1998-The Philippine Daily Inquirer published
reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
- PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and former navy officer Sergio
Cruz were members of the negotiating panel
- Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions
of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of the renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation
of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to
information on matters of public concern
- 1999-PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved
ISSUES
1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because
subsequent events
2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the
hierarchy of courts
3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative-remedies
4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement
6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to amari of
certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 consitution; and
7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageuos to the government.
o threshold issue: whether amari, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
amended jva 367.5 hectares of reclaimed froeshore and submerged area in manila
bay in view of sections 2 and 3, article 12 of the 1987 constitution
HELD
(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily
includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in
violation of the Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the effects of an
unconstitutional contract
(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions
Reasoning the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the
public
(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue
involved is a purely legal or constitutional question
(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and as such, there
is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s suit on these matters of transcendental public
importance
(5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government
and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order
Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must prepare all
the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are no “official
acts, transactions, or decisions” on the bids or proposals but once the committee makes its
official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government
(6) In a form of a summary:
o The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain .
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
o The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain and outside the commerce of man until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after
PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate.
o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain
o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may
reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
services. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Reasoning Commonwealth Act 141 of the Philippine National Assembly empowers the
president to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable” sec. 6. The
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into—(a) Alienable of disposable, (b)
timber, and (c) mineral lands.-The President must first officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession.
-Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a)
Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c)
Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes . -Sec. 61 states that the
lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private parties
by lease only and not otherwise
-After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable
lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These
lands remained suis generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the
government could not sell to private parties. The only way that the government can sell to
private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for
the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.
-in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a public bidding is required
-1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Article 12,
Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
-ration behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except through lease is not well
understood. If the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the Consti could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire.
If the intent was to encourage “owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to
prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then placing the land in the name of a
corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is
registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit
shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent
the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the
next. In actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain
could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could
own as many corporations as his means would allow him. He could even hide his ownership
of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation.
J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; September 24, 2003
FACTS
- January 27, 1977 – The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a
government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Kawasaki Heavy
Industry, Ltd of Kobe, Japan for the construction, operation, management of the Subic
National Shipyard, which became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation
(PHILSECO) with 60-40% capitalization.
- One of the features of the agreement is the grant to the parties the right of first refusal
should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture.
- November 25, 1986-- the NIDC transferred all its rights, title and interest in PHILSECO to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). And subsequently transferred to the Nat’l Government
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14
- December 8, 1986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Committee on
Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take possession of, manage
and dispose of non*performing assets of the National Government.
- APT was named trustee in the National Gov’t share in PHILSECO.
- COP and APT decided to sell the gov’t shares to private entities (87.67% equity share).
- APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKI’s right of first refusal for the right to top
by 5% the highest bid, and be entitled to name the company which could top. KAWASAKI
named Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
- JG Summit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of 2,030,000,000.00php with an acknowledgment
of KAWASAKI/PHI’s right to top. JGSHI was declared the highest bidder.
- KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COP approved. APT and PHI executed a
Stock Purchase Agreement.
- JGSHI filed a petition for mandamus to question the legality of the right to first refusal and
right to top exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI.
- CA held that petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy, and that JGSHI was
estopped from questioning the validity because it participated in the public bidding with the full
knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHI’s right to top.
- SC held that a) the right to top granted to KAWASAKI/PHI was illegal. Because it allows
foreign corporations to own more than 40% equity in PHILSECO, which is a public utility
whose capitalization should be 60% Filipino-owned. It also violates the rules of competitive
bidding; b) JGSHI cannot be estopped from questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and
inequitable provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000.00 bid of JGSHI, execute
Stock Purchase Agreement, return to PHI the amount of 2,131,500,000.00php, and cancel the
stock certificates issued to PHI.
- Respondents filed MFR with the ff. issues…
ISSUES
1. WON PHILSECO is a public utility.
2. WON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI can exercise its right of first refusal
only up to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO
3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of competitive bidding.
HELD
1. No. PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not a public utility by nature, and there is
no law declaring it to be.
a) Public utility = a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with
some commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, water,
transportation. The facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation
of residents.
b) Public utility implies public use and service to the public. Determinative characteristic:
service or readiness to serve an indefinite public (not a privileged few), which has rights
to demand and receive the services and commodities.
c) Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The fact that a business offers
services and goods that promote public good and serve the interest of the public does
not make it a public utility.
d) True criterion to judge the character of the use: whether the public may enjoy it by RIGHT
or only by PERMISSION
e) Shipyard = a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired. It has a limited
clientele whom it may choose to serve as its discretion. It is not legally obliged to render
its services to the public. Though the industry may be imbued with public interest, its
public service is only incidental.
f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public utilities (by Act No 2307, Commonwealth
Act No 146). Then Marcos’ PD No. 666 removed it from the list of public utilities to free
the industry from the 60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution (he wanted to
accelerate the growth of the industry). Then BP Blg 391 repealed PD No. 666 , reverting
back the status of shipyards as public utilities.
g) Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226. But this did not revive PD No 666 or
the other repealed laws. The status of shipyards reverts back to non-public utility prior to
the Public Service Law.
2) No. There is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI to acquire more then 40% of PHILSECO’s
total capitalization, under the Joint Venture Agreement. (or YES, it can own more than
40%). They agreed that in the event that one party sells its shares, the non-selling party
have a preferential right to buy or to refuse the selling. The partnership is based on
delectus personae. No one can become a member of the partnership association w/o the
consent of all other associates.
3) No. The right to top did not violate the rules of competitive bidding.
a) bidding = making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors whereby the
gov’t manifests its intention to make proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials
and equipment for official business or public use. Public bidding is the accepted
method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and ensures that overpricing,
favoritism, and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized.
b) Principles of bidding: 1) the offer to the public; 2) an opportunity for competition; 3) a
basis for comparison of bids. As long as the three are complied with, the bidding is
valid and legal.
c) The highest bid may not be automatically accepted. Bidding rules may specify other
conditions or reservations.
d) In the case, 1) all interested bidders were welcomed; 2) basis for comparing bids
were laid down; 3) all bids were accepted sealed and were opened and read in the
presence of the COA’s official representative and before all other bidders.
e) The bidders were placed in equal footing. And they were made aware of
the rules that the gov’t reserved the right to reject the highest bid should
KAWASAKI/PHI decide to exercise its right to top.
f) If the parties did not swap right to first refusal with right to top, KAWASAKI
would still have the right to buy the shares (for the original amount, which was
lesser), so there is no basis in the submission that the right to top unfairly favored
KAWASAKI.
Decision : MFR granted. Decision & resolution of CA affirmed.
Voting Concur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga (w/ sep op)
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA
Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of CA No. 454 shipyards have never been
considered public utilities. PD 666 merely removed any doubt as to their non-public utility
status.
BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION
QUAISON; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of shares of Petron
Corporation and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company as the highest bidder and to
stop the sale of said block of shares to Aramco
- PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1966
under the corporate name “Esso Philippines, Inc.”
- In 1973, the Philippine government acquired ESSO through the PNOC and became a
wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a
subsidiary of PNOC.
- On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 entitled
“Proclaiming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of
Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof and creating the Committee on
Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust” in the exercise of her legislative power under
the Freedom Constitution.
- Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the government and the ideal of
leaving business to the private sector.
- December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the privatization program to be successful and
beneficial.
- September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors approved Specific Thrust No. 6 and
moved to bring the attention of the administration to the need to privatize Petron.
- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on Privatization,
endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC.
- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del Rosario to President Ramos.
- January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of Energy endorsed for approval
- January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of Petron as part of the Energy
Sector Action Plan.
- March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee
recommended a 100% privatization of Petron.
- March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company
to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong
Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to Petron.
- April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the privatization of Petron up to a maximum of
65% of its capital stock.
- August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%-40%-20% privatization strategy of
Petron.
- Invitation to bid was published.
- The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at US$400 million.
- The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), ARAMCO, and WESTMONT were
submitted while the floor price was being dicussed.
- ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502 million
- December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief Executive Officer of PNOC,
endorsed to COP the bid of ARAMCO for approval. And was approved on the same day. Also
on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO.
- February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement
- March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders’ Agreement
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioner have locus standi
2. WON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization program contravened the declared policy of
the State
3. WON the bidding procedure was valid
4. WON Petron was a public utility
HELD
1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national government or
government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law.
2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of the COP of such
privatization, being made in accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the
Court. Such acts are exercises of the executive function as to which the Court will not pass
judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom.
3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the
interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.
4. NO. A public utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized for
hire or compensation to serve the public, which is given the right to demand its service. Petron
is not engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties.
Decision Petitions dismissed
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001
FACTS
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
- Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of importing crude
oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network of service
stations throughout the country
- Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a Caltex service
station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City
- June 30, 1983: Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an
application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque to Imelda
Marcos Ave, Paranaque. The application was initially rejected because the old site had been
closed for five years such that relocation of the same to a new site would amount to a new
construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a moratorium.
Subsequently, BEU relaxed its position and gave due course to the application.
- PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are adequate service stations attending
to the motorists’ requirements in the trading area, (2) ruinous competition will result, and (3)
there is a decline not an increase in the volume of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also
opposed on the ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.
- March 6, 1984: BEU dismissed application on jurisdictional grounds and for lack of “full title”
of the lessor over the proposed site
- May 7, 1984: BEU reinstated application and conducted a hearing thereon
- June 3, 1986: BEU rendered a decision denying application because there was no necessity
for an additional petroleum products retail outlet on the site. Shell appealed to the Office of
Energy Affairs (OEA)
- May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and
transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU
- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shell’s appeal. Shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for
new hearing or remand of the case for further proceedings. Shell submitted a new feasibility
study to justify application.
- July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the updated survey conducted by Shell
- September 17, 1991: ERB allowed Shell to establish the service station
- PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the ERB. It thus elevated the
case to the CA.
- November 8, 1993: CA reversed ERB judgment
- CA denied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERB thus elevated matters to the Supreme
Court
- While case was pending in the CA, Caltex filed a similar application in the same area. PDSC
opposed on the same grounds but ERB also approved application. PDSC again filed a petition
with the CA. Petition was dismissed in May 14, 1993.
- ERB arguments: evidence used as basis for ERB’s decision is neither stale nor irrelevant
and justifies establishment of retail outlet, evidence on vehicle volume and fuel demand
supports construction of outlet, new outlet will not lead to ruinous competition
- Shell arguments: ERB findings based on substantial evidence, feasibility study has not
become irrelevant even if presented two years after preparation, CA erred in passing
judgment and making pronouncement of purely economic and policy issues on petroleum
business, proposed outlet will not result to ruinous competition, CA should have referred the
new evidence to ERB under the doctrine of prior resort to primary jurisdiction
ISSUES
1. WON the court should set aside the ERB decision
2. WON there is substantial evidence to support ERB’s finding of public necessity to warrant
approval of Shell’s application
3. WON the Feasibility study has become stale because it was submitted in evidence two
years after it was prepared in 1988
4. WON the establishment of the outlet would result to ruinous competition
HELD
Ratio The courts will not interfere with actions of an administrative agency, except if there is
an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
General Rule : The courts will not interfere in matters, which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies
- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations
pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent,
conscientious and competent expert opinion
- Exception An action by an administrative agency may be set aside if there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the
letter and spirit of the law.
- When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.
1. No cogent reason to depart from general rule since ERB findings conform to the
governing statutes and controlling case law on the matter
Regulatory boards were empowered to entertain and act on applications for the
establishment of gasoline stations in the Philippines.
 There is a worldwide trend towards economic deregulation. This trend is reflected in
our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence.
- RA 8479 was enacted to implement Art XII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution
- Government believes deregulation will eventually prevent monopoly
- Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses competition. The
objective is based upon the belief that through competition producers will
satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest
resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods
and services and thus, matches their desires with society’s opportunity costs.
 Recent developments in the oil industry as well as legislative enactments and
jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale the view
espoused by the appellate court in denying Shell’s petition
2. ERB Decision was based on hard economic data
 Data includes: developmental projects, residential subdivision listings, population
count, public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand,
growth of private cars, public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles  increased
market potential which will benefit community and transient motorists
 ERB is in a better position to resolve Shell’s application being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter
 Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion
3. The pronouncement of Court of Appeals’ Sixteenth Division affirming ERB Decision
approving a similar application by Caltex is more in keeping with the policy of the State
and the rationale of the statutes enacted to govern the industry
 CA: no gasoline station along the entire stretch; need not necessarily result in
ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to that effect; unless petitioner is able to
prove by competent evidence that significant changes have occurred sufficiently to
invalidate that afore-stated study, the presumption is that said study remains valid
4. The mere possibility of reduction of earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove
ruinous competition
 In determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for the construction
of a service station, the CA confined the factors thereof within the rigid standards
governing public utility regulation, where exclusivity, upon satisfaction of certain
requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity is more the exception rather than the
rule in the gasoline service station business
 PDSC failed to show that its business would not have sufficient profit to have a fair
return on investment
 Caltex, PDSC’s principal, never filed any opposition to Shell’s application
 A climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous
competition already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free
competition, consistently with legislative policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil
industry to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate
and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high quality petroleum products
Decision
(1) Challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside
(2) ERB Order granting the amended application of Pilipinas Shell Corporation to relocate its
service station to Benigno Aquino Jr., Ave., Pque, Metro Manila reinstated
Voting 3 Justices concurred, 1 on sick leave
ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM
FORTRICH V CORONA
MARTINEZ; November 17, 1998
FACTS
- Two separate motions for reconsideration seeking reversal of the SC’s decision nullifying the
win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President (OP)
- Decision struck down as void the act of the OP in reopening the case in OP Case No. 96-C
6424 through the issuance of November 7, 1997 win-win Resolution which substantially
modified its March 29, 1996 OP Decision that had long become final and executory
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory
after the DAR’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied for having been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
- Movants:
o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling
o Proper remedy for petitioner is a petition for review and not certiorari
o Filing of motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before petition for
certiorari may be filed
o Petitioners are guilty of forum shopping
- Intervenors:
o They have right to intervene
o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling
o Win-win resolution properly addresses the substantial issues of the case
- Both movants ask that their motions be resolved en banc since the issues are “novel” and of
“transcendental significance” Issue here according to them is WON the power of the local
government units (LGU’s) to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Dept of Agrarian
Reform (DAR)
- Other issues raised by movants described as “substantial” (1) whether the subject land is
considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long been
covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if
not, whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and
(4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land
into industrial/institutional use
ISSUE
WON the SC’s decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by
the Office of the President (OP) must be reversed.
HELD
- The issues presented are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the
Court en banc
o The issue is no longer novel as having been decided in Province of Camarines Sur, et
al. v. CA wherein it was held that LGU’s need not obtain the approval of the DAR to
convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non agricultural use.
o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five
members of the 2nd Division.
- The order which denied the DAR’s motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision was not an erroneous ruling and it does not have to be corrected by the November 7,
1997 win-win resolution
o In accordance with Administrative order No. 18 which mandates that decisions, orders,
resolutions of the OP shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of copy
thereof… unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within such period.
o Late filing of DAR is not excusable because DAR must not disregard the reglementary
period fixed by law in referring the decision to the departments concerned for the
preparation of the motion of consideration
o Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard as they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
delay in the resolution of rival claims in the administration of justice
- There is a grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the second motion for reconsideration
and on the basis thereof issued the win-win resolution was a flagrant infringement of the
doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are
clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
o When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory,
vested rights were acquired by the petitioners
- When the DAR’s order denying the petitioners’ first application for conversion was first
brought by petitioner to the OP, the appropriate administrative rules were not complied with.
But movants cannot now question the supposed procedural lapse for the first time before the
SC. It should have been raised and resolved at the administrative level.
- Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in the subject matter.
o Being merely seasonal farmworkers without the right to own, application for
intervention must fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the
subject land
o even "win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 did not recognize the latter as proper
parties to intervene in the case simply because the qualified farmer-beneficiaries have
yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said resolution.
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the
aforementioned “substantial” issues
o Factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field
are binding and conclusive on the Court, presuming the OP is the most competent in
matters falling within its domain
- Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor
considering that more of the impoverised members of society will be benefited by the agro-
economic development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the
municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake.
o The OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, no just
of the few. This is clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land as
conceived by the petitioners
- WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision of
this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby DENIED
with FINALITY.
SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002
FACTS
- Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre
(predecessor of petitioner Rolando Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the
rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre.
- Ernesto Sigre was private respondent’s tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay
Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of 16 cavans
per crop or 32 cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre
stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant
to the Department of Agrarian Reform’s Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which
set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under
the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27.
- The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 reads:
"A. Where the value of the land has already been established.
The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary or his authorized
representative has finally approved the average gross production data
established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and
tenant farmers concerned heretofore authorized.
Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall terminate on the
date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay
their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents: provided that
in case where the value of the land is established during the month the crop is to
be harvested, the cut-off period shall take effect on the next harvest season. With
respect to cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of the land, the
tenant-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such rental, but it shall be his duty
to notify the landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned of such fact who
shall ascertain immediately the veracity of the information and thereafter resolve
the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner shall insist after positive
ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him, the amount
equivalent to the rental insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer
with the LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his account to be
withdrawn only upon proper written authorization of the DAR District Officer
based on the result of ascertainment or investigation."
- According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the 3-
year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per hectare, and the
value of the land was pegged at P13,405.67. Thus, the petition filed before the Court of
Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of MC No. 6, but also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.
- The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and declared MC No. 6 null and void.
The LBP was directed to return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre, while
Sigre was directed to pay the rentals directly to private respondent. In declaring MC No. 6 as
null and void, the appellate court ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which sanctions the
contested provision of the circular; that said circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which provides
that payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter, being a statute,
must prevail over the circular; that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for
determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining
just compensation; and that it is no longer applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act No.
6657.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES
1. WON MC No. 6 is valid
2. WON MC No. 6 can be reconciled with PD 816
3. WON PD 27 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES.
- PD 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, proclaimed the
entire country as a “land reform area” and decreed the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its
purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized
as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands
that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers
at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued
MC No. 6, series of 1978.
- The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction said Circular, particularly, the
provision stating that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall terminate on the date the
value of the land is established, after which the tenant-farmer shall pay their lease
rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents.
- We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement
the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez
v. Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they’re tilling. As noted, however,
in the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious
implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation.
- The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it
stated that “(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental
payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the
land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease
rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of
the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price.” Since the assailed
Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid.
Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect.
2. YES.
- The Court cannot see any “irreconcilable conflict” between P.D. No. 816 and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer
(agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has
been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay
to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined.
- In Curso v. Court of Appeals, involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically
ruled that there is no incompatibility between these two.
- In other words, MC No. 6 merely provides guidelines in the payment of lease
rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and MC No. 6,
payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established.
Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank. The rentals
previously paid are to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers.
- Private respondent, however, “splits hairs,” so to speak, and contends that the Curso case is
premised on the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly
stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of P.D. 27. Both MC No. 6 and P.D.
816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in
isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be
made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the
tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6.
Clearly, there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No.
6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on
the agricultural property.
3. NO.
- P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity. It is a judicial fact that has been
repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in De Chavez v.
Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the law of
the land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the
land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners
is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate
of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is
unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of
constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any
other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do
away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope
associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings
in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution
and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be
contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as
well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification
for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the
traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting
fundamental policy goals."
- Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves private respondent and
counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared that "Presidential Decree No.
27 has survived the test of constitutionality."
- Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association of
Rice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council .
- Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. 6657, any
other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ultimately foreclosed when it was declared therein
that “R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petition.”
- The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative
of determining just compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:
"For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the
tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to
two and one half (2 ½) times the average harvest of three normal crop years
immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;"
- E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:
 "SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall
be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay
Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuances and regulation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production per hectare shall
be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by
Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50
kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the
government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972,
and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case
may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to
the landowner."
- The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A.
6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the succeeding
paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:
"x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of lease
rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute
within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian
Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent
issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the dispute, the
landowner’s compensation shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds
shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute
before the court."
- Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of
the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may bring
the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task
unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.
- Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operates
distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229,
which provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
specifically states: “(P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with
respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x” It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that
R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D.
27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights
acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
Decision Petitions GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE.
ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; December 17, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
- Three haciendas (Palico, Banilad, Caylaway) in Nasugbu, Bats is owned by Roxas and Co.,
a domestic corp.
- President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO 229 for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
- Congress passed RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL). This was
signed by Pres. Aquino.
- Roxas and Co. filed w/ DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance w/ CARL.
PALICO AND BANILAD
- For Haciendas Palico and Banilad, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent
notices Invitation to Parties to Roxas and Co. through Mr. Jaime Pimentel, Hacienda
Administrator. This was to discuss the results of DAR investigation of Haciendas. The
reports recommended that the haciendas be subject to compulsory acquisition. DAR, through
its Secretary, sent Notices of Acquisition.
- Whether they accept or reject this offer, they must inform Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution. In case of rejection or failure to reply, DAR conducts administrative proceedings
to determine just compensation of the land. In case of acceptance or if compensation has
already been deposited, DAR takes immediate possession of the land.
- Bec petitioner rejected, DAR sent to Landbank a Request to Open Trust Account in favor of
petitioner for its compensation.
- Petitioner applied w/ DAR for conversion of Palico and Banilad fr agricultural to non-agri
lands. Despite this application, DAR proceeded w/ acquisition of the haciendas.
- The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were replaced by DAR with cash and
Landbank bonds.
- DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and distributed them to
farmer beneficiaries.
CAYLAWAY
- This hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the gov’t. DAR accepted the petitioner’s
voluntary offer and sent Notice of Acquisition.
- However, Roxas and Co. President sent letter to DAR withdrawing voluntary offer for sale
(VOS) bec Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway fr agri to non-agri land.
- DAR said reclassification would not exempt the land fr agrarian reform. It denied the - The Notice of Coverage notifies landowner that his property is placed under CARP, informs
withdrawal of the VOS. him that a public hearing will be conducted and a field investigation of the land will be
- Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for cancellation of the conducted.
CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a tourist zone and not suitable for agri production. This petition for - Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the President, Manager, Secretary,
conversion was denied by the MARO. Cashier or agent or directors. This is to ensure prompt and proper notice. Jaime Pimentel is
- Petitioner filed w/ CA, but CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the recourse to SC. not one of these parties.
- Petitioner’s principal place of business is in Makati. Pimentel is based in Nasugbu.
ISSUES - Assuming that Pimentel was an agent of the corp, there is no showing that he was duly
1. WON SC can take cognizance despite failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative authorized to attend the conference meeting.
remedies - Assuming petitioner was duly notified, the areas subject to CARP were not properly
2. WON acquisition proceedings were valid identified before they were taken over by DAR. The acquisition covers only portions, not the
3. WON SC can rule on reclassification of the haciendas entire haciendas. The haciendas are not entirely agri lands. Petitioner had no idea which
portion was subject to compulsory acquisition. This is important bec petitioner can exercise
HELD right to retention – choose to retain not more than 5 hectares out of the total area subject to
1. Yes. CARP.
- Administrative remedies must be exhausted first. But judicial action can be resorted to - With respect to Caylaway, notices were not deemed received by the petitioner.
immediately when 3. No.
- question is purely legal - DAR’s failure to observe due process in acquisition does not ipso facto give SC power to
- the administrative body is in estoppel adjudicate on application for conversion from agri to non-agri land. It’s DAR’s job.
- act is patently illegal - Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve prime agri lands for food production
- there’s urgent need for judicial intervention while recognizing need of other sectors for land. CARL promotes social justice,
- respondent disregarded due process industrialization, and optimum use of land.
- the respondent is a department secretary - Land use – manner of utilization of land incl. allocation, devt and mgmt.
- irreparable damage will be suffered - Land use conversion requires field investigation.
- there’s no other speedy remedy - Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant SC to arrogate authority to resolve
- strong public interest is involved controversy jurisdiction over w/c is initially lodged w/ an administrative body. Here, DAR must
- subject of controversy is private land be given chance to correct its procedural lapses.
- in quo warranto proceedings Decision Petition is remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination
- DAR issued CLOAs w/o just compensation. And the law provides that deposit must be of petitioner’s application for conversion.
made only in cash or Landbank bonds. DAR’s initial action to open trust account deposits
does not constitute payment. SEPARATE OPINION
2. No.
- CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsory and voluntary. MELO [concur and dissent]
- In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and the landowners must first be
identified. However, the law is silent on how identification must be made. To address this, - PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone, has force and effect of law unless
DAR issued Admin Order 12-1989. This was amended by DAR AO 9-1990 and DAR AO 1- repealed. It cannot be disregarded by DAR.
1993. In these amendments, Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to conference
meeting were expanded.
YNARES-SANTIAGO [concurr and dissent]
- If acts of DAR are patently illegal and rights of party are violated, the wrong decisions of
DAR should be reversed and set aside.
- CLOAs do not have nature of Torrens Title and administrative cancellation of title is sufficient
to invalidate them.
ART XIV: EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS
AND ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE
MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
FACTS
- Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is an Indian citizen taking her doctoral program in
Anthropology at the University of the Philippines. To complete the doctoral program she was
required to pass a dissertation and she created one entitled, “Tamil influences in Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines.” She defended her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina
noted some lifted material in the dissertation without proper acknowledgment. She got the nod
of four of the five panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the letter coming from
Dean Paz that wanted her to be temporarily struck off the list of candidates for graduation to
clear the problems regarding her dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time.
- Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a letter that she would not be granted
academic clearance without Celine substantiating her accusation of Drs. Diokno and Medina
maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation. Celine answered by saying that the
unfavorable attitude was due to some failure to include Dr. Medina in the list of panel
members and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr. Medina answered back and wrote
that Celine’s dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her doctorate be withdrawn.
- An ad-hoc committee was formed to investigate the charges and that the request for the
withdrawal of the doctorate degree was asked of the Board of Regents. In the investigation it
was found out that in at least 90 instances the dissertation included lifted materials without
proper or due acknowledgment. The College Assembly therefore unanimously approved and
recommended the withdrawal of the doctorate degree and forwarded it to the University
Council. The University Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the withdrawal to the
Board of Regents. UP Diliman Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a meeting and that
she should submit her written explanation to the charges against her. The Chancellor
informed Celine of the charges and showed a copy of the findings of the investigating
committee. A second meeting was done as well as a third one, however Celine did not attend
the third meeting alleging that the Board of Regents at that time already had decided her case
before she was fully heard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the jurisdiction was
placed on the student disciplinary tribunal in the case of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of
the doctorate degree is not an authorized penalty.
- A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman that investigated the case and they
came out with the findings through all the documents and an interview of Celine. It was
established that at least 22 counts of documented lifting were identified that forms the 90
instances found by the College ad-hoc committee. That Celine admits of being guilt of the
allegation of plagiarism. The Board of Regents decided to withdraw the doctorate degree.
Celine requested an audience with the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was
denied.
- Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction and
damages was filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit while Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered the restoration of the degree.
ISSUES
1. WON the writ of Mandamus is applicable in this situation
2. WON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be done by the University
3. WON there was a denial of due process
HELD
1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an institution of higher learning from the
exercise of its academic freedom that is a constitutional right
2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to
do the act required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
a law. It could not be invoked against the academic freedom of the school as academic
freedom as a Constitutional right (Article XIV Section 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere of authority
over the choice of students. This entails as well that it can also determine who would have the
distinction of being a graduate of the school. If the University discovers that the honor and
distinction was obtained through fraud it has the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction.
The actions of the University through the Board of Regents is to protect academic integrity by
withdrawing her academic degree that she obtained through fraud.
3. No, Due process was done as there were several investigations done by the school starting
from the college to the Board of Regents. She was also invited in the investigation to clear up
her name. However, the actual admission and the clear plagiarism of her sources proved that
indeed she committed the offense. Her demand for the Student Tribunal to decide her case is
untenable, as it is obvious that such case is useless for the penalty it gives is suspension. -the RTC referred the case to the CA for disposition w/c issued a resolution requiring the
Celine in not in the ambit of disciplinary powers of the UP anymore. respondents to show cause why no preliminary injunction should be issued, and issued a TRO
(against the dismissals/suspensions)
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT OF APPEALS -the CA granted the students’ petition, declaring the RTC order and the
KAPUNAN; December 15, 2000 dismissals/suspensions as void
-hence this present petition by Miriam College
FACTS
-PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals ISSUES
-Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of Miriam College’s school paper “Chi- 1. WON the case has been rendered moot
Rho” entitled “Libog at Iba Pang Tula” was odiously received by the MCHS community, calling 2. WON the TC has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari by the students
it “obscene”, “indecent” and “devoid of all moral values” among other things. 3. WON Miriam had jurisdiction over the complaints against the students
-an excerpt written by Mr. Gomez, who wrote the foreword (‘Foreplay’) reads:
HELD
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang—
1. NO. Petitioner asserts that the case is moot since more than 1 year had passed since the
mga putang bikay na sa gitna
court issued the TRO. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of a proceeding prior to
‘di na puwedeng paglabhan
the judgment of a final order to preserve the status quo of things until the merits of the case
‘di na maaring pagbabaran…”
can be heard and persists until issuance of a final injunction.
-several other poems and stories are contained w/ the theme “sekswalidad at iba’t ibang
A TRO on the other hand preserves the status quo until the hearing of the application of the
karanasan nito”
preliminary injunction. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued, hence
-ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the MC Discipline Committee wrote a letter
the TRO automatically expired (BP 224, TRO expires after 20 days if judge takes no action on
to the editorial board, informing them of the complaints filed against their publication by the
application of preliminary injunction). The CA erred in assuming its order was complied w/ by
Miriam Community, along with the alleged school regulations violated, and requiring the board
Miriam; it can’t be said that the students had graduated w/in that short span of time. Miriam
to submit a written statement in answer to the charges.
also allegedly refused the students readmission, and so actual controversy still existed. Since
-the students requested to transfer the case to DECS, w/c under Rule 7 of DECS order no. 94,
the RTC had set aside all previous orders, it allowed the dismissals and suspensions to
has jurisdiction
remain in force.
-the students’ atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for actions committed w/in their capacity
2. YES. RA 7079 includes a certain S4 which states that the editorial board of a school
as campus journalists, what applies is RA 7079 (The Campus Journalism Act) and not
publication is free to determine its editorial policies; S7 of the same act provides that a ..”a
committee regulations
student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he/she has written
-the committee proceeded w/ its investigation ex parte, suspending 5 students, expelling 3,
or…performance of his/her duties…”. S9 mandates DECS to “promulgate the rules and
dismissing 2 and withholding graduation privileges of 1 student
regulations for the act, as embodied by DECS Order No. 94, series of 1992 which under Rule
-these students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction
12 provides that …”DECS regional office shall have original jurisdiction over cases as a result
and/or restraining order before the RTC of QC, questioning the Discipline Board’s jurisdiction
of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school w/in its area of
-the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO and held that nothing in the DECS Order No. 94
administrative responsibility.
excludes school Admin from exercising jurisdiction and that it cannot delimit the jurisdiction of
When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the students, they filed a petition for
schools over disciplinary cases
certiorari and prohibition raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline Board had no jurisdiction
-the students then filed a “Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration” after w/c the
over the case (2) the Board did not have the qualities of an impartial and neutral arbiter, w/c
RTC granted the writ for preliminary injunction (against expulsion and dismissal) so as not to
would deny the students their right to due process.
render the issues moot
The issues thus raised were purely legal in nature and well within the jurisdiction of the TC to
-both parties moved for reconsideration after w/c the RTC recalled the issues and dismissed
determine. The TC had the duty to render a decision for a case w/in its jurisdiction and should
the case
have settled the issues before dismissing the case.
3. YES. A14 S5(2) of the Constitution guarantees all institution of higher learning academic
freedom w/c includes the right of the school to decide for itself how best to attain it:
(1) who may teach (2) what may be taught (3) how it shall be taught (4) who may be admitted
to study
-“how it shall be taught” certainly encompasses the right of the school to discipline its
students. “what may be taught” embodies the Constitutional obligation to instill discipline in
students, stated in A14 S3(2)
-“who may be admitted to study” clearly provides the school w/ the right to determine whom to
expel
A14 S4(1) merely recognizes the State’s power to regulate and supervise educational
institutions, not deprive them of their rights
-In several cases, the Court has upheld the rights of students to free speech in school
premises.
-As held in Tinker v. Des Moines School District: petitioners have the right to peacable
assembly and free speech—they do not shed these constitutional rights at the schoolhouse
gate. A student’s rights extend beyond class hours, and he/she may express even
controversial subjects on school grounds
-however, free speech is not absolute and students lose immunity when “conduct by the
student…disrupts class work or involves…invasion of the rights of others.”
-provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside the provisions of the Constitution.
Consistent w/ jurisprudence, S7 of RA 7079 should be read to mean that the school can’t
suspend/expel a student on the sole basis of articles he/she has written, except when such
articles materially disrupt class work or…invades the rights of others.
- From the foregoing, it is evident that Miriam College has jurisdiction over the complaints
against the students, as the power to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel
students. It is a necessary corollary to its enforcement of rules and regulations, w/c is
inherently granted by the Constitution. The court therefore rules that MC has the authority to
hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
CAMACHO V CORESIS
QUISUMBING; August 22, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the graft investigator in the Office of the
Ombudsman, Atty. Jovito Coresis Jr., in dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints
against private respondents.
- In June 1995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of the College of Education of the
University of Southeastern Philippines (USP) received complaints from several doctoral
students regarding a class held by respondent Dr. Daleon during the 1st sem. of SY 1994-
1995. The complaints were that there were “ghost students” in Dr. Daleon’s class, namely
respondents Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson, who were given grades of 1.0,
1.5, and 1.25 respectively, despite their failure to attend regular classes.
- June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon to furnish copies of exams, term
papers, records of attendance, which respondent ignored. The matter was raised in a
university council meeting and a committee was created to investigate the complaint. Dr.
Daleon admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding
their course without petitioner’s approval.
- Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University Pres) that Agulo, Alaba, and Tecson
be required to attend regular classes and comply with the course requirements. Dr. Prantilla
approved the recommendation; however, he also entertained an appeal by Agulo to validate
the grades given to them. The BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against Dr. Daleon, as well as criminal complaints against Dr.
Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson, and members of the USP BoR including Dr. Prantilla for
violating R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Said office ordered respondents to desist from further proceedings to consolidate the
administrative complaint with the criminal complaint.
- On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., the graft investigator
of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. It
dismissed both complaints upon finding insufficient evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for the
administrative charges as well as finding no prima facie violation for the criminal complaint.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration and was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the case was
brought before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
(in exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his
giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson, and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes).
HELD
- Absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, the Court’s power of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
may not be invoked.
Reasoning
1. From the records, there is no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold respondent Office of
grave abuse of discretion because the conclusions in its assailed Resolution are based
on substantial evidence easily verifiable. Well established is the principle that factual
findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by
this Court, provided such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art. 140 of the University Code which
provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes subject
to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. It is
undisputed that Dr. Daleon had already been designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Graduate School by the President of USP and was even entitled to emoluments inherent
to the Dean of the Grad. School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the
Dean of the Grad. School, Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance
without seeking permission of petitioner.
3. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style had support of the members of the Board of Regents (BoR),
the body with the authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on
attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing its resolution, they not only
validated the grades given by Daleon, they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety,
regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleon’s instructional approach.
4. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style, validated by the USP BoR, is bolstered by the constitutional
guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered - that of the academic
institution and the teacher’s. As was held in Miriam College v. CA, “Institutional freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and
the methods on how best to attain them, free from interference or outside coercion
except when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It includes the freedom to
determine for itself: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.
5. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation that, “ Academic freedom
also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty.”
Applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude
to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his
students, subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Consider that the BoR,
whose task is to lay down school rules and policies, has validated his teaching, there can
be no reason for petitioner to complain before the Court simply because he holds a
contrary opinion on the matter.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Resolution of Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao is affirmed.
Voting Concurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Corona
GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL
FERNANDO; November 28, 1975
FACTS
- This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology to allow petitioner to continue studying there.
- Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of 1975 to pursue
graduate studies leading to an MA in Theology, but was denied re-admission in the following
semester. She contended that the reason given by respondent for such denial, namely: that
"her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing
down the progress of the class," is not valid ground for expulsion
- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was admitted, not to a degree
program but merely to take some courses for credit, since admission to a degree requires
acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of Ateneo de Manila University (as
opposed to, the Loyola School of Theology), and no such acceptance was given.
- Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher learning" has the "academic freedom"
to discretion whether to admit or continue admitting any particular student considering not only
academic or intellectual standards but also other factors.
- Finally that there is no "clear duty" to admit petitioner since the School of Theology is a
seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the
priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON a mandamus proceeding is proper in the case at bar
Substantive
2. WON respondent is deemed possessed of a right to continued admission to the Loyola
School of Theology.
3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds (therefore, not aribtrary).
HELD
1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is a clear legal right on her part and a
clear duty on respondent's part to so admit her.
- What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the
prime an indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.
2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom."
- Although "academic freedom" is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to
publish his findings and thoughts without fear of retribution, the reference given by the
constitution of "institutions of higher learning," show that the school or college itself is
possessed of such a right.
- J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for itself who may teach, what may
taught, how, and who may be admitted to study
- Universities, unlike public utitlities, have discretion as to whom to admit or reject.
3. Denied not only on general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular
educational institution involved. It is a seminary for the priesthood. Therefore, at most, she
can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school.
- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best considering the interest of the school as well as
of the other students and her own welfare. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of
the circumstances deemed relevant.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [concur]
- Same points as Ponencia, plus:
- A petition will be dismissed where petitioner has admittedly failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies.
- Questions of admission to the school are matters of technical and academic judgment that
the courts will not ordinarily interfere with. Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies
and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of
the school faculty.
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- 1935 Constitution: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." VS.
1973 Constitution which broadened the scope into "All institutions of higher learning." Thus
guaranteed, it is not limited to the members of the faculty nor to administrative authorities of
the educational institution. It must also be deemed granted in favor of the student body
because all three constitute the educational institution, without any one of which the
educational institution can neither exist nor operate.
- An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and develop his faculties. The
Constitution provides for this in various provisions. The happiness and full development of the
curious intellect of the student are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom
and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and press,
and academic freedom.
- No private person has the inherent right to establish and operate a school. Education is a
sovereign state function; therefore, not different in this respect from commercial public utilities,
whose right to exist and to operate depends upon state authority. Constitutional rights must be
respected by the State and by enterprises authorized by the state to operate.
REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UP
MEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining
order to review the decision of the CA
- Respondent-students (students hereinafter) as then applicants to the University of the
Philippines College, of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percent in the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was the cut-off score prescribed for academic
year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the
University Council (UC) on April 8,1986.
- However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the
UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88.
- Upon appeal of some concerned PreMed students, the Board of Regents (BOR) in its 996th
resolution dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the NWAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The
BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March 24, 1987.
- subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor,
conducted an investigation on the student's case and recommended inter alia the admission
of all applicants obtaining a percentile I rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right".
- The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the
students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. On June
11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission.
- Students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached thereto their letter 69 to the
UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their case with prejudice.
In view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990
where it denied the appeal of the students on the ground that they were not qualified for
admission to the UPCM. As a result, the students filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its
order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the
students to the college. Whereupon, the petitioners moved to lift the ex-parte mandatory order.
- Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its plenary power
under the Charter of the University over matters affecting university affairs, resolved to
approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the
petitioners to admit them.
- Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them
and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. So, herein petitioners appealed to
the CA but their appeal was dismissed. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE
WON the BOR violated the petitioners’ academic freedom, and thus could validly direct the
petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine.
69
Students manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the question
of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action;
that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they
would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college

HELD
There is no violation of academic freedom when an order of BOR in upholding the admission
requirement approved by the University Council (in 1986) is supportive of right of the
University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM Faculty and
Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without
following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.
Reasoning The method deployed was simply referring to the UP Charter or to the University
Code, and then applying the relevant provisions or rules to the case at bar. The ponencia cited
the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee 70, Loyola School of Theology, citing
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire71, though as obiter dicta
only, to strengthen the arguments in support of the ratio decidendi.
First. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to any college of
the university is vested in the University Council (See. 9). The power to prescribe the courses
of study is vested in the University Council subject to the approval of the Board of Regents
(Sec. 9). The power to appoint the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service and
other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the
income among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board of Regents
Second. Academic freedom72 may be asserted by the University Council or by the Board of
Regents or both in so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them by law which are
essential to institutional academic freedom
The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been violated by the Board of Regents
when it issued the questioned order is related to the right of the University to fix admission
requirements. This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in
the University Council. The College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of Regents
under Article 324 of the University Code to initially determine the admission requirements,
subject to the approval of the University Council and the President of the University.
Third. When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in the NMAT at 70th percentile (p,
161, Rollo) which was the cut off score approved by the University Council on 8 April 1986, it
did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power
of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to the UPCM and
rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, which attempted to exercise that power
to increase the cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the approval of the University
70
The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that His conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be,
whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments
71
In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study
72
Art. XIV Sec.5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution sates that Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Council and the President of the University in violation of Section 324 of the University Code
(supra) which is very explicit on this matter.]
Fourth. The BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the
units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.
Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements
[Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be the UC could ratify the acts of the College
regarding admission requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable time. It is to
be recalled that the controversy regarding the students' admission started in 1987. It is
surprising that despite petitioners' insistence on the UC's jurisdiction over admission
requirements, they did not seek recourse to it immediately. From the records, there appears to
be no physical or legal hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the students' case. To
validate these resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and equitable to the students.
In the span of three years, they have proved their mettle by passing the academic
requirements of the college
Therefore No. There was no violation of the petitioners’ academic freedom by the BOR
since the BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the
units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.
Decision Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Voting 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part.
MORALES V UP
CHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004
FACTS
- According to Art. 410 of the UP Code, students who complete their courses with the following
minimum weighted average grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa cum laude – 1.20
Magna cum laude – 1.45
Cum laude – 1.75
- Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the curriculum, as well as subjects
that qualify as electives, shall be included in the computation of the weighted average grade;
provided further that in cases where the electives taken are more than those required in the
program, the following procedure will be used in selecting the electives to be included in the
computation of the weighted average grade:
1) For students who did not shift programs, consider the required number of electives
in chronological order.
2) For students who shifted from one program to another, the electives to be
considered shall be selected according to the following order of priority:
a. Electives taken in the program where the student is graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
 b. Electives taken in the previous program and acceptable as electives in the
second program will be selected in chronological order.
c. Prescribed courses taken in the previous program, but qualify as electives in the
second program will be selected in chronological order.
- Nadine Morales transferred from UP Manila (majored in Speech Pathology) to UP Diliman
and enrolled in the European Languages undergraduate program in SY 1997-98. She was
enrolled under the Plan A curriculum and chose French as her major and German as her
minor.
- Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 units with 27 being electives.
- 1st semester of AY 1997-98 – Morales enrolled in German 10 and German 11 where she
obtained a grade of 1.0 in both subjects.
- 2nd semester of AY 1997-98 – Morales changed minor to Spanish but maintained French as
her major.
- End of 1st semester of SY 1990-2000 – Morales included in list of candidates for graduation
with probable honors based on the computation made by the College of Arts and Letters of
Morales’ GWA inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in German 10 and 11. Her GWA then was 1.725.
- 2nd semester of SY 1999-2000 – Morales’ GWA was 1.729 after obtaining an average of
1.708 in her final semester in UP, making her eligible for cum laude honors.
- During the assessment for graduation, she was not granted cum laude honors because her
grades in German 10 and 11 were excluded in the computation, bringing her GWA to 1.760.
- According to Prof. Bautista of the Dept. of European Languages, a Plan A student is required
to major in a European language other than Spanish and minor in any other discipline allowed
in the curriculum.
o In Morales’ case, her major is French and her minor is Spanish so German does not fit
into her curriculum.
o Plan A curriculum also does not allow for free electives.
 Electives must be major language electives taken from French courses in either
literature or translation.
 German 10 and 11 are basic language courses and do not fall under electives as
contemplated in the Plan A curriculum.
- Morales requested that her German 10 and 11 grades be included in the computation of her
GWA.
o Her letter was taken up on a no-name basis during the University Council meeting
upon the endorsement of the Registrar. By a vote of 207-4, the Council affirmed the
decision of the CAL in not awarding honors to Morales.
o Issue was then elevated by Morales to the UP Board of Regents and it was resolved
that the appeal be returned to the University Council for further consideration with full
disclosure of petitioner’s identity.
o By a vote of 99 in favor-12 against-6 abstaining, the Council denied the award of cum
laude honors to Morales.
o A subsequent appeal was made to the Board of Regents. This appeal was denied 9-2.
- Morales filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC and assailed the
decision of the UP Board of Regents as erroneous. The RTC ruled in her favor by saying that
the UP Board of Regents greatly abused its discretion in the improper application of its
academic discretion in interpreting Art. 410 of the UP Code. The RTC ordered that UP
recomputed Morales’ grades by including German 10 and 11 and confer upon her cum laude
honors.
- In the Court of Appeals:
o In resolving the issue, the CA initially determined whether only questions of law were
involved and eventually decided that an analysis of the facts of the cases was
indispensable.
o The CA ruled that the lower court violated UP’s constitutionally protected right to
academic freedom when it substituted its own interpretation of the internal rules and
regulations of the University for that of the UP Board of Regents and applied the same
to the case at bar.
ISSUES
1. WON the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the RTC Order because the essential
facts were never in dispute, the case involving only questions of law
2. WON the RTC’s interpretation of Art. 410 of the UP Code violated the academic freedom
granted to UP as an institution of higher learning
HELD
1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law.
- A question of law arises when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. There is a question
of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct is a question of law.
- Both parties admitted to the facts. Any conclusion based on these facts would not involve a
calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence, but would be limited to an inquiry
of whether the law was properly applied given the state of facts of the case. Since the appeal
raises only questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CA did not
have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal.
2. Yes, the RTC violated the academic freedom granted to UP.
Ratio decidendi: Unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary and capricious exercise
of judgment, courts may not interfere with the University’s exclusive right to decide
for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them (in this case, to whom
among its graduates it shall confer academic recognition based on its established
standards).
- In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was said that the discretion of schools of GOVERNMENT
learning to formulate the rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of the academic freedom. Such discretion may not be disturbed much Elements of the State
less controlled by the courts unless there is a grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
- Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The power should be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic DE JURE AND DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.
- UP proceeded fairly in evaluating the situation of Morales and gave her and her parents Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
ample opportunity to present their side on different occasions. There is no showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness.
o Deliberations were done in the University Council. Co Kim Cham has a civil case in CFI Manila instituted under the Republic of the Philippines
 A member asked whether German 10 and 11 could be counted as electives for during the period of Japanese occupation. Judge Dizon alleges that the case shouldn’t be
Morales and the Registrar responded the student was enrolled in Foreign
Languages with a major in French and a minor in Spanish and German 10 and 11 continued because:
are not required in the checklist. These can neither be considered as electives
because electives should be non-language electives. German 10 and 11 are
excess subjects.
 Even if Morales completed all the required subjects under the curriculum so that 3. The PEC and RP under Japanese military
German 10 and 11 should be included, the Dean of the CAL said that the same rule occupation were not de facto governments.
had applied in the past to previous students. Applying the rules to Morales would be
unfair to the other students. 4. McArthur’s proclamation invalidated all
o Since the rule provides for an order of priority in the electives, there is an implication judicial proceedings and judgments of Philippine Courts under the PEC and the RP.
that not all electives may be included in the GWA.
3. Lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings with the
o The Advising Committee allows students to change their majors and minors but these
shifts are not counted as part of the course with credit in the curriculum. absence of an enabling law to grant such authority.
- The word “program” in Art. 410 must be interpreted in the context of a particular curriculum.
In computing the GWA, the grades of subjects prescribed in the curriculum and the grades of
subjects that qualify as electives in the curriculum are included. A writ of mandamus was issued to the judge ordering him to take cognizance and render final
- The interpretation of the required subjects or allowable electives in the curriculum should be judgment of the case. The first issue involved was whether or not the PEC and the RP were
taken in the context of the entire courses. Morales’ decision to shift caused the exclusion of de facto governments. And the SC held that they were by expounding on the different kinds of
her grades in German 10 and 11. Besides, German 10 and 11 were excess subjects, her total de facto governments (which are listed below) and pointing out that all acts and proceedings
units taken up in the University being 147, instead of the required 141. of the PEC/RP (which was classified as a de facto government of the second form) are good
- Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of and valid.
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded respect, if not finality, by the Courts.
Art. 14, Sec. 4 of the Constitution proves that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all 4. Government that USURPS by FORCE or BY
institution THE VOICE OF THE MAJORITY the rightful legal government.

5. Government of PARAMOUNT FORCE.

6. Government established by the native
inhabitants who rise in INSURRECTION against the parent state.
The second issue revolved around McArthur’s proclamation. It did not have the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of Philippine Courts under
the PEC and the RP by virtue of the principle of POSTLIMINY in international law.
Postliminium is a principle in international law which considers valid, except in a
very few cases, the acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is
within his competence to do so, notwithstanding the fact that the territory which
has been occupied by him comes again in the power of its legitimate government
or sovereignty.
The last issue was the question of whether or not an enabling law was required. It isn’t.
Conquest or colonization is impotent to amend laws. Laws remain unchanged until the new
sovereign by a legislative act creates such change.
In Re: Saturnino Bermudez
(1986)
A lawyer questions Article 18 of proposed 1986 Constitution regarding who the provision
refers to when it says President and Vice President. The court dismisses it outright for lack of
jurisdiction and a cause of action.
Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President
Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action.
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover,
the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In re: Letter of Associate Justice Reynate Puno
This is an administrative matter in the SC. Puno was elevated in the seniority rankings of the
CA from no. 12 to no. 5. This, however, caused Javellana and Campos to file a motion for
reconsideration. Puno countered by saying that Aquino had pledged that “no right provided
under the 1973 Constitution shall be absent from the Freedom Constitution” and thus by virtue
of Section 2 E.O. 33, Puno can claim seniority. This was debunked by the SC on the ground
that a revolution changes everything because it went in defiance of the then existing 1973
Constitution. The core issue at hand was precisely WON the existing legal order was
overthrown by the revolutionary government. It was. The little resistance met by the new
government, control of the state, appointment of key officers in the administration, departure
of officials of the previous regime, and the revamp of the military and judiciary signaled the
point where the legal system had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino people.
Estrada v. Desierto
(2001)
Erap alleges that he is still the President, albeit on-leave, where as Arroyo merely claims to be
President. He sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any criminal
complaints against his office until after the term of his presidency was over and only if legally
warranted. The first issue raised by the respondents is that the case is a political question and
therefore outside the jurisdiction of the SC. To determine whether or not the question is
political, the court looks to the most authoritative guideline in determining such issues: Justice
Brennan’s words in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr. The Philippines’ leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that
political questions refer:
“to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The court held that the Arroyo government was not a revolutionary government as compared
to its Aquino counterpart. EDSA I involved extra-constitutional exercise of people power
revolution (and is thus a political question and not subject to judicial review) whereas EDSA II
provoked the resignation of the sitting president which resulted in the succession of the vice
president (which is intra-constitutional and thus justiciable). EDSA I overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II sought to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President.
CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS
ACCFA v. CUGCO
ACCFA is being sued by CUGCO because of alleged violations of a collective bargaining
agreement, discrimination against members, and refusal to bargain. The CIR favored the
complainants but ACCFA petitioned to the SC questioning WON the CIR has jurisdiction over
the case depending on WON ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions. The
court ruled that the implementation of the land reform program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function. The CIR
has no jurisdiction but nevertheless the collective bargaining agreements must be enforced.
The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as
"constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as those relating to the
maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination
of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign
relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these letter functions being
ministrant he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group
of individuals,"5 continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is
to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere
else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.
PARENS PATRIAE
Gov. of Phil. Islands v. Monte de Piedad
(1916)
Contributions were collected during the Spanish Regime for the relief of the victims of an
earthquake. Part of the money was never distributed and was instead deposited with the
defendant bank. In an action for its recovery later filed by the government, the defendant
questioned the competence of the plaintiff (PI government), contending that the suit could be
instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by the heirs of the victims. The
issue of concern here is WON the PI has the right to file a case in behalf of its citizens. It does
in its capacity as the guardian or parens patriae of the people.
SOVEREIGNTY
Elements of the State
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh (1945)
There was no change of sovereignty during the period of Japanese occupation. Possession of
sovereignty remained with the Americans while the exercise of the acts of sovereignty
belonged to the belligerent invaders.
Macariola v. Asuncion
(1992)
In a civil case of the CFI Leyte, Judge Asuncion ruled a partition of lots of one deceased
Francisco Reyes among Macariola (sole child of Francisco’s first wife) and the children from
his second marriage. A year later, the judge bought one of the lots he settled from a certain
Galapon. Macariola charges Asuncion with a complaint of committing “acts unbecoming a
judge.” The main issues are twofold: the first is WON he violated Article 1491 (5) of the CC;
and second is WON he violated Article 14 (1) & (5) of the Code of Commerce.
The prohibition of the article in the first issue has already been decided in recent cases by
reasoning of: ". . . for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" 73 Thus, no violation of
said provision took place. As for the second regarding the violation of the Code of Commerce
provision:
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto). It may
be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from
the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of the Spanish Code
of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs that:
"'By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another,
either following a conquest or otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their
nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease
upon the transfer of sovereignty.'74
73
The Director of Lands vs. Ababa, et al., [1979]; Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals,
[1978]
74
Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899
 "While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of
the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror, the political laws do not. 75
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto, this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of
the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated."
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect
and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff
(1946)
Ruffy, a provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, instead of surrendering to the
Japanese forces, disbanded his company, retreated to the mountains and led a guerilla unit.
Lieut. Col. Jurado, recognized by the United States Armed Forces, was sent to replace Ruffy
but was slain by the latter and his companions. The same people who killed the replacing
officer claim that they were not subject to military law at the time when the offense was
committed. But the rule suspending political laws only affects the civilian inhabitants of the
occupied territory and is not intended to bind the enemies in arms. Thus, members of the
armed forces continued to be covered by the National Defense Act, the Articles of War, and
other laws relating to the armed forces even during the Japanese occupation. By the
acceptance of the petitioners’ appointments as officers in the Philippine Army they became
amenable to the Articles of War.
75
Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14
Peralta v. Director of Prisons
(1945)
Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was prosecuted for the crime of
robbery as defined by the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He
was found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7 promulgated by the President of the Republic.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court’s existence was void ab
initio because it was created as a political instrumentality under the command of the Japanese
Imperial Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the
penalties provided for are much more severe than the RPC. SolGen is of the opinion that the
petition should be granted because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said court is “tinged
with political complexion”, that the procedure does not afford a fair trial and violates
constitutional right of accused persons under a legitimate Constitution. The court is of the
opinion that:
As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7 , the only factor to be considered is the authority of
the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established
in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, — it is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose
authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or
through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor,
International Public Law, p. 598.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of
the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to
whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is mere governmental
agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its
jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political complexion or not
depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for
doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.
The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends
upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65
which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted.
It appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of
robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of
the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as
maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were
altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as
new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war,
and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the
protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the
success of its operations.
The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and
restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is, whether or not, by the
principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell
through or ceased to be valid from that time.
We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgment of political complexion of the courts
during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by
virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present
case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms. The CA modified the
sentence from arresto mayor to prision correccional. Petitioner questions the validity of the CA
on the sole ground that the court was a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation. In Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, the
court ruled that the RP and the PEC were governments de facto and that judicial acts were
good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government. The CA that existing during Japanese occupation was the CA after the
restoration. And even if the CA was a new court, its judgments would still remain good and
valid provided that they do not have a political complexion.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes
either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the
latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial
law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant,
incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and
the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather
than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy
and are directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.
As examples, the crimes against national security, such as treason, espionage, etc.,
and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the
Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which
were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.
STATE IMMUNITY
CHARACTERIZATION OF SUIT
Begosa v. Chairman, Phil. Vet. Assoc. legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative
(1970) body.

A veteran, Begosa, suffering from permanent disability was being denied what has been
granted him specifically by legislative enactment (which certainly is superior to any regulation
that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration). Although the respondent
relented, the amount released was far less than what the veteran was legally entitled to. He
appealed. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be invoked by the PVA.

Where litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official being tried cannot be held liable
RATIONALE FOR IMMUNITY
by virtue of state immunity. However, where the suit against such a government official had to
be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating
funds for the benefit of the plaintiff, then the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied.
Sanders v. Veridiano

(1988)
Republic v. Feliciano

(1987)
Feliciano allegedly owns a parcel of land through his possession of informacion possesoria.
But this same land, by virtue of Proclamation No. 90 of President Ramon Magsaysay, became
reserved for settlement purposes. Feliciano seeks to prove that his ownership of the land as
evidenced by his informacion is valid and makes a claim to recover said property. However,
the court ruled that the state did not give its consent to be sued and thus immune from the
complaint. Although the proclamation stated that it shall be “subject to private rights if any
there be”, this cannot be construed as an express waiver of immunity.
Rossi and Wyer, gameroom attendards, are suing Sanders and Moreau (superiors of the
attendants) for libelous imputations committed by the latter which eventually cost them their
jobs. However, the court ruled that the alluded acts were official and not personal and that the
acts petitioners are called to account were performed in the discharge of their official duties.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the
petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but
must be construed in strictissimi juris76. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
76
STRICTISSIMI JURIS. The most strict right or law. In general, when a person receives an
advantage, as the grant of a license, he is bound to conform receives an advantage, as the grant
of a license, he is bound to conform strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in
The doctrine of state immunity is applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign
states who are subject to the jurisdiction of our courts.
case of a strictly to the exercise of the rights given him by it, and in case of a dispute, it will be
strictly construed.
 The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no Three main cases dealing with the doctrine of state immunity are consolidated in this case
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." In with the fourth being remanded due to a lack of information.
the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium77
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence
(1) Respondents file for a case of cancellation of a barbershop concessionaire. The State
to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution,
herein can be sued because barbershop concessionaires are commercial in nature and the
where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the
state entering into such a proprietary contract implicitly gave its consent to be sued.
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."

(2) A cook was found guilty of pouring urine in soup and was subsequently relieved from duty.
The acts of petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not
He files a complaint against the club manager who invokes state immunity. The State can be
been overturned by the private respondents. Mistakes concededly committed by
sued since restaurant operation is a commercial affair, however, it does not necessarily mean
such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were
that the state is liable.
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Exceptions to the
doctrine of state immunity as enumerated in the case are:

(3) Luis Bautista was caught in a buy-bust operation; he was then subsequently relieved from
duty. He now sues with the complaint of illegal dismissal. The respondent State cannot be
Officer is sued to compel him to do an act required by law [such as restraining a
sued because it performed acts within its official capacity.
Cabinet member from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional].

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to
When the government violated its own laws.
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
that no such waiver may be implied.
When an officer acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private
property without paying just compensation thereof, though the property was
converted for the public good.
Even without such affirmation [in Art. 16, Sec. 3 of 1987 Constitution], we would still
be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine
of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such
United States v. Guinto principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to
(1990) such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in
its relations with other states.
77
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
XXX
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty"
because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic
societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its
citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not
be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is
implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person
to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party
and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is
also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim.
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the
will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. 18 We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only
where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
The Holy See v. Rosario
(1994)
The Holy See, represented by the Papal Nuncio, sold certain parcels of land to two buyers.
However, because the petitioners were unable to evict the squatters, a dispute arose as to
who held the responsibility of clearing the said parcels of land of squatters. Respondents filed
a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the land but the DFA filed a motion to intervene
claiming that it had a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner.
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner,
being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent
insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has
divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial
transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.
Private respondent’s opinion is untenable. Aside from the privilege of sovereign immunity
established by the DFA, the Holy See is nonetheless immune from suit because the
transaction entered into was not for profit or for gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same
because the squatters living there made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the
purpose of the donation (construction of Papal Nuncio’s residence). The fact that squatters
have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
 without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz)
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come
out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is
in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course
of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for
the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
Sayson v. Singson
(1973)
Singson filed a money claim against the Highways Auditor General petitioning the latter to be
compelled to pay the balance due to Singson. Sayson failed to pay the corresponding balance
to Singson after discovering that the equipment being sold by Singson was overpriced.
To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the Republic.
The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-suability. So it
was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It is
apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the
government, for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts
supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the
validity of such claim, although as will be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the
cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not
the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State..., but an
ordinary action for specific performance... Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit
against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with
the consent of the State
Republic v. Purisima
(1977)
Yellow Bell Freight Lines brought a suit against the Rice and Corn Administration for an
alleged breach of contract. Rice and Corn moved to dismiss the suit by using the doctrine of
state immunity. Respondent judge dismissed the motion to dismiss. The SC held that the
courts do not have jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the claims against any office or entity
acting as part of the machinery of the national government.
Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must
be effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under the implied
forms of consent as earlier discussed.
Amigable v. Cuenca
(1972)
The government used a portion of the land owned by Amigable for the construction of the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues without prior negotiation/expropriation. Amigable sues Cuenca
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways seeking payment for the appropriated
land. The court ruled in favor of the state by virtue of applying state immunity. However, the
SC set aside the lower courts decision on the basis that “immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for penetrating an injustice on a citizen.”
Ministerio v. City of Cebu
(1971)
Petitioners seek just compensation for a registered lot alleging that the government took
physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of Gorodo Ave. in Cebu
City. CFI dismissed the case on the ground of immunity of the state to be sued without its
consent.
The SC held that: where the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The SC there said:
". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken
for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should
not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by
what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important,
if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the
rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of
immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked."
Santiago v. Republic
(1978)
Santiago filed an action in the CFI naming as defendant the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). His plea was
for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse in 1971, with the BPI
as the donee. Petitioner alleges that the donee failed to comply the terms of the donation.
Petitioner then is led to conclude that he was exempt from compliance with such an explicit
constitutional command, which prohibits a suit against the Republic without its consent. The
issue is WON the RP gave its consent when it accepted the terms of donation given by
Santiago, thereby allowing itself to be sued based on the high dictates of equity and justice.
In the case at bar, the Republic, as donee, gave its implied consent to perform the
conditions of the donation. In such a case as this, the court held that the donor, with
the Republic as donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the
conditions of such donation. He (the donor) has the right to be heard. Under the
circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suitability cannot stand in the way.
The government being the beneficiary manifests its adherence to the highest ethical
standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the
people.
Lim v. Brownell
(1960)
Lim is claiming ownership over certain lots of land that were reclaimed by the US government
and subsequently, turned over to the RP. Lim claims these lands originally belong to his
deceased mother but were illegally possessed by Japanese troops. The US was able to take
possession of said lands after the war by virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
The immunity of the state from suit, however, cannot be invoked where the action, as
in the present case, is instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an
enemy for the purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and
of recovering his ownership and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has
expressly been given by the United States.
United States v. Ruiz
(1985)
Respondent was able to win a bid for a project for the repair of the wharves/shoreline of the
Subic Bay Area. Petitioner asked for a quotation but later on denied the respondent the project
stating that the respondent was not qualified. The latter files suit for awarding the project to
him and for damages as well.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
Republic v. Villasor
(1973)
Respondent Judge Villasor is alleged to have acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and thus, the Alias
Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void. What
was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a
recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at
the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective
obstacle, could very well be imagined."
Justice Malcolm: "A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money
in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not
 liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One
reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own
courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still
another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of
public policy forbids it."
SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Phil. National Railways v. IAC
(1993)
Baliwag Bus and an express train collided resulting to death and damages. Baliwag sues
PNR; but PNR raises the defense that it was the bus driver who was negligent and the
doctrine of state immunity exempts them from suit. IAC ruled in favor of Baliwag, hence this
appeal.
Although PNR is a government formed department, PNR engages in a purely commercial
action. PNR was created not to discharge a governmental function but to operate a transport
service which is essentially a business concern. When the government enters in a commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private
corporation.
National Irrigation Administration v. Fontanilla
(1991)
The NIA group was on its way to a campsite. In a hurry to reach their destination, they ran
over someone and did not even stop to check what happened. It turned out to be the son of
herein respondents who subsequently filed suit. NIA avers that they were an agency of the
government and therefore not liable for the acts of the driver who was a special agent. The SC
ruled, however, that the NIA is a government agency with juridical personality that is separate
and distinct from the government. Therefore it is not immune from suit. Besides, the NIA’s
charter specifically allows the NIA to sue and be sued.
SUITABILITY V. LIABILITY
Merritt v. Gov. of the Phil Islands
(1916)
Plaintiff Merritt on a motorcycle collided with an ambulance which did not warn of its
impending approach. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an
agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is
legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The government, by no less than an Act,
authorized Merritt to bring suit in the CFI Manila in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital.
Did the government simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the
plaintiff?
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “The state is liable in this sense
when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable." It is, therefore,
evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts
of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS 78
Gonzales v. COMELEC
November 9, 1967, Concepcion, C.J.
Facts:
The House of Representatives passed a
bill which allowed for proposals in
Resolution 1 (increasing max number of
representatives from 120-180) and
Resolution 3 ( authorizing Senators and
Representatives to be delegates in a
constitutional convention) to be passed.
This was subsequently approved by the
President as R.A. 4913 which provided
for amendments to be made subject to
the people’s approval at the general
elections of Nov. 1967.
Gonzales, a taxpayer, filed a class suit
and prayed that: (1) COMELEC restrain
from performing acts that would result in
the holding of the plebiscite for
ratification; and (2) declare the Act
unconstitutional.
78
No digests for the first two sections of
this chapter: Separation of Powers and the
Non-Delegation Doctrine
PHILCONSA (Philippine Constitution
Association), on the other hand, prayed
that the decision in this case be deferred
until an identical case pending (which was
expected soon) was decided on.
COMELEC dismissed the petition which
instigated the association’s filing of a
review by certiorari. SolGen maintains
that the SC has no jurisdiction upon the
ground that the same is "merely political"
as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.
It was urged by the petitioners that said
resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which
approved the proposed amendments, as
well as the resolution calling a convention
to propose amendments, are, at best, de
facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two
alternatives propose — amendments or
call a convention therefore but may not
avail of both — that is to say, propose
amendment and call a convention — at
the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for
amendment to the Constitution shall be
submitted for ratification, must be a
special election, not a general election, in
which officers of the national and local
governments — such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14,
1967 — will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands
that the election, in which proposals for
amendment shall be submitted to the
people for ratification, must be held under
such conditions — which, allegedly, do
not exist — as to give the people a
reasonable opportunity to have a fair
grasp of the nature and implications of
said amendments.
Senator Arturo Tolentino objected to the
PHILCONSA petition on the following
grounds: a) that the Court has no
jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought
in the petition, or to pass upon the legality
of the composition of the House of
Representatives; b) that the petition, if
granted, would, in effect, render in
operational the legislative department;
and c) that "the failure of Congress to
enact a valid reapportionment law . . .
does not have the legal effect of
rendering illegal the House of
Representatives elected thereafter, nor of
rendering its acts null and void."
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the SC has jurisdiction.
Yes. "The judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent
units thereof." – Dr. Jose P. Laurel,
Angara v. Electoral Commission.
The force of the precedent in Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito declaring the issue to be
“merely political” has been weakened by
Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs.
Cuenco, and Macias vs. Commission on
Elections. In the first, we held that the
officers and employees of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal are under its
supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the
latter; in the second, this Court proceeded
to determine the number of Senators
necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in
the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having
the largest number of votes in said
chamber, purporting to act on behalf of
the party having the second largest
number of votes therein, of two (2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as
members, for the second party, of the,
Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the
fourth, we declared unconstitutional an
act of Congress purporting to apportion
the representative districts for the House
of Representatives, upon the ground that
the apportionment had not been made as
may be possible according to the number
of inhabitants of each province. Thus we
rejected the theory, advanced in these
four (4) cases, that the issues therein
raised were political questions the
determination of which is beyond judicial
review.
In short, the issue whether or not a
Resolution of Congress — acting as a
constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent that this view
may be inconsistent with the stand taken
in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter
should be deemed modified accordingly.
The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.
(2) WON R.A. 4913 is unconstitutional.
No, it is constitutional. Even though it is
urged that the Congress became
unconstitutional because the
Apportionment Act was deemed illegal
(act was not made according to the
number of inhabitants of the different
provinces of the Philippines), this
argument isn’t tenable. Failure to make
the apportionment does not dissolve
Congress or makes it illegal.
On the argument that the acting congress
was unconstitutional because it failed to
apportion itself within three years, this is
untenable. The fact that Congress is
under legal obligation to make said
apportionment does not justify, however,
the conclusion that failure to comply with
such obligation rendered Congress illegal
or unconstitutional, or that its Members
have become de facto officers.
On the argument of the petitioners that
Congress may only amend or call a
convention but not do both, the SC ruled
that this was a question of wisdom and
not authority and hence was a political
question.
On the choice between a special election
and a general election, a majority of the
SC, but not enough to constitute a
qualified majority needed to declare a law
unconstitutional, was of the view that the
spirit of the Constitution demanded that
“election” be read as “special election” in
order that the transcendental importance
of a constitional amendment could
command the undivided attention of the
electorate. The minority but prevailing
view, however, said:
“This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped
for. It is a goal the attainment of which
should be promoted. The ideal conditions
are, however, one thing. The question
whether the Constitution forbids the
submission of proposals for amendment
to the people except under such
conditions, is another thing. Much as the
writer and those who concur in this
opinion admire the contrary view, they
find themselves unable to subscribe
thereto without, in effect, reading into the
Constitution what they believe is not
written thereon and can not fairly be
deduced from the letter thereof, since the
spirit of the law should not be a matter of
sheer speculation. “
On the issue of insufficiency of the
publicity and time for discussion afforded
by the mechanism of ratification provided
by the legislature, again the minority but
prevailing opinion said:
“We do not believe it has been
satisfactorily shown that Congress has
exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it
could have done something better to
enlighten the people on the subject-
matter thereof. But, then, no law is
perfect. No product of human endeavor is
beyond improvement. Otherwise, no
legislation would be constitutional and
valid.”79
Tolentino v. COMELEC
79
Despite this decision of the SC which
cleared the way for the plebiscite, the
plebiscite nevertheless, overwhelmingly,
rejected Resolutions 1 and 3. – Mars.
October 16, 1971, Barredo, J.
Facts:
After the Constitional Convention of 1971
came into being and after its election of
delegates, the convention, on Sept. 28,
1971, approved its first formal proposal to
amend the Constitution by Organic
Resolution No. 1 (Lowering the Voting
Age to 18 in Article V). Arturo M. Tolentino
filed a petition for prohibition to restrain
COMELEC from holding a plebiscite on
November 8 at which the proposed
amendment could be ratified by the
people.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON only Congress can call a
plebiscite for ratification of amendments.
The SC chose not to answer the question
on whether or not the power to call a
plebiscite was exclusively legislative. “In
the view the Court takes of the present
case, it does not perceive absolute
necessity to resolve that question, grave
and important as it may be Truth to tell,
the lack of unanimity or even of a
consensus among the members of the
Court in respect to this issue creates the
need for more study and deliberation, and
as time is of the essence in this case, for
obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the
date set by the Convention for the contained in Organic Resolution No. 1
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will and is thus unconstitutional.
refrain from making any pronouncement
or expressing Our views on this question
until a more appropriate case comes to
Yes. “The Court holds that there is [a
Us. After all, the basis of this decision is
violation], and it is the condition and
as important and decisive as any can be.”
limitation that all the amendments to be
proposed by the same Convention must
be submitted to the people in a single
ARTICLE XV "election" or plebiscite. It being
AMENDMENTS indisputable that the amendment now
proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite
is only the first amendment the
Convention will propose We hold that the
SECTION 1. The
plebiscite being called for the purpose of
Congress in joint session
submitting the same for ratification of the
assembled, by a vote of
people on November 8, 1971 is not
three-fourths of all the
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of
Members of the Senate
the Constitution, hence all acts of the
and of the House of
Convention and the respondent
Representatives voting
COMELEC in that direction are null and
separately may propose
void.”
amendments to this
Constitution or call a
convention for the
purpose. Such Barredo reasoned out his grammatical
amendments shall be valid argument by saying that partial
as part of this Constitution amendments do not reflect a study of the
when approved by a whole Constitution in its entirety which is
majority of the votes cast necessary in order to amend a fragment
at an election at which the or portion of its parts. Thus, a single
amendments are election of these amendments ensures
submitted to the people for that all the proposed and accepted
their ratification. amendments are compatible with the
entire Constitution and not just within the
provision’s scope.
(2) WON Sec. 1 Article XV is violated by
the act of the Convention in calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment
“We are not denying any right of the
people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that
under Section 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the same should be
submitted to them not separately from but
together with all the other amendments to
be proposed by this present Convention.”
Occena v. COMELEC
April 2, 1981, Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Occena and Gonzales filed an action of
prohibition against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments,
thereby implying the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental
law, regardless of the recent Javellana
ruling.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the 1973 Constitution is the
fundamental law of the land.
Yes. It is too late to deny the applicability
of the 1973 Constitution. This was already
decided on by a 6-4 vote in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary. “There is no further
obstacle to the new constitution being
considered in force and effect.”
(2) WON the Batasang Pambansa has
the power to propose amendments:
Yes it does. The existence of the power of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa is
indubitable. The applicable provision in
the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit.
Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The
Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have
the same powers and its Members shall
have the same functions, responsibilities,
rights, privileges, and disqualifications as
the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the
Members thereof." One of such powers
is precisely that of proposing
amendments.
Petitioners would argue that the
amendments proposed are so extensive
as to constitute a revision. “At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people.”
Regarding the issue of votes necessary to
propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission,
petitioners have not made out a case that
calls for a judgment in their favor. The
language of the Constitution supplies the
answer to the above questions. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as
a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be
proposed.
Teehankee, J. (Dissenting):
1. Under the prevailing doctrine of
Tolentino vs. Comelec that the
proposed amendments to be valid
must come from the constitutional
agency vested with the constituent
power to do so, i.e. in the Interim
National Assembly provided in the
Transitory Article XVII which would
then have to be convened and not
from the executive power as vested
in the President (Prime Minister)
from whom such constituent power
has been withheld.
2. As restated by me in the 1977
case of Hidalgo, under the
controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the
October 1976 constitutional
amendments which created the
Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu
of the Interim National Assembly
were invalid since as ruled by the
Court therein, constitutional
provisions on amendments "dealing
with the procedure or manner of
amending the fundamental law are
binding upon the Convention and the
other departments of the government
(and) are no less binding upon the
people" and "the very Idea of
deparcing from the fundamental law
is anachronistic in the realm of
constitutionalism and repugnant to
the essence of the rule of law." The
proposed amendments at bar having
been adopted by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as the fruit of
the invalid October, 1976
amendments must necessarily suffer
from the same congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing
and assuming the validity of the
proposed amendments, I reiterate
my stand in Sanidad that the
doctrine of fair and proper
submission firs enunciated by a
simple majority of six Justices (of an
eleven member Court prior to the
1973 Constitution which increased
the official composition of the Court
to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec
and subsequently officially adopted
by the required constitutional two-
thirds majority vote of the Court (of
eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully
applicable in the case at bar. The
three resolutions proposing complex,
complicated and radical
amendments of our very structure of
government were considered and
approved by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 27, 1981. It
set the date of the plebiscite for
thirty-nine days later on April 7, 1981
which is totally inadequate and far
short of the ninety-day period fixed
by the Constitution for submittal to
the people to "sufficiently inform
them of the amendments to be voted
upon, to conscientiously deliberate
thereon and to express their will in a
genuine manner."
4. "The minimum requirements that
must be met in order that there can
be a proper submission to the people
of a proposed constitutional
amendment" as stated by retired
Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in his
separate opinion in Gonzales bears
repeating as follows: "... we take the
view that the words 'submitted to the
people for their ratification,' if
construed in the light of the nature of
the Constitution – a fundamental
charter that is legislation direct from
the people, an expression of their amendments no matter how
sovereign will – is that it can only be prejudicial it is to them, then so be it.
amended by the people expressing For the people decree their own
themselves according to the fate."
procedure ordained by the
Constitution. Therefore,
amendments must be fairly laid
Justice Sanchez therein ended the
before the people for their blessing
passage with an apt citation that "...
or spurning. The people are not to be
The great men who builded the
mere rubber stamps. They are not to
structure of our state in this respect
vote blindly. They must be afforded
had the mental vision of a good
ample opportunity to mull over the
Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley,
original provisions, compare them
who has said 'A good Constitution
with the proposed amendments, and
should be beyond the reach of
try to reach a conclusion as the
temporary excitement and popular
dictates of their conscience suggest,
caprice or passion. It is needed for Almario v. Alba
free from the incubus of extraneous
stability and steadiness; it must yield
or possibly insidious influences. We
to the thought of the people; not to January 25, 1984, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
believe the word 'submitted' can only
the whim of the people, or the
mean that the government, within its
thought evolved in excitement, or hot
maximum capabilities, should strain
blood, but the sober second thought,
every short to inform every citizen of Facts:
which alone if the government is to
the provisions to be amended, and
be safe, can be allowed efficacy ... The Filipino electorate will go to the polls
the proposed amendments and the
Changes in government are to be to approve or reject amendments to the
meaning, nature and effects
feard unless benefit is certain.' As Constitution proposed by resolutions of
thereof. ... What the Constitution in
Montaign says: 'All great mutation the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioners seek
effect directs is that the government,
shake and disorder a state. Good to delay the date of ratification/rejection in
in submitting an amendment for
does not necessarily succeed evil; order to give ample time to study the
ratification, should put every
another evil may succeed and a ramifications of the two questions stated
instrumentality or agency within its
worse."' in Question No. 3 and No. 4 .
structural framework to enlighten the
people, educate them with respect to
their act of ratification or rejection.
For, as we have earlier stated, one Issues/ Held/Ratio:
thing is submission and another is
ratification. There must be fair (1) WON Questions No. 3 and No. 4 have
submission, intelligent consent or been properly submitted to the people.
rejection. If with all these safeguards
the people still approve the
Yes. The Constitution provides, under
Sec. 2, Art. 16, a period of three months
for an information campaign regarding the
intended amendments. The sufficiency of
the period during which amendments are
submitted to the people before they vote
to either affirm or reject depends on the
complexity and intricacy of the questions
presented. The petitioners have failed to
show that the addition of the one word
"grant" to Section 11, Article XIV or that
the addition of two paragraphs including
one on urban land reform to Section 12 of
Article XIV result in amendments of such
nature that when the people go to the
polls on January 27, 1984 they cannot
arrive at an intelligent judgment on their
acceptability or non-acceptability.
More important, however, is that the
necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the
proposed amendments are beyond the
power of the courts to adjudicate.
Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public
land and "urban land reform" are unwise
or improvident or whether or not the
proposed amendments are unnecessary
is a matter which only the people can
decide. The questions are presented for
their determination. Assuming that a
member or some members of this Court
may find undesirable any additional mode
of disposing of public land or an urban
land reform program, the remedy is to
vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the
proposed amendments by denying to the
millions of voters an opportunity to
express their own likes or dislikes. The
issue before us has nothing to do with the
wisdom of the proposed amendments,
their desirability, or the danger of the
power being abused. The issue is
whether or not the voters are aware of the
wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of
abuse. The petitioners have failed to
make out a case that the average voter
does not know the meaning of "grant" of
public land or of "urban land reform."
Teehankee, J. (Dissenting):
The doctrine of fair and proper
submission to the people of
proposed constitutional amendments
as enunciated by the Court in
Tolentino vs. Comelec (41 SCRA
702, 729) mandates that "in order
that a plebiscite for the ratification of
an amendment to the Constitution
may be validly held, it must provide
the voter not only sufficient time, but
ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its
relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form
a harmonious whole." There must be
fair submission and intelligent
consent or rejection.
As the late Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez stressed in his separate
opinion in the earlier case of
Gonzales vs. Comelec, concurred in
by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro and Justice Calixto Zaldivar,
(21 SCRA 774, 817), the people
must be "sufficiently informed of the
amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon,
to express their will in a genuine
manner."
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND
STATE POLICIES
Lim v. Executive Secretary 80
2002, De Leon, Jr. J
Two years after the VFA was approved in
1999, the terrorist attacks 9/11 prompted
America to declare an international
terrorist campaign. Pres. GMA pledged
the country’s support to the endeavor.
On January 2002, members of the USAF
(United States Armed Forces) arrived in
80
A lot of dissenting opinions. Too lazy.
Will get back to them when I have time.
Mindanao to, along with the AFP, take
part in the “Balikatan 02-1” exercises. The
next month, the Senate, after conducting
a hearing on the military exercise,
approved the Draft Terms of Reference
upon presentation by then VP Guingona.
Petitioners Lim and Ersando filed this
petition for certiorari and prohibition
attacking the constitutionality of the joint
exercise. They filed suit as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers. Two party-list
intervenors, SANLAKAS and PARTIDO
NG MANGAGAWA, aver that some of
their members are residents of
Zamboanga and Sulu and thus are
directly affected by operations conducted
in Mindanao.
They argue (a) that the Abu-Sayyaf
bandits do not constitute an external
armed force and thus, the Philippines is
not subject to armed external attack
contemplated in the MDT (mutual defense
treaty) of 1951 to warrant US military
assistance. They also claim that the VFA
signed in 1999 does not authorize US
soldiers to engage in combat operations
in Philippine territory, not even to fire back
if fired upon.
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have legal standing.
No. They cannot file suit as taxpayers
because the military exercise does not
involve Congress’ taxing or spending
powers. Being lawyers does not invest
them with personality to initiate the case
and they have failed to demonstrate the
requisite of suffering proximate injury.
Issues raised premature and based on a
fear of future violations of the Terms of
Reference.
(2) WON the “Balikatan” exercises violate
the Constitution.
No. Petitioners claim that it violates the
Renunciation Clause of the Constitution
(The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy) but neither
the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops
to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory. The VFA permits the
USAF to engage, on an impermanent
basis, in “activities”. The word was used
to give leeway in negotiation by both
parties. In this manner, the US may
sojourn in the Philippines for purposes
other than military. Combat-related
activities, as opposed to combat, are
authorized by the MDT and the VFA.
Although international laws are adhered
to, as expressed by the Indoctrination
Clause, it does not imply primacy of
international law over national law. The
Constitution espouses a view that has
marked antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country. The Court, if it
sees that the treaty runs counter to
Congress or goes against the
fundamental law, can nullify such an
agreement. But in the case at bar, the
question is WON American troops are
engaged in combat alongside Filipino
soldiers under the guise of alleged
training and exercise. The Court cannot
answer this question because it lacks
sufficient information. Newspapers or
electronic reports per se cannot be
considered apt support for petitioner’s
allegations. Facts must be established
according to the rules of evidence. WON
Pres. GMA is engaged in doublespeak
involves a question of fact… the question
is thus not fit for a special civil action for
certiorari.
Petition is thereby dismissed.
Lasco, et. al. v. UNRFNRE
Feb. 23, 1995, Quiason, J.
Facts:
Lasco, et. al were dismissed from the
United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration
(UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and
subsidiary organ of the United Nations.
The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint
project of the Philippine Government and
the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island. They filed suit with the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and
damages.
Respondent UNRFNRE filed a motion to
dismiss claiming the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction because the respondent
enjoyed diplomatic immunity (citing the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations).81
81
In support thereof, private respondent
attached a letter from the Department of
Labor Arbiter subsequently dismissed the
claim made by the petitioner. With their
motion for reconsideration denied, they
proceeded to appeal with NLRC which
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Without seeking a reconsideration of the
resolution, they filed an instant petition for
certiorari in the SC.
Petitioners argued that the acts of mining
exploration and exploitation are outside
the official functions of an international
agency protected by diplomatic immunity.
Even assuming that private respondent
was entitled to diplomatic immunity,
petitioners insisted that private
respondent waived it when it engaged in
exploration work and entered into a
contract of employment with petitioners.
Petitioners, likewise, invoked the
constitutional mandate that the State shall
afford full protection to labor and promote
full employment and equality of
Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991,
which acknowledged its immunity from
suit. The letter confirmed that private
respondent, being a special fund
administered by the United Nations, was
covered by the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations of which the Philippine
Government was an original signatory
(Rollo, p. 21).
employment opportunities for all (1987
Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
The Office of the Solicitor General is of
the view that private respondent is
covered by the mantle of diplomatic
immunity. Private respondent is a
specified agency of the United Nations.
Under Article 105 of the Charter of the
United Nations.82
82
"1. The Organization shall enjoy in the
territory of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the
fulfillment of its purposes.
"2. Representatives of the Members of
the United Nations and officials of the
Organization shall similarly enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the
Organization."
Corollary to the cited article is the
Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations, to which the
Philippines was a signatory (Vol. 1,
Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621.) We quote
Sections 4 and 5 of Article III thereof:
"Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their
property and assets, wherever located and
by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity
from every form of legal process except
insofar as in any particular case they have
expressly waived their immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of
Issues/Held/Ration:
WON the respondent is immune by virtue
of its diplomatic status.
As a matter of state policy as expressed
in the Constitution, the Philippine
Government adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law
(1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being
a member of the United Nations and a
party to the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations, the
Philippine Government adheres to the
doctrine of immunity granted to the United
Nations and its specialized agencies.
Both treaties have the force and effect of
law.
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction
over private respondent if it expressly
waived its immunity, which is not so in the
execution mphasis supplied).
"Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized
agencies shall be inviolable. The property
and assets of the specialized agencies,
wherever located and by whomsoever
held, shall be immune from search,
requisition, confiscation, expropriation and
any other form of interference, whether by
executive, administrative, judicial or
legislative action".
case at bench (Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).
Private respondent is not engaged in a
commercial venture in the Philippines. Its
presence here is by virtue of a joint
project entered into by the Philippine
Government and United Nations for
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its
mission is not to exploit our natural
resources and gain pecuniarily thereby
but to help improve the quality of life of
the people, including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioners have no
recourse. Section 31 of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations states that "each specialized
agency shall make a provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other
disputes of private character to which the
specialized agency is a party."
Mejoff v. Director Of Prisons
1951 (Jackie Espenilla)
Nature:
a 2nd petitition for habeas corpus by Boris
Mejoff (a Russian who was brought to the
country from Shanghai as a secret
operative by the Japanese)
Facts:
Mejoff was arrested as a Japanese spy
upon Phil liberation by the US Counter
Intelligence Corps; he was handed to the
Commonwealth for disposition according
to Commonwealth Act No. 682. The
People’s Court later released him.
The Deportation Board found that he had
no travel documents and was thus an
illegal alien.
The Board of Commissioners of
Immigration declared that he entered the
country illegally in 1944 and was ordered
deported immediately
Has been in detention ever since (failed
attempts to deport him) while authorities
try to make new travel arrangements
The Court held that temporary detention
is a necessary step in the process of
expulsion of undesirable aliens and said
detention for a reasonable length of time
is a Government right
  No period
was fixed within which
immigration authorities would
carry out the deportation
 “Reasonabl
e time” depends on the
circumstances
Issue/Held/
WON Mejoff should be discharged from
custody
Writ will issue commanding petitioner’s
release w/ terms: shall be placed under
surveillance; will put up a bond as surety
Ratio:
Non-enemy Foreign nationals against
whom no charge has been made other
than the expiry of their permission to stay
may not be indefinitely kept in detention
Protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process is not limited to
Filipinos (extends to everyone except
enemy aliens)83
83
Note: Petitioner’s entry in to the Phils
was not unlawful as was brought in by a de
facto belligerent Jap govt (decrees were
law)
Art 2, Sec. 3 – the Phils adopts the
generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
Nation
Phils was part of UN General Assembly
that approved Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
 Said Declaration outlined:
 All human beings are born free
and equal in rights
 Everyone is entitled to the
freedoms set forth in this
Declaration w/o making any
distinctions
 Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by competent
tribunals for acts violating
fundamental rights granted to
him by the Consti or law
 No one shall be subject to
arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile
Philippine law on immigration was copied
from US law, thus the reasoning in
Staniszewski v. Watkins applies (writ of
habeas corpus was sustained. Petitioner
was released w/ condition to inform
immigration officials of his whereabouts
every month until he can be properly
deported)
Further, petitioner has no pending
charges against him and the prospects of
bringing any against him are slim and
remote.
violates local laws and constitution and
(b) because the Phils. is not a signatory of
the Hague Convention on Rules and
regulations covering Land Warfare
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
(Jackie Espenilla)
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid
Nature:
Petition to declare EO No. 68 84 invalid/
petition to prohibit proceeding with the Yes. SC says it is valid and constitutional
case
Art. 2, Sec. 3 of Consti – Phils. renounces
Facts: war as an instrument of national policy
and adopts the generally accepted
Kuroda was formerly a Lt. General of the principles of international law as part of
Japanese Army and Commanding the nation
General of the Japanese forces in the
Phils. he is now charged before a military
commission convened by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the The Hague Convention and Geneva
Philippines with having failed to discharge Conventions form part of and are wholly
his duties 85 based on the generally accepted
principles of international law.
Kuroda now petitions SC to establish the
illegality of EO No. 68 because (a) it Since both US and Japan signed them,
their principles form part of our law even if
84
EO No. 68 – established a National War Phils. was not a signatory
Crimes Office prescribing rule and
regulation governing the trial of accused
war criminals.
Phils. was under the sovereignty of the
US at the time the crimes were committed
85
letting those in his command to commit so we are equally bound to uphold the
atrocities and other high crimes against principle
civilians and prisoners in violation of the
laws and customs of war
Rights and obligations were not erased by
assumption of sovereignty
International jurisprudence established
that all persons who have been guilty of
planning or staging a war, committing
atrocious crimes and offenses, etc are to
be held accountable86
(2) WON respondents Hussey and Port
can participate in prosecuting petitioner’s
case
Yes. It is not violative of Consti because
the Military Commission is a special
military tribunal governed by a special law
and not by ROC which govern civil courts.
Nothing in EO. 68 which says that
participating lawyers have to be qualified
in the Phils. Common in military tribunals
that counsels are usually military personal
Spirit of comity esp. since US is a party in
interest
EO No. 68 is valid. Military commission
can proceed.
86
EO No. 68 is in conformity with this
Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General
(Jackie Espenilla)
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of lower court
denying petition for naturalization of
Eremes Kookooritchkin
Facts:
Kookoo applied for citizenship under
Commonwealth Act 473 as amended by
Act 535
Established at the hearing that he was a
native born Russian and grew up in
Russia under the czars. When Bolsheviks
took over, he fled the country and found
his way to Manila in 1923
Permanently established residence in
Camarines Sur on May 1925
 Remained a resident except
from 1942-1945 because he
became an underground
guerilla officer. After the
liberation, he went back to
Camarines
 Has resided in Phils. for about
25 years
Married to a Filipina with whom he has a
son
Works as a shop superintendent with
about 80 Pinoys under him. Gets income
Can speak English and Bicol dialect.
Intermingles with Pinoys. Has good moral
character and believes in the Phil
Constitution
Applicant could have been chummy with
the Japanese but instead, chose to fight
in guerilla movement
Although a Russian by birth, he disclaims
allegiance to the present Communist govt
of Russia. He is thus STATELESS and a
REFUGEE of this country
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen is invalid and
insufficient as a basis for the petition for
naturalization
Sec. 5 of Revised Naturalization Law –
No declaration shall be valid until entry for
permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the
date, place and manner of arrival has
been issued
iii. Only a reconstituted
declaration was presented as
the records of the Bureau of
Justice were destroyed
during the battle for the
liberation of Manila
iv. Even if reconstituted,
declaration is still valid coz
proven by other competent
evidence
(2) WON Kookoo established a legal
residence in the Phils and WON he can
speak and write in Phil. Languages
Testimonies on the record show that he
was a legal resident for a continuous
period of not less than 10years as
required by Sec. 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473
Lower court found that he could speak
and write English and Bicol. Besides, no
specific standard has been set on the use
of the principal Phil. Languages
(3) WON Kookoo is really stateless and
WON he is disqualified from citizenship
Lower court is upheld in pronouncing
Kookoo stateless.
Appellee’s testimony is uncontradicted
and it is a well known fact that modern
dictatorships have scattered stateless
refugees all over the world.
Kookoo owes and feels no allegiance to
Russia
Appealed decision is AFFIRMED.87
87
Jackie: Kookoo is Pinoy!
Yamashita v. Styer
(Jackie Espenilla)
Nature:
Petition for habeas corpus and prohibition
against Lt. Gen. Styer (Commanding
General of the US Army Forces)
Facts:
Yamashita was the commanding general
of the 14th army group of the Japanese
army in the Phils and is now charged
before the American military commission
for committing heinous acts against
Americans and Pinoys
Was originally classified as prisoner of
war but was later changed to war criminal
Yamashita now wants to be changed
back to prisoner of war and that the
military commission be prohibited from
further trying him
Issues/Held/Ratio:
WON Yamashita may seek writ of habeas
corpus
Nope. Petition DENIED.
Untenable. He doesn’t seek discharge
from confinement, just restoration to old
status as POW
iii. Degree of confinement is a
matter of military measure,
beyond jurisdiction of civil
court
iv. Military Commission has
been validly constituted and
has jurisdiction over
petitioner (coz Yamashita fell
into the hands of the US
army)
Under Par. 356 of the Rules of the Land
Warfare, a Military Commission for the
trial and punishment of war criminals
must be designated by the belligerent (the
belligerent’s representative in this case is
Styer)
According to the Regulations Governing
the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific,
the trial of persons, units and
organizations accused as war criminals
will be the Military Commissions to be
convened by or under the authority of the
Commander in Chief, US Army Forces.
Articles of War Nos. 12 and 15
recognized the military Commission
appointed by military command as an
appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of
the war not ordinarily tried by court
martial.88
Further, it is alleged that Spain (Japan’s
protecting power) as not given due notice
before trial was begun against petitioner,
contrary to provision of Geneva
convention.89
IBP v. Zamora
88
Yamashita is charged with permitting
atrocities like rape of young girls,
massacre of noncombatants, destruction of
property – offenses described in Par. 347 of
the Rules of Land Warfare
89
Nothing in Convention saying that notice
is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of
military commissions appointed by
victorious belligerent. Spain has also
severed diplomatic relation with Japan
August 15, 2000, Kapunan, J.
Facts:
IBP alleged that Erap, in ordering the
military deployed in Manila, committed
grave abuse of discretion because: (a) no
emergency existed, and thus no military
deployment was warranted; and (b)
through Letters of Instruction formulated
by the head of the national police, the
joint exercise of ‘Task Force Tulungan’ (as
visibility patrols) conducted by the
marines and the PNP was a violation of
civilian supremacy because the task of
law enforcement was civilian in nature.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the IBP has standing.
No. They failed to present a specific and
substantial interest in the resolution of the
case. “Upholding the rule of law and the
constitution” is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry.
(2) WON the President’s decision is
subject to judicial review.
Yes. When the President calls out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, the Court cannot question the
wisdom or substitute its own. However, it
can still conduct an examination on
whether such a decision was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or
whether or not it was exercised
constituting grave abuse of discretion.
In lieu of such a decision made by the
President, it is incumbent for the
petitioners to show that the decision was
without factual basis. No evidence of such
nature was adduced.
(3) WON grave abuse of discretion was
committed in calling out the military when
no emergency existed.
In the words of the late Justice Irene
Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
“More particularly, this case calls for the
exercise of the President’s powers as
protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The
American Presidency]. The power of the
President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-
chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The
President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times
when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential
duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-
in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the President’s
exercising as Commander-in-Chief
powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.”
(4) WON in deploying the marines, the
President violated the civilian supremacy
clause.
IBP contends that with the said
agreement, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized and is thus in
violation of Sec. 3, Article II of the
Constitution.
Court rules that there is no breach. The
joint exercise merely constitutes a
permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement; military
participation in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed as evidenced by the LOI.
Furthermore, leadership is vested in the
PNP, a civilian institution, and their
assigned role specifically gives them the
responsibility of directing and managing
the deployment of the marines.
There is no incursion of the military
because the marines weren’t incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP - the
marines, in effect, merely provided
assistance in these visibility patrols;
hence, such deployment does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP.
As evidenced by the long history of
military and civilian agencies working in
tandem with each other, the joint visibility
patrols instead of showing the alleged
derogation of civilian supremacy, shows
mutual support and cooperation in the
deployment of the marines.
Puno, Separate:
He contends that the executive
branch’s decision to cloud its
activities under the political question
doctrine will not suffice.

Mendoza, Dissenting, Concurring:
There being no actual controversy
manifest yet, the case should not be
heard, but he concurs with the
dismissal of the petition because of
the lack of standing.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary
Facts:
The Rome Statute was signed by the
Philippines through the DFA. Its’
provisions, however, required that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance and
approval of the signatory states. Pimentel,
as senator, files a petition for mandamus
claiming that the ratification of a treaty
(under domestic and international law) is
a function of the Senate, hence, the
Executive Dept. has a duty to transmit the
signed statute to the Senate for
ratification.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON the ExecSec and DFA have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate
the copy of the Rome Statute.
No. As chief architect of foreign policy,
President is the country’s mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. In the
realm of treaty making, President has the
sole authority to negotiate with other
states; ratification is under his/her
authority. The Constitution, however,
provides a limitation to such power to
ratify by vesting in the Senate, the power
to concur with the President’s decision. It
does not the agency delegated to ratify
but the agency to concur or not with said
decision. The duty being in the province
of the President’s official duties, the court
cannot compel the Executive branch by
means of mandamus because it is
beyond its jurisdiction.
Bayan v. Executive Secretary
October 10, 2000, Buena, J.
Facts:
The VFA, after being ratified and
concurred with, was put into effect on
June 1, 1999. Petitioners contend that
such an agreement is in violation of
Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution.
Respondents claim that the applicable
provision is Article VII Sec 21. since the
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an
agreement which involves temporary
visits engaged in joint military exercises.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON petitioners have standing.
No. As concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators, they fail to show that they
have sustained or in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers,
the VFA doesn’t involve the exercise by
Congress in taxing/spending powers.
(2) WON the applicable provision is that
stated by the petitioners or that stated by
respondents.
When the respondent says that temporary
visits doesn’t make it a basing
arrangement and thus invalidates the
applicability of Article XIII Sec. 25, the
Court considers this untenable since the
Constitution does not make a distinction
between transient and permanent bases.
When the respondent avers that said
Article shouldn’t be controlling because
no bases are involved but merely troops
and facilities, the Court finds it irrelevant
because the provision’s prohibition
involves either one of the independent
situations.
“It is our considered view that both
constitutional provisions, far from
contradicting each other, actually share
some common ground. These
constitutional provisions both embody
phrases in the negative and thus, are
deemed prohibitory in mandate and
character. In particular, Section 21 opens
with the clause “No treaty x x x,” and
Section 25 contains the phrase “shall not
be allowed.” Additionally, in both
instances, the concurrence of the Senate
is indispensable to render the treaty or
international agreement valid and
effective.”
“The fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements” regardless of
what provision is deemed applicable.
The only thing to consider now is whether
all the requirements of Article XVIII Sec.
25 have been complied with:
(a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate
and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
Petitioners say that there must be
concurrence by the US Senate as well as
illuminated by (c). Respondents claim that
the only thing necessary is US recognition
of the treaty which was given when the
US Ambassador stated the VFA was
binding.
The Court says : “To require the other
contracting state, the United States of
America in this case, to submit the VFA to
the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase.”
“Well-entrenched is the principle that the
words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in
common use.”
Silva v. CA
Facts:
Married businessman Silva cohabited
with an unmarried actress Gonzales
without benefit of a marriage. Although
they had two children, they eventually
parted ways. Gonzales refused to allow
Silva to be with the children on weekends.
Silva filed a petition for custodial rights
before the RTC. Petition was opposed by
the mother of the children on the ground
that Silva was a womanizer and a
gambler and such behavior would have
detrimental effects on the children. The
RTC granted visitation rights which
Gonzales still contended despite her
marrying a Dutch national and emigrating
to Holland with the children. The CA ruled
in favor of Gonzales because it saw that
the rotation of custody would not be
conducive to the welfare of the children.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON visitations right should be granted.
Yes. The Constitution doesn’t specifically
mandate the “natural and primary rights of
parents” to those who have legitimate
relationships with their children. And such
visitations, contrary to the CA’s ruling,
would not affect the children to such an
extent that it would be detrimental to their
upbringing.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Married for 11 years, wife, former teacher
of the husband in college, files petition for
annulment on the ground of psychological
incapacity for failure to support the family
and contribute to the management of the
household. She alleges that he spent
most of his time drinking with his friends
and that because of his extramarital
relations, he infected her with an STD –
testament to which was confinement of
both parties in a hospital for treatment.
RTC dismissed the petition saying: “The
Court can underscore the fact that the
circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that
respondent was "psychologically
incapacitated" to marry her are among the
grounds cited by the law as valid reasons
for the grant of legal separation (Article 55
of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a
declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment thereof.” CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC citing Santos v. CA:
“It is clear in the above law and
jurisprudence that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage, must
exist at the time of the celebration of
marriage. More so, chronic sexual
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and
use of prohibited drugs are not grounds
per se, of psychological incapacity of a
spouse.”
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON the instant case with the
circumstances presented can serve as a
ground for psychological incapacity.
No. In the instant case, other than her
self-serving declarations, petitioner failed
to establish the fact that at the time they
were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage
and its concomitant responsibilities. As
the Court of Appeals pointed out, no
evidence was presented to show that
private respondent was not cognizant of
the basic marital obligations.
PT&T v. NLRC
Facts:
A woman’s (Grace de Guzman)
employment was terminated by PT&T
because of alleged concealment of civil
status and defalcation of company funds.
De Guzman argues that the real reason
she was fired was because she
contracted the married during
employment which is against company
policy. She admits, however, that when
she applied to work she indicated she
was single when, in fact, she was already
married. She was reminded by
correspondence of the company’s policy
of not accepting married women as
employees. She subscribed to the
defense that she wasn’t aware of such a
policy and thus, had no intent to hide the
fact that she was already married. The
labor arbiter decided that she was
discriminated against because of having
contracted marriage while employed with
the company. PT&T appealed to the
NLRC but the latter upheld the decision of
the labor arbiter modifying the decision by
saying the woman’s dishonest nature
warrants a 3-month suspension from
work.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
WON PT&T’s policy of not accepting or
considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts a marriage,
is discriminatory and thus contrary to the
Constitution?
Yes. Although PT&T asserts that it
dismissed Grace because of her
dishonesty; records, not to mention the
letter reminding her of her company’s
policy, say otherwise; proving that she
was terminated because of her civil
status. Furthermore, it was the policy
itself which was the cause of Grace’s
secretive conduct (he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused.)
PT&T’s allegations of misappropriation is
insincere and self-serving.
CMTC v. Alcala, Sec. DENR
June 13, 1997, Mendoza, J.
Facts:
CMTC’s timber concession was approved
by Marcos after it was previously
cancelled; however, said concession,
operating on TLA no. 106, was under
another concession (TLA no. 360)
operated by FLDC – after issuance by
Ministry of National Resources. TLA no.
360 was given primacy over the TLA no.
106 allegedly because of Marcos’ sister
who was behind FLDC. Two years later,
however, on June 1986, Ministry head
suspended TLA no. 360 and cancelled
the license of FLDC (because in spite of
previous suspension order, logging still
continued). CMTC, learning of the
cancellation, sought to revalidate TLA no.
106 by writing a letter to the said
government agency.
DENR declared TLA no. 106 as no longer
having force and effect, the petition being
barred because of latches: CMTC did not
immediately file an opposition when
FLDC was awarded the said concession
and because it had waited for two years
before filing such a petition. In an appeal
to the Office of the President and after its
second motion for reconsideration, CMTC
claims that it had written a letter dated on
the day to oppose FLDC’s grant of TLA.
The Office of the President, however,
again denied the petition on the basis of a
“new policy of consideration on forest
conservation and protection.”
CMTC appeals to the SC saying that
there were no latches and that the new
public consideration averred to by the
Office of the President denied the CMTC
due process. There being no total log ban
in the country (Congress still needing to
make an announcement regarding the
issue), any notice to this effect “must be
stated in good form, not implied”; and that
in any case, any new policy consideration
should be prospective in application and
cannot affect petitioner’s vested rights in
its TLA no. 106.
Main Issue/ Held/Ratio:
WON the new policy of forest
conservation and protection could affect
the previous TLAs mentioned.
As evidenced by reports, it would seem
that CMTC was one of those whose TLAs
were terminated in 1983, a year before its
concession was awarded to FLDC. Since
petitioner failed to protest the grant of
concession within a “reasonable time”,
action is barred by latches.
“because executive evaluation of timber
licenses and their consequent
cancellation in the process of formulating
policies with regard to the utilization of
timber lands is a prerogative of the
executive department and in the absence
of evidence showing grave abuse of
discretion courts will not interfere with the
exercise of that discretion.”
Public respondents herein, upon whose
shoulders rests the task of implementing
the policy to develop and conserve the
country's natural resources, have
indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license
agreements entered into, and permits or
licenses issued, under the previous
dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment
is apparently in response to the renewed
and growing global concern over the
despoliation of forest lands and the utter
disregard of their crucial role in sustaining
a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern can hardly be
disputed, most especially in this country. .
..
Thus, while the administration grapples
with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled
exploitation of these resources, the
judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so
where, as in the present case, the
interests of a private logging company are
pitted against that of the public at large on
the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. . . . Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause.
Guingona v. Carague
April 22, 1991, Gancayco, J.
Facts:
The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in
automatic appropriation (86.8 going to
debt service) and P155.3 from the
General Appropriations Act or a total of
P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for
DECS. Petitioners, as members of the
Senate, question the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt
service in the said budget as provided for
by Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and
1967.
Petitioners allege that the allotted budget
runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the
Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of
the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary
to the Constitution, it shall be void.
They further contend that the Presidential
Decrees are no longer operative since
they became functus oficio after President
Marcos was ousted. With a new congress
replacing the one man-legislature, new
legislation regarding appropriation should
be passed. Current appropriation,
operating on no laws therefore, would be
unenforceable.
Moreover, they content that assuming
arguendo that the said decrees did not
expire with the ouster of Marcos, after
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said
decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24,
Article VI of the Constitution which stated
that:
Sec. 24. All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the
President, 10 then a law must be passed
by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state
said decrees violate Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution which
provides as follows
Sec. 29(1). No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be
definiteness, certainty and exactness in
an appropriation, 11 otherwise it is an
undue delegation of legislative power to
the President who determines in advance
the amount appropriated for the debt
service.
SolGen argues, on the other hand, that
automatic appropriation provides
flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it
enables the Government to take
advantage of a favorable turn of market
conditions by redeeming high interest
securities and borrowing at lower rates, or
to shift from short-term to long-term
instruments, or to enter into arrangements
that could lighten our outstanding debt
burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset,
debt-to-debt or other such schemes.
Second, the automatic appropriation
obviates the serious difficulties in debt
servicing arising from any deviation from
what has been previously programmed.
The annual debt service estimates, which
are usually made one year in advance,
are based on a mathematical set or
matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of
foreign exchange and interest rate
assumption's which may significantly
differ from actual rates not even in
proportion to changes on the basis of the
assumptions. Absent an automatic
appropriation clause, the Philippine
Government has to await and depend
upon Congressional action, which by the
time this comes, may no longer be
responsive to the intended conditions
which in the meantime may have already
drastically changed. In the meantime,
also, delayed payments and arrearages
may have supervened, only to worsen our
debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in
the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate-payment even
before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the
loans and indebtedness is conditioned
upon the continuance of the person of
President Marcos and his legislative
power goes against the intent and
purpose of the law. The purpose is
foreseen to subsist with or without the
person of Marcos."
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt
service as compared to its appropriation
of P27.7B for education in violation of
Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
The State shall assign the
highest budgetary priority to
education and ensure that
teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the
best available talents through
adequate remuneration and
other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.
The Court disagrees that Congress’
hands are hamstrung by the provision
provided. There are other imperatives of
national interest that it must attend to; the
amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is
the highest in all department budgets
thereby complying with the mandate of
having the highest priority as stated
above. The enormous national debt,
incurred by the previous administration,
however, still needs to be paid. Not only
for the sake of honor but because the
national economy is itself at stake. Thus,
if Congress allotted more for debt service
such an appropriation cannot be
considered by this Court as
unconstitutional.
(2) WON the Presidential Decrees are still
operative, and if they are, do they violate
Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitutional.
Yes, they are still operative. The transitory
provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII
of the Constitution recognizes that:
All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders,
proclamations, letters of
instructions and other
executive issuances not
inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain
operative until amended,
repealed or revoked.
This transitory provision of the
Constitution has precisely been adopted
by its framers to preserve the social order
so that legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws
are to remain in force and effect unless
they are inconsistent with the Constitution
or are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or
amendment by implication is frowned
upon. Equally fundamental is the principle
that construction of the Constitution and
law is generally applied prospectively and
not retrospectively unless it is so clearly
stated.
(3) WON there was undue delegation of
legislative power by automatic
appropriation.
No. The legislative intention in R.A. No.
4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the
amount needed should be automatically
set aside in order to enable the Republic
of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it
when they shall become due without the
need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefore as the need
arises. The purpose of these laws is to
enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of
the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees
do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the
problem being, addressed, the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the
decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited
discretion as to the amounts to be
disbursed for debt servicing. The
mandate is to pay only the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures or security or other evidences
of indebtedness sold in international
markets incurred by virtue of the law, as
and when they shall become due. No
uncertainty arises in executive
implementation as the limit will be the
exact amounts as shown by the books of
the Treasury.
Cruz, Dissenting:
He sees that an essential
requirement for valid appropriation is
that the sum authorized for release
should be determinate or
determinable. The Presidential
Decrees do not satisfy this
requirement. As to the ponencia’s
reference to “legislative parameters
provided by law”, Cruz says no such
regulatory boundaries exist.
Padilla, Dissenting:
 He agrees with Cruz but furthers the
argument by saying that Sec.
29(1)Article VI implies that a law
enacted by Congress (and approved
by the President) appropriating a
particular sum or sums must be
made before payment from the
Treasury can be made. Laws should
be construed in light of current laws
and not those made by a one-man
legislative branch.
Besides, these decrees issued by
President Marcos relative to debt service
were tailored for the periods covered by
said decrees. Today it is Congress that
should determine and approve the proper
appropriations for debt servicing, as this
is a matter of policy that, in my opinion,
pertains to the legislative department, as
the policy-determining body of the
Government.
Paras, Dissenting: Any law that
undermines our economy and therefore
our security is per se unconstitutional.
Tanada v. Angara
May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J.
Facts:
The Philippines, by ratification of the
President and concurrence of the Senate
became a member of the WTO.
Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and
intent of the Constitution mandating
“economic nationalism” are violated by
the “parity provisions” and “national
treatment” clauses scattered in the
agreement, annexes and other parts of
the treaty. These allegedly place foreign
nationals on equal footing as Filipinos in
contravention of the Constitution’s
Filipino-first policy. Main provisions which
are supposedly violated by the WTO
agreement are the following:
(1) Art II, Sec. 19 – Self-reliant,
independent economy.
(2) Art. XII Sec. 10 – Capital owned by
Filipinos; grants, privileges, concessions
for national economy gives preference to
qualified Filipinos.
(3) Art. XII Sec. 12 – Preferential use of
Filipino labor, material and goods.
These provisions are allegedly
desecrated in the areas of investment
measures, trade selected aspects of IPR,
and in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services.
The SolGen, on the other hand, argues
(a) that the charter provisions are not self-
executing and are mere general policies;
(b) that the provisions shouldn’t be read in
isolation but in conjunction with Art. XII
Sec. 1 and 13, which when read properly
as a whole, ensures that the WTO
agreement doesn’t violate the
Constitution; and (c) that WTO contains
sufficient provisions to protect developing
countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of trade liberalization.
By praying for the nullification of the
Philippine ratification of the WTO
Agreement, petitioners are invoking this
Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to
determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part
of the Senate in giving its concurrence
therein via Senate Resolution No. 97.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON the petition presents a
jusiticiable controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld."
(2) WON the WTO agreement and its
three annexes contravene the respective
provisions in the Constitution.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-
Executing
By its very title, Article II of the
Constitution is a "declaration of principles
and state policies." The counterpart of this
article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is
called the "basic political creed of the
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These
principles in Article II are not intended to
be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides
in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. As held in the leading
case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-
executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in
the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation."

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read
with Other Constitutional Mandates to
attain Balanced Development of
Economy
As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of
national economic development, as
follows: (1) A more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income and wealth; (2) A
sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services provided by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and
(3) An expanding productivity as the key
to raising the quality of life for all
especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the
Constitution then ordains the ideals of
economic nationalism (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos
"in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony" and in the use
of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods"; (2) by
mandating the State to "adopt measures
that help make them competitive; and (3)
by requiring the State to "develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos." In
similar language, the Constitution takes
into account the realities of the outside
world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade
policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of
exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity"; and speaks of industries
"which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets" as well as of the
protection of "Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade
practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila
Prince Hotel vs. Government Service
Insurance System, et al., this Court held
that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable." However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to "the grants
of rights, privileges and concessions
covering national economy and
patrimony" and not to every aspect of
trade and commerce. It refers to
exceptions rather than the rule. The issue
here is not whether this paragraph of Sec.
10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not.
Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule,
there are enough balancing provisions in
the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the
WTO Agreement. And we hold that there
are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for
business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak
Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents
maintain that the WTO itself has some
built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise
the vast majority of its members. Unlike in
the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions
are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member's vote equal
in weight to that of any other. There is no
WTO equivalent of the UN Security
Council.
Hence, poor countries can protect their
common interests more effectively
through the WTO than through one-on-
one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push
their economic agenda more decisively
than outside the Organization. This is not
merely a matter of practical alliances but
a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of
developing countries like the Philippines
to "share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development."
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign
Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a
"self-reliant and independent national
economy" does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither
"economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in
the international community." As
explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
"Economic self reliance is a primary
objective of a developing country that is
keenly aware of overdependence on
external assistance for even its most
basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means
avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the
freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such
strategic industries as in the development
of natural resources and public utilities."
The WTO reliance on "most favored
nation," "national treatment," and "trade
without discrimination" cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that
apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocity," the fundamental
law encourages industries that are
"competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets," thereby demonstrating a clear
policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries
that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino
managers and Filipino enterprises have
shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have
demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not
Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any
unbalanced bias in favor of any business
or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino
companies should be pampered with a
total proscription of foreign competition.
Oposa v. Factoran
Facts:
Petitioners, minors represented by their
parents, filed a complaint in the RTC; it
was a taxpayer’s class suit representing
themselves, the countless multitudes, and
future generations of those who are
entitled to the benefits of the country’s
virgin tropical forests.
The plaintiff’s complaint was specified as
follows: that a balanced and healthful
ecology in the Philippines is evidenced by
54% forest cover and 46% everything
else.
Twenty five years ago, tropical virgin
forests amounted to 53% of our land area
but in 1987, satellite images showed that
only four percent of the land was covered
by forests. Recent surveys, in the
meantime, show that only 2.8% of the and is therefore subject to judicial
country’s land area is composed of scrutiny.
tropical virgin rainforests.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
Public records reveal that at the present
(1) WON petitioners have standing.
rate of deforestation, the Philippine
Islands will be bereft of national resources
after the end of the decade, if not earlier.
Plaintiffs assert their constitutional right to The petitioners, minors assert that they
a balanced and healthful ecology and represent their generation as well as
claim that they are entitled to protection of generations yet unborn. We find no
this right by the State in its capacity as difficulty in ruling that they can, for
parens patriae. themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can
The complaint was filed against Factoran,
only be based on the concept of
then head of the DENR; it would order the
intergenerational responsibility insofar as
DENR to cancel all existing timber
the right to a balanced and healthful
licensing agreements (TLAs) in the
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
country, and cease and desist from
hereinafter expounded, considers the
accepting, processing, renewing, and
"rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
approving TLAs. The trial court dismissed
means the created world in its entirety.
the complaint and the judge stated that
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
the relief sought for (cancellation of TLAs)
include, inter alia, the judicious
cannot be done because it would not
disposition, utilization, management,
allow due process. The amended petition
renewal and conservation of the country's
to the SC repeated its earlier right to a
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
sound environment, and added that (a)
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
TLAs were not contracts and even if they
resources to the end that their
were considered protected by the non-
exploration, development and utilization
impairment clause, the State may still
be equitably accessible to the present as
revoke such agreements when public
well as future generations. Needless to
interest demands it; and (b) in granting
say, every generation has a responsibility
more TLAs to cover more areas of land
to the next to preserve that rhythm and
than what is available is an act
harmony for the full enjoyment of a
constituting grave abuse of discretion,
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
(2) Is there a specific right violated that
would serve a the petitioner’s cause of
action?
Yes. Sec. 16, Article II of the Constitution
provides the right. A cause of action is
therefore present but as far as
cancellation of TLA’s is concerned, there
is a need to implead the guarantees of
the same for they are indispensable
parties.
(3) Are the TLAs contracts? Are they
protected by the non-impairment clause?
No. Even if a law is passed mandating
cancellation/modification of the TLAs, the
same cannot be stigmatized as a violation
of non-impairment clause because it is
within the State’s exercise of police power
to protect its ecology.
Feliciano, Concurring:
Although the petitioners are in fact
entitled to a balanced and healthful
ecology as stressed by the
Constitutional right, one cannot
classify such a right as “specific”
without doing excessive violence to
the language. The implications of
making the Sections in Article II self-
executory are not the subject of this
case. Petitioners should seek a
specific legal right. It is his
understanding that the Court’s
decision implies that within the
collection of statutes, there is a
specific right which the petitioners
can use.
Chavez v. Phil. Estates Authority 90
Facts:
90
As you’ll gather from the last few
deplorable digests (and this last one) … I’ve
run out of juice. Feel free to
fix/update/mock them at your convenience.
– Mars.
PEA, as authorized by its charter created decried the JVA, the task force upheld its
by Marcos, was mandated to reclaim legality. This prompted Chavez, in 1998,
land, develop, improve, etc… sell, and to file suit as a taxpayer, contending the
lease these reclaimed lands. During the following:
time of Cory, more land was transferred to
PEA under its name. Transfer Certificate
of Titles of the then reclaimed Freedom
Petitioner contends the government
Islands were given to PEA during this
stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale
time. During Ramos’ tenure as President,
by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
PEA, entered into a joint venture
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose
agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
corporation without public bidding. The
invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section
JVA intended to develop the reclaimed
7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on
Freedom Islands and reclaim an
the right of the people to information on
additional 250 hectares surrounding said
matters of public concern. Petitioner
islands. In 1996, Senate President
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
Maceda, in a privileged speech, called the
public domain as a blatant violation of
JVA “the grandmother of all scams.” An
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
investigation ensued with the report
Constitution prohibiting the sale of
concluding the following:
alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. Finally, petitioner
asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
(1) The lands being sold to AMARI were billions of pesos in properties of the State
lands of the public domain which the that are of public dominion.
government has not yet classified as
alienable, and therefore the PEA has no
authority to sell yet.
The Amended JVA, however, pushed
through after being signed by PEA and
AMARI, with the approval of then
(2) Transfer Certificate of Titles of the President Estrada. After such a
Freedom Islands are then void; and the maneuver, Chavez prayed that the
renegotiated contract be declared null
and void based on constitutional and
statutory grounds.
(3) JVA entered into is illegal.
In 1997, a Legal Task Force was formed
by the President to study the JVA; but Issues/ Held/Ratio:
contrary to the Senate investigation that
(1) WON the case is academic and moot
after subsequent events.
Respondents – Yes; satisfied petitioner’s
prayer for disclosure of renegotiations;
moot, because already signed.
Petitioners - counters that PEA and
AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional
issue by simply fast-tracking the signing
and approval of the Amended JVA before
the Court could act on the issue.
Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
Court - PEA and AMARI have still to
implement the Amended JVA. The prayer
to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA
on constitutional grounds necessarily
includes preventing its implementation if
in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s principal basis in assailing the
renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution,
which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to
private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the
duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first
impression. All previous decisions of the
Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, or its counterpart
provision in the 1973 Constitution,
covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands
from private parties. The transferors of
the private corporations claimed or could
claim the right to judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 (“CA No. 141”
for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI
seeks to acquire from PEA, a public
corporation, reclaimed lands and
submerged areas for non-agricultural
purposes by purchase under PD No.
1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA
No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI
under the Amended JVA constitute the
consideration for the purchase. Neither
AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial
confirmation of their titles because the
lands covered by the Amended JVA are
newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title
requires open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain for at least thirty
years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Besides, the deadline for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title expired on December 31,
1987.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction
immediately the constitutional issue over the instant case.
raised in this petition because of the
possible transfer at any time by PEA to
AMARI of title and ownership to portions
(3) WON the petition should be dismissed
of the reclaimed lands. Under the
because of non-exhaustion of
Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to
administrative remedies.
transfer to AMARI the latter’s seventy
percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation
progresses. The Amended JVA even Respondent – they didn’t ask us for the
allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the information before proceeding to Court to
entire reclaimed area to raise financing issue a mandamus; this is in violation of
for the reclamation project. the rule of mandamus. Tanada v. Tuvera
is different from the current situation
because there, the ExecDept had an
affirmative statutory duty to publish the
(2) WON the petition should be dismissed
President Decrees and thus, the
because judicial hierarchy wasn’t
mandamus was warranted. In the instant
respected.
case, PEA has no affirmative duty to
disclose such information.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored
the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
Court - The original JVA sought to dispose
directly from the Court. The principle of
to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
hierarchy of courts applies generally to
government corporation. Under Section
cases involving factual questions. As it is
79 of the Government Auditing Code, the
not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
disposition of government lands to private
entertain cases involving factual issues.
parties requires public bidding. PEA was
The instant case, however, raises
under a positive legal duty to disclose to
constitutional issues of transcendental
the public the terms and conditions for the
importance to the public. The Court can
sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA
resolve this case without determining any
to make this public disclosure even
factual issue related to the case. Also,
without demand from petitioner or from
the instant case is a petition for
anyone. PEA failed to make this public
mandamus which falls under the original
disclosure because the original JVA, like
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,
the Amended JVA, was the result of a
Article VIII of the Constitution. We
negotiated contract, not of a public
bidding. Considering that PEA had an
affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach
of this legal duty, petitioner had the right
to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative
of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply
when the issue involved is a purely legal
or constitutional question. The principal
issue in the instant case is the capacity of
AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in
view of the constitutional ban prohibiting
the alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations. We rule
that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in
the instant case.
(4) Do petitioners have standing?
PEA argues that petitioner has no
standing to institute mandamus
proceedings to enforce his constitutional
right to information without a showing that
PEA refused to perform an affirmative
duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution.
PEA also claims that petitioner has not
shown that he will suffer any concrete
injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA.
Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this
taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks
to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First
is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The
thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA
to disclose publicly information on the
sale of government lands worth billions of
pesos, information which the Constitution
and statutory law mandate PEA to
disclose. The thrust of the second issue
is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of
the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply
with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of
transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG,[28] the Court upheld
the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer’s
suit on matters of transcendental
importance to the public, thus -
“Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the
matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses is an issue of
‘transcendental importance to the public.’
He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a
right to initiate and prosecute actions
questioning the validity of acts or orders
of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are
of ‘paramount public interest,’ and if they
‘immediately affect the social, economic
and moral well being of the people.’
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right,
such as in this case. He invokes several
decisions of this Court which have set
aside the procedural matter of locus
standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that
while expenditure of public funds may not
have been involved under the questioned
contract for the development,
management and operation of the Manila
International Container Terminal, ‘public
interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the
subject contract] . . . in the economic
development of the country and the
magnitude of the financial consideration
involved.’ We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in
the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's
standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored
on the right of the people to information
and access to official records, documents
and papers — a right guaranteed under
Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor
general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites
laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule
that the petition at bar should be allowed.”
(5) Whether the constitutional right to
information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
explains the people’s right to information
on matters of public concern in this
manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people
to information on matters of
public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government
research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to
 such limitations as may be
provided by law.”
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people’s right to information
on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II
of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and
implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public
interest.”
These twin provisions of the Constitution
seek to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the
government does not disclose its official
acts, transactions and decisions to
citizens, whatever citizens say, even if
expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing.
These twin provisions are also essential
to hold public officials “at all times x x x
accountable to the people,”[29] for unless
citizens have the proper information, they
cannot hold public officials accountable
for anything. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any
democracy. As explained by the Court in
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.
“An essential element of these freedoms
is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for
free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the
people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can
be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when
the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear
fruit.”
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31]
that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to “definite
propositions of the government.” PEA
maintains the right does not include
access to “intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications
during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being of, the terms and conditions of the
formulated or are in the ‘exploratory disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the
stage’.” minimum price and similar information.
PEA must prepare all these data and
disclose them to the public at the start of
the disposition process, long before the
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner
consummation of the contract, because
cannot invoke the right at the pre-
the Government Auditing Code requires
decisional stage or before the closing of
public bidding. If PEA fails to make this
the transaction.
disclosure, any citizen can demand from
PEA this information at any time during
the bidding process.
AMARI argues there must first be a
consummated contract before petitioner
can invoke the right. Requiring
Information, however, on on-going
government officials to reveal their
evaluation or review of bids or proposals
deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
being undertaken by the bidding or review
will degrade the quality of decision-
committee is not immediately accessible
making in government agencies.
under the right to information. While the
Government officials will hesitate to
evaluation or review is still on-going, there
express their real sentiments during
are no “official acts, transactions, or
deliberations if there is immediate public
decisions” on the bids or proposals.
dissemination of their discussions, putting
However, once the committee makes its
them under all kinds of pressure before
official recommendation, there arises a
they decide.
“definite proposition” on the part of the
government. From this moment, the
public’s right to information attaches, and
We must first distinguish between any citizen can access all the non-
information the law on public bidding proprietary information leading to such
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,
information the constitutional right to the Court ruled as follows:
information requires PEA to release to the
public. Before the consummation of the
contract, PEA must, on its own and
“Considering the intent of the framers of
without demand from anyone, disclose to
the Constitution, we believe that it is
the public matters relating to the
incumbent upon the PCGG and its
disposition of its property. These include
officers, as well as other government
the size, location, technical description
representatives, to disclose sufficient
and nature of the property being disposed
public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up
with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process
of being formulated or are in the
“exploratory” stage. There is need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions
on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier – such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information.”
Contrary to AMARI’s contention, the
commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to
information “contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation
of the transaction.” Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can
never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the
public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will
keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or
even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public
concern, a situation which the framers of
the Constitution could not have intended.
Such a requirement will prevent the
citizenry from participating in the public
discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can
allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the
State of its avowed “policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.”
The right covers three categories of
information which are “matters of public
concern,” namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions;
and (3) government research data used in
formulating policies. The first category
refers to any document that is part of the
public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials. The
second category refers to documents and
papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting,
justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government
agencies or officials. The third category
refers to research data, whether raw,
collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating
government policies.
The information that petitioner may
access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached
to such reports or minutes, all relating to
the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like relating to the renegotiation of the
JVA. The right only affords access to
records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and
copy them. One who exercises the right
must copy the records, documents and
papers at his expense. The exercise of
the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the
public records and to minimize disruption
to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.
The right to information, however, does
not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the
separation of powers. The right does not
also apply to information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused, which courts
have long recognized as confidential. The
right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by
law.
There is no claim by PEA that the
information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the
separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal deliberations
of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal
branch of government. A frank exchange
of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power. This is not the situation in
the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional
right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public
order. Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in
several legislations.
(6) Whether stipulations in the Amended
JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.
We can now summarize our conclusions
as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands
to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the
1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain
until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only
then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain,
which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present
state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares[110] of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares[111] of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable
or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still,
the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will
be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates
glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409[112] of the Civil Code, contracts
whose “object or purpose is contrary to
law,” or whose “object is outside the
commerce of men,” are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.” The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the
proper forum to raise the issue of whether
the Amended JVA is grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null
and void ab initio, there is no necessity to
rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court
is not a trier of facts, and this last issue
involves a determination of factual
matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation
are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared
NULL and VOID ab initio.
ANGARA vs. ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
GR NO. 171396 May 3, 2006
Petitioner: Jose A. Angara
Respondent: electoral Commission,
pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio C. Mayor
Nature of the Case: original action in
the SC. Prohibition (Writ of Prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Comission from taking further cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua
against the election of petitioner as
member of National Assembly for the 1 st
district of the Province of Tayabas
Issue:
Ponente: Laurel, J.
Facts:
1) Sept 17, 1935: elections—Jose
Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates
2) Oct 7, 1935: Provincial Board of
canvassers, proclaimed Angara
as member-elect of NA for said
district
3) Nov 15, 1935: petitioner took
his oath
4) Dec 3, 1935: NA passed a
resolution confirming his being
elected as member of NA
5) Dec 8, 1935: Pedro Ynsua filed
before the EC a “motion of
Protest” against the election of
petitioner and that he be
declared winner or the election
of said position be nullified
6) Dec 9, 1935: EC adopted a
resolution that no protests
would be considered anymore
7) Dec 20, 1935: petitioner filed
before the EC “motion to
Dismiss the Protest” alleging
 a) Res. NO 8- adopted in
legitimate exercise of
Constitutional prerogative
of the NA to prescribe
period during which
protests should be
presented
b) Aforesaid resolution—
accepted the limitation of
said period
c) Protest in question has
been filed out of prescribed
period
8) Dec 27, 1935: Pedro Ynsua
filed “ Answer to Motion for
Dismissal”—alleging no barring
of presentation of protest
against election of member
after confirmation by NA
9) Dec 31, 1935: Angara filed his
reply
10) Case submitted for decision –
EC promulgated a resolution—
January 23, 1936 denying
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss
Protest
WHY THE NEED TO ISSUE THE WRIT
(according to petitioner)
a) Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon EC as regards
to merits of contested elections
to the NA
b) Consti excludes power to
regulate the proceedings of said
election contests-- reserved to
the legislative department or the
NA
c) EC can regulate proceedings
only if NA have not availed of
its primary power to regulate
such proceedings
d) Res No.8 of NA is valid and
should be respected and
obeyed
e) Par 13 of Sect 1 of ordinance,
Par 6 of Art VII – Tydings-
mcduffie Law, Sec 1 and 3 Art
VIII of Consti—SC—jurisdiction
to pass upon the fundamental
questions herein raised
because it involves
interpretation of the constitution
of the Phils
11) Feb 25, 1936: Solicitor- general
on behalf of SC—defenses:
a) EC has been created by
the Constitution
(instrumentality of the
legislative department)
with jurisdiction to decide
“all contests relating to
election, returns and
disqualifications of
members of NA
b) Dec 9, 1935: fixing the
date of last day of filing of
protests—legitimate
exercise of the implied
powers granted by the
Constitution
c) Jan 23, 1936: res.
Overruling motion of
petitioner to dismiss
election protest and taking
cognizance of the said
protest—acted in
legitimate exercise of
quasi-judicial functions
d) Resolution of NA (dec 3,
1936)—confirming election
of members of NA could
not deprive the EC of its
jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election
protests filed within set
date
e) EC is a body vested with
quasi-judicial functions—
not an inferior tribunal or a confirmation of such election
corporation or board by resolution of NA?
ANSWER OF PEDRO YNSUA:
a) At the time of approval of Rules
of EC (dec 9, 1935) there was ANSWERS:
no existing law fixing the period 1) Separation of powers—
within which protests against each department of
election of members of NA government has exclusive
should be filed—Dec 9, 1935— cognizance of matters w/in
set last day of filing its jurisdiction and
b) Respondent presented his supreme w/in its own
motion before dec 9, 1935 sphere
c) EC acquired jurisdiction over - Checks and balances
protest filed to secure coordination
d) Confirmation of NA not required on the various
by law/ consti –this does not workings of various
operate to limit the period within departments of the
which protests should be filed government
as to deprive EC of jurisdiction - In cases of conflict,
over protests filed the judicial dept is the
e) EC is an independent entity only constitutional
created by Consti endowed with organ w/c can be
quasi-judicial function— called upon to
decisions are final and determine the proper
unappeallable allocation of powers
f) It is a constitutional creation between several
and is not an inferior tribunal departments and
g) Par 6 of Art 7 of TMD has an among the integral or
application to the case at bar constituent units
thereof
MARCH 13, 1936: case argued: issuance - But judiciary does not
of preliminary writ of prohibition against assert superiority,
the respondent EC was denied does not nullify or
MARCH 21, 1936- resolution of the court invalidate acts of
legislature but only
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED IN THE CASE asserts the solemn
AT BAR: and sacred obligation
1) Has the Supreme Court assigned to it by the
jurisdiction over the EC/ constitution
2) Has the EC acted without or in - JUDICIAL
excess of jurisdiction in SUPREMACY: power
assuming to take cognizance of of judicial review
the protest filed against the under the constitution
election of petitioner —limited to actual
notwithstanding previous
 cases and
controversies
PETITIONER’s VIEW:- confirmation
nullifies the power of the EC to entertain
protests against election returns and
disqualifications submitted after dec 3,
1935
RESPONDENT’S VIEW: EC has the sole
power of regulating its proceedings—Dec
9, 1935 resolution should be upheld
- Need for final arbiter
to determine conflict
of authority between
two agencies crested
by the Constitution
DECISION FOR ISSUE # 1: SC has
jurisdiction over EC and the subject
matter of controversy
( Constitutiona grants to EC the power of
being the sole judge to protests regarding
election returns, and qualifications of the
members of the NA)
DECISION FOR ISSUE #2: Sec 4 of Art
VI of Constitution (3 justices of Sc, 6 from
NA – 3 majority, 3 from that with second
largest number of votes); sole judge to all
contests….
 Original provision : Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902
—“Assembly shall be the judge
of elections, returns and
qualifications of its members”
HOW IT WAS CREATED: EC
 Subcommittee of 5 appointed
by Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees of constitutional
Convention (August 30,
1934)=== creation of a Tribunal
for Constitutional Security
(hear protests in Congress and
Exec officials-
elections)===Committee of
Constitutional Guarantees==
reduction of legislative reps
from 6 to 4 (sept 15, 1936)
Meanwhile:
 Committee on Legislative
Power (Sept 24, 1934)===
Electoral Commission (6 reps)
- Electoral commission
favored: modified by
the Sponsorship
Committee (adopt
unicameral rather
than bicameral
legislature)===
submitted to the
convention (Oct 26,
1934)
- Delegates Labrador
and Abordo: amend to
seek restoration of
peace and decide on
contests relating to
elections of NA- to
neutralize politics,
non-partisan
character of the
Commission
January 31, 1935: draft made for approval
 Transfer of power of
determining the election, return
and qualifications of the
members of the legislative long
lodged in the leg body to an
independent, impartial and non-
partisan tribunal
 Purpose was to transfer in
totality the powers previously
exercised by the legislative in
CONCLUSIONS
matters pertaining to contested
1) Government established by the
elections of its members to an
independent and impartial
tribunal
2) System of checks and balances
 The grant of power to the EC to
judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and
qualifications of members of NA
is intended to be as complete
and is unimpaired as if it has
remained originally in the
legislature
 Therefore: It cannot be that NA
may regulate the proceedings
of EC and cut off power of the
EC to lay down the period w/in
w/c protests should be filed
 The EC in such case would be
invested with power to
determine contested cases
involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the
members of the NA not subject
at all times to the regulative
power of NA
 This will lead to DUAL
AUTHORITY—clash of powers
from time to time
 EC has the power and authority
 Confirmation from the NA is not
needed or necessary—mere
certification from Prov board of
canvassers is sufficient to
entitle a member-elect to a seat
in the NA and renders him
eligible to any office in the said
budy
 Under the JONES LAW- each
house of the Phil leg fixed the
time when protests against
election should be filed but this
was repealed by the Consti
Consti following the theory of
separation of powers (L, E, J)
and the overlapping of functions
and duties make difficult the
delimitation of powers granted
3) Cases of conflict: the SC is the
final arbiter—only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries
4) JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:
judicial review on actual cases
and controversies—to see that
no branch or agency of
government transcends the
consti—source of all authority
5) EC is the sole judge of all
contests realting to election,
returns and qualifications of
members of NA
6) EC is an independent
constitutional creation w/
specific powers and functions
7) Under the prevailing organic
Law before the present consti—
legislature (each house) sole
judge to elections
8) Present consti has transferred
all these powers to EC
9) Such transfer of power was full,
clear and complete
10) EC creation’s purpose:
independent consti organ to
handle contests on elections of
NA members impartially and
with to reduce if not totally avoid
partisan politics
11) Sec 4 Art VI of Consti repealed
Sec 18 of Jones Law and Sec
478 Act 388 authorizing each
house to prescribe time and
manner of filing
protests/contests on elections
of member
12) Confirmation of NA is not
essential for discharging of
functions and duties
 13) Confirmation of NA does not
and cannot deprive the EC of its
incidental power to prescribe
the time w/in w/c protests
against election of any member
of NA should be filed
THEREFORE:
 EC was acting w/in the
legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua
against the election of petitioner
Jose Angara
 Resolution of NA dated Dec 3,
1935 cannot in any matter toll
the time of filing protests
against the election
DECISION:
The writ of prohibition against the EC is
hereby DENIED with costs against
petitioner.

CONCURRING OPINION
Abad Santos, J
- Power vested by
consti to EC judicial
in nature and purpose
of creation of EC was
not to erect a body
above the law but to
raise leg election
contests from the
layer of political to
justiciable decision
- Authority to prescribe
time for filing protest –
EC
- Dec 3, 1935 reso did
not ban EC from
taking cognizance of
the protest